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Dominions

No. 8.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Summary showing action taken on
the Resolutions of the Colonial
Conference of 1907, and on other
Matters affecting the self-govern-
ing Dominions.

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I.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT.

The first resolution of the Colonial Conference of 1907 recommended the establishment of a system, by which the several Governments represented on that Conference should be kept informed, between the periods of the Conferences, in regard to the matters which had been made the subjects of discussion, by means of a permanent Secretarial Staff, charged under the direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies with the duty of obtaining information for the use of the Conference, of attending to its resolutions, and of conducting correspondence on matters relating to its affairs.

In accordance with this resolution a re-organisation of the Colonial Office took place, the details of which were communicated by Lord Elgin to the Governors-General and Governors in a despatch of the 21st of September, 1907. Under this arrangement a separate branch of the Office was created in respect of the business of the Self-governing Colonies, and a permanent Secretariat established in connection with the Imperial Con-

ference. It was also proposed that in regard to matters of routine connected with the Conference, the Secretariat should correspond direct with Dominion Ministers, either under Flying Seal through the Secretary of State to the Governors, or through the High Commissioners or Agents-General.

The Government of the Transvaal expressed great gratification with the proposed alterations, and they laid stress on bringing the High Commissioners and the Agents-General of the Dominions into constant touch with the work of the Conference, on the ground that the permanent Secretariat to the Conference would thus have the advantage of consultation with experts in Dominion affairs who were in the confidence of their Governments, and that the Dominion Governments would thus receive communications from their advisers on the spot, and, without special reference to them and consequent loss of time, have their views on matters referred to them.

The Government of the Cape of Good Hope expressed appreciation at the promptitude with which effect had been given to the changes in the organisation of the Colonial Office and their desire to participate in every way. They suggested that a Conference should be held with the Agents-General, with a view to drawing up proposals for the establishment of their relations with the Secretariat to the Imperial Conference for subsequent consideration by the Governments concerned. Since the expression of these opinions a change has taken place in the Government of the Cape of Good Hope.

The Government of Natal expressed thanks for the information contained in the Circular Despatch of the 21st of September, and suggested that the Agent-General in London should be brought into close touch with the matters appertaining to the affairs of the Conference.

The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia pointed out that the proposals made did not, in their opinion, carry out the resolution agreed to at the Imperial Conference.

The Government of Newfoundland suggested that the new Secretariat might be used for keeping each Dominion informed of the laws from time to time enacted in any other Dominion, as well as in the United Kingdom.

No reply has yet been received from the Governments of Canada and New Zealand with regard to this question, although these Governments have been reminded that an expression of their views is awaited, while the Government of the Orange River Colony merely acknowledged receipt of the despatch sent.

II.

IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF AND SENDING OF DOMINION OFFICERS TO THE STAFF COLLEGE.

The third resolution of the Colonial Conference affirmed the need of developing for the

service of the Empire a General Staff, selected from the Forces of the Empire as a whole, which should study military science in all its branches, collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on common principles, and, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organisation of the Military Forces of the Crown in the various parts of the Empire.

On the 24th of December, 1907, the Governor-General of Canada forwarded a recommendation from his Government for the extension of the employment of selected officers of the Canadian Forces with His Majesty's regular troops. It was pointed out that in 1905 arrangements were approved for the exchange of Canadian officers, who had graduated at the Staff College, and Imperial Staff officers. During the visit of the Minister of Militia and Defence to London, in connection with the Colonial Conference, he had discussed with the Army Council the further possibility of executive commands, as well as Staff appointments, in the British Army being offered by the Army Council to Canadian officers who had acquitted themselves well in active service in the field, and had arranged with the Army Council for the exchange of executive officers. The appointments of Chief of the General Staff, Director of Operations and Staff Duties, Commander of the Royal Military College, and Staff Officer of the Maritime Provinces Command were already held by officers of the British Regular Army, so that ample fulfilment had been made of the pledge of reciprocity on the part of the Canadian Forces. It may be added that arrangements have been recently made for an extension of the service of Major-General Lake with the Canadian Forces as Chief of the Service Staff, and that he has been given a seat on the Militia Council.

The Army Council, in reply, heartily concurred in the view expressed by the Government of Canada, and stated that the Command of the 5th Infantry Brigade at Aldershot was available to be offered to Colonel Otter, C.B. Colonel Otter, however, was not actually able to accept the appointment.

The attention of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand and of the South African Colonies has also been called to the desirability of sending qualified officers each year to the Staff College in England, as a preliminary towards the formation of an Imperial General Staff.

The Commonwealth of Australia have sent to this country Major-General Hoad, in order to discuss with the War Office and with the Imperial Defence Committee various matters of importance, and in particular the question of the representation of Australia on a General Staff.

Similarly at the instance of the Canadian Government Sir F. Borden has discussed with the War Office the same question as affecting Canada.

The War Office have prepared a memorandum stating the principles on which the organisation of the General Staff and the preparation of a uniform defence scheme for the Empire should be based, and this memorandum has been communicated to the Dominions and has been laid before Parliament (Cd. 4475). The principles of the Memorandum has been accepted by the Government of the Dominion of Canada.

III.

JUDICIAL APPEALS.

The fifth resolution arrived at by the Colonial Conference on the subject of Judicial Appeals was to the effect

(1) That it is expedient that the practice and procedure of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should be definitely laid down in the form of a code of rules and regulations.

(2) That in the codification of the rules regard should be had to the necessity for the removal of anachronisms and anomalies, the possibility of the curtailment of expense, and the desirability of the establishment of courses of procedure which would minimise delays.

(3) That with a view to the extension of uniform rights of appeal to all Colonial subjects of His Majesty, the various Orders in Council, Instructions to Governors, Charters of Justice, Ordinances and Proclamations upon the subject of the appellate jurisdiction of the Sovereign should be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the desirability of equalising the conditions which give right of appeal to His Majesty.

(4) That much uncertainty, expense, and delay would be avoided if some portion of His Majesty's prerogative to grant special leave to appeal in cases where there exists no right of appeal were exercised under definite rules and restrictions by the Colonial Courts.

In accordance with this resolution a revised draft of rules regarding appeals has been drawn up by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and has been forwarded to the Colonial Governments in despatches of the 20th of August, 1908, for their consideration. The rules represent a codification of the rules which at present are in force, with simplifications on all possible points. The most important alteration is that it is suggested that every Colonial Court should be entitled to grant leave to appeal at its discretion from any judgment, whether final or interlocutory, if in the opinion of the Court the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its grave general or public importance or otherwise, ought to be submitted to His Majesty in Council for decision. This power will rest with the Court entirely, and will in all Possessions except Canada and Australia co-exist with the

right of appeal which will, as at present, exist in the case of final judgments of the Court where the matter of dispute on appeal amounts to, or is of the value of, a sum which varies in the several Colonies from £300 to £2,000—£500 being the most usual amount. This alteration will obviate the necessity which at present exists of obtaining special leave to appeal from the Privy Council, involving as a rule a double resort to the Privy Council with its attendant inevitable delay and expense. The rule will also permit of the granting of leave to appeal by the Court in criminal cases, involving points of law in which it is desired to obtain the decision of the Judicial Committee, whereas at present it is very difficult to obtain a decision of the Judicial Committee on any criminal case, as the Judicial Committee are most unwilling to grant special leave to appeal in such cases, in which the delay of the execution of the sentence of the Court below is usually most undesirable.

To save expense and delay it is also provided that a Colonial Court may permit an appellant, to whom final leave to appeal has been granted, to withdraw his appeal prior to the despatch of the record to England, a power which at present Colonial Courts do not appear to have, and that if an appellant, having obtained final leave to appeal, fails to show due diligence in taking the necessary steps for the purpose of procuring the despatch of the record to England, the respondent may, after giving the appellant due notice of his intended application, apply to the Court for a certificate that the appeal has not been effectually prosecuted by the appellant, and if the Court sees fit to grant such a certificate, the appeal shall be deemed as from the date of such certificate to stand dismissed for non-prosecution without express order of His Majesty in Council. Several of the Colonial Governments have pointed out that the matter dealt with by the latter rule is the cause of much of the delay in prosecuting appeals. Provision is also made that where at any time between the Order granting final leave to appeal and the despatch of the record to England, the record becomes defective by reason of the death or change of status of a party to the appeal, the Court may, notwithstanding the Order granting final leave to appeal, on an application made by any person interested, grant a certificate, showing who is the proper person to be substituted in place of, or in addition to, the party who has died, or undergone a change of status, and the name of such person shall thereupon be deemed to be so substituted, without express order of His Majesty in Council, thus obviating the expense and the delay of procuring a formal Order in Council.

Generally the rules are based on the assumption that the Court appealed from is the best qualified to deal with any questions that may arise in connection with the appeal up to the despatch of the record to England, and they

seek accordingly to invest the Court with all necessary powers for that purpose, especially in the cases when some time elapses between the final Order granting leave to appeal and the despatch of the record, when, in some cases, it has been held the Court has no power to take any steps that may be necessary to meet the altered circumstances.

In sending the draft rules to the Dominion Governments it was pointed out that the rules, after adaptation to local circumstances, could either be enacted by the Dominion Parliament, or might be issued in the form of a Order in Council. It was suggested that the latter form of procedure would probably be the more convenient, as permitting alterations to be made in the rules at the request of the Dominion Governments without the delay and trouble of procuring an amending Act of the local Parliament, but it was suggested that, whatever mode of procedure were adopted, a draft of the proposed legislation should be forwarded to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, for any observations they might desire to offer on the subject.

As yet two replies have been received to the despatches forwarding the draft rules. In both cases, those of South Australia and the Transvaal, the rules have been cordially approved and the Governments have requested that they should be brought into force by Order-in-Council. Steps for this purpose have accordingly been taken.

An Order-in-Council has also been issued approving new rules for procedure in England on appeals from the Dominions. These rules, which have been communicated to the Courts of the Dominions, simplify the procedure in this country with a view to diminishing the cost of appeals.

An Act, 8 Ed. VII. c. 51, to amend the law with respect to the Judicial Committee, passed in 1908, among other provisions, carried out a suggestion made at the Conference, that upon the hearing of an appeal from the Supreme Court of any self-governing Dominion, it should be possible for a Judge of the Court from which the appeal is being brought, to attend as an Assessor of the Judicial Committee. This Act added the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Courts of Newfoundland, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony to the Schedule of the Judicial Committee Amending Act of 1905, and also made provision for the resignation of any member of the Judicial Committee.

IV.

AUSTRALIAN PREFERENCE.

At the close of the Colonial Conference Mr. Deakin requested that the Australian Custom Tariff (British Preference) Bill of 1906 might remain reserved, as he proposed during the next session of the Commonwealth Parliament to obtain the assent of Parliament to a proposal

which would render the submission of that Bill for the Royal Assent unnecessary. The Bill has accordingly not been assented to, but under the Commonwealth Tariff Bill enacted by the Parliament in 1908, preferences of varying, but in many cases of substantial extent, are given upon British goods without any reservation as to the mode of importation.

V.

APPOINTMENT OF TRADE COMMISSIONERS IN THE DOMINIONS AND SUPPLY OF INFORMATION RESPECTING DOMINION LEGISLATION AFFECTING TRADE INTERESTS.

During the discussions of the Colonial Conference, it was pointed out by the Prime Minister of New Zealand that certain disadvantages accrued to British manufacturers owing to the lack of any commercial representatives in the Colonies. The main duty of the Consular representatives of foreign countries is to supply information for the use of foreign manufacturers, while the absence of consular representatives in the Colonies deprives British manufacturers of the assistance which their rivals have, and which they themselves obtain in foreign countries from British Consular representatives.

In view of the opinion expressed at the Conference, the Board of Trade proposed that in addition to local commercial correspondents in each of the principal industrial centres in the Colonies, commercial agents of standing and remuneration similar to those of Consuls-General should be appointed in each of the principal self-governing Colonies.

Similar suggestions were made by the Governments of Canada, of the Cape of Good Hope, and of the Commonwealth of Australia independently, and His Majesty's Government accordingly decided to make the proposed appointments with the concurrence of the Dominion Governments. Appointments have, therefore, been made of Trade Commissioners in Canada, in the Commonwealth of Australia, in New Zealand, and in South Africa, while in the case of Newfoundland an officer of the Colonial Government has been appointed as paid correspondent for that Colony. The duties of these officers will be to keep themselves in close touch with all the commercial developments of all the Dominions in question, to supply to the Board of Trade and to manufacturers in England information on all commercial questions, to supervise the work of the local commercial correspondents of the Board of Trade, and generally to afford the same sort of assistance to British manufacturers as is now given by the British Consuls in foreign countries. All the Dominion Governments have readily undertaken to co-operate with the Trade Commissioners, and to afford them such information as it may be possible to give them as to commercial legislation contemplated by the Governments.

VI.

COAST-WISE TRADE IN THE COLONIES AND
TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS DEPENDENCIES.

The tenth resolution of the Colonial Conference re-affirmed a resolution of 1902, calling the attention of the Governments of the Colonies and of the United Kingdom to the advisability of refusing the privileges of coast-wise trade to countries in which the corresponding trade is confined to vessels of their own nationality.

In accordance with the spirit of this resolution, the Government of Canada by an Order in Council of the 13th of January, 1908, has withdrawn from the vessels of Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Belgium, and the Argentine Republic, with effect from 1st January, 1909, the privilege of sharing in the coasting trade in the Dominion which these countries have hitherto enjoyed, thus reserving entirely to British ships the coast-wise trade of Canada.

It has, however, since been found necessary to pass an Act, giving the Governor-General in Council power to admit any defined classes of vessels to the coasting trade of Canada, on the ground, it is understood, that it may not be possible forthwith to replace the particular type of foreign (especially Norwegian) vessel now engaged in the coast-wise trade of Eastern Canada by British ships, and an Order-in-Council has been issued under the Act permitting within definite limits the engagement of certain classes of foreign vessels in the coasting trade up to 1911.

By the Navigation Bill now before the Parliament of the Commonwealth, all foreign vessels engaged in the coasting trade will be required to submit to the same conditions as those enforced upon British and Australian vessels, and the Governor-General in Council will be empowered to exclude altogether from the coasting trade, the vessels of those countries which do not admit British ships to the coasting trade.

It may be noted, however, that the United States Legislature has passed an Act, repealing the prohibition on foreign vessels from engaging in trade between the Philippine Islands and the United States, to which attention was called at the Colonial Conference of 1907. A similar Bill with regard to Hawaii is under the consideration of Congress, but it has not yet been passed.

VII.

TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

The eleventh resolution arrived at by the Colonial Conference on the subject of Treaty obligations was that the Imperial Government be requested to prepare, for the information of the Colonial Governments, statements showing privileges conferred and the obligations imposed on the Colonies by existing Commercial Treaties,

and that enquiries be instituted to ascertain how far it is possible to make these obligations and benefits uniform throughout the Empire. The desire of the Colonial Governments for further information as to the provisions of Treaties has been provided for in part by the publication of Blue Books containing the terms of Commercial Treaties with most-favoured-nation clauses, and by the publication of a special volume of Commercial Treaties which has been transmitted to the several Dominions, and which has also been published in this country.

The question of introducing uniformity into the stipulations contained in Commercial Treaties has also received consideration. After consultation with the Board of Trade a model draft Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was forwarded to the Governors-General and Governors of the Dominions on the 1st of August, 1907. On the whole the replies from the Dominion Governments were in favour of the adoption of the proposed form of Treaty.

The Government of the Dominion of Canada expressed satisfaction with the Treaty, but pointed out that several points would require further consideration in actual negotiations. The Government of Newfoundland considered that it might be desirable to divide the Treaty into the Heads "Commercial" and "Navigation," but concurred generally in the terms of the Treaty. At the same time they suggested that when negotiations were projected with any particular country with a view to arranging a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation each Colony should be notified and invited to express any views relating to the trade of that Colony with the country in question.

The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia suggested that it might be possible to obtain the right of separate adherence to each article of the model Treaty, but it was recognised that such a request could not be made as of right. The Government of New Zealand stated that they had no suggestions to offer with regard to the Draft Treaty of Commerce, but later suggested that the proposal of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia should be adopted.

The Government of the Cape of Good Hope stated that they considered that the draft articles submitted appeared to be as satisfactory as could well be devised for dealing with a complicated subject on general lines, and that the provisions of Articles 20 and 21, permitting separate adherence and withdrawal of a Dominion, would meet the requirements of the Cape. The Government of Natal reported that they were generally in favour of the terms of the draft Treaty, but offered criticisms on certain articles. The Government of the Transvaal were of opinion that there were serious difficulties in the way of accepting as applicable to the Transvaal the provisions of the draft Treaty of Commerce and

Navigation, as Articles 1 to 3 conflicted with the existing legislation in the Transvaal affecting coloured persons and Asiatics, Article 5 conflicted with the special agreement regarding freedom from all duty of the produce and manufactures of the Province of Mosambique, while Articles 10 to 17 referred to matters of navigation. But they consider that Articles 20 and 21 removed any difficulties from the position by leaving it open to the Transvaal Government to adhere or not to Treatise.

The Government of the Orange River Colony considered that it would not be possible, for reasons similar to those given by the Government of the Transvaal, for the Orange River Colony to adhere to a Treaty on the basis of the model draft, but that paragraphs 20 and 21 would appear sufficient to safeguard the position of the Colony.

After full consideration of the replies from the Dominion Governments, His Majesty's Government, in a despatch of the 22nd of May, 1908, decided that it was not possible to revise the terms of the draft Treaty so as to obviate all possible objections, but that clauses 20 and 21 of the draft adequately safeguarded the interests of the Dominions. The suggestion of the Government of the Commonwealth was considered not to be practicable. At the same time, His Majesty's Government intimated that when negotiations were projected with any particular country, the Government of each Dominion should, where time and circumstance permitted, be notified of the fact, and be invited to express any views which it might desire to offer relating to the trade of that Dominion with the country concerned, and this rule has been followed in the case of the commercial negotiations with Guatemala and Salvador.

In reply to Lord Crewe's despatch of 22nd May, the Commonwealth Government have replied that they have no objection to the draft Treaty on the understanding that the Commonwealth could not be a party to any Treaty which would hamper its action in dealing with such subjects as the differential treatment of British or Australian shipping, reciprocity with other countries, and restrictions on immigration.

VIII.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE DOMINIONS FROM VARIOUS TREATIES.

In accordance with the eleventh resolution of the Colonial Conference, steps have also been taken as far as possible to revise the existing Commercial Treaties with Foreign Powers, so as to secure to the Dominion Governments the power of separate withdrawal from Treaties which might fetter the freedom of action. This concession has been obtained from the Government of Paraguay in respect of the Commercial

Treaty of 1884; from the Government of Egypt in respect of the Commercial Convention of 1889; and from the Government of Liberia in respect of the Treaty of 1848. A similar proposal was made to the Government of Salvador in respect of the Treaty of 1862, but that Government thereupon gave notice of the termination of that Treaty, and a fresh Treaty is being negotiated, which, like all recent Treaties, will include the right of separate adherence and withdrawal. Negotiations are also under consideration with the other Powers with which His Majesty's Government have Commercial Treaties, and which do not contain clauses of separate withdrawal by the Dominion Governments.

IX.

UNIFORMITY OF TRADE MARKS AND PATENTS.

The thirteenth resolution of the Colonial Conference declared that "it is desirable that His Majesty's Government after full consultation with the Self-governing Dominions should endeavour to provide for such uniformity as may be practicable in the granting and protection of Trade Marks and Patents."

In accordance with this resolution the Patents Memorandum presented to the Colonial Conference (Printed at pages 507 to 520 of Cd. 3524) has been brought up to date, and a similar Memorandum as to Trade Marks has been prepared. Both these Memoranda have been forwarded to the Dominion Governments with a suggestion that those Governments should consider how far it is possible to assimilate the Dominions legislation to that in force in the United Kingdom, special attention being shown in each case to the differences at present existing between the two sets of laws.

X.

UNIFORMITY IN TRADE STATISTICS.

The fourteenth resolution of the Colonial Conference declared that "it is desirable, so far as circumstances permit, to secure greater uniformity in the Trade Statistics of the Empire, and that the note prepared on this subject by the Imperial Government be commended to the consideration of the various Governments represented at the Conference."

This Resolution, and the note referred to, were brought to the notice of the Governors-General and Governors, in a despatch of the 30th of July, 1907. The replies received up to 14th December were forwarded to the Dominion Governments in a despatch of that date.

The Government of Canada, in a reply received after the despatch of that circular, pointed out that it would not be possible on grounds of convenience to adopt the calendar year as a

basis of compilation; that save in the case of imports enjoying the preferential tariff accurate information as to country of origin could not be obtained, nor could such information be obtained as to exports; that the classification of articles was already very detailed; and that it was not practicable to arrange articles in main groups distinguishing trade with the United Kingdom, British Possessions, and foreign countries.

The Government of Newfoundland pointed out that in order to bring their statistics into uniformity with those of the United Kingdom, it would be necessary to alter the arrangements now in force including the financial year, and the mode of entering goods, which could not take place until a new Revenue Act was passed, and that in the meantime the statistical staff was too small to admit of a second compilation on a different form to the earlier returns.

The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia replied that quantities and values of goods imported would in future publications of the trade reports of the Commonwealth be shown against the particular countries of origin in all cases where quantity is now recorded, the values only having hitherto been shown in relation to the country of origin. The question of extending the record of quantity to a larger number of items was also to receive consideration; the list is already exhaustive but does not distinguish linen and cotton "piece-goods."

In South Africa the question has been discussed by the Principal of the South African Customs Statistical Bureau on behalf of the Colonial Governments with the Board of Trade and certain suggestions have been made to the South African Governments for the improvement of the method of collecting information.

The Government of New Zealand were ready to carry out the suggestions of the Board of Trade as to a return of articles in summary groups to show trade with the United Kingdom, British Possessions and foreign countries, if Canada and Australia also agreed to do so. To give the country of origin save in the case of goods liable to surtax would be merely to give inexact and unreliable information.

XI.

UNIFORMITY IN COMPANY LAW.

The fifteenth resolution arrived at by the Colonial Conference on the subject of uniformity in Company Law declared that "it is desirable, so far as circumstances permit, to secure greater uniformity in the Company Laws of the Empire, and that the memorandum and analysis prepared on this subject by the Imperial Government be recommended to the consideration of the various Governments represented at this Conference."

This resolution was brought to the notice of the Governments of the Dominions in a despatch

of the 31st of July, 1907. The resolution was also communicated to the Australian States, as the Commonwealth Government has not hitherto exercised its power of legislation with regard to trading companies.

The Governments of the Australian States replied that they did not propose to take any action under the resolution, as they understood that the Commonwealth Government intended to legislate on the subject, while the Commonwealth Government replied that a Bill was being drafted by their Law Advisers, and would be introduced into Parliament in the session of 1908-9. The Governments of the South African Colonies replied that they were in sympathy with obtaining uniformity in the Company Laws of the Empire, and that the matter had for some time been under their consideration, and they hoped to be able to deal with it in a practical manner at some not very distant date. It is understood, however, that the matter will stand over for consideration in the event of federation.

The Government of New Zealand expressed readiness to consider amendment of its company legislation for the sake of uniformity with Imperial legislation.

The Government of the Dominion of Canada reported that the papers laid before the Colonial Conference in 1907 were being transmitted to the Lieutenant-Governors of the several Provinces and the Commissioner of the Yukon Territory with a request that they might receive consideration at the hands of the Provincial Governments at the very earliest opportunity.

In a despatch of the 22nd of May, 1908, the Secretary of State forwarded to the Governors-General and Governors copies of the draft Bill to consolidate the Company Laws of the United Kingdom which was then before the Imperial Parliament, and which it was hoped might serve to indicate the nature of the steps to be taken to secure similarity in Company legislation. The Bill has since become law as Act 8 Ed. vii. c. 69, and copies have been sent to the Governments of the Dominions and States.

A substantial privilege is conceded by this Act (consolidating a short Act passed in the same session) to all Companies registered in the Dominions, as the requirements of a licence or mortmain, costing about £70 on each occasion, for the holding of land by such Companies is repealed, and as regards the holding of land the Companies are placed on the same footing as Companies registered in the United Kingdom.

XII.

RECIPROCITY IN ADMISSION OF SURVEYORS TO PRACTICE.

The question of the admission of Surveyors to practice was discussed during the Colonial

Conference, and a Memorandum was drawn up by the Council of the Surveyors' Institute, which was laid before the Conference, on the subject of the proposal to establish reciprocity between the several parts of the British Empire in matters connected with the examination and authorisation of Surveyors. The sixteenth resolution of the Conference recommended the resolution to the consideration of the Colonial Governments.

On the 8th of April, 1908, a despatch was sent to the Dominion Governments, requesting copies of the syllabus of examination recognised by those Governments for the information of the Surveyors' Institute. These copies have been received and transmitted to the Institute, which has submitted a memorandum dealing with the matter for communication to the several Governments.

XIII.

NATURALISATION.

The nineteenth resolution arrived at by the Colonial Conference on the subject of naturalisation was that, with a view to obtain uniformity as far as practicable, an enquiry should be held to consider further the question of naturalisation, and in particular to consider how far, and under what conditions, naturalisation in one part of His Majesty's Dominions should be effective in other parts of those Dominions, a subsidiary Conference to be held if necessary under the terms of the resolution adopted by the Conference on the 20th of April.

In accordance with the resolution an Inter-departmental Committee was appointed by His Majesty's Government to discuss the terms of the draft Naturalisation Bill. This Committee consisted of Sir M. D. Chalmers, K.C.B., C.S.I., representing the Home Office, who acted as chairman; Mr. W. R. D. Maycock, C.M.G., Superintendent of the Treaty Department of the Foreign Office, representing the Foreign Office; Mr. S. G. Sale, Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State for India in Council, representing the India Office; Mr. H. W. Just, C.B., C.M.G., the Secretary to the Imperial Conference, representing the Colonial Office; and Mr. W. A. Robinson, of the Colonial Office, as Secretary. Various amendments were proposed in the Bill and a memorandum on the subject of these amendments was drawn up which was sent to the Governments of the Dominions on the 9th November, 1908, with a request that they will request their High Commissioners and Agents-General or other representatives in this country to confer with the Secretary to the Imperial Conference and the nominees of the other offices, with the object of arriving at a general agreement on the subject of naturalisation, which could then be carried into effect by Imperial and Colonial legislation.

XIV.

NAVAL DEFENCES—AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

During the Colonial Conference, Mr. Deakin discussed with Lord Tweedmouth and the heads of the Admiralty the question of Australian Naval Defence. On the 16th of October, 1907, he addressed to the Governor-General a despatch explaining the views of the Commonwealth Government in this matter. In that despatch the suggestion was pressed that instead of a contribution of money, the share of the duty of the Naval Defence undertaken by Australia should take the form of a contribution of Australian seamen.

The proposal then made by Mr. Deakin was to substitute for the present Commonwealth subsidy 1,000 seamen—Australians if possible—to be paid by the Commonwealth, for service in the Navy on the station, at an estimated cost of about £100,000 per annum to the Commonwealth, the remainder of the subsidy to be applied by the Commonwealth to obtaining submarines or destroyers, or similar local defences.

At the same time, two cruisers of P. or a superior class, manned by 400 of the 1,000 Australians, should be retained on the coast in peace or war.

In addition, the Commonwealth would provide in 1907 £250,000 for harbour and coast defences, and £50,000 for the fortification of harbours.

The Admiralty, in reply, pointed out that at the Colonial Conference, no proposal had been made for the permanent retention of cruisers in Australian waters, and that while anxious to meet the wishes of Mr. Deakin, they were not prepared to depart from the decision taken up at the Conference, that while they did not themselves propose to cancel the agreement with Australia and New Zealand, yet if the Commonwealth Government desired to cancel the agreement and to substitute other arrangements, they were willing to advise and assist in carrying out a scheme for local defences, always provided that such a scheme did not involve a definite obligation to maintain British vessels permanently in Australian waters. They also regarded it as essential that complete control by the Commander-in-Chief over the local forces in time of war must be secured to the Imperial Government.

After further correspondence, Mr. Deakin requested that the Admiralty should draw up a scheme to provide for the utilisation of Australian seamen in local defences and for the connection of the Australian Flotilla with His Majesty's Fleets of War. This scheme was forwarded to Australia in August last, and is now under the consideration of the Parliament of the Commonwealth. It is based on the principle that the Commonwealth Government shall provide and

maintain nine submarines and six destroyers in Australian waters; that this flotilla shall be manned by officers and men of the Royal Navy, as many as possible of whom shall be men recruited for the Royal Navy in Australia; that the officers and men shall serve under the King's Regulations for the Navy, but that the direction of the fleet shall be entrusted to the Minister of Marine of the Commonwealth, who shall control the fleet so long as it remains in Australian waters or while passing from one point to another point of Australian territory, including Papua. If passing beyond Australian waters, the fleet shall fall under the control of the Senior Naval Officer, but by arrangement with the Commander-in-Chief it will be possible to despatch the fleet on training cruises.

The estimated total annual cost is just under £350,000 while the capital cost is estimated at £1,277,000.

It would be understood that in time of war, the fleet would be placed by the Commonwealth Government under the control of the Commander-in-Chief.

This scheme, full details of which are given in the Parliamentary Paper [Cd. 4325], is understood still to be engaging the earnest attention of the Commonwealth Government.

The Government of New Zealand have decided to increase the subsidy to the Squadron on the present basis to £100,000 a year from the 1st of October, 1908, and this proposal has been approved by the Dominion Parliament. Recognising how important it is for the protection of the Empire that the Navy should be at the absolute disposal of the Admiralty, the Dominion Government do not desire to suggest any conditions as to the location of the ships, as they are confident that the truest interests of the people of New Zealand will be best served by having a powerful navy under the constant control of the Admiralty.

XV.

NAVAL AND MILITARY DEFENCES—CAPE AND NATAL.

During the presence of the Cape Ministers in this country at the Colonial Conference, the Admiralty discussed with them the draft of the Bill for the establishment of the Cape Naval Volunteers as a division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

A Bill was accordingly introduced into the Cape Parliament, but owing to the dissolution of the Parliament, it was found impossible to get the Bill through in 1907. Nevertheless the Admiralty placed at the disposal of the Naval Volunteers at the Cape at Simonstown, the vessel "Odin" for the purpose of their training.

In 1908 the new Government stated that they were prepared to re-introduce the Naval

Volunteers Bill, provided the Admiralty did not object to the cost of the maintenance of the force, in addition to the cost of the up-keep of the vessel, being defrayed from the £50,000 paid as a naval contribution. The Admiralty concurred in this arrangement in view of the existing depression in the finances of the Colony. Under this arrangement, while the Admiralty do not undertake direct responsibility for the Administration of the Naval Volunteers as a Colonial division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, they are prepared to co-operate by affording such assistance in regard to training afloat, inspection and general supervision, as the circumstances of the Navy permit. Accordingly an Act, No. 14 of 1908, has been passed by the Cape Parliament which provides for the establishment in the Cape of a Branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve established under the Imperial Act of 1903. While on active service or on the books of his Majesty's vessels for training, the Volunteers fall under the Imperial rules for naval discipline. They are also liable to serve as Volunteers on land under the Cape Colonial Forces Act, 1892. The question of the arrangements as to the reorganisation of the forces and the inclusion in it of the Woodstock Naval Cadets has been considered by a Board appointed by the Colonial Government and presided over by the Captain of His Majesty's ship "Hermes," and the recommendations of that Board are under the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. It is estimated that the annual cost will be about £4,300, which will be deducted from the annual subsidy of £50,000 now paid to naval funds.

A similar arrangement has been made with the Government of Natal, and the Parliament of that Colony passed an Act in 1907 to permit of the enrolment of a force of Naval Volunteers, the cost of which will be defrayed from the contribution of £35,000 annually to the Imperial Navy, provided for in 1903.

The details of the arrangement, however, are still under consideration. Meanwhile steps are to be taken by Imperial legislation to define more clearly the position of the proposed forces in Natal and the Cape.

XVI.

PROFITS ON SILVER CURRENCY AND DECIMAL COINAGE.

At the Colonial Conference it was agreed that the Imperial Government should redeem worn gold coin at each of the Australian mints on the same terms as those on which such coins are redeemed in London. After the conclusion of the Conference, correspondence passed between the Imperial Government and the Government of the Commonwealth, with the result that it has been

arranged that His Majesty's Government will gradually redeem all British token coin at its face value, if and when the Australian Government decide to establish its own subsidiary coinage, provided that the amount withdrawn in any one year, in addition to worn coin which is withdrawn under existing arrangements, shall not exceed the face value of £100,000. The Commonwealth Government is to arrange the method of withdrawal and the silver is to be paid for at its nominal value at the branch mints. With regard to the issue of the new Australian silver coinage, a similar procedure is contemplated as that adopted by the Dominion of Canada. The representative of the Commonwealth Government in London will inform the Royal Mint of the amount of coinage required, and on the requisition of the Royal Mint will purchase the necessary silver bullion. The Royal Mint will then manufacture the coin, at the cost of the Commonwealth Government, which will make arrangements for the conveyance of the coin to Australia.

An Order in Council has also been issued, providing for the exchange of light gold coin at the Sydney and Melbourne branches of the Royal Mint.

XVII.

STAMP DUTIES UPON DOMINION SECURITIES.

At the Conference of Premiers and Ministers of the Australian States held at Melbourne in 1908 a resolution was passed to the effect that it was desirable that stamp duties upon the issue of all Colonial Government securities should be abolished by the Imperial and all Colonial Governments. This resolution was brought by the Government of New South Wales to the notice of the Imperial Government, but after the most exhaustive consideration of the question in all its aspects by the Treasury and the Colonial Office it has not been found possible to meet the views of the State Governments. It has been explained to the Dominion and State Governments in a despatch of the 13th of November, 1908, that it is a mistake to regard these duties as a case of taxation of the Crown by the Crown. The stamp duties are not, as a matter of fact, levied upon the issue of Government securities, but they represent a composition for the duties payable by holders of the stock upon transfer from one holder to another. It is quite open to any Colonial Government to issue stock without compounding for the duties, and similar duties are levied upon the issue of all municipal stocks in this country. To remit these duties would therefore be merely for the Crown to transfer revenues properly receivable by the Imperial Government from persons resident in the United Kingdom to the Crown in the Dominions.

XVIII.

COPYRIGHT.

Since the date of the Colonial Conference replies have been received from the various Governments as to their views on the subject of the proposed insertion in the Imperial Copyright Bill of certain clauses applying to the British Possessions.

The Government of Natal objected to the proposed clauses as curtailing the power of legislation already possessed by the Colonial Parliament. The Government of the Cape of Good Hope were of the opinion that the draft clauses satisfied the main objections which were originally submitted.

The Governments of Newfoundland and of New Zealand concurred in the proposed clauses.

The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia considered that the proposed clauses might be read as restricting the powers of the Commonwealth to legislate with regard to copyright in works produced outside Australia.

In view of the objections raised by the various Dominion Governments, His Majesty's Government decided that it would be better to postpone any attempt to deal comprehensively with copyright and to leave untouched the sections of the Act of 1842 and 1886 which applied to the Colonies. As there were certain specific points on which an amendment of the law had long been necessary, and as it seemed impracticable to obtain the consent of all the Dominions to any Imperial Bill affecting copyright within their jurisdiction, it has been suggested in despatches of the 2nd and 3rd September, 1908, to the Dominion Governments that an endeavour should be made by means of a subsidiary Conference to arrange for concurrent legislation by the Dominion and the Imperial Parliaments.

At the Berlin Conference of 1908 His Majesty's Government explained that the agreements arrived at there could not be accepted finally by them unless and until they obtained the concurrence of the Dominion Governments to the proposed alterations in the existing conventions. The decisions of that Conference are now being examined by His Majesty's Government.

XIX.

IMPORTATION OF LIVE CATTLE FROM CANADA.

At the Colonial Conference Sir Wilfrid Laurier drew attention to the view of His Majesty's Government regarding the prohibition of the importation of live cattle from Canada into the United Kingdom. The question has accordingly received the most careful consideration by the Board of Agriculture, but it has not been found possible to alter the existing rules on the subject.

The Board of Agriculture pointed out in a letter of the 8th of July, 1907, which was communicated to the Government of Canada, that the existing requirements for the slaughtering of cattle has, in the case of the Argentina, proved no obstacle to the development and maintenance of a large and valuable trade, and that the same remark applied to the United States and also to Canada. The rule applied not merely to all foreign countries, but also to Australia and New Zealand, and was a sanitary law of universal application and of great importance to stock owners at home as a valuable safeguard against the introduction of disease, and yet was not inconsistent with the transaction of a large and growing trade. The necessity of maintaining the freedom of Great Britain from disease was such as to render it impossible to give up any of the precautions which had hitherto been found necessary. The necessity of precautions has been emphasised by the recent outbreak of disease in cattle in the United States in close proximity to the Canadian boundary, though the spread of the disease to this country has so far been avoided by the prompt measures of precaution taken at the suggestion of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries by the Canadian Government.

XX.

RADIO-TELEGRAPHIC CONVENTION OF 1906.

In a despatch of the 31st of July, 1907, the Secretary of State informed the Dominions that His Majesty's Government had decided to ratify the Radio-Telegraphic Convention, and enquired whether the Dominion Governments desired to adhere to it. It was pointed out that, under the Convention, in future Conferences the British Empire would be able to obtain the same amount of representation as under the Postal Union.

The Governments of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and New Zealand decided to adhere to the Convention. The Government of Newfoundland decided not to adhere at present, but stated that they would watch with interest the development of the principle involved in the Convention.

The Governments of the Cape of Good Hope, of Natal, and the Transvaal decided to adhere, but the Government of the Orange River Colony, as an inland Colony, decided not to adhere at present.

The ratification of the Radio-Telegraphic Convention accordingly took place on the 1st of July, 1908, when adhesion was notified on behalf of the adhering Dominions. At the same time, notification was made that the Dominions which adhered to the Convention—like the Imperial Government—reserved the right referred to in Article 2 of the final protocol of exempting certain coast stations from the obligations of inter-communication.

In notifying the adhesion, the Secretary of State suggested that a vote should be claimed in due course on behalf of the South African Colonies as a whole, rather than on behalf of the two maritime Colonies only, although in actual practice the exercise of the vote would presumably be governed by the wishes of the maritime Colonies. It has also been suggested that the Colonies should unite in paying one subscription to the Bureau.

XXI.

VOTING OF DOMINIONS AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES.

The question of the voting powers of the Dominions at International Conferences was discussed at the Colonial Conference, not as a general question but in connection with the Radio-Telegraphic Convention. Under that Convention His Majesty's Government secured the possibility of obtaining at future Conferences, if a sufficient number of Dominions adhered, probably the same number of votes as is accorded to the British Empire under the Postal Union Convention of Rome, namely, six.

It was originally proposed at the Conference on electrical units and standards held in London in October, 1908, that every State should have a vote without regard to the number of its delegates, the British Dominions beyond the Seas to be on the same footing as other States. The German Government, however, objected to this proposal; they considered that on mainly scientific questions it was not fair that countries like Natal, Newfoundland, or even New Zealand, should be on the same footing as the great European Powers. They therefore considered that they were entitled to demand that only one vote should be given to the British Empire, including all the British Possessions, but they were prepared to agree to a vote being given both to India and Australia in addition to Canada. This proposal was accepted by His Majesty's Government, but only in view of the fact that Natal, Newfoundland, and New Zealand had decided not to send delegates, and that the Cape of Good Hope had requested to be represented by the British delegate.

XXII.

MARRIAGE FACILITIES.

The question of the existing facilities for marriage between British subjects dwelling in the Colonies and British subjects resident in the United Kingdom was laid before the Colonial Conference, but was not discussed owing to want of time and the number of other matters before the Conference.

The Secretary of State accordingly forwarded in a despatch of the 20th of June, 1907, to the

Governors-General and Governors a memorandum which had been drawn up by the Registrar-General dealing with this question, and the draft of a Bill indicating the lines on which it was suggested that legislation should be proceeded with to provide for improved facilities.

In this memorandum it was pointed out that there was need for further facilities for marriage in cases where one of the parties to the intended marriage resided in the United Kingdom and the other in a British Colony.

In England a civil marriage by certificate involves the residence by both parties seven days before notice can be given, and an interval of twenty-one complete days must intervene after the date of the notice before the marriage.

A civil marriage by a licence involved a residence of fifteen days by one party before the notice, and one week day must intervene after the notice and before the marriage; in this case residence in England on the date when the notice was given was all that was required of the other party.

The prime object of giving notice of marriage was to allow of any proper legal objection being taken before the marriage was solemnized, and it was clear that if this public notice was to be of real value it must be given in the place where the person concerned had usually resided.

Under the present system there was no provision by which notice of an intended marriage in any Dominion could be given in this country, nor by which notice of an intended marriage in this country could be given in any of the Dominions.

It was proposed in the draft Bill to enact that in the case of an intended marriage in England between a British subject dwelling in England and a British subject dwelling in a British Colony, in which notice of marriage could be given or banns published and a certificate issued by an authorised officer stating that all legal requirements had been complied with in accordance with the laws and regulations in such Colony, it should be lawful for such certificate to be accepted as authority for the marriage, by the person whose duty it was to register the marriage, in respect of the party dwelling in the Colony, in the same manner as if it had been a certificate issued by the Superintendent Registrar of another district in England. Similarly when the necessary arrangements had been made in a British Colony by Statute or otherwise, it should be lawful in the case of an intended marriage in a British Colony between a British subject dwelling in such Colony and a British subject dwelling in England for the party in England to give notice of marriage in the same manner as if that party were about to be married in England, and that the Superintendent Registrar should accept the notice and

issue a certificate which should be accepted in the Colony as an authority for the marriage in respect of the party dwelling in England.

The Governments of the Canadian Provinces, which have the power to legislate as to the performance of marriage, are divided in opinion as to the need for the proposed Act. The Provinces of Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, appear on the whole to be opposed to legislation; those of Quebec, Prince Edward Island, British Columbia, and Alberta, seem to have no objection. No reply has been received from the Government of Newfoundland.

The Government of the Commonwealth stated that they considered that no additional facilities for marriage were at present necessary in Australia. They considered it very undesirable that the Parliament of Great Britain should legislate with respect to marriages in Australia, as all necessary facilities could be provided by local legislation. They suggested, however, that if the Bill were considered necessary to provide increased facilities for marriages in England, where one of the parties was domiciled in a British Colony, such facilities might perhaps be extended to cases where both parties to an intended marriage in England were domiciled in British Colonies.

The Government of New South Wales reported that they had no objection to the terms of the draft Bill. The Government of Victoria stated that no further facilities were required in that State, as a person could be married in Victoria by a clergyman upon the day of arrival, or by the Government Statist, or by a Registrar, upon giving three days' notice. The Government of Queensland did not raise any objection to the proposed legislation, but pointed out that no notice or certificate of any kind was required before marriages could be celebrated in Queensland, and that, therefore, the Act would have little practical effect so far as it applied to the State. The Government of South Australia considered that no necessity existed for legislation increasing the facilities for marriages in the State, as no length of residence was required before a marriage took place. The Government of Tasmania replied that the legislation was not necessary as far as it affected Tasmania. The Government of Western Australia were of the same opinion as regards that State.

The Government of the Cape of Good Hope pointed out that the Colonial law already allowed ministers of religion to accept certificates of publication of banns outside the Colony, which certificates dispensed with the necessity of publishing banns within the Colony. This permission, however, is of no value in the case of persons other than members of the Established Church of England. The Government of Natal were of opinion that the present facilities

for marriage were adequate, and there was no necessity for the introduction of the proposed legislation as far as it concerned Natal. The Government of the Transvaal had no objection to the proposed legislation, while the Government of the Orange River Colony were in favour of such legislation.

In view of the divergence of opinion on the subject and of the fact that Imperial legislation could only be justified by a consensus among all the Dominions and States, it appears impossible to proceed with the Draft Bill as it stands. It has now been suggested, on the part of the Registrar General, that it would be desirable to pass a short Act, merely providing for the acceptance in this country of certificates issued in the Dominions, and for the issue in this country for use in such Dominions as would recognise them, on the understanding that an Order-in-Council would be issued in each case where a Dominion made provision for the issue of such certificates or their acceptance.

19th February, 1909.

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Printed for the use of the Imperial Conference Secretariat.

Dominions

No. 9.

Confidential.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

[March 1908 to December 1909.]

RELATING TO

MERCHANT SHIPPING LEGISLATION IN THE DOMINIONS.

(In continuation of [Cd. 4355] October, 1908 ; continued by Dominions No. 18.)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT,
April, 1910.

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Serial No.	From or to whom.	Dominion & Despatch No.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1908.		
1	Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	Canada	March 18	Forwards copy of a cablegram received by a leading Shipping Insurance Association in London acquainting them of the introduction into the Canadian Parliament of Bill to restrict shipowners' contract rights in regard to bills of lading; deprecates legislation on such subjects and asks that the Governor-General may be requested to furnish particulars of the proposed legislation and that the Colonial Office will use its influence to prevent the Bill from being passed into law.	1
2	Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association.	Canada	March 20	Draws attention to the introduction into the Canadian Parliament of a Bill dealing with the question of the carriage of goods by sea, and asks that the attention of the Canadian Government may be directed to the inadvisability of passing legislation which will make the law different in England and the Colonies.	2
3	To the Governor-General.	Canada, 150.	March 21	Transmits copy of No. 1 and asks to be furnished with information as to the legislation stated to be contemplated.	2
4	To the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	Canada	March 21	Explains that Lord Crewe has no information concerning the legislation said to be in contemplation, but that a copy of No. 1 will be sent to the Governor-General with a request for a report.	2
5*	Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	—	March 23	Forwards copy of a Resolution to the effect that Australian and other Colonial legislation affecting British ships owned in the United Kingdom not engaged in the coastal trade should not impose upon such ships any restrictions beyond those imposed by the British Merchant Shipping Acts.	3
6	To the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association.	Canada	March 27	States, in reply to No. 2, that Lord Crewe is in communication with the Governor-General of Canada on the subject of the proposed Dominion legislation.	3
7*	To the Governors-General and Governor.	Australia 110, Canada 175, New Zealand 54.	April 2	Transmits copy of No. 1; and expresses the concurrence of His Majesty's Government in the views of the Chamber expressed therein.	3

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Dominion & Despatch No.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1908.		
8	Board of Trade ...	Canada	May 18	States that the Board have had under consideration the Bill to regulate the terms of bills of lading entered into in Canada; and that they adhere to the views already expressed with regard to similar provisions in the Fiji Ordinance; forwards copies of letters received from the Chamber of Shipping and the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, and suggests that copies of these should be sent to the Canadian Government.	3
9	Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	Canada	June 3	Points out the one-sided character of the "Water Carriage of Goods Bill, 1908"; and expresses the hope that the Canadian Parliament will hesitate before passing it.	5
10	To the Governor-General.	Canada, 312.	June 3	States that copies of the Water Carriage of Goods Bill have been sent to the Board of Trade; transmits copy of enclosures in No. 8; His Majesty's Government consider that to some extent the objections raised by the shipowners are well founded; suggests that Ministers should introduce a Bill of their own on the lines indicated; and offers the assistance of His Majesty's Government.	7
11	To the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	Canada	June 6	Transmits copy of the Canadian Bill regarding the ocean carriage of goods as amended by the Senate; observes that their objections to the Bill have been partly met, but that a copy of No. 9 will be sent to the Governor-General.	8
12	To Board of Trade	Canada	June 6	Transmits copy of the Canada Water Carriage of Goods Bill as amended by the Senate; and copies of Nos. 9, 10, and 11.	8
13	To the Governor-General.	Canada, 320.	June 6	Transmits copies of Nos. 9 and 11 ...	9
14*	The Governor-General.	Canada, 249.	May 30 (Rec. June 15.)	Forwards copy of an approved Minute of the Privy Council giving particulars of the only restriction to which ships referred to in No. 5 are liable in Canada.	9
15	Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	Canada	June 15	Points out that the Canadian Constitution differs from the Australian in that the Imperial Government has not conferred upon the Dominion the power to legislate on shipping and navigation with other countries.	9
16	To the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	Canada	June 22	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 15; states that Lord Crewe is not disposed to accept the views of the Chamber of the powers of the Parliament either of the Commonwealth of Australia or of the Dominion of Canada; and does not propose to forward the letter to Canada.	10

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			1908.		
17*	The Governor-General.	Australia, 162.	June 17 (Rec. July 20.)	Transmits copy of a despatch from the Prime Minister commenting on the Board of Trade memoranda on the provisions of the Australian Navigation Bill.	10
18*	The Governor ...	New Zealand, 48.	June 22 (Rec. Aug. 4.)	States in reply to No. 7 that Ministers are not prepared to promise that legislation of the nature objected to will not be initiated by the New Zealand Government.	10
19	To Board of Trade..	New Zealand.	August 26	Transmits the draft of a despatch to the Governor of New Zealand in reply to No. 18 and expresses opinion that no time should be lost in intimating to the Government of New Zealand that His Majesty's Government do not admit that the Dominion Government can legislate for intercolonial trade for vessels not registered in the Dominion and not engaged in the coasting trade.	11
20	Ditto	Canada	September 2	Transmits a copy of the Shipping Act Amendment Act; suggests that it would be desirable to point out to the Government of Canada that a doubt exists as to its validity and that it would be desirable to validate it by passing a Confirming Act; and asks for the views of the Board of Trade.	11
21*	To the Governor ...	New Zealand, 151.	September 3	Presumes that New Zealand Ministers do not desire to depart from the 9th Resolution of the Merchant Shipping Conference of 1907, in which Sir Joseph Ward concurred, and suggests that if in their opinion fresh legislation becomes necessary, it should be determined upon by mutual agreement, and passed by the Imperial Parliament.	12
22*	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 308.	September 3	Transmits copies of Nos. 18 and 21, and trusts that Commonwealth Ministers will concur in thinking that such legislation should be determined upon by mutual agreement between the Governments concerned, and should be passed by the Imperial Parliament.	12
23	To Board of Trade..	New Zealand.	September 8	Transmits copy of a Bill introduced into the Parliament of New Zealand to provide for workers' compensation; points out that the Bill appears to be of doubtful validity in so far as it affects vessels other than those registered in New Zealand or engaged in the coasting trade; and asks for the observations of the Board of Trade.	12
24*	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 326.	September 18	Conveys a full explanation of the views of His Majesty's Government on the points on which they are at issue with the Government of the Commonwealth.	13

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			1908.		
25	The Earl of Crewe to the Earl of Dudley.	Australia, Telegram, Private and Personal.	September 18	Requests, if Navigation Bill is introduced to Parliament during present session, telegraphic information of any points on which views of Board of Trade are not accepted, and instructs him to reserve the Bill if it is passed.	13
26	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. Oct. 28)	Reports that Ministers are unable to accept views on constitutional points put forward in Secretary of State's despatch of 18th September, and states modifications in the Navigation Bill which they are prepared to recommend to Parliament.	13
27	To Board of Trade..	Australia	November 2	Transmits copy of the Navigation Bill as introduced into the Senate and copy of No. 26, and comments thereon; states proposed reply, and requests observations.	14
28	To the Governor ...	New South Wales, 101.	November 13	Suggests means of meeting the difficulty experienced in New South Wales in detaining foreign ships which are deemed not to be safe.	16
29	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 392.	November 13	Transmits copy of correspondence with the Governor of New South Wales, and asks that his Ministers may take the matter into consideration, with the object of securing the application of the same regulations as to safety both to foreign and to British vessels.	16
30	Board of Trade ...	New Zealand.	November 18	States that the Board of Trade have no objection to the Workers' Compensation Bill, recently introduced into the New Zealand Parliament, provided that the provisions indicated are inserted.	17
31	Ditto	Australia	November 20	Offers observations on the provisions of the Australian Navigation Bill as to compulsory survey of steamships and suggests amendment to Clause 369, which affects the power of the Board to revise sentences of Courts of Marine Enquiry in Australia cancelling or suspending certificates.	17
32	Ditto	South Australia	November 20	Enquires whether, in the event of the Australian Commonwealth Seamen's Compensation Bill becoming law, the individual States can also legislate on this subject, and states that, if so, the provisions of the Commonwealth Bill would, modified in certain respects, form a satisfactory basis for such legislation.	18
33	To the Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	November 21	Requests that Ministers be informed that the Board of Trade suggest that the Workers' Compensation Bill, 1908, be amended as indicated.	18
34	To the Governor-General.	Australia Telegram.	November 27	Conveys the substance of No. 31 ...	19
35	Board of Trade ...	Australia	December 2	Suggests that No. 34 should be amplified by a further telegram in the sense stated in order to remove any possible ground for misconception of His Majesty's Government's views.	19

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1908.					
36	To the Governor ...	South Australia, 75.	December 4	Suggests that, in the Bill which was re-introduced into the Parliament of South Australia in August, 1908, express provision should be made to prevent the possibility of duplicate claims being raised both in South Australia and the United Kingdom or some other part of His Majesty's dominions.	20
37	To Board of Trade.	South Australia	December 5	Explains, in reply to No. 32, that, in the event of the Commonwealth Seamen's Compensation Bill becoming law, the individual States will still retain full power of legislation on the subject, and the Courts of Australia will enforce such legislation provided that it does not actually conflict with existing Commonwealth legislation; transmits copy of No. 36.	20
38	Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company.	Australia	December 15	Transmits copy of observations by the Company's Superintendent in Australia on the Navigation Bill (No. 2).	21
39	Board of Trade ...	South Australia	December 16	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 37, concurs in the amendment to the South Australian Bill proposed in No. 36; and expresses doubt whether legislation having so wide a scope is within the competency of the State Parliament.	22
40	To the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company.	Australia	December 22	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 38 and states that Lord Crewe is still in communication with the Government of the Commonwealth with regard to the Bill.	22
41	To Board of Trade..	Australia	December 23	Points out objections to the concession proposed by the Board of Trade in No. 35 with regard to Clause 369 of the draft Bill, and suggests that the proposal originally made in No. 27 should be adopted instead.	23
42	Board of Trade ...	Australia	December 29	Agrees, in the circumstances pointed out in No. 41, to the adoption of the proposed reply with regard to Clause 369 of the Bill.	24
43	To Board of Trade..	Canada	December 29	Requests to be furnished with an early reply to No. 20.	24
44	The Governor ...	New Zealand, 85.	November 21 (Rec. Dec. 31.)	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 21 and transmits copy of a minute by the Minister for Marine, expressing the opinion that it would not be wise for the New Zealand Government to accept the proposal.	24
1909.					
45	To Board of Trade..	South Australia.	January 1	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 39 and states that Lord Crewe does not propose to discuss the question of the competence of the legislation proposed, as the Bill has been amended, and that on the other point referred to, Lord Crewe prefers to leave the matter to be dealt with by the Courts.	25

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Dominion & Despatch No.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
46	To Board of Trade..	New Zealand.	January 8	Transmits copy of No. 44 and asks for opinion as to whether any communication should be addressed to the New Zealand Government at the present moment.	25
47	To the Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	January 9	Regrets that the method suggested in No. 34 as to dealing with the question of the cancellation of certificates cannot legally be carried out; states that the Board of Trade propose to accept Clause 369 of the draft Bill provided that the two additions enumerated are made; and trusts that such a course will be acceptable to the Commonwealth Government.	26
48	To Board of Trade..	New Zealand.	January 16	Transmits copy of an Act of the Parliament of New Zealand, entitled "The Workers' Compensation Act, 1908"; points out that the Act was passed before it was possible for the New Zealand Government to consider the amendments suggested in No. 33 and states that under the circumstances Lord Crewe proposes to sanction the Act, but to call attention to No. 33.	26
49	Board of Trade ...	New Zealand.	January 19	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 46; concurs in the proposal to postpone any further representations until the New Zealand Government's amending legislation has been put into the form of a Bill.	27
50	The Governor-General.	Australia, 304.	December 16, 1908 (Rec. Jan. 23, 1909).	Forwards copy of a letter from the Prime Minister expressing inability to accept the view that only the Imperial Parliament should have power to regulate trade between Australia and New Zealand.	27
51	To Board of Trade	Tasmania	January 27	Transmits copy of an Act of the Parliament of Tasmania, entitled "An Act to further amend the Marine Boards Act, 1889"; and asks for the observations of the Board of Trade on the actual provisions of the Act and on the question of its validity.	28
52	The Governor-General.	Australia, 317.	December 23, 1908 (Rec. Feb. 1, 1909).	States that No. 34 has been communicated to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, and appends copy of his reply.	28
53	To Board of Trade	Australia	February 3	Transmits copy of No. 50, and states that Lord Crewe considers that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the correspondence on this matter, pending the re-introduction of the Australian Navigation Bill into the Commonwealth Parliament.	29
54	The Governor-General.	Australia, 319.	December 29, 1908 (Rec. Feb. 6 1909).	States that the Navigation Bill now before Parliament will effect the object desired in No. 29.	30

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Dominion & Despatch No.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
55	Board of Trade ...	Canada	February 9	Acknowledges the receipt of Nos. 20 and 43 and forwards a copy of a memorandum, prepared to show the Board's views in regard to certain points arising out of the provisions of the Canadian Shipping Act Amendment Act.	30
56	Ditto ...	Australia	February 11	Concurs in the terms of the despatch which Lord Crewe proposes to address to the Governor-General, on the subject of the Australian Navigation Bill, but suggests addition of the words "or Privy Council," to the provision for an appeal to the High Court of the Commonwealth.	33
57	To the Governor ...	New Zealand, 31.	February 11	Sanctions the Workers' Compensation Act, No. 248 of 1908, and requests that the attention of Ministers may be invited to No. 33.	33
58	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 63.	February 12	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 52; refers to No. 47 and trusts that the compromise suggested therein will commend itself to the Commonwealth Government; explains reasons for sending No. 34 and points out that the legal question involved in the effect of Imperial legislation on the question of survey is not altogether free from doubt.	33
59	To the Board of Trade.	Australia	February 13	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 56 and states that Lord Crewe has not seen his way to add the words "or Privy Council."	34
60	Ditto ...	Canada	March 2	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 55 and makes observations thereon.	34
61	Ditto ...	Canada	March 15	Transmits, for observations, copy of a Bill entitled "The Water-Carriage of Goods Act, 1909," and draws attention to certain modifications from the form of the Bill introduced in 1908.	35
62	Board of Trade ...	Canada	March 26	States in reply to No. 61, that in view of the modifications made to meet the objections taken last year, the Board have no further observations to offer on the Bill.	37
63	Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	Australia	March 26	Forwards a copy of a resolution regretting that the Australian Navigation Bill is not in conformity with the resolutions of the Colonial Merchant Shipping Conference of 1907 and supporting the principles laid down in No. 24.	38
64	To Board of Trade	Canada	March 30	Transmits, for observations, copy of a Canadian Bill respecting Immigration; invites attention to section 57 as to the number of passengers to be carried by vessels sailing to Canada, and as to stowaways.	38
65	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 127.	March 31	Transmits a copy of No. 63 ...	39

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Dominion & Despatch No.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
66	To the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom.	Australia	April 2	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 63, and states that a copy of it has been forwarded to the Governor General of the Commonwealth.	39
67	Board of Trade ...	Canada	May 1	States, in reply to No. 64, that the Board of Trade do not think that any objection need be raised to the provisions referred to.	39
68	Ditto ...	Canada	May 6	Submits further observations on the Canada Shipping Act, and encloses a copy of a memorandum by the Board's solicitor.	40
69	To Board of Trade	Canada	May 10	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 68, and transmits the draft of a despatch to the Governor-General of Canada.	42
70	Board of Trade ...	Tasmania	May 25	States that the Board have no objections to offer to the Act to further amend the Marine Boards Act but enquires why section 10 of the Act was required, and how the provisions relating to survey have worked since their introduction in 1889.	42
71	To the Acting Governor.	Tasmania, 53.	June 4	Asks to be informed of the reasons for the enactment of the Act to further amend the Marine Boards Act, 1889, and how the provisions relating to survey have worked since their introduction in 1889.	43
72	Board of Trade ...	Canada.	July 13	Concurs in the draft enclosed in No. 69 subject to alterations indicated.	43
73	The Governor-General.	Australia, 141.	June 23 (Rec. July 26.)	States that an amendment in the terms of the Board of Trade's suggestion conveyed in No. 47 will be proposed by the Government in Parliament, and that the Commonwealth Government feel assured that the Board of Trade will not exercise its powers under the Merchant Shipping Act in regard to certificates without first consulting the Commonwealth Government.	43
74	To Board of Trade.	Canada.	July 30	States that Lord Crewe has given most careful consideration to No. 72 and, for the reasons indicated, considers that it is hardly desirable to adopt the line of argument indicated by the alterations suggested in the draft despatch to Canada.	44
75	Ditto ...	Australia.	August 4	Transmits copy of No. 73 ...	45
76	Board of Trade ...	Australia.	August 26	Expresses satisfaction at the attitude of the Commonwealth Government as shown by No. 73, and undertakes that the Board will not exercise their powers under sec. 474 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, without first consulting the Commonwealth Government.	45
77	The Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. Aug. 28.)	States, in reply to No. 33, that Ministers propose to amend the Workers' Compensation Act in manner suggested by Board of Trade.	46

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Dominion & Despatch No.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
78	Board of Trade ...	Canada.	August 31	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 74 and concurs generally in the terms of the draft enclosed in No. 69 but suggests some amendments.	46
79	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 318.	August 31	Transmits copy of No. 76 ...	47
80	Board of Trade ...	Canada.	September 2	Forwards a note of an interview with the Hon. L. P. Brodeur on the question of the validity of certain Canadian Shipping legislation.	47
81	To Board of Trade..	Canada	October 23	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 78 and explains that in view of No. 80 the proposed despatch to the Governor-General of Canada will have to be recast on the lines indicated.	49
82	Ditto ...	Canada	December 13	Transmits copy of a Bill introduced into the Canadian House of Commons dealing with load lines on ships, and asks for any observations which the Board may have to offer on the Bill.	50
83	Ditto ...	Canada	December 20	Transmits copy of a Bill entitled "an Act respecting the Water Carriage of Goods," which has been introduced into the Canadian House of Commons and points out that the Bill is in substance a reproduction of that of which a copy was enclosed in No. 61.	50
84	Board of Trade ...	Canada	December 21	Submits observations on the Bill enclosed in No. 82.	51
85	Ditto ...	Canada	December 24	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 83 and states that the Board have no further observations to offer on the Bill.	51

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

[March, 1908 to December, 1909.]

RELATING TO

MERCHANT SHIPPING LEGISLATION IN THE DOMINIONS.

9727

No. 1.

CANADA.

CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF UNITED KINGDOM to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 19 March, 1908.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 31 March, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 4 and on 9 May, 1908, 15715: not printed.]

Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom,
5, Whittington Avenue, Leadenhall Street, E.C.,
18 March 1908.

Proposed Legislation in Canada, re Bills of Lading.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Executive Council of this Chamber to forward to you the subjoined copy of a cablegram which has just been received by a leading shipping insurance association in London from, I am informed, a most respectable firm of solicitors in Montreal:—

"Bill introduced Canadian Parliament restricting shipowners' contract rights, bills of lading. Opposition being organized. Shall we represent you?"

I am further informed that the chief shipping insurance associations in London have to-day united in cabling out instructions to the firm of solicitors in question to do their best to oppose the Bill, but I am, in addition, desired by the Executive Council of this Chamber to respectfully ask that the Colonial Office will also cable out to the Governor-General of Canada for particulars of the proposed legislation and will likewise use its influence to prevent the Bill in question from being passed.

The broad ground upon which my Council make this request of His Majesty's Government is that, whereas there may be some valid arguments to be adduced in favour of legislation where defenceless persons, *e.g.*, women, children, lunatics, &c., are concerned, there are absolutely none in cases like that to which this Bill refers, *i.e.*, where the two parties to the contract are an adult shipowner and an adult merchant. Merchants and shipowners who are actively engaged in business and who in the course of such business voluntarily enter into contracts between themselves are grown-up men who are perfectly able to look after their respective pecuniary interests—as to which they are acutely sensitive—and my Council submit that the less the State interferes by legislation between two such parties, in civil contracts, the better.

My Council will be very grateful for any assistance which the Colonial Office may be able to afford them in this matter.

I am, &c.,

W. H. COOKE,
Secretary.

10159

No. 2.
CANADA.

LIVERPOOL STEAM SHIP OWNERS' ASSOCIATION to COLONIAL OFFICE

(Received 21 March, 1908.)

[Copy to Board of Trade and to Governor-General, No. 169, 31 March, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 6 and on 9 May, 1908, 15715: not printed.]

The Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association,
10, Water Street, Liverpool,
20 March, 1908.

Canadian Legislation as to Sea Carriage of Goods.

MY LORD,

I AM directed by the Association to draw your Lordship's attention to a Bill which has been introduced into the Canadian Parliament, which Bill I understand contains provisions similar to those contained in the Australian Sea Carriage of Goods Act.

The Association is of opinion that if the Bill is passed in its present form it will be detrimental to the interests of British shipowners engaged in the Canadian trade.

The Association would also point out that special and local legislation of this kind will have a disastrous effect upon the efforts which have for some years been made and are being made to secure uniformity in the maritime law and practice of this and other countries. If Acts of this kind are passed, all hope of securing uniform conditions of carriage must be abandoned, and much that has already been achieved in that direction will be nullified.

The Association therefore trust your Lordship will bring to the notice of the Canadian Government the inadvisability of introducing legislation which will make the laws relating to carriage by sea different in England and in the Colonies.

I am, &c.,

F. RUSSELL ROBERTS,
Assistant Secretary.

9727

No. 3.
CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 31 March, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by 15715: not printed.]

(No. 150.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 21 March, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, to be laid before your Ministers, copy of a letter* from the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom on the subject of Canadian legislation regarding "Bills of Lading."

2. I shall be grateful if your Ministers will furnish me with information as to the legislation stated to be contemplated.

I have, &c.,
ELGIN.

9727

No. 4.
CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF UNITED KINGDOM.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 31 March, 1908. L.F.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 21 March, 1908.

In reply to your letter of the 18th March,* I am directed by the Earl of Elgin to inform you that he has no information as to the proposed legislation

* No. 1.

3

regarding "Bills of Lading" said to be contemplated in Canada, but that a copy of your letter under reference is being sent to the Governor-General by to-day's mail with a request for a report.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

10547

No. 5.

CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received March 24, 1908.)

[Acknowledged, 1 April.]

5, Whittington Avenue, Leadenhall Street, E.C., March 23, 1908.

Australian and other Colonial Legislation.

[Published as enclosure in No. 1 in [Cd. 4355] October, 1908].

10159

No. 6.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to LIVERPOOL STEAM SHIP OWNERS' ASSOCIATION.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 31 March, 1908, L.F.]

Downing Street, 27 March, 1908.

SIR,

In reply to your letter of the 20th of March,* I am directed by the Earl of Elgin to request you to inform the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association that he is in communication with the Governor-General of Canada on the subject of the proposed Dominion legislation as to sea carriage of goods.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

10547

No. 7.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNOR.

(Australia. No. 110.)

(Canada. No. 175.)

(New Zealand. No. 54.)

Downing Street, 2 April, 1908.

[Published as No. 1 in [Cd. 4355] October, 1908.]

18032

No. 8

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 19 May, 1908.)

[Answered by No. 12.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens, London, S.W.,

18 May, 1908.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to state that they have had under con-

* No. 2.

sideration the Bill, forwarded with your letter of the 6th ultimo (11578/08),* which has been introduced into the Dominion Parliament to regulate the terms of bills of lading entered into in Canada.

The Board desire me to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that, so far as Clauses 1-6 and 9 of the Bill are concerned, they adhere to the views which they have already expressed in the letter of the 24th June last,† in regard to similar provisions contained in the Fijian Ordinance relating to the sea carriage of goods, and, although they are unaware whether the Bill now before the Dominion Parliament has the support of the Canadian Government, they would suggest for Lord Crewe's consideration that the Canadian Government should be informed of their views in regard to these clauses of the Bill.

I am at the same time to forward the accompanying copies of letters on the subject of the Bill which they have received from the Chamber of Shipping and the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, and to request that you will invite Lord Crewe's attention specially to the criticisms made by the latter body in regard to Clause 8 of the Bill.

The Board would suggest that copies of these letters should be transmitted to the Canadian Government.

I have, &c.,
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom,
5 Whittington Avenue, Leadenhall Street, E.C.,
30 April, 1908.

Proposed Legislation in Canada, *re* Bills of Lading.

SIR,

As President of this Chamber, I beg to thank you for your letter of the 16th instant upon the above subject, and in reply thereto I enclose, for your information, copy of a letter dated 18th ultimo which this Chamber addressed to the Colonial Office upon the same matter, together with a copy of the reply of the Colonial Office of the 21st ultimo, since which date no further communication, I may state, has been received from the Colonial Office upon the subject.

I may add that this Chamber, for the reasons which are stated in its letter to the Colonial Office of the 18th ultimo, strongly disapproves of legislation upon such subjects as bills of lading, and it earnestly trusts that the Board of Trade will use its influence with the Colonial Office so as to induce that Department to oppose the Bill which is, I understand, now before the Canadian Parliament.

In answer to the enquiry put in the last paragraph of your letter under acknowledgment, I may inform you that the practice of merchants and shipowners as regards the provisions of bills of lading varies with the nature and character of the goods shipped and the nature of the voyage upon which the vessel is about to enter.

It is true that there are printed "forms" which are in common use between merchants and shipowners for different trades, but in the event of there being anything unusual in the nature of the goods shipped, or the voyage upon which the ship is to enter, any such peculiar circumstances are met by special clauses being inserted by mutual agreement between the merchant and shipowner in the charter-party and bills of lading. It is this freedom of contract—which would, in my opinion, be seriously impaired were the proposed legislation in the Canadian Parliament to become law—which British shipowners are most anxious to preserve.

Any assistance which the Board of Trade may be able to render with a view to maintaining the *status quo* in this matter will be, I am sure, greatly appreciated by British shipowners.

The Assistant Secretary,
(Marine Department),
Board of Trade, S.W.

I am, &c.,
JENNESON TAYLOR,
President

* Not printed.

† 22593: not printed.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

THE LIVERPOOL STEAM SHIP OWNERS' ASSOCIATION.

10, Water Street, Liverpool, 21 April, 1908.

SIR,

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of, and to thank you for, your letter of the 16th inst. with reference to the Water Carriage of Goods Bill now before the Dominion Parliament.

For your information I enclose a print of the report* I have made to this Association on the Bill.

The Association attach the greatest importance to Clause 6, and they trust that if the Bill is to be proceeded with this clause will be modified so as to bring it into accord with the provisions of the Harter Act.

Clause 7 in itself is not open to serious objection, as the information there specified is, as a matter of business, inserted in bills of lading at the present time.

Clause 8 is, in the opinion of the Association, for the reasons indicated in my report, quite unworkable.

The Association are very strongly opposed to any statutory interference with freedom of contract in relation to bills of lading. As you are aware, steady progress has been made towards the adoption of international rules and regulations in relation to sea carriage, and the Association feel that separate legislation on the part of the British Colonies must seriously imperil the success of the movement.

I am, &c.,
NORMAN HILL,
Secretary.

R. C. Heron Maxwell, Esq.,
Marine Department,
Board of Trade.

20219

No. 9.

CANADA.

CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM to COLONIAL
OFFICE.

(Received 4 June, 1908.)

[Answered by No. 11.]

5, Whittington Avenue, Leadenhall Street, E.C.,
3 June, 1908.

Canadian "Water Carriage of Goods Bill, 1908."

SIR,

I BEG to thank you for your letter (15715/1908), of the 9th ultimo,† and its enclosures. I return herewith, as requested, the printed enclosures in your letter under acknowledgment.

With respect to the Canadian "Water Carriage of Goods Bill, 1908," I am directed to state to you that this Chamber considers it to be a measure of extreme importance to the shipowners of this country. Without dealing with the clauses *seriatim* this Chamber would desire to point out that a very erroneous impression appears to predominate in the minds of those who are responsible for this Bill.

The view of the supporters of the Bill would seem to be that all shipowners are common carriers, and, acting upon this idea, they base an assumed analogy to the case of railways. A railway, however, is a monopoly, and has alone the privilege of carrying goods through such part of the country as is traversed by its lines. It is, therefore, fit and proper that Parliament, when granting this monopoly, should impose conditions of carriage along with it. This view is, however, in no sense true of steamship owners. The mere fact of their carrying the goods by water precludes the possibility of any monopoly. The result is that there is (and always has been) keen competition between steamship owners for the water carriage of goods. The prime elements applicable to common carriers are, therefore, not

* Not received in Colonial Office.

† Not printed.

present in the case of steamship owners. Moreover, it can never be truthfully asserted that a steamship owner is bound to carry all goods offered to him for transport. He can refuse to carry goods if he so desires. For instance, it would be obviously absurd to compel the owners of an insulated ship specially constructed for the carriage of frozen produce to carry a cargo of coal which might be offered to them. This is not true of railways. They are bound to carry all goods offered to them under certain schedule rates and on certain conditions. Steamship owners are, therefore, not common carriers. Consequently, they are at liberty to exercise that right of freedom of contract which has always been admitted to all members of the mercantile community.

It seems to this Chamber that the introducer of the Bill is not aware of the lengths to which British Courts have gone in applying the doctrine of "seaworthiness." Many of the cases which he cites, and which appear on the face of them to be unfair are not, in fact, so when looked at from the point of view of the decisions of British Courts of Law, which have extended the doctrine of "seaworthiness" in a most drastic manner. For instance, it is a well-known fact that before such delicate cargo as flour is shipped on board any steamer, underwriters' surveyors invariably inspect the vessel and certify the holds to be fit for the carriage of the produce intended to be loaded.

A shipowner, who often times expends £100,000 in building a ship and in making her in every way fit for the carriage of perishable cargoes, feels himself aggrieved when by some subtle legal technicality he is held liable for damage in large sums of money which really should be payable by those who insure the cargoes.

This Chamber will only cite three instances in support of its arguments:—

- (1) A vessel, on a previous voyage, had been engaged in carrying cattle. When this vessel arrived at the port of loading she was thoroughly cleansed in every respect, passed by the surveyors, and her holds, to all appearance, were perfectly sweet and clean. All means which human foresight could devise had been taken to make the ship safe for the carriage of the cargo, and, indeed, the surveyors so pronounced her to be. In consequence, however, of the heat which naturally generates in the holds of a vessel during the voyage, some fumes from the disinfectant which had been used to cleanse the holds penetrated the cargo. Result, the vessel held "unseaworthy."
- (2) A rivet in a bulkhead gave way. (This Chamber need not remind you that there are many thousands of rivets in every vessel.) The result of such a catastrophe was that water was admitted into the ship. A careful examination of the rivet showed that the iron had been crystallised by too much hammering. Result, the vessel held to be "unseaworthy."
- (3) A vessel stranded and sustained damage whereby cargo on board her was also damaged. It was ascertained that the captain had not on board the very latest chart issued by the Admiralty which indicated the newly-formed sandbank on the spot where the stranding took place. Result, the vessel held to be "unseaworthy."

It is absurd to assume that an owner who spends very large sums of money on the equipment of his vessel would hesitate to spend a few additional pounds in order to obtain the very latest devices for rendering his vessel seaworthy. Nevertheless, because of the happening of these unforeseen occurrences numerous steamship owners have been held responsible who (had it been possible for them to know beforehand) would certainly have taken steps to remedy the defect.

With respect to the Australian "Carriage of Goods Act," shipowners in this country feel that it constitutes a very grave menace to them, and steps have been taken to minimise as much as possible the effects of that drastic enactment.

As regards the "Harter Act" owners would much prefer to be allowed to make their own form of contract, but this Act is certainly much more favourable to steamship owners than the Australian Act, and, if the Canadian Government insists upon passing the "Water Carriage of Goods Act," shipowners here would much prefer it to be in the form of the "Harter Act." At the same time it seems grossly unfair that one country should seek to legislate for the carriage of goods to all parts of the world. Shipowners here think that it should be sufficient if they make enactments for the carriage of goods to ports in their own country, and this Chamber

ventures to suggest that it is a very questionable policy for one country to endeavour to legislate for other countries.

Again, the Canadian Senate would appear to have disregarded the fact that from time immemorial sea carriage has been regarded both by shipper and shipowner as a joint adventure in which the merchant as well as the shipowner bears his share of the risks consequent upon the transport of goods by sea. It was this idea which was the foundation of general average, and which pervades the sea contract of carriage. The merchants, however, nowadays, notwithstanding the enormous sums of money spent by shipowners in making their ships as seaworthy as human ingenuity can devise, seem to require that shipowners should become not only carriers of their goods, but, also, absolute insurers of them.

This Chamber trusts that the Canadian Legislature will hesitate before it passes a most one-sided Bill, and that time will be granted for the shipowners of Great Britain to lay before them their views on this very important piece of legislation.

I am, &c.,
W. H. COOKE,
Secretary.

18032

No. 10.

CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 312.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 3 June, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's despatch, No. 189, of the 22nd of April,* on the subject of the Water Carriage of Goods Bill introduced into the Canadian Parliament.

2. I have communicated copies of the Bill to the Board of Trade, and have now to transmit to you, to be laid before your Ministers, copies of letters† from the Chamber of Shipping and the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, in which certain objections are raised to the proposed legislation.

3. To some extent the objections raised by the shipowners seem to His Majesty's Government to be well founded, and the proposed legislation, which is based on the model of the Australia Sea Carriage of Goods Act, appears open to criticism as hardly effecting the real object of the promoters of the Bill. Section 8 appears to be unworkable in practice, and not to confer any real benefit on consignees, and Section 6 seems of doubtful expediency.

4. That section in effect establishes an obligation on the shipowner to secure that his ship shall be in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied at the commencement of the journey. If this condition is absolutely complied with, then, and then only, the shipowner is exempted from bearing the loss in a specified number of cases. These provisions seem at once to concede too much to the shipowner and to deny him reasonable treatment. If the accident causing loss is in any case due to his negligence or that of his servants, it would seem unreasonable that he should be exempted from liability merely because his ship was at the beginning of the journey properly equipped, &c. On the other hand, if after due diligence the vessel is from latent causes not really seaworthy at the commencement of the journey, it is perhaps unfair that full liability should be imposed upon him by law, especially in cases where the accident is due to causes, *e.g.*, the act of God or the King's enemies, which stand in no relation to the seaworthiness of the vessel.

5. His Majesty's Government would, therefore, suggest to your Ministers that if they consider that legislation is absolutely necessary upon this subject, they might introduce a Bill of their own on the matter, based on the principle that shipowners should be allowed full freedom of contract in shipping matters, save that it should be provided that in every bill of lading there shall be implied the two following warranties:—

(a) That due diligence shall be exercised in making the ship at the beginning

* 15715 : not printed.

† Enclosures in No. 8.

of the journey seaworthy and keeping the ship during the voyage seaworthy for the carriage of the goods.

(b) That due diligence shall be exercised in or about the custody and delivery of the goods.

Any clause in a bill of lading or other agreement for the carriage of goods inconsistent with these warranties should be null and void, and the insertion of such a clause could be rendered penal, if desired.

6. His Majesty's Government consider that such a Bill would probably satisfy the real needs of the case without tending to hamper the shipping industry. They recognise that there are disadvantages in the present system of shipowners contracting out of liability for negligence, but they consider that a Bill on the above lines would afford a satisfactory remedy for the existing difficulties.

7. If your Ministers are inclined to adopt this course, His Majesty's Government will be happy to afford any assistance in their power to the preparation of a suitable enactment.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

20219

No. 11.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

[Answered by No. 15.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 6 June, 1908.

IN reply to your letter of the 3rd of June,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, for the information of the Chamber of Shipping, copy of the Canadian Bill† regarding the ocean carriage of goods as amended by the Senate.

2. The Chamber will observe that, in part, their objections to the Bill are met by the alterations made, but a copy of your letter will be forwarded to the Governor-General of the Dominion for the consideration of his Ministers.

3. I am to request that the enclosed Bill may be eventually returned to this Department.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

20219

No. 12.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 6 June, 1908.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade with reference to your letter of 18th ultimo,‡ copy of the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Bill† as amended by the Senate, and of a despatch§ which was addressed—with the approval of the Board of Trade obtained semi-officially—to the Governor-General of the Dominion on the 3rd of June conveying the views of His Majesty's Government on the Bill in its original form.

2. The amended Bill appears to meet in considerable measure the objections which have been raised to the Bill.

3. I am, at the same time, to enclose copy of correspondence|| with the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom on the same subject.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

* No. 9.

§ No. 10.

† See 20109: not printed.

|| Nos. 9 and 11.

‡ No. 8.

20219

No. 13.

CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 320.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 6 June, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, to be laid before your Ministers, with reference to my despatch, No. 312, of the 3rd of June,* copy of correspondence† with the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom on the subject of the Water Carriage of Goods Bill.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

21479

No. 14.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received June 15, 1908.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 20 June, 1908. L.F.]

[Acknowledged 20 June, 1908, No. 357.]

(No. 249.)

Government House, Ottawa, 30 May, 1908.

[Published as No. 2 in [Cd. 4355], October, 1908.]

21718

No. 15.

CANADA.

CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 16 June, 1908.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 23 June, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 16.]

5, Whittington Avenue, Leadenhall Street, E.C.,
15 June, 1908.

Canadian "Water Carriage of Goods Bill, 1908."

SIR,

I BEG to thank you for your letter (20219/1908), of the 6th instant,‡ enclosing copy of the above-named Bill as amended by the Senate.

I have, also, to thank you for the intimation that a copy of my letter to you of the 3rd instant,§ will be forwarded to the Governor-General of the Dominion for the consideration of his Ministers.

I am now desired by this Chamber to address you on what may be termed the constitutional question which is raised by the above Bill. In this connection I am instructed to point out to you that, inasmuch as an Act similar to the Canadian "Water Carriage of Goods Bill" was passed by the Commonwealth of Australia and was not disallowed by His Majesty the King, it may be argued from this circumstance that the Imperial Parliament would consider such an Act as that of the Canadian "Water Carriage of Goods Bill" also constitutional.

I am, however, desired to submit to you that the Constitution of Australia differs from that of Canada. By Section 51 of the "Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act" (63-64 Vict., c. 12) power is given to the Parliament of the Commonwealth to legislate on trade and commerce "with other countries," and that by Section 98 of the same Act this power is made to extend "to navigation and shipping." This being so, I have to submit that by Sections 51 and 98 of the "Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act" there is thus an express delegation

* No. 10.

† Nos. 9 and 11.

‡ No. 11.

§ No. 9.

by the Imperial Parliament of the power to legislate on "navigation and shipping with other countries." No such powers have, however, this Chamber is informed, as yet been given to the Dominion of Canada, and therefore, it is to be inferred that the Imperial Parliament did not intend to confer them.

I may also point out that Sub-sections 10, 29, and 30 of Section 51 of the "Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act" show that it was intended by that Act to give to the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Australia greater territorial jurisdiction than has been given to the Parliament of Canada.

I am to add that this Chamber would be greatly obliged if you would be so good as to forward a copy of this letter—in the same way as you have kindly done in the case of previous letters from this Chamber—to the Governor-General of Canada for the consideration of his Ministers.

I am, &c.,
W. H. COOKE
Secretary.

21718

No. 16.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 23 June, 1908. L.F.]

SIR, I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th of June,* on the subject of the constitutional rights of the Parliament of Canada as regards shipping.

2. Lord Crewe is not disposed to accept the views of the powers of the Parliament either of the Commonwealth of Australia or of the Dominion of Canada expressed in your letter, but, without further discussing the constitutional points which have been raised, I am to state that his Lordship does not propose to forward your letter to Canada, as he does not consider that such a course would in any way further the object which you have in view.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

26295

No. 17.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 20 July, 1908.)

(No. 162.)

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 17 June, 1908.

[Published as No. 3 in [Cd. 4355] October, 1908.]

28325

No. 18.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received August 4, 1908.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 12 August, 1908. L.F.]

(No. 48.)

Government House, Wellington, 22 June, 1908.

[Published as No. 4 in [Cd. 4355], October, 1908.]

* No. 15.

28325

No. 19.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by 31947, concurring: not printed.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 26 August, 1908.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 12th of August,* I am directed by the Secretary of State to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, draft of a despatch† which he proposes to address to the Governor of New Zealand, in reply to his despatch of the 22nd June,‡ on the subject of merchant shipping legislation in New Zealand.

2. The Secretary of State would be glad to receive any observations which the Board of Trade may have to offer on the draft despatch. As the Parliament of New Zealand is now in session, it is, in his opinion, desirable that there should be no delay in intimating to the Dominion Government that His Majesty's Government do not accept the principle that the Dominion Parliament can legislate for inter-colonial trade in the case of such vessels as are not registered in New Zealand and do not engage in the coasting trade of the Colony. It is proposed to send to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth for the information of his Ministers a copy of the correspondence with the Government of New Zealand.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

31258

No. 20.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 55.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 September, 1908.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, copy of an Act, Chapter 65, of the Parliament of Canada, entitled "An Act to amend the Canada Shipping Act." This Act has been assented to by the Governor-General, but I am to point out that it does not contain any clause suspending the operation of the Act until the assent of His Majesty shall have been proclaimed in Canada, and in this connection I am to call attention to Sections 735 and 736 of the "Merchant Shipping Act, 1894," under the authority of which it is presumed that the Act in question has been passed.

2. It is true that the "Navigation Act" of Western Australia, No. 55 of 1904, and the "Navigation Act Amendment Act," No. 9 of 1907, did not contain any clauses suspending the operation of the Act as required in Sections 735 and 736 of the "Merchant Shipping Act," and in this connection I am to refer to correspondence on the subject of the Act of 1904, which terminated with your letter of the 2nd of August, 1906.§

3. In the case of the Western Australian Acts and certain other Australian State Acts to which the same observation applied, it was not considered necessary to press the point in question, in view of the fact that the Parliament of the Commonwealth was likely to legislate at an early date, in which event the legislation of the States would *ipso facto* cease to have effect, which rendered the State legislation a fact of comparatively minor importance.

4. In the case of Canada the consideration referred to in the previous paragraph does not apply, and the Secretary of State is inclined to think that it would be desirable to point out to the Government of Canada that there exists a doubt as to the validity of the Act, and that it would appear, therefore, desirable to validate the Act by a short confirming Act to be passed next Session, which should duly contain a suspending clause, and be confirmed by Order in Council as contemplated by the "Merchant Shipping Act." On this point, however, the Secretary of State would be glad to learn the views of the Board of Trade.

* L.F. transmitting copy of No. 18. † See No. 21. ‡ No. 18. § 28447: not printed.

5. At the same time the Secretary of State would be glad if the Board of Trade would favour him with any observations which they may have to offer on the provisions of the Act.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

31947

No. 21.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

[Copy to Board of Trade, September 10, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 44.]

(No. 151.)

Downing Street, 3 September, 1908.

[Published as No. 5 in [Cd. 4355], October, 1908.]

31947

No. 22.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

[Copy to Board of Trade, September 10, 1908. L.F.]

(No. 308.)

Downing Street, 3 September, 1908.

[Published as No. 6 in [Cd. 4355], October, 1908.]

31927

No. 23.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 30.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 8 September, 1908.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of a Bill* introduced into the Parliament of New Zealand to provide for workers' compensation.

2. It will be observed that under Section 10 the provisions of the proposed Act are to apply to accidents happening elsewhere than in New Zealand in the case of vessels registered in New Zealand, or owned by corporate bodies established by the laws of New Zealand or having their principal office or place of business in New Zealand, or owned by any person whose chief office or place of business, in respect of the ship, is in New Zealand.

3. In so far as the proposed legislation affects vessels other than those registered in New Zealand or engaged in the coasting trade of New Zealand (see Sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894), the legislation would appear to be of doubtful validity and to raise the possibility of conflict with the legislation at present in force in the United Kingdom, and Lord Crewe would therefore be glad to receive any observations which the Board of Trade may have to offer on these provisions of the Bill.

4. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Home Office.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

* Attached to 31927: not printed.

33929

No. 24.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

[Copy to Board of Trade, October 15, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by No 26.]

(No. 326.)

Downing Street, 18 September, 1908.

[Published as No. 7 in [Cd. 4355], October, 1908.]

34240

No. 25.

AUSTRALIA.

THE EARL OF CREWE to THE EARL OF DUDLEY.

(Sent 5.45 p.m., 18 September, 1908.)

TELEGRAM.

(Private and Personal.)

I hope to send you shortly despatch on Navigation Bill. If that Bill comes up in Parliament during present session, please telegraph any points in which views of Board of Trade are not accepted. You will, of course, reserve Bill if passed.

I shall be glad if you will take it as standing instruction to keep me informed by telegraph of progress of any Bills involving constitutional questions or affecting Imperial interests.—CREWE.

39375

No. 26.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10 a.m., 28th October, 1908.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 34.]

Referring to your despatch, No. 326, dated 18th September,* Government regret that they are unable to accept views on constitutional points therein put forward. Prime Minister proposes writing fully shortly. Regarding outstanding points Government prepared recommend Parliament modify Clauses 23, 39, 61, 96, 101, 218, in manner in which it is thought will meet views of British Government. Government understand that no further objections offered Clauses 64, 285, 417. Clause 185 has been law in New South Wales and Victoria for many years without complaint or entailing suggested inconveniences or expenses, therefore abandonment right survey cargo ships would not be acceptable. Suggest only alteration period from six to twelve months. Presume in view of Resolution 1, Imperial Shipping Conference, your objection will not be further pressed. Former reply stands regarding Clause 369.—DUDLEY.

* No. 7 in [Cd. 4355], October, 1908.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 31.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 November, 1908.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 15th of October,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of the Navigation Bill† of the Parliament of Australia in the form in which it has been introduced into the Senate.

2. It will be seen that the Bill substantially carries out the proposals which were mentioned in Lord Northcote's despatch, No. 162, of the 17th of June.‡ In accordance with that despatch, Sections 185 and 201 still render necessary the survey of ships, except under certain definite conditions.

3. Section 218 has not been altered as requested by the Board of Trade, but Section 285 has been amended so as to remove in part the technical objection that the section attempts to legislate for vessels while beyond territorial waters, and Section 289 has been so amended as to make it clear that foreign ships shall not be granted privileges or advantages in the coasting trade in excess of those given to British ships.

4. Section 385 has been altered by the omission of the sub-section referring to acts done outside Australia.

5. Section 414 has been so altered as to refer to the obligations of the Commonwealth under any Treaty made between a foreign country and the United Kingdom, without any reference to the necessity of the Treaty having been concurred in by the Commonwealth, and, as it stands, would appear to Lord Crewe to be perfectly satisfactory.

6. I am also to enclose copy of a telegram§ which has just been received from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth, summarising the reply of his Ministers to Lord Crewe's despatch, No. 326, of the 18th of September.¶ It will be observed that, as was anticipated, the Government of the Commonwealth are not prepared to accept the views on the constitutional position laid down in Lord Crewe's despatch, but further comment on this matter would not appear to be necessary pending the receipt of a fuller expression of Mr. Deakin's views.

7. It will be seen, however, that the Government of the Commonwealth are prepared to accept the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to Section 23 of the Bill as to the employment of uncertificated persons, and to Section 39 relative to the approval by the Superintendent of the form of agreement entered into with seamen; of Section 61 with regard to the discharge of seamen; of Section 96 as to offences against discipline; of Section 101 as to sending seamen on board vessels; and of Section 218 as to the loadline of ships laden with coal. The proposed action of the Commonwealth Government on these points will no doubt be satisfactory to the Board of Trade.

8. Probably also the Board of Trade will not desire to press their objections to Clause 64, as to the advance of wages, or to Clause 285, as to wages in the coasting trade; or to Section 417, as to giving notice of regulations, as this is sufficiently provided for by the Rules Publication Act of the Australian Commonwealth.

9. As regards Section 369, it will be observed that the Commonwealth Government are unable to accept the proposals of His Majesty's Government. Lord Crewe presumes that the Board of Trade will hardly see their way to acquiesce in this proposal as it stands, but he would suggest that, as a compromise, the Government of the Commonwealth should be informed that the clause will be accepted if it is strictly confined to ships registered in Australia and ships engaged in the coasting trade. Lord Crewe is advised that in the case of such vessels, the Commonwealth Parliament has legally power, under Sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, to alter the provisions of the Imperial Act so far as regards the categories

of ships mentioned above. At the same time he considers it very unfortunate that the Commonwealth Government are persistent in this proposal, and he would propose to make it clear that it cannot be accepted as regards any other class of vessels, partly on the ground that it is clearly *ultra vires* the Commonwealth, and partly that the Board of Trade are not prepared to surrender their power to deal with the certificates of officers employed in ships which are not registered in the Commonwealth and which do not engage in the coasting trade.

10. As regards Section 185, it will be observed that it is stated that similar provisions have been enforced in New South Wales and Victoria for many years without complaint, and Lord Crewe would be glad to be informed whether the Board of Trade have any information as to the correctness of this statement, and as to whether the laws of those Colonies relative to the matter have, in fact, been enforced. If the statement made by the Commonwealth Government is accurate, it would appear to be difficult, if not impossible, to press for the amendment of this clause, although Lord Crewe understands that stress is laid on this point by the Board of Trade, and he accordingly made strong representations on the matter to the Government of the Commonwealth in his despatch, No. 326, of the 18th of September.*

11. The question is complicated by the fact that the recommendation was made by the Conference that the Board of Trade should arrange to survey non-passenger steamers, and to give certificates of survey, and Lord Crewe would be glad to know whether the Board of Trade could not meet the Government of the Commonwealth in this matter by making arrangements for certificates of survey to be given in cases where they may be applied for, leaving it to those owners who prefer not to incur the expense and trouble of a survey in this country to have their vessels surveyed in Australia. It will be observed that the Commonwealth Government are prepared to extend the period of survey from six months to one year, which would appear to be a concession of some value.

12. At the same time Lord Crewe desires to point out that there is no express provision in the Bill as it stands to comply with Section 736 (a) of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, which requires the insertion of a suspending clause providing that the Act shall not come into operation until His Majesty's pleasure shall have been publicly signified thereon in Australia. That clause has doubtless been omitted deliberately because of the view held by Mr. Garran and accepted by the Commonwealth Government, that the legislative power mentioned in Section 736, is a power additional to the general legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament. Lord Crewe is advised that this view is not correct, and that Section 736 in effect imposes restrictions upon the exercise of the general legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament as to legislation, and he feels that if this clause is not inserted, it may be possible to question the validity of the Act in the Courts. On the other hand, Section 1 of the Bill provides that the Act shall commence on a date to be fixed by Proclamation, and in effect the same result will be produced as if the former clause had been inserted complying with the requirements of Section 736 (a) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.

13. Lord Crewe therefore proposes to inform the Commonwealth Government that he is advised that grave doubt will exist as to the validity of the Act as far as it concerns the coasting trade if a clause is not inserted as provided by Section 736 (a), but that it must rest with the Government of the Commonwealth whether or not they wish to take the risk of their legislation being questioned on this technical ground in the Courts.

14. Lord Crewe would be glad to receive at the earliest possible date any observations which the Board of Trade may desire to offer upon the Commonwealth Bill, the Governor-General's telegram,† and this letter, in order that the final decision of His Majesty's Government may be immediately communicated to the Commonwealth Government before the Bill is passed through the Houses of Parliament. If desired, he will be glad to arrange for an informal conference between representatives of the two offices on the question.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

* L.F. transmitting copy of No. 24. † Not reprinted, but see [Cd. 3826]. ‡ No. 3 in [Cd. 4355].
§ No. 26. ¶ No. 7 in [Cd. 4355].

40964

No. 28.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 16 November, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by 12489/09 : not printed.]

(No. 101.)

SIR,

Downing Street, 13 November, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 71, of the 8th of September,* transmitting a copy of a minute from your Premier on the subject of the complaints made by the Leyland Shipping Company, Limited, of Liverpool, respecting alleged restrictions placed on British shipping at Newcastle, New South Wales.

2. I observe from the second paragraph of Mr. Wade's minute, that a difficulty has been experienced in New South Wales in detaining foreign ships which are deemed not to be safe. I have consulted the Board of Trade on this subject, and they suggest that it may be possible to obviate the difficulty in question in the following manner:—

3. The powers of the New South Wales Government under the Navigation Act, 1901, are the same as those of the Board of Trade under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and no difficulty is experienced in this country in detaining foreign ships which are clearly overloaded according to the British rules, whether a disc is marked on the side or not. All that is necessary is for a competent surveyor to satisfy himself that the vessel is distinctly overloaded under the freeboard rules, and detention in ordinary circumstances follows as a matter of course. A considerable number of foreign vessels are detained in this way every year in the United Kingdom. A copy of the detention order is, under Section 462 of the Merchant Shipping Act, sent to the Consul of the country to which the ship belongs in order that he may take any action he thinks necessary to safeguard the interest of the ship, but the order itself is executed by the officers of the Board of Trade or Customs.

4. The power to detain is safeguarded by the right of appeal, but if the surveyor is competent and the case is clear, there need be no hesitation about detaining a foreign vessel which is overloaded.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

40964

No. 29.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 16 November, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 54.]

(No. 392.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 13 November, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency, to be laid before your Ministers, the accompanying copy of correspondence† with the Governor of New South Wales on the subject of restrictions alleged to be placed on British ships at Newcastle, New South Wales.

2. Your Ministers will observe that in practice British ships have been placed at a disadvantage as compared with foreign vessels with regard to the carrying out of the rules for safety, and I shall be glad if they will take the matter into their consideration in connection with the Navigation Bill of the Commonwealth of Australia, in order that care may be taken to secure the application of the same regulations as to safety both to foreign and to British vessels.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* 38034 : not printed.

† 38034 : not printed, and No. 28.

42378

No. 30.

NEW ZEALAND.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 19 November, 1908.)

[Answered by Nos. 45 and 48, and by L.F. transmitting copy of No. 77.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., 18 November, 1908.

SIR,

IN reply to your letters of the 8th and 25th September last* (Nos. 31927 and 34397), relating to the Workers' Compensation Bill recently introduced into the New Zealand Parliament, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that, as workmen's compensation is not a subject which is dealt with by the Imperial Merchant Shipping Acts, they are doubtful whether Sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, are altogether applicable to the New Zealand Bill, and that, in any case, they do not desire to raise any objection to the Bill, provided that, in order to prevent difficulties arising in cases in which Clause 10 covers the same ground as Section 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, or similar legislation in other Colonies, words are inserted (1) which will prevent proceedings being taken in New Zealand when the case has already been or is being dealt with in the United Kingdom or another Colony; and (2) which will make it clear that when a similar claim has not already been made, but is enforceable in the United Kingdom or another Colony, the New Zealand Courts will not entertain a claim except on the sole condition that the claimant binds himself not to take proceedings under any Act enforceable in His Majesty's dominions which gives substantially the same remedy.

I have, &c.,
WALTER J. HOWELL.

42620

No. 31.

AUSTRALIA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received November 21, 1908.)

[Answered by L.F. transmitting copy of No. 34.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens, London, S.W.,

20 November, 1908.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter (No. 39375) of the 2nd instant,† transmitting a copy of the Australian Commonwealth Navigation Bill as introduced into the Senate in September last, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that they do not desire to offer any further observations on this question except with regard to the two points of the compulsory survey of steamships (Clauses 185-9), and the power of the Board of Trade to revise sentences of Courts of Marine Inquiry in Australia cancelling or suspending certificates (Clause 369).

With regard to the question of survey, the Board of Trade offer no objection to the proposals of the Bill so far as they relate to ships registered in Australia or engaged in the Australian coasting trade. I am, however, to point out that any certificate of survey which the Board of Trade may find it possible to give with respect to ships of a class not subject to compulsory survey under the Imperial Law, in accordance with the suggestion made in the first resolution passed by the Colonial Merchant Shipping Conference, 1907, could only be of a voluntary and optional character. If, contrary to the hope of the Board of Trade, the Commonwealth Government consider it necessary to retain the survey clauses in the Navigation Bill in their present general form, the Board trust that in practice the administration of such provisions will follow the precedents of the New South Wales and Victoria Acts, referred to in the telegram‡ from the Governor-General of Australia,

* No. 23 and one not printed.

† No. 27.

‡ No. 26.

which, so far as they are aware, have not hitherto given much ground for complaint. Should it, unfortunately, prove otherwise, and if British ships of a class exempt from compulsory survey under Imperial Law should be subjected to compulsory periodic survey in Australian ports, though neither registered in Australia nor engaged in the Australian coasting trade, the Board of Trade presume that every facility would be given to an aggrieved shipowner to obtain an authoritative decision of the highest Court as to the legality of any proceedings taken against him for penalties.

With regard to Clause 369, the Board of Trade suggest that it would be desirable to add some such words as "except with the assent of the Minister" after the word "not" in line 19 of sub-clause (1), and to make a corresponding alteration in sub-clause (2), which should also be made to apply only to service in Australia. If these alterations are made, the Board would not press their objections to the clause further.

I have, &c.,
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

42621

No. 32.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 21 November, 1908.)

[Answered by No. 37.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,
London, S.W., 20 November, 1908.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th September last, No. 34709,* forwarding a copy of a Bill which has been introduced into the Parliament of South Australia respecting the compensation of workmen.

In reply, I am to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that the Board would be glad to be informed whether, in the event of the Australian Commonwealth Seamen's Compensation Bill becoming law, the individual States can also legislate on this subject. If so, the Board are of opinion that the provisions of the Commonwealth Bill, subject to the criticisms which have already been put forward in the letter from this Department of the 19th October,† would form a satisfactory basis for such legislation.

I am, &c.,
WALTER J. HOWELL.

42373

No. 33.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4.40 p.m., 21 November, 1908.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to Home Office and Board of Trade, 25 November, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 77.]

Please inform your Ministers that attention of Board of Trade has been called to Section 10, Workers' Compensation Bill, 1908. In order to prevent possibility of conflicting claims under that Act and Imperial Workmen's Act, 1906, Board of Trade suggest that Bill be amended to make it clear that proceedings cannot be taken under proposed Act if the case has already been, or is being, brought before Courts of United Kingdom or other Colony, and that claimant shall only be allowed to proceed in New Zealand Courts on giving undertaking not to proceed elsewhere in His Majesty's Dominions under Act giving substantially same remedy.—CREWE.

* Not printed.

† 38246: not printed.

42620

No. 34.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 1.55 p.m., 27 November, 1908.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to Board of Trade, November 27, 1908. L.F. See No. 35.]

[Answered by No. 52.]

Your telegram, 28th October,* Navigation Bill, Board of Trade are most anxious to meet your Government as far as possible. If your Ministers consider it essential to insist on extending compulsory survey to all vessels they earnestly trust that Act will be administered in same spirit as New South Wales and Victorian Acts which, so far as they are aware, have not caused serious ground for complaint. Further, if any shipowner is compelled to have a vessel which is not registered in the Commonwealth or engaged in coasting, and which is exempt from survey under Imperial Law, surveyed, Board of Trade presume that your Ministers will facilitate taking of test case to High Court or Privy Council. It is also assumed that period will be extended to twelve months, as stated in your telegram.

As regards Clause 369, His Majesty's Government have no doubt that clause as it stands is *ultra vires* in so far as it is not limited to coasting trade and registered vessels, but they will consent with reluctance that, in the case of Australia, the powers given by the Imperial Act shall not be used even with regard to vessels not registered nor coasting, thus avoiding the legal difficulty. At the same time, the Board of Trade suggest that in sub-clause (1), line 19, after the word "not," there should be added the words "except with the assent of the Minister," and that a similar alteration should be made in sub-clause (2).—CREWE.

44201

No. 35.

AUSTRALIA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received December 2, 1908.)

[Answered by No. 41.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens, London, S.W.,
2 December, 1908.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo,† transmitting a copy of a telegram‡ addressed to the Governor-General of Australia on the subject of the Commonwealth Navigation Bill, and, in reply, to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that it appears to them possible that some misunderstanding may arise in connection with the statement, made with reference to Clause 369 of the Bill, that His Majesty's Government "will consent with reluctance that in the case of Australia the powers given by the Imperial Act shall not be used even with regard to vessels neither registered nor coasting."

The Board do not think that it is possible for them to waive altogether the power conferred on them by Section 474 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, to revise sentences of Australian Courts cancelling or suspending certificates of competency, nor would it appear practicable in returning a cancelled or suspended certificate under Section 474 to lay down a stipulation to the effect that the revision of the Australian Court's sentence was only to be operative at ports outside Australia.

As was stated, however, in their letter of the 20th ultimo,§ the Board of Trade are prepared to refrain from pressing their objections to Clause 369 of the Bill provided it is altered so as to admit of the recognition in Australia of the revision of an Australian Court's sentence by the Board of Trade in cases where the revision is assented to by the Minister for Trade and Customs, and provided sub-clause (2) is modified so as to apply only to service in Australia. The Board desire me to suggest, if Lord Crewe agrees, that a telegram in this sense should be addressed to the

* No. 26.

† L.F.

‡ No. 34.

§ No. 31.

Governor-General in amplification of the telegram despatched to him on the 27th ultimo,* so as to remove any possible grounds for misconception of His Majesty's Government's views in regard to this matter.

I have, &c.,
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

42621

No. 36.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR.

[Answered, stating that Bill was not passed. 8045/09: not printed.]

(No. 75.)

SIR,

Downing Street, 4 December, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to request that you will inform your Ministers that I have had under my consideration, in conjunction with the Home Office and the Board of Trade, the Bill for an Act to consolidate and amend the law with respect to compensation to workmen for injuries suffered in the course of their employment which was again introduced into the Parliament of South Australia in August, 1908.

2. His Majesty's Government would suggest that, in order to avoid the possibility of duplicate claims being raised, especially in respect of seamen, both under the Imperial Workmen's Compensation Act and under any Act which may be passed by the Parliament of South Australia, express provision should be made that no suit for compensation shall be entertained by the Courts of South Australia if the case has already been brought, or is being brought, before the Courts of the United Kingdom or some other British Colony, and that the claimant shall only be allowed to proceed in the Courts of South Australia on giving an undertaking not to proceed elsewhere in His Majesty's dominions under an Act giving substantially the same remedy.

3. I trust that your Ministers will give this proposal their favourable consideration in order to avoid the confusion of duplicate claims.

4. I may add that a similar suggestion has been made to the Government of New Zealand with respect to the Bill recently introduced into the Dominion Parliament and also to the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia in respect of the Bill relating to compensation of seamen which was introduced this year into the Senate.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

42621

No. 37.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 39.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 5 December, 1908.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th of November,† on the subject of the Bill respecting the compensation of workmen introduced into the Parliament of South Australia.

2. With reference to the 2nd paragraph of your letter, I am to request that you will inform the Board of Trade that, in the event of the Australian Commonwealth Seamen's Compensation Bill becoming law, the individual States will still retain full power of legislation on the subject, but that Section 109 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth provides that when a law of the State is inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.

3. Lord Crewe is advised that this clause in all probability could be interpreted to mean that legislation by a State Government would only be invalid in so far as it actually conflicts with existing Commonwealth legislation, and that if, for example,

* No. 34.

† No. 32.

the State Bill applied to classes of vessels for which no legislation was contained in the Commonwealth Bill, the provisions of the State Bill would be given effect to by the Courts of Australia.

4. I am at the same time to enclose a copy of a despatch* which the Secretary of State has addressed to the Governor of South Australia, suggesting that care should be taken to prevent claims being brought both under the South Australian Act, and also under the Imperial Workmen's Compensation Act. This despatch is based on the principles laid down in your letter of the 18th of November† with regard to the case of the New Zealand's Workmen's Compensation Bill.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

46024

No. 38.

AUSTRALIA.

PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 16 December, 1908.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 24 December, 1908. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 40.]

SIR,

122, Leadenhall Street, London, E.C., 15 December, 1908.

REFERRING to the communications which have passed between the Secretary of State and the Federal Government of Australia, with regard to the Navigation Bill, I am requested by my Directors to transmit the attached copy of the observations on the Bill, as amended, which have been addressed to them by their Superintendent in the Australian Colonies, and which appear to show the necessity for further vigilance in this very important matter.

I am, &c.,
W. O. JOHNSON,
Secretary.

Enclosure in No. 38.

EXTRACT from letter from Peninsular and Oriental Company's Superintendent in Australia to his Directors, dated Sydney, 10 November, 1908.

NAVIGATION BILL (No. 2).

The advices from Melbourne Agency, dated 23rd and 30th September last, will have placed you in possession of the latest phase of the legislation in connection with the above measure, which the Government of the Commonwealth is feverishly anxious to place on the Statute Book, but which, I am glad to observe, the Senate considers worthy of consideration. Since the date of the Melbourne advices above referred to, a further despatch, dated Downing Street, 18th September, 1908, has been received by the Government of the Commonwealth from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and I observe, from the cablegram sent by the Governor-General of Australia in reply, that the Government of Australia is prepared to recommend Parliament to modify further clauses of the proposed Act to meet the views of the British Government. In making these modifications, however, the Australian Prime Minister assumes no further objection on the part of the Imperial Authorities will be taken to Clauses 64, 285, and 417 of the Bill.

Now Clause 64 is of no particular importance so far as this Company is concerned, as it merely deals with advances.

Clause 285, however, should be strenuously opposed as it stands, and so worded that its provisions should apply only to vessels actually registered in Australia. The reason for endeavouring to get it through in its present form is in order to prevent any over-sea vessels from carrying passengers coastwise, and it is scarcely conceivable that the Imperial Authorities will overlook this.

Clause 417 is highly objectionable, in that by a mere "Order in Council" the Governor-General may be induced to put in motion all the sub-clauses from A to H, both in regard to vessels registered in Australia and those registered elsewhere.

* No. 36.

† No. 30.

There can be no doubt in my own mind, after a careful study of the debates, that the intention is to impose a six-monthly survey on all vessels wherever registered, and to institute the most irritating and impossible regulations in regard to inspections generally. I believe the intention to impose a six-months' survey of hulls will be extended to twelve months, but this is by no means certain at present.

In regard to Clause 279, which was only introduced in the present Bill and which, I gather from the debates in the Senate, was not officially made known to the Imperial Authorities, but cabled by a private person, it is merely necessary to turn to "Parliamentary Debates," No. 5, of the Commonwealth of Australia, to gather what is intended; thus, pages 308-309, Senator Millen points out that "The Government may by order declare that the carrying of passengers between ports in Australia by the Orient Steam Navigation Company shall be legal, but when carried by the Peninsular and Oriental Company it shall not be legal."

At pages 508-516, 530-537, and 599-623 of Hansard No. 5, will be found the speeches made by Senators in connection with this measure, and I would beg to urge that the intended operation of Clause 279 should be specially brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

From the conversation I had with several Senators a few days ago, when travelling from Melbourne to Sydney, I gathered that there was no probability of the Bill passing the Senate before the end of this year, but I would urge that no time be lost in inviting attention to the remaining objectionable clauses which are still embodied in it, and which, if permitted to pass, will seriously hamper British shipping.

46142

No. 39.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 17 December, 1908.)

[Answered by No. 45.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., 16th December, 1908.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 42621) of the 5th instant,* on the subject of the Bill which has been introduced into the Parliament of South Australia respecting the compensation of workmen, and in reply I am to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that they concur in the amendment to the Bill proposed in the despatch addressed to the Governor of South Australia on the 4th instant.†

I am, however, at the same time to point out that Clause 10 of the Bill as it stands applies to "members of the crew of any ship," and it seems very doubtful to the Board whether legislation having so wide a scope is within the competency of the State Parliament. The corresponding provisions in the Compensation Bills introduced into the New Zealand and Australian Commonwealth Parliaments are very much more restricted in their application, and the Board fear that difficulties may arise in practice unless some similar limitation is inserted in the South Australian Bill, especially in view of the opinion expressed in the third paragraph of your letter.

I have, &c.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

46024

No. 40.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM
NAVIGATION COMPANY.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 24 December, 1908. L.F.]

Downing Street, 22 December, 1908.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th of December,‡ on the subject of the Australian Navigation Bill.

• No. 37.

† No. 36.

‡ No. 38.

2. In reply, I am to request that you will inform the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company that his Lordship is still in communication with the Government of the Commonwealth with regard to this Bill.

I am, &c.,

H. W. JUST.

44201

No. 41.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 42.]

Downing Street, 23 December, 1908.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd of December,* on the subject of the Commonwealth Navigation Bill.

2. Lord Crewe regrets that there should have been a misunderstanding as to the meaning of the last paragraph of your letter of the 20th of November.† In view of this misunderstanding a conference was arranged between representatives of the two Departments, which took place on the 14th instant, and at which the whole question was fully discussed.

3. Lord Crewe now understands that it was the proposal of the Board of Trade to make a concession to the Commonwealth Government by accepting Clause 369 of the draft Navigation Bill if it was so altered as to provide that with the consent of the Minister a certificate returned by the Board of Trade should be available for use in Australia.

4. Lord Crewe has given careful consideration to the question whether this concession to the Commonwealth Government could properly be made, and he desires to offer some considerations to the effect that it is hardly desirable that the concession should take this form.

5. The concession in the form proposed by the Board of Trade would amount to a formal admission that it is within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to modify by local legislation the effect of an Imperial Act applicable to ships registered in Great Britain while within the waters of the Commonwealth. This is a principle which has never yet been conceded by His Majesty's Government, though it has long been contended for in the case of the Dominion of Canada, and Lord Crewe fears that, if a concession were made in this case, it would be impossible to maintain any longer the theory of the restrictions placed on Colonial legislation as to Imperial shipping, which was contended for by His Majesty's Government at the Conference of 1907, and which was then in effect accepted by representatives of New Zealand, and even to some extent by the representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia. Moreover, the concession once made with regard to the principle would apply to all the legislation of the Commonwealth of Australia, and Lord Crewe feels considerable anxiety as to the result of such an admission.

6. In these circumstances Lord Crewe would suggest that it might be well to fall back on the suggestion made in the 9th paragraph of the letter from this Office of the 2nd of November.‡ It was there pointed out that the Parliament of the Commonwealth could legally alter or repeal Section 374 of the Imperial Act so far as it relates to vessels registered in Australia or engaged in the coasting trade, and it was suggested that this fact should be pointed out to the Commonwealth Government, and at the same time that His Majesty's Government should decline to surrender the power of the Board of Trade to deal with the certificates of officers employed in ships which are not registered in the Commonwealth and which do not engage in its coasting trade.

7. Lord Crewe feels that in adopting this attitude, His Majesty's Government would be in a strong position, as they would, moreover, be maintaining the position which they put forth every effort to make at the Conference of 1907, and on which they have laid so much stress in the subsequent correspondence.

8. Lord Crewe would be glad to receive an early reply to this letter, as he is anxious to communicate as soon as possible to the Commonwealth Government the exact views held by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.,

FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

• No. 35.

† No. 31.

‡ No. 27.

47771

No. 42.

AUSTRALIA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received December 29, 1908.)

[Answered by 47771: not printed.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,
London, S.W., 29 December, 1908.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 44201) of the 23rd instant,* in regard to Clause 369 of the Australian Commonwealth Navigation Bill, and in reply to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that in the circumstances they concur in the proposal to point out to the Commonwealth Government that the Parliament of the Commonwealth could legally alter or repeal Section 474 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, so far as it relates to vessels registered in Australia or engaged in the Australian coasting trade, and to decline to surrender the power of the Board of Trade to deal with the certificates of officers employed in ships not so registered or engaged.

I have, &c.,
WALTER J. HOWELL.

31258

No. 43.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 55.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 29 December, 1908.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to request that you will invite the attention of the Board of Trade to the letter from this Office of the 2nd of September,† on the subject of the Act, Chapter 65, of the Parliament of Canada, entitled "An Act to amend the Canada Shipping Act."

2. Lord Crewe would be glad to receive an early reply to that letter, as it is desirable that some communication on the subject should be made without delay to the Canadian Government.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

47944

No. 44.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 31 December 1908.)

(No. 85.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Wellington, 21 November, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's despatch, No. 151, of the 3rd September last,‡ on the subject of merchant shipping legislation, which I duly forwarded to my Government for consideration.

2. In reply I have now received from my Prime Minister, for transmission to your Lordship, the following minute written by the Minister for Marine:—

"I do not think that it would be wise for the Government of the Dominion to promise that at any future time no restrictions beyond those imposed by the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act will be imposed upon British ships registered outside the Dominion and not engaged in the New Zealand coastal trade. Such vessels may engage in the inter-colonial trade, and that

* No. 41.

† No. 20.

‡ No. 5 in [Cd. 4355].

is a trade regarding which, in my opinion, the Dominion should at any rate have the right to legislate."

I have, &c.,
PLUNKET,
Governor.

46142

No. 45.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

Downing Street, 1 January, 1909.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th of December,* on the subject of the Bill introduced into the Parliament of South Australia, respecting the compensation of workmen.

2. Lord Crewe does not propose to discuss the question of the competence of the legislation proposed, as he learns from page 769 of the Debates of the House of Assembly of South Australia, a copy of which is enclosed herewith for perusal and return, that the application of Section 10 of the Bill has been confined to practically the same set of cases as are dealt with in the New Zealand Act which formed the subject of correspondence ending with the letter from this Office of the 25th of November.† I am also to enclose a copy of the Bill,‡ "as received from the House of Assembly and read a first time," in the Legislative Council, which, it will be seen, has been amended in accordance with the proposals mentioned in the Debates.

3. Lord Crewe concurs with the opinion expressed in your letter of the 18th of November,§ that it is doubtful whether Sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 are applicable in the case of legislation for workmen's compensation, and he is advised that if these sections do not apply the legislation of the State must be strictly confined within territorial limits. He does not, however, propose to make any communication on this subject to the State, as the matter is one of great doubt, and it appears to him desirable that it should be left to the Courts to deal with, if and when the question is raised.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD

47944

No. 46.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 49.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 8 January, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 10th of September last,|| I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of a despatch¶ from the Governor of New Zealand on the subject of merchant shipping legislation.

2. It will be seen that the Government of New Zealand desire to have the right to legislate for vessels engaged in the inter-colonial trade, and the Board of Trade will recognise that this is a serious departure from the principles adopted in the Conference of 1907.

3. Lord Crewe would be glad to learn whether the Board of Trade consider it desirable that any representations should be made to the Government of New Zealand at the present moment, or whether they concur in the course which Lord Crewe considers preferable under the circumstances, namely, that His Majesty's Government should wait until this proposal is actually embodied in a Bill.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

* No. 39.

† L.F. transmitting copy of No. 33.

‡ Not reprinted.

§ No. 30.

|| L.F. transmitting copy of Nos. 21 and 22.

¶ No. 44.

47771

No. 47.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 1.30 p.m., 9 January, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 73.]

My telegram, 27 November,* Navigation Bill. His Majesty's Government regret to state that, on careful reconsideration of the whole question of the cancellation of certificates, they have come to the conclusion that the method of dealing with the matter suggested in my telegram cannot legally be carried out. It would be improper that Board of Trade should bind themselves in the matter of the exercise of the discretionary power expressly conferred on them by Section 474 of Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. They therefore propose to accept Clause 369 of Navigation Bill as it stands in Bill as introduced into Senate, provided that in Sub-clause (1) after the word "ship" the following words are inserted, namely, "registered in Australia or engaged in the coasting trade," and in Sub-clause (2) after the word "serve" the following words, "upon any such ship as aforesaid." This arrangement will concede substantially all that was desired by your late advisers, and is in harmony with the resolution of the Navigation Conference, and I trust, therefore, that it will be acceptable to your present Government.—CREWE.

46460

No. 48.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by 4280 concurring: not printed.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 16 January, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th of November last,† I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, a copy of an Act, No. 248 of 1908,‡ of the Parliament of New Zealand, entitled "The Workers' Compensation Act 1908."

2. It will be seen that this Act was assented to on the 10th of October last and that, therefore, it was not possible for the Government of New Zealand before the passing of the Act to consider the amendments suggested in Lord Crewe's telegram of the 21st of November,§ a copy of which accompanied the letter from this Office of the 25th of November.||

3. It will be seen that Section 11 of the Act has more extended effect than Section 10 of the Bill, as by Sub-section 5 an accident is to be deemed to happen in New Zealand if it happens within any harbour in New Zealand or within the marginal or other waters of the Dominion, whereas under Section 10 an accident was to be deemed to happen out of New Zealand if it happened at sea below low-water mark, even though within the marginal or other waters of the Dominion. In view of the considerations stated in the letter from this Office of the 1st of January,¶ on the subject of the similar Bill introduced into the Parliament of South Australia, Lord Crewe proposes, unless the Board of Trade see any objection, to inform the Governor that His Majesty will not be advised to disallow the Act, but at the same time to draw the attention of the Governor to his telegram of the 21st of November, to which no reply has yet been received.

I am, &c.,

FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

* No. 34. † No. 30. ‡ Not reprinted. § No. 33. || L.F. ¶ No. 45.

2280

No. 49.

NEW ZEALAND.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 20 January, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 53.]

Marine Department,

7, Whitehall Gardens, London, S.W., 19 January, 1909.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, No. 47944,* forwarding a copy of a despatch from the Governor of New Zealand respecting merchant shipping legislation in the Dominion, and, in reply, I am to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that the Board concur in his proposal to postpone any further representations until the New Zealand Government's amending legislation has been put into the form of a Bill.

I have, &c.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

2685

No. 50.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 23 January, 1909.)

(No. 304.)

MY LORD,

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 16 December, 1908.

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch, No. 308, dated 3rd September last,† on the subject of merchant shipping legislation, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a despatch which has been addressed to me by His Majesty's Prime Minister of the Commonwealth in reply thereto.

I have, &c.,

DUDLEY,

Governor-General.

Enclosure in No. 50.

MY LORD,

Prime Minister, Melbourne, 9th December, 1908.

WITH reference to the despatch of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, No. 308, of the 3rd September last, covering copy of correspondence with the Governor of New Zealand on the subject of merchant shipping legislation, I have the honour, at the instance of my colleague the Minister of State for Trade and Customs, to invite Your Excellency to be so good as to inform Lord Crewe that the Government are fully in accord with the policy of preserving uniformity, as far as is practicable, in the shipping laws of the Empire, but at the same time do not see their way to concur in the view that only such legislation as may be passed by the Imperial Parliament shall have effect in regulating trade between the Commonwealth and the Dominion of New Zealand. It is thought that any such legislation should be passed in pursuance of an arrangement between the Commonwealth and the Dominion, and it is not anticipated that there would be any practical difficulty in arriving at an understanding for common action.

2. Another difficulty which the Government feel in regard to giving any assurance for the future is that in a matter of this kind no Government can bind its successors or undertake to limit the freedom of legislative action of existing or future Parliaments.

I have, &c.,

ANDREW FISHER.

Governor-General

His Excellency the Right Honourable

The Earl of Dudley, P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,

&c., &c., &c.

* No. 46.

† No. 6 in [Cd. 4355].

1530

No. 51.

TASMANIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[See No. 70.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 27 January, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of an Act of the Parliament of Tasmania, entitled "An Act to further amend the Marine Boards Act, 1889."*

2. The Board of Trade will observe that Sections 8-10 of this Act alter Sections 160, 164, and 169 of the principal Act with regard to the survey of steamships.

3. The terms of these sections apply to steamers trading to or from any port in Tasmania. It will be seen that there is no clause in the Act providing that it shall not take effect until His Majesty's pleasure has been signified in the State, in accordance with Sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. No such clause appears in the Acts of 1889 (No. 34) and of 1895 (No. 27) dealing with this matter.

4. Lord Crewe will be glad to receive any observations which the Board may desire to make on the actual provisions of the Act; but he desires especially to call the attention of the Board to the question raised in the letters from this Office of the 2nd of September and the 29th of December† (to which no reply has yet been received) in the case of the Canadian Shipping Bill as to the validity of an Act which is passed without conforming to Sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.

5. It is true that, as was stated in the letter from this office of the 2nd of September, it has not been considered necessary in the case of certain Acts of other Australian States to insist on this point, as it was then thought that the Navigation Bill of the Australian Commonwealth would shortly pass into law. But Lord Crewe now considers that, in view of the doubt as to whether that Bill will become law at an early date, it is advisable to deal with this question without reference to the possibility of the Australian Navigation Bill being passed.

6. Lord Crewe will be glad to receive an early reply to this letter.

I am, &c.,

C. P. LUCAS.

3595

No. 52.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1 February, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 58.]

(No. 317.)

MY LORD,

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 23 December, 1908.

REFERRING to your Lordship's cablegram dated 27th ultimo,‡ relative to certain provisions of the Navigation Bill, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that a decode of the cablegram in question was at once transmitted to His Majesty's Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, who has now addressed to me a further communication upon the subject, a copy of which I append hereto for your information.

I have, &c.,

DUDLEY,

Governor-General.

Enclosure in No. 52.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

(P.M. 08/4801.)

MY LORD,

Prime Minister, Melbourne, 23 December, 1908.

WITH reference to the Secretary of State for the Colonies' telegraphic

* Act No. 31 of 1908.

† Nos. 20 and 43.

‡ No. 34.

despatch of the 27th November, on the subject of the provisions of the Navigation Bill, I have the honour, at the instance of my colleague the Minister of State for Trade and Customs, to invite Your Excellency to be so good as to inform Lord Crewe that the desire of the Board of Trade to meet the views of this Government is highly appreciated, and that the necessary proposals to give effect to the suggested changes in matters of detail will be made.

2. I shall, however, be pleased if Your Excellency will point out that the object of that part of the telegram which relates to taking a test case to the High Court or Privy Council is not quite clear. Allusion has been previously made to the fact that a power similar to that the inclusion of which in the Commonwealth Bill was objected to has existed for years in the New South Wales and Victorian Acts, and it is now admitted that the exercise of such power has so far "not caused serious ground of complaint." As there is no reason for assuming that Federal administration will not be as considerate as that of the States mentioned, it is difficult to understand the reason for the suggestion to take a test case to the Court. Had cases of hardship occurred, or had there been any doubt as to the legal position of the matter, it might reasonably have been expected that shipowners would not have waited till now to appeal to the Courts.

3. Still, should a case occur in which a shipowner desires to test the constitutional validity of the clause in question, the Government would, of course, offer no objection to his claim being speedily brought before the High Court for decision.

4. With regard to the statement in the telegram that certain vessels are "exempted" from survey in Great Britain, my colleague points out that that statement may be capable of misunderstanding. The ships referred to are "exempted" because they are not included in the scope of the Imperial Act, which places them in a somewhat different position from that which they would occupy if they were specially exempted by actual reference. If such reference existed the Bill would be in direct opposition to the Imperial Act, but as it is, it merely attaches a liability to a British ship whilst in Australian jurisdiction only, and does not directly contravene any Imperial legislation.

I have, &c.,

ANDREW FISHER.

Governor-General,

His Excellency the Right Honourable

The Earl of Dudley, P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,

&c.,

&c.,

&c.

2685

No. 53.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 3 February, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th of January,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of a despatch† from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, on the subject of merchant shipping legislation by the Commonwealth Parliament.

2. It will be observed that the position adopted by the Commonwealth Government is in full agreement with that adopted by the Dominion of New Zealand.

3. Lord Crewe considers that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the correspondence on this matter, pending the re-introduction of the Australian Navigation Bill into the Commonwealth Parliament.

I am, &c.,

R. L. ANTROBUS.

* No. 49.

† No. 50.

4841

No. 54.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6 February, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 12 February, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 319.)

Commonwealth of Australia,

MY LORD, Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 29 December, 1908.
 REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch, No. 392, dated 13th November, 1908,* respecting restrictions alleged to be placed upon British ships at Newcastle with regard to the carrying out of the rules for safety, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the provisions of the Navigation Bill now before Parliament will effect the object desired in the second paragraph of your Lordship's despatch now under reference.

I have, &c.,
 DUDLEY,
 Governor-General.

4921

No. 55.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 10 February, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 60.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., 9 February, 1909.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 2nd September last, and of 29th December last (No. 31258/08),† respecting an Act to amend the Canada Shipping Act, which was passed by the Canadian Legislature in the Session of 1908 and assented to by the Governor-General on the 20th July last, and, in reply, I am to forward, for the information and consideration of the Earl of Crewe, a copy of a memorandum which has been prepared to show the Board's views in regard to certain points arising out of the provisions of the Act.

In regard to the application of Sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 to the Act under consideration and to the necessity to validate the Act by a short confirming Act, as suggested in the fourth paragraph of your letter of the 2nd September last, the Board desire me to state that while they are advised that certain sections of the Act appear to come within the provisions of Section 735, viz., Sections 33 and 35, in so far as they apply to ships registered in Canada, and that to that extent these sections require to be dealt with strictly under the provisions of Section 735, yet they would suggest that the provisions in Sections 33 and 35 should be altered so as to agree with the corresponding provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. The alterations are not very important as regards ships registered in Canada, but can, technically, only be brought into operation by proceeding under the provisions of Section 735, which it seems unnecessary to invoke in such small matters. On the other hand, so far as Sections 33 and 35 affect ships not registered in Canada, their enactment is not within the powers of a Colonial Legislature and should not, therefore, be assented to.

As regards the provisions of Section 38, it is submitted that as far as this Section purports to take away the right of appeal given by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, to holders of Imperial certificates or of certificates having Imperial force the section is *ultra vires* (Section 478 (6) Merchant Shipping Act, 1894), even when the ship in question is registered in Canada, and it is suggested that this repeal of a provision of the Imperial Act is not one that should be sanctioned.

With regard to Section 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, the Board

* No. 29.

† Nos. 20 and 43.

desire me to state that Section 3 of the Canada Act, which increases the scope of the definition of coasting voyage, might be regarded as in a way regulating the coasting trade, and that while its mere definition of coasting voyage does not necessarily extend the scope of the coasting trade, yet the use of the term may be made a ground hereafter for a claim by the Canadian Government that they should be allowed to legislate for the extended voyages as if they were part of the coasting trade, and therefore they agree that if such provisions were allowed to stand it would probably be necessary to require the Act to be validated by a Confirming Act containing the suspending clause required by Section 736 (a).

It may not, however, be necessary to lay down that such provisions necessarily require validating under Section 736 (a), for it is open to the Colonial Office to discuss the question of extending the definition of a coasting voyage on its merits and require further explanation, and at all events a disavowal of any claim that the ships engaged in these voyages can thereby be said to be engaged in the coasting trade.

It may be pointed out that in so far as the Canadian Acts require ships registered in Canada to have certificated officers when engaged on coasting voyages, which would include "coasting trade," in excess of the requirements of the Imperial Act they would probably violate the provisions of Section 736 (b). It is probably, however, not desirable to call the attention of Canada to this point.

It may be difficult now to take notice of the provisions of Sections 953 and 954 of the Canada Act of 1906, but it appears to the Board that these provisions are also contrary to Sub-section (b) of Section 736 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.

I have, &c.,
 H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 55.

MEMORANDUM of observations on the Canada Shipping Amendment Act, 1908.

This section might be limited in its application to Government ships which are under the control of the Canadian Government, as in its present form it appears wider than is intended. Section 1

The definition of coasting voyage is much wider than in paragraph (f) of Section 72 of the Act of 1906 so far as regards the eastern coast, and it is possible that many of the provisions of the principal Act relating to coasting voyages may, by reason of the wider definition of "coasting voyage" in this Act, give rise to difficulty; for instance, under the Canada Act of 1906 a master of a ship trading to a port on the eastern coast of America south of Cape Hatteras would require to have a certificate of Imperial force. Under the new Act a local certificate would enable the master to take charge of a vessel trading to a port south of Cape Hatteras down to a point 5° north latitude. Section 3.

No reason is given for such extension.

The inconvenience of extending the definition of "coasting voyage" to voyages to other British Colonies may be found if any other of our Colonies within the scope of the extended definition legislated in regard to the certificates which must be held by officers on board ships leaving their ports.

It seems, therefore, that the provisions of this Section (3) might lead to a conflict which it would be well to avoid.

Sections 264 and 265 of Part II. of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, are in point here, and in any case our West Indian and South American Colonies might very well take exception to their being impliedly called upon to recognise Canadian coasting certificates, even though when limited to Canadian registered ships, as in this case.

Amend part VII. of the Canada Shipping Act, 1906, which deals not only with steamboat inspection but also with the examination of engineers for certificates of competency. Sections 12-22.

The provisions of this part of the Act apply or may under Section 569 be applied by the Governor in Council to steamers registered elsewhere than in Canada.

But apart from this, Section 641 (which is slightly amended by Section 20 of the Act under consideration) regarding the employment of certificated engineers is wide in its terms and would appear to apply to ships registered in the United Kingdom and in British possessions other than Canada; and it would seem to require that if a third or fourth engineer were carried they would have to hold certificates of competency as third or fourth-class engineer or of higher grades. (The Section 641 does not, however, seem to fit in very well with the preceding one.) This section, if intended to apply to ships not registered in Canada, is therefore in excess of the requirements of the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act.

Section 14 (c). It is observed that the limit of size in the case of motor boats has been omitted.
Section 20. Query whether the words "or under the Acts of the United Kingdom" are sufficient to cover certificates having Imperial force granted in other Colonies. This appears to have been intended but it might be made quite clear in any amending Act.

Section 30. Provides that in formal investigations into shipping casualties at least *two* assessors shall assist the Court. These are to be selected by the Minister, but the Court is to be the sole judge as to whether any assessor possesses the requisite qualifications in regard to the matter to be enquired into.

It would seem preferable that the Minister should decide whether an assessor is competent before selecting him to act. The Statutory Rules in the United Kingdom settle the qualifications and are part of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and the Secretary of State for the Home Department appoints assessors and selects them from his lists as occasion requires (Sections 466 (3) and 467 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894).

Section 31. 75 should be 785 it seems.

Section 33. The Board of Trade have no observations to offer as regards pilots, but in the case of the cancellation or suspension of the certificates of the master, mate, or engineer, Section 473 (a) of Imperial Act provides that he shall deliver his certificate if cancelled or suspended by a Court to that Court on demand. The original provision of the Canada Shipping Act, 1906, which is practically in accord with the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act seems preferable.

Section 35. Is open to the objection that it appears to relieve the Court of the necessity to draw up a report upon the case, though this is required by Section 478 (5) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, applying Section 466 (6) to Colonial inquiries where the Court cancels or suspends a certificate.

The Board therefore consider it would be better to keep to the former wording as regards "Report" instead of "Judgment" (Section 799 of the Canadian Act of 1906).

Reports of formal investigations held in British Possessions are published by the Board of Trade for general information, and it is important that the report should contain not only the judgment of the Court but also a statement of the facts of the case.

Section 36. Section 470 (4) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, is represented by Section 788 of the Canada Shipping Act, which, however, does not appear to go quite far enough, inasmuch as it does not provide that the copy of the report or a statement of the case on which the investigation or inquiry has been ordered must be furnished to the holder of the certificate *before the commencement* of the investigation or inquiry, nor that the Court have no power to deal with a certificate unless this has been done.

Section 37. Amends Section 806 to provide that the Minister may order the case to be reheard either by the Court of first instance or by another Commissioner with the same or other assessors, and Section 38 provides that this shall be the only and final appeal. The latter clause, therefore, ignores the appeal reserved by Section 478 (6) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and it is desirable that the provisions of that section should be recognised by Section 37.

Section 38. The latter clause, therefore, ignores the appeal reserved by Section 478 (6) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and it is desirable that the provisions of that section should be recognised by Section 37.

Section 39. Appears to require some qualification as regards masters, mates, and engineers as the certificate may have been lost by the ship.

Section 41. Is superfluous, Clauses 4 and 6 of the Bill to which it originally referred having been omitted from the Act.

5095

No. 56.

AUSTRALIA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 11 February, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 59.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., 11 February, 1909.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter of the 5th instant (No. 3595/1909),* respecting the Australian Commonwealth Navigation Bill, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that they concur in the terms of the despatch† which his Lordship proposes to address to the Governor-General, but they would suggest that the words "or Privy Council" might be added after the words "High Court of the Commonwealth" at the end of paragraph 3 of the draft enclosed in your letter.

I have, &c.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

4280

No. 57.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 15 February, 1909. L.F.]

[See No. 77.]

(No. 31.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 11 February, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty will not be advised to exercise His power of disallowance with respect to Act No. 248 of 1908, shortly entitled the Workers' Compensation Act, 1908, transcripts of which accompanied your despatch, No. 81, of the 3rd of November.†

2. I have, however, to request that you will invite the attention of your Ministers to my telegram of the 21st of November,‡ to which I have not yet received any reply.

I have, &c.,

CREWE.

5095

No. 58.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

[Answered by No. 73.]

(No. 63.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 12 February, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's despatch, No. 317 of the 23rd of December,|| transmitting a copy of a communication from your Prime Minister on the subject of certain provisions of the Navigation Bill.

2. In reply I have to refer you to my telegram of the 9th of January,¶ from which it will be seen that His Majesty's Government regret that it is not possible to carry out precisely the arrangements contemplated in my telegram of the 27th of November last.** I trust, however, that the compromise suggested in my telegram of the 9th of January¶ will commend itself to your Government as being in harmony with the resolutions of the Navigation Conference of 1907, and as conceding practically the whole measure of control desired by your Ministers.

3. With regard to paragraphs 2 to 4 of Mr. Fisher's Minute, I have to request

* Not printed.

† See No. 58.

‡ 46460: not printed.

§ No. 33.

|| No. 52.

¶ No. 47.

** No. 34.

that you will explain to your Ministers that His Majesty's Government fully recognise that under the administration of the Commonwealth it is not likely that any inconsiderate treatment will be meted out to British vessels. As, however, the matter of survey is one on which there is strong feeling among the shipowners in this country, His Majesty's Government asked, in my telegram of the 27th of November,* for the assurance which your Ministers have now readily given, that if any shipowner is advised that the provisions as to survey in the Commonwealth Navigation Bill when passed into law are in effect repugnant to the provisions of the Imperial merchant shipping legislation no technical difficulties will be placed in the way of the matter being taken before the High Court of the Commonwealth.

4. Your Ministers will recognise that the legal question involved is whether or not the effect of the Imperial legislation is to exempt from survey vessels not required to be surveyed under the Imperial Act, and that this question cannot be considered as being altogether free from doubt.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

5095

No. 59.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[See No. 76.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 13 February, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th of February,† on the subject of the Australian Commonwealth Navigation Bill.

2. In reply, I am to request you to explain to the Board of Trade that, in sending to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth the despatch‡ of which a draft was enclosed in the letter from this Office of the 5th of February,§ the Secretary of State, after full consideration, has not seen his way to add the words "or Privy Council," because that would not accurately represent the undertaking given by the Commonwealth Government, and it does not appear to the Secretary of State desirable at the present time to refer further to the possibility of an appeal to the Privy Council, as an alternative to an appeal to the High Court of the Commonwealth, even if the Commonwealth Government had the power to prevent such an appeal.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

4921

No. 60.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 68.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 March, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th of February|| on the subject of the Act to amend the Canadian Shipping Act.

2. In reply I am to state that Lord Crewe will suggest to the Government of the Dominion that Sections 33 and 35 of the Act should be altered so as to agree with the corresponding provisions of the Imperial Shipping Act of 1894. At the same time he is advised that the section in question could, under Section 736 of the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, be regarded as binding on vessels coasting in Canada, as well as in the case of vessels registered in Canada under the provisions of Section 735, though in both cases it would be necessary that the formalities prescribed in these sections should be complied with.

3. In communicating with the Canadian Government on the subject, Lord Crewe therefore proposes to place before that Government the two alternatives,

* No. 34. † No. 56. ‡ No. 58. § 3595: not printed. || No. 55.

either to restrict the operations of the section to coasting and registered vessels, and to confirm them by an Act containing a suspending clause as provided in the Imperial Act, or to alter them so as to correspond with the Imperial Act, in which case a suspending clause will not be necessary.

4. Similarly, with regard to Section 38, Lord Crewe is advised that under a strict interpretation of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, the Parliament of Canada has the power of modifying the provisions of Section 478, Sub-section 6, of the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and while he is prepared to ask the Canadian Government to alter this section so as to permit of an appeal as at present, he proposes to give them the alternative of restricting the clause to coasting and registered vessels. The position which Lord Crewe suggests should be taken up with regard to Sections 33, 35, and 38 is in accordance with the principle recognised by His Majesty's Government at the Merchant Shipping Conference of 1907, and he does not wish to appear to regard the powers of the Canadian Parliament as to merchant shipping as being more restricted than those of the Commonwealth Parliament or of the Parliament of the Dominion of New Zealand.

5. With regard to Section 1 of the Act, Lord Crewe would be glad to be informed if the Board consider that this section would apply to ships of war of the Imperial Government. In this case he would propose, with the concurrence of the Admiralty, to inform the Canadian Government that the Act must be amended so as to confine its application to vessels of the Canadian Government.

6. With regard to Section 3 of the Act, it appears to Lord Crewe that, as Section 101 of the principal Act compels a master going on a coasting voyage to produce his certificate in view of Sections 82 to 85, a master holding a certificate of competence granted in England will be required to pass an examination in Canada before he can engage on a coasting voyage. If coasting voyages were confined to Canadian waters, there could be no objection in point of law to this provision, but as Section 3 of the new Act extends the definition of coasting voyages to Mexico and Central America, there appears to be grave objection to a provision which compels a master of a ship, who holds a certificate granted by the Board of Trade, to pass an examination in Canada before his vessel is permitted to clear for Mexico.

7. Lord Crewe would be glad to know whether the Board concur in this interpretation of the two Acts, and to have any observations which the Board may desire to offer on these points.

8. With regard to Section 14 of the Act, Lord Crewe feels it difficult to take exception to Section 566 of the principal Act as amended, in view of the provisions of Section 571 of that Act.

9. With regard to Section 20 of the new Act, Lord Crewe presumes that the Board of Trade do not wish to press their objections to Section 641 of the principal Act.

10. I am to add that Lord Crewe would be glad to receive an early reply to this letter.

I am, &c.,
H. BERTRAM COX.

6621

No. 61.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 62.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 15 March, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th of June, 1908,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of a Bill which has been introduced into the Senate of Canada entitled "The Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1909."

2. Lord Crewe will be glad to receive any observations which the Board may have to offer upon this Bill. It will be seen that Sections 6 and 7 are considerably modified from the form of the Bill introduced in 1908, to which exception was then taken by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

* 20308: not printed.

Enclosure in No. 61.
1st Session, 11th Parliament, 9 Edward VII., 1909.

THE SENATE OF CANADA.

BILL A.

An Act relating to the Water-Carriage of Goods.

Preamble. His Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:—

Short title. 1. This Act may be cited as "The Water-Carriage of Goods Act, 1909."

Interpretation. 2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:—

"Goods." (a) "goods," includes goods, wares, merchandise, and articles of any kind whatsoever, but does not include live animals;

"Ship." (b) "ship" includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars;

"Port." (c) "port" means a place where ships may discharge or load cargo.

Application of Act. 3. This Act applies to ships carrying goods from any port in Canada to any other port in Canada, or from any port in Canada to any port outside Canada, and to such goods carried by such ships, or received to be carried by such ships.

Certain clauses prohibited in bill of lading. 4. Where any bill of lading or document contains any clause, covenant or agreement whereby—

(a) the owner, charterer, master, or agent of any ship, or the ship itself, is relieved from liability for loss or damage to goods arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the proper loading, stowage, custody, care or delivery of goods received by them or any of them to be carried in or by the ship; or

(b) any obligations of the owner or charterer of any ship to exercise due diligence to properly man, equip, and supply the ship, and make and keep the ship seaworthy, and make and keep the ship's hold, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation, are in any wise lessened, weakened or avoided; or

(c) the obligations of the master, officers, agents, or servants of any ship to carefully handle and stow goods, and to care for, preserve, and properly deliver them, are in any wise lessened, weakened or avoided;

that clause, covenant or agreement shall be illegal, null and void, and of no effect.

Express reference to be made to this Act. Jurisdiction. 5. Every bill of lading or document relating to the carriage of goods from any place in Canada to any place outside of Canada shall contain a clause to the effect that the shipment is subject to all the terms and provisions of, and all the exemptions from liability contained in, this Act; and any stipulation or agreement purporting to oust or lessen the jurisdiction of any court having jurisdiction at the port of loading in Canada in respect of the bill of lading or document, shall be illegal, null and void, and of no effect.

Responsibility for navigation and management. 6. If the owner of any ship transporting merchandise or property from any port in Canada exercises due diligence to make the ship in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the ship nor the owner, agent or charterer shall become or be held responsible for loss or damage resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of the ship.

Loss for which the ship, the owner, &c., is not liable. 7. The ship, the owner, charterer, agent or master shall not be held liable for loss arising from fire, dangers of the sea or other navigable waters, acts of God or public enemies, or inherent defect, quality or vice of the thing carried, or from insufficiency of package, or seizure under legal process, or for loss resulting from any act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative, or from saving or attempting to save life or property at sea, or from any deviation in rendering such service, or from strikes, or for loss arising without their actual fault or privity or without the fault or neglect of their agents, servants or employees.

8. The ship, the owner, charterer, master or agent shall not be liable for loss or damage to or in connection with goods for a greater amount than one hundred dollars per package, unless a higher value is stated in the bill of lading or other shipping document, nor for any loss or damage whatever if the nature or value of such goods has been falsely stated by the shipper, unless such false statement has been made by inadvertence or error. The declaration by the shipper as to the nature and value of the goods shall not be considered as binding or conclusive on the ship, her owner, charterer, master or agent.

9. Every owner, charterer, master or agent of any ship carrying goods, shall on demand issue to the shipper of such goods a bill of lading showing, among other things, the marks necessary for identification as furnished in writing by the shipper, the number of packages, the quality or the weight, as the case may be, and the apparent order and condition of the goods as delivered to or received by such owner, charterer, master or agent; and such bill of lading shall be *prima facie* evidence of the receipt of the goods as therein described.

10. When a ship arrives at a port where goods carried by the ship are to be delivered, the owner, charterer, master or agent of the ship shall forthwith give such notice as is customary at the port, to the consignees of goods to be delivered there, that the ship has arrived there.

11. Every one who, being the owner, charterer, master or agent of a ship—
(a) inserts in any bill of lading or document any clause, covenant or agreement declared by this Act to be illegal; or makes, signs, or executes any bill of lading or document containing any clause, covenant or agreement declared by this Act to be illegal;

without incorporating *verbatim*, in conspicuous type, in the same bill of lading or document section 4 of this Act; or

(b) refuses to issue to a shipper of goods a bill of lading as provided by this Act; or

(c) refuses or neglects to give the notice of arrival of the ship required by this Act;

is liable to a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, with cost of prosecution; and the ship may be libeled in any Admiralty District in Canada within which the ship is found.

2. Such proportion of any penalty imposed under this section as the court deems proper, together with full costs, shall be paid to the person injured, and the balance shall belong to His Majesty for the public uses of Canada.

12. Every one who knowingly ships goods of an inflammable or explosive nature, or of a dangerous nature, without before shipping the goods making full disclosure of their nature to, and obtaining the permission of, the agent, master or person in charge of the ship, is liable to a fine of one thousand dollars.

13. Goods of an inflammable or explosive nature, or of a dangerous nature, shipped without permission from the agent, master or person in charge of the ship, may, at any time before delivery, be destroyed or rendered innocuous, by the master or person in charge of the ship, without compensation to the owner, shipper or consignee of the goods; and the person so shipping the goods shall be liable to the owner or charterer of the ship for all damages directly or indirectly arising out of such shipping.

14. This Act shall not apply to any bill of lading or document made pursuant to a contract entered into before this Act comes into force.

15. This Act shall come into force on the first day of September, A.D. 1909.

10669

No. 62.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received March 26, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 83.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens, London, S.W.,

26 March, 1909.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter

Limit of liability as to value of goods.

Effect of declaration.

Bill of lading to be issued to shipper. Contents.

Effect as evidence.

Notice of arrival of ship.

Penalties.

Disposal of penalty.

Shipping inflammable explosives or dangerous goods.

Penalty.

Master may destroy such goods, if shipped without disclosure.

Shipper liable for damages.

Act not retroactive.

Commencement of Act.

of the 15th instant, No. 6621,* forwarding a copy of a Bill recently introduced into the Canadian Senate entitled "The Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1909."

In reply, I am to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that, having regard to the modifications which have been made with the view of meeting the objections taken to the Bill when introduced last year, the Board have no further observations to offer.

The copy of the Bill is returned herewith.

I have, &c.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

10737

No. 63.

AUSTRALIA.

CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 27 March, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 6 April, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 66.]

5, Whittington Avenue, Leadenhall Street, E.C., 26 March, 1909.

Australian Legislation.

MY LORD,

I AM directed by the Executive Council of this Chamber to forward to your Lordship the subjoined copy of a Resolution, upon the above subject, which was unanimously agreed to at the recent Annual Meeting of this Chamber, and to request for it your Lordship's favourable consideration.

I have, &c.,

W. H. COOKE,

Secretary.

Resolution.

"That this Chamber regrets to learn that the Navigation Bill, which was introduced into the Senate of the Commonwealth of Australia in September last, is not, in many respects, in conformity with the resolutions of the Colonial Merchant Shipping Conference held in London in 1907. That the Chamber cordially approves of the statement as to the principles which should govern the relations between Imperial legislation and the legislation of the Commonwealth and New Zealand, in regard to navigation and shipping, which is contained in the despatch of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of Australia, dated September 18th last,† and respectfully urges that those principles shall be maintained in future legislation."

8031

No. 64.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 67.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 30 March, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of a Bill† introduced into the Canadian House of Commons, entitled "An Act respecting Immigration."

2. Lord Crewe would invite the attention of the Board of Trade to Section 57 as to the number of passengers to be carried by vessels sailing to Canada, and Section 62 as to stowaways.

* No. 61. † No. 7 in [Cd. 4355]. ‡ Enclosure, not reprinted, in No. 7 in Dominions No. 10.

3. Lord Crewe would be glad to receive any observations which the Board of Trade may desire to offer with regard to the Bill.

I am, &c.,

FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

10737

No. 65.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 127.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 31 March, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 63, of the 12th of February,* I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, for the information of your Ministers, the accompanying copy of a letter† from the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, on the subject of the proposed merchant shipping legislation of the Parliament of the Commonwealth.

I have, &c.,

CREWE.

10737

No. 66.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 6 April, 1909. L.F.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 April, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th of March,† forwarding copy of a Resolution on the subject of the proposed merchant shipping legislation of the Commonwealth of Australia.

2. In reply, I am to request that you will inform the Chamber of Shipping that a copy of your letter has been forwarded to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth for the information of his Ministers.

I am, &c.,

R. L. ANTROBUS.

14836

No. 67.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 3 May, 1909.)

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., 1st May, 1909.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter of the 30th March (No. 8031/1909)‡ respecting the Canadian Bill No. 17 on the subject of immigration, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that they do not think any objection need be raised, so far as this Department is concerned, to the provisions of Clauses 57 and 62 of this Bill.

I have, &c.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

* No. 58.

† No. 63.

‡ No. 64.

No. 68.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 7 May, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 69.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

SIR,

London, S.W., 6th May, 1909.

In reply to your letter (4921/1909) of the 2nd March last* on the subject of the Act to amend the Canada Shipping Act, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that they do not wish to raise any objection to the course proposed to be taken with regard to Sections 33 and 35 of the Act. It seems, however, undesirable that there should be any differentiation between the procedure to be followed by a Court of formal investigation in the case of a British ship engaged in the coasting trade and in the case of a British ship not so engaged, and I am to suggest that, in placing before the Canadian Government the two alternatives mentioned in the third paragraph of your letter, an opinion should be expressed in favour of the sections being amended so as to correspond with the Imperial Act.

With regard to Section 38, I am to point out that the powers of Colonial Courts of formal investigation are defined in detail in Section 478 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and to state that, in the opinion of the Board, it was not the intention of Sections 735 and 736 to give Colonial Legislatures power to enact provisions which purport to take away from the holder of a certificate of competency of Imperial validity the right of appeal given him by Imperial law. This particular point has not arisen in connection with Australian or New Zealand legislation, for the New Zealand Shipping and Seamen Act and the Australian Navigation Bill do not interfere with the appeal provided by Section 478 (6) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. The provisions of Section 38 of the Canadian Act seem further open to the objection that no right of appeal is given to a higher Canadian Court in the event of the Minister refusing a re-hearing; and the Board also desire me to point out that the last sentence of the section might possibly be construed as taking away from the Board of Trade the power given them by Section 474 of the Imperial Act, of revising sentences dealing with certificates. In all the circumstances, the Board feel that the only satisfactory course with regard to this section is that suggested in their letter of the 9th February last,† i.e., that it should be amended so as to secure in all cases the right of appeal to the High Court conferred by Section 478 (6) on the holder of a certificate granted in the United Kingdom or in a British Possession.

In reply to the fifth paragraph of your letter, the Board desire me to say that Section 1 of the Act would, in their opinion, apply to ships of war of the Imperial Government, and I am to suggest that in calling the attention of the Canadian Government to the desirability of limiting the application of the section, reference might be made to Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 80 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1906.

The Board do not think that the Canadian Acts bear the interpretation placed on them in the sixth paragraph of your letter. Section 96 of the principal Act provides that foreign trade certificates granted in the United Kingdom shall be valid for the purpose of a "coasting voyage," so that the holders of such certificates would be able to engage on a coasting voyage without passing an examination in Canada.

The Board further desire me to say that, in referring to Section 14 of the new Act, their intention was rather to point out a possible error in drafting than to object to the omission of the limit of size in the case of motor boats, and I am to add that the Board do not desire to press their objections to Section 641 of the principal Act.

In conclusion the Board desire me to enclose a copy of a memorandum by their Solicitor dealing with Sections 33, 35, and 38 of the new Canadian Act.

I have, &c.,

H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

* No. 60.

† No. 55.

Enclosure in No. 68.

MEMORANDUM.

Re CANADIAN ORDINANCE.

So far as Section 33 of the Canadian Act differs from the Imperial Act, it may be said that there is no particular object in departing from the wording of the Imperial Act, and the Canadian Government may be perfectly willing to use the language of the Imperial Act. After all, it is a matter of internal administration.

As regards Section 35, the omission to provide for a report being sent to the Board of Trade is possibly consequent on the wish to avoid allowing an appeal to the High Court in England.

In regard to both these sections technically, in so far as they may deal with ships registered in Canada or ships engaged in the coasting trade, they, both of them, require, to enable effect to be given to such provisions as regards such ships, to be followed by the formalities prescribed by Section 735 and 736 of the Imperial Act, the latter section requiring the specific insertion of a suspending clause; but I would suggest that, if His Majesty's Government are prepared to assent to provisions of this character as limited to ships registered in Canada or engaged in the coasting trade, the clauses themselves should be amended so as to make it perfectly clear that they relate to those vessels and none other, as it would probably not be desirable to leave such clauses, on the face of them, to appear to apply to all vessels, and then to say they are limited to the classes of vessels already indicated, on the ground that to extend them to all British vessels would be *ultra vires*.

But there is always this consideration to be borne in mind, that power to regulate the coasting trade, given to British Possessions by Section 736, may very well not have been intended to cover a provision of this character. The question as to whether there should be an appeal as regards the certificate of a master, mate, or engineer, hardly appears to fall under the term regulation of the coasting trade.

Therefore, all things considered, I should prefer that these clauses should be brought into line with the Imperial Act, so that, whatever power of appeal may be left, we may always get a report of the proceedings.

As regards Clause 38, it is to be noted that, whatever may be the power of the Colony as regards appeals from the findings of Courts of Inquiry in relation to ships registered in Canada or engaged in the coasting trade, an important question arises for the consideration of the Colonial Office.

It should be noted that the Board's power to order a re-hearing still remains, but that it is the right to appeal which has been dealt with. Now, under Section 478, 6 (a) and (b), there is no appeal—

- (a) from any order or finding on an inquiry into a casualty affecting a ship registered in a British Possession, or
- (b) from a decision affecting the certificate of a master, mate, or engineer, if that certificate has not been granted either in the United Kingdom or in a British Possession, under the authority of this Act;

and it will be noticed that there appears to be a discrimination between the order or finding of the Court as regards a casualty affecting a ship registered in the British Possession and decision affecting the certificate of a master, mate, or engineer, as if the finding of the Court were split up, as regards appeals, into two parts, one part relating merely to the casualty to the ship and the other to dealing with certificates.

Now, by implication, it is possible to say that though from the finding of the Court, as regards the cause of the casualty relating to a ship registered in Canada, there is under the Imperial Act no appeal; yet there is an appeal, even when the ship is registered in Canada, when the certificate is one of Imperial value, and if the Imperial Act has discriminated in the way I have indicated, then (apart from the question as to whether the right of holders of Imperial certificates to appeal to the High Court in England should be taken away by a Colonial Act or Ordinance) there remains the question to be considered as to whether it may not be alleged that, having regard to the specific provision of the Merchant Shipping Act discriminating between the right of appeal from the finding of the Colonial Court as to the casualty to a ship registered in the Colony and to the finding of such Court when it deals with certificates, Section 735 must not be read strictly so as to suggest that, having regard to Section 478, 6 (b), British Possessions have not the same right of appeal as regards the certificate as they may have as regards the ship itself.

R. E. C.

26 April, 1909.

15357

No. 69.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 72.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 10 May, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th of May,* on the subject of the Canada Shipping Act of 1908.

2. In reply, I am to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying draft of a despatch† which Lord Crewe proposes, with the concurrence of the Board, to address to the Governor-General of Canada, intimating the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

3. It will be observed that no reference is made to the question of the interpretation of Section 3 of the Act.

4. As it is understood that the Canadian Parliament will adjourn within the next few days, it is not possible that any legislation should be passed this Session, even if the Canadian Government are prepared to adopt the views laid down in his Lordship's despatch, and Lord Crewe has accordingly suggested that, if necessary, the question might be discussed with the Minister of Marine, Mr. Brodeur, who is expected to arrive in this country towards the end of July in connexion with the proposed Conference on the Military and Naval Defence of the Empire.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

17780

No. 70.

TASMANIA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received May 26, 1909.)

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., May 25, 1909.

SIR,

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th January last (No. 1530/1909),‡ forwarding, for the observations of this Department, a copy of the Tasmanian Act, No. 31 of 1908, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that they do not desire to raise any objection to Sections 8 and 9 of this Act.

Section 10 appears to be intended to give the Tasmanian authorities greater powers to enforce the provisions of the original Act of 1889, relating to the survey of steamers trading to or from Tasmania, but the Board would be glad if they could be informed why this section was required and how the provisions relating to survey in Tasmania have worked since their introduction in 1889; in particular it would be desirable to ascertain whether any cargo steamers trading between the United Kingdom and Tasmania have been compelled to undergo survey and obtain certificates in the Colony.

As, however, the section in question does not directly impose any new requirement as to survey of steamers, but merely provides specific penalties for the infringement of provisions which have existed for twenty years, the Board do not desire to press any objection to it, although they consider that the provisions of Tasmanian law as to the survey of steamers are not free from objection when taken as a whole.

I am to add that the Board regret that it was not found possible to send an earlier reply to your letter.

I have, &c.,
WALTER J. HOWELL.

* No. 68.

† Not printed.

‡ No. 51.

17780

No. 71.

TASMANIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE ACTING GOVERNOR.

(No. 53.)

SIR,

Downing Street, June 4, 1909.

WITH further reference to Sir G. Strickland's despatch, No. 48, of the 7th of December last,* I have the honour to inform you that I have had under my consideration Act No. 31 of 1908 of the Parliament of Tasmania entitled "An Act to further amend 'The Marine Boards Act, 1889.'"

2. I should be glad if I could be informed of the reasons for the enactment of Section 10 of the Act, which appears to be intended to give the State authorities greater powers to enforce the provisions of the original Act of 1889 relating to the survey of steamers trading to or from Tasmania.

3. I should also be glad to learn how the provisions relating to survey in Tasmania have worked since their introduction in 1889, and in particular whether any cargo steamers trading between the United Kingdom and Tasmania have been compelled to undergo survey and obtain certificates in the State.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

23495

No. 72.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 14 July, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 74.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., 13th July, 1909.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter of the 10th May, No. 15357,† on the subject of the Canada Shipping Act, 1908, I am directed by the Board of Trade to suggest, for the consideration of the Earl of Crewe, that the proposed despatch to the Governor-General of Canada should be amended so as to embody the alterations shown in the enclosed draft.‡

At the same time, as the Board of Trade feel that as the alterations effected by Sections 33 and 35 of the Act of 1908 are not of great importance, it is not perhaps essential to lay too much stress upon them, and it might suffice if it were simply suggested that, unless the Canadian Government considered them to be of importance, it would be more convenient, for the sake of uniformity of practice, to bring these provisions back into line with those of the Imperial Act, as was the position under the Canadian Act before the last amendments.

Subject to these alterations the Board of Trade concur in the terms of the despatch.

I have, &c.,
WALTER J. HOWELL.

24854

No. 73.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 26 July, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 79.]

(No. 141.)

MY LORD,

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 23 June, 1909.

REFERRING to your Lordship's cablegram, dated 9th January, and your

* 956: not printed (submitting Acts of 1908).

† No. 69.

‡ Not printed.

despatch, No. 63, dated 12th February last,* on the subject of those provisions of the Navigation Bill relating to the cancellation of certificates, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that an amendment in the terms of the Board of Trade's suggestion, as communicated in the cablegram of 9th January, will be proposed by the Government in Parliament.

2. Having regard to the views expressed in previous correspondence hereon, the Prime Minister desires me to say that the Commonwealth Government feel assured that the Board of Trade will not exercise its powers under Section 474 of the Merchant Shipping Act in regard to masters or officers of oversea vessels in cases in which their certificates have been dealt with in Australia under any Federal Act without first consulting the Commonwealth Government.

I have, &c.,
DUDLEY,
Governor-General.

23495

No. 74.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by Nos. 78 and 80.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 30 July, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to request you to inform the Board of Trade that he has given his most careful consideration to your letter of the 13th of July† on the subject of the Canada Shipping Act, 1908.

2. Lord Crewe considers that on the whole, for the reason indicated below, it is hardly desirable to adopt the present line of argument indicated by the alterations suggested in the draft despatch to Canada.

3. In the first place, it must be remembered that the Act of 1908 is now in force in Canada, and that the question of disallowance is one which, in view of the constitutional relations of Canada and His Majesty's Government, could not be entertained. The particulars in which the Act deviates from Imperial legislation, though important, are not of the degree of seriousness which could justify any proposal to disallow the Act.

4. It will therefore be necessary that the Canadian Government should be asked to amend the Act of 1908, and in view of the jealousy with which suggestions from His Majesty's Government for the amendment of Colonial legislation are naturally viewed, it will be essential that His Majesty's Government should be able, in making representations to the Canadian Government, to indicate some broad ground on which the request for amendment can properly be based.

5. Such a ground exists in the principle adopted unanimously at the Merchant Shipping Conference of 1907, and embodied in the 9th Resolution of that Conference, which, as understood by the Colonial delegates and the representatives of the Colonial Office at that Conference, recognises the right of Colonial legislation to regulate in all matters vessels registered in the Colonies or engaged in the coasting trade.

6. It is now proposed by the Board to restrict the operations of the principle by holding (a) that the regulation of the coasting trade does not include the making of such alterations in the regulations as to shipping enquiries as appear in Sections 33 and 35 of the Act of 1908, and (b) that the power to legislate for registered vessels and vessels engaged in the coasting trade does not include the right to affect the provisions of Sections 474 and 478 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 as regards certificates of masters, &c., with Imperial validity.

7. Whether or not the restrictions proposed by the Board are such as would be upheld by the Courts, Lord Crewe feels great difficulty in putting them forward on grounds of practical policy. He feels that it would now be impossible to attempt to apply these restrictions to Australia or New Zealand; indeed, His Majesty's Government have definitely consented to allow the Australian Parliament to amend Section 474 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, and obviously the Canadian Parliament cannot be refused any power as regards merchant shipping which is

* Nos. 47 and 58.

† No. 72.

conceded to Australia or New Zealand. Moreover, the grounds for the proposed restrictions legally are somewhat technical; and in a matter in which controversy with a self-governing Dominion is likely to arise Lord Crewe feels it essential that His Majesty's Government should adopt an attitude based on broad lines intelligible to the Parliaments and Governments of both this country and the Dominions concerned.

8. Lord Crewe would therefore be very glad if the Board of Trade could concur in the terms of the draft despatch to Canada which was enclosed in the letter from this office of the 10th of May* (omitting the last sentence of the last paragraph as no longer in point). It will be seen that that draft in paragraph 7 goes so far as to suggest a doubt as to the power of the Canadian Parliament to affect certificates of master, &c., Imperially valid. That doubt was expressed in deference to the views of the Board, and further than that Lord Crewe feels that it is not advisable to go.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

24854

No. 75.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 76.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 4 August, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 13th February† and connected correspondence, I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the enclosed copy of a despatch‡ from the Governor-General of Australia respecting the provisions of the Commonwealth Navigation Bill relating to the cancellation of certificates.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

28696

No. 76.

AUSTRALIA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 26 August, 1909.)

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens, London, S.W.,

SIR,

26 August, 1909.

IN reply to your letter (No. 24854/09) of the 4th instant,§ enclosing a copy of a despatch from the Governor-General of Australia respecting the provisions of the Commonwealth Navigation Bill relating to the cancellation and suspension of certificates, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state that they have learned with much satisfaction that the Commonwealth Government have decided to propose an amendment on the lines suggested by this Department.

The Board have no hesitation in undertaking that they will not exercise their powers under Section 474 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, in regard to masters or officers of oversea vessels in cases in which their certificates have been dealt with in Australia under any Federal Act without first consulting the Commonwealth Government.

I have, &c.,
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

* No. 69.

† No. 59.

‡ No. 73.

§ No. 75.

28885

No. 77.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 7.55 a.m., 28 August, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to Board of Trade, August 30, 1909. L.F.]

Your telegram, 21st November,* my Ministers propose to amend Workers' Compensation Act in direction suggested by Board of Trade.—PLUNKET.

29112

No. 78.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 31 August, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 81.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., 31st August, 1909.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo,† asking them to concur in the terms of the draft despatch to the Governor-General of Canada respecting the Canada Shipping Amendment Act, 1908, enclosed in your letter of the 10th May last‡ (with the omission of the last sentence).

In reply, the Board desire me to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that, having regard to the considerations referred to in your letter, they are prepared to concur generally in the terms of the draft despatch in question.

At the same time the Board wish to submit the following suggestions for His Lordship's consideration:—

- (1) Paragraph 4 of the draft despatch deals with the amending Act by which it is proposed to repeal and re-enact Sections 33 and 35 of the Act of 1908 in a form applying only to vessels registered in Canada or engaged in the Canadian coasting trade. I am to point out that if, as is proposed, the amending Act is to apply to both these classes of vessels, it will be enacted under Section 735 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, as well as under Section 736. The formalities prescribed in the former section, therefore, should be observed, and as these are not precisely similar to those prescribed by Section 736, it seems to be for consideration whether mention of the formalities specified in the last few lines of Sub-section (1) of Section 735 does not require to be inserted in the Bill for the amending Act.
- (2) The Board think that the concluding sentence of paragraph 7 of the draft despatch should be amended to refer also to the powers vested in the Board of Trade by Section 474 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, with a view to preserving those powers equally with the right of appeal established by Section 478, Sub-section (6).
- (3) I am to point out that the word "not" has been omitted between the words "is intended" in paragraph 8. Also in paragraph 2 "coast" might be changed to "coasting."

I have, &c.,

H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

* No. 33.

† No. 74.

‡ No. 69.

28696

No. 79.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

(No. 318.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 31 August, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch, No. 141, of the 23rd June,* I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, for the information of Your Ministers, copy of a letter† from the Board of Trade respecting the provisions of the Commonwealth Navigation Bill relating to the cancellation of certificates.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

29386

No. 80.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 3 September, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 81.]

Marine Department, 7 Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W., 2nd September, 1909.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to forward to you, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, the accompanying note of an interview between Mr. Brodeur, the Canadian Minister of Marine, and the officers of this Department, at which the question of the validity of Canadian shipping legislation was discussed.

Mr. Brodeur's suggestion as to an Imperial validating Act has received careful consideration, and the Board of Trade desire me to state that, so far as those parts of Canadian legislation which deal with ships registered in the Dominion and ships engaged in the coasting trade are such as could be allowed to pass at the present day having regard not only to the terms of Sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, but to the general principles and the considerations of Imperial interest and policy which govern the relation of Imperial to Colonial shipping legislation, the Board would be prepared to consider sympathetically any representations that may be put forward with a view to the validation of the existing Canadian laws; but at the same time the Board of Trade incline to the view that the Canadian Government should on their part be invited to take steps to define in a suitable manner the limits of the coasting trade affected by their legislation, and to bring their law regarding vessels which are neither registered in Canada nor engaged in the coasting trade into harmony with the Imperial Acts so far as may be necessary.

Such action on the part of the Dominion Government is in any case very desirable and would undoubtedly facilitate the passing of a validating Imperial Act, if such an Act be necessary, though it must, of course, be understood that this Department cannot pledge itself in any way as to the introduction of such an Act until all the facts and circumstances have been fully considered.

I have, &c.,

R. C. HERON-MAXWELL.

Enclosure in No. 80.

CANADIAN MERCHANT SHIPPING LAW.

NOTES OF INTERVIEW WITH THE CANADIAN MINISTER OF MARINE.

A message was received from the Colonial Office that Mr. Brodeur, the Canadian Minister of Marine, wished to discuss some shipping questions with the Board of Trade, and he came over to see Mr. Maxwell this afternoon. The question raised was as to the validity of some of the Canadian Acts relating to merchant shipping. No specific case had arisen, but some misgiving had been felt in Canada as to whether

* No. 73.

† No. 76.

some of their merchant shipping Acts were valid, having regard to the provisions of the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act of 1904.

The way they looked at it in Canada was as follows:—Under the old Imperial Act of 1854 they recognised that there were a number of provisions which extended to all parts of His Majesty's Dominions, and Canada, like other places, was bound by those provisions. Then in 1867 the British North American Act was passed, which gave Canada power to legislate with regard to merchant shipping, and under the powers thus conferred a great deal of merchant shipping legislation had been passed in Canada. In 1894, however, the Imperial Consolidation Act was passed and reproduced the provisions of the old Imperial Acts, including those which laid down that certain provisions extended to all parts of His Majesty's Dominions. What was feared in Canada was that the re-enactment of these provisions in 1894 might invalidate legislation passed in virtue of the North American Act of 1867. The class of case they had more particularly in mind were those relating to the registry of ships. Canadian law deals with this subject, but Section 91 of the Imperial Act of 1894 states definitely that the provisions of the Imperial Act relating to registry shall apply to the whole of His Majesty's Dominion. Canadian law is, generally speaking, on the same lines as the Imperial law, and what they think might happen is that a case might come before the Courts in which the Canadian Registry Law might be slightly different from the Imperial law, and the question might arise whether the Canadian law should prevail or the Imperial law. As stated above, no specific case had yet arisen, but a very serious misgiving was felt in Canada on this point.

It was put to Mr. Brodeur that the point he was raising was really as to how far the British North America Act could be held to repeal the provisions of the antecedent Imperial Merchant Shipping Acts; but he hardly liked to put the question in that way. He preferred to say that the question was as to what effect the British North America Act had on previous Imperial merchant shipping provisions extending to Canada, and what effect the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 had on the North America Act and on Canadian merchant shipping legislation passed subsequent to the North America Act.

He agreed that the question was a difficult constitutional and legal one, and that in practice difficulties would not be likely to be raised either by the Imperial Government or the Canadian Government, seeing that Canadian shipping legislation is based on the same principles as the Imperial legislation, and seeing that the Imperial Government have expressly recognised that questions relating to ships registered in a Dominion and to ships engaged in the coasting trade of a Dominion can be dealt with by the Parliament of that Dominion without interference from the Imperial authorities.

What Mr. Brodeur desired to suggest was that a short Imperial declaratory Act might be passed, making it clear that the Canadian shipping legislation as to which he was doubtful was valid. He expressly stated that he only wanted this Act to deal with matters relating to ships registered in Canada or engaged in the Canadian coasting trade, and the kind of Act he would like to see passed would be one declaring that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Imperial Shipping Acts, any provisions of Canadian shipping legislation which related to ships registered in Canada and to ships engaged in the Canadian coasting trade should be of full effect and validity. He was informed that his suggestion would be reported to the Board of Trade, and be very carefully considered.

The opportunity was taken to discuss with Mr. Brodeur the most important of the questions which have been raised in the official papers as to the Canadian Merchant Shipping Act of 1908, viz., Section 38, which lays down definitely that there should be no appeal from any decision of a Court holding a formal investigation under the Canadian Shipping Act except to the Minister for re-hearing. It was pointed out to Mr. Brodeur that this section might have the effect of depriving men not engaged in the coasting trade and not employed in ships registered in Canada of a right of appeal which they might have under Section 478 of the Imperial Act, and he at once recognised that this might be so, but said that it was not in the least intended, and steps would be taken to put the matter right. He explained that the main object of Section 38 of their Act of 1908 was to put a stop to the continued litigation and applications to the Courts which had taken place in connection with inquiries as to shipping casualties in Canada, more especially those in which pilots were concerned; it was only meant to deal with a local trouble of their own, and not to touch any rights of appeal which anyone might have under the Imperial Act.

29386

No. 81.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 84.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 23 October, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 31st August last,* concurring generally in the terms of the draft despatch proposed to be addressed to the Governor-General of Canada respecting the Canada Merchant Shipping Amendment Act, 1908.

2. The errors referred to in the last paragraph of your letter were due to mistakes in copying, and will be corrected, but in view of your further letter of the 2nd September† Lord Crewe is of opinion that the proposed despatch will require to be re-cast, and in regard to that letter I am to offer the following observations for the consideration of the Board of Trade.

3. The shipping legislation of the Dominion of Canada appears to have originated with Act 128 and Act 129 of 1873 (given at the beginning of the volume of 1874 Acts enclosed herewith for inspection and return). Both of those Acts were reserved and subsequently confirmed by two Orders in Council dated 20th November, 1873. It will be seen that Section 2 of Act 128 and Section 5 of Act 129 repealed those provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 and of any Act amending the same and construed to be part thereof which were inconsistent with the two Canadian Acts, so far as they related to ships registered in Canada.

4. Numerous amending Acts were subsequently passed dealing with ships registered in Canada, which were finally consolidated in portions of the Canada Shipping Act of 1906, cap. 113 of Revised Statutes of 1906, copy of which is enclosed. The various amending Acts were not reserved, but were left in operation by the Secretary of State intimating from time to time in the usual manner that they would not be disallowed.

5. Lord Crewe is, however, disposed to think that no question with regard to the validity of these amending Acts can now be raised in consequence of the fact that they were not reserved in accordance with the provision of Section 735 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, or the similar clause of the earlier Merchant Shipping Acts, unless it can be shown that any of the amendments involved any new further departure in principle from the Imperial Act beyond those contained in the two Acts of 1873 as regards ships registered in Canada. In other words, the provisions of Section 735 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 would appear to be spent, so far as Canada is concerned, by reason of the fact that the Acts of 1873 were reserved and subsequently confirmed by Order in Council.

6. Again, Canada Act 7 of 1902 (copy enclosed), dealing with the coasting trade, contained a suspending clause, as required by Section 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, and did not come into operation until His Majesty's non-disallowance thereof was notified in the Canada Gazette of 18th October, 1902. The provisions of this Act are embodied in Part XVI. of the enclosed Shipping Act of 1906.

7. It would therefore appear that no question can arise in regard to the validity of the provisions of the Canadian law with respect to coasting trade, at any rate previous to the passing of Act 65 of 1908, which is now under discussion.

8. The Board of Trade will perhaps consider whether there are any provisions in the Consolidating Act of 1906 to which objection can, in their opinion, be taken, as regards their validity.

9. It will be observed that Part XV. of that Act contains a suspending clause (Section 950), and cannot be brought into operation until an Order in Council is issued under Section 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act. This part re-enacts, with some alterations, the provisions of Act 40 of 1891, which also contained a suspending clause and which has never been brought into operation; but the Load Line Act, No. 22 of 1893, to which the Board of Trade objected (see your letter of 18th September, 1894,† and connected correspondence) does not appear to be embodied in the Act of 1906.

* No. 78.

† No. 80.

‡ 16508/94.

10. Lord Crewe would be glad to learn whether the Board are of opinion that Part XV. is free from objection and can now be sanctioned by Order in Council. If not, I am to ask how the Board consider that it can be amended so as to become free from objection.

11. As regards the Act of 1908, Lord Crewe is prepared to write generally on the lines already agreed to, but omitting the latter part of paragraph 3 and the latter part of paragraph 4 of the draft despatch (as to reservation, &c.). Moreover, as Mr. Brodeur appears to be anxious to meet the views of the Board of Trade generally in the matter, his Lordship will also be prepared to ask the Canadian Government what reasons they have for the extension of the definition of "coasting voyage," pointing out the difficulty to which it gives rise, referred to in your letter of 5th August last,* and asking whether they can see their way to alter this provision.

12. If the last-mentioned provision in the Canadian Act is amended, I am to enquire whether the Board would still think it necessary to suggest the amendment of the Jamaica Law proposed in the penultimate paragraph of your letter of 5th August last.*

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

39781

No. 82.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 84.]

SIR, Downing Street, 13 December, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of a Bill† which has been introduced into the Canadian Parliament dealing with load lines on ships.

Lord Crewe would be glad to receive any observations on the Bill which the Board may wish to offer, with particular reference to paragraph 9 of the letter from this Department of the 23rd of October,‡ on the general question of Canadian shipping legislation, to which letter I am to request the favour of a reply as soon as possible.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

Enclosure in No. 82.

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA.

BILL 10. An Act respecting the Load Line on Ships.

8. At least two-thirds of the weight of cargo or fuel carried by any ship which leaves a port in Canada between the fifteenth day of September and the fifteenth day of April in the following year shall be properly stowed in the lower hold of such ship.

40466

No. 83.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to BOARD OF TRADE.

[Answered by No. 85.]

SIR, Downing Street, 20 December, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th March,§ I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of a Bill|| which has been introduced into the Canadian House of Commons, entitled an Act respecting the Water Carriage of Goods.

2. It will be seen that this Bill is in substance a reproduction of that of which a copy was enclosed in the letter from this Office of the 15th of March,¶ and Lord

* 26229: not printed. † Section 8 only printed. ‡ No. 81. § No. 62.
|| Not reprinted. ¶ No. 61.

Crewe presumes that the Board will not desire to offer any observations with regard to it.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

41294

No. 84.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 22 December, 1909.)

[Answered 7 January, 1910, 41294 in Dominions No. 18.]

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,
London, S.W., 21st December, 1909.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter, No. 39781, of the 13th instant,* enclosing a copy of a Canadian Bill respecting load lines on vessels and other matters, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that they observe that the clauses relating to load line do not harmonise with the provisions of the principal Canadian Act dealing with the same subject, as neither of the two methods of determining a load line prescribed in this Bill is the same as the method required in Section 934 of the Canadian Act of 1906.

It is also observed that no provision is made for enforcing the marking of a load line on vessels navigating inland waters (Clause 1), though this matter is provided for in respect of the barges mentioned in Clause 3, and that the drafting of the Bill generally seems to be susceptible of improvement; but in view of the fact that only Canadian vessels are affected by Clauses 1-6 of the Bill, these clauses have not been examined in detail, though it may be pointed out that as Clause 1 appears to be in effect a repeal of Section 437 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, so far as Canadian registered ships are concerned, an Order in Council under Section 735 of that Act will be necessary in the event of this Bill being passed.

As regards the remaining clauses of the Bill, the Board desire me to state that they see no objection to the provisions of Clause 7, if the Canadian Government consider that the clause will be useful, but if Clause 8 is intended to apply to ships other than those registered in Canada, and if there is any likelihood of the Bill passing, the Board would be glad to be favoured with full information as to the reasons underlying the clause and the manner in which it will be enforced in practice, before they offer any definite opinion regarding it.

I am to add that the questions raised in your letter of the 23rd October last† are receiving careful consideration, and a reply will be sent as soon as possible.

I have, &c.,
WALTER J. HOWELL.

41896

No. 85.

CANADA.

BOARD OF TRADE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 29 December, 1909.)

Marine Department, 7, Whitehall Gardens,
London, S.W., 24th December, 1909.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, No. 40466,‡ forwarding a copy of the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Bill, and in reply I am to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe that, as presumed in your letter, the Board have no further observations to offer on the Bill.

I have, &c.,
WALTER J. HOWELL.

* No. 82.

† No. 81.

‡ No. 83.

CO 886/2/3

Printed for the use of the Imperial Conference Secretariat.

Dominions

No. 10.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

[1909]

RELATING TO THE

**TREATMENT OF ASIATICS IN
THE DOMINIONS.**

(In continuation of Dominions No. 3 ; continued by Dominions No. 21.)

[NOTE.—*Correspondence relating to the Treatment of Asiatics in South Africa will be found in separate South African Office and Parliamentary Papers.*]

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT,
May, 1910.

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1	The Governor-General.	514	December 21, 1908 (Rec. Jan. 2, 1909.)	Forwards copy of an approved Minute of the Privy Council advising that Mr. Mackenzie King be authorized to confer with His Majesty's Minister at Peking and with the Chinese Authorities with a view to an agreement whereby the Government of China would undertake to control and restrict within defined limits the emigration of Chinese to Canada.	1
2	To the Governor-General.	Confidential.	January 14	States that His Majesty's Government approve the proposal relative to Mr. Mackenzie King's mission, and encloses copy of a despatch addressed by Sir E. Grey to His Majesty's Minister at Peking requesting that he will further the negotiations.	2
3	To Foreign Office...	—	January 14	Transmits copy of No. 2, and states that Lord Crewe concurs in the view of the Foreign Office that it is unnecessary to telegraph to Sir J. Jordan.	2
4	The Governor-General.	Confidential.	January 7 (Rec. Jan. 18.)	Forwards a copy of a letter from Colonel Swayne, Governor of British Honduras, covering confidential reports dealing with enquiries made by him into the position of the East Indian community in Vancouver, and points out that unless the Indian Government can exercise effective control of emigration from India to Canada, the Canadian Government will be driven further to restrict it.	2
5	To India Office ...	—	February 19	Transmits copy of No. 4; enquires whether there is now any possibility of effectively controlling Indian emigration to Canada, and states that, if not, Lord Crewe presumes that Lord Morley will not desire to oppose the imposition of further restrictions by the Canadian Government.	10
6	To the Governor-General.	123	February 27	Enquires whether the British Columbia Immigration Act, No. 23, is disallowed or is permitted to remain on the Statute Book.	10
7	The Governor-General.	93	February 25 (Rec. March 6.)	Encloses a copy of an Immigration Bill just introduced into the House of Commons, and calls attention to certain of its clauses prohibiting the immigration of Asiatics.	10
8	Foreign Office ...	—	March 23	Transmits paraphrases of telegrams from and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Peking on the subject of the negotiations with the Chinese Government.	11

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
9	The Governor-General.	Telegram	(Rec. March 25)	Reports, in reply to No. 6, that the British Columbia Immigration Act, No. 23 of 1908, was disallowed on 15th February.	12
10	To India Office ...	—	March 30	Transmits a copy of the Bill forwarded in No. 7, and draws attention to certain of its sections.	12
11	To Foreign Office...	—	March 30	Ditto	12
12	Canadian Government.	—	February 24 (Registered in Colonial Office March 31.)	Papers relating to the disallowance of an Act of the Legislature of British Columbia, entitled "An Act to Regulate Immigration into British Columbia."	13
13	India Office ...	—	March 31	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 5, and states that the serious consideration of the Government of India is being invited to the proposal that steps should be taken to check emigration to Canada.	15
14	To the Governor-General.	229	March 31	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 9; expresses satisfaction at the disallowance of the Act, and asks to be furnished with reports of any cases in the Courts by which its invalidity was established.	15
15	To India Office ...	—	April 2	States that the Earl of Crewe has learnt from the Governor-General of Canada that Act No. 23 of 1908 of the Legislature of British Columbia has been disallowed.	15
16	To Foreign Office ...	—	April 2	Ditto	16
17	Foreign Office ...	—	April 19	Submits observations on the Bill transmitted in No. 11.	16
18	India Office ...	—	April 20	Transmits copy of a letter from the Government of India reporting discussions with Mr. Mackenzie King; endorses the views of the Indian Government on the satisfactory way in which the Dominion Government has treated the question and requests that the correspondence may be communicated to the latter Government.	16
19	Foreign Office ...	—	April 22	Transmits copies of despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Peking on the subject of Mr. Mackenzie King's negotiations with the Chinese Authorities.	18
20	India Office ...	—	April 28	States that Lord Morley does not desire to offer any observations on the Bill enclosed in No. 10, being confident that the powers to be conferred will be exercised with that consideration for broader Imperial interests which has marked the policy of the Dominion with regard to British Indian immigrants.	25

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Dominion, Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
21	To the Governor-General.	Confidential.	April 30	Transmits copy of No. 18, and associates Lord Crewe with the views of Lord Morley and the Indian Government as to the manner in which this question has been treated by the Dominion Government.	26
22	To India Office ...	—	April 30	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 18, and transmits a copy of No. 21.	26
23	To Foreign Office ...	—	May 7	Replies to points raised in No. 17, and observes that Lord Crewe does not propose to communicate any criticism of the Bill to the Canadian Government unless Sir E. Grey deems it absolutely necessary to press any objection.	26
24	To the Governor-General.	Confidential.	May 8	Transmits copies of despatches from His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of Mr. Mackenzie King's negotiations with the Chinese Government, and expresses the satisfaction felt by His Majesty's Government with the able conduct of the negotiations by Mr. Mackenzie King.	27
25	Foreign Office ...	—	May 13	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 23, and states that Sir E. Grey will not press his objections to certain provisions of the Bill.	27
26	The Governor-General.	Confidential.	May 4 (Rec. May 15.)	Forwards copy of a minute of the Privy Council discussing the statement of the Chinese Minister that the limit imposed by the arrangement with Japan for restricting Chinese immigration into Canada had been overstepped.	27
27	India Office ...	—	June 30	Transmits copy of a letter from the Government of India stating that they are unable to impose any restrictive measures on the further emigration of British Indians to Canada.	28
28	To India Office ...	—	July 13	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 27, and states that Lord Crewe does not think it necessary to communicate a copy of it to the Dominion Government.	30

Part II.—Australia and New Zealand.

29	To Foreign Office ...	New Zealand.	January 2	Transmits copy of an Act, No. 230, of the Parliament of New Zealand to amend the Immigration Restriction Act of 1908; and presumes that, as this Act is a concession in the interests of Chinese residents, Sir Edward Grey will have no objection to the Governor being informed that the Act will not be disallowed.	30
30	Foreign Office ...	New Zealand.	January 12	Concurs that the Act should not be disallowed; and suggests that provision for exemptions in the matter of finger-print requirements of persons who are well known or can easily be identified should be made in the law.	31

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Dominion, Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
31	To Foreign Office ...	New Zealand.	January 27	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 30; states that the Governor of New Zealand has been informed that His Majesty will not be advised to disallow the Act in question; and points out that, for the reasons stated, Lord Crewe is not in a position to take action of the kind suggested.	31
32	India Office ...	Australia	March 3	States that Colonial Office letter of 15th September, 1908, as to the relations between India and Australia has been carefully considered, but that before discussing the proposed draft despatch to the Governor-General of Australia, Lord Morley desires that the observations of the Government of India should be awaited; Lord Morley does not consider that anything would be gained by holding a preliminary inquiry of the kind suggested.	32
33	To India Office ...	Australia	March 15	Concurs in the proposal in No. 32 ...	32
34	India Office ...	Australia	August 6	Transmits copy of a letter in which the Government of India express their views on the suggestions made in Colonial Office letter of 15th September, 1908, and decline to accept the solution proposed by the Colonial Office, and states that Lord Morley anticipates that Lord Crewe will consider it undesirable to address the Government of the Commonwealth in the sense proposed.	32
35	To India Office ...	Australia	August 21	Concurs for the present in the opinion of Lord Morley that it would be undesirable to address the Commonwealth Government as proposed.	35
36	Foreign Office ...	—	August 23	Transmits copy of a note from the Chinese Minister in London requesting that certain changes may be introduced into the laws of New Zealand which relate to the Immigration of Chinese subjects, and enquires what reply should be returned to Lord Li's note.	36
37	To Foreign Office ...	New Zealand.	September 24	States that a copy of Lord Li's note in No. 36 has been sent to the Governor of New Zealand for the consideration of his Ministers.	37
38	To the Governor ...	New Zealand, 179.	September 24	Transmits, for the consideration of his Ministers, copy of the enclosure in No. 36.	37
39	The Governor ...	New South Wales, 87.	August 24 (Rec. Sept. 27.)	Transmits copy of the Bill to amend the Factories Act (which affects the employment of Asiatics) which it is proposed to introduce into the New South Wales Parliament during the present session.	36

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No. &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
40	To the Governor ...	New South Wales, Telegram.	October 8	Asks, with reference to No. 39, to be furnished with a statement of the reasons for applying to all Asiatics the clauses which seem to be aimed at competition from Chinese; urges the undesirability of discrimination against Asiatics <i>nominatim</i> ; and enquires what is the present position of the Bill.	36
41	The Governor ...	New South Wales, Telegram.	(Rec. Dec. 15)	Conveys Premier's explanation of provisions affecting Asiatics, and enquires whether he may assent to Bill.	37
42	To the Governor ...	New South Wales, Telegram.	December 20	Authorizes him to assent to the Bill ...	37

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

[1909.]

RELATING TO THE

TREATMENT OF ASIATICS IN THE DOMINIONS.

PART I.—CANADA.

112

No. 1.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2 January, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 2.]

(No. 514.)

MY LORD,

Montreal, P. Q., 21st December, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of an approved Minute of the Privy Council, authorizing Mr. Mackenzie King, M.P., to confer with His Majesty's Minister at Peking and with the Chinese authorities, in order to ascertain whether it would be possible to effect an agreement whereby the Government of China would undertake to control and restrict within defined limits the emigration of Chinese to Canada.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

(P. C. 2708.)

CERTIFIED Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by HIS EXCELLENCY the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, on the 13th December, 1908.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the President of the Privy Council, advise that while in China, as Canada's representative on the Joint Opium Commission, Mr. Mackenzie King, M.P., be authorized to confer with the British Minister at Peking, and with the Chinese authorities, on behalf of the Government of Canada, with a view to ascertain whether it would be possible to effect between the Governments of China and Canada an agreement whereby the Government of China would undertake to control and restrict within defined limits the emigration of Chinese to Canada.

The Committee, on the same recommendation, further advise that Mr. Mackenzie King be authorised to discuss with the Chinese authorities the terms of such an agreement.

The Committee further advise that Your Excellency may be pleased to forward a copy hereof to the Right Honourable the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

112

No. 2.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 14 January, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch, No. 514 of the 21st of December,* on the subject of the proposed negotiations with the Chinese authorities at Peking, as to the restrictions on the emigration of Chinese to Canada.

2. In reply I have to request that you will inform your Ministers that His Majesty's Government approve the proposal that Mr. Mackenzie King should discuss the question with His Majesty's Minister at Peking and with the Chinese authorities, and that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has accordingly addressed a despatch,† of which a copy is enclosed, to Sir J. Jordan, requesting that he will further the proposed negotiations.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

112

No. 3.

COLONIAL OFFICE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

[See No. 8.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 14 January, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st of December,‡ on the subject of the proposal that Mr. Mackenzie King should, during his approaching stay in China, negotiate with the Chinese authorities with a view to the restriction of Chinese immigration into Canada.

2. In reply, I am to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir Edward Grey, the accompanying copy of a despatch§ which has been addressed to the Governor-General of Canada on the subject, and to state that Lord Crewe concurs in the view that it is not necessary to telegraph to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

2112

No. 4.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 18 January, 1909.)

(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Ottawa, Canada, 7 January, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter I have received from Colonel Swayne, Governor of British Honduras, covering confidential reports dealing with enquiries made by him into the position of the East Indian community in Vancouver.

It would appear from Colonel Swayne's reports that the position of the Sikhs and Hindus at present in British Columbia leaves little to be desired. He found there was no justification for the statement that large numbers were unemployed and in distress.

Colonel Swayne states that the climatic conditions in British Columbia are not so severe as those to which the Sikhs are accustomed in their native country, and that, so far as they are concerned, it will be impossible in future to urge climatic considerations as a reason for discouraging, on humanitarian grounds, the emigration of Sikhs to British Columbia.

* No. 1.

† Enclosure in No. 143A in Dominions No. 3.

‡ No. 143A in Dominions No. 3.

§ No. 2.

Colonel Swayne further reports:—

1. that the wages obtained in British Columbia by the Sikhs, from a British Indian standpoint, are very high—at the rate of \$45 a month, this sum being sufficient to leave, after allowing for the cost of living at a much higher rate than is customary in the Punjab, viz., \$10 a month, the large net saving of \$35 a month; and

2. that it is the intention of the Sikhs, after they have saved a sufficient sum of money to pay off their mortgages, &c., and to establish their positions at home, to return to their native country.

Colonel Swayne appeared to be of the opinion that the return of the Sikhs, enriched with the savings of five years' employment in British Columbia, would have a disquieting effect on the Punjab population.

Further, the fact that the millowners, &c., appear to prefer the employment of Sikhs to that of white men, on the ground that the Sikhs can be more safely relied upon to give continuous employment, may be an additional consideration inducing the Sikhs to emigrate to British Columbia.

These inducements, apart from the hostility of the white trades unions, to British Indians to emigrate to Canada would thus appear to be so great that, unless some further regulations restricting the influx can be established, there may be a danger of new developments arising, with results possibly prejudicial to British interests in India.

The Dominion Government at present prohibit entrance to Canada of Asiatics other than those having Treaty rights, unless they have \$200, and I am not aware that it is the present intention of the Dominion Government to take any further measure to restrict the immigration of British Indians into Canada.

Mr. Mackenzie King has received instructions from Sir Wilfrid Laurier to discuss this question of British Indian emigration to Canada with the Government of India, on his way to Shanghai. Sir Wilfrid Laurier is most anxious to help the Government of India in every way in his power, but unless the Government of India can see its way to exercise some effective control of emigration from India to Canada, the only alternative would appear to be the adoption of further, and, from an Imperial point of view, undesirable, regulations, restricting British Indian emigration to Canada by His Majesty's Canadian Government.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Colonel SWAYNE TO LORD GREY.

(Confidential.)

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Ottawa, 30 December, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to attach, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter addressed by me to the Officer Administering the Government of British Honduras, relating to my enquiries into the possibility of obtaining free East Indian labourers from the Canadian Pacific Coast.

I also submit a confidential report dealing with enquiries made by me into the position of the East Indian community in Vancouver.

I desire to express my grateful acknowledgments of the invariable courtesy and assistance given to me by officers of the Dominion and Provincial Governments, and by Ministers, and especially to the Railway Department of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company for the courtesies so kindly extended me. Everything was done to make my journey comfortable, and the expense was borne by the Department and the railway in a very generous way.

I purpose now to proceed to New Orleans, where I hope to embark for Belize, British Honduras, on the 7th January.

I have, &c.,
E. J. E. SWAYNE, Colonel,
Governor, British Honduras.

Colonel SWAYNE to Mr. COLLET.

DEAR MR. COLLET,

Vernon, British Columbia, December 20, 1908.

BEFORE my arrival in Canada the Mayor of Vancouver had called a meeting to discuss the Asiatic question at the instance of the Anti-Asiatic Society. Some injudicious speeches were made, and gave rise to the feeling amongst the better class Hindus, who were gaining big wages, that forcible deportation would be attempted. When it was arranged that delegates should go to Belize, the election was just being decided, and the political parties, being intent on capturing the anti-Asiatic labour votes, at once gave out in the Press that it was proposed to deport 1,000. Now, in British Columbia of the 2,500 natives of India present, there are over 1,000 Sikhs and other Hindus whose savings average 35 dollars a month, or total, say, over 35,000 dollars a month. All these have come to Canada leaving their families behind in India, and with the object of saving enough in five years to return to India and release their farms from mortgages or buy others. Many are sawyers, and some are old soldiers. There were batches of men who arrived in a destitute condition, they were of inferior physique, and followed in the wake of the bigger wage earners. The former last winter roamed about the streets pinched by the cold and appealing to the sympathies of the white man. There was great depression in trade, and it was anticipated that this winter some 1,500 Hindus, in addition to a large number of white men, would be out of employment, and the case was strongly represented to Ottawa, and Government was asked to provide against this danger. I do not think the Government officials ever desired to deport the well-to-do, but nevertheless, the feeling grew amongst all the Hindus that a strong attempt was being made to remove them to Honduras, and they eventually formed a labour union to prevent it. In the meantime the financial difficulties resulting from the American depression cleared up, mills were re-started, and a revival of business took place, and thus the unemployed whites and Hindus got work. The Sikh labour union was, therefore, easily able to arrange to provide funds to maintain the few members who were out of work, and at the same time stories were spread about that in British Honduras the condition of our old coolies was miserable in the extreme, that water was sold to them absorbing a considerable part of their pay, and that yellow fever and mosquitoes had possession of the country. Moreover, the distance from India was much greater than Canada.

The real reason for the crusade against the movement was that the community as a whole was making very big wages—four or five times what they could hope to get in British Honduras. They had not gone out of India to settle, but with the sole object of saving enough money to return as quickly as possible, and no grant of land in British Honduras could, therefore, have tempted them. The soldier class, to whom I offered 20 dollars, rising to 40 dollars, a month in our police (12 men) were getting 45 to 60 dollars a month clear here, after paying their keep, and it was not likely, therefore, that they would be attracted. The cold of the Punjab in winter is as severe as the mild climate of Vancouver, and the winter here, therefore, did not deter them.

Immediately I arrived in Canada I tried to dissipate the idea that there would be any compulsion, but on getting to Vancouver I found that the authorities there could not put me into touch with any unemployed, and my private efforts only discovered three, who were at the same time allowed by their employed brethren. I was told there might be some in the districts at Vernon and at Nelson, and so I arranged to go there, but my enquiries showed that Hindus are sought after in the fruit orchards, and very few, if any, are out of work; there were none here, at Vernon. In the summer the work is regular, and this demand for labour in the winter is, therefore, a good indication that these men will be employed in the summer.

I duly received your letter *re* the embarrassments that might be caused by any attempt to alter the labour laws, and I have just received a telegram from India fully dealing with other difficulties, which, however, as an old Indian officer, I had fully foreseen.

As the men will not be coming (and please notify this as soon as possible, so as to cause as little disappointment to planters who have been deferring hiring as possible) no question arises.

I am arranging that in case of any Hindus becoming destitute, selected men (agriculturists) passed by a doctor, may be, after previous communication with us, got together in batches of 25 to 50 at a time, and sent to us.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier assured me, after I had had an opportunity of putting the case fully before him, that Canada would bear part of the expense, and I, therefore, fear no financial difficulty, bearing in mind the offer made by the Colony to contribute 30 dollars a head.

I go from here to Nelson, so as to leave no stone unturned, and thence to Ottawa to report, and so on direct to British Honduras. One good result of my visit is that the Hindu question in British Columbia is solved as far as those now in the country go. The Sikh community must be held to it to keep indigent Hindus off the streets, and this will assuage, as it has in fact already done, white labour feeling, as it is now moreover hoped that India will limit the number of incoming Hindus.

Apart from the industrial question on the Pacific Coast as between whites and Asiatics there is no reason why these Hindus should not do very good work here. Many mills speak strongly in favour of the better class amongst them, and it is to the Asiatics in Vancouver that the present stage of activity of the mills and allied industries must be chiefly ascribed. The railways want them badly, as development is hampered by the grip of the trades unions. Please make full use of this letter.

Yours truly,
E. J. E. SWAYNE.

MEMORANDUM on matters affecting the East Indian Community in British Columbia
by Colonel E. J. E. Swayne.

Information as to Hindu Agitators in Vancouver.

(Confidential.)

Taraknath Dass, Bengali Brahmin of Bhawanipur, suburb of Calcutta, F.A. of Calcutta University, student at one of the colleges of Seattle, came to Vancouver from Seattle as interpreter to the United States Emigration Department. He published a newspaper called "Free Hindustan," in English. Its general tenor is theosophical, but from time to time it contains articles setting forth the so-called unfair treatment of Hindus in Vancouver, and has reference to agitation in Bengal, and in tone is anti-British.

Owing to representations made by the Dominion Government to Washington, inviting attention to the unfriendly attacks made upon British prestige in a paper published by an interpreter in their employment, claiming protection as a United States citizen (no papers have, however, been issued to him), the United States Government dispensed with his services, and the paper ceased for a time to appear. After an interval of two months, during which he remained unemployed in Vancouver, he was found to have opened a school for Hindus at Millside, New Westminster (near Vancouver), and lectures were delivered on topics connected with the unrest in India, and the unfair treatment of Hindus in Vancouver. Gurmukhi newspapers from the Punjab containing articles animadverting on British administration in India have been circulated amongst the Hindus round this school, as also Bengali newspapers containing articles on the unfair treatment of Hindus in Vancouver. At the same time translations of Taraknath's paper "Free Hindustan" have been made at the school into Gurmukhi and Urdu and sent to the Punjab and Calcutta; and posters showing cartoons in which white men are kicking out Hindus from Canada (Vancouver Province, December 1st, 1908, Opposition paper) have also been sent. It was found that besides considerable correspondence through the ordinary channels of the Post Office, between Vancouver Hindus and their friends in India, the Hindu store at Millside and the school were used as addresses from which correspondence on arrival was distributed.

Taraknath Dass also collected sums of money from the Hindus for a fund called the Mutual Fund.

For this information I am indebted to Mr. W. Hopkinson, Inspector of the Calcutta Police, now on leave from India, and employed by the Dominion Government as official Hindustani interpreter in Vancouver. Mr. Hopkinson in this capacity accompanied the two Hindu delegates to Belize, British Honduras, returning to Vancouver with them on November 4th, 1908.

Mr. Hopkinson considered that the matters relating to the school at Millside which came to his knowledge were sufficiently important to be made public, and as his official position at that time was only that of interpreter, and, therefore, in

his opinion, precluded his making an official report in a matter of this kind, he, after consultation with Mr. L. W. Creppin, who, as correspondent of the "London Times," was then enquiring into the position of the Hindus in Vancouver, decided to give publicity to the information acquired by him to the public Press of Vancouver. Thereupon the school was closed.

Tarakanth Dass for 14 days thereafter remained unemployed amongst the Brahmin section of the Hindus. Amongst these were Udey Ram, Bengali, who, with Radhi Krishan, of the North-West Provinces (who came to Vancouver from Fiji) keeps a 2,000 dollar store at Millside, the business of which is to make advances of food, clothing, and money to Hindu labourers at the mills, recovering the value from the men's pay with heavy interest. Udey Ram has a brother Nubhi Ram, a Bengali Brahmin settled in Seattle.

It was found that Tarakanth Dass has family relations in the Sham Bazar of Calcutta; that he is acquainted with A. C. Bannerji, Barrister at Law of the Calcutta High Court, arrested in October, 1907, for sedition and known as a leader of the present agitation in Bengal. He also knew Surendernath Bannerji, formerly a District Judge in the Civil Service of India, and now editor of the newspaper "Bengali," published in English in Calcutta. He also knew Arbindeo Ghos, editor of the "Sunjimandi," a vernacular newspaper of Calcutta. Fourteen days after the closing of the school, Tarakanth Dass, taking with him Behari Lal, Brahmin, went to Seattle to Nubhi Ram, brother of Udey Ram, settled there, and arranged for the entry of Behari Lal as a student at the University there. Tarakanth Dass himself continued the publication of the "Free Hindustan" in Seattle, and sends copies to Vancouver. A copy of the paper in the possession of Mr. Harkin, Secretary of the Minister of the Interior, which was seen by me was decidedly seditious. In the midst of a long disquisition on the theosophical teaching, references were made to the so-called miserable condition of natives in India under British rule; the famine in India being attributed to the depletion of the gold reserves by British merchants and officials.

TEJA SINGH.

Teja Singh is an Amritsar Sikh; an M.A. of Lahore University, an LL.B. of Cambridge, and a student of the Columbia University of New York. He first came to Vancouver on the 2nd October, 1908, and gave out that he had been touring the United States and Canada, looking into the position and grievances of Hindus. He left on October 8th (within the week) for Victoria and Seattle, whence he proceeded to San Francisco. About a month later, on November 11th, seven days before the return of the deputation to British Honduras, he was called back to Vancouver by Udey Ram, Braham Storekeeper, and Radha Krishan, Brahmin. His mission this time apparently was to dissuade Hindus from proceeding to Honduras. Local Hindus, who were receiving very good wages, enabling them to save four times what they could possibly save in Honduras, had been led to believe by the attitude of newspapers representing white labour opinion, and made use of for electioneering purposes, that an attempt would be made to forcibly deport the whole community (rich and poor) to British Honduras on the ground that they were destitute, had become a charge upon the public, and were physically unfit to sustain the rigours of the Canadian climate. In order to prevent this disruption of a very profitable livelihood for themselves, the well-to-do Hindus, who probably save some 40,000 dollars a month, which they have been placing in banks and sending by money orders to India, decided to form a society which is, in fact, a labour union, using as a rendezvous, a Sikh Temple, built 2½ years ago at Fairview, 2nd Avenue, Vancouver. It was decided to provide assistance to indigent Hindus so as to keep them off the streets, to form a labour employment bureau, and to start schemes for the purchase of land and colonization. (Note 1.)

The disaffected Brahmin section were anxious, whilst holding out forcible deportation as a threat out of which they could make political capital, to prevent

NOTE 1.—Hindus have been in the habit of privately helping their poorer brethren, but up to quite recently there appears to have been no organization to give poor relief. From time to time cases of destitute Hindus asking for repatriation to India have been brought by the community to the notice of Government officials and a number of them have in this way been assisted by Government to return to India. Quite recently indigent Hindus have disappeared from the streets, and this no doubt is due to the efforts of the new organization.

a voluntary exodus of the poorer part of the community to British Honduras, as this would have taken the wind out of their sails, and could not be used in the agitation against the British Government in Bengal. They were also personally and privately opposed, owing to the interest in the profits of their shop and the debts owed by their customers, to the latter leaving. Moreover, it is very probable that the whole community of the Sikh Temple and its priests, which is supported by the contributions of Vancouver and provincial Sikhs, would be opposed to the departure of the people.

I do not think that the Machiavellian idea of compelling the Canadian Government by an attitude of passive resistance to deport the Hindus wholesale, and thus set up centres of disaffection in the Punjab, could have emanated from these local Vancouver Hindus, for even the Brahmin agitators had too much to lose, in their private interests, from such a course. The idea, if started at all amongst the Hindus, must have come from Bengal. In fact, Teja Singh has done all he can to prevent deportation by assisting the union to make feasible schemes to provide work. Immediately on his arrival in Vancouver, on November 11th, he convened meetings at Millside, New Westminster, at Vancouver, and at Port Moody, 20 miles up the line of the Canadian Pacific Railway, and there dissuaded the people from going to British Honduras, and made proposals for their employment locally. He formed the Guru Nanak Mining and Trust Company, Limited, received contributions, and made application for registration from the Government. He also made arrangements to purchase a tract of land in North Vancouver to be divided into market-garden lots, and worked by Hindu labourers. (Note 2.) He has publicly lectured and had interviews with Press men. Neither his interviews nor his lectures gave me the impression of being intended to further the agitation in India, although they undoubtedly show indignation, and possibly resentment, at what he considers to be the unfair treatment of natives of India as British subjects, as well in Vancouver as in India. He is anxious to show that so far the Sikhs are loyal, but he at the same time warns the public that current events are tending to do much to shake that loyalty, and that results may be disastrous. (Note 3.) He is primarily a theosophical teacher, and whilst, no doubt, flattered by the idea as posing as the protector and head of Hindu communities on this continent, I do not think he intended to take up this position from mere agitator's motives. There is an interesting lecture by him in the "Vancouver World" of Friday, December 11th, in which he refers to the Temple incident, when the Government officials, fearing to furnish grounds for misrepresentation, declined to take off their shoes and enter the upper room, where the Sikh religious ceremonies were at that time being performed. His contention is that all matters affecting the public weal of the Sikh community, must, according to their rules, be discussed in open conclave in the Temple, so as to avoid any idea that it is a "hole and corner affair." Personally, I think, however, that he had reasons of his own for desiring to prevent the Government officials from presenting a true report on British Honduras conditions to the natives of India as a whole, and wished that it should be done in the Inner Temple where the Sikhs, over whom he had complete influence, would not be likely to be affected by the Government proposals or recede from their decision. (Note 4.)

It is a matter of considerable interest to trace the growth of a combined sentiment between the various classes of Hindus in Vancouver. They have coalesced from the common need of protection against the hostility of white labour, and Punjabi-Mohamedans, Sikhs, and Hindus from the Punjab, and Brahmins from the north-west from lower Bengal, have been brought together in a way that could not have happened in India.

I have been unable to discover any general strong feeling on the part of the white population against the Hindus. Undoubtedly last winter, when large numbers of Hindus arrived in a destitute condition, and when they were competing with destitute white people, the feeling was strong that immigration of Asiatics

NOTE 2.—The negotiations have, I have since heard from Mr. Harkin, not yet come to anything.

NOTE 3.—One of the delegates to British Honduras made an allegation of bribery against his companion, saying Mr. Hopkinson had bribed him to report favourably on British Honduras. Teja Singh communicated this to a correspondent of the "Province" newspaper, but he wrote withdrawing the allegation, whilst still in press, but before publication. This I have from the "Province" correspondent himself.

NOTE 4.—Amongst the natives of India in Vancouver, besides Hindus of the Punjab, United Provinces, and Bengal, there are a certain number of Punjabi Mahomedans, and these could never combine with the Hindus except under very exceptional circumstances, and could never be counted on to act in a body with the Hindus for any length of time.

should be stopped, but now that the numbers coming in have decreased, and labour conditions have improved, the feeling against Hindus has died down. (Note 5.) It is, however, strong against the Japanese, who are considered to be the real competitors of white labour, and who are thought to be a political danger. The Chinese do not compete in that class of work done by the whites, and there is no general feeling against them, although there is a feeling that in their case, as well as in that of the natives of India, further immigration should be restricted to small numbers, and strictly controlled. Employers, on the other hand, stand in need of the regular labour supplied by Asiatics, and are hampered by the want of sufficient white labour, and the unsettled nature of the labour given by whites. Whites go from one work to another, but Asiatics stay where they are satisfied. At one mill the Sikhs there employed had stayed for two years, and had given complete satisfaction, and amongst the many reports received by me from employers the feeling was one of satisfaction with the better class of Hindus and their work. (Note 6.)

The Hindus met by me in Vancouver and Robson and at Nelson were quite satisfied with their positions and had been sending money to India. They intended to remain three years longer and then return to their families in India. They were very anxious to explain that they were thoroughly loyal and that they were pleased with the country. They no doubt feared that any other attitude would give their opponents a chance to deport them.

Now that the Hindu community has undertaken to provide for indigent Hindus it only remains to hold them to it and to make use of the representatives to undertake responsibilities as to sanitation, &c. At the same time, there are, I think, strong reasons why further immigration should be strictly limited. The terms of close familiarity which competition with white labour has brought about do not make for British prestige.

These Hindus never meant to settle in British Columbia. Even the most wealthy do not mean to bring their families out. They all mean to accumulate money and return to India to free their farms from mortgages or to purchase others. Socialists of a very undesirable type have made it their business to tamper with the East Indians in Vancouver. Recently Emma Goldman, the Socialist lecturer from the United States, visited Vancouver and lectured in public. The return of the Sikhs to the Punjab, amongst their friends, spreading as they will, new, ill-digested socialistic ideas, and the familiar knowledge of such defects amongst their white fellow labourers, such as labour rivalry would have been only too ready to pick out, cannot but tend to react amongst the military classes of the Punjab to the detriment of British prestige. As—when all is said and done—looking at our position in India as a whole, it must be recognised that it is by prestige alone that India is held, and not by force, the importance of a circulation of labour between Vancouver and India as affecting that prestige is such, I submit, as cannot be wisely overlooked. Also looking to the future, labour rivalry must from time to time cause outbreaks of feeling on the part of the white labour on the Pacific which must produce difficulties, as has been the case in the past, both for the Canadian and Imperial Governments, and any dissatisfaction at unfair treatment of Hindus in Vancouver resulting therefrom will be sure to be exploited, as, in fact, has already been done, for purposes of agitation in India. For these reasons (as apart from the general one of keeping the temperate zones of the Empire for the surplus white population, whilst giving full scope to our Asiatic subjects in the more tropical zones of the Empire) I think immigration into Canada from India should be strictly limited and controlled. I would suggest that Indian regulations as to indentured emigration from India, necessitating as it does legislation on behalf of such emigrants by Colonial Governments, be applied if possible to emigrants not proceeding out of India on indenture or contract. The absence of such legislation on the part of the Colonies would, as pointed out by Mr. Mackenzie King, be sufficient to make such emigration illegal, and a system of passports would then enable the Governments of India and of Canada to control the immigration

NOTE 5.—It is claimed that white people are building up the country and however destitute they may be at the start, soon settle down into valuable citizens, whereas, the Asiatic takes his money away with him, and at the same time by accepting lower wages than white men prevents the poorer whites from eking out a living until better times come. It is a fact however that the better class of Hindus are earning as high wages as the white man.

NOTE 6.—The Hindus belong to various classes of society in India. The soldier class or the policemen from Hong Kong are highly thought of, whilst on the other hand, weaker members of the community have an indifferent value.

into Canada of such persons, having commercial, educational, or other interests, as might advantageously be admitted. (Note 7.)

Undoubtedly many industries of British Columbia at the outset require encouragement in the shape of a cheaper form of labour than could be obtained under the unlimited control of white labour unions which would result from the total exclusion just now of Asiatics, and this is more especially the case with the promising fruit industry; but the political reasons I have given for the exclusion of natives of India and the importance of this exclusion to India itself do not admit, I think, of our continuing the immigration of these Asiatics as free labourers, whatever might be feasible in the way of contracts. That the Indian of the Punjab is unsuited, owing to climatic conditions, to work and reside in British Columbia, cannot, in the face of the experience of the last three years amongst the Hindus in Vancouver, be maintained. The rigorous winter of parts of the Punjab is more severe than the mild climate of the Pacific coast. It is true that in the winters of 1906-7 large numbers of Indians arrived provided only with cotton clothing, and owing to the general bad labour conditions which at that time prevailed through the country were unable to get employment and roamed the streets in a destitute condition; but Dr. Monroe (attached to the General Hospital and Emigration Department) assured me from his personal observation that a smaller number of Asiatics were admitted into hospital, or suffered from pulmonary affections, than would have been the case with an equal number of white men under similarly trying conditions and unprovided with proper clothes.

When I left England it was assumed that there would be large numbers (possibly as many as 1,500) of Hindus in Vancouver out of employment, but on my arrival I found that industrial conditions had improved to such an unexpected extent as to completely alter the state of affairs and upset the calculations as to unemployment which the authorities of Vancouver, basing their estimates upon previous winters, had been, I am convinced, fully justified in making.

I have received the greatest assistance in my enquiries from many gentlemen, official and otherwise, in Vancouver. Mr. McMahon, City Relief Officer, enabled me to personally visit various quarters inhabited by the Hindus and courteously accompanied me with his assistants. Dr. Underhill and Mayor Betheun called upon me and gave me frankly such information as their intimate knowledge of the sanitary condition of the Hindus enabled them to collect, and I am much indebted to these gentlemen for their courtesy. The emigration authorities also did all they could to help me.

I am indebted to Mr. Harkin for bringing me in touch with these and other gentlemen and for doing everything to forward my enquiries. I did not call a public meeting of the Hindus nor appeal to the local authorities for facilities to get in touch with the community as a whole, as, after recent events at the Temple, I did not think such a course would have resulted in any good, and I preferred, therefore, to make my enquiries unofficially.

I think it important that the doings of the Brahmin section be closely watched. There is presumptive evidence that they have a close connection with the agitation in Bengal. I do not think that a better man than Mr. Hopkinson, of the Calcutta police, could be found for this work. He has already managed to get a knowledge of their affairs, and Mr. R. S. Chamberlin, Chief of the Police of Vancouver, with whom I unofficially spoke on the matter, would have no objection to his doing this. I suggest Mr. Hopkinson be appointed as Dominion Police Officer on special duty at Vancouver, for the special purposes of this enquiry, and the Government of India be asked to place him in official communication with the head of the Calcutta Police in order to further his work. This suggestion is, of course, a purely confidential one.

E. J. E. S.

NOTE 7.—As natives of India now in Vancouver will return to India as soon as they have made sufficient money, it will only be necessary to prevent their return to eliminate the whole Hindu community in course of time. I, however, think that no harm, but on the other hand a certain amount of good, will result from allowing the limited numbers now in Canada to be maintained. The limitation of further immigration might be put at 100 yearly for the present, but the number will depend on the commercial needs of the times and these will naturally be dictated by the growth and development of trade between Canada and India. I deprecate measures recently adopted to check immigration by imposing the onerous condition that Hindus landing in Canada must be provided with \$200. This, when compared to the \$40 imposed upon Japanese, cannot fail to give rise in India to the cry that British subjects are unfairly discriminated against, and it will be difficult to explain this away.

3115

No. 5.

COLONIAL OFFICE to INDIA OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 13.]

SIR, Downing Street, 19 February, 1909.
I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before Viscount Morley, the accompanying copy of a despatch from the Governor-General of Canada,* forwarding Colonel Swayne's confidential reports dealing with the enquiries made by him into the position of the East Indian community in Vancouver. The enclosures to this despatch were communicated to you in the letter from this Department of the 26th ultimo.†

2. Lord Crewe has expressed to Colonel Swayne his appreciation of the ability and discretion with which he discharged his mission in British Columbia, and in response to a telegraphic request‡ from the Governor-General of Canada, Lord Crewe has informed His Excellency that he is at liberty to show to his Ministers, confidentially, Colonel Swayne's reports "On matters affecting the East Indian community in British Columbia."

3. Lord Crewe would invite the earnest attention of Lord Morley to the views expressed in the last paragraph of Lord Grey's despatch, and would be glad to know whether His Lordship thinks that there is now any possibility of the adoption of measures in India by which emigration from India to Canada can be effectively controlled.

4. If no arrangements can be made for this purpose, Lord Crewe presumes that Lord Morley will not desire to oppose further regulations by the Canadian Government restricting British Indian immigration into Canada.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

5843

No. 6.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

[Answered by No. 9.]

(No. 123.)

MY LORD, Downing Street, 27 February, 1909.
AMONG the printed papers received by the last mail, is copy of an Order in Council of 17 November, 1908,§ relating to the Acts passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia during the Session of 1908, in which it is stated that Chapter 23 of the Statutes, entitled "An Act to Regulate Immigration into British Columbia," is reserved for further report.

2. I shall be glad to learn in due course whether the Act is disallowed, or is permitted to remain on the Statute Book.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

8031

No. 7

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6 March, 1909.)

(No. 93.)

MY LORD, Government House, Ottawa, 25 February, 1909.
I HAVE the honour to enclose an advance copy of an Immigration Bill|| just introduced into the House of Commons by the Minister of the Interior.

I beg leave to call your Lordship's attention to Clauses 39, 42, and 43. Clause 39 empowers the Governor in Council to prohibit the landing of immigrants

* No. 4 † 1408: not printed.
§ Not printed: but see No. 12.

‡ 3115: not printed.
|| Not reprinted.

belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada. This clause is aimed against all Asiatics.

Clauses 42 and 43 empower the Minister of the Interior, in his discretion, after an investigation, to order the deportation of any person other than a Canadian citizen suspected of belonging to any secret society or organisation which in any way attempts to compel any resident of Canada by force or threat of bodily harm or by blackmail.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

10318

No. 8.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 24 March, 1909.)

[Copy of enclosures to Governor-General, 31 March, 1909. Confidential. L.F. See No. 26.]

THE Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith paraphrases of the following papers:—Sir J. Jordan, Peking: telegram, March 19, 1909; to Sir J. Jordan, Peking, March 20, 1909: (Chinese immigration into Canada: Proposed arrangement.)

Foreign Office,
March 23rd, 1909.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

Paraphrase of telegram from Sir J. JORDAN, Peking, to FOREIGN OFFICE, No. 65, dated March 19th, 1909.

Chinese immigration into Canada. Your despatches, Nos. 565* and 25. Progress is being made in the negotiations here, and Chinese Minister in London is being consulted by the Chinese Government as to the advisability of restricting the emigration on the lines that the Canadian Government desire.

As Mackenzie King is pressed for time, matters would be greatly facilitated if Chinese Minister were asked to send an early reply to the Wai-wu-Pu, and if the Canadian point of view could be explained to him.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Paraphrase of telegram from FOREIGN OFFICE to Sir J. JORDAN, No. 50, dated March 20th, 1909.

Chinese immigration into Canada. See your telegram, No. 65, of the 19th instant. The Chinese Minister has, I understand, been asked to give his opinion and, in particular, to ascertain the views of the prospective Chinese Consul for Canada, now, apparently, at San Francisco on his way to London.

The Chinese Minister has replied that a trial could be made of provisional arrangements, and that exemption from poll tax should be granted to emigrants within any specified number. The Minister has referred to the Japanese arrangement, and said that the limit has been overstepped; he advises the Wai-wu-Pu to consider how any regulations which they may agree to should be enforced.

It has been explained to him that Mackenzie King represents the point of view of Canada, and that no fuller details than he can give can be furnished by His Majesty's Government.

* Enclosure 1 in No. 143A in Dominions No. 3.

10548

No. 9.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.55 p.m., 25 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 14.]

Your despatch of 20th January [27 February], No. 123,* Act disallowed 15th February.—GREY.

8031

No. 10.

COLONIAL OFFICE to INDIA OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 20.]

SIR, Downing Street, 30 March, 1909.
I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before Viscount Morley, the accompanying copy of a Bill† which has been introduced into the Canadian House of Commons, entitled "An Act respecting Immigration."

2. I am to invite Lord Morley's special attention to Sections 37 and 39 of the Bill, which deal with restrictions on immigration, and to Sections 42 and 43, which deal with the deportation of persons guilty of agitation against His Majesty's Government in any part of the world, and to Section 78, which will be utilised to keep a note of the movements of Asiatic immigration.

3. Lord Crewe would be glad to receive any observations which Lord Morley may have to offer on the Bill.

4. A copy of the Bill has been sent to the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

8031

No. 11.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 17.]

SIR, Downing Street, 30 March, 1909.
I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir Edward Grey, the accompanying copy of a Bill† introduced into the House of Commons of Canada entitled "An Act respecting Immigration."

2. Lord Crewe would desire to call the attention of Sir Edward Grey to the definition of "Canadian citizen" in Section 2 (g), and to the provisions of Sections 37, 39, 42, and 43, which deal with the prohibition of the entry of certain immigrants and the power of deportation of aliens guilty of certain offences.

3. Lord Crewe would be glad to receive any observations which Sir Edward Grey may desire to offer on the Bill.

4. A copy of the Bill has been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

* No. 6.

† Enclosure (not printed) in No. 7.

11188

No. 12.

(Registered in Colonial Office 31 March, 1909.)

[Copy to Foreign Office and India Office, 14 April, 1909. L.F.]

PAPERS RELATING TO CHAPTER 23 OF THE ACTS OF 1908, BEING "AN ACT TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION INTO BRITISH COLUMBIA."

By Command,

HENRY ESSON YOUNG,
Provincial Secretary.

Provincial Secretary's Office,
24th February, 1909.

CERTIFIED COPY of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor-General on the 15th February, 1909.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a memorandum, dated 19th November, 1908, from the Minister of Justice, stating that he has under consideration a Statute of the Legislature of British Columbia, passed in the eighth year of His Majesty's reign (1908), and received by the Secretary of State for Canada on 18th February, 1908, being Chapter 23, intituled "An Act to Regulate Immigration into British Columbia."

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, and for the reasons mentioned by his predecessors in office, and for the additional reason mentioned in the report of the Minister of Justice above referred to, and attached hereto, advise that the said statute of British Columbia be disallowed.

The Committee, on the same recommendation, further advise that a copy of this Minute, if approved, together with the report of the Minister of Justice, be transmitted to the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia for the information of his Government.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

His Honour the LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR,
Province of British Columbia.

Ottawa, 19th November, 1908.

To His Excellency the GOVERNOR-GENERAL in Council:

The undersigned has under consideration a statute of the Legislature of British Columbia, passed in the eighth year of His Majesty's reign (1908), and received by the Secretary of State for Canada on 18th February last, being Chapter 23, intituled "An Act to Regulate Immigration into British Columbia," and he has the honour to report as follows:—

This Act is in terms substantially a re-enactment of a similar statute bearing the same title which has been several times enacted by the Local Legislature, and as often disallowed by the Governor-General in Council. See the report of Hon. Mr. Mills, Minister of Justice, of 5th January, 1901; his report of 4th September, 1901, approved by His Excellency on the 11th September, 1901; the report of the Hon. Mr. Fitzpatrick of 14th November, 1902, approved by His Excellency on 5th December, 1902; his report of 1st October, 1903, approved by His Excellency on 26th March, 1904; his report of 16th November, 1904, approved by Your Excellency on 20th January, 1905; his report of 19th April, 1905, approved by Your Excellency on 28th April, 1905, and his report of 18th September, 1905, approved by Your Excellency on the 30th September, 1905.

By Dominion Statute, the Japanese Act, 1900 (6-7 E. VII, c. 50), the Convention

of 31st January, 1906, between the United Kingdom and Japan is declared to be sanctioned. By Article 1 of this Convention the High Contracting parties agree that the stipulations of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan of 16th July, 1894, and of the Supplementary Convention of 16th July, 1905, shall be applied to the intercourse, commerce, and navigation between the Empire of Japan and the British Dominion of Canada. By Article 1 of the said Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 16th July, 1894, it is provided that the subjects of each of the two high contracting parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the Dominions and possessions of the other contracting party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property.

The British Columbia Immigration Act, 1908, is, therefore, subject not only to all the objections on account of which the preceding statutes of similar import were disallowed, but in so far as it affects Japanese subjects coming into British Columbia it is also repugnant to the provisions of the said Dominion Statute, the effect of which is, as has been stated, to confer upon Japanese subjects full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the Dominion.

The undersigned, therefore, for the reasons mentioned by his predecessors in office, and for the additional reason mentioned in this report, recommends that the said statute of British Columbia be disallowed, and he recommends that a copy of this report, if approved, be transmitted to the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia for the information of his Government.

Humbly submitted,
A. B. AYLESWORTH,
Minister of Justice.

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA.
Monday, the 15th day of February, 1909.

PRESENT:

His Excellency the Governor-General in Council.

Whereas the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of British Columbia with the Legislative Assembly of that Province did, on the 11th day of February, 1908, pass an Act, Chapter 23, which has been transmitted, intituled "An Act to regulate Immigration into British Columbia"

And whereas the said Act, together with a report from the Minister of Justice, recommending that the said Act be disallowed, has been laid before His Excellency the Governor-General in Council:

Therefore, His Excellency the Governor-General in Council is pleased to declare his disallowance of the said Act, and the same is hereby disallowed accordingly.

Whereof the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of British Columbia and all persons whom it may concern are to take notice and govern themselves accordingly.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

His Honour the LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR,
Province of British Columbia.

I, Sir Albert Henry George, Earl Grey, Governor-General of Canada, do hereby certify that the Act, Chapter 23, passed by the Legislature of the Province of British Columbia on the eleventh day of February, nineteen hundred and eight, intituled "An Act to regulate Immigration into British Columbia," was received by me on the eighteenth day of February, nineteen hundred and eight.

Given under my hand and seal, at Ottawa, this fifteenth day of February, nineteen hundred and nine.

[L.S.]

GREY.

11233

No. 13.

INDIA OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 1 April, 1909.)

SIR,

India Office, Whitehall, London, S.W., 31 March, 1909.

I AM directed by Viscount Morley to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo, No. 3115,* and, in reply, to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that he is inviting the serious consideration of the Government of India to the proposal that steps should be taken to check emigration to the Dominion of Canada. The visit of Mr. Mackenzie King will have given the Government of India special facilities for the discussion of this question. Upon the receipt of their answer a further communication will be made to your Department.

I am to say that Lord Morley will be glad if Lord Crewe will be so good as to convey to Colonel Swayne an expression of the cordial appreciation by the Secretary of State for India in Council of his valuable services in the Dominion of Canada.

I have, &c.,
COLIN J. CAMPBELL.

10548

No. 14.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 229.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 31 March, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's telegram of the 25th of March,† reporting the disallowance of the British Columbia Immigration Act, No. 23, of 1908.

2. His Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction of the disallowance of this Act, which had, I understand, already been declared inoperative in so far as it affected Japanese and British Indians.

3. I shall be glad to receive, if possible, reports of any cases in the Courts by which the invalidity of this Act was established.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

10548

No. 15.

COLONIAL OFFICE to INDIA OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 20.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 April, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 6th of March, 1908,‡ I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to acquaint you, for the information of Viscount Morley, that he has learnt from the Governor-General of Canada that Act No. 23, of 1908, of the Legislature of British Columbia, entitled "An Act to Regulate Immigration into British Columbia," has been disallowed by the Governor-General of Canada in Council.

2. It will be within Viscount Morley's recollection that this Act was declared by the Canadian Courts to be invalid—in so far as it affected Japanese immigrants, because of its repugnance to the Dominion Act confirming the accession of Canada to the Treaty with Japan, and in so far as it affected British Indians because of its repugnance to the Canadian Immigration Acts.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

* No. 5.

† No. 9.

‡ L.F. transmitting copies of Nos. 83, 89, and 99 in Dominions No. 3.

No. 16.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 April, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 6th of March, 1908,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to acquaint you, for the information of Secretary Sir Edward Grey, that he has learnt from the Governor-General of Canada that Act No. 23 of 1908 of the Legislature of British Columbia, entitled "An Act to Regulate Immigration into British Columbia," has been disallowed by the Governor-General of Canada in Council.

2. It will be within Sir Edward Grey's recollection that this Act was declared by the Canadian Courts to be invalid—in so far as it affected Japanese, because of its repugnance to the Dominion Act confirming the accession of Canada to the Treaty with Japan, and in so far as it affected British Indians because of its repugnance to the Canadian Immigration Acts.

I am, &c.,

H. W. JUST.

13277

No. 17.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 20 April, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 23.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, April 19, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge receipt of your letter (8031/1909) of the 30th ultimo,† inviting him to offer any observations he might have to make on certain sections of a Bill respecting immigration, which has recently been introduced into the House of Commons of Canada.

With regard to Section 2 (g), it appears to Sir E. Grey that the term "Canadian" would be preferable to the expression "Canadian citizen," as it is customary to confine the use of the word "citizen" to persons belonging to a Republic, and who do not owe allegiance to any Sovereign. Lord Crewe will no doubt have observed that the definition of "Canadian citizen," as given in this section, places an inhabitant of the British Isles who emigrates to Canada in a worse position, at least for three years, than Canadians.

As regards Sections 37 and 39, I am to point out that, as they are of an enabling character only, they do not in themselves appear to contravene any foreign treaty rights; but if regulations were to be actually promulgated under these sections, applying to Japanese immigrants treatment more onerous than is applied to immigrants of any other nationality, such regulations would, in the opinion of Sir E. Grey, be an infringement of Article 1 of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1894 to which Canada has adhered. As it appears probable that the regulations foreshadowed in these sections are to be applied to Chinese subjects, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the Canadian Government would be well-advised to await the outcome of Mr. Mackenzie King's mission to Peking before proceeding further with the matter.

Sir E. Grey has no observations to offer as regards Sections 42 and 43 of the Bill.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

13540

No. 18.

INDIA OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 21 April, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 22.]

SIR,

India Office, Whitehall, London, S.W., 20th April, 1909.

WITH reference to Mr. Just's letter of the 24th December last,‡ on the subject

* L.F. transmitting copies of Nos. 83, 89, and 99 in Dominions No. 3.
† No. 11.

‡ 47320: not printed.

of Mr. Mackenzie King's visit to India, I am directed by Viscount Morley to transmit for the consideration of the Earl of Crewe a copy of a letter received from the Government of India on the question of Indian immigration into the Dominion of Canada.

Lord Morley desires cordially to endorse the views expressed by the Government of India on the treatment given to this grave question by the Dominion Government, to whom, if Lord Crewe sees no objection, he would wish the correspondence to be communicated.

I have, &c.,

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure in No. 18.

No. 18 of 1909.

Government of India.

Department of Commerce and Industry.

EMIGRATION.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Calcutta, the 11th March, 1909.

WE have the honour to refer to Mr. Herbert's letter, No. J. & P. 4837, dated the 1st January, 1909, forwarding a copy of correspondence received from the Colonial Office regarding the visit to this country of Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King, C.M.G., the Canadian representative on the Joint Opium Commission at Shanghai.

2. We have discussed with Mr. Mackenzie King the present position with regard to the immigration of Indians into British Columbia. The chief points considered were:—

- (a) The probability of the present arrangements for stopping the influx of Indians into Canada, remaining effective, and
- (b) The attitude of the Indian Government towards these arrangements.

3. As regards the first point, the Canadian Immigration Act has been amended so as to empower the Governor in Council to prohibit the landing in Canada of any specified class of immigrants, who have come to Canada otherwise than by a continuous journey from the country of which they are natives or citizens, on through tickets purchased in that country; and an Order in Council, dated the 27th May, 1908, has been issued to give effect to this provision. At the present time there is no direct line of steamships running from ports in India to ports in Western Canada, and we believe that there is no likelihood of any steamship line starting through running from India to a West Canadian port. By a further Order in Council, dated the 3rd June, 1908, the Governor-General of Canada has directed that all Asiatic immigrants, other than those specially excepted in the last paragraph of the Order (as possessing Treaty rights), must have in their possession at least 200 dollars. The deportation sections of the Immigration Act further permit of the deportation, at the expense of the transportation company which brought him into Canada, of any prohibited immigrant or of any immigrant who has within two years become an inmate of a hospital or other charitable institution. We believe that these measures will be perfectly effectual in preventing further immigration into Canada of Indians of the type who have already found their way there. The effect of the second Order in Council makes it practically impossible for the ordinary Indian labourer to enter Canada. Immigration has for some time past ceased altogether, and we see no possibility of its being re-opened under the conditions which have been laid down by the Colonial Government.

4. We would add that we have already communicated the provisions of the two Orders in Council to all Local Governments for publication in this country. Resolutions had previously been published from time to time warning intending emigrants against proceeding to Canada. The steamer agencies have further been informed that the Indian Emigration Act of 1883 makes it illegal for natives of India to proceed to Canada under an agreement to work for hire.

5. As to the second point which was discussed with Mr. King, the attitude adopted by us has been throughout to oppose the imposition of direct restrictive measures in this country. We have on two occasions* pointed out that any action that might be necessary must be taken by the Canadian Government. We have raised no objection to the measures which have accordingly been adopted by the Colonial Government, and we do not intend to raise any question in regard to the steps which have been taken to control immigration into Canada.

* *Vide* telegrams, dated the 22nd January, 1908, and the 30th March, 1908.

6. In our telegram of the 22nd January, 1908, to your Lordship, we stated that we recognised the peculiar difficulties of the Canadian Government, and appreciated the conciliatory attitude with which they had approached this difficult question. The subsequent negotiations have tended further to confirm this view. A solution of the difficulties with which the Dominion Government were faced has been found without resorting to invidious legislation aimed particularly at British Indians, and the treatment which the subject has received has involved us in none of the controversies which have beset us in connection with Indian immigration into others of the self-governing Colonies.

7. We request that, if there is no objection, your Lordship will take the necessary steps to communicate our views to the Government of Canada.

We have, &c.,

MINTO
KITCHENER.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
H. ADAMSON.
J. O. MILLER.
W. L. HARVEY.
G. F. WILSON.

13685

No. 19.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 23 April, 1909.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the following papers:—Sir J. Jordan, Peking, Nos. 123 and 143, March 17th and April 1st, 1909: Chinese emigration to Canada.

Foreign Office,
April 22, 1909.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

(No. 123. Via Siberia.)

SIR,

Peking, 17 March, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 565, of the 31st December, and No. 25, of the 29th January last, informing me of the object of Mr. Mackenzie King's mission to China, and instructing me to give him every assistance in my power.

I lost no time in placing myself in communication with Mr. Mackenzie King immediately he arrived in Shanghai, and acting upon his advice I explained at length the objects of his mission to the Waiwupu, and prepared them generally for the reception of his proposals for the restriction of Chinese emigration to Canada.

Mr. Mackenzie King and the other members of the Opium Commission reached Peking on the 6th instant, and on the 9th the first interview on the subject took place at the Waiwupu with His Excellency Liang Tun-yen, whose long residence in the United States made him specially qualified to deal with such a question.

The exhaustive accounts,* prepared by Mr. Mackenzie King himself, copies of which I have the honour to enclose, of what passed at this and a subsequent interview on the following day, render it unnecessary for me to do more than touch upon the leading points of the discussion, and sum up very briefly my impression of the results that have so far been achieved.

* Memoranda of interviews of 9th and 10th March: not printed.

Mr. Mackenzie King explained with great clearness and force the economic and political reasons which rendered a policy of restriction necessary. The difference in the standard of living between Orientals and the people of the North American continent formed an important element in the competition of the labouring classes, and this led to an agitation for exclusion both in Canada and the United States, which no representative Government, charged with the duty of preserving good order, could afford to ignore.

Broadly speaking, there were two methods of dealing with the question. One consisted in the issue of prohibitory enactments in the nature of exclusion laws; the other was voluntary restriction by a foreign country of its own emigration. The latter was the system adopted by Japan and India, both of whom had entered into arrangements with Canada under which they undertook to exercise a certain degree of control over their own emigration.

With China there had so far been no arrangement, and restriction had been enforced by means of a poll tax. Canada had no wish to maintain an invidious discrimination against China, and wished to ascertain whether China would not herself undertake the restriction of her own emigration.

Mr. Liang said that he could not discuss any proposal which aimed at the exclusion of all labourers. He could say at once that the Chinese Government would adhere to its traditional policy of discouraging contract labour. While advocating, on principle, liberty of movement for free labourers, he intimated the possibility of adopting some temporary measure of restriction, on the understanding that provision should be made for such gradual increase as circumstances permitted. The poll tax he regarded as a violation of Treaties concluded with Great Britain.

Mr. Mackenzie King, it will be seen, combated this latter contention with great skill, and pointed out, forcibly, that Canada did not wish to restrict any classes of Chinese from going to Canada other than the classes amongst her own people whom she was prepared to prevent from going to China. Students, merchants, tourists, and officials from China would all be welcomed, and those were the classes from which the Canadians in China were drawn. Mr. Liang, of course, retorted that such an agreement would be reciprocal in name rather than in reality, as Canadian labour did not wish to come to China, and would not succeed if it did. He concluded by saying that China had to guard against a repetition of what had occurred in connection with the interpretation of the 1894 Agreement with America, which had resulted in a boycott of American goods in China, and he asked Mr. Mackenzie King to furnish him with a written statement setting forth what was desired.

This Mr. Mackenzie King did at his second interview on the following day, the 10th March, when much of the ground covered on the previous day was again traversed, and the whole subject discussed in all its bearings.

Eventually, Mr. Mackenzie King, coming to close quarters with Liang Tun-yen, asked him pointedly whether China could restrict her own emigration. Mr. Liang met this by saying that Canada could refuse to admit Chinese beyond a certain number. After, however, the Japanese system had been explained to him, Mr. Liang expressed the opinion that the Chinese Government might adopt the plan of issuing passports to a certain number of emigrants, and that Canada might refuse admission to any Chinese who came without passports.

This struck me as likely to prove the turning point of the negotiations, which have been conducted with such admirable skill, patience, and ability by Mr. Mackenzie King. Various documents bearing on the question have been supplied to Liang Tun-yen by Mr. Mackenzie King, as stated in the latter's letter,* copy of which is also enclosed. His Excellency will thus be fully informed in view of further discussion of the subject.

Another interview takes place to-day, and although a successful issue is by no means assured, the ground has been so carefully prepared and the position of the Canadian Government so fully explained, that even should the present attempt to arrive at an arrangement fail, an eventual solution has been greatly facilitated.

I have, &c.,

J. N. JORDAN.

The Right Honourable
Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.

* March 11: not printed.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

(No. 143. - Via Siberia.)

SIR,

Peking, 1st April, 1909.

In continuation of my despatch, No. 123, of the 17th March last, I have the honour to report on the further course of the negotiations between Mr. Mackenzie King and His Excellency Liang Tun-yen for the restriction by China of Chinese emigration to Canada in return for the removal by Canada of the present capitation tax.

The exhaustive accounts* of the two succeeding interviews, which have been prepared by Mr. Mackenzie King and are enclosed herewith, cover the ground so fully that it is unnecessary for me to do more than recapitulate the main facts.

At the meeting on the 17th March, Mr. Liang virtually admitted that China was in a position to make an agreement similar to that which had been concluded between Canada and Japan, and that the Waiwupu could regulate the restriction of emigration within defined limits by the issue of a certain number of passports. The form in which the agreement should be drawn up raised a slight difference of opinion. Mr. Liang thought that an exchange of Notes would be sufficient, while Mr. Mackenzie King preferred a more formal arrangement, in view of the fact that legislation in the Canadian Parliament would probably be necessary to give effect to any understanding that might be reached, and the public would have to be left in no doubt that its form was such as to secure the end in view. This was the more necessary on account of the difficulties which had arisen through the acceptance of informal assurances from the Japanese. It was pointed out that Treaties were between Nations what contracts were between individuals, and that a Treaty was desirable in a matter of this kind to prevent any possibility of misunderstanding as to the exact terms of the engagement. As Mr. Liang, however, adhered to his preference for an assurance in the form of an exchange of Notes, Mr. Mackenzie King said that he had no desire to press the question at that stage of the discussion, and would be prepared to leave to the consideration of his Government the form which the Agreement should take.

It was eventually decided that Mr. Mackenzie King should prepare a draft for purposes of further discussion on the basis that contract labour should be prohibited, except by the consent of both Governments, that free labour should be restricted to such numbers per annum as might be agreed upon, the restriction to be enforced by the issue of passports; and that Canada should, in return, take measures for the removal of the capitation tax.

The fourth interview, at which the terms of a proposed agreement were discussed, took place on the 19th March. Taking the existing Canadian legislation respecting Chinese immigration as his basis, Mr. Mackenzie King showed the amendments which would be required to bring it into harmony with the arrangement now contemplated between China and Canada and submitted for purposes of discussion a rough draft embodying the essential provisions of the proposed agreement. The various points enumerated in this were considered *seriatim*, and the reasons were given in each case for the wording that had been adopted. Mr. Liang found the terms of this proposal generally acceptable, and only made one or two suggestions, which were embodied in a revised draft, copy of which was, at his request, sent to him on the 20th March. This revised draft, which forms Enclosure No. 3 in this despatch, summarizes in a very succinct and complete form the final outcome of all these discussions, and is important as furnishing the basis on which any future consideration of the question must proceed. The document is perhaps somewhat fuller than the requirements of the negotiations here might have necessitated, but in drawing it up Mr. Mackenzie King had to keep in view the impression it would produce in political circles in Canada, and this consideration was explained to, and fully appreciated by, Mr. Liang.

The illness of the Grand Secretary, Na-tung, has practically placed the whole work of the Foreign Board in the hands of Mr. Liang, and being very busy himself at the moment, he referred Mr. Mackenzie King's draft to Mr. Tong Kai-son, a junior member of the Department, who had been one of the Chinese delegates to the Opium Commission. Mr. Liang, however, reverted to the question in an after-dinner conversation at the Legation on the 24th March, and explained to Mr. Mackenzie King the difficulties to be experienced in coming to an immediate decision. The substance of what passed on this occasion and at subsequent informal interviews is

* 17th and 19th March: not printed.

recorded in Mr. Mackenzie King's final memorandum, copy of which is likewise enclosed. It was evidently felt that the question was too large a one to be fully considered and decided in the limited time covered by Mr. Mackenzie King's visit, and it was thought advisable to postpone its further discussion until the Consul-General, whom the Chinese Government are sending to Canada, reached Ottawa. This decision was communicated to me in a letter of the 28th March, copies of which and of Mr. Mackenzie King's acknowledgment to Mr. Liang are enclosed, and there the matter rests for the present.

Although no final agreement has been reached, Mr. Mackenzie King's visit has produced an excellent effect by putting the immigration question in a far better position than it previously occupied. The Chinese Government are now fully aware of Canada's difficulties, of her anxiety to meet them in the way least calculated to offend Chinese susceptibilities, and if, for reasons of their own, they find that the friendly offer which has been made to them cannot be accepted, they must at least recognize the sincerity of the effort that was made to come to an understanding. The question was a new one to them, so far as Canada is concerned, and it is only natural that they should desire to have reports from their Consuls before committing themselves to any definite course of action.

Apart from the immediate object he had in view, Mr. Mackenzie King has done good work in placing Canada for the first time in direct official communication with China, and I cannot conclude this despatch without recording my belief that both the Imperial Government and the Government of the Dominion were fortunate in having such an able and sympathetic representative to perform the task.

I have, &c.,

J. N. JORDAN.

The Right Honourable

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.,

&c., &c., &c.

DEAR MR. LIANG,

British Legation, Peking, March 20, 1909.

I AM enclosing a draft of the proposed letter, which I promised to forward at our interview yesterday. You understand, of course, that it is only a draft, and that I shall welcome suggestions and criticisms concerning any of its paragraphs which you may think it desirable to make.

The communication is a somewhat lengthy one, but I have thought that on the whole it would be more satisfactory to have the several points deserving of consideration set out at length. This course may help to simplify discussion, and to prevent the possibility of any subsequent misunderstandings.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

His Excellency

Liang Tun-yen.

DEAR MR. LIANG,

British Legation, Peking,

FROM the interviews which have been accorded Sir John Jordan and myself at the Foreign Office since my arrival here, Sir John and I have been led to believe that the Chinese Government, appreciating the difficulties with which the Canadian Government is confronted in the matter of Oriental immigration, and being equally desirous with the Canadian Government to promote the friendliest relations between the peoples of the two countries, is prepared to voluntarily restrict emigration from China to Canada, and to make this restriction effective within defined limits, provided the Canadian Government is willing to remove the capitation tax (\$500 gold) which at the present time is imposed as a means of restricting immigration from China.

The following is proposed as the basis of an agreement between the Chinese and Canadian Governments in this connection:—

- (1) That restriction shall be effected, and the possibility of evasions safeguarded by the use of passports to be issued in a form and by authorities approved.
- (2) That persons at present exempt from payment of the capitation tax shall be freely admitted.

- (3) That persons at present required to pay the capitation tax, but entitled on the fulfilment of certain conditions to a refund, shall be freely admitted, subject to regulations to be approved.
- (4) That persons at present required to pay the capitation tax, and not entitled to a refund, shall be freely admitted in such number as may be agreed upon between the Government of China and the Government of Canada.
- (5) That persons without passports, or persons of the class mentioned in paragraph (4) coming with passports but in excess of the number agreed upon, may be refused admission, and such refusal will not be deemed by the Government of China to be an act of discourtesy or a violation of any agreement or undertaking respecting emigration from China to Canada.
- (6) That the bringing of Chinese to Canada under contract shall be prohibited, except in the case of contracts having the express approval of both the Chinese and Canadian Governments.

The persons referred to in paragraph (2) as being at present exempt from the capitation tax are:—

- (a) The members of the diplomatic corps, or other Government representatives, their suites and their servants, and consuls and consular agents;
- (b) The children born in Canada of parents of Chinese origin, and who have left Canada for educational or other purposes;
- (c) Merchants, their wives and minor children;
- (d) The wives and minor children of clergymen;
- (e) Tourists;
- (f) Men of science;
- (g) Duly certified teachers (subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the Governor in Council).
- (h) Chinese residents of Canada re-entering within twelve months after leaving to travel abroad, provided they have complied with conditions framed for the purpose of facilitating identification.

The persons referred to in paragraph (3) as being at present required to pay the capitation tax, but entitled on the fulfilment of certain conditions to a refund, are students entering Canada for the purpose of securing a higher education in one of the recognized universities, or in some other educational institution approved by the Governor in Council. At present, a student to be entitled to a refund, is required to furnish "satisfactory proof that he has been a *bona fide* student in such university or educational institution for a period of one year."

- (7) It is agreed that the Chinese Government would deprecate as strongly as the Canadian Government any attempt on the part of persons other than *bona fide* students to gain admission to Canada under conditions intended to afford special facilities to students only. It is proposed, therefore, that should the removal of the capitation tax endanger the privilege accorded to *bona fide* students by rendering possible any subterfuge on the part of others, it be left to the Governor in Council to adopt such regulations as may appear to be necessary to safeguard this privilege from abuse.
- (8) It is thought that the numbers to be agreed upon of persons of the class set forth in paragraph (4) might most advantageously be left to the Governor in Council to be determined in accordance with special conditions which may prevail in Canada from time to time—it being understood that except with the full concurrence of both the Chinese and Canadian Governments, this number shall not be less than in any one year.
- (9) As a means of preventing the fraudulent use of passports, and assisting Government officials in the discharge of their duties (except where otherwise specially provided by the Governor in Council), each passport shall be issued by the Chinese *Waiwupu*, be in the Chinese and English (or French) languages, and bear the seal of the *Waiwupu* and the signature of the bearer in his own handwriting, or contain

other sufficient means of identification. Each passport shall specify the occupation of the bearer and his object in coming to Canada, and to be valid shall be endorsed (*visé*) by the British Legation, or by a British Consul or accredited representative of the Dominion of Canada at the place where it is granted, or at the port or place of departure, and presented within one year of the date of its issue.

- (10) Any agreement reached between the Chinese and Canadian Governments would be on the clear understanding that such agreement would not be held to exempt any persons from the application of general laws or regulations of the Dominion, or measures specially enacted with a view to giving full effect to the provisions of such agreement; or to restrict the right of the Chinese or Canadian Governments respectively to enact and enforce laws respecting immigrants and immigration as may from time to time seem necessary.
- (11) Any agreement reached may be altered or amended by mutual consent, and shall be terminable at the expiration of year after formal notice of its desire to terminate such agreement shall have been given by either Government to the other.

I shall be deeply obliged, if before returning to Canada and reporting the results of the several interviews to the Canadian Government, you would give me an official assurance as to my having rightly understood the attitude and intentions of the Chinese Government, and as to the concurrence of the Chinese Government in the proposals and suggestions as outlined.

Yours sincerely,

His Excellency
Liang Tun-yen.

CONCLUDING INTERVIEWS WITH ACTING PRESIDENT OF WAI WU PU, March 24, 27, 30.

His Excellency, Liang Tun-yen, dined at the British Legation on the evening of March 24. During the course of the evening he mentioned to Sir John Jordan and myself that he had received a somewhat evasive reply from Lord Lee (the Chinese Minister at London). Having been very busy he had referred the draft communication I had sent him to Mr. Tong Kai-son, of the Wai Wu Pu, to look over carefully, and see if there was any point which required consideration. (Mr. Tong was one of the Chinese delegates to the Opium Commission.) He, Mr. Liang, felt that the matter was too important to decide himself, that he would have to lay the whole situation before the Grand Council for its action. The point which troubled him at the moment was whether the adoption of the system of restriction by means of passports as regarded emigration to Canada might not lead to other countries demanding a like form of restriction. The Dutch had been making representations concerning the number of Chinese going into their possessions in the East Indies, Java, and other islands, and were talking of enacting exclusion laws. They would be asking for voluntary restriction if it were adopted in the case of Canada. Australia and other countries might do the same.

The question of the numbers to be allowed came up for further consideration. Mr. Liang thought a larger number should be permitted than in the case of Japan, seeing that China had a much larger population. I remarked that, viewed from the Canadian standpoint, Chinese and Japanese were alike Orientals, and it was the competition of Oriental labour that it was desired to restrict. However, there might be something in the point raised, and if it were regarded as important, I thought the Government might consider a minimum of 500 a year, instead of 400 as originally suggested. This would be a recognition of Chinese superiority in the matter of numbers. Mr. Liang said he thought a minimum number might be agreed upon, the Canadian Government to increase this number as circumstances permitted. The Chinese Consul-General at Ottawa could be informed of the wishes of the Canadian Government, and let his Government know at stated intervals the numbers to be allowed in. I pointed out that this was the kind of arrangement proposed in the draft submitted, that it was altogether probable in some years the Canadian Government would be prepared to let in more than the minimum number specified. I asked if exception would be taken to a proposal to restrict to certain occupations (*e.g.*, domestic service) by a system of licences, such numbers as might be agreed

upon in excess of the minimum agreed on. Mr. Liang thought such an arrangement would be quite satisfactory.

I said to Mr. Liang that when presenting the case to the Grand Council he might tell its members frankly that the popular movement and tendency in Canada was in the direction of exclusion, and that if the present chance went by, exclusion would be all but inevitable in the near future. I explained the combination of circumstances which made the present an opportune time, should the Chinese Government desire it, to effect an arrangement such as had been proposed and mentioned that conditions as favourable might not always be at hand, or continue long to exist.

Before leaving, Mr. Liang said that he would do what he could to hurry matters along, but it might be a week before he could lay the subject before the Grand Council. He thought, seeing my time was short, it would be better were I not to wait till a final decision was reached, but allow time for a full consideration by the Government. I urged the desirability of something definite being decided before I returned if that were possible.

Mr. Liang appears to have taken up the matter almost immediately after this talk, for he remarked to Sir John Jordan on the Saturday following, Wednesday being the evening at the Legation, that he had been discussing the subject with his colleagues, and that he was afraid it would not be possible to conclude matters at once; the question would require some consideration, especially in regard to the effect of a policy of voluntary restriction on the possible attitude and demands of other countries. He would send a communication in a day or two.

On Sunday, March 28, a communication signed by Prince Ching and the other Ministers of the Wai Wu Pu was received by Sir John Jordan. Having been given by Sir John Jordan a copy of this communication, I sent a letter to Mr. Liang on March 30, mentioning that I would call at the Wai Wu Pu on the afternoon of that day.

I called at the Wai Wu Pu with Sir John and other members of the Legation during the afternoon. Mr. Liang in referring to the communication of the Wai Wu Pu, said that as the whole question was a large one, and it was not possible to say definitely what the final decision ought to be, it had seemed advisable I should not be kept waiting, especially as it was known that I was anxious to return to Canada as soon as possible. He agreed that the whole subject had been frankly and thoroughly discussed. As, however, the Chinese Government were sending a Consul-General to Canada, it had been thought best to allow matters to stand over until he reached Ottawa. Mr. Liang, in conclusion, expressed the Chinese Government's appreciation of the friendly attitude of Canada, and I thanked him on behalf of the Canadian Government for the time and care with which he had gone into the whole question in the several interviews.

WAI WU PU to H.M. MINISTER.

(Translation.)

SIR, Peking, 28 March, 1909.

We have carefully perused Your Excellency's memorandum and Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King's letter regarding the proposals of the Canadian Government for restricting the immigration of Chinese labour into the Dominion, and note their desire to arrange with the Chinese Government for limiting the number of Chinese labourers entering Canada each year, and for rendering it obligatory even on Chinese of a higher class to hold passports.

We have the honour to observe, in reply, that the number of Chinese subjects who have entered Canada in recent years amounts to some thirty odd thousand. We understand the desire of the Canadian Government to be that China should herself limit the number of labourers by a system of passports, and that Canada would under those circumstances be willing to remove the present onerous capitation tax.

While fully appreciating the friendly spirit manifested by these proposals, we have to bear in mind that this question affects the livelihood of Chinese subjects, and that its importance to us is therefore considerable. It is consequently impossible to come to a definite decision at short notice as to how the matter should be treated, and as we are now appointing a Consul-General for the Dominion, the best plan will perhaps be that he should go into the matter fully, and discuss it direct with the Canadian Government, whenever an opportunity presents itself.

Mr. Mackenzie King's present visit to Peking cannot, we presume, be indefinitely prolonged, and we would suggest that he should return to Canada and bring forward to the Chinese Consul-General any matter which he may have for discussion. The Consul-General will refer to this Board for instructions, and in view of the increasing cordiality in the good relations between China and Great Britain, and the consideration which the Canadian Government desires to show to Chinese subjects, we feel sure that it should be possible to accord to them most favourable treatment, and we profoundly hope that the capitation tax and all other cruel and vexatious ordinances may be completely removed, as a token of benevolence to these immigrants and as a manifestation of justice.

We have the honour to request Your Excellency to ask Mr. Mackenzie King to report to his Government in the above sense.

We avail, &c.,

PRINCE CHING,

And Ministers of the Wai Wu Pu.

Dear MR. LIANG,

British Legation, Peking, 30 March, 1909.

SIR JOHN JORDAN has shown me the despatch from the Wai Wu Pu in reference to the immigration matters we have been discussing together. I note that the Chinese Government desires to carefully consider the whole question before coming to a final decision, and I am therefore arranging, in accordance with its suggestion, to return to Canada, where, as the communication suggests, the matter may be taken up later on with the Chinese Consul-General at Ottawa.

I should not like to leave Peking without expressing my appreciation of the cordial way in which you have received me as a representative of the Government of Canada, and acknowledging with thanks on behalf of the Government the frank and thorough manner in which you have discussed the subject in its many bearings. I am fully sensible of what this has meant, amid your many and onerous duties.

I shall call at the Wai Wu Pu this afternoon at three o'clock, at which time I hope I may have the opportunity of thanking you in person.

Believe me, dear Mr. Liang,

Yours very sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

H. E. Liang Tun-yen,
Wai Wu Pu.

14409

No. 20.

INDIA OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 29 April, 1909.)

SIR,

India Office, Whitehall, London, S.W., 28th April, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo, No. 8031, and to Mr. Just's letter of the 2nd instant, No. 10548,* and in continuation of my letter of the 20th instant,† on the subject of British Indian immigration into the Dominion of Canada, I am directed by Viscount Morley to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that he does not desire to offer any observations on the Bill respecting immigration which has been introduced into the Canadian House of Commons. His Lordship is confident that the powers to be conferred on the Governor-in-Council by Section 39 of the Bill will be exercised with that consideration for broader Imperial interests which has marked the policy of the Dominion with regard to British Indian immigrants.

I have, &c.,

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

* Nos. 10 and 15.

† No. 18.

13540

No. 21.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 30 April, 1909.

WITH reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the 17th of December,* I have the honour to transmit to you, to be laid before your Ministers, the accompanying copy of a letter† from the India Office on the subject of the Indian immigration into the Dominion.

2. I desire to associate myself with the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India in expressing to your Ministers my appreciation of the manner in which the Government of the Dominion has treated this extremely difficult and important question.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

13540

No. 22.

COLONIAL OFFICE to INDIA OFFICE.

[See No. 27.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 30 April, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th April,† and to transmit to you, for the information of Viscount Morley, the accompanying copy of a despatch‡ which he has addressed to the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada on the subject of the restriction of Indian immigration to Canada.

I am, &c.,
H. BERTRAM COX.

14409

No. 23.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 25.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 7 May, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th of April,§ on the subject of the Immigration Bill of the Dominion of Canada.

2. Lord Crewe quite agrees with Secretary Sir Edward Grey that the use of the word "Canadian" in Section 29 of the Bill would be preferable to the expression "Canadian citizen," but the latter expression is not new, and is in frequent use in Canada, and Lord Crewe feels that it is not desirable to trouble the Canadian Government with any criticism of a mere verbal inaccuracy which does not imply any incorrect view as to the position of Canadians towards the British Empire.

3. Lord Crewe is aware that the definition of Canadian citizens places an inhabitant of the British Isles who emigrates to Canada in a worse position than Canadians, but he is already in a worse position under the existing law, and no objection can be taken to the substance of the enactment, which recognises the responsibility of Canada for persons who can fairly be deemed to be domiciled there.

4. With regard to Sections 37 and 39, Lord Crewe concurs that they are not in contravention as they stand to any treaty rights, and he feels no doubt that no action will be taken under those sections which will infringe Article 1 of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1894. Nor does Lord Crewe doubt that the Canadian Government will await the outcome of Mr. Mackenzie King's mission to Peking before proceeding to make under the Act any regulations applicable to Chinese subjects.

5. I am at the same time to transmit a copy of a letter|| from the India Office, from which it appears that the Secretary of State does not desire to criticise the Bill, and to say that, unless Sir Edward Grey deems it absolutely necessary to press any

* Not printed. † No. 18. ‡ No. 21. § No. 17. || No. 20.

objection, Lord Crewe does not propose to communicate any criticisms of the Bill to the Canadian Government.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

13685

No. 24.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

[Copy to Foreign Office, 11 May, 1909. L.F.]

(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 8 May, 1909.

WITH reference to my Confidential despatch of the 31st of March,* I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, for the information of your Ministers, copies of despatches† from His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of Mr. Mackenzie King's negotiations with the Chinese Government as to immigration into Canada from China. Copies of Mr. King's reports are not forwarded, as they will no doubt already be in the hands of your Government.

2. I desire to express the satisfaction felt by His Majesty's Government with the able conduct of the negotiations by Mr. Mackenzie King.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

16152

No. 25.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 14 May, 1909.)

SIR,

Foreign Office, May 13, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, 14409, of the 7th instant,‡ on the subject of the Immigration Bill recently introduced into the Canadian House of Commons.

I am to state, in reply, that, having regard to the fact that Lord Crewe is anxious to avoid communicating any criticisms of the Bill to the Canadian Government, unless it should be deemed absolutely necessary to do so, Sir E. Grey will not press his objections, in which, however, he is glad to note that Lord Crewe agrees.

I am, &c.,
W. LANGLEY.

16476

No. 26.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 15 May, 1909.)

[Copy to Foreign Office, 24 May, 1909. L.F.]

(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Ottawa, 4th May, 1909.

WITH reference to your Lordship's confidential despatch of the 31st March last,* on the subject of the restriction of Chinese immigration into Canada, I have the honour to forward copy of a minute of the Privy Council, discussing the statement of the Chinese Minister that the limit imposed by the arrangement with Japan had been overstepped, and pointing out that for the six months ended 31st March, 1909, the number of Japanese immigrants has been well within the prescribed limit.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

* L.F. transmitting copy of enclosures in No. 8. † Enclosures 1 and 2 in No. 19. ‡ No. 23.

Enclosure in No. 26.

(P.C. 249 N.)

CERTIFIED COPY of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor-General on the 27th April, 1909.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a confidential despatch, dated 31st March, 1909, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, enclosing the paraphrase of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Peking, Sir J. Jordan, to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and a reply thereto, in reference to the negotiations now being conducted by Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King for the restriction of Chinese emigration to Canada. In his reply to Sir J. Jordan, the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that the Chinese Minister in referring to the Japanese arrangement says that the limit has been overstepped.

The Right Honourable the Prime Minister observes that while it was feared during the first two or three months after the arrangement was entered into by Honourable Rodolphe Lemieux with the Japanese Government that the arrivals in Canada were to exceed the prescribed 400, and a warning to that effect was embodied in a Minute of Council on the 17th August, 1908, and forwarded to Sir Claude Macdonald, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio, later immigration returns show that the number has been kept well within the mark for the six months ending 31st March, 1909, the total arrivals in Canada being 92.

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, advise that a copy of this minute, if approved, be transmitted to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, for the information of His Majesty's Government.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

21806

No. 27.

INDIA OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 30 June, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 28.]

SIR, India Office, Whitehall, London, S.W., 30th June, 1909.
WITH reference to the correspondence on the subject of British Indian immigration into the Dominion of Canada, ending with Mr. Cox's letter of the 3rd ultimo, No. 13540,* I am directed by Viscount Morley to transmit, for the consideration of the Earl of Crewe, and for communication, should His Lordship think fit, to the Governor-General of Canada, a copy of a further letter from the Government of India. A copy of the previous despatch to which reference is made in the 3rd paragraph was sent to your Department in my letter of the 20th April last.†

I am to say that Lord Morley does not think it possible at present to urge upon the Government of India the adoption of further measures to check the emigration of natives of India.

I am to explain that your letter of the 30th March last, No. 8031,‡ and Mr. Just's letter of the 2nd April, No. 10,548,§ are now in the hands of the Government of India.

I have, &c.,
COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

* Not printed, but see No. 22.

† No. 18.

‡ No. 10.

§ No. 15.

Enclosure in No. 27.

No. 34 of 1909.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

Emigration.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN, O.M.,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Simla, 20th May, 1909.

MY LORD,

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, No. 59, Public, dated the 2nd April, 1909, regarding the question of restricting the emigration of British Indians to Canada.

2. In Lord Grey's letter, dated the 7th January, 1909, which forms an enclosure to the despatch, it is observed that the return to India of Sikhs now in British Columbia, enriched with the savings of five years' employment, and the knowledge that Indian labourers are preferred to white men, may give a fresh impetus to emigration to Canada from this country. In order to check this it is suggested that the Government of India should exercise some effective control over emigration to the Dominion.

3. In this connection we would invite a reference to our despatch, No. 18, dated the 11th March, 1909, relating to our interview with Mr. Mackenzie King, C.M.G., on the subject of the immigration of Indians into British Columbia. In that despatch we expressed the opinion that the measures undertaken by the Canadian Government had made it practically impossible for the ordinary Indian labourer to enter Canada; that immigration had for some time past ceased altogether, and that there appeared to be no prospect of its being reopened under the conditions which had been laid down by the Colonial Government. In the papers now forwarded by your Lordship we do not find any evidence to show that the present measures have failed to attain the object in view. We recognise, however, the possibility of a further influx of Indians into Canada being apprehended from the improvement in the position of the Indians now in that country. There may be cases of Sikhs returning to India with considerable sums of money accumulated in savings, and they may be able to supply their friends with the funds which immigrants are required to produce on arrival in Canada under the Order in Council dated the 3rd June, 1908. In other cases remittances from Canada may become so large that loans may be readily obtained from village money-lenders by intending emigrants, on the strength of the harvest that is being made by Indians who have already migrated to the Dominion. We are, however, of opinion that this risk will be met by the prohibition enforced by the Order in Council dated the 27th May, 1908, against the entry into Canada of Indians who have not arrived by continuous journey from India upon through tickets purchased in India. This check is likely to remain effective, even if the funds required for landing in Canada are forthcoming: and we consider that further experience should be awaited before raising the question of imposing any further restrictions on the entry of Indians into Canada.

4. In any case, such steps, if they should be found to be ultimately necessary, must, we consider, be taken by the Canadian Government. We have already placed fully before your Lordship the reasons which make it impossible for us to assume the burden of regulating or prohibiting free emigration from India. No new arguments have been adduced which would justify us in abandoning the position we have so far adopted on this subject, and, while we are prepared to take the necessary steps to warn intending emigrants of possible trouble in the country to which they are bound, we cannot propose any measures, such as the suggested introduction of a system of passports, which would publicly identify us with the policy of exclusion of Indians from other portions of the Empire.

We have, &c.,

MINTO.
KITCHENER.
H. ADAMSON.
J. O. MILLER.
W. L. HARVEY.
G. F. WILSON.
S. P. SINHA.

21806

No. 28.

COLONIAL OFFICE to INDIA OFFICE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 13 July, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th of June,* enclosing a copy of a despatch from the Government of India on the subject of British Indian immigration into Canada.

I am to request you to inform Viscount Morley of Blackburn that Lord Crewe does not think it necessary, under the circumstances, to communicate the despatch to the Dominion Government.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

PART II.—AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

46451

No. 29.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 30.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 January, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 20th of November,† I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir Edward Grey, the accompanying copy of an Act No. 230 of the Parliament of New Zealand, to amend the Immigration Restriction Act of 1908.

2. I am to explain that the principal Act referred to in this Act is a Consolidating Act, and that Section 42 thereof embodies the provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Act of 1907 enclosed in the letter from this Department of the 6th February last.‡

3. As this Act is a concession in the interests of Chinese residents, Lord Crewe presumes that Sir Edward Grey will have no objection to the Governor being informed forthwith that His Majesty will not be advised to exercise his power of disallowance with regard to this Act.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

Enclosure in No. 29.

NEW ZEALAND.

No. 230.

Title. An Act to amend the Immigration Restriction Act, 1908.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of New Zealand in Parliament assembled and by the authority of the same as follows:—

Short title. 1. This Act may be cited as the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act, 1908, and shall be read together with and deemed part of the Immigration Restriction Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act).

Section 42 of principal Act not to apply to Chinese returning to New Zealand within four years after leaving, if name registered. 2. (1) Section 42 of the principal Act shall not apply:—

(a) To the return to New Zealand of any Chinese who, whether before or after the passing of this Act has left or leaves New Zealand after registering his name and thumb-print with a Collector of Customs, and who returns to New Zealand within four years after the date of such registration, and satisfies a Collector of Customs as to his identity; or

(b) To the return to New Zealand before the first day of January, 1909, of any Chinese who has at any time theretofore been resident in New Zealand, and who satisfies a Collector of Customs as to his former residence in New Zealand.

* No. 27.

† Not printed.

‡ No. 241 in Dominion No. 3.

(2) The Governor may from time to time by Order in Council make regulations prescribing the manner in which and the conditions on which such registration may be effected, and every registration effected while any such regulations are in force shall be effected in conformity therewith, or otherwise shall be of no effect.

In the name and on behalf of His Majesty I hereby assent to this Act this 6th day of October, 1908.

PLUNKET,
Governor.

1444

No. 30.

NEW ZEALAND.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 13 January, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 31.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, 12 January, 1909.

I HAVE laid before Secretary Sir Edward Grey your letter, 46451/1908, of the 2nd instant,* enclosing a copy of an Act, No. 230, of the Parliament of New Zealand to amend the Immigration Restriction Act of 1908.

Sir E. Grey concurs with Lord Crewe in considering that this Act should not be disallowed.

He would, however, invite Lord Crewe's attention to the letter from the Colonial Office, No. 3385, of February 11th last,† in enclosure 2 of which particulars are given of the arrangements made in the Transvaal for dispensing with finger-print requirements in the case of Chinese who, by reason of their education, property or public character, are well known or can be easily identified otherwise. He would suggest that opportunity should be taken in future cases of providing for similar exemptions in New Zealand.

I am, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

1444

No. 31.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 27 January, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th of January,‡ on the subject of Act No. 230 of the Parliament of New Zealand, entitled "An Act to amend the Immigration Restriction Act, 1908."

2. Lord Crewe has intimated to the Governor of the Dominion that His Majesty will not be advised to exercise his power of disallowance with respect to this Act.

3. With regard to the 3rd paragraph of your letter, I am to point out that all that is required under the New Zealand legislation is the giving of a thumb print. To this no objection has been raised by the Secretary of State for India, and the practice in India, as stated in the despatch of the Indian Government of 30th January, 1908,§ which is printed in the Parliamentary Paper [Cd. 4327], is that "in the transactions connected with pensions, the standing rules of the Indian Accounts Department provide for the taking of the impression of the thumb and fingers of the left hand, while the impression of the left thumb alone is required from persons executing documents before registrars."

4. Under these circumstances, Lord Crewe does not consider that he is in a position to take any action of the kind suggested in your letter, even if objection were raised to the use of thumb prints on behalf of the Chinese themselves, a point as to which no evidence has been adduced.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

* No. 29.
† No. 30.‡ No. 27 in African No. 897.
§ Enclosure 1 in No. 3 in [Cd. 4327], October, 1908.

7745

No. 32.

AUSTRALIA.

INDIA OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 4 March, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 33.]

SIR, India Office, Whitehall, London, S.W., 3 March, 1909.
I AM directed by Viscount Morley to state, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, that he has carefully considered Sir C. Lucas's letter of the 15th September last, No. 24595,* on the subject of the relations between India and Australia. His Lordship desires to express his cordial appreciation of the sympathy with India shown by Lord Crewe in the letter itself, and in the accompanying draft of a despatch† to the Governor-General of Australia.

Before, however, he enters into a discussion of the terms of that draft despatch, Lord Morley desires to consider the observations of the Government of India, which, he ventures to think, it might be well to await before Lord Crewe definitely addresses the Australian Government.

Lord Morley does not consider that at present anything would be gained by holding a preliminary enquiry of the kind suggested in the fifth paragraph of Sir C. Lucas's letter, and he gathers from the terms of an answer given by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies in the House of Commons on the 5th November, that Lord Crewe does not desire to press this suggestion.

I have, &c.,
COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

7745

No. 33.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to INDIA OFFICE.

SIR, Downing Street, 15 March, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd March,‡ on the subject of the relations between the Empire of India and the Commonwealth of Australia.

2. In reply, I am to request that you will inform Lord Morley that Lord Crewe concurs in the proposal to await an expression of the views of the Indian Government before any despatch on the subject is addressed to the Commonwealth Government.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

26284

No. 34.

AUSTRALIA.

INDIA OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 6 August, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 35.]

SIR, India Office, Whitehall, London, S.W., 6th August, 1909.
IN continuation of Mr. Campbell's letter of the 3rd March last,‡ regarding the relations between India and Australia, I am directed by Viscount Morley to transmit, for the consideration of the Earl of Crewe, a copy of a letter in which the Government of India express their views on the suggestions made in Sir Charles Lucas's letter of the 15th September last, No. 24595.*

* No. 254 in Dominions No. 3.

† Enclosure 1 in No. 254 in Dominions No. 3.

‡ No. 32.

Lord Morley anticipates that Lord Crewe will probably agree that in the circumstances it is undesirable to address the Government of the Commonwealth in the sense proposed.

I am, &c.,
A. GODLEY.

Enclosure in No. 34.

No. 43 of 1909.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

EMIGRATION.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 24th June, 1909.

WE have given our very careful consideration to your public despatch, No. 40, dated the 5th March, 1909, with which was forwarded a copy of correspondence between your Lordship and Lord Crewe on the subject of the mutual relations of India and the Australian Commonwealth. The occasion which gave rise to the discussion of this difficult and delicate question was the proposal for the attachment of Australian officers to the Indian Army. This proposal has now been sanctioned by your Lordship in deference to the considerations advanced in Sir C. Lucas's letter, No. 30810, dated the 24th August, 1908. Your Lordship has, however, desired that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should make a representation on the general question of the lack of consideration for His Majesty's Indian subjects on the part of the Australian Government and people, and, in accordance with this desire, Lord Crewe has caused to be prepared a draft despatch to the Commonwealth Government on lines which, at the outset, at any rate, his Lordship considers to be those of least resistance. It is pointed out that it is impossible to overcome the Australian objection to the immigration of Asiatics into the Commonwealth, but Lord Crewe proposes that the Commonwealth Government should be urged to recognise in the case of India that there ought to be between the two countries a certain amount of reciprocity of action or at least of sentiment in the matter. The exact nature of the arrangements to be adopted in furtherance of this policy does not very clearly appear from the correspondence forwarded with your despatch, but we understand from Sir C. Lucas's letter of the 15th September, 1908, that the solution contemplated by Lord Crewe is apparently that Australia should agree to the imposition of restriction on the entry of Australians into India, and that, the principle of reciprocity of treatment being thus accepted, an agreement on the lines of the draft agreement of 1888 between China and Australia should be arrived at between the two countries. Under the proposed agreement it would be necessary for each Government to agree to adopt measures to prevent the departure from its ports of persons whose entry into the territories of the other would not be permitted. In asking us to consider the proposal, your Lordship observes that the reciprocity which Lord Crewe contemplates would be rather nominal than real, and expresses the belief that the Government of India would not in any case wish to initiate a policy of retaliation in the matter. You further request us to consider whether, within the limits indicated, an arrangement might be arrived at which could be regarded as a public intimation that the Indian subjects of the Crown are entitled to no better and no worse treatment than their white fellow subjects.

2. The position of Indians in Australia has not hitherto attracted the attention which has been devoted to the Indian question in other portions of the Empire. The emigration of Indians to that country has never been extensive, and since 1901 it has been strictly controlled under the Immigration Restriction Act. There never has been any emigration of indentured labour from India, and the trade connection between the two countries has so far been very slight. The resident Indian population is consequently inconsiderable, and unlike the Indian population in Natal, is not being increased by additions from the ranks of Indians admitted in the first instance as indentured labourers, or by new arrivals migrating there in connection with trade. The restrictions to which the Indian immigrants

into, and the Indian residents in, Australia are subject, appear originally to have been framed to meet the influx of Chinese and Japanese immigrants into the Commonwealth, and cannot be said to have been consciously directed against natives of India, against whom they operate by reason of their being Asiatics. The restrictions imposed on the entry of Indians into Australia are those applied by the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 as amended by the Act of 1905. A summary of these restrictions is contained in our despatch, No. 20, dated the 12th April, 1906. Of these restrictions the dictation test is waived in the case of Indian merchants, students, and tourist travellers, holding passports from one of the local Indian Governments and desirous of making a temporary stay in Australia. This concession, it may be mentioned, was secured by Lord Northcote, then Governor-General of Australia, without solicitation from the Indian Government. We have no precise information that disabilities other than those imposed by the Immigration Restriction Act are applied, beyond the fact that an Indian cannot acquire a miner's right without the previous authorisation of a Minister.

3. Your Lordship recognises that if we are to enter into negotiations with the Commonwealth Government on the basis suggested by Lord Crewe, it will be necessary that we should abandon the principle for which we have hitherto contended. Proposals have on more than one occasion in the past been made to us with a view to a check being applied at Indian ports on intending emigrants. In 1905 the Australian Government suggested the introduction of a system of supervision at Indian ports, so as to prevent the departure from India of persons who would, on arrival in Australia, not be permitted to land. To this suggestion the Government of India replied that they had no power under the law, as it stood, to control the emigration of free labourers, and that they did not consider that a case had been made out to justify the introduction of the special legislation, which would be necessary to give effect to the arrangement proposed by the Colonial Government. Again in 1906, in considering the effect of Section 8 of the Act of 1905 to amend the Immigration Act of 1901, which introduced a new section permitting of the exemption from the dictation tests of subjects or citizens of a Government which had made an arrangement regulating the emigration of its subjects, we informed your Lordship in despatch, No. 20, dated the 12th April, 1906, that we did not consider that we should in any circumstances be justified in assisting the Government of the Commonwealth to enforce a law which we regarded as unjust to British subjects in India though for the protection of the latter we published as widely as possible information regarding the disabilities imposed on Indians desirous of entering Australia. A similar suggestion was, as your Lordship is aware, also made in 1907 by the Canadian Government in connection with the immigration of Sikhs into Vancouver and was not agreed to by us, as being opposed to our policy. It was renewed in another form a few months later in the proposal that passports should be issued to intending emigrants, so as to secure that none but those physically fit should be allowed to leave India. This proposal, too, we were unable to accept. In a recent despatch from your Lordship, No. 59, Public, dated the 2nd April, 1909, we were again asked to reconsider our decision, but, after a review of all the circumstances of the case, we informed you in our despatch, No. 34, dated the 20th May, that we could not agree to take any action to control voluntary emigration from India.

4. The considerations which have influenced us in declining to accede to the proposals indicated in the preceding paragraph apply with equal force to the arrangement contemplated by Lord Crewe. We could not control the emigration of Indians to Australia without taking the necessary power by legislation. This legislation we should find it impossible to justify. It would be bitterly opposed by Indian public opinion, and would be regarded as an acceptance by the Government of India of the principle on which is based the Anti-Asiatic legislation of certain Colonial administrations. As against the abandonment of the policy which we have hitherto adopted in regard to the emigration of Indians, we could not even claim that we should be securing any real advantage in favour of our subjects. The restrictions on the entry of Indians into Australia would still in actual practice be maintained, but the invidious task of enforcing the necessary check at the port of departure would devolve on our Government. On the other hand, the immigration of Australians into India would be subject to restrictions which, it is admitted, must necessarily be nominal rather than real. It is by no means clear to what classes of Australian immigrants it is intended that these restrictions

should apply. It is conceded by Lord Crewe that there is practically no migration of the working classes from Australia into India, and, assuming that for the purpose of the nominal reciprocity suggested by Lord Crewe, the entry into India of Australian immigrants were to be prohibited, it is not clear to us what practical tests could be applied to secure that such immigrants should not enter the country. We cannot in these circumstances hope that the one-sidedness of the arrangement proposed would escape detection, and we are convinced that our acceptance of it would be regarded, and justly so, as a betrayal of the cause of the Indian people.

5. While we fully appreciate the spirit in which Lord Crewe's proposal has been conceived, we regret that we must, for the reasons which we have stated, decline to accept the solution suggested by his Lordship. We have already explained in an earlier paragraph of this despatch that the question of the position of Indians in the Commonwealth is not one which has come prominently to notice in India. That India is not very seriously affected by the immigration policy of Australia is clearly demonstrated by the absence of any popular feeling or clamour, such as would promptly be brought into existence if there were any reason, however inconsiderable. On the other hand, the attitude of the Commonwealth Government, as instanced by their concessions in regard to the admission of merchants, students, and travellers has been far more conciliatory than that of some of the Governments of other portions of the Empire. It would, we consider, be a matter for regret if the question of the position of Indians in Australia were re-opened on the present occasion; and we would repeat our conviction that a satisfactory solution cannot, from our point of view, be reached by the abandonment of the logical and consistent policy which we have hitherto adopted, in favour of a course of action which in principle is bound to be strongly disapproved by Indian public opinion.

We have, &c.,

MINTO.

KITCHENER.

H. ADAMSON.

J. O. MILLER.

W. L. HARVEY.

G. F. WILSON.

S. P. SINHA.

To the Right Honourable

Viscount Morley of Blackburn, O.M.,

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

26284

No. 35.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to INDIA OFFICE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 21 August, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th August,* forwarding a copy of a despatch in which the Government of India communicate their views on the proposals made in the letter from this Department of the 15th of September last† in regard to the relations between India and the Commonwealth of Australia.

Lord Crewe concurs for the present in Lord Morley's opinion that, in the circumstances, it is undesirable to address the Government of the Commonwealth in the sense proposed.

I am, &c.,

H. BERTRAM COX.

* No. 34.

† No. 254 in Dominions No. 3.

28390

No. 36.

NEW ZEALAND.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 24 August, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 37.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, 23 August, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Earl of Crewe, copy of a note from the Chinese Minister in London, requesting that certain changes may be introduced into the laws of the Dominion of New Zealand which relate to the immigration of Chinese subjects.

I am to enquire what reply Lord Crewe would desire should be returned to Lord Li's note?

I am, &c.,
W. LANGLEY.

Enclosure in No. 36.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Chinese Legation, August 14th, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received telegraphic instructions from the Wai-wu Pu in Peking, directing me to approach Your Excellency on the subject of the present position of Chinese subjects in the Dominion of New Zealand.

In the year 1908 the New Zealand Legislature passed an Act entitled "The Immigration Restriction Act," with an addition in the same year called "The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act." On reading the provisions contained in the said Acts, I cannot refrain from remarking that the restrictions they impose upon Chinese subjects appear very oppressive and indiscriminating. With the exception of officers or crews of Chinese vessels of war, as provided for in Clause 41 of Part III. of the principal Act, all other classes of Chinese subjects are precluded from visiting that prosperous Colony of the British Empire unless they are willing to submit themselves to certain proceedings derogatory to their dignity and self-respect.

As New Zealand is within easy distance of China, and has made great progress within the last generation in the development of various industries and also in her economical conditions, it would be to the advantage of both countries if facilities were afforded to Chinese subjects to visit that Dominion not only for the purpose of encouraging trade but also for intellectual studies.

With this object in view the Chinese Government have had this matter under consideration for some time, and have now arrived at the conclusion that the present might be considered an opportune time to approach the Government of New Zealand for the negotiation of some change in their laws regulating the immigration of Chinese subjects into their Dominion.

I am now instructed therefore by my Government to enclose herewith, for Your Excellency's information, a memorandum of the proposed modifications on the existing Immigration Rules of New Zealand, and my Government would feel deeply gratified if Your Excellency could see your way to exercise such a favourable influence in the matter as would contribute to the settlement of this important question in the sense desired.

I have, &c.,
LI CHING-FONG.

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.

MEMORANDUM of proposed modifications in the New Zealand Regulations for the Immigration of Chinese.

1. Chinese officials, students, and merchants with capital shall be granted the same privileges and facilities in landing at any port of New Zealand as are

granted to the subjects of other Powers who have Treaty relations with England: Provided they can produce passports issued by competent Chinese authorities certifying as to his status and condition, such passports to be viséed by English Consuls or otherwise duly authorised English officials.

2. Any Chinese subject who has been resident in New Zealand for over three years and who is well known to have been engaged *bona fide* in any respectable business can have his wife and family brought from China to New Zealand to reside with him, and his wife and family may be allowed to land without paying any tax or submitting themselves to the language test, if they can produce a passport or passports issued by a competent Chinese authority certifying that they are in fact the wife and family of the aforesaid Chinese subject.

3. No Chinese subject who has been resident in any part of New Zealand for a number of years and is well known to his neighbours shall, if he desires to leave New Zealand temporarily with the intention of returning within four years, be required to leave his thumb impressions for identification.

4. Any Chinese subject who is able to pass the language test on entering New Zealand shall be allowed to land, like the subjects of other Powers, without paying any tax.

5. Any Chinese subject who is passing through New Zealand on his way to other countries shall be exempted from paying any tax if he can find sureties to guarantee that he is a *bona fide* through traveller. If such traveller is afterwards found to remain in any part of New Zealand, he will be dealt with in accordance with Clause 34 of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1908.

28390

No. 37.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 24 September, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd August,* enclosing a copy of a note from the Chinese Minister, requesting that certain changes may be introduced into the laws of New Zealand relating to the immigration of Chinese subjects.

I am to request you to inform Sir E. Grey that a copy of Lord Li's note has been forwarded to the Governor of New Zealand for the consideration of his Ministers

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

28390

No. 38.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

[Answered by 10606.]

(No. 179.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 24 September, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 15, of the 22nd January,† I have the honour to transmit to you, for the consideration of your Ministers, the enclosed copy of a note‡ addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Chinese Minister, requesting that certain changes may be introduced into the laws of New Zealand relating to the immigration of Chinese subjects into the Dominion.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* No. 36.

† L.F.

‡ Enclosure in No. 36.

31932

No. 39.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 27 September, 1909.)

[Copy to Foreign Office and India Office, 12 October, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 40.]

(No. 87.)

MY LORD, State Government House, Sydney, 24th August, 1909.
In compliance with the request contained in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 17th instant,* I have the honour to transmit, herewith, copy of the Bill† to amend the Factories Act which it is proposed to introduce into the New South Wales Parliament during the present session.

I have, &c.,
CHELMSFORD,
Governor.

Enclosure in No. 39.

A BILL to amend the Factories and Shops Act of 1896; and for other purposes.

Amend-
ment of
s. 2.

2. Section two of the Principal Act is amended—

(b) Paragraph (b) in the same definition is omitted, and the following substituted:—

(b) any laundry, office, building, or place, not being a private house, boarding house, or restaurant or hotel in which one or more Asiatics are so engaged.

New sec-
tion 42A.Hours of
employ-
ment in
Asiatic
and certain
other
factories.

13. The following section is inserted next after section forty-two of the said Act:—

42A. (1) In any factory where any Asiatic works, and in any other factory where any person is employed in preparing or manufacturing articles of furniture, no person shall work, or shall employ or authorise or permit any person whomsoever to work on any day before half-past seven o'clock in the morning or after five o'clock in the evening, or on a Saturday after two o'clock in the afternoon, or on Sunday at any time whatever.

31932

No. 40.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4.37 p.m., 8 October, 1909.)

[Copy to Foreign Office and India Office, 12 October, 1909. L.F.]

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 41.]

Your despatch of 24 August† Factories and Workshops Amendment Bill. With regard to clauses affecting Asiatics, I should be glad to receive statement of reasons for applying to all Asiatics measures which seem to be aimed at competition from Chinese only or mainly. Please inform your Ministers that His Majesty's

* 26545: not printed.

† Extracts only printed.

‡ No. 39.

Government, while fully appreciating desire for measures designed to prevent unfair competition, would urge, for high political reasons affecting the Empire, the undesirability of discrimination against all Asiatics *nominatim*. The reasons, which will commend themselves to your Ministers, have in the past formed the subject of published correspondence with Australia. What is present position of Bill?—CREWE.

40580

No. 41.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.30 a.m., 15th December, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 42.]

Premier regrets delay in replying to inquiries contained in your telegram 8th October* *re* Factories and Shops Amendment Bill. He intended modifying Bill to meet as far as possible objection of Colonial Office when he was unfortunately taken seriously ill, and precluded from attending to the matter subsequently. Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament, and position is as follows:—All reference to Asiatics has been eliminated, and only two clauses have application to Chinese. Subsection (C) of Section 2 does not carry the law further in principle than Section 2, Subsection (B) of the principal Act. Amending Bill, however, now makes it clear that whereas four persons are required to constitute a factory of Europeans only one Chinese is necessary. This has been interpretation of principal Act, and in view of the fact that operations are carried out by one or more Chinese which require the supervision of the Factories Law it was thought desirable to express more definitely what was the intention of Parliament in 1896. Section 16 of the Bill is for purpose of preventing evasions of the awards of the Industrial Court which govern the furniture trade. Hours of work and wages are fixed by these awards, but the Chinese, especially in the furniture trade, persistently evade the awards by working during prohibited hours, and professing to be in partnership, so as to evade the relationship of employer and employee. At the same time Chinese furniture factories most seriously compete with European work, and obtain undue advantages through evading the law. Section 16 is, therefore, in general terms, applicable to all persons employed in manufacturing furniture, and in its terms applies equally to Europeans and Asiatics, but the essence of the section is employment, yet Chinese evade the question of employment by alleging partnership. Therefore, introductory words in the section are inserted to make section operative in any furniture factory where a Chinese works, whether as partner or as employee. Premier adds these provisions are absolutely essential to check unfair competition which Chinese now exercise against Europeans through evasion of the industrial awards which the latter are compelled to obey. May I assent to Act?—CHELMSFORD.

40580

No. 42.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 3 p.m., 20th December, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram, 15th December.† You may assent to Bill.—CREWE.

* No. 40.

† No. 41.

Co 886/2/4

Printed for the use of the Imperial Conference Secretariat.

Dominions
No. 11.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

[15 September, 1908, to 31 December, 1909]

RELATING TO THE

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE.

(In continuation of Dominions No. 7 ; continued by Dominions No. 19.)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT,
April, 1910.

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I.

(Resolution I.) Imperial Conference Secretariat.

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
1	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 92. Australia 60. New Zealand, 35. Cape of Good Hope, 44. Transvaal, 51. Orange River Colony, 26. Natal, 33. Newfoundland, 24.	February 12	Asks for views of Ministers as to the business to be discussed at the next meeting of the Conference in 1911.	1
2	The Governor ...	Cape of Good Hope, 43.	March 16 (Rec. April 3.)	Encloses copy of a Minute from Ministers suggesting that the question of the subjects to be discussed at the next Conference should be left in abeyance until the position of affairs in South Africa can be seen with greater precision than at present.	1
3	To the Governor ...	Cape of Good Hope, 123.	April 17	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 2 ...	3
3A	Home Office ...	—	July 21	Expresses opinion that if the naturalization question is not settled by 1911 an agreement on any outstanding points would be desirable, and that it might be useful to discuss arrangements for preventing the arrival in the United Kingdom of undesirable aliens expelled from the Colonies.	3
4	The Governor ...	Orange River Colony, 167.	October 25 (Rec. Nov. 13.)	States that Ministers consider it advisable to leave the consideration of subjects for discussion to the Union Government.	3
5	Ditto ...	Natal, 178.	October 25 (Rec. Nov. 22.)	States that Ministers wish the consideration of the business to be discussed to be left to the Union Government.	4

II.

(Resolution V.) Judicial Appeals.

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
6	To the Governor ...	South Australia, 29.	March 2	Transmits copies of an Order in Council of 15th February making provision for appeals from the Supreme Court of South Australia to His Majesty in Council.	4
7	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 145. Newfoundland, 36. Australia, 89. New South Wales, 42. Victoria, 26. Queensland, 24. Western Australia, 23. Tasmania, 27. New Zealand, 54. Cape of Good Hope, 75. Natal, 52. Orange River Colony, 40.	March 5	Transmits copies of Orders in Council of 15th February making provision for appeals from the Supreme Courts of South Australia and of the Transvaal to His Majesty in Council.	4
8	To the Governors ...	South Australia, 35. Transvaal, 90.	March 12	Forwards a copy of an Order in Council making provision for appeals from the Supreme Court of the Transvaal.	5
9	To the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.	Canada	April 3	Transmits copy of a Bill introduced into the Legislature of Ontario restricting the right of appeal to the Privy Council; states objections to the Bill, and encloses the draft of a telegram to the Governor-General of Canada on the subject.	5
10	To the Governor-General.	Canada, Telegram.	April 5	Requests that his Ministers be asked to approach the Government of Ontario with a view to the omission from the Ontario Bill, No. 128, of the clauses restricting the right of appeal to the Privy Council, and observes that if the Ontario Government propose to press the matter the whole question of the powers of the Provincial Legislature should be referred to the Judicial Committee.	5

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
11	Privy Council Office	Canada	April 6	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 9; states that the Lord President of the Council and the Lord Chancellor concur, with slight amendments, in the telegram enclosed therein, and adds that their Lordships are of opinion that if the matter is pressed the whole question of the powers of the Provincial Legislatures should be referred for consideration to the Judicial Committee.	6
12	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 264. Newfoundland, 57. Australia, 152. Victoria, 40. Queensland, 39. South Australia, 46. Western Australia, 31. Tasmania, 39. New Zealand, 83. Cape of Good Hope, 125. Natal, 82. Transvaal, 139. Orange River Colony, 71.	April 21	Transmits copy of an Order in Council making provision for appeals from the judgments of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to the King in Council.	6
13	To the Governor ...	New South Wales, 63.	April 21	Ditto	7
14	To the Governor-General.	Canada, Telegram.	May 17	Enquires whether clauses referred to in No. 10 have been retained in Ontario Act, No. 128, and, if so, what view his Ministers take of the matter.	7
15	The Governor-General.	Canada, 283.	June 2 (Rec. June 14.)	Encloses a copy of an approved minute of the Privy Council stating that the clauses relating to appeals to the King in Council were not retained in the Ontario Act.	7

III.

(Resolution XI. (2).) Withdrawal of the Colonies from certain Treaties.

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
16	Foreign Office ...	—	January 28	Transmits copies of the Bill for effecting legislation desirable before the Conventions agreed to by the Second Peace Conference are ratified, and asks to be furnished with Lord Crewe's observations on the draft and whether it will be necessary to defer the introduction of the Bill until the self-governing Dominions have been consulted.	8
17	To Foreign Office...	—	February 20	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 16, and states that Lord Crewe will send copies of the Bill to the Dominion Governments, but he does not think it necessary to defer its introduction; he thinks that, in future, Dominion Governments should be represented at the examination of agreements of this kind, and would be glad to be able to assure the Dominion Governments that they will be given the fullest latitude in carrying out any regulations.	8
18	Foreign Office ...	—	March 31	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 17; states that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the representation of Dominion Governments on Interdepartmental Committees appointed to examine International Agreements would make the Committees unwieldy, and explains that the proposal to prepare a draft Order in Council which can be submitted to the Dominion Governments will afford ample opportunity for the exercise of discretion by those Governments.	9
19	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 254. Newfoundland, 54. Australia, 144. New Zealand, 80. Cape of Good Hope, 119. Natal, 79. Transvaal, 132. Orange River Colony, 68.	April 15	Transmits copies of enclosures in No. 16, and states that the draft of the Order in Council to be issued under Clause 2 will be forwarded for observations when ready.	10

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
20	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Confidential.	April 15	Explains the reasons of His Majesty's Government for legislating for the Empire, and asks that, in case Ministers should express any dissatisfaction with the procedure, the matter may be explained to them in a friendly way.	10
21	To Foreign Office...	—	May 6	Asks that it may be considered whether, before concluding or renewing arbitration treaties in future, it would be possible to ask foreign Powers to agree to the insertion of a clause reserving to His Majesty's Government the right of obtaining the concurrence of the Government of any Dominion concerned.	11
22	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 321. Newfoundland, 73. Australia, 184. New Zealand, 98. Cape of Good Hope, 148. Natal, 101. Transvaal, 173. Orange River Colony, 87.	May 12	Transmits copy of a Bill which is being introduced into the Imperial Parliament to effect the legislation which is desirable before the Conventions drawn up at the Second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907 are ratified by His Majesty's Government.	12
23	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. May 19.)	Requests that notice of withdrawal from the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1889, may be given on behalf of the Commonwealth.	12
24	To Foreign Office...	Australia	May 21	Transmits copy of No. 23 and asks that the necessary notification may be made to the Government of Egypt.	12
25	Foreign Office ...	—	May 25	Expresses some doubt as to the value of the insertion in arbitration treaties of the clause proposed but states that Sir E. Grey is willing to endeavour to secure its adoption and encloses draft of a note to the German Chargé d'Affaires accordingly, in reference to the Treaty with Germany, which expires on 12th July next.	13

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
26	To Foreign Office...	—	June 3	Concurs in the terms of the draft enclosed in No. 25.	13
—	Mr. Risley (Colonial Office) to Mr. Hurst (Foreign Office).	—	June 9	See No. 27 ...	17
27	Mr. Hurst (Foreign Office) to Mr. Risley (Colonial Office).	—	June 28	Transmits papers relating to the Arbitration Convention with the United States.	14
28	Foreign Office ...	—	July 7	Transmits copy of a despatch to His Majesty's Representative at Berlin, recording a conversation with the German Ambassador respecting the objections of the German Government to the proposed addition to the Arbitration Treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany.	18
29	Ditto ...	—	July 10	Transmits (in substitution for the draft enclosed in No. 25) copy of a note to the German Ambassador proposing the renewal of the Arbitration agreement of 12th July, 1904, between the United Kingdom and Germany.	19
30	The Governor-General.	Australia, 118.	May 28 (Rec. July 12.)	States that it is the desire of the Government of the Commonwealth to withdraw from the treaties indicated.	20
31	Foreign Office ...	—	July 17	Encloses note from the German Ambassador agreeing to the renewal for one year of the Arbitration Agreement with Germany; suggests that the self-governing colonies should be asked whether they concur in the renewal of these agreements in their present form.	21
32	Lord Plunket ...	New Zealand, Confidential.	June 14 (Rec. July 26.)	States, with reference to No. 20, that his Ministers have returned No. 19 without comment.	21
33	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 293.	August 6	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 30, and states that Sir E. Grey has been asked to take steps for the withdrawal of the Commonwealth from the treaties with Greece, Paraguay, and Honduras; and to consider how far it is possible to secure permission for the Commonwealth to withdraw from the other treaties which are binding upon it in respect of one or more States.	22
34	To Foreign Office...	Australia	August 7	Transmits copy of No. 30, and asks that steps may be taken to give notice of the termination of the obligations of the Commonwealth in the treaties with Paraguay, Greece, and Honduras; asks for Sir E. Grey's observations as to the possibility of obtaining the withdrawal of the Commonwealth from the other treaties dealt with in the previous correspondence.	22

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
35	Foreign Office ...	—	August 27	Enquires what precise meaning Lord Crewe attaches to the proviso in Article 2 of the Arbitration Convention with the United States of April, 1908, reserving the right of His Majesty's Government to obtain the concurrence of the Government of a self-governing Dominion before concluding a special agreement affecting the interests of that Dominion.	22
36	The Governor ...	Orange River Colony, 131.	August 9 (Rec. Aug. 28.)	Acknowledges the receipt of Nos. 19 and 22, and states that Ministers have not offered any remarks upon the proposed legislation.	23
37	Foreign Office ...	Australia	September 13	Transmits copies of telegrams to His Majesty's Representatives at Athens, Guatemala, and Asuncion instructing them to denounce certain commercial treaties with Greece, Honduras, and Paraguay respectively on behalf of the Australian States, and explains the position with regard to the Treaties with Roumania, Italy, Mexico, Muscat, and Austria-Hungary.	23
38	Ditto ...	Australia	September 15	Transmits copy of communications from His Majesty's Ministers at Guatemala and Athens reporting the notification to the respective Governments of the withdrawal of the Australian States from certain Commercial Treaties.	24
39	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 342.	September 23	Transmits copies of the enclosures in Nos. 37 and 38.	25
40	To Foreign Office ...	—	September 24	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 31 and states that Lord Crewe now considers it unnecessary to consult the colonies for the reasons stated.	26
41	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 360.	October 8	Refers to No. 39 and explains the position with regard to the Treaties with Roumania, Italy, Mexico, Muscat, and Austria-Hungary.	26
42	To Foreign Office ...	Australia	October 9	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 37; concurs in the proposal to consult the Board of Trade with regard to the Treaties with Italy, Mexico, and Muscat; asks if Foreign Office is satisfied that when a Colony has once thrown open its trade to Austro-Hungarian ships it can subsequently withdraw the privilege.	27
43	The Governor-General.	Australia, 242.	October 16 (Rec. Nov. 2.)	States, with reference to No. 19, that, so far as the application of the proposed legislation to Australia is concerned, there does not appear to be any objection in principle or detail to the Bill.	27

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
44	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 639. Newfoundland, 162. Australia, 377. New Zealand, 194. Cape of Good Hope, 284. Natal, 202. Transvaal, 349. Orange River Colony, 174.	October 30	States that the 27th of November has been fixed as the date for the first deposit of ratifications of the Conventions drawn up at the Second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907, and enumerates the Conventions and Declarations ratification of which it is proposed to deposit.	27
45	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 396.	November 8	Requests that his Ministers may be informed that the Government of Honduras have denounced the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 21st January, 1887, with the United Kingdom, and points out that Australia will be free from its provisions on the 6th September, 1910.	28
46	To the Governor-General and Governors.	Canada, 668. Newfoundland, 170. New Zealand, 200. Cape of Good Hope, 291. Natal, 210. Transvaal, 360. Orange River Colony, 182.	November 8	States that the Honduranian Government have denounced the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 21st January, 1887, with the United Kingdom, and that it will be terminated on the 6th October, 1910.	28
47	Foreign Office ...	Australia	November 11	Transmits copies of correspondence with the Board of Trade relative to the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia from certain commercial treaties, and drafts of despatches to His Majesty's Representatives at Vienna, Rome, and Mexico on the subject.	29

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
48	To Foreign Office ...	—	November 20	Explains, in reply to No. 35, that under the Arbitration Convention with the United States of April, 1908, a Dominion interested in a matter the subject of proposed arbitration is entitled to refuse to accept in any form a special agreement as contemplated by the Convention and thereby to render arbitration impossible.	30
49	Ditto ...	Australia	November 24	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 47; concurs in the terms of the draft despatches subject to certain verbal specified alterations; and enquires what is the position with regard to the Commercial Treaty with Muscat.	31
50	Foreign Office ...	—	December 3	Transmits copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Representative at the Hague reporting that the Representatives of certain Powers had signed Protocols recording the deposit of the ratifications of such of the Conventions and of the Declaration of the Second Peace Conference as had been ratified by their respective Governments.	31
51	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 430.	December 3	Transmits copies of despatches sent by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna, Rome, and Mexico, instructing them to ascertain the views of the Governments as to the power of the Commonwealth States to withdraw from certain Treaties and states that it is proposed to await replies from the various Governments before making any communication to Muscat.	32
52	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 728. Newfoundland, 191. Australia, 437. New Zealand, 216. Cape of Good Hope, 316. Natal, 230. Transvaal, 382. Orange River Colony, 197.	December 10	Transmits copy of the enclosure in No. 50.	33

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
53	To the Governor-General and Governors.	Canada, 772. Newfoundland, 208. New Zealand, 230. Cape of Good Hope, 335. Natal, 250. Transvaal, 398. Orange River Colony, 207.	December 31	States that His Majesty's Representatives at Vienna, Rome, and Mexico have been instructed to enter into negotiations with the countries concerned in order to secure, if possible, for the self-governing Dominions the right to withdraw from the treaties specified.	33

IV.

(Resolution XIII.) Uniformity in Trade Marks and Patents.

54	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Australia, 88. Canada, 144. Newfoundland, 35. New Zealand, 53. Cape of Good Hope, 74. Natal, 51. Orange River Colony, 39. Transvaal, 74.	March 5	Transmits copy of a memorandum showing how far the laws of the Dominions differ from those of the United Kingdom, and enquires whether it is considered desirable to summon a conference of representatives of the Dominions to discuss the amendment of Colonial laws.	34
55	The Governor ...	Natal, 50.	April 13 (Rec. May 8.)	States that Ministers are of opinion that any question of the alteration of the Trade Marks and Patent Laws should be held over pending the settlement of the question of closer union.	46
56	Ditto ...	Transvaal, 117.	April 26 (Rec. May 15.)	Encloses copy of a minute from Ministers stating that they have had under consideration the draft of a Bill consolidating and amending existing laws but do not propose to introduce it while the draft Act of Union is under consideration.	46

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
57	The Governor ...	Orange River Colony, 59.	April 26 (Rec. May 15.)	States that his Ministers are giving careful attention to the subject of the assimilation of Trade Marks and Patent Law to the Imperial Act of 1905, and have desired him to ascertain the views of the Governments of the Cape Colony, Natal, and the Transvaal.	47
58	Ditto ...	Cape of Good Hope, 91.	May 18 (Rec. June 5.)	States that Ministers consider it inexpedient to revise the Cape law as regards Trade Marks and Patents pending settlement of question of South African Union.	47
59	The Acting Governor.	Newfoundland, 90.	September 4 (Rec. Sept. 20)	Encloses copy of a letter from the Attorney-General expressing the opinion that the local law might be made to conform more closely to the Imperial law, and suggesting that the subject should be discussed at the next regular session of the Imperial Conference.	48

V.

(Resolution XIV.): Uniformity in Trade Statistics.

60	To the Governor-General and Governors.	Australia, 90. New Zealand, 55. Newfoundland, 37. Cape of Good Hope, 76. Natal, 53. Transvaal, 75. Orange River Colony, 41. South Africa, 95.	March 5	Transmits a copy of correspondence with the Governor-General of Canada.	49
61	The Governor-General.	Canada, 192.	April 19 (Rec. May 1.)	Forwards copy of an approved minute of the Privy Council showing that the Dominion Ministers are prepared to take steps during the present year to carry out the suggestions made on the subject of uniformity in the trade statistics of the Empire.	49

VI.

(Resolution XVI.): Reciprocity in the Matter of Surveyors.

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
62	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 140. Newfoundland, 34. Australia, 86. New South Wales, 41. Victoria, 24. Queensland, 22. South Australia, 32. Western Australia, 22. Tasmania, 26. New Zealand, 51. Cape of Good Hope, 71. Natal, 49. Transvaal, 72. Orange River Colony, 38.	March 4	Transmits copies of a memorandum which has been drawn up by the Council of the Surveyors' Institution, on reciprocity in the examination and authorization of Surveyors throughout the Empire, and trusts that it will be possible to accept the suggestion of the Institution that a Conference on the subject should be held in London.	50

VII.

(Resolution XIX.): Naturalization.

63	The Governor ...	Newfoundland, 14.	March 2 (Rec. Mar. 17.)	Transmits copy of a letter from the Colonial Secretary forwarding a copy of a report by the Minister of Justice on the subject of proposed Imperial legislation.	57
64	Ditto ...	Orange River Colony, 34.	March 8 (Rec. Mar. 27.)	States that Ministers do not feel justified in pledging the colony at the present juncture on the question of naturalization and prefer to leave it open for consideration by a Union Parliament when constituted.	58
65	The Deputy Governor.	Transvaal, 139.	May 8 (Rec. May 29.)	Transmits Minute by Ministers recommending that the subject be left for the consideration of the Union Government.	59

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
66	The Governor ...	Natal, 76.	May 10 (Rec. June 5.)	Encloses copy of a Minute from Ministers suggesting that the proposed discussion of the draft Naturalization Bill should be postponed pending the establishment of a Union of the South African colonies.	59
67	To the Governors-General and Governor.	Australia, 217. New Zealand, 119. Canada, 394.	June 11	Asks for the observations of their Ministers on the draft Naturalisation Bill.	60
68	The Governor ...	Cape of Good Hope, 100.	May 26 (Rec. June 12.)	Forwards copy of a Minute from Ministers, transmitting a resolution adopted by the South African Naturalization Reform Association and a press report of an interview between a Deputation from the Association and the Prime Minister.	61

(Resolution VIII.) : Naval Defence.

69	The Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. Mar. 22.)	States that the Prime Minister desires to explain that legislation will be required by New Zealand to raise a loan for building the warship, and that meanwhile any money that may be required for the purpose must be advanced by the British Government.	63
70	To Admiralty ...	New Zealand.	March 22	Transmits copies of telegrams from the Governor of New Zealand and asks what reply should be sent to the Dominion Government.	63
71	House of Commons	New Zealand.	March 24	In reply to Mr. Cathcart Wason and Mr. Fell, the Prime Minister read the telegraphic correspondence which had passed between the Government of New Zealand and His Majesty's Government.	64
72	Ditto ...	New Zealand.	March 29	In reply to Mr. Fell, who asked whether the New Zealand ships were to be additional to the programme of His Majesty's Government, the Prime Minister said that the terms of the offer had been communicated to the House, but referred the Hon. Member to Sir J. Ward's telegram published in the morning papers.	64
73	Ditto ...	New Zealand.	March 29	In reply to Major Anstruther-Gray, the Prime Minister stated that no further information than that contained in Sir J. Ward's telegram had been received.	64
74	The Commonwealth Representative in London.	Australia	March 29	Requests that the permission of the Admiralty be obtained for the Commonwealth Government to make use of the Admiralty system of burning oil fuel and other secret fittings for the torpedo boat destroyers now being built at Glasgow.	65

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
75	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. Mar. 31.)	States that the Commonwealth Government have placed an order with Denny Brothers and Fairfield for the construction of two torpedo boat destroyers, and that they ask for the assistance of the Admiralty in the matter.	65
76	To the Admiralty...	New Zealand.	March 31	Transmits copies of telegraphic correspondence with the Governor of New Zealand and requests a full expression of the views of the Admiralty as to the reply to be made.	65
77	Ditto ...	Australia	April 1	Transmits copies of Nos. 75 and 74 and enquires what reply should be sent in each case.	66
78	Ditto ...	New South Wales, Victoria.	April 7	Forwards copy of telegraphic correspondence respecting the desire of the Governments of New South Wales and Victoria to contribute their share of the cost of a Dreadnought.	66
79	Admiralty ...	Australia	April 16	States that the Admiralty will readily give every assistance in their power to the Commonwealth Government in connexion with the construction of the torpedo boat destroyers ordered from shipbuilding firms in this country on the condition that secrecy is maintained.	66
80	To Admiralty ...	Australia	April 16	Transmits copies of telegraphic correspondence with the Governor-General and asks for a very early intimation of the views of the Admiralty on the present proposals of the Commonwealth which, in effect, concede everything desired by the Admiralty as to the control of the Commonwealth force.	67
81	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. April 19.)	States that, owing to the unsettled condition of politics, the proposals of the Australian Government should not be relied on as a final expression of Australian opinion, and asks whether publication in London of extracts from the scheme was authorized by His Majesty's Government.	67
82	To the Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	April 19	States, in reply to No. 81, that the Imperial Government has not authorised the publication of information about the Australian Naval Scheme which appeared in the London Press.	68
83	To the Admiralty...	Australia, Confidential.	April 20	Transmits copies of Nos. 80, 81, and 82, and asks for an early intimation of the views of the Admiralty on the scheme, which represents for the time being the considered policy of the Commonwealth Government.	68
84	To the Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	April 20	States that the Admiralty will render the assistance requested in No. 75, and that the Colonial Office is in communication with the Commonwealth Representative.	68

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
85	To Admiralty ...	Australia	April 21	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 79, and states that Lord Crewe presumes that the assistance offered does not depend on the assumption contained in its last paragraph that the new vessels are to be additions to the existing force, and he has accordingly sent a copy of it minus that paragraph to Captain Collins and the Governor-General.	69
86	To the Commonwealth Representative in London.	Australia	April 21	Transmits copy of No. 79, and states that Lord Crewe will be glad to receive the undertaking of secrecy required by the Admiralty.	69
87	The Commonwealth Representative in London.	Australia	April 22	Asks that Lord Crewe will convey to the Admiralty the appreciation of the Commonwealth Government for their promise of assistance, and states that the conditions upon which confidential information will be imparted will be strictly adhered to.	69
88	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 154.	April 22	Transmits copies of Nos. 74, 79, and 86.	70
89	The Administrator	New South Wales, 34.	March 26 (Rec. May 1.)	Transmits resolutions passed at a meeting of citizens of Sydney in favour of a more active share in the naval defence of the Empire being taken by the Commonwealth, and states that diversity of opinion exists as to the form assistance should take.	70
90	The Governor-General.	Canada, 191.	April 19 (Rec. May 1.)	Encloses copy of a report of a statement by Sir James Whitney in the Ontario Legislative Assembly to the effect that the Dominion had missed a golden opportunity of offering assistance to the mother country.	71
91	To War Office and Admiralty.	—	May 5	Transmits copies of despatches to the self-governing Dominions suggesting the holding of a conference to discuss the question of naval and military defence.	72
92	To Admiralty and War Office.	—	May 6	Transmits, with reference to No. 91, telegraphic replies from Canada and Australia.	72
93	The Governor-General.	Canada, Secret.	May 6 (Rec. May 15.)	States attitude of Prime Minister towards the conference in July next, viz., that he welcomes the opportunity for the Ministers of Defence to confer with the Imperial Authorities on technical matters, but does not favour their taking part in a conference to consider matters of general policy.	72
94	Ditto ...	Canada, Secret.	May 11 (Rec. May 24.)	Reports on the views of the Prime Minister as to the best form in which Canada can contribute to Imperial Defence.	73
95	To War Office and Admiralty.	—	May 26	Forwards copy of correspondence ...	74
96	Ditto ...	Canada, Confidential.	June 1	Transmits copy of No. 94 ...	75

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
97	To War Office and Admiralty.	Australia, Confidential.	June 8	Transmits copy of a telegram from the Governor-General of Australia conveying an offer of a battleship, and of the reply thereto, and enquires whether any further reply should at present be returned.	75
98	The Governor ...	Transvaal, Confidential.	May 17 (Rec. June 12.)	Encloses copy of a letter from General Botha stating that whilst in the present political situation of South Africa the separate colonies cannot take a very active part in a defence conference, the Transvaal Government will be pleased to be represented thereat by the delegates attending the Conference on the South Africa Bill.	75
99	Admiralty ...	Australia	June 15	States, in reply to No. 97, that the Admiralty concur in the terms of the reply given to the Commonwealth Government and consider that no further action should be taken pending the assembling of the Naval Conference.	76
100	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. June 17.)	State that Col. Foxton should arrive in England on 19th July.	76
101	To War Office and Admiralty.	—	June 25	Transmits copies of correspondence and enquires whether the 28th of July would be a suitable date for the opening of the Defence Conference.	77
102	War Office ...	Australia	June 30	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 97, and states that from a military point of view no further reply to the offer of a battleship by the Commonwealth seems necessary at this stage, and that the matter may now be left for consideration at the forthcoming Conference.	77
103	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Telegram.	July 6	Requests that Ministers may be informed that the Defence Conference will meet on 28th July.	77
104	The Acting Governor-General.	Canada, 343.	July 3 (Rec. July 14.)	Encloses newspaper reports of a Conference at Montreal at which the Minister of Marine and Fisheries referred to the policy favoured by Canada as regards Naval Defence.	77
105	To the Governor-General and Governor.	Australia, New Zealand, Telegram, Confidential.	November 23	States that the First Lord of the Admiralty thinks that it will be advantageous to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand if they can now place their orders for the building of their large armoured cruisers, as firms are tendering on low prices.	80

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
106	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. Dec. 9)	Requests that the Admiralty will arrange without further delay for the construction of the "Indefatigable" type, to be followed by the three unarmoured cruisers of improved "Bristol" type in their turn.	80
107	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 441.	December 10	States that a copy of No. 106 has been sent to the Admiralty with a request that the desired action may be taken.	80
108	To Admiralty ...	Australia	December 11	Transmits copy of No. 106 and asks that the desired action may be taken.	81
109	The Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. Dec. 16)	Reports that the Defence Bill has been passed by both Houses of Parliament.	81
110	To the Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	December 16	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 106 and states that His Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction of the decision of the Commonwealth Parliament and that the Admiralty have been asked to take the desired action.	81
111	To the Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	December 16	States that His Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction that the Defence Bill has been passed by the Parliament of New Zealand.	81
112	The Acting Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram, Confidential.	(Rec. Dec. 29.)	States, with reference to No. 106, that the Commonwealth Government propose to build the remaining three destroyers in Australia and ask for the assistance of the Admiralty.	82
113	To Admiralty ...	Australia	December 31	Transmits copy of No. 112 and asks what reply should be returned to it.	82

IX.—Imperial General Staff.

1908.					
114	Commonwealth Representative in London.	Australia	September 15	States that Major-General J. C. Hoad, Inspector-General of the Forces, is coming to England to confer with the General Staff of the War Office on the subject of the establishment of the General Staff for the service of the Empire; encloses a memorandum of the proposals approved by the Commonwealth Government on the subject, and expresses the hope that Major-General Hoad may be given all the necessary facilities.	82
115	To the Commonwealth Representative in London.	Australia	September 17	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 114 and states that the War Office and the Imperial Defence Committee have been asked to afford Major-General Hoad all possible assistance.	84
116	To War Office and Imperial Defence Committee.	Australia, Confidential.	September 17	Transmits copy of No. 114 and trusts that all possible assistance will be afforded to Major-General Hoad.	85

1908.					
117	To the Governor-General.	Australia, Confidential.	October 5	Transmits copy of No. 114 and states that the Army Council and the Committee of Imperial Defence have been asked to afford all possible assistance to General Hoad, but points out that the absence of any official communication from Ministers on this very important subject has proved embarrassing.	85
1909.					
118	The Governor ...	Orange River Colony, Confidential.	February 22 (Rec. Mar. 13.)	Encloses copy of a private letter from the Prime Minister expressing his doubts as to the suitability of the plan to the Orange River Colony and as to the wisdom of discussing it at the present moment.	85
119	To the Governor-General.	Canada, 179.	March 13	States that a copy of his despatch of 15th February has been communicated to the Army Council.	88
120	To War Office ...	Australia	May 26	Transmits copy of a despatch from the Governor-General and enquires what answer should be returned.	88
121	War Office ...	—	June 10	Expresses opinion that, for the reasons given it would be inexpedient to raise the question of the interchangeability of military units between the mother country and the overseas dominions in the immediate future.	88
122	The Governor ...	Orange River Colony, 77.	May 24 (Rec. June 12.)	Transmits Minute from Ministers withholding their opinion on the question of the General Staff until the meeting of the proposed Defence Conference.	89
123	To War Office ...	—	June 28	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 121 and concurs in the view of the Army Council; presumes that if the question should be raised at the approaching Defence Conference the Army Council will be prepared to discuss the practical difficulties involved.	90
124	Ditto ...	Canada	June 29	Asks for the observations of the Army Council regarding the proposals for the organisation of the Canadian section of the proposed Imperial General Staff.	90
125	War Office ...	Australia	July 12	Expresses satisfaction that the Commonwealth Government concurs in the general principles relating to the creation of the Imperial General Staff and realizes that questions of detail must be reserved for future discussion; observes that in view of the forthcoming Imperial Conference detailed correspondence on the subject would be of little advantage.	90
126	To War Office ...	Australia	July 22	Acknowledges the receipt of No. 125; concurs in the view that it is not desirable to enter into correspondence at this juncture.	91

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
127	The Governor-General.	Australia, 146.	June 29 (Rec. Aug. 2.)	States that Colonel Bridges has been selected to be the Australian representative in London on the Imperial General Staff; and asks that a General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, may be sent to Australia in exchange for Colonel Bridges.	91
128	To War Office ...	Australia	August 12	Transmits copy of No. 127 ...	92
129	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 298.	August 13	Requests that his Ministers may be informed that a copy of No. 127 has been forwarded to the War Office for consideration.	92
130	War Office ...	Australia	August 20	States, with reference to No. 128, that the Army Council concur in the recommendations made by the Governor-General regarding the appointment of Colonel Bridges, and will give him every facility to acquire information; points out that the request for a General Staff Officer to be sent to Australia in exchange for Colonel Bridges is not in accordance with the principle governing the exchange of officers, but that if the services of such an officer as Director of Training are required on loan the Army Council will be glad to accede to the request.	92
131	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. Sept. 1)	States that the Commonwealth Government desire that the selection of Colonel Bridges should be accepted as a step towards the adoption of the principle of assimilating organization for war, leaving the War Office to allot his duties, and that an Imperial officer sent in exchange for Colonel Bridges would be similarly employed in Australia.	93
132	To War Office ...	Australia	September 2	Transmits copy of No. 131 and enquires whether the Army Council desires to add anything to the terms of No. 130.	93
133	To the Governor-General.	Australia, 321.	September 3	Transmits copy of No. 130 and states that a copy of No. 131 is being communicated to the War Office.	94
134	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. Sept. 14)	Reports that the Commonwealth section of the Imperial General Staff has been formed and that Major-General Hoad has been gazetted Chief of the Section.	94
135	War Office ...	Australia	October 12	States, with reference to No. 132, that there is at present no suitable appointment vacant to which Colonel Bridges could be appointed, and that pending an appointment his emoluments should be paid by the Commonwealth Government and suggests that £1,000 per annum would be a suitable salary for a first-grade officer sent to Australia, to be paid by the Commonwealth.	94
136	To the Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	November 4	Conveys purport of No. 135 ...	95
137	Ditto ...	Australia, 391.	November 5	Transmits copy of No. 135 and observes that Ministers will recognise that it must be sometimes difficult or impossible to find immediate vacancies of the kind required.	95

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
138	The Governor-General.	Australia, 247.	October 16 (Rec. Nov. 22.)	Forwards copy of the Regulation issued by the Commonwealth Government in respect to the Commonwealth section of the General Staff, and states that it has been decided to postpone for a time the appointment of General Staff Officers in district commands, and that instructions have been issued as to the mode of communication between the Imperial General Staff and the local staff.	96
139	To War Office ...	Australia	December 6	Transmits copy of No. 138 ...	97
X. Copyright.					
140	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Confidential.	January 2	Transmits text of the Copyright Convention signed at Berlin on November 13th, 1908; reminds those who have not already replied, of the Secretary of State's despatch of September 2nd and 3rd, 1908, and states that a committee is being appointed by His Majesty's Government to examine the revised convention, whose report it is hoped will serve as a basis for the discussion at the proposed subsidiary conference.	98
141	To the Governor-General.	Canada, 353.	May 26	Calls attention of Ministers to the despatch of 3rd September, 1908; states that the Commonwealth of Australia have appointed Lord Tennyson to be their representative at the proposed subsidiary conference on Copyright and that New Zealand will send a representative.	98
142	The Governor ...	Newfoundland, 54.	June 22 (Rec. July 1.)	Transmits copy of a letter from the Colonial Secretary covering a report by the Attorney-General recommending that Newfoundland be represented at the proposed conference.	99
143	The Acting Governor-General.	Canada, 320.	June 28 (Rec. July 10.)	Transmits copy of a minute of the Privy Council advising that Canada be represented at the proposed subsidiary conference.	100
144	To the Governors-General and Governors.	Canada, 584. Newfoundland, 144. Australia, 343. New Zealand, 180. Cape of Good Hope, 264. Natal, 188. Transvaal, 303. Orange River Colony, 161.	September 24	Suggests that it would be most convenient for the proposed subsidiary conference to meet in London early in the spring of 1910 and states that if the proposal is concurred in the exact date of meeting can be arranged by telegraph.	100

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
145	The Governor ..	Newfoundland, 96.	October 7 (Rec. Oct. 18.)	States, with reference to No. 144, that his Ministers have no objection to the time suggested for the subsidiary conference, and that a name of a representative from Newfoundland will be submitted in due course.	101
146	The Agent-General for the Transvaal.	South Africa.	November 23	States that he has been appointed to watch over the interests of British South Africa at the subsidiary conference.	102
147	To the Agent-General for the Transvaal.	South Africa.	December 8	Acknowledges No. 146 and observes that the Secretary of State has been duly notified of the appointment by the Governments concerned.	102
148	To the Governor-General.	Canada, 752.	December 23	Transmits the report of the Committee appointed to consider the alterations required to be made in the law of the United Kingdom so as to enable His Majesty's Government to give effect to the International Copyright Convention of 1908.	102
149	To the Governor-General and Governors.	Australia, 456. New Zealand, 226. Newfoundland, 203. Cape, 329. Natal, 237. Transvaal, 393. Orange River Colony, 203.	December 24	Ditto	102
149A	The Governor-General.	Australia, 271.	November 18 (Rec. Dec. 27.)	States that his Government concurs in the Conference on Copyright being held in London at the time suggested, and proposes to ask Lord Tennyson to represent the Commonwealth thereat.	103.

XI.

Silver Coinage.

150	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. June 15)	Embodies a message from Ministers asking that the Authorities of the Royal Mint may be informed that Australia has decided to introduce a distinctive coinage, that dies be prepared according to the description given and that the utmost expedition in preparation be used.	103.
151	To Treasury ...	Australia	June 16	Transmits copies of No. 150, and asks that the Deputy Master of the Mint may be instructed to comply with the request of the Commonwealth Government.	104
152	Treasury ...	Australia	June 23	States, in reply to No. 151, that the Deputy Master of the Mint has been instructed to prepare dies after the designs specified by the Commonwealth Government.	104

XII.

Marriage Facilities.

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
153	The Registrar-General.	—	April 22	Transmits a revised draft Bill to provide further facilities for the marriage of British subjects residing in different parts of His Majesty's Dominions, a memorandum explanatory of the details of the Bill, and a copy of a letter from the Registrar-General of Ireland on the subject.	104
154	To the Registrar-General.	—	December 23	States that Lord Crewe has no objection to legislation of the nature indicated in the memorandum enclosed in No. 153 but points out certain features of the provisions of the draft Bill which might be held to be objectionable in the Colonies, and asks that the Bill when amended as suggested may be submitted for further consideration.	109

XIII.

Suez Canal Dues.

1908.					
155	The Governor-General.	Australia, 97.	April 14 (Rec. May 16.)	Transmits copy of a communication addressed to the Prime Minister by the Associated Chambers of Commerce suggesting that the time has arrived for a further reduction of the rate of the charges; Prime Minister states that the question is one which excites considerable interest in Australia.	109

with a view to the suggestion of any subjects which, in their opinion, should engage its attention.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE.

I.

Resolution I.—Imperial Conference Secretariat.

5227

No. 1.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

- | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| (Canada. No. 92.) | (Transvaal. No. 51.) |
| (Australia. No. 60.) | (Orange River Colony. No. 26.) |
| (New Zealand. No. 35.) | (Natal. No. 33.) |
| (Cape of Good Hope. No. 44.) | (Newfoundland. No. 24.) |

My LORD,
SIR,

Downing Street, 12 February, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to request that you will invite your Ministers to take into consideration the question of the nature of the business which may usefully be discussed at the next meeting of the Imperial Conference, with a view to the suggestion of any subjects which, in their opinion, should, in the interests of the Empire at large, engage its attention.

2. That meeting, in accordance with the first resolution of the last Conference, is fixed to be held in the course of the year 1911, and it is desirable that adequate time for previous preparation should be given in the case of any subjects which may require investigation and the accumulation of materials.

3. Communications are taking place with the various Government Departments as to subjects to be proposed on the part of His Majesty's Government.

4. Correspondence relating to the resolutions of the last Conference has already reached your Prime Minister's hands as progress has been made from time to time in regard to the subject of each particular resolution.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

11574

No. 2.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

THE GOVERNOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3 April, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 3.]

(No. 43.)

My LORD,

Government House, Cape Town, 16 March, 1909.

As requested by your Lordship in your despatch, No. 44 of 12th February,* I invited Ministers to take into consideration the nature of the business which may usefully be discussed at the next meeting of the Imperial Conference.

* No. 1.

with a view to the suggestion of any subjects which, in their opinion, should engage its attention.

2. Ministers recognise that early notice of such questions is desirable, but point out that the course of events in South Africa points to a material alteration, in the course of the next two years, in the condition of the four South African self-governing Colonies. If union takes place, questions affecting the common interest of South Africa will have to be dealt with by a Government speaking on behalf of the united Colonies; and whilst it is possible that South African union may not be fully realised before the meeting of the next Conference, it is tolerably certain that the future of the South African communities will be known at a date sufficiently early to enable consultations to take place between the several Colonies for the submission of resolutions framed with a view to conditions likely to exist at the date of the Conference.

3. Ministers therefore suggest that it would be advisable to hold these questions in abeyance until the position of public affairs in South Africa can be seen with greater precision than is possible at present.

4. I enclose a copy of the Minute which I have received from Ministers on this subject.

I have, &c.,
WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.

Enclosure in No. 2.

MINISTERS TO GOVERNOR.

(Minute No. 1/77.)

Prime Minister's Office, Cape Town, 15th March, 1909.

Ministers have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency the Governor's Minute, No. 137 of 3rd March, 1909, covering an invitation from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies to take into consideration the subjects which in their opinion might usefully engage the attention of the next Imperial Conference, arranged to be held in the course of the year 1911.

Ministers recognise that early notice of such questions is desirable to allow investigation of the matter recommended for discussion and for the preparation of detail.

The outlook of the self-governing States in South Africa in regard to this Conference is not, however, under present circumstances, quite identical with that of similar communities in other parts of the Empire. The status of these latter is unlikely to undergo modification during the next two years, while the course of events in South Africa points to a material alteration in the condition of the four South African Colonies.

Assuming that the anticipations in the direction of union are fulfilled, questions of Imperial interest affecting in a greater or less degree the common interest of South African Administrations will have to be dealt with by a Government speaking on behalf of united Colonies.

While it is possible that a state of union may not be fully realised before the meeting of the next Conference, it is tolerably certain that the future of the South African communities will be known at a sufficiently early date to allow of consultations taking place between the several Colonies for the submission of resolutions framed with a view to the conditions that are likely to obtain at the date of the Conference.

For the reasons given, Ministers would venture to suggest to His Excellency it would be advisable to hold these questions in abeyance until the position of public affairs in South Africa in 1911 can be foreseen with greater precision than is possible at present.

JOHN X. MERRIMAN.

11574

No. 3.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR.

(No. 123.)

SIR,

Downing Street, 17 April, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 43 of the 16th of March,* enclosing a copy of a Minute from your Ministers, in which they express the opinion that the settlement of subjects for discussion at the next Imperial Conference should be left in abeyance till the future political position in South Africa is more clearly defined.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

24435

No. 3A.

HOME OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 22 July, 1909.)

SIR,

Home Office, Whitehall, 21st July, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th March last (5227/09),† I am directed by Mr. Secretary Gladstone to say that he thinks that it would be useful if the following matters affecting the Home Office were discussed at the next meeting of the Imperial Conference:—

- (1) If the naturalization question is not settled by 1911, it would be desirable to see whether the Conference could come to an agreement on any outstanding points.
- (2) It might be useful to discuss arrangements for preventing the arrival in the United Kingdom of undesirable aliens who are expelled from the Colonies. Understandings with the South African Colonies on this point are working not unsatisfactorily.

I am also to refer to the Home Office letter of the 29th August, 1906,‡ in reply to the Colonial Office letter of the 3rd July of that year (15959/1906),§ and to say that if the Colonial Office letter of the 27th November, 1906 (32076/1906),§ still holds good, Mr. Gladstone does not propose the discussion of any of the other subjects then mentioned.

I am, &c.,
C. E. TROUP.

37248

No. 4.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received November 13, 1909.)

(No. 167.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, 25 October, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch, No. 26, of the 12th of February last,|| relative to the nature of the business which may usefully be discussed at the next meeting of the Imperial Conference.

2. My Ministers, who have carefully considered the matter, advise me that they deem it inexpedient that subjects for discussion should be submitted by each South African Colony separately so shortly before Union, and that they have no doubt that suggestions and proposals will receive early attention at the hands of the Union Government.

I have, &c.,
HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS,
Governor.

* No. 2.

† Not printed: in the terms of No. 1.
‡ Not printed.§ 32076/6: not printed.
|| No. 1.

No. 5.

NATAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received November 22, 1909.)

(No. 178.)

Government House, Pietermaritzburg, Natal,

25 October, 1909.

MY LORD,

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch, No. 33, dated the 12th February, 1909,* I have the honour to report that, in view of the early establishment of Union in South Africa, Ministers here wish the consideration of the question of the nature of the business which may usefully be discussed at the meeting of the Imperial Conference to be held in the course of the year 1911 to be left over to the Union Government.

I have, &c.,
M. NATHAN.

II.

Resolution V.—Judicial Appeals.

6444

No. 6.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(No. 29.)

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 March, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 9, of the 15th of January,† I have the honour to transmit to you, for the information of your Ministers, one sealed and 12 plain copies of an Order‡ of His Majesty in Council of the 15th of February, 1909, making provision for appeals from the Supreme Court of the State of South Australia to His Majesty in Council.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

6444

No. 7.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

(Canada. No. 145.)

(Western Australia. No. 23.)

(Newfoundland. No. 36.)

(Tasmania. No. 27.)

(Australia. No. 89.)

(New Zealand. No. 54.)

(New South Wales. No. 42.)

(Cape of Good Hope. No. 75.)

(Victoria. No. 26.)

(Natal. No. 52.)

(Queensland. No. 24.)

(Orange River Colony. No. 40.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 5 March, 1909.

SIR,

WITH reference to my despatch No. [532] [128] [300] [75] [49] [55] [36] [39] [144] [179] [151] [101] of the 29th of August last,§ I have the honour to transmit to [Your Excellency] [you], for the information of your Ministers, the accompanying copies of Orders in Council‡ of the 15th of February, making provision for appeals from the Supreme Courts of the State of South Australia and of the Transvaal to His Majesty in Council.

2. Your Ministers will observe that the draft rules which were enclosed in my despatch under reference have been accepted by the Governments of both those parts of His Majesty's Dominions.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* No. 1.

† No. 7 in Dominions No. 7.
§ No. 3 in Dominions No. 7.

‡ Not printed here.

6444

No. 8.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA; TRANSVAAL.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS.

(South Australia. No. 35.)

(Transvaal. No. 90.)

SIR,

Downing Street, 12 March, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Ministers, copy of an Order in Council* of the 15th of February, making provision for appeals from the Supreme Court of [the Transvaal] [South Australia] similar to the Order in Council for [South Australia] [the Transvaal], copies of which accompanied my despatch [No. 29] [No. 70] of the [2nd instant] [27th ultimo].

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

11211

No. 9.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL.

[Answered by No. 11.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 3 April, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 30th of March, 1908,§ I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords of the Judicial Committee, copy of a Bill|| introduced into the Legislature of Ontario restricting the right of appeal to the Privy Council.

2. Lord Crewe feels that there are very grave objections to the passing of this Bill. He takes exception not so much to the abolition of appeals as of right (though hitherto this state of affairs has in effect been confined to the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada, tribunals of much higher dignity than a Provincial Supreme Court), as to the abolition of the right to grant special leave save in certain defined cases. He would add that in two of these excepted cases the procedure contemplated seems cumbrous, as the leave of the Court in the Province is required, then leave to appeal, and then the actual appeal can proceed. In any case, it would be better to allow an appeal to be direct without further leave or a certificate of the Court, as in the case of the Commonwealth of Australia.

3. Lord Crewe also considers that the present time, when efforts are being made to secure uniformity in conditions of appeal throughout the Empire, is singularly inopportune for the passing of legislation of this nature in Ontario, and I am to enclose draft of a telegram¶ which, with their Lordships' concurrence, he proposes to address to the Governor-General of Canada on the subject.

4. I am to request an early reply to this letter, as the Provincial Legislature is still in session.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

11211

No. 10.

CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 6.10 p.m., 5th April, 1909.)

[See No. 13.]

TELEGRAM.

Ontario Bill, 128. Please ask your Ministers to approach Ontario Government with view to omission of clauses in Bill restricting right of appeal to Privy Council.

* Not printed here.
§ 10222: not printed.† No. 6.
‡ Not printed.§ No. 9A in Dominions No. 7.
¶ See No. 10.

The abolition of appeal by special leave would probably be inoperative in view of repugnancy to Imperial Act, 1844, as to appeals to Privy Council, and in any case policy in question is opposed to principle hitherto accepted of preserving Privy Council as final Appeal Court. As to abolition of appeals as of right I would be glad if your Government would refer Provincial Governments to discussion as to appeals at Colonial Conference, 1907, and to correspondence enclosed in my despatch, 532, 29th August, 1908,* as to uniformity of appeals in Empire.

Confidential. If Ontario Government propose to press matter, I understand whole question should be referred to Judicial Committee to consider matter in all bearings before any decided opinion is expressed as to powers of Provincial Legislature.—CREWE.

11921

No. 11.

CANADA.

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 6 April, 1909.)

Downing Street, London, S.W., 6th April, 1909.

"The Law Reform Bill, 1909." (Ontario.)

SIR,

REFERRING to Sir Francis Hopwood's letter of the 3rd instant,† in the above matter, I am to acknowledge the receipt to-day of the copy telegram‡ from the Secretary of State to the Governor-General of Canada which was sent yesterday after I had an interview at the Colonial Office with Mr. Keith.

I take this opportunity of confirming what I then stated, viz., that I acquainted the Lord President and the Lord Chancellor with the contents of Sir Francis Hopwood's letter, and that their Lordships concurred in the telegram proposed to be sent, with the slight amendments which I indicated.

I am to add that their Lordships also expressed agreement with the objections raised by Lord Crewe to the Bill, and, as I said, are of opinion that, if the matter is pressed, the whole question should be referred to the Judicial Committee to consider the powers of the Provincial Legislature.

I am, &c.,

E. S. HOPE,

Registrar of the Privy Council.

12769

No. 12.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL and GOVERNORS.

(Canada. No. 264.)

(Newfoundland. No. 57.)

(Australia. No. 152.)

(Victoria. No. 40.)

(Queensland. No. 39.)

(South Australia. No. 46.)

(Western Australia. No. 31.)

(Tasmania. No. 39.)

(New Zealand. No. 83.)

(Cape of Good Hope. No. 125.)

(Natal. No. 82.)

(Transvaal. No. 139.)

(Orange River Colony. No. 71.)

MY LORD,

SIR,

Downing Street, 21 April, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. [145] [36] [89] [26] [24], of the 5th§ [35, of the 12th||] [23] [27] [54] [75] [52], of the 5th§ [90, of the 12th||] [40, of the 5th§] of March, I have the honour to transmit to [Your Excellency], [you], for the information of your Ministers, copy of an Order in Council¶ of the 2nd of April making provision for appeals from the Supreme Court of New South Wales to His Majesty in Council.

I have, &c.,

CREWE.

* No. 3 in Dominions No. 7.
† No. 8.

‡ No. 9.

§ No. 10.
¶ Not printed.

§ No. 7.

12769

No. 13.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(No. 63.)

Downing Street, 21 April, 1909.

SIR,

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 51, of the 23rd of March,* I have the honour to transmit to you, for the information of your Ministers, copies of an Order of His Majesty in Council providing for appeals from the Supreme Court of New South Wales to the King in Council.

I have, &c.,

CREWE.

15950

No. 14.

CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 1.5 p.m., 17 May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to Privy Council Office, 17 June, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 15.]

My telegram, 5 April.† From Ontario Parliamentary Papers it appears Bill 128 was passed 8 April, and assented to 13 April. I should be glad to know whether clauses as to Privy Council, referred to in my telegram, were retained, and, if so, what view your Ministers take of the matter.—CREWE.

19734

No. 15.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 14 June, 1909.)

[Copy to Privy Council Office, 17 June, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 283.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Ottawa, 2nd June, 1909.

IN reply to your Lordship's telegram of the 17th ultimo,‡ making enquiry as to the Ontario Act governing legal procedure in that Province, I have the honour to enclose copy of an approved Minute of the Privy Council, stating that the clauses relating to appeals to His Majesty in Council were not retained in the Act.

I have, &c.,

GREY.

Enclosure in No. 15.

CERTIFIED COPY OF A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, APPROVED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL ON THE 28th MAY, 1909.

(P. C. 316 N.)

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a telegraphic despatch, dated 17th May, 1909, from the Right Honourable the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, inquiring whether the clauses as to the Privy Council, referred to in Lord Crewe's telegram of 5th April, 1909, were retained, and, if so, what views Your Excellency's Ministers took of the matter.

The Minister of Justice, to whom the despatch was referred, states that he has caused inquiry to be made of the Deputy Attorney-General at Toronto upon the subject, and Mr. Cartwright writes in reply (enclosing copy of the Bill (No. 128), as passed at the late session of the Legislature) that the clauses relating to appeals to His Majesty in Council were not retained.

* 9125; not printed.

† No. 10.

‡ No. 14.

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, advise that Your Excellency may be pleased to communicate this information to the Right Honourable the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

COLONIAL OFFICE NOTE.—Orders in Council on the basis of the draft rules have been issued for Western Australia, Queensland, New Zealand, and the province of Alberta in Canada. The New Zealand Order in Council differs from the rest in so far as a direct appeal is provided for, in certain cases, from the Supreme Court of New Zealand as well as from the Court of Appeal, but no appeal lies from the Supreme Court except by special leave.

III.

Resolution XI. (2).—Withdrawal of Colonies from certain Treaties.
3436

No. 16.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 30 January, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 17.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, January 28, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, herewith, to be laid before the Earl of Crewe, 50 copies of a Bill,* which has been prepared by the Second Parliamentary Counsel, for effecting the legislation which is desirable before the Conventions, other than that relating to the establishment of an International Prize Court, agreed to at the Second Peace Conference are ratified by His Majesty. The text of these Conventions will be found in the Blue Book Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1908),† a copy of which is enclosed for convenience of reference.

Lord Crewe will observe that the Bill, as drafted, applies to all British Possessions. As the date at which the first deposits of ratifications can take place at The Hague is already past, it is desirable that this legislation should be proceeded with as soon as possible in order that the ratification by His Majesty may be deposited at the same time as those of other Powers.

Fifty copies of Mr. Liddell's notes* are also enclosed.

I am to ask that Sir E. Grey may be favoured with Lord Crewe's observations upon the draft Bill at an early date, and to state that Sir Edward would also be glad to be informed whether his Lordship thinks it will be necessary to defer the introduction of the Bill until the opinions of the self-governing Dominions have been obtained.

I am, &c.,
W. LANGLEY.

3436

No. 17.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 18.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 20 February, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th of January,‡ on the subject of the Bill for effecting the legislation which is desirable before the Conventions (other than that relating to the establishment of an International Prize Court) agreed to at The Hague are ratified by His Majesty.

2. Lord Crewe will send copies of the Bill to the Dominion Governments for their information, but he does not consider that it is necessary to defer the introduction of the Bill until the views of the Dominion Governments shall have been received.

* Not reprinted.

† [Cd. 4175].

‡ No. 16.

3. Lord Crewe, however, is sensible of the somewhat difficult position in which His Majesty's Government are put by the necessity of legislating for the self-governing Dominions in this manner without previous consultation with the Governments concerned. He would not suggest that in international questions other than commercial the consent of the Dominion Governments should be made essential before action is taken by His Majesty's Government, nor would he desire that the Dominions should be represented separately at any future conferences, such as the recent Conference at The Hague; but he thinks, subject to any observations which Secretary Sir E. Grey may desire to offer, that it would be desirable that, in future, Dominion Governments should be given representation on any Inter-Departmental Committees appointed to examine International agreements of this kind before ratification.

4. Lord Crewe does not desire to offer any comments on the Bill as drafted, but in view of the possible objections which may be raised by the Governments of the self-governing Dominions to legislation by Order in Council, as contemplated by Clause 2 of the Bill, his Lordship would be glad, when sending out the Bill to the Dominions, to couple it with an assurance that the widest possible discretion will be left to the respective local authorities as to the measures which should be taken in order to enforce within their jurisdiction whatever rules may be laid down in any such Order in Council. Lord Crewe would also be glad to be given the opportunity of seeing the draft of the Order in Council which will presumably be made as soon as the Bill has become law.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

11224

No. 18.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 1 April, 1909.)

[Answered by L.F. transmitting copies of Nos. 19 and 20.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, March 31st, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (3436) of the 20th ultimo* on the subject of the Bill for effecting the legislation which is desirable before the Conventions (other than that relating to the establishment of an International Prize Court) drawn up at the Second Peace Conference are ratified by His Majesty.

With regard to the suggestion made in the second paragraph of your letter that in future Dominion Governments should be given representation on any Inter-Departmental Committees appointed to examine International Agreements of this kind before ratification, Sir E. Grey desires me to observe that in his opinion the adoption of this course would tend to make such Inter-Departmental Committees somewhat unwieldy, and might unduly prolong their discussions. It appears to him that it would be preferable that the Colonial Office representative should be instructed to place himself in communication with the Agents-General of the Colonies concerned, and keep them informed of any matters in which they may be especially interested.

As regards paragraph 4 of your letter, I am to state that, as the Earl of Crewe is aware, the present practice at the outbreak of war between foreign states is to issue certain rules with respect to neutrality, to be enforced in His Majesty's dominions. This document has, however, no validity as an enactment, since it is issued by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and it is doubtful whether anyone can be proceeded against criminally for infringing its provisions.

The Order in Council under the draft Bill will replace these neutrality rules, will possess statutory validity, and will cover all the obligations of neutrality. As at present advised, however, Sir E. Grey sees no reason why it should be issued except at the outbreak of a war and for the period of that war, and it seems preferable to adhere to the existing practice in this respect.

On the other hand it is desirable that a draft of the Order in Council should be prepared as soon as possible, and kept in reserve ready for issue when required.

* No. 17.

This procedure will, it appears to Sir E. Grey, meet the difficulties felt by Lord Crewe, since the draft Order can be submitted to all the self-governing Dominions, and their observations considered before the final text is settled. Ample opportunity will thus be allowed for the exercise of the discretion which Lord Crewe desires should be extended to the respective local authorities in the matter.

I am, &c.,
F. A. CAMPBELL.

11224

No. 19.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL and GOVERNORS.

[Copy to Foreign Office, 20 April, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by Nos. 32, 36, and 43.]

(Canada. No. 254.)	(Cape of Good Hope. No. 119.)
(Newfoundland. No. 54.)	(Natal. No. 79.)
(Australia. No. 144.)	(Transvaal. No. 132.)
(New Zealand. No. 80.)	(Orange River Colony. No. 68.)

MY LORD,
SIR,

Downing Street, 15 April, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to [Your Excellency] [you], to be laid before your Ministers, the accompanying copies of a Bill* which is being introduced into the Imperial Parliament to effect the legislation which is desirable before the Conventions (other than the conventions for the establishment of an International Prize Court) drawn up at the Second Peace Conference of the Hague in 1907 are ratified by His Majesty's Government. I also enclose copies of notes* on the Bill, and for convenience of reference a copy of the Blue Book containing the Conventions. ([Cd. 4175].)

2. Your Ministers will observe that under Clause 2 His Majesty will be able to regulate by Order in Council the supply of fuel and provisions to belligerent vessels, the internment of belligerent troops, and the use of signalling apparatus. Steps are being taken to prepare a draft of the Order in Council to be issued under this clause in case of war, and the draft when ready will be forwarded to you for any observations which your Ministers may wish to offer on it.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

11224

No. 20.

THE EARL OF CREWE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL and GOVERNORS.†

[Copy to Foreign Office, 20 April, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 32.]

(Confidential.)

DEAR [LORD GREY],

Downing Street, 15 April, 1909.

I AM sending you in an official despatch† of even date, a copy of the Bill which is being brought in here to effect the legislation necessary before we ratify the Conventions concluded at the last Hague Conference.

You will see that the Bill is expressed to extend to all His Majesty's dominions, and it is possible that objection might be taken by one or other of the Colonial Governments to Imperial legislation. Of course, the ultimate decision as to foreign policy must rest with His Majesty's Government as long as on His Majesty's Government rests the responsibility both for the conduct of foreign affairs and for Imperial defence against foreign attack, and this seems to be in itself a sufficient justification for an Imperial Act on such a subject.

If it is argued that a more proper mode of procedure would be to allow the

* Enclosure (not reprinted) in No. 16.

† As in No. 19

‡ No. 19.

Parliament of each self-governing Dominion or Colony to pass the legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention, I may further point out that this procedure would have been at least very inconvenient. His Majesty's Government are anxious to ratify the Conventions, but reluctant to do so until they have legal powers to enforce the provisions contained in them, and it is obvious that, in a technical matter of this sort, legislation by eight local Parliaments would have been very slow, and, indeed, very possibly, one or more Parliaments would not have been able to spare time to pass it.

We have, therefore, decided to legislate for the Empire, in accordance with the usual practice, and in order to obviate any reasonable objection on the part of the self-governing Dominions, we have decided to reserve for the consideration of each Government a draft of the Order in Council contemplated in Clause 2 of the Bill. This Order is really the instrument of immediate practical importance, because it will lay down details, while the Act itself only confers general powers.

You will, of course, understand that I do not want you to raise any question on the procedure adopted with your Ministers if they raise none, but I have thought it well to explain the position to you so that if your Government are in any way dissatisfied you can discuss the matter with them in a friendly way, and do your best to remove any feeling of dissatisfaction.

Yours sincerely,
CREWE.

8874

No. 21.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 25.]

SIR,

Downing Street, May 6, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to request that you will inform Secretary Sir E. Grey that his attention has been drawn to the exchange of notes of the 4th and 14th of January,* respectively, renewing for a further period of five years the Arbitration Agreements of 1904 with the Governments of Italy and Spain.

2. It will be within Sir Edward Grey's recollection that in the recent General Arbitration Convention with the United States of the 4th of April, 1908, a provision was inserted by which His Majesty's Government reserved the right, before concluding a Special Agreement under the Arbitration Convention in any matter affecting the interests of a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire, to obtain the concurrence therein of the Government of that Dominion. In this connection I am to refer particularly to the last paragraphs of the letter from this Department of the 20th February, 1908.†

3. The concession made by the United States in that case was no doubt due to the fact that that Government required on the part of His Majesty's Government an agreement that each special agreement for reference to arbitration should be approved by the Senate, and it is possible that other foreign Powers whose political constitutions do not limit the powers of the executive in the way in which they are limited by the powers of the Senate in the United States of America, might refuse to consider a provision for enabling a colonial Government to reject arbitration, even when the case to be arbitrated upon falls clearly within the scope of the arbitration treaty. The constitutional necessity for consulting a self-governing Dominion before accepting arbitration directly affecting that Dominion is already recognised in practice, and it is possible to hold that no practical advantage would accrue from the insertion of a clause such as exists in the American Arbitration Treaty in all arbitration treaties. In this connection I am to draw special attention to the Foreign Office letter of 7th May, 1904.‡ Lord Crewe would, however, be glad if Sir E. Grey would consider whether before concluding or renewing arbitration treaties in future it would be possible to ask foreign Powers to accept a clause similar to that inserted in the American Treaty.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

* [Cd. 4470], February, 1909.

† 5845: not printed.

‡ 6919: not printed.

No. 22.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

(Canada. No. 321.) (Cape of Good Hope. No. 148.)
 (Newfoundland. No. 73.) (Natal. No. 101.)
 (Australia. No. 184.) (Transvaal. No. 173.)
 (New Zealand. No. 98.) (Orange River Colony. No. 87.)

MY LORD,

SIR,

Downing Street, 12 May, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. [254] [54] [144] [80] [119] [79] [132] [68], of the 15th of April,* I have the honour to transmit to [your Excellency] [you], to be laid before your Ministers, the accompanying amended copy of the Bill† which is being introduced into the Imperial Parliament to effect the legislation which is desirable before the Conventions (other than the Convention for the establishment of an International Prize Court) drawn up at the Second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907 are ratified by His Majesty's Government.

2. The amendments which have been made in the Bill are as follows:—

Clause 2 (2) provides that any offences against the Order in Council to be made under the Bill shall be treated as an infraction of Section 10 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870.

Section 2 (3) provides for offences committed or legal proceedings commenced whilst the Order in Council made under the Bill was still in force, after the Order in Council has ceased to be so in force.

Clause 3 (2) prohibits the use of the Geneva flag by any British ship or boat other than a hospital ship or boat.

I have, &c.,
 CREWE.

16991

No. 23.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.30 a.m., 19th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram 12th February,‡ Egyptian Treaty. Government of Commonwealth would be glad if notice of withdrawal from treaty could be given on the behalf of the Commonwealth. Shortly sending despatch dealing with general question of application of treaties to Australia.—DUDLEY.

16991

No. 24.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 21 May, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd of April,§ I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir Edward Grey, the accompanying copy of a telegram|| from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, stating that his Ministers would be glad if notice could be given of the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia in respect of the States of Tasmania and Queensland from the Commercial Convention of 1889 between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

2. Lord Crewe will be glad if the necessary notification can be made to the Government of Egypt.

I am, &c.,
 H. W. JUST.

* No. 19.

† Not reprinted.
 § 11635: not printed.‡ 2734: not printed.
 || No. 23.

17767

No. 25.

FOREIGN OFFICE TO COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received May 26, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 26.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, 8874/1909,* stating that, before concluding or renewing general arbitration agreements with foreign Powers, it would, in the opinion of the Earl of Crewe, be desirable to endeavour to obtain the acceptance of a clause similar to that contained in the last portion of paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the General Arbitration Convention with the United States, of April 4th, 1908.

Sir Edward is inclined to think that the adoption of a clause such as that proposed is hardly of any great practical importance in the renewal, after a period of five years, of this class of agreement; nor would its addition, so far as he is aware, confer any substantial advantage upon the self-governing Dominions. He is, moreover, somewhat apprehensive of difficulties with foreign Powers as regards the renewal of certain of the existing agreements with the addition of the new clause, but in deference to the opinion expressed by Lord Crewe, he is willing to endeavour to secure its adoption.

I am to state that the next arbitration agreement which will shortly expire is that with Germany, which terminates, unless renewed, on July 12th next. I am therefore to enclose the draft of a Note which Sir Edward proposes to address to the German Chargé d'Affaires on the subject. He will be glad, however, to learn, at Lord Crewe's earliest convenience, whether his Lordship concurs in its terms.

I am, &c.,
 F. A. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure in No. 25.

(Draft.)

HERR VON KUHLMANN.

SIR,

Foreign Office, May , 1909.

As you are aware, the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the German Government providing for the settlement by arbitration of certain classes of questions which may arise between the two Governments, which was signed at London in 1904, expires on July 12th next.

I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government are prepared to renew that agreement for a further period of five years from the date of its expiration. In renewing the agreement, however, His Majesty's Government are desirous that the following stipulation shall, if possible, be read into, and be considered as forming an integral portion of Article 2:—

"His Majesty's Government reserve the right before concluding a special agreement in any matter affecting the interests of a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire to obtain the concurrence therein of the Government of that Dominion."

I shall be glad to hear from you, as soon as convenient, that the German Government are prepared to agree to this addition, and, in that eventuality, this note and your reply can be regarded as placing upon record the understanding arrived at between our respective Governments in the matter.

I have, &c.,

17767

No. 26.

COLONIAL OFFICE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

[See No. 28.]

SIR,

Downing Street, June 3, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th of May,† and to request you to inform Secretary Sir E. Grey that he

* No. 21.

† No. 25.

concur in the terms of the draft note which it is proposed to address to the German Chargé d'Affaires in London as to the renewal of the Arbitration Treaty of 1904.

I am, &c.,
R. L. ANTROBUS.

22224

No. 27.

MR. HURST (FOREIGN OFFICE) TO MR. RISLEY (COLONIAL OFFICE).

(Received 3 July, 1909.)

MY DEAR RISLEY,

Foreign Office, June 28, 1909.

THESE are the papers I spoke to you about the other night.

The doubt that has now arisen in my mind is whether the wording of the "Colony clause," as I call it, is not by itself sufficient to exclude the operation of Article 53, and we are endeavouring to get such a clause inserted in all the renewals.

I am inclined to think that *without* the ending "such agreements shall be binding only when confirmed by the two Governments by an exchange of notes," Article 53 would not be excluded.

Where that ending appears, it is of course excluded; the sentence was framed for the purpose.

I am, &c.,
C. J. B. HURST.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

ARBITRATION CONVENTION* BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOGETHER WITH AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 2.

Signed at Washington, April 4, 1908.

[Ratifications exchanged at Washington, June 4, 1908.]

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the President of the United States of America, desiring, in pursuance of the principles set forth in Articles 15-19 of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at The Hague, July 29, 1899, to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of an Arbitration Convention, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, The Right Honourable James Bryce, O.M., and

The President of the United States of America, Elihu Root, Secretary of State of the United States,

Who, after having communicated to one another their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.

Differences which may arise of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two Contracting Parties and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the Convention of the 29th of July, 1899, provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the two Contracting States, and do not concern the interests of third Parties.

ARTICLE 2.

In each individual case the High Contracting Parties, before appealing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, shall conclude a special Agreement defining clearly the matter in dispute, the scope of the powers of the Arbitrators, and the periods to be fixed for the formation of the Arbitral Tribunal and the several stages of the procedure. It is understood that such special agreements on the part of the United States will be made by the President of the United States, by and with the advice

* This was published as [Cd. 4179] August, 1908 (Treaty Series, No. 21).

and consent of the Senate thereof; His Majesty's Government reserving the right before concluding a special agreement in any matter affecting the interests of a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire to obtain the concurrence therein of the Government of that Dominion.

Such Agreements shall be binding only when confirmed by the two Governments by an Exchange of Notes.

ARTICLE 3.

The present Convention shall be ratified by His Britannic Majesty, and by the President of the United States of America by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof. The ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible, and the Convention shall take effect on the date of the exchange of its ratifications.

ARTICLE 4.

The present Convention is concluded for a period of five years, dated from the day of the exchange of its ratifications.

Done in duplicate at the City of Washington, this fourth day of April, in the year 1908.

JAMES BRYCE.
ELIHU ROOT.

ANNEX.

Washington, April 4, 1908.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have been instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to place on record, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, with reference to the General Arbitration Treaty just signed by you and myself, that the final sentence of Article 2 has been inserted in order to reserve to both Governments the freedom of action secured to the United States Government under their Constitution until any Agreement which may have been arrived at shall have been notified to be finally binding and operative by an exchange of notes. It is understood that this Treaty will not apply to existing pecuniary claims nor to the negotiation and conclusion of the special Treaty recently recommended by the International Waterways Commission or any other such Treaty for the settlement of questions connected with boundary waters.

I shall be obliged if you will inform me of the concurrence of the United States Government in the terms of this note.

I have, &c.,
JAMES BRYCE.

The Honourable Elihu Root,
Secretary of State.

EXCELLENCY,

Department of State, Washington, April 4, 1908.

IN signing with you to-day a General Arbitration Treaty which has been negotiated between our respective Governments, I have the honour to acknowledge and take due cognizance of your note of this day's date, whereby you inform me that you are instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to place on record, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, with reference to said Treaty, that the final sentence of Article 2 has been inserted in order to reserve to both Governments the freedom of action secured to the United States Government under their Constitution until any Agreement which may have been arrived at shall have been notified to be finally binding and operative by an exchange of notes. The Government of the United States, in turn, declares that its understanding of the final sentence of Article 2 aforesaid is that which you set forth on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

I also take note of, and concur in, the understanding expressed in your note that the Treaty we have just signed will not apply to existing pecuniary claims nor to the

negotiation and conclusion of the Special Treaty recently recommended by the International Waterways Commission or any other such Treaty for the settlement of questions connected with boundary waters.

I have, &c.,
ELIHU ROOT.

His Excellency
The Right Honourable J. Bryce, O.M.,
&c., &c., &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

So soon as the General Arbitration Convention, 1907, has been ratified an Article will come into operation which will give the tribunal power to settle the "compromis" in any particular dispute referred to arbitration, unless the particular Arbitration Treaty under which the dispute is referred to arbitration excludes the right of the tribunal to do so.

The Article is meant to cover cases where the parties are agreed that the dispute shall be referred to arbitration but cannot agree on the terms of the document* which formulates the question, which the tribunal is to decide, and settles various details of procedure. In such cases the tribunal is to have power to settle the "compromis" itself.

It seems at first sight as if there could be no difficulty in settling the "compromis" where both parties are agreed to go to arbitration, but in actual practice it is not so.

For instance, when Great Britain, Germany, and France had jointly agreed with Japan to settle the House Tax dispute by arbitration, the utmost difficulty was found in agreeing with Japan as to what precisely was to be included within the scope of the litigation. It will also be remembered that it took over a year to settle the terms of the "compromis" in our coming arbitration with the United States of America about the Newfoundland fisheries.

On the other hand, fears have from time to time been expressed that it was unwise to give this power to the tribunal on the ground that it might result in Great Britain being compelled to arbitrate a particular point which she did not wish to. In view, however, of the narrow limitation introduced by the wording of the Article on its possible abuse, I do not think this danger is very serious.

During the sitting of the Second Peace Conference Sir E. Fry seemed rather hostile to this clause, and during the meetings of the Inter-Departmental Committee that advised on the acceptance of the Second Peace Conference Convention, Mr. Risley (the representative of the Colonial Office) expressed similar opinions. Both appear now to have changed their views, from the letters (annexed) that they have sent me. I gather they think there is no need for Great Britain, in making or renewing arbitration agreements with foreign Powers, to exclude the operation of Article 53 of the General Convention.

This is the text:—

ARTICLE 53.

The Permanent Court is competent to settle the "compromis," if the parties are agreed to have recourse to it for the purpose.

It is similarly competent, even if the request is only made by one of the parties, when all attempts to reach an understanding through the diplomatic channel have failed, in the case of:—

- (1) A dispute covered by a general Treaty of Arbitration concluded or renewed after the present Convention has come into force, and providing for a "compromis" in all disputes and not either explicitly or implicitly excluding the settlement of the "compromis" from the competence of the Court. Recourse cannot, however, be had to the Court if the other party declares that in its opinion the dispute does not belong to the category of disputes which can be submitted to obligatory arbitration, unless the Treaty of Arbitration confers upon the Arbitration Tribunal the power of deciding this preliminary question;

- (2) A dispute arising from contract debts claimed from one Power by another Power as due to its subjects or citizens, and for the settlement of which

* Called the "Compromis."

the offer of arbitration has been accepted. This provision is not applicable if acceptance is subject to the condition that the "compromis" should be settled in some other way.

Excluding all such cases as the arbitration agreement with the United States of America, where it was necessary to exclude the operation of the clause in order to safeguard the claims of the American Senate, I think it might be adopted as a general rule that in arbitration agreements made or renewed after the ratification of the General Arbitration Convention of 1907, it is not necessary that the operation of Article 53 should be excluded.

MY DEAR HURST,

Downing Street, 9th June, 1909.

UNDER Article 53 (1) of the Convention in question, there is at least a possibility that, England being an unpopular litigant in International Courts, the Permanent Court may on occasion settle a *Compromis* in such a way as to prejudice the English case.

I quite agree, however, that this risk may be run with regard to the questions of minor importance, which alone are suitable subjects for obligatory arbitration. In such cases it cannot be denied that it is useful to have some extraneous means of settling the pleadings so as to run the arbitration through in a reasonable time.

With regard to questions of real gravity, I understand (and we have had official Foreign Office assurances on the point) that it is possible under our existing arbitration treaties, such as that of 12th July, 1904, with Germany, entirely to withhold any such question from arbitration on the ground that it "affects our vital interests" (e.g., including those considered vital by Australia or Canada) and this possibility is, in fact, recognised by Article 53 (1) of the Hague Convention. The proviso as to vital interests, &c., in these treaties in effect takes the sting out of Article 53 (1) of the Convention, and my objection was consequently directed only against the possible future danger lurking in the invitation or suggestion contained in the last sentence of the sub-Article.

In other words, it seems to me essential that any future arbitration treaty, or any renewal of an existing arbitration treaty should abstain from "conferring upon the Arbitration Tribunal the power of deciding the preliminary question whether the dispute does or does not belong to the category of disputes which can be submitted to obligatory arbitration," and consequentially (if in a given case the tribunal decides that question in the affirmative) the power, unless explicitly or implicitly excluded in *all* cases, of settling the *Compromis* in a vital case.

On the assumption that, notwithstanding the ratification of Article 53 (1), vital cases can still be withheld from arbitration, and that no power will be conferred in future treaties or in renewals of existing treaties enabling the Arbitration Tribunal to decide whether a dispute is arbitrable or not, I can see no objection to ratifying Article 53 (1), or (in future treaties or renewals of existing ones) to admitting the power of the Court to settle the *Compromis*, since *ex hypothesi* that power will be exercisable only in disputes of minor importance.

Yours, &c.,

J. S. RISLEY.

DEAR SIR EDWARD FRY,

Foreign Office, June 15, 1909.

A POINT of some importance must soon be settled with reference to Article 53 of the 1907 Arbitration Convention.

Before long that Convention will probably be ratified; when that has taken place, Great Britain must either accept the application of Article 53 or exclude the power of the Court to settle the "compromis" in any arbitration treaties which she makes or renews under Article 40 of the Convention.

It so happens that the five years for which most of our arbitration treaties were concluded are running out, and they are gradually falling due for renewal.

In the Arbitration Treaty with the United States of America last year the application of Article 53 was impliedly excluded (by means of the provision that the "compromis" is only to become binding when confirmed by an exchange of notes), but this was solely due to the fact that the American Senate claim a voice in the acceptance of the "compromis," and we wanted to reserve power to reject a "compromis" which had been amended by the Senate.

In cases where no such complication arises, we shall be free either to accept or reject the principle of giving the tribunal power to frame the "compromis" in cases where both parties are agreed that the question should be referred to arbitration.

My own view is that we should gain more than we should lose by accepting the principle—but I remember that at The Hague you were rather hostile to giving any such power to the tribunal, and so I venture to ask whether you are still of that opinion, and, if so, whether you would mind giving me the reasons why.

When once we have agreed with another Power that a question should be referred to arbitration, I do not believe that we should ever attempt to wriggle out of the arbitration by making difficulties about the "compromis." I have no such confidence as to many Powers with whom we have arbitration agreements. If the principle of obligatory arbitration is to make progress, it seems to me that machinery must be provided which will diminish the opportunities of the unwilling party to bring matters to a deadlock, and in almost every case where arbitration is suggested—one party is willing and the other unwilling.

Very faithfully yours,
C. J. B. HURST.

DEAR HURST,

Failand, 16 June, 1909.

I HAVE your letter of yesterday, and I am very happy to reply to your inquiry.

I think the reasons why I rather leaned against Clause 52 of the Convention were twofold. In the first place, I thought that compulsion was premature and that the cause of arbitration was more likely to be promoted by the voluntary action of Powers than by any attempt to compel them to arbitrate when they were unwilling so to do. In the second place, the clause gives so many loopholes to an unwilling and unscrupulous Power that it has little real effect, where goodwill is absent.

But now that the clause is there and we are not likely to wish to evade it, I incline to the view which you express that we should accept it.

Yours truly,
EDWARD FRY.

C. J. B. Hurst, Esq., C.B.

22836

No. 28.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 8 July, 1909.)

(Confidential.)

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the following paper:—To His Majesty's representative at Berlin, June 28th, 1909, Arbitration Treaty between United Kingdom and Germany. Reference to previous letter: Colonial Office June 3rd, 1909.*

Foreign Office, July 7th, 1909.

Enclosure in No. 28.

(No. 77. Confidential.)

SIR,

Foreign Office, 28th June, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 66 Treaty, of the 8th instant, Count Metternich has made to me to-day, confidentially, the following observations on behalf of his Government, respecting the addition which we propose to the Arbitration Treaty.

This addition, the German Government feel, would place Germany at a disadvantage as regards legal obligations.

On the German side the execution of the Treaty would lie solely in the hands of the German Government, who would have the sole responsibility. On the English

* No. 26.

side this responsibility would depend upon the sovereign pleasure of Colonial Governments as regards cases concerning them.

The German Government would undertake responsibility for the strict recognition of the Treaty in all cases. The British Government would be able to decline responsibility in the case of the self-governing Colonies, in so far as the compromise was dependent upon the consent of the latter.

The British self-governing Colonies are independent of the central Government in their decisions, and yet are withdrawn from diplomatic action and can therefore take decisions without any opportunity being given to Germany to urge upon them her point of view. For this reason, if the Colonial Governments reject a special agreement, the British Government are covered from any responsibility by the reservation in question, while the German Government would be exposed in a similar case to the reproach of not keeping their Treaty engagements.

The German Government consider these arguments to be all the more weighty because the Anglo-German Arbitration Treaty has actually failed in its first application. The German Government cannot admit the reasons we have put forward for declining to arbitrate on the South African claims. These, they thought, were specially suitable for settlement under the Arbitration Treaty. If the Treaty was renewed, there would in future cases be no means of fixing an arrangement under Articles 53, 54, and 58 of the Second Peace Conference, as those articles would not apply to the Anglo-German Treaty, which had been concluded before them. Our treaties with France, Italy, and Spain had been renewed without the Colonial reservation, and to accept it would place Germany in a position less favourable than that of these other countries. The reservation had, it was true, been put into our Treaty with the United States; but there was a special reason for that, because the United States made their arbitration dependent upon the consent of their Senate, which was an independent factor outside international law.

Finally, the Ambassador asked me whether we would renew the Treaty for five years as it stood, without the proposed addition. The renewal might be effected by an exchange of Notes, as we had suggested, and as had been done with France, Italy, and Spain. In this case, Count Metternich would reply to our Note by saying that the German Government agreed to the renewal without the addition in question, and our answer accepting this would end the matter. Another way would be for us to withdraw the Note we had already sent in, and to send one without the addition, in which case Count Metternich would agree at once.

I told him that I must consult the Colonial Office before saying anything about this.

He reminded me, in conclusion, that the Arbitration Treaty lapses on the 12th of July.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

Count de Salis, C.V.O., C.M.G.,
&c., &c., &c.

23477

No. 29.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 14 July, 1909.)

SIR,

Foreign Office, July 10th, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 7th instant,* I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, herewith, a copy of a note which he has addressed to the German Ambassador on the subject of the renewal of the Arbitration Agreement of July 12th, 1904, between this country and Germany, in substitution for the note addressed to Herr von Kuhlmann on the 7th ultimo, a draft of which was enclosed in the letter from this Department of the 25th May last.†

I am, &c.,
F. A. CAMPBELL.

* No. 28.

† No. 25.

Enclosure in No. 29.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Foreign Office, June 7th, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government are prepared to renew, for one year, from the 12th proximo, the date of its expiration, the agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany, providing for the settlement by arbitration of certain classes of questions which may arise between the two Governments, which was signed at London on the 12th of July, 1904.

I should be glad to learn from Your Excellency that the Imperial Government are equally prepared to renew the agreement for this period, in which case the present Note and Your Excellency's reply would be sufficient to give legal validity to this understanding between the two Governments.

I have, &c.,
E. GREY.

His Excellency

Count Metternich,
&c., &c., &c.

23127

No. 30.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 12 July, 1909.)

[Answered by Nos. 33 and 39.]

(No. 118.)

MY LORD,

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 28th May, 1909.

IN continuation of my cablegram dated the 19th instant,* intimating that the Commonwealth Government would be glad if notice of withdrawal from the Egyptian Treaty could be given on their behalf; and also with reference to your Lordship's cablegram of the 30th June last,† on the subject of the applicability to the Commonwealth of certain commercial treaties, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the intention of the Commonwealth to withdraw from the various treaties, as set forth in my predecessor's despatch, No. 112, dated 16th April, 1908,‡ has been communicated to the State Governments concerned.

2. With reference to the various points set out in your Lordship's cablegram of the 30th June last, I now have the honour to state that it is the desire of this Government that the Commonwealth shall be relieved of all connection with the existing treaties or conventions referred to in your Lordship's cablegram at the earliest possible date, and the Government will be glad if the Imperial authorities will take such steps as may be necessary to effect this object. In his Memorandum to me on this subject His Majesty's Prime Minister of the Commonwealth observes that "the difficulties in the way of a complete realisation of our wishes in this regard are observed, but Ministers have full confidence that the Imperial Government will do all that is in their power to secure it."

3. Ministers observe that notice of withdrawal can only be given as of right in regard to the treaties with Paraguay, Greece, Egypt, and Honduras. On the 19th instant I forwarded a cablegram* to your Lordship, intimating that the Commonwealth Government would be glad if notice of withdrawal from the Egyptian Treaty could be given, and Ministers now request me to represent to your Lordship that the Government would be pleased if notice of withdrawal from the other three treaties above-mentioned can be given at once.

4. With respect to your Lordship's inquiry as to the treaty with Mexico, Ministers express the desire that the withdrawal shall be from the treaty as a whole.

5. With regard to Roumania, the original reference by the Commonwealth Government was to the Commercial Convention between Great Britain and that country made in 1892 (Hertslet, Vol. XIX., 801), to which the Colonies of Queensland, South Australia, and Tasmania adhered. It is now, however, assumed by the Commonwealth Government, from the fact of a new Commercial Treaty having been entered into in 1905, that all obligations under the former Convention have lapsed.

* No. 23.

† No. 102 in Dominions No. 5.

‡ No. 96 in Dominions No. 5.

6. The Prime Minister informs me, in connection with your Lordship's reference to the Navigation Bill being so altered as to secure all existing treaty rights, that it is believed that Clause 414, as it stands, will suffice to remove any difficulty which may arise in that direction.

I have, &c.,
DUDLEY,
Governor-General.

23981

No. 31.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 19 July, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 40.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, July 17th, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 10th instant,* I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to enclose, for the information of the Earl of Crewe, a translation of a note from the German Ambassador, agreeing, on behalf of his Government, to the renewal for one year of the Arbitration Agreement between this country and Germany signed at London on July 12th, 1904.

I am to suggest, for Lord Crewe's consideration, that enquiry should now be made of the self-governing Colonies as to whether they concur in the renewal of these Arbitration Agreements in their present form.

As several of these agreements expire in November next, it would seem desirable that the views of the self-governing Colonies should be obtained without delay.

I am, &c.,
F. A. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure in No. 31.

(Translation.)

SIR,

London, July 9th, 1909.

IN reply to your note of the 7th ultimo, and by instruction of the Imperial Government, I have the honour to inform you that the latter agree to the proposal of the British Government to renew for one year the Arbitration Agreement of July 12th, 1904.

I have, &c.,
P. METTERNICH.

Sir E. Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.

24983

No. 32.

NEW ZEALAND.

LORD PLUNKET to THE EARL OF CREWE.

(Received July 26, 1909.)

(Confidential.)

DEAR LORD CREWE,

Palmerston North, 14th June, 1909.

WITH reference to your confidential letter of the 15th April,† regarding the Bill which is being introduced to ratify conventions concluded at the last Hague Conference, I have to inform you that my Ministers have returned me your despatch, No. 80,‡ upon that subject without comment.

Yours sincerely,
PLUNKET.

* No. 29.

† No. 20.

‡ No. 19.

23127

No. 33.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 293.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 6 August, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's despatch, No. 118, of the 28th May,* on the subject of the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia from certain treaties.

2. In reply, I have to request that you will inform your Ministers that I have asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to take steps for the withdrawal of the Commonwealth from the treaties with Greece, Paraguay, and Honduras.

3. I have also asked Sir Edward Grey to consider how far it is possible to secure permission for the Commonwealth to withdraw from the other treaties which are at present binding upon it in respect of one or more States, and I shall communicate further with you on this matter in due course.

I have, &c.,

CREWE.

23127

No. 34.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 37.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 7 August, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 3rd April,† I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir Edward Grey, the accompanying copy of a despatch* from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth on the subject of the withdrawal of the Commonwealth from certain commercial treaties.

2. Lord Crewe would be glad if steps could be taken to give notice of the termination of the obligations of the Commonwealth in the treaties with Paraguay, Greece, and Honduras.

3. With reference to the last paragraph of Lord Dudley's despatch, I am to enclose a copy of Section 414 of the Commonwealth Navigation Bill in the latest form available in this Department, and to state that if passed in that form the Bill would appear to comply with all the requirements of the situation.

4. Lord Crewe would be glad to receive any observations which Sir Edward Grey may desire to make as to the possibility of obtaining the withdrawal of the Commonwealth Government from the other treaties dealt with in the previous correspondence; and also to learn that the Commonwealth Government are correct in assuming that the Convention of 1892 with Roumania has now lapsed.

I am, &c.,

FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

28818

No. 35.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 28 August, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 48.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, August 27th, 1909.

ARTICLE 2 of the Arbitration Convention with the United States of April 4th, 1908, includes, as the Earl of Crewe is aware, the proviso "His Majesty's Government reserving the right before concluding a special agreement in any matter

* No. 30.

† No. 110 in Australian No. 190.

affecting the interests of a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire to obtain the concurrence therein of the Government of that Dominion."

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with Lord Crewe's view as to the precise meaning which he attaches to the proviso in question—whether in fact, as is held in this Department, it is to be construed as merely implying the right of His Majesty's Government to obtain the concurrence of a particular Dominion in the terms of a "compromis" for some specific arbitration which concerns that Dominion, or whether it is capable of being interpreted as giving the Dominion the power to reject arbitration altogether.

I am, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

28882

No. 36.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 28 August, 1909.)

(No. 131.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, 9 August, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches, No. 63, of the 15th of April, and No. 87, of the 12th of May,* relative to the Hague Conventions Bill, and to acquaint you that my Ministers have not offered any remarks upon the proposed legislation.

I have, &c.,

HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS,

Governor.

30553

No. 37.

AUSTRALIA.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 14 September, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 42.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, September 13th, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter, 23127/09, of last month (undated),† received on August 9th, respecting the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia from certain commercial treaties, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of telegrams which have been sent to His Majesty's Representatives at Athens, Guatemala, and Asuncion instructing them to denounce the treaties of November 10th, 1886, with Greece, of January 21st, 1887, with Honduras, and of October 16th, 1884, with Paraguay, respectively, on behalf of the Australian States which had adhered to those treaties.

Of the treaties mentioned in despatch No. 112 from the Governor-General of April 16th, 1908 (enclosed in your letter of the 3rd June, 1908),‡ the only ones which remain to be dealt with are the following:—

Roumania.—Treaties of 1892 and 1893, reference being especially made to the Treaty of 1892, as explained in paragraph 5 of the Governor-General's despatch, No. 118, of May 28th last§ (copy of which was enclosed in your letter† of last month).

This treaty has been superseded by a subsequent Treaty of October 31st, 1905, Article XVIII. of which stipulates that on its coming into force the Treaty of August, 1892, shall cease to have effect. No Australian States have adhered to the Treaty of 1905.

Italy, Mexico, and Muscat.—The commercial treaties with these countries contain, as you are aware, a stipulation allowing for the separate adherence of Colonies to the treaty, but no stipulation allowing for their separate withdrawal. In the similar case of the treaty with Paraguay, a subsequent agreement has been made to enable Colonies to withdraw. Sir E. Grey proposes to consult the Board

* Nos. 19 and 22.

† No. 34.

‡ No. 97 in Dominions No. 5.

§ No. 30.

of Trade as to the desirability of approaching the countries above mentioned with proposals to conclude agreements similar to that concluded with Paraguay.

Austria-Hungary.—Treaty of Navigation, April 30th, 1868. The stipulations of Article I. which give national and most-favoured-nation treatment are, by Article II., restricted as regards coasting trade, in the case of British Colonies, to those Colonies which open their coasting trade to foreign ships. Sir E. Grey presumes that there are other clauses in the Commonwealth Navigation Bill besides those concerning coasting trade which make it desirable for the Commonwealth to withdraw from this treaty, for as regards coasting trade it would seem sufficient that any of the Australian States which threw open their coasting trade to Austro-Hungarian ships should notify the Austro-Hungarian Government through His Majesty's Government that they withdraw this right. If other matters besides the coasting trade are involved it will be necessary to conclude a separate agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Government, and on hearing from you that this is so, Sir E. Grey would consult the Board of Trade on this point also.

I am, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

Telegram to Athens, No. 6, Commercial, dated September 3rd, 1909.

Inform Government to which you are accredited that under Article IV., Declaration of November 10th, 1904, His Majesty's Government give 12 months' notice on behalf of Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia, and South Australia of withdrawal from Commercial Treaty, November 10th, 1886.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Telegram to Mr. CARDEN (Guatemala), No. 6, Commercial, dated September 3rd, 1909.

Inform Honduras Government that His Majesty's Government, on behalf of New Guinea, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia, give twelve months' notice of withdrawal from Commercial Treaty, January 21st, 1887, under Article 3 of Protocol, February 3rd, 1900.

Enclosure 3 in No. 37.

Telegram to Asuncion, September 3rd, 1909.

Inform Paraguayan Government that His Majesty's Government, on behalf of South Australia and New South Wales, gives twelve months' notice under Declaration, March 14th, 1908, of withdrawal from Commercial Treaty, October 16th, 1884.

30774

No. 38.

AUSTRALIA.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 16 September, 1909.)

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the following papers: His Majesty's Minister at Guatemala, September 6: His Majesty's Minister at Athens, September 4: on

the subject of the withdrawal of Australian States from Commercial Treaties. Reference to previous letter: Foreign Office, September 13.*
(A similar letter has been sent to Board of Trade.)

Foreign Office,
September 15, 1909.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

Paraphrase of telegram from Mr. CARDEN, No. 8, Commercial, Guatemala, 6th September, 1909.

With reference to your telegram, No. 6, Commercial, of September 3rd, I have the honour to inform you that I have to-day telegraphed to the Honduras Government the notification of the withdrawal of the Colonies named from the Commercial Treaty of 1887.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

(Commercial. No. 37.)

SIR, Athens, September 4, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram, No. 6, Commercial, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note in which I have, as instructed, given the Greek Government twelve months' notice of the withdrawal of the States of Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia, and South Australia from the Commercial Treaty of the 10th of November, 1886.

I have, &c.,
F. ELLIOT.

The Right Honourable
Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.

His Britannic Majesty's Legation, Athens,
MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL, September 4 (August 22), 1909.

By direction of His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs I have the honour to notify Your Excellency that, under Article 4 of the Declaration signed at Athens on the 23rd (10th) of November, 1904, His Majesty's Government give twelve months' notice, from to-day's date, on behalf of the States of Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia, and South Australia, of their withdrawal from the Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Greece concluded on the 10th of November (29th of October), 1886.

I have, &c.,
F. ELLIOT.

His Excellency
Monsieur K. P. Mavromichalis,
&c., &c., &c.

30774

No. 39.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 342.)

MY LORD, Downing Street, 23rd September, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 293, of the 6th August,† I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, for the information of your Ministers, copies of correspondence‡ between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and His

* No. 37.

† No. 33.

‡ Enclosures in Nos. 37 and 38.

Majesty's Representatives at Athens, Guatemala, and Asuncion, relative to the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia from certain commercial treaties.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

23981

No. 40.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

SIR,

Downing Street, 24 September, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th of July,* suggesting that the views of the self-governing Colonies should be obtained before various arbitration agreements about to expire are renewed.

2. Lord Crewe has given this question further careful consideration, and he is now of opinion that it will not be necessary to consult the Colonies, as these agreements have been in force for some considerable time without any objection having been raised, and several of them have, in fact, been renewed.

3. It is true that this decision may conceivably involve His Majesty's Government in paying the expenses of an award in an unsuccessful arbitration affecting a Colony, if that Colony objects to being forced into arbitration under a treaty on the conclusion of which it was never consulted, but, owing to the well-established practice of acting in consultation with the Colonial Government before submitting to arbitration any particular case in which the Colony is concerned, this contingency is very remote, and the risk may be regarded as one of the minor liabilities attached to the control of the foreign affairs of the Empire, and as involving less difficulties than might arise were any Colonial Government to raise objections in a matter of high policy, and one in which His Majesty's Government are so deeply committed as to be precluded from giving effect to those objections.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

30553

No. 41.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 360.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 8 October, 1909.

YOUR Ministers will no doubt have perceived that the enclosures in my despatch, No. 342, of the 23rd September,† dealt only with some of the commercial treaties from which the Commonwealth of Australia desires to withdraw. The position with regard to the others is as follows:—

2. The Treaty of 1892 with Roumania has been superseded by the subsequent Treaty of October 31st, 1905, and all obligations under the former have lapsed.

3. The commercial treaties with Italy, Mexico, and Muscat contain, as your Ministers are aware, a stipulation allowing for the separate adherence of Colonies to the treaty, but no stipulation allowing for their separate withdrawal. In the similar case of the treaty with Paraguay a subsequent agreement has been made to enable Colonies to withdraw. His Majesty's Government are considering the question of the desirability of approaching the countries above mentioned with proposals to conclude agreements similar to that concluded with Paraguay, and I shall address you further on the subject in due course.

4. The question of withdrawal from the Navigation Treaty of 1868 with Austria-Hungary is not without difficulties, which are now being considered. On this subject also I shall address you further.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* No. 31.

† No. 39.

30553

No. 42.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 47.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 9 October, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th ultimo,* respecting the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia from certain commercial treaties.

2. As regards the treaty with Roumania, Lord Crewe will communicate to the Governor-General the substance of what is stated in your letter. With regard to Italy, Mexico, and Muscat, his Lordship concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal to consult the Board of Trade as to the desirability of approaching these countries with proposals to conclude agreements similar to that concluded with Paraguay, and he will inform Lord Dudley that the question is receiving the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

3. As to the treaty with Austria-Hungary, there is one point in your letter on which his Lordship feels some doubt. In the absence of express provision in the treaty, it does not appear quite clear that when a Colony has once thrown open its coasting trade to Austro-Hungarian ships it can subsequently withdraw the privilege. Lord Crewe presumes, however, that Sir E. Grey is satisfied on this point, and on being informed to that effect, he will explain the position to the Governor-General and enquire whether there are other clauses in the Commonwealth Navigation Bill, besides those concerning coasting trade, which make it desirable for the Commonwealth to withdraw from this treaty.

I am, &c.,
H. BERTRAM COX.

37889

No. 43.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2 November, 1909.)

(No. 242.)

MY LORD,

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 16th October, 1909.

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch, No. 144, dated 15th April last,† forwarding copies of a Bill to effect certain legislation which is desirable before the ratification of the Conventions of the Peace Conference of the Hague in 1907, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that this matter has received the consideration of the Commonwealth Government, and that, so far as its application to Australia is concerned, there does not appear to be any objection in principle or detail.

I have, &c.,
DUDLEY,
Governor-General.

34776

No. 44.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

(Canada. No. 639.)

(Cape of Good Hope. No. 284.)

(Newfoundland. No. 162.)

(Natal. No. 202.)

(Australia. No. 377.)

(Transvaal. No. 349.)

(New Zealand. No. 194.)

(Orange River Colony. No. 174.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 30 October, 1909.

SIR,

WITH reference to my despatch No. [321] [73] [184] [98] [148] [101] [173] [87] of 12th May last,‡ I have the honour to inform [Your Excellency] [you] that, with the consent of His Majesty's Government, 27th proximo has been fixed as the

* No. 37.

† No. 19.

‡ No. 22.

date for the first deposit of ratifications of the Conventions drawn up at the Second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907.

2. It is accordingly proposed to deposit on that date His Majesty's ratification of the following Conventions and Declarations (in respect of which legislation is not required), viz. :—

- (1) Convention respecting the limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts.
- (2) Convention relative to the opening of hostilities.
- (3) Convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land.
- (4) Convention relative to the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities.
- (5) Convention relative to the conversion of merchant ships into war ships.
- (6) Convention relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines.
- (7) Convention respecting bombardments by naval forces in time of war.
- (8) Convention relative to certain restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war.
- (9) Declaration prohibiting the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons.

3. The Conventions relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines and bombardments by naval forces in time of war were signed by His Majesty's Plenipotentiaries subject to certain reservations. These reservations will be recited and embodied in the instrument of ratification.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

35302

No. 45.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 396.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 8 November, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 360, of the 8th ultimo,* respecting the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia from certain commercial treaties, I have the honour to request Your Excellency to acquaint your Ministers that information has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Guatemala that the Government of Honduras have denounced the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 21st January, 1887, with this country.

Notice of the intention of the Honduranian Government to terminate the Treaty was received on the 6th ultimo, and it will, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Article 16, be terminated one year from that date, viz., on the 6th of October, 1910.

In the case of Australia, however, notice of withdrawal was given on the 6th of September, as stated in my despatch above-mentioned, and the Commonwealth and Papua will accordingly be free from the provisions of the Treaty one month before it ceases to operate in regard to other parts of His Majesty's Dominions.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

35302

No. 46.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

(Canada. No. 668.)

(Natal. No. 210.)

(Newfoundland. No. 170.)

(Transvaal. No. 360.)

(New Zealand. No. 200.)

(Orange River Colony. No. 182.)

(Cape of Good Hope. No. 291.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 8 November, 1909.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint [Your Excellency] [you], for the information

* No. 41.

of your Ministers, that the Government of Honduras have denounced the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 21st January, 1887, with this country.

Notice of the intention of the Honduranian Government to terminate the Treaty was received on the 6th of October, and it will, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Article 16, be terminated in one year from that date, viz., on the 6th October, 1910.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

37021

No. 47.

AUSTRALIA.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 12 November, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 49.]

SIR,

Foreign Office, November 11, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 9th ultimo, 30553/09,* I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit, herewith, copy of correspondence which has passed between this Office and the Board of Trade relative to the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia from certain commercial treaties, together with drafts† of despatches on the subject which it is proposed to address to His Majesty's representatives at Vienna, Rome, and Mexico.

It will be observed that Sir E. Grey accepts the Board of Trade suggestion that the same course should be adopted in respect of the treaty with Austria-Hungary as in respect of those with Italy and Mexico.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn whether the Earl of Crewe concurs in the terms of the despatch which it is proposed to address to His Majesty's representatives in the countries concerned.

I am, &c.,
W. LANGLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

SIR,

Foreign Office, October 15th, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 15th ultimo, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit herewith copy of a further letter* from the Colonial Office respecting the withdrawal of Australia from commercial treaties.

With regard to the treaty with Austria-Hungary, I am to observe that Article II. of the Austro-Hungarian Treaty certainly does not state in so many words that a Colony may withdraw the right of the coasting trade after it has once granted it to Austro-Hungarian subjects. But if the treaty gives to Colonies the right of reserving their coasting trade in the first instance, it might be urged that they also possess, by implication, the right of subsequently withdrawing their coasting trade from the stipulations of the treaty.

As to the treaties with Italy and Mexico, Sir E. Grey is disposed to think that the contention that the liberty of accession given to the self-governing Colonies by articles such as XIX. of the Commercial Treaty with Italy (1883) carries with it, by implication, a liberty of withdrawal would not hold good if the case were submitted to arbitration.

In these circumstances, therefore, the best course would appear to be for His Majesty's Government to approach the Mexican and Italian Governments as "dubitants" rather than as "suppliants," informing them that the Colonies are anxious to withdraw from the treaty, but that His Majesty's Government are in some doubt whether the article entitled them to do so, and saying that if those Governments think that the Colonies are entitled to withdraw, His Majesty's Government propose to give notice; while if they consider that the Colonies are not so entitled, His Majesty's Government would wish to negotiate a declaration, on the lines of that with Paraguay, under which they would be so entitled.

Sir E. Grey would be glad if the Board of Trade would furnish him with their

* No. 42.

† Not printed, but see enclosures in No. 51.

views, both on the question of the validity of the right of withdrawal from the Austro-Hungarian Treaty, and also as to the desirability of approaching the Italian and Mexican Governments in the sense suggested.

I am, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

The Secretary
to the Board of Trade.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

Board of Trade (Commercial Department), Gwydyr House,
Whitehall, London, S.W., 2nd November, 1909.

SIR, I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 37673, of the 15th October, transmitting copy of a letter from the Colonial Office on the subject of the withdrawal of Australia from commercial treaties.

In reply I am to say that the Board share the opinion expressed by Sir E. Grey, that the liberty of accession given to the self-governing Colonies by the treaties with Italy and Mexico does not necessarily carry with it the right of withdrawal; and they concur in the course which Sir E. Grey proposes to adopt in these two cases.

As regards Article II. of the Austro-Hungarian Treaty, however, the Board are disposed to think that, whatever may be the position under the treaty of Colonies which opened their coasting trade subsequently to its conclusion, the right of those Colonies whose coasting trade was open at the time, and whose names are specifically mentioned in Article II., to withdraw from the treaty is by no means assured.

They accordingly venture to suggest, for the consideration of Sir E. Grey, that the course which he proposes to adopt with regard to the Italian and Mexican Treaties might also, with advantage, be adopted in the case of the Austro-Hungarian Treaty.

I have, &c.,
GEO. J. STANLEY.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

28818

No. 48.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

SIR, Downing Street, 20 November, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th August,* enquiring what precise meaning he attaches to the proviso in Article 2 of the Arbitration Convention with the United States of April 4th, 1908—"His Majesty's Government reserving the right before concluding a special agreement in any matter affecting the interests of a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire to obtain the concurrence therein of the Government of that Dominion."

2. The proviso was intended to safeguard the self-governing Dominions from being forced to arbitrate in any case against their will, and Lord Crewe apprehends that in effect it attains this object. A Dominion interested in a matter with regard to which arbitration is proposed under the Convention is entitled to refuse to accept in any form a "special agreement" as contemplated in Article II., and thereby it can render arbitration impossible.

3. In this connection I am to point out that whatever may be the correct interpretation of the words of the proviso taken by themselves, it would appear from the notes annexed to the Convention that the intention of the proviso is to place His Majesty's Government in the same position in regard to a Dominion Government as is occupied by the Government of the United States in relation to the Senate. Under the Constitution of the United States the consent of the Senate is an indispensable condition to the conclusion of a treaty, and that consent may be refused on any or no grounds. It would seem to follow that the Government of a Dominion has the same unlimited right of rejection. As is pointed out above, the exercise of that right to the full in regard to special agreements for the reference of any par-

* No. 35.

ticular matter to arbitration would clearly amount to declining arbitration altogether on that matter.

4. It follows from this view that the proviso in question must be regarded as devised to meet a somewhat special case, and that, if a general clause to the same effect could be inserted in treaties with other Powers, it would require to be differently framed.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

37021

No. 49.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to FOREIGN OFFICE.

[See enclosures to No. 51.]

SIR, Downing Street, 24 November, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant,* enclosing copy of correspondence with the Board of Trade relative to the withdrawal of the Commonwealth of Australia from certain commercial treaties and drafts of despatches which it is proposed to address to His Majesty's representatives at Vienna, Rome, and Mexico.

I am to request you to inform Sir E. Grey that Lord Crewe concurs in the terms of the draft despatch subject to the following alterations:—

- (a) In the first paragraph, for lines 2-4 should be substituted "the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, of which New South Wales, &c., are now parts, has given notice of its desire to withdraw, &c."
- (b) In the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs the word "Commonwealth" should be substituted for "Colonies," and the plural altered to the singular accordingly.

Lord Crewe would be glad to be furnished in due course with copies of the despatches as actually transmitted to His Majesty's representatives at Rome, Vienna and Mexico for communication to the Commonwealth Government.

I am also to enquire what is the position with regard to the Commercial Treaty with Muscat, to which reference was made in your letter of the 13th September.†

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

39323

No. 50.

FOREIGN OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 4 December, 1909.)

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith a copy of the following paper: His Majesty's Representative at the Hague, November 27, 1909: Conventions of Second Peace Conference.

Reference to previous letter: Foreign Office, October 21, 1909.‡

Foreign Office,
December 3, 1909.

(Similar letter sent to the Admiralty, Board of Trade, and War Office.)

Enclosure in No. 50.

(No. 49. Treaty.)

SIR, The Hague, November 27th, 1909.
WITH reference to your despatch, No. 30 of this series of the 20th of

* No. 47.

† No. 37.

‡ 34776: not printed. (See No. 44.)

this month, I have the honour to report that the Representatives of the following Powers: Germany, United States of America, Austria-Hungary, China, Denmark, Great Britain, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, and Sweden, held a meeting this afternoon, under the presidency of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, in the "Salle de la Trêve" of the Ministry of Waterways, and signed protocols, recording the deposit of the Ratifications of such of the Conventions and of the Declaration drawn up at the Second Peace Conference as had been ratified by their respective Governments.

In signing the protocols relative to the 8th and 9th Conventions I was careful to state that the reservations made by His Majesty's Plenipotentiaries at the time of signature are especially maintained.

The enclosed list will show which of the Conventions have been ratified by the respective Powers.

I shall have the honour to forward to you copies of the Protocols, signed by my colleagues and myself, as soon as they have been communicated to me.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.

Depôt du 27 Novembre, 1909.

Allemagne	...	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XIII	
Amerique	...	I	II	III	IV	V			VIII	IX	X	XI		XIV
Autriche-Hongrie	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XIII		
Chine	...	I									X			XIV
Danemark	...	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XIII	
Grande Bretagne			II	III	IV		VI	VII	VIII	IX		XI		XIV
Mexique	...	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XIII	
Pays Bas	...	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XIII	XIV
Russie	...	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII		IX	X		XIII	
Suede	...	I		III	IV	V	VI	VII		IX		XI	XIII	

39142

No. 51.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 430.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 3 December, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 360, of the 8th of October,* I have the honour to transmit to you, for the information of your Ministers, the accompanying copies of despatches which have been addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Representatives at Vienna, Rome, and Mexico on the subject of the withdrawal of the Commonwealth Government from certain treaties between Great Britain and the Governments of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Mexico.

It is proposed by the Foreign Office to await replies from these Governments before making any communication to Muscat.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

The SECRETARY OF STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS to HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES
AT VIENNA, ROME, AND MEXICO.

(No. 41.)

(No. 47.)

(No. 31.)

SIR,

Foreign Office, November 30th, 1909.

I HAVE to inform you that the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia,

* No. 41.

of which [*omit to Mexico*, New South Wales] Victoria, Queensland, [*omit to Italy*, South Australia], Tasmania, and Western Australia are now parts, is anxious to withdraw from the Treaty of [*Austria-Hungary*: Navigation of April 30th, 1868, between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary.] [*Italy*: Commerce and Navigation of June 15th, 1883, between Great Britain and Italy.] [*Mexico*: Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation of November 27th, 1888, between Great Britain and Mexico.]

I request that you will approach the Government to which you are accredited and inform them that His Majesty's Government are in some doubt whether the Commonwealth is entitled to withdraw under Article [II.] [XIX.] [XIV.] of the Treaty, but that they would be glad to learn the view of the [*Austro-Hungarian*] [*Italian*] [*Mexican*] Government on this point.

You should add that, if that Government consider that the Commonwealth is entitled to withdraw, His Majesty's Government propose to give notice of such withdrawal, but that, if they consider that it is not so entitled, His Majesty's Government would wish to negotiate a declaration on the lines of that concluded with Paraguay, copy of which is herewith enclosed.†

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

39323

No. 52.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL and GOVERNORS.

(Canada. No. 728.)

(Cape of Good Hope. No. 316.)

(Newfoundland. No. 191.)

(Natal. No. 230.)

(Australia. No. 437.)

(Transvaal. No. 382.)

(New Zealand. No. 216.)

(Orange River Colony. No. 197.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 10 December, 1909.

SIR,

WITH reference to my despatch, No. [639] [162] [377] [194] [284] [202] [349] [174], of the 30th October last,* I have the honour to transmit to [Your Excellency], [you], to be laid before your Ministers, the enclosed copy of a despatch† addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Representative at the Hague reporting the deposit by Great Britain and other Powers of the Ratifications of such of the Conventions and of the Declaration drawn up at the Second Peace Conference as had been ratified by their respective Governments. A list showing which of the Conventions have been ratified by the respective Powers is also enclosed.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

39142

No. 53.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL and GOVERNORS.

(Canada. No. 772.)

(Natal. No. 250.)

(Newfoundland. No. 208.)

(Transvaal. No. 398.)

(New Zealand. No. 230.)

(Orange River Colony. No. 20.)

(Cape of Good Hope. No. 335.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 31st December, 1909.

SIR,

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the possibility of obtaining for the self-governing Dominions the right of withdrawal from certain treaties with Foreign Powers, I have the honour to acquaint [Your Excellency] [you], for the information of your Ministers, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has instructed His Majesty's Representatives at Vienna, Rome, and Mexico to enter into negotiations with the Governments of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Mexico, in order

* No. 44.

† Enclosure in No. 50.

‡ Not printed here.

to secure, if possible, for the self-governing Dominions the right to withdraw from the Treaty of Navigation with Austria-Hungary of the 30th of April, 1868, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Italy of the 15th of June, 1883, and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Mexico of the 27th of November, 1888.

2. I shall inform you in due course of the results of these negotiations.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

IV.

(Resolution XIII.): Uniformity in Trade Marks and Patents.

4967

No. 54.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 9 March, 1909. L.F.]

(Australia. No. 88.)

(Cape of Good Hope. No. 74.)

(Canada. No. 144.)

(Natal. No. 51.)

(Newfoundland. No. 35.)

(Orange River Colony. No. 39.)

(New Zealand. No. 53.)

(Transvaal. No. 74.)

MY LORD,
SIR,

Downing Street, 5 March, 1909.

WITH reference to the Thirteenth Resolution of the Colonial Conference of 1907, on the subject of the provision of uniformity in the granting and protection of trade marks and patents, I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, to be laid before your Ministers, copies of a printed memorandum† on trade mark law which has been drawn up at the Patent Office by the direction of the Board of Trade, showing how far the laws of the self-governing Dominions agree with, or differ from, that in force in the United Kingdom.

2. His Majesty's Government desire to suggest to your Ministers that they should consider whether it would not be desirable to assimilate the legislation of the [Commonwealth] [Canada] [Newfoundland] [New Zealand] [Cape] [Natal] [Orange River Colony] [Transvaal] to the Imperial Trade Marks Act of 1905, as far as circumstances permit, in the manner indicated in the enclosed statement furnished by the Patent Office.

3. The Memorandum on the Mutual Protection of Patents, which was laid before the Colonial Conference (p. 507 of [Cd. 3524]), has now been revised and brought up to date. I enclose copies of this revised Memorandum,* and would suggest that your Ministers should take into their consideration the question whether certain provisions in the Imperial Act might not with advantage be adopted by them; for example, the provision as to improper conditions imposed by patentees (page 16 of Memorandum); the surrender of patents (p. 16), the restoration of lapsed patents (p. 17), patents of addition (p. 11), and compulsory licences (p. 14).

4. I should also be glad to learn whether your Ministers consider that it would be desirable to summon a conference of representatives of the self-governing Dominions to discuss these subjects in detail.

5. Should the reply be in the affirmative, I shall be glad to instruct the Secretary to the Imperial Conference to make the necessary arrangements.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* Not reprinted.

† NOTE.—In the copies sent to the several Dominions the paragraphs relevant to each were marked in blue except those in last section "Special provisions."

Enclosure 1 in No. 54.
MEMORANDUM.
COLONIAL TRADE MARK LAW.

REGISTRABLE MARKS.

In order to compare the laws on this point I have tabulated the variations in the Statutes of the United Kingdom in four columns, A, B, C, D, for reference:—

A. Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, Section 10.	B. Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, Section 64.	C. Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1888, Section 10.	D. Trade Marks Act, 1905, Section 9.
For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark consists of one or more of the following essential particulars: that is to say:	(1) For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark must consist of or contain at least one of the following essential particulars:	(1) For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark must consist of or contain at least one of the following essential particulars:	(1) For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark must consist of or contain at least one of the following essential particulars:
A name of an individual or firm, printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner: or	(a) A name of an individual or firm printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner: or	(a) A name of an individual or firm printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner: or	(1) The name of a company, individual or firm, represented in a special or particular manner:
A written signature or copy of a written signature of an individual or firm: or	(b) A written signature or copy of a written signature of the individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a trade mark: or	(b) A written signature or copy of a written signature of the individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a trade mark: or	(2) The signature of the applicant for registration or some predecessor in his business.
A distinctive device, mark, heading, label, or ticket:	(c) A distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket: or	(c) A distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, or ticket: or	(5) Any other distinctive mark, but a name, signature, or word or words, other than such as fall within the descriptions in the paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4), shall not, except by order of the Board of Trade or the Court, be deemed a distinctive mark:
	Fancy word or words not in common use.	(d) An invented word or invented words.	(3) An invented word or invented words.
		(e) A word or words having no reference to the character or quality of the goods and not being a geographical name.	(4) A word or words having no direct reference to the character or quality of the goods, and not being according to its ordinary signification a geographical name or a surname:
and there may be added to any one or more of the said particulars any letters, words, or figures, or combination of letters, words, or figures: also	(2) There may be added to any one or more of these particulars any letters, words, or figures, or combination of letters, words, or figures, or of any of them.	(2) There may be added to any one or more of the essential particulars mentioned in this section any letters, words, or figures, or combination of letters, words, or figures, or of any of them, but the applicant for registration of any such additional matter must state in his application the essential particulars of the trade mark and must disclaim in his application any right to the exclusive use of the added matter, and a copy of the statement and disclaimer shall be entered on the Register.	
		(3) Provided as follows: (i) A person need not under this section disclaim his own name or the foreign equivalent thereof, or his place of business, but no entry of any such name shall affect the right of any owner of the same name to use that name or the foreign equivalent thereof:	

A. Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, Section 10.	B. Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, Section 64.	C. Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1888, Section 10.	D. Trade Marks Act, 1905, Section 9.
any special and distinctive word or words or combination of figures or letters used as a trade mark before the passing of this Act may be registered as such under this Act.	(3) Provided that any special and distinctive word or words, letter, figure, or combination of letters or figures or of letters and figures used as a trade mark before the 13th day of August, 1875, may be registered as a trade mark under this part of this Act.	(ii.) Provided that any special and distinctive word or words, letter, figure, or combination of letters or figures or of letters and figures used as a trade mark before the 13th day of August, 1875, may be registered as a trade mark under this part of this Act.	Provided always that any special or distinctive word or words, letter, numeral, or combination of letters or numerals used as a trade mark by the applicant or his predecessors in business before the 13th day of August, 1875, which has continued to be used (either in its original form or with additions or alterations not substantially affecting the identity of the same) down to the date of the application for registration shall be registrable as a trade mark under this Act.
			For the purposes of this Section "distinctive" shall mean adapted to distinguish the goods of the proprietor of the trade mark from those of other persons. In determining whether a trade mark is so adapted, the tribunal may, in the case of a trade mark in actual use, take into consideration the extent to which such user has rendered such trade mark in fact distinctive for the goods with respect to which it is registered or proposed to be registered.

Canada.—There is no definition of trade marks which can be registered. All that is said is:—"All marks, names, labels, brands, packages or other business devices which are adopted for use by any person in his trade, business, occupation, or calling, for the purpose of distinguishing any manufacture, product or article of any description manufactured, produced, compounded, packed, or offered for sale by him, applied in any manner whatever either to such manufacture, product or article, or to any package, parcel, case, box, or other vessel or receptacle of any description whatsoever containing the same, shall, for the purposes of this Act, be considered and known as trade marks."

I notice, however, a somewhat peculiar provision dividing marks into general and particular which are defined as follows:—

"General trade mark" means a trade mark used in connection with the sale of various articles in which a proprietor deals in his trade, business, occupation, or calling generally.

"Specific trade mark" means a trade mark used in connection with the sale of a class merchandise of a particular description.

I do not understand the force of this division. I also notice that the Minister may refuse to register any trade mark "if the so-called trade mark does not contain the essentials necessary to constitute a trade mark, properly speaking."

Newfoundland.—Same as column "C," but in the copy which we have the words "or combination of letters, words, or figures" appear to have dropped out from sub-section (2). With this omission the sub-section does not read. In the provision with regard to old marks the words "before the coming into force of these Consolidated Statutes" are substituted for "before the 13th day of August, 1875."

Australia.—Practically the same as "C." I find also the following which corresponds with part of "D" and is useful:—"In determining whether any particular of a trade mark is distinctive, regard may be had, in the case of a trade mark in actual use, to the extent to which user has rendered the trade mark or the particular distinctive for the goods with respect to which the trade mark is sought to be registered."

Certain provisions are made for the transfer to the register of marks already registered in any State in the Commonwealth and also for the registration of marks in use in any State before the passing of the Act.

New Zealand.—Same as "C" but with the words "before the commencement of this Act" substituted for "before the 13th day of August, 1875."

Cape Colony.—Same as "C" but with the words "and a copy of the statement and disclaimer shall be entered on the register" omitted, and the words "before the 8th day of August, 1877" in place of "before the 13th day of August, 1875."

Natal.—Same as "B" but without subsection (3).

Transvaal.—Same as "C" but with the words "before Law No. 6 of 1892 came into operation" in place of "before the 13th day of August, 1875."

Orange River Colony.—Practically the same as "B." I suppose that the variations are due to the fact that the MS. in English which we have is only a translation.

ADVERTISEMENT AND OPPOSITION.

Canada.—There is no provision in the Act for advertisement or opposition. If application is duly made for registration and the Minister does not refuse to register on any of certain stated grounds, the mark is forthwith registered.

Newfoundland.—There is no provision for advertisement or opposition. As in the case of Canada, if application is duly made and the Colonial Secretary does not object to register on any of certain stated grounds, the mark is forthwith registered.

Australia, New Zealand.—The procedure is practically the same as in the United Kingdom.

Cape Colony.—The procedure with regard to advertisement is somewhat different from our own. The Rules provide that "any person desiring to register a trade mark shall advertise his intention so to do once a week during two consecutive weeks, in the *Government Gazette*, and once a week during two consecutive weeks, in a Cape Town newspaper, to be approved of by the Registrar of Deeds." This advertisement must be in a prescribed form which includes a representation of the mark. Thirty days must elapse between the date of the last advertisement of the application and the date on which application is made for registration. The applicant must supply copies of the newspaper in which his application appeared, and the dates of the *Gazette* in which it was published.

The procedure in case of opposition is also different from that of the United Kingdom. The Rules provide that any person objecting to the registration of a trade mark must give notice before the expiration of thirty days after the last advertisement of the application. He shall state the grounds of his opposition, and shall before the expiration of thirty days after the date of lodging his objection, proceed to have the application set aside by some competent court, failing which the opposition is deemed abandoned.

Natal.—Every application for registration must, as soon as may be after its receipt, be advertised in the *Government Gazette*. As in the case of Cape Colony, the application must be advertised, with a representation, by the applicant. Opposition cases are determined by the Supreme Court of Natal, very much as was the procedure in the United Kingdom before 1888.

Transvaal.—Every application is advertised with a representation by the Registrar in the *Government Gazette* and in such newspaper or newspapers as he may prescribe.

The provisions regarding opposition are practically the same as those in the United Kingdom.

Orange River Colony.—The provisions for advertisement are the same as those in Cape Colony.

There does not appear to be any provision for opposition.

COSTS IN OPPOSITION CASES.

Canada, Newfoundland, and the Orange River Colony make no provision for opposition.

Australia.—The Registrar and the Law Officer, respectively, may award costs against any party to any proceeding before him.

In Opposition cases the applicant, if he fails to lodge a counter statement, is not liable for costs, but, if he lodges a counter statement and thereafter abandons his application, is liable, unless the Registrar otherwise orders, to pay to the opponent such costs as the Registrar allows. If a person giving notice of opposition or appeal does not reside in Australia, the Registrar, Law Officer, or Court may order him to give security for costs, and if the order is not complied with, the opposition or appeal shall be deemed to be abandoned.

New Zealand.—There seems to be no provision enabling the Registrar to give general costs, but in opposition cases it is specially provided that the applicant, if he abandons his application after notice of opposition, shall be liable to pay to the opponent such costs in respect of the opposition as the Registrar may determine to be reasonable.

Cape Colony.—No provision is made for the award of costs.

Natal.—The determination of opposition cases lies with the Supreme Court of Natal, and there is no provision in trade mark legislation for the award of costs.

Transvaal.—The Registrar has power to order that the costs of any opposition proceeding be paid by either party in all respects as if the Registrar were a Judge of the Court. Costs are taxed by the Taxing Officer.

In case the applicant or opponent resides abroad or has no fixed property within the Colony, then the applicant or opponent shall have the right to require that security to the satisfaction of the Registrar be lodged by the applicant or opponent for the costs.

If the applicant abandons his application after notice of opposition he shall be liable to pay to the opponent such costs in respect of the opposition as the Registrar may determine to be reasonable.

DURATION OF REGISTRATION.

Canada—		
General Trade Mark	...	Unlimited.
Specific Trade Mark	...	25 years: may be renewed.
Newfoundland	...	Unlimited.
Australia	...	14 years: may be renewed.
New Zealand	...	14 years: may be renewed.
Cape Colony	...	14 years: may be renewed.
Natal	...	14 years: may be renewed.
Transvaal	...	Unlimited.
Orange River Colony	...	14 years: may be renewed.

RESTRICTIONS ON REGISTRATION.

Canada.—The Minister may refuse to register any trade mark if it appears that it is calculated to deceive or mislead the public, or if it contains any immorality or scandalous figure.

Newfoundland.—The Colonial Secretary may object to register any trade mark on similar grounds.

Australia.—“No scandalous design, and no mark the use of which would, by reason of its being calculated to deceive or otherwise be deemed disentitled to protection in a court of justice, or the use of which would be contrary to law or morality, shall be used or registered as a trade mark or part of a trade mark.”

“Except in the case of a trade mark properly registered in any State under a State Trade Mark Act, a registrable trade mark must not contain:—

- (a.) The words ‘Trade Mark,’ ‘Registered,’ ‘Registered Design,’ ‘Copyright,’ ‘Entered at Stationers’ Hall,’ ‘To counterfeit this is Forgery,’ or words to the like effect; or
- (b.) A representation of the King, the Queen, or any member of the Royal Family, or of the Royal Crown.

A registrable trade mark must not contain:—

- (a.) The word “Royal” or any word, letter or device, indicating Royal or Government patronage; or
- (b.) A representation of the Royal Arms, or of the National Flag of the United Kingdom, or of the flag of the Commonwealth, or of the National Arms of the United Kingdom, or of the arms or seal of the Commonwealth or any State; or
- (c.) A representation of any living person without his written consent.”

New Zealand, Natal, Transvaal follow the provisions of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, as follows:—“It shall not be lawful to register as part of or in combination with a trade mark any words the exclusive use of which would by reason of their being calculated to deceive or otherwise be deemed disentitled to protection in a court of justice, or any scandalous design.”

Cape Colony follows the provision of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, which runs as follows:—“It shall not be lawful to register as part of or in combination with a trade mark any words the exclusive use of which would not, by reason of their being calculated to deceive or otherwise, be deemed entitled to protection in a court of equity; or any scandalous designs.”

Orange River Colony.—The corresponding provision runs:—“It will not be lawful to register any words as part of a trade mark where danger could arise that by the exclusive use of these words the public might be misled. Neither may indecent devices or designs be registered.” The variations in phraseology are perhaps due to the fact that the copy which we have is a translation.

RECTIFICATION OF THE REGISTER.

Canada.—The Exchequer Court of Canada may, on the information of the Attorney-General, or at the suit of any person aggrieved by any omission, without sufficient cause, to make any entry in the Register of Trade Marks, or by any entry made without sufficient cause in any such Register, make such order for making, expunging or varying any entry in the Register as the Court thinks fit. The Court may in any proceedings under the section decide any question that may be necessary or expedient to decide for the rectification of the Register.

Newfoundland.—Apparently no provision is made for rectification of the Register.

Australia.—The provision for rectification is substantially the same as in the United Kingdom, but power is given to the Registrar to make application to the Court. It is, however, expressly provided that the Registrar shall only make application to the Court in cases where he thinks the application necessary or desirable in the public interest.

If it is shown that there has been no *bonâ fide* user of a trade mark for a consecutive period of three years since the date of the last registration thereof, the Court may order its removal from the Register unless it was at the date of the application in *bonâ fide* use and had been so for a period of six months immediately prior to the date of the application.

New Zealand.—The provision for rectification of the register by the Court is practically the same as that in the United Kingdom.

Cape Colony, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony follow the provisions of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, which run as follows:—

“If the name of any person who is not for the time being entitled to the exclusive use of a trade mark in accordance with this Act, or otherwise in accordance with law, is entered on the Register of Trade Marks as a proprietor of such trade mark, or if the Registrar refuses to enter on the Register as proprietor of a trade mark the name of any person who is for the time being entitled to the exclusive use of such trade mark in accordance with this Act, or otherwise in accordance with law, or if any mark is registered as a trade mark which is not authorised to be so registered under this Act, any person aggrieved may apply in the prescribed manner for an Order of the Court that the Register may be rectified; and the Court may either refuse such application, or it may, if satisfied of the justice of the case, make an Order for the rectification of the Register, and may award damages to the party aggrieved.”

And further “the Court may, in any proceeding under this section, decide any question as to whether a mark is or is not such a trade mark as is authorised to be registered under this Act, also any question relating to the right of any person who is party to such proceeding to have his name entered on the Register of trade marks, or to have the name of some other person removed from such Register, also any other question that it may be necessary or expedient to decide for the rectification of the Register.”

Natal.—No provision appears to be made for rectification.

ALTERATION OF A REGISTERED TRADE MARK AND CORRECTION OF THE REGISTER ON APPLICATION BY THE REGISTERED PROPRIETOR.

Canada.—The provisions for alteration of a registered trade mark are practically identical with those in the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, which run as follows:—

“The registered proprietor of any registered trade mark may apply to the

Court for leave to add to or alter such trade mark in any particular, not being an essential particular within the meaning of this Act, and the Court may refuse or grant leave on such terms as it may think fit.

"Notice of any intended application to the Court under this section shall be given to the Comptroller by the Applicant; and the Comptroller shall be entitled to be heard on the application."

"If the Court grants leave, the Comptroller shall, on proof thereof and on payment of the prescribed fee, cause the register to be altered in conformity with the order of leave."

"The Exchequer Court of Canada" is substituted in place of "the Court" and "the Minister" in place of "the Comptroller."

It is also provided that any person who has registered a trade mark may petition for the cancellation of the same and the Minister may, on receiving such petition, cause that said trade mark to be so cancelled.

Newfoundland makes no provision for alteration of a registered trade mark or for correction of the register.

Australia.—"The registered proprietor of a trade mark may apply to the Court for leave to add to or alter the trade mark in any manner not substantially affecting its identity and the Court may refuse or grant the leave on such terms as it thinks fit. If leave be granted, the Registrar shall, on service of the order of leave, cause the register to be altered in accordance with the order and shall, in the prescribed manner, advertise the trade mark as altered."

Otherwise the provisions for correction of the register are practically the same as those at present in force in the United Kingdom:—"The Registrar may, on request made in the prescribed manner by the registered proprietor of a trade mark, amend or alter the register by—

- (a) correcting any error in the name or address of the registered proprietor of the trade mark; or
- (b) altering the name or address of the registered proprietor who has changed his name or address; or
- (c) cancelling the registration of the trade mark; or
- (d) striking out any goods or classes of goods from those in respect of which the trade mark is registered; or
- (e) entering a disclaimer or memorandum relating to the trade mark which does not in any way extend the rights given by the registration of the trade mark.

New Zealand.—The provisions for alteration of a registered trade mark are identical with those of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (quoted above), with the substitution of "Registrar" for "Comptroller."

The provisions for correction of the register are likewise identical with those in the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, which provide that the Registrar may, on request in writing accompanied by the prescribed fee, correct any clerical error in the name, style, or address of the registered proprietor of a trade mark; or cancel the entry or part of the entry of a trade mark on the register, provided that the applicant accompanies his request by a statutory declaration made by himself, stating his name, address, and calling, and that he is the person whose name appears on the register as the proprietor of the said trade mark.

Cape Colony makes no provision for the alteration of a registered trade mark. But it is provided in the "Regulations" that if the registered proprietor of a trade mark send to the Registrar of Deeds notice of an alteration in his address, the Registrar shall alter the Register accordingly; and that the Registrar of Deeds may on request in writing cancel the entry or part of the entry of a trade mark on the register, provided, as above, that the applicant accompanies his request by a declaration that he is the person whose name appears in the register as proprietor of the mark.

In the Scale of Fees there is an item "For every entry in the Register of a rectification thereof or an alteration therein not otherwise charged" as well as an item "For altering address in Register," and another "For cancelling the entry or part of an entry of a trade mark on the application of the owner of such mark."

Natal.—There is nothing provided in the Law regarding alteration of a regis-

tered mark, or correction of the Register, but in the Scale of Fees the following items occur:—

"For altering address in the Register."

"For every entry in the Register of a rectification thereof or an alteration therein not otherwise charged."

"For cancelling the entry of a trade mark upon the Register, on the application of the owner of such trade mark."

Transvaal.—The provision made for alteration of a registered trade mark and for correction of the Register is practically identical with that in the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, with the substitution of "Registrar" for "Comptroller" and the addition that the Registrar may correct any error in or in connection with any registered trade mark in any special circumstances not otherwise provided for upon such terms and conditions as the Registrar may think fit.

Orange River Colony.—Nothing is provided in the Acts, but in the Scale of Fees items occur similar to those quoted under Natal.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS.

Canada.—It is specially provided that "timber or lumber of any kind upon which labour has been expended by any person in his trade, business, occupation, or calling, shall, for the purposes of the Act, be deemed a manufacture, product or article" within the meaning of the definition of registrable marks.

Australia.—Special provision is made for what are termed "Workers' Trade Marks." A workers' trade mark is defined as "a mark which is a distinctive device, design, symbol, or label registered by any individual Australian worker or association of Australian workers corporate or unincorporate for the purpose of indicating that articles to which it is applied are the exclusive production of the workers or of members of the association."

The mark is applied to the goods (being goods produced in Australia) by the employer for whom they are produced, or, with the authority of the employer, by the worker or a member of the association registering the mark.

The registered proprietor of a workers' trade mark is entitled to institute legal proceedings to prevent, and recover damages for, any contravention of the Act in respect of that trade mark.

Workers' trade marks are not capable of assignment and the main provisions relating to ordinary trade marks do not apply to them.

These special provisions do not apply to any primary products of the agricultural, viticultural (including wine-making), horticultural, dairying (including butter-making and cheese-making), or pastoral industries.

There are also special provisions with regard to the Commonwealth Trade Mark. The Minister may cause to be designed and registered a trade mark, called the Commonwealth Trade Mark, consisting of a distinctive device or label bearing the words "Australian Labour Conditions." The Minister is deemed the proprietor and is entitled to prevent the unauthorised application of the mark. He may give authority to any person to apply the mark either generally or in respect of specific goods. The provisions regarding the Commonwealth mark apply to all goods included in or specified by a resolution passed by both Houses of the Parliament that in their opinion the conditions as to the remuneration of labour in connection with their manufacture are fair and reasonable. Such a resolution shall be deemed to have been passed at the commencement of the Act in respect of goods which are manufactured in any part of the Commonwealth under conditions as to the remuneration of labour prescribed, required, or provided in relation to the goods by an industrial award or order, or an industrial agreement under an industrial law. The mark must be applied, with the authority of the Minister, by the first proprietor of the goods, who must have personally manufactured them or have paid for labour at least the minimum amount prescribed by an industrial award or order, or an industrial agreement under an industrial law. As in the case of Workers' Trade Marks the ordinary provisions relating to trade marks do not apply.

Following the Trade Marks Act, 1905, Section 62, provision is also made for the registration of Standardisation Marks by which, where any Commonwealth or State authority, or any association or person undertakes and certifies by a mark the examination of any goods, the Minister may permit the registration of the mark in respect of these goods. Conditions of manufacture are included amongst the objects

of such examination and certification, but in respect of them the provision applies to Commonwealth and State authorities only.

The principle of association introduced by the Trade Marks Act, 1905, has been adopted in Australia.

Another innovation of the Trade Marks Act, 1905, has been adopted in the provision that the registration of a person as proprietor of a trade mark shall, after the expiration of five years from the date of registration, (in the absence of fraud) be conclusive evidence of the validity of the registration and, subject to this Act, of his right to the exclusive use of the trade mark in respect of the goods in respect of which it is registered, upon the registered proprietor proving that he or his predecessors in title have continuously used the trade mark in respect of the goods to a substantial extent for the five years immediately preceding the commencement of the legal proceedings.

New Zealand.—It is specially provided that no trade mark shall be registered for artificial manures manufactured in the Colony unless accompanied by a chemical analysis setting forth the component parts of the substance of such manure. A copy of such analysis, made by a competent analytical chemist, must be affixed to every parcel of the manure to which the trade mark is attached and shall be deemed to form part of such trade mark.

Enclosure 2 in No. 54.

I.

TRADE MARKS.

General for each Dominion other than Australia.

As regards Trade Marks, the standard of the United Kingdom is contained in the Trade Marks Act, 1905, and the Trade Marks Rules, 1906.

The enclosed Memorandum on Trade Mark Law, which has been prepared at the Patent Office by direction of the Board of Trade, shows, generally, the similarity or the material points of difference between the law of the United Kingdom and those of the various self-governing Dominions. The attention of the Government of is called in particular to the passages in the Memorandum marked in blue, which indicate specifically how the [Canadian] law agrees with, or differs from, that of the United Kingdom.

In addition to the points specifically dealt with in the Memorandum, it is considered that the special provisions as to the registration of Cotton Marks (Section 64 of the Act) should be adopted so far as they can be made to apply. Attention is called to the provisions as to Common Marks (Section 15 of the Act). It has been found by experience that there are, in nearly every trade, marks which otherwise might be registrable, but which have been used in common by many traders. Thus, in the biscuit trade the word "Albert" is a common trade term for a kind of biscuit, and is used by many traders. These common marks cannot be distinctive and it might be well to exclude them specifically by enacting that marks that are common to the trade cannot be registered for the goods in which that trade is concerned. Standardization Marks (Section 62 of the Act) should also be included in the amending legislation.

The detailed statement,* also enclosed, indicates the various sections of the Act of 1905 and the various rules on which legislation would have to be based, should it be determined to carry out the recommendation of the Colonial Conference; these sections and rules have been marked in blue in the copies of the Act and Rules, which are also sent herewith.

It is intended at an early date to initiate legislation which shall prohibit the use as a Trade Mark, or for similar purposes, of the device of the Geneva Red Cross or of the words "Red Cross," and it is suggested, in the event of the Government deciding to assimilate their Trade Mark Law to that in force in the United Kingdom, that the amended law should contain provisions similar to those which will be introduced here. Details of such provisions will be communicated to the

Government in due course.

II.

AUSTRALIA.

As regards Trade Marks, the standard of the United Kingdom is contained in the Trade Marks Act, 1905, and the Trade Marks Rules, 1906.

* Not reprinted.

The enclosed Memorandum on Trade Mark Law, which has been prepared at the Patent Office, by direction of the Board of Trade, shows, generally, the similarity or the material points of difference between the law of the United Kingdom and that of Australia. The attention of the Government of Australia is called in particular to the passages in the Memorandum, marked in blue, which indicate specifically how the Australian law agrees with, or differs from, that of the United Kingdom.

In addition to the points specifically dealt with in the Memorandum, it is considered that the special provisions as to the registration of Cotton Marks (Section 64 of the Act) should be adopted so far as they can be made to apply.

The detailed statement, also enclosed, indicates the various sections of the Act of 1905 and the various rules on which legislation would have to be based, should it be determined to carry out the recommendation of the Colonial Conference; these sections and rules have been marked in blue in the copies of the Act and Rules which are also sent herewith.

It is intended at an early date to initiate legislation which shall prohibit the use as a Trade Mark or for similar purposes of the device of the Geneva Red Cross or of the words "Red Cross," and it is suggested, in the event of the Australian Government deciding to assimilate their Trade Mark Law to that in force in the United Kingdom, that the amended law should contain provisions similar to those which will be introduced here. Details of such provisions will be communicated to the Australian Government in due course.

It has been found by experience that there are in nearly every trade, marks which otherwise might be registrable but which have been used in common by many traders. Thus, in the biscuit trade the word "Albert" is a common trade term for a kind of biscuit, and is used by many traders. These Common Marks cannot be distinctive, and it might be well to exclude them specifically, by enacting that marks that are common to the trade cannot be registered for the goods in which that trade is concerned.

III.

CANADA.

Registrable Trade Marks.—It would be necessary to adopt the material provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1905.

Advertisement and Opposition.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 13 and 14, and of Rules 51 to 61 inclusive.

Costs in Opposition Cases.—See Section 14 (above), Sub-section 10.

Duration of Registration.—See Sections 23, 29, and 30, and Rules 68 to 75 inclusive.

Restrictions on Registration.—Legislation should be on the lines of Section 11, and Rules 11 to 15 inclusive.

Rectification of the Register.—See Section 35, Sub-section 3. Power for removal for non-user, as in Section 37, should be obtained.

Alteration of a Registered Trade Mark and Correction of Register on Application by the Registered Proprietor.—The extended powers given by Sections 32 and 34 should be obtained.

Cotton Marks.—Legislation to be on the lines of Section 64, as far as may be.

Common Marks.—Section 15 to be followed, and, possibly, an express prohibition should be inserted.

Standardization Marks.—The provisions of Section 62 should be adopted.

IV.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

Registrable Trade Marks.—It would be necessary to adopt the material provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1905.

Advertisement and Opposition.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 13 and 14, of Rules 51 to 61 inclusive.

Costs in Opposition Cases.—See Section 14 (above), Sub-section 10.

Duration of Registration.—See Sections 28, 29, and 30, and Rules 68 to 75 inclusive.

Restrictions on Registration.—Legislation should be on the lines of Section 11 and Rules 11 to 15 inclusive.

Rectification of Register.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 35 and 37.

Alteration of a Registered Trade Mark and Correction of Register on Application by the Registered Proprietor.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 32 and 34.

Cotton Marks.—Legislation to be on the lines of Section 64, as far as may be.

Common Marks.—Section 15 to be followed, and, possibly, an express prohibition should be inserted.

Standardization Marks.—The provisions of Section 62 should be adopted.

V.

AUSTRALIA.

Registrable Trade Marks.—It might be well to adopt the material provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1905.

Costs in Opposition Cases.—The general power under Section 14, Sub-section 10, should replace the present procedure; of course, the power to require security should be retained.

Restrictions on Registration.—The wording of Rule 11 should be followed.

Cotton Marks.—Legislation to be on the lines of Section 64, as far as may be.

VI.

NEW ZEALAND.

Registrable Trade Marks.—It would be necessary to adopt the material provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1905.

Costs in Opposition Cases.—The power under Section 14, Sub-section 10, should replace the present procedure; provision might also be made for security for costs, see Sub-section 11.

Restrictions on Registration.—Legislation should be on the lines of Section 11, and Rules 11 to 15 inclusive.

Alteration of a Registered Trade Mark and Correction of Register on Application by the Registered Proprietor.—The extended powers given by Sections 32 and 34 should be obtained.

Cotton Marks.—Legislation to be on the lines of Section 64, as far as may be.

Common Marks.—Section 15 to be followed, and, possibly, an express prohibition should be inserted.

Standardization Marks.—The provisions of Section 62 should be adopted.

VII.

CAPE COLONY.

Registrable Trade Marks.—It would be necessary to adopt the material provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1905.

Advertisement and Opposition.—Legislation should provide for an advertisement and opposition procedure on the lines of Sections 13 and 14, and of Rules 51 to 61 inclusive.

Costs in Opposition Cases.—See Section 14 (above), Sub-section 10.

Restrictions on Registration.—Legislation should be on the lines of Section 11, and Rules 11 to 15 inclusive.

Rectification of the Register.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 35 and 37.

Alteration of a Registered Trade Mark and Correction of Register on Application by the Registered Proprietor.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 32 and 34.

Cotton Marks.—Legislation to be on the lines of Section 64, as far as may be.

Common Marks.—Section 15 to be followed, and, possibly, an express prohibition should be inserted.

Standardization Marks.—The provisions of Section 62 should be adopted.

VIII.

NATAL.

Registrable Trade Marks.—It would be necessary to adopt the material provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1905.

Advertisement and Opposition.—Legislation should provide for an advertisement and opposition procedure on the lines of Sections 13 and 14, and of Rules 51 to 61 inclusive.

Costs in Opposition Cases.—See Section 14 (above), Sub-section 10.

Restrictions on Registration.—Legislation should be on the lines of Section 11, and Rules 11 to 15 inclusive.

Rectification of the Register.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 35 and 37.

Alteration of a Registered Trade Mark and Correction of Register on Application by the Registered Proprietor.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 32 and 34.

Cotton Marks.—Legislation to be on the lines of Section 64, as far as may be.

Common Marks.—Section 15 to be followed, and, possibly, an express prohibition should be inserted.

Standardization Marks.—The provisions of Section 62 should be adopted.

IX.

TRANSVAAL.

Registrable Trade Marks.—It would be necessary to adopt the material provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1905.

Costs in Opposition Cases.—The general power under Section 14, Sub-section 10, should replace the present procedure; of course, the power to require security should be retained.

Duration of Registration.—See Sections 28, 29, and 30, and Rules 68 to 75 inclusive.

Restrictions on Registration.—Legislation should be on the lines of Section 11, and Rules 11 to 15 inclusive.

Rectification of the Register.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 35 and 37.

Alteration of a Registered Trade Mark and Correction of Register on Application of the Registered Proprietor.—The extended powers given by Sections 32 and 34 should be obtained.

Cotton Marks.—Legislation to be on the lines of Section 64, as far as may be.

Common Marks.—Section 15 to be followed, and, possibly, an express prohibition should be inserted.

Standardization Marks.—The provisions of Section 62 should be adopted.

X.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

Registrable Trade Marks.—It would be necessary to adopt the material provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1905.

Advertisement and Opposition.—Legislation should provide for an advertisement and opposition procedure on the lines of Sections 13 and 14, and of Rules 51 to 61 inclusive.

Costs in Opposition Cases.—See Section 14 (above), Sub-section 10.

Restrictions on Registration.—Legislation should be on the lines of Section 11, and Rules 11 to 15 inclusive.

Rectification of the Register.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 35 and 37.

Alteration of a Registered Trade Mark and Correction of Register on Application by the Registered Proprietor.—Legislation should be on the lines of Sections 32 and 34.

Cotton Marks.—Legislation to be on the lines of Section 64, as far as may be.

Common Marks.—Section 15 to be followed, and, possibly, an express prohibition should be inserted.

Standardization Marks.—The provisions of Section 62 should be adopted.

15594

No. 55.

NATAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8 May, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 25 May, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 50.)

Government House, Pietermaritzburg, Natal,

13 April, 1909.

MY LORD,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch, No. 51, dated the 5th March, 1909,* on the desirability of assimilating, as far as circumstances permit, the legislation of Natal to the Imperial Acts relating to trade marks and patents, and of summoning a Conference of Representatives of the self-governing Dominions to discuss these subjects in detail, I have the honour to state that Ministers here are of opinion that any question of the alteration of the trade marks and patent laws in the direction indicated should be held over pending the settlement of the matter of the Closer Union of the South African Colonies.

I have, &c.,

M. NATHAN.

16313

No. 56.

TRANSVAAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 15 May, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 25 May, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 117.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Johannesburg, 26 April, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 5th March, No. 74,* I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a Minute from Ministers on the subject of the provision of uniformity in the granting and protection of trade marks and patents.

I have, &c.,

SELBORNE,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 56.

(Minute. No. 166.)

Prime Minister's Office, Pretoria, 23 April, 1909.

Ministers have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency the Governor's Minute, No. 57/1/09, of the 25th ultimo, covering copy of despatch, No. 74, dated 5th idem, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the subject of Trade Mark Law.

2. Ministers are prepared, as soon as a suitable opportunity occurs, to introduce legislation assimilating as far as possible the Trade Mark Law of the Transvaal to the Imperial Act of 1905, for Ministers are advised on the one hand that the provisions of the Transvaal law are so stringent that applicants are often unable to obtain the registration of marks which may reasonably be treated as distinctive marks, while on the other hand the provisions of the Imperial Act are sufficiently wide to allow of a trade mark which is commercially suitable for registration being registered.

3. Ministers are further advised that many of the clauses referred to in the annexure to the despatch under reply could, with or without modification, advantageously be incorporated in the Transvaal law. There are, however, clauses which are likely to give rise to controversy, but could be settled by the Select Committee to which any new Trade Marks Bill would probably be referred. The clause of the Imperial Act which appears to present the greatest difficulty is Section 64, relating

* No. 54.

to cotton marks. These marks are, it would appear, of a highly complicated and technical character, and in England, Ministers are informed, become frequently the subject of reference to the Trade and Merchandise Marks Committee in Manchester. No corresponding body of persons exists in this Colony, and as the considerations which arise in England do not obtain here Ministers are advised that it would not be expedient or even possible to adopt in a Transvaal law Section 64 *in toto*; but that it might be expedient to introduce a clause which would not only permit of the registration of cotton marks registered in England or elsewhere, but which would also enable an applicant to effect registration of any word or words as the sole essential feature of a cotton mark. Under such a clause a mark registered in England or elsewhere would be, *prima facie*, a distinctive mark, and if it did not conflict with a mark already on the register, its acceptance would follow as a matter of course.

4. Ministers have had under consideration the draft of a Bill consolidating and amending the existing laws with regard to patents, designs, and trade marks. They are, however, of opinion that while the draft Act of Union is under consideration, it is inadvisable to introduce that Bill, as its subject matter is clearly one in which the interests of all South African Colonies are identical. The same considerations would, of course, govern the attitude of Ministers in regard to the representation of the Transvaal at any conference of representatives of self-governing Colonies.

JACOB DE VILLIERS.

16432

No. 57.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 15 May, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 25 May, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 59.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, 26 April, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, No. 39, of the 5th ultimo,* referring to the thirteenth resolution of the Colonial Conference of 1907, and suggesting the desirability of assimilating the legislation of the Orange River Colony controlling the granting and protection of trade marks and patents to the Imperial Trade Marks Act of 1905.

2. My Ministers are giving this matter their careful attention, but in the meantime they have asked me to ascertain the views of the Governments of the Cape Colony, Natal, and the Transvaal on the subject. With this object I am communicating with the various Governments and I will address a further despatch to your Lordship in due course.

I have, &c.,

HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS,

Governor.

18829

No. 58.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received June 5, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, June 10, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 91.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Cape Town, May 18, 1909.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch, No. 74, of 5th March,* I transmit a Minute from Ministers, stating that it would not appear expedient to revise the provisions of the existing law of the Cape Colony as regards Trade Marks and

* No. 54.

Patents with a view of securing uniformity, until the question of South African Union is settled.

2. I am informing the High Commissioner accordingly.

I have, &c.,

WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.

Enclosure in No. 58.

MINISTERS to GOVERNOR.

(Minute, No. 1/179.)

Prime Minister's Office, Cape Town, May 11, 1909.

Ministers have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency the Governor's Minute, No. 199, of the 23rd March last, transmitting a copy of a despatch, No. 74 of the 5th idem, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the subject of the provision of uniformity in the granting and protection of Trade Marks and Patents. In regard thereto, Ministers desire to state that it would not appear expedient to revise the provisions of existing laws of this Colony with a view to securing uniformity, until the question of the proposed Union of the South African Colonies has been disposed of finally, when further communications upon these subjects will be addressed to His Excellency.

N. F. DE WAAL.

31129

No. 59.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 20 September, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 30 September, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 90.)

MY LORD,

Government House, St. John's, 4th September, 1909.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch, No. 35, of the 5th March,* relating to uniformity in the granting and protection of trade marks and patents, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of letter from the Attorney-General upon the subject.

I have, &c.,

W. H. HORWOOD.

Enclosure in No. 59.

Attorney-General's Office, St. John's, Newfoundland,

27th August, 1909.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 23rd forwarding letter from His Excellency Sir William MacGregor to Sir E. P. Morris, dated April 26th last, covering despatch No. 35 of March 5th last, with enclosures, on the subject of uniformity in the granting and protection of trade marks and patents.

I beg to make the following observations with regard to same:—

(1) Our local law in relation to trade marks and their registration is contained in Chapter 112 of the Consolidated Statutes, and is practically a transcript of the Imperial legislation which was in force when our original Trade Mark Act was passed, with such alterations as were thought necessary to meet local conditions. In my opinion, it will be desirable to assimilate our legislation to the Imperial Trade Marks Act of 1905, as far as our local circumstances permit.

(2) Our law with regard to patents is defective in a number of particulars, and might with advantage be amended to conform more closely to Imperial legislation on the same subject.

* No. 54.

(3) In my opinion it is desirable that these subjects shall be discussed at a Conference of representatives of the self-governing Dominions, but it seems to me that this may be done more conveniently by deferring the discussion until the next regular session of the Imperial Conference.

(4) I return the despatch and enclosures herewith.

I have, &c.,

D. MORISON,

His Majesty's Attorney-General.

Honourable R. Watson,

Colonial Secretary.

V.

(Resolution XIV): Uniformity in Trade Statistics.

6701

No. 60.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL and GOVERNORS.

(Australia. No. 90.)

(Natal. No. 53.)

(New Zealand. No. 55.)

(Transvaal. No. 75.)

(Newfoundland. No. 37.)

(Orange River Colony. No. 41.)

(Cape of Good Hope. No. 76.)

(South Africa. No. 95.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 5 March, 1909.

SIR,

IN continuation of my despatch, [No. 425] [No. 209] [No. 184] [No. 290] [No. 246] [No. 434] [No. 164] [No. 607], of the 14th of December last,* I have the honour to transmit to [[Your Excellency] [you], for the information of your Ministers], [South Africa: you, for your information], the accompanying copy of correspondence† with the Governor-General of Canada on the subject of uniformity in the trade statistics of the Empire.

I have, &c.,

CREWE.

14808

No. 61.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1 May, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 8th May, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 192.)

MY LORD,

Montreal, P.Q., Canada, 19 April, 1909.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch, No. 133, of the 3rd ultimo,‡ on the subject of uniformity in the trade statistics of the Empire, I have the honour to forward copy of an approved minute of the Privy Council, from which your Lordship will observe that my responsible advisers are prepared to take steps, during the present year, to obtain declarations from importers showing the countries from which imported goods are consigned to Canada, and to publish import statistics on that basis, and that they will further cause to be included in the Annual Returns of Statistics for the financial year such a summary of imports and exports as is suggested in paragraph 5 of your Lordship's despatch.

I have, &c.,

GREY.

* No. 78 in Dominions No. 7.

† Nos. 80 and 81 in Dominions No. 7.

‡ No. 81 in Dominions No. 7.

Enclosure in No. 61.

CERTIFIED COPY OF A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, APPROVED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL ON THE 16TH APRIL, 1909.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a despatch, dated 3rd March, 1909, from the Right Honourable the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the subject of the uniformity in trade statistics of the Empire.

The Minister of Customs, to whom the despatch was referred, states that steps will be taken during the present year to obtain Customs entries from importers, showing the countries from which imported goods are consigned to Canada, and to cause import statistics to be published on that basis.

The Minister observes that the Department of Customs will also undertake to include in the Annual Volume of Statistics for the financial year a summary of imports and exports under the heads of "Foods," "Raw Materials," and "Manufactured Articles" (not in detail) distinguishing in each category the trade with the United Kingdom, British possessions, and foreign countries.

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Minister of Customs, advise that a copy hereof be transmitted to the Right Honourable the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

VI.

(Resolution XVI): Reciprocity in the matter of Surveyors.

6815

No. 62.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

[Copy to the British South Africa Company, 10 March, 1909. L.F.]

(Canada. No. 140.)	(Western Australia. No. 22.)
(Australia. No. 86.)	(Tasmania. No. 26.)
(Newfoundland. No. 34.)	(New Zealand. No. 51.)
(New South Wales. No. 41.)	(Cape of Good Hope. No. 71.)
(Victoria. No. 24.)	(Natal. No. 49.)
(Queensland. No. 22.)	(Transvaal. No. 72.)
(South Australia. No. 32.)	(Orange River Colony. No. 38.)

MY LORD,

SIR,

Downing Street, 4 March, 1909.

[Canada only. With reference to Your Excellency's despatch, No. 13, of the 12th of January,*]

[With reference to my despatch, No. [362], [153], [91], [70], [67], [61], [51], [52], [173], [227], [186], [319], [127], of the 20th of October last†], I have the honour to transmit to you, to be laid before your Ministers, the accompanying copies of a Memorandum which has been drawn up by the Council of the Surveyors' Institution on the subject of the proposed establishment of reciprocity in matters connected with examination and authorisation of surveyors throughout the Empire.

2. It will be observed that the Surveyors' Institution suggest that with a view to making further progress with the proposal for reciprocity, a Conference of the Surveyors-General of the Colonies concerned should be held at the Surveyors' Institution in London, and His Majesty's Government trust that it will be possible for your Government to accept the suggestion, and to make arrangements for the attendance of one or more representatives.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* 2807: not printed.

† No. 89 in Dominions No. 7.

Enclosure in No. 62.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COUNCIL OF THE SURVEYORS' INSTITUTION comparing respectively the requirements of several Colonial Governments in connection with the authorisation of Surveyors and those of the Institution in connection with the issue of their Special Certificate.

1. In response to a communication from the Secretary of State for the Colonies the Council of the Surveyors' Institution, in March, 1907, supplied a Memorandum on the proposal submitted by the Government of New Zealand on the subject of the reciprocal admission of Surveyors to practise their profession in the various parts of the British Empire.

2. This Memorandum formed the basis of a discussion on the subject at the Colonial Conference held in April, 1907, at which the following resolution was adopted:—

"That it is desirable that reciprocity should be established between the respective Governments and examining authorities throughout the Empire with regard to the examination and authorisation of land Surveyors, and that the Memorandum of the Surveyors' Institution on this subject be commended to the favourable consideration of the several Governments."

3. A copy of this resolution with requests for their co-operation and suggestions having been sent to all the Colonial Governments concerned, it is now possible to see in what manner the regulations affecting Surveyors differ throughout the Empire and at home, and the Council of the Surveyors' Institution have been desired by the Earl of Crewe to place before him such observations as occur to them on the information which has already been furnished them on the subject by his Department.

4. The authorities chiefly concerned in this matter are:—

The Surveyors' Institution, London.

The various Governments of Australasia, including those of New Zealand, Tasmania, Western Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland.

The various Governments of South Africa, which include the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange River Colony, Transvaal, and Rhodesia.

The Government of the Dominion of Canada, and the Governments of the Provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec.

There are several other Colonies which require Surveyors practising to hold licences, but there is reason to hope that in the event of the above examining bodies coming to any reciprocal agreement, the rest of the Colonies will shortly co-operate with them.

5. A copy of the regulations affecting Surveyors, with Syllabus of Examinations, has been received from each of the above-named authorities, from which it is seen that before a Surveyor can obtain his licence he is called upon to observe a number of conditions and to pass several examinations. These differ, in some cases very greatly, but it cannot be doubted that, aided by free discussion, a uniform standard of qualification may be agreed upon.

A Surveyor would then, having taken his diploma in England or one of the Colonies, be eligible to practise in any part of the Empire, subject to an examination in the local land laws and conditions.

6. Existing Regulations.

Among the Australasian Colonies there already exists a great degree of uniformity, and indeed reciprocity, concerning the conditions to be observed by a candidate for a Surveyor's licence, the regulations in these Colonies approximating so nearly that it has been found possible to deal with them collectively. A similar condition happily obtains throughout the South African Colonies, while in Canada, as will be seen later, the case is rather more complicated.

7. Conditions in England.

In the original Memorandum of the Surveyors' Institution the existing conditions are clearly stated. The work of the ordinary English Surveyor differs so

widely from that of his Colonial *confrères* that he does not need to study the higher branches of scientific surveying; and for those whose practice is limited to the British Isles, no change is proposed to be made in the existing qualifying examinations.

The Institution is, however, prepared to grant Special Certificates in the subject of Land Surveying and, in order to place their members on an equal footing with the Government Surveyors in the Colonies, would probably agree to any change in their existing syllabus that would bring it up to the standard imposed elsewhere. The present would be a peculiarly appropriate time to do this, as no candidates have yet presented themselves to be examined for this Special Certificate, although the examination has been established for some years. The reason for this appears to be that such a certificate would not be of great value in England, and would not be recognised in a Colony, the result being that the British Surveyor going abroad prefers to sit for the Colonial examinations direct rather than to waste time in taking a diploma at home which, after all, would be of little use to him.

The existing regulations state that the candidate for a Special Certificate must be a professional member of the Institution. In order to have reached this position he must at least have passed the intermediate and final examinations of the Institution qualifying him for membership.

At the time of election he must not be less than 21 years of age, and either in practice on his own account or employed as an assistant in a Surveyor's office. Although no minimum length of time is specified, the conditions are such that in practice it would be impossible for the young member to sit for a Special Certificate until he had at least three and a half years' experience in a Surveyor's office.

8. Australasian Regulations.

Before being admitted to final examination the candidate is required to comply with the following preliminary regulations, stated briefly:—

- (A) He must not be less than 20 years of age at the time of examination, but cannot receive the licence until he is 21.
- (B) He must have passed an examination equivalent to matriculation at any University recognised by an Australasian University.
- (C) He shall have been professionally employed with a qualified Surveyor for not less than three years (four in some Colonies), two of which must have been in the field.

In place of conditions (B) and (C) he may have taken a degree in civil engineering at any University recognised by an Australasian University, and have been employed in the field for a period of two years with a qualified Surveyor.

- (D) In addition to evidence of service, a candidate must produce a certificate that he is competent from the Surveyor whom he has served.
- (E) He must submit his original plan, field notes, &c., of a survey of an area of not less than 40 acres.

9. South African Regulations.

These are somewhat different from those which obtain in Australasia, inasmuch as there are two distinct examinations to be taken in surveying, the first being theoretical and the second practical. The candidate may not sit for the latter until he has passed the former, and has also acted as an assistant to a Surveyor for two years, 18 months of which must have been in the field.

In order to sit for the theoretical examination it is only necessary to have matriculated at any University recognised by the University of the Cape of Good Hope.

10. Canadian Regulations.

There are three classes of Surveyors in Canada, as follows:—

Provincial Surveyors who are authorised by each of the Provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec, and may only practise within the Province in which they are licensed.

Dominion Surveyors who are authorised by the Government of the Dominion of Canada to make the surveys of the Public Lands of the Dominion.

Dominion Topographical Surveyors who are qualified to conduct extensive governing or topographical surveys and geographic explorations.

The conditions under which a Surveyor may obtain his diploma to practise as a Provincial Surveyor differ considerably in the various Provinces, but are generally about the same as are required in Australasia.

In order to become a Dominion Surveyor direct, the candidate is required to comply with the following regulations:—

- (A) He must pass a preliminary examination of about the usual matriculation standard, which entitles him to become an articled pupil.
- (B) He must then enter into articles with a Dominion Land Surveyor for three years, including 12 months in the field.
- (C) He may then sit for final examination. (Schedule C of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Examiners for Dominion Land Surveyors.)

If a candidate be already a Provincial Surveyor, he may become a Dominion Surveyor by passing one examination (Schedule D), the subjects of which are exactly the same as are required in Schedule C, with the addition of penmanship, orthography, and algebra.

There are also certain privileges granted to graduates in surveying of the Royal Military College and others holding approved diplomas.

The Certificate as Topographical Dominion Surveyor can only be obtained by one who is already a Dominion Surveyor on passing a further and more advanced examination.

11. Final Examinations.

Having described the regulations to be observed by the Surveyor before he may sit for his final examination in the various parts of the Empire, it will be necessary to review briefly the range of subjects and the standard of qualification imposed at these examinations.

(A) *The Surveyors' Institution.*—The syllabus of the Special Certificate for surveying and levelling is at present as follows:—

Surveying.—General principles. Surveying with chain alone. Construction of lines. Surveying across obstacles. Traversing with chain alone. Traversing with angular instruments. Plotting by latitude and departure. Plane table and telemeter surveying. Staking out centre line of railways. Tunnels on curve or straight. Town surveying. General use and adjustment of surveying instruments. Trigonometrical surveying. Plotting, copying, enlarging, and reducing maps. Large scale surveys for special works (such as bridges, stations, &c.). Setting out side widths. Computing land quantities. Route and expeditionary surveying. Harbour, coast, river, and general marine surveying. Latitudes and longitudes. Practical surveying in the field.

Levelling.—General principles. Adjustment of instruments. Trial and check levelling and making of cross sections. Levelling with angular instruments. Levelling with barometer, hypsometer, &c. Grading sections. Contouring and preparation of sections generally. Computing earthwork quantities. Practical work in the field.

(B) *The Australasian Colonies.*—The syllabus of the examination presented by each Colony being very similar, that of New Zealand is given below to show the standard required in Australasia.

Mathematics.—Plane and spherical trigonometry, geometry, and algebra, as far as these subjects are applicable to surveying.

Computations.—Triangulation, including quadrilateral, polygonal, and ray-trace computations. Reduction of traverses. Computations connected with the setting out of roads and curves. Adjustment of discrepancies in surveys. Computations of areas, including such as have irregular and curved boundaries.

Principles and Practice of Surveying.—Details of field practice, including the keeping of field notes. Topographical surveying. Cutting off given areas. Re-determination of boundaries. Laying out roads. Setting out curves. Plotting from field notes. Stadia surveying.

Barometric and other measurements of heights. Surveys under the "Land Transfer Act, 1885."

Candidates may be required to make surveys under the supervision of the Board.

Engineering Surveys.—Levelling, grading, and measurement of earthworks, including practical tests.

Surveying Instruments.—Principles of construction, adjustment, and use of the following instruments:—Theodolite, tacheometer, telemeter, plane table, sextant, level, compass, clinometer, barometer, thermometer, steel measuring band, pantograph, eidograph, and planimeter.

Field Astronomy, Geodesy, &c.—Determination of latitude, azimuth, and time. Reduction of star places. Elementary geodesy, including spherical excess and convergence of meridians. Declination of the magnetic needle.

Drawing.—General plan drawing. Compilation of plans. Drawing of sections and contours. Projection of maps and charts.

Miscellaneous.—Elementary physics, elementary geology, and elementary forestry.

Practical and *viva voce* Examinations.—Practical astronomy and levelling. Use and adjustment of surveying instruments. *Viva voce* examination in methods of field practice and in knowledge of the laws relating to surveys and of the Survey Regulations.

(c) *The South African Colonies*.—As noticed previously, the examination in these Colonies consists of two distinct parts. The purely theoretical portion may be taken as soon as the candidate likes after he has matriculated, while he may not sit for the latter until a considerable amount of actual practice has been obtained in the field.

EXAMINATION IN THE THEORY OF LAND SURVEYING.

This consists of two parts, as follows:—

Part I.—(a) Algebra.

(b) Geometry.

(c) Plane trigonometry and mensuration.

Part II.—(a) Spherical trigonometry and astronomy.

(b) Co-ordinate geometry and differential calculus.

(c) Theory of surveying.

(d) Optics and heat.

EXAMINATION IN PRACTICAL LAND SURVEYING.

This consists of three parts, as follows:—

PART I.

(a) (1) Methods for the determination of azimuth latitude, time, and longitude.

(2) Computation of azimuths, latitudes, and longitudes from the data of astronomical observations or from the data of known points.

(3) Projection of maps.

(b) (1) Methods of base measurement and the application of corrections.

(2) Methods of overcoming difficulties in the field, and reduction of small errors of position.

(3) Computation of co-ordinates and of the areas of figures from the co-ordinates of their angular points, and of areas bounded by curves.

(4) Plotting co-ordinates and taking out areas by planimeter.

(c) (1) Method of observation of angles, horizontal and vertical, and the application of corrections.

(2) Computation of a geodetic triangulation (principal and secondary), and the computation and reduction of a traverse.

(3) Elements of geology as found in Jas. Geikie's "Structural and Field geology."

(4) Physics, light, and heat, as found in D. E. Jones's class books.

(d) (1) Construction, manipulation, and adjustment of all surveying instruments.

(2) Computations of heights and reductions of level observations.

(3) Setting out curves, laying out roads, making cross sections, and calculation of quantities.

PART II.

The laws and regulations appertaining to the survey, registration, and transfer of lands within the Colony.

PART III.

Trial survey.

(d) *Canada*.—The final examination for Dominion Land Surveyor (Schedule C) consists of the following subjects:—

Plane geometry.

Solid geometry.

Spherical trigonometry.

Measurements of areas, and sub-division of land.

Descriptions for deeds.

Astronomy (including observing).

Practical surveying.

Manual of Surveys and Dominion Lands' Surveys Acts.

The Dominion Topographical Surveyors' examination (Schedule E) is a very severe one, the subjects being as follows:—

PART I.

Algebra.

Plane and spherical trigonometry.

Analytical geometry.

Descriptive geometry and projections.

Differential and integral calculus.

Probability and least squares.

PART II.

Geodesy.

Astronomy.

System of Dominion land surveys; topographical and exploratory surveys.

Theory, construction, and adjustment of instruments.

Gravity and terrestrial magnetism.

Meteorology, geology, and mineralogy.

12. Comparison.

Having briefly outlined the regulations and standards of efficiency required by the examining bodies, a comparison is now possible, and it is obvious that the tests imposed by the South African Colonies are more stringent than those required by Australasia or by Canada (excluding the Topographical Certificate), which in turn are both of a higher standard than is at present required for the Special Certificate of the Surveyors' Institution.

Both Australasia and South Africa require that the candidate must first of all matriculate at a recognised University, while to become a Dominion Surveyor in Canada he must sit for a special examination of about the same standard.

In addition to this, South Africa imposes a very severe test in subjects, chiefly, of course, mathematical, which cover the purely theoretical side of surveying.

Having complied with the preliminary conditions referred to at length earlier in this Memorandum, and having served the necessary time with an admitted Surveyor, a Colonial candidate is at liberty to sit for the final examination.

A comparison of the syllabi of the written examinations shows that, as already intimated, the standard set by South Africa for a licence to practise is considerably higher than is required by either Australasia or Canada, both in theory and practice. While in the latter States the mathematics specified are comparatively elementary, the former exact a much deeper knowledge. The Cape also lays very great stress on co-ordinate surveying, which subject is treated lightly in Australasia and Canada.

Each Colony requires an actual survey to be made as a part of the final examination, and here again the tests imposed are severer in the case of South Africa than elsewhere.

That the South African States are fully aware that theirs is a very high standard is shown by their Ministers' Minutes to Governors on this subject, in all of which they are emphatic that, although they have no objection to making the examination in the theory of land surveying as uniform as possible throughout the Empire, the standard of such examination must not be lowered.

They regard the practical tests, moreover, as being very necessary, owing to the considerable difference between the methods of surveying employed by them and the other Colonies; and they still require the minimum two years' practical experience with a South African admitted Surveyor.

The Australasian Colonies also jealously safeguard the interests of their Surveyors, and this is evidenced by the resolutions carried at the Conference of representatives from the Surveyors' Boards of Australia and New Zealand, held in Sydney in April, 1908.

At this meeting, although the motion 1 (a) on the order paper: "That this Conference endorses the Imperial Conference resolution on reciprocity" was carried unanimously, the motions 1 (b), 1 (c), and 1 (d), which aimed to give effect to the resolution, were unanimously withdrawn.

It is important that the terms of these unsupported motions should not be overlooked. They are as follows:—

- 1 (b) That it is desirable that a Conference be arranged between Canada, South Africa, and Australasia to consider the above resolution, and devise means of giving effect thereto.
- 1 (c) That an Imperial Diploma issue on passing a special examination, the syllabus and papers to be drawn up by a Committee consisting of representatives from Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, and one from England.
- 1 (d) That this examination be open to all who hold local licences.

The various examining bodies in Canada appear to be particularly careful of the interests of their own admitted Surveyors, no Provincial Surveyor apparently even being allowed to practise in another Province until he has passed its final examination.

The clause of the Dominion Lands Act under which Surveyors from His Majesty's Dominions, other than Canada, would come up for final examination after one year's service as pupil with a Dominion Land Surveyor, was repealed only last year. The views indicated by the revocation of that concession were corroborated at the meeting of the Corporation of Land Surveyors of the Province of Quebec, who, at a special meeting in December last, declared very definitely against any proposals of reciprocity.

It will thus be seen that, although some of the Colonies appear to welcome the idea of reciprocity, they are all very jealous of the present high status of their Surveyors, and therefore hesitate to risk any practical action in the matter.

13. Conclusion.

In view of the foregoing, it seems that no great progress can be possible until each Colony is satisfied—

- 1st. That the interests of its admitted Surveyors will not be jeopardised;
- 2nd. That the standard of its existing examinations, &c., will at least not be lowered; and
- 3rd. That the other Colonies and England will reciprocate equally.

It seems almost impossible that this result can be achieved unless a Conference of the Surveyors-General of the Colonies be held on the lines of the motions withdrawn at Sydney. At such a Conference, which might conveniently meet at the Surveyors' Institution in London, all the subjects might be discussed, and more done in a week to arrive at a settlement than could be accomplished by years of correspondence.

If such a meeting could be arranged, the chief points to strive for would

probably be the following, which would apply reciprocally throughout the Empire:—

- (a) That a candidate must have matriculated at some recognised University, or passed an equivalent examination.
- (b) That an examination in the theory of land surveying be then taken, the standard of this examination to be as high as that now in force in South Africa.
- (c) That the candidate be then required to pass an examination in practical surveying, and that he be ineligible to sit for this final examination until he has had at least two years' experience with a practising Surveyor.

These tests having been complied with, each Colony or group of Colonies would be at liberty, before giving a licence to practise, to insist on the Surveyor passing an examination in the law and regulations appertaining to the survey, registration, and transfer of lands within the Colony, and to make a trial survey.
January, 1909.

COLONIAL OFFICE NOTE.—In reply to the Secretary of State's despatch of the 4th March, the Government of *Canada* stated that they would send to any Conference which might be held the Surveyor-General of the Dominion and that the Provincial Governments chiefly concerned would also be invited to send representatives. The Governments of *New Zealand* and the *Australian States* made arrangements to be jointly represented at the Conference by two delegates. The Governor of the *Transvaal* reported, in a despatch of 18th December, that his Ministers were endeavouring to convene a meeting of Surveyors-General of the four *South African Colonies* and *Southern Rhodesia* for February, 1910, for the purpose of discussing the proposed establishment of reciprocity in matters connected with the examination and authorisation of surveyors and also for the selection of a representative to attend the proposed Conference in London. The Government of *Newfoundland* stated that they did not desire to be represented at such a Conference.

VII.

(Resolution XIX.): Naturalization.

9293

No. 63.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 17 March, 1909.)

(No. 14.)

MY LORD, Government House, St. John's, 2 March, 1909.
REFERRING to your despatch, No. 167, of date 9th November last,* covering draft of proposed Imperial legislation in connection with the naturalization of aliens, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter from the Colonial Secretary forwarding a copy of a report by the Minister of Justice on the subject.

I have, &c.,
WM. MACGREGOR.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Colonial Secretary's Office, St. John's, Newfoundland,

February 16, 1909.

SIR,

REFERRING to despatch, No. 167, of date 9th November, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, covering draft of proposed Imperial legislation on the subject of the naturalization of aliens, I have the honour to enclose copy of report of the Minister of Justice in reference to the same. There is no objection to the terms of the draft, provided that it is understood that the Act will not interfere in any way with the terms of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1906, or with the right or power of the Legislature of this Colony to adopt any legislation regarding immigrants, irrespective of allegiance, which may from time to time be deemed desirable. If any such result should accrue from the adoption of the

* No. 90 in Dominions No. 7.

proposed draft of Imperial legislation, it is suggested that the Act should only apply to any particular Colony upon a request preferred by the Legislature of such Colony.

Should further discussion of the question be found necessary, the same might be taken up with the Minister of Justice of this Colony.

I beg to return herewith to Your Excellency the original despatch under reference.

His Excellency

Sir Wm. MacGregor, G.C.M.G., C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.

I have, &c.,

R. BOND,
Colonial Secretary.

Attorney-General's Office, St. John's, Newfoundland,

31 December, 1908.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to return under cover herewith despatch, No. 167, of date November 9th, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, covering report of an Interdepartmental Committee, having annexed thereto draft of proposed Imperial legislation on the subject of the naturalization of aliens, forwarded to me under cover of your letter of December 3rd. I have examined the said report and draft, and in view of the fact that it leaves unaltered the local naturalization with which alone the Legislature of this Colony can deal, I see no objection to complying with the request of the Secretary of State, provided, however, that in doing so it is not to be understood that the Act will interfere in any way with the terms of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1906, or the right or power of the Legislature of this Colony to adopt any legislation regarding immigrants, irrespective of allegiance which may from time to time be deemed desirable. The general principles of the law relating to the status and naturalization of aliens as it exists in the United Kingdom to-day is not materially amended by the proposed legislation. It consists merely of an effort to create a uniform system of naturalization for the Empire, and to give the naturalized person, wherever naturalized within the Empire, under the Act, his status as a British subject. It is especially a subject proper for Imperial legislation, provided that it does not interfere with the liberty of the self-governing Colonies to confer upon aliens within the jurisdiction of such Colony the status of a British subject, or to exclude from its territory undesirable immigrants. The draft, as I read it, does neither of these, and there can be no objection to it, provided the enactment of the draft will not be made a pretext for refusing the Royal Assent to legislation which may be made to exclude from the territory of any Colony persons naturalized in any other Colony, but who, in the particular Colony, may be regarded as undesirable immigrants. If any such result should accrue from the adoption of the proposed draft as Imperial legislation I would suggest that the Act should only apply to any particular Colony upon a request preferred by the Legislature of such Colony, and upon such request being preferred provision might be made whereby the Act founded on the said draft would be made applicable to such Colony by order of His Majesty in Council.

I have, &c.,

J. M. KENT,
His Majesty's Attorney-General.

A. Mews, Esquire,

Deputy Colonial Secretary.

10750

No. 64.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 27 March, 1909.)

(No. 34.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, 8 March, 1909.

WITH reference to the contents of your Lordship's despatch, No. 141, of the 9th November last,* dealing with a proposal made at the Colonial Conference of 1907, regarding the question of Naturalisation within His Majesty's Dominions, I have the honour to state that, having submitted your despatch to Ministers, I am informed by them that "whilst in theory they have nothing to urge against the proposals with regard to naturalisation in the Empire contained in Orange River Colony despatch, No. 141, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for

* No. 90 in Dominions No. 7.

the Colonies, the matter appears to them to be one of such importance in its possible and, indeed, probable practical results in regard to the grave questions that might and probably would arise out of the adoption of a uniform policy for the Empire, regardless of local difficulties and dangers, that they do not feel justified in pledging the Orange River Colony in this matter at the present juncture. Ministers would, therefore, prefer to leave the question open for consideration by a Union Parliament of South Africa when constituted."

I have, &c.,

HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS,
Governor.

18079

No. 65.

TRANSVAAL.

THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 29 May, 1909.)

(No. 139.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Johannesburg, 8th May, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 9th November, No. 372,* I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a Minute from Ministers on the subject of the draft Naturalisation Bill.

I have, &c.,

METHUEN,
Deputy Governor.

Enclosure in No. 65.

MINISTERS to GOVERNOR.

(Minute. No. 202.)

Prime Minister's Office, Pretoria, 7th May, 1909.

Ministers have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency the Deputy Governor's Minute, No. 16/5/08, of the 3rd December, 1908, covering copy of despatch, No. 372, dated 9th November, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, relative to the report of the Inter-departmental Committee on the draft Naturalisation Bill.

2. Ministers have given their consideration to that report and to the suggested amendments to the Bill, but delayed replying to the despatch while the Convention was sitting for the purpose of discussing the Union of the South African Colonies.

3. Ministers feel that, in the event of South African Union becoming an established fact in the near future, the subject of naturalisation of aliens within the Union would become a matter for the earnest consideration of the Union Parliament, especially as the laws of the South African Colonies on the subject of naturalisation of aliens differ considerably. With these considerations in view, Ministers are unable at the present time to express any definite opinion on the report of the Inter-departmental Committee or the amendment of the draft Bill, or to give any authority to the Agent-General to discuss the question.

4. Ministers feel sure that the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies will appreciate their position. At the same time, they desire to express their own appreciation of the consideration given by the Inter-departmental Committee to the suggestions put forward by General Botha at the Imperial Conference of 1907.

JACOB DE VILLIERS.

18841

No. 66.

NATAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5 June, 1909.)

(No. 76.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Pietermaritzburg, Natal, 10th May, 1909.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch, No. 205, dated the 9th November,

* No. 90 in Dominions No. 7.

1908,* dealing with the draft of a Bill to consolidate and amend the enactments relating to Naturalisation, British nationality, and the status of aliens, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a minute from Ministers, dated the 5th instant, in which they suggest that from the point of view of the South African Colonies it would be better that the proposed discussion with the view of arriving at a final agreement as to the terms of the draft should be postponed pending the Colonies entering into Union.

I have, &c.,
M. NATHAN.

Enclosure in No. 66.

MINUTE.

ACTING PRIME MINISTER to HIS EXCELLENCY.

Ministers regret that there has been so much delay in dealing with the Secretary of State's despatch of the 9th November last, but they have hesitated to enter upon this important subject pending the result of the proposals for the closer union of the British Colonies of South Africa.

In view of the possibility of the Colonies entering into union, the question of the naturalisation of aliens will pre-eminently be one to be decided by the central Government rather than that the individual Colonies should deal with it at the present time. It will be noticed that the draft South Africa Act, prepared by the Convention, provides (Section 139) that persons of European descent who have been naturalized in any of the Colonies shall be deemed to be naturalized throughout the Union, and this makes it the more desirable that no legislation should be undertaken by this Colony whilst the question of union is unsettled.

For this reason no instructions have been given to the Agent-General as regards any of the matters raised by the Committee's report, and unless delay is likely to cause serious inconvenience it appears to Ministers that from the point of view of the South African Colonies it would be better that the discussion should be postponed.

If, however, it is decided that a further Conference should be held, Ministers would wish to consult the Governments of the other South African Colonies before the issue of any instructions to the Agent-General.

C. O'GRADY GUBBINS,
Acting Prime Minister.

5 May, 1909.

18841

No. 67.

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL and GOVERNOR.

(Australia. No. 217.)

(New Zealand. No. 119.)

(Canada. No. 394.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 11 June, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. [386] [188] [678], of the 9th of November last,* I have the honour to request [Your Excellency] [you] to inform your Ministers that I should be glad to receive their observations regarding the proposed Conference to discuss the terms of the draft Bill to consolidate and amend the enactments relating to naturalisation.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* No. 90 in Dominions No. 7.

19514

No. 68.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 12 June, 1909.)

[Acknowledged 24 June, 1909. No. 183.]

(No. 100.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Cape Town, 26th May, 1909.

I FORWARD, for your consideration, a minute from Ministers, transmitting a resolution adopted by the South African Naturalization Reform Association, and a press report of an interview between a Deputation from the Association and the Prime Minister.

I have, &c.,
WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 68.

MINISTERS to GOVERNOR.

(Minute. No. 1/186.)

Prime Minister's Office, Cape Town, 15th May, 1909.

With reference to discussions that took place at the Conference of Premiers held in London in 1907 on the question of "naturalization throughout the Empire," Ministers have the honour to forward, in original, for transmission to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a resolution adopted on the 15th April, 1909, by the South African Naturalization Reform Association, together with a press cutting giving a report of an interview granted to a deputation from this Association by the Prime Minister of Cape Colony.

JOHN X. MERRIMAN.

NATURALIZATION REFORM ASSOCIATION.

Council Chambers, Old Town House, Cape Town, 15th April, 1909.

Resolutions.

(1.) That this meeting strongly supports the resolution moved by the Government of New Zealand, of the Premiers' Conference held in London in 1907, which reads as follows:—

"That the law as to naturalization should be uniform throughout the Empire, and that naturalization wherever granted should be Imperial and not local, subject, however, to the rights of any self-governing dependency to impose conditions if they should think fit."

(2.) That in consequence of this Association having ascertained the views of the Cape Government on the question of naturalization, as a result of a deputation that waited on the Prime Minister of this Colony on the 16th March last, this Association is fully in accord with the Resolution moved by the Cape Government at the same Conference in the same year, which reads as follows:—

"This Conference is of opinion that in order to remove anomalies attached to the naturalization of aliens throughout the Empire, His Majesty's Government should, after full consultation with the Colonies, take steps to secure Imperial legislation providing for the treatment of the question on a uniform basis."

(3.) That this resolution, supporting the resolutions moved by the Governments of the Cape and New Zealand, be submitted to the Prime Minister of this Colony, for transmission to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with a view to having the bill introduced by the Honourable H. Gladstone, as to making of the law of naturalization uniform, carried into effect at the earliest opportunity.

J. PETERSEN,
President.

M. SIFF,
Honorary Secretary.

Enclosure 2 in No. 68.

"CAPE TIMES," Wednesday, March 17, 1909.

NATURALISATION QUESTIONS.

DEPUTATION TO THE PREMIER.

BRITISH PROTECTION.

A deputation waited upon the Prime Minister (the Honourable J. X. Merriman) yesterday morning representing the Naturalisation Reform Association, for the purpose of bringing to his notice certain grievances at present existing. The deputation consisted of Mr. J. W. Jagger, M.L.A., the Honourable Dr. J. Petersen, M.L.C., the Reverend A. P. Bender, Mr. H. Liberman, Dr. Forsyth, Messrs. I. Friedlander, M. Siff (honorary secretary), S. Saharin, L. Pinn, S. Schaspolski, I. Ochberg, E. Palley, J. Zuckerman, B. Brown, and P. Policanski.

Dr. PETERSEN, in introducing the deputation, said that the grievance of which they complained was that, whilst they were naturalised and full British subjects in the Cape, yet as soon as they went to the Transvaal, they lost the protection of the British Government, and the same held good if they went to Australia. They accordingly asked the Colonial Government to initiate a movement which would give them the full privileges of all born British subjects.

Mr. JAGGER said that there was no doubt that that matter of the naturalisation law was extremely unsatisfactory. A man might be naturalised in the Cape Colony, but that would only cover him so far as the Cape Colony was concerned. Of course, they had put that right in the draft Constitution, under which naturalisation in the one colony covered the whole of South Africa. But the old state of affairs still existed as regarded Great Britain or any other part of the British dominions. He might perhaps remind them that at the Imperial Conference in 1907 a draft Bill on that subject was submitted for the consideration of the Conference, which, however, adopted the following resolution bearing on the subject, viz.: "That with a view to attain uniformity, so far as practicable, an inquiry should be held to consider further the question of naturalisation, and, in particular, to consider how far, and under what conditions, naturalisation in one part of His Majesty's Dominions should be effective in other parts of those Dominions, a subsidiary Conference to be held, if necessary, under the terms of the resolution adopted by this Conference on the 20th April last." A minute on the subject was on record from the Attorney-General.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Which one?

Mr. JAGGER: Mr. Sampson, expressing the opinions of the Government of the day on the matter. Proceeding, the honourable gentleman pointed out that naturalisation in Great Britain covered all the Empire, but a man had to be five years in residence in that country, and he had to state that he intended to reside in Great Britain. The consequence was, as Mr. Gladstone had pointed out, that they debarred a man from going to the colonies, which was not at all a satisfactory state of affairs. Under the Bill which the Imperial Government drew up, they proposed to do away with that, and they only required a certificate from the applicant that he was going to reside within the British Dominions. Broadly speaking, the Bill of the Imperial Government was not so stringent as ours; it was generally felt that a considerable grievance existed, and they accordingly asked the Prime Minister to press upon the Imperial Government the desirability of taking some steps in the matter.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Press it upon our own Government; let us get a resolution through our own Parliament. I don't like the Imperial Parliament legislating for us.

Mr. JAGGER: That is what General Botha said; they won't legislate for us.

Mr. MERRIMAN: But they do legislate in some things, and very unfortunately so. (Laughter.)

Mr. JAGGER: I think they were very clear that they did not want to impose legislation on the colonies.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Then you have reciprocity, and we may have very awkward people coming in.

Mr. JAGGER: I quite agree that you would have to be extremely careful.

Mr. MERRIMAN: We know where we are in South Africa, and shortly, I hope, when we get Union, we shall all be one; but when you ask us to pass legislation by which Australia can allow anyone they choose to come in here—why?

Mr. JAGGER: They are more strict in Australia than we are. Proceeding, the honourable member suggested that, on behalf of the Government, the Prime Minister should again bring the matter to the notice of the Imperial Government, and endeavour to push the matter forward.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I have no objection to that, but if you ask that there should be reciprocity between, as the saying goes, Tom, Dick, and Harry all over the world, I think it requires very great consideration. We know what we are about here. We are prepared to let our people here who have been naturalised go anywhere, but to receive other people—

Dr. PETERSEN said he thought Mr. Jagger was perhaps going a little too far; what their people wanted was protection, in case they left the Colony. They left this country, and went to England or to Russia, and they had no protection from the British Government; they could rely upon no one. They wanted the British Government to protect them when they were travelling.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Yes; there is some sense in that. (Laughter.)

Mr. LIBERMAN said he thought they wanted the same right wherever they went in the British dominions.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Well, if you do that, you have to have reciprocity; I do not say it is not a good thing, but we should have to very carefully consider it.

Mr. BENDER said that they understood that under the Constitution one grievance was already remedied—that was to say, that a citizen of this colony would be a citizen of South Africa.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Yes, yes.

Mr. BENDER: That is one thing we are grateful for.

Mr. LIBERMAN said he was a naturalised British subject, and when he was travelling he did not know whether he should be protected by the British Government or not; and sometimes he might have been in difficulties. He thought it was necessary that a man who was naturalised in England should have the same rights when he went to the colonies. There was no doubt that by reciprocity they should get undesirable people, but they could not stop them as it was.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Well, we try. (Laughter.)

Mr. LIBERMAN thought it would be a mutual advantage that they might have the same right throughout the dominions of Great Britain.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Well, I will inquire what the Imperial Government are doing, and mention about this business of protection for travellers, and see what they suggest.

The deputation, having expressed its thanks to the Prime Minister, then withdrew.

Annexure to No. 68.

Mr. J. X. MERRIMAN to COLONIAL OFFICE.

DEAR MR. JUST,

Brown's Hotel, London, W., 25 August, 1909.

THANK you for your note* about naturalisation. I can quite see all the difficulties. What I meant to imply by my remarks about Imperial legislation was not any objection to the right—which is obvious—or to the necessity, which is equally plain, if anything is to be done at all, but to the imposition of any uniform rule which might be found to be unpleasant. There are exceptions, but as a rule the class that is vocal is not one that is greatly beloved by other colonists.

Believe me, &c.,

JOHN X. MERRIMAN.

H. W. Just, Esq.,
Colonial Office,
Downing Street.

VIII.

Naval Defence.

10080

No. 69.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10.30 a.m., 22 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 3 in Dominions No. 13.]

My telegram of 22nd March.† Am desired by Prime Minister state that it would be necessary for New Zealand Government to obtain legislation for raising loan required, and that, meanwhile, any advance for building warship will require to be made by British Government, and any money which British Government expends before meeting of Parliament would be taken over as part of New Zealand contribution.—PLUNKET.

10042

No. 70.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

SIR,

Downing Street, 22 March, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the

* Not printed.

† No. 1 in Dominions No. 13.

Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copies of telegrams* from the Governor of New Zealand conveying the offer of his Government to bear the cost of the immediate construction and armament of a battleship of the latest type.

2. Lord Crewe has addressed to Lord Plunket in reply the telegram† of which a copy is enclosed.

3. Lord Crewe would be glad to learn what reply should, in the opinion of their Lordships, be returned to the most generous offer of the Dominion Government.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

10145

No. 71.

NEW ZEALAND.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, 24th March, 1909.

MR. CATHCART WASON asked the Prime Minister if he had received an offer from the New Zealand Government to provide one or, if necessary, two "Dreadnoughts" for national defence; and, if so, had he accepted the offer.

MR. FELL asked the Prime Minister if he had received any offer from the Government of New Zealand to provide one or two battleships for the defence of the Empire; and, if so, what answer he had given to such offer.

THE PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith), answering both questions together, said: The following telegrams have passed between the Governor of New Zealand and my noble friend, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Perhaps I had better read them‡ to the House:—[Governor's telegram of 22nd March and Secretary of State's telegraphic replies of 22nd and 24th March.]

10457

No. 72.

NEW ZEALAND.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, 29th March, 1909.

MR. FELL asked the Prime Minister if the offer of the New Zealand Government to contribute one or two battleships was an offer to furnish additional ships for the greater safety of the Empire, and not an offer to build ships for us next year in place of those which would in the ordinary course be included in the Estimates.

THE PRIME MINISTER said: The terms of the offer, which, I venture to think, speaks for itself, have been communicated to the House. But I would refer the Honourable Member to the telegram which appears in this morning's papers from the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

10630

No. 73.

NEW ZEALAND.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, 29th March, 1909.

MAJOR ANSTRUTHER-GRAY asked the Prime Minister whether he had any further information that he could give the House with regard to the offer of the Dominion of New Zealand.

THE PRIME MINISTER said: No, Sir, beyond what is contained in the important and very gratifying telegram§ from Sir Joseph Ward to which I have already referred.

* No. 1 in Dominions No. 13 and No. 69.
† Nos. 1 to 3 in Dominions No. 13.

‡ No. 2 in Dominions No. 13.
§ No. 1 in Dominions No. 13.

10940

No. 74.

AUSTRALIA.

THE COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 30 March, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 86.]

SIR,

72, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W., 29 March, 1909.

WITH regard to the construction of torpedo boat destroyers being built to the order of the Commonwealth Government by Messrs. Fairfield and Denny Brothers at Glasgow, I have the honour to request that the permission of the Admiralty be obtained for the Commonwealth Government to make use of the Admiralty system of burning oil fuel and other secret fittings.

I have, &c.,

R. MUIRHEAD COLLINS,

Representative of the Commonwealth
in London.

11178

No. 75.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 8.40 a.m., 31st March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by Nos. 84 and 88.]

Government of Commonwealth have placed an order with Denny Brothers and Fairfield, in association, for the construction of two torpedo boat destroyers, to be delivered in England complete, and one to be erected there and taken to pieces for shipment to Australia. Full particulars of class will be furnished by Commonwealth Representative in London. Professor Biles has been engaged as naval architect in connection with this work. Prime Minister of Commonwealth informs me that Commonwealth Government will be much obliged if Lords Commissioners of Admiralty will render any assistance and supply to the Commonwealth Representative in London any necessary confidential information in connection with the construction of these vessels which may be considered desirable.—DUDLEY.

10874

No. 76.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

SIR,

Downing Street, 31 March, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 22nd of March,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copy of telegraphic correspondence† with the Governor of New Zealand on the subject of the proposed gift of a battleship by the Dominion Government to His Majesty's Government.

2. Lord Crewe will be glad to receive, as soon as practicable, a full expression of the views of their Lordships in regard to the further communication to be made to the Government of New Zealand.

I am, &c.,

H. W. JUST.

* No. 70.

† Nos. 3 and 6 in Dominions No. 13.

11178

No. 77.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

[Answered by No. 79.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 1 April, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of a telegram* from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, and of a letter† from Captain R. M. Collins on the subject of the construction of two destroyers for the Commonwealth Government.

2. Lord Crewe would be glad to learn what reply should, in their Lordships' opinion, be returned to the Governor-General and to Captain Collins.

I am, &c.,

H. W. JUST.

11710

No. 78.

NEW SOUTH WALES: VICTORIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

SIR,

Downing Street, 7 April, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to forward, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of telegraphic correspondence,‡ as noted in the margin, respecting the desire of the Governments of New South Wales and Victoria to contribute their share of the cost of a battleship.

Acting Governor, New South Wales,
4 April.
Governor, Victoria, 5 April.
To Governors, Victoria and New South
Wales, 7 April.

I am, &c.,

H. W. JUST.

12944

No. 79.

AUSTRALIA.

ADMIRALTY to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received April 17, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 85.]

SIR,

Admiralty, 16 April, 1909.

I HAVE laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 1st April, No. 11178,§ forwarding copies of a telegram from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, and of a letter from Captain R. M. Collins on the subject of the construction of certain destroyers by the Commonwealth Government.

My Lords desire me to state, in reply, that they will readily give every assistance in their power to the Commonwealth Government in connection with the construction of the torpedo boat destroyers contracts for which have been placed with ship-building firms in this country.

Their Lordships will give instructions to their overseers to inspect the boiler tubes for these destroyers at the tube makers' works, and also for the inspection of the armament of the vessels. Information will also be supplied as to the specifications of the guns for these destroyers and of the torpedo tubes. They further give their permission to the Commonwealth Government to make use of the Admiralty system of burning oil fuel, and as regards other secret fittings the Admiralty will be prepared to consider specific applications for the use of such fittings as Captain Collins may desire to embody in the destroyers.

In all cases, however, where confidential information is given, or secret fittings are permitted to be used, an undertaking must be given that no information is allowed to pass into the possession of persons other than the accredited representa-

* No. 75. † No. 74. ‡ Nos. 8 and 9 in Dominions No. 13. § No. 77.

tives of officers of the Commonwealth Government, and that this Government will undertake, in view of the importance of the interests involved, to require from its officers the strictest obligation to observe secrecy. Great care is taken in the case of the Navy, and their Lordships would necessarily hesitate to afford assistance of this kind if there were any danger of a disclosure to improper persons of details which they consider of the first importance.

The question of the supply of fittings for wireless telegraphy is being enquired into. It is not certain whether the agreement with the Marconi Company leaves the Admiralty an entirely free hand in dealing with the matter.

My Lords desire me to take this opportunity of drawing attention to the fact that no reply has yet been received from the Commonwealth Government to Admiralty letter of 20th August, 1908,* on the general question of the establishment of a Naval Defence Force by the Commonwealth Government for service in their own waters. In the absence of any communication they assume that the destroyers now ordered will form part of the existing Colonial Naval Force, and are not intended as the commencement of a new force under the conditions previously discussed.

I am, &c.,

C. I. THOMAS.

12859

No. 80.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

SIR,

Downing Street, 16 April, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with reference to your letter of the 7th of October,† copy of a telegram‡ from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the subject of the naval forces of Australia.

2. I am also to enclose copy of a telegram§ which Lord Crewe has sent in reply to Lord Dudley's telegram.

3. Their Lordships will observe that in effect the proposals now made by the Commonwealth Government as to the control of the naval forces of the Commonwealth concede everything desired by the Admiralty. The proposal (7) in effect carries out the wishes of the Admiralty, and as will be seen from the letter from this office of the 7th of September last,|| claims, in his Lordship's opinion, less for the Australian Government than might legally be claimed.

4. Lord Crewe will be glad of a very early intimation of the views of their Lordships on the present proposals, which do not involve the curtailment of the operation of the present naval agreement, and so obviate the necessity of reference to the Government of New Zealand.

I am, &c.,

H. W. JUST.

13229

No. 81.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9 a.m., 19 April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 82.]

(Paraphrase.)

My telegram of 15 April,‡ transmitting the proposals of Australian Government as to Naval Defence policy. I think it well to remind your Lordship that owing to the unsettled condition of politics here no great reliance should be placed on these proposals as a final expression of Australian opinion. The proposals have no Parliamentary sanction as yet, and a change of Government might involve considerable

* No. 35 in [Cd. 4325] October, 1908. † 36077: not printed. ‡ No. 10 in Dominions No. 13.
§ No. 11 in Dominions No. 13. || No. 98 in Dominions No. 7.

modification of details. I am sending by mail despatch on subject. I see that the London press have published extracts from scheme. Can you inform me by telegraph whether Imperial Government authorised publication?—DUDLEY.

13229

No. 82.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 6 p.m., 19th April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram 19th April.* Imperial Government has not authorised publication of information about naval scheme which appeared in London Press.—CREWE.

13229

No. 83.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

(Confidential.)

SIR, Downing Street, 20 April, 1909.
In continuation of the letter from this office of the 16th of April,† I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copy of a telegram* from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the subject of the proposals of his Ministers as to Naval Defence policy.

2. It is, of course, the case, as pointed out by Lord Dudley, that the proposals now made by Mr. Fisher have not received the authority of Parliament, and that they may be largely modified if a change of Government occurs. On the other hand, they must be taken to represent for the time being the considered policy of the Commonwealth, and Lord Crewe would therefore be glad to receive an early intimation of their Lordships' views on the scheme.

3. It is, of course, possible that the scheme may be supplemented, when the Parliament of the Commonwealth meets, by a resolution based on the proposal of the States of New South Wales and Victoria to contribute a battleship to the Imperial Navy, but it is not probable that any such resolution would interfere with the determination of the Commonwealth Government to proceed with the construction of a small Australian flotilla, probably of torpedo destroyers.

4. I am to enclose a copy of a telegram‡ which has been sent to the Governor-General in reply to the last paragraph of his telegram.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

12944

No. 84.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 2.25 p.m., 20 April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram, 31 March.§ Lords Commissioners, Admiralty, will render assistance requested, and I am in communication with Captain Collins on matter. Despatch|| follows by next mail.—CREWE.

* No. 81. † No. 80. ‡ No. 82. § No. 75. || No. 88.

12944

No. 85.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

SIR, Downing Street, 21 April, 1909.
I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th of April,* on the subject of the construction of certain destroyers by the Commonwealth Government.

2. With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, I am to refer to the letter from this Office of the 16th instant,† from which it will be seen that new proposals have been made by the Commonwealth Government with regard to the establishment of a defence force for service in Australian waters. The Lords Commissioners will have observed that the Commonwealth Government propose to proceed with the establishment of a local force, but Lord Crewe presumes that the assistance offered in your letter under acknowledgment does not depend on the assumption contained in its last paragraph, and he has accordingly communicated a copy of it, with the omission of that paragraph, to Captain R. M. Collins and to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth.

I am, &c.,
H. BERTRAM COX.

12944

No. 86.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to THE COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON.

[Answered by No. 87.]

SIR, Downing Street, 21 April, 1909.
WITH reference to your letter of the 29th of March,‡ I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, for your information, the accompanying copy of a letter§ from the Admiralty on the subject of the destroyers which are now being built to the order of the Commonwealth Government at Glasgow.

2. Lord Crewe will be glad to receive the undertaking referred to in the penultimate paragraph of the letter from the Admiralty.

I am, &c.,
H. BERTRAM COX.

13692

No. 87.

AUSTRALIA.

THE COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received April 23, 1909.)

[Copy to Admiralty, 27 April, and to Governor-General, No. 165, 28 April, 1909. L.F.]

SIR, 72, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W., 22 April, 1909.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant,|| forwarding a copy of the reply from the Admiralty on the subject of the destroyers now being built to the order of the Commonwealth Government at Glasgow.

2. I shall be glad if Lord Crewe will convey to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the appreciation of my Government for their promise of assistance in furnishing the necessary permission for the use of their oil-burning fittings.

3. It is noted that in all cases where confidential information is given or secret fittings are permitted to be used, an undertaking is required that no such information is allowed to pass into the possession of persons other than the accredited

* No. 79. † No. 80. ‡ No. 74. § No. 79, omitting the last paragraph. || No. 86.

representatives of officers of the Commonwealth Government, and that the Commonwealth Government should undertake to require from its officers the strictest obligation to observe secrecy. I, therefore, on behalf of my Government, am pleased to state that these requirements will be strictly adhered to, and I have brought the same under the notice of my Government, so that the necessary action may equally be taken in Australia.

I have, &c.,
R. MUIRHEAD COLLINS,
Representative of the Commonwealth
in London.

12944

No. 88.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 154.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 22 April, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 20th of April,* I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, for the information of your Ministers, the accompanying copy of correspondence† with the Admiralty and Captain R. M. Collins on the subject of the torpedo destroyers which are being built to the order of the Commonwealth Government at Glasgow.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

14689

No. 89.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE ADMINISTRATOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1 May, 1909.)

[Copy to Admiralty, May 11, 1909. L.F.]

[Acknowledged 7 May, 1909. No. 71.]

(No. 34.)

MY LORD,

State Government House, Sydney, 26th March, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Lordship's information, that a representative meeting of the citizens of Sydney was held in the Town Hall last night, and, according to the Press reports, the meeting was largely attended and the utmost enthusiasm prevailed. At the meeting the following resolutions were unanimously passed:—

1. "That in the opinion of this meeting of citizens, glorifying in the traditions of the British race of which they are a part, the time has arrived for the Commonwealth to take an active share in the Naval Defence of the Empire."
2. "That in view of the expressed determination of Britain's rivals to challenge her naval supremacy Australia should present a Dreadnought to the British Navy as the immediate expression of her invincible resolve to stand by the Mother Country and take her place in the Empire's fighting line."

An influential Committee was then appointed to carry into effect the above resolutions.

2. Speeches in support of the resolutions were delivered by leading citizens, including the Lord Mayor, the Right Honourable G. H. Reid, late leader of the Opposition in the Commonwealth House of Representatives, the Honourable J. Cook, the present leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, and many letters and telegrams of a patriotic character were received and read at the meeting.

* No. 84.

† Nos. 74, 79, omitting last paragraph, and 86.

3. A diversity of opinion appears to exist amongst leading public men here as to whether it would not be more expedient to substantially increase the present naval subsidy than to offer a battleship. The Premier of this State is strongly in favour of renewing the Naval Agreement and increasing the present subsidy, but considers the proposition to present a battleship inappropriate, and many others favour this opinion.

4. I enclose, herewith, an extract from the "Sydney Morning Herald" containing a comprehensive account of last night's meeting.

I have, &c.,
G. B. SIMPSON,
Administrator.

(Copy sent to Governor-General.)

14807

No. 90.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1 May, 1909.)

[Copy to Admiralty, 11 May, 1909. L.F.]

[Acknowledged 10 May, 1909. No. 318.]

(No. 191.)

MY LORD,

Montreal, P.Q., 19 April, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a report of a statement made by Sir James Whitney in the Ontario Legislative Assembly, in connection with the action of the Dominion Parliament in regard to the question of naval defence.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

Enclosure in No. 90.

MEMORANDUM.

REPORT of Mail and Empire, Toronto, 1st of April, 1909.

Shortly before the Legislature arose for dinner yesterday, Sir James Whitney made a statement to the House giving his opinion of the action taken by the Dominion Parliament with reference to a grant to Great Britain for navy purposes. Sir James spoke as follows:—

"Another rumour that has been current all over the Dominion yesterday and to-day has referred to the possible action of certain Provinces of the Dominion on the question of the crisis in Great Britain, and as to what steps, if any, should be taken to show the Mother Country that the Provinces are prepared to go further even than the Dominion Parliament on this very momentous question. I have received many telegrams from different parts of the Dominion enquiring as to this, and I think I should say with reference to it, that I have communicated with no person directly or indirectly on the subject, and I have received no communication from any person directly or indirectly on the subject except as mentioned above. Although this is the case, I have no hesitation in saying—in fact I consider it my duty to say—that in my opinion Canada has missed an opportunity which may never come to her again. Had Parliament immediately and spontaneously appropriated the value of a Dreadnought, or of even two such ships, and offered the same to the Mother Country together with an intimation that further aid would certainly be forthcoming in case of need, in my opinion such action, together with similar action from New Zealand and Australia, would have had an immediate and tremendous effect upon all outside nations, demonstrating beyond all possibility of doubt that all the groups and communities comprising and making up the British Empire are ready, and will be found standing together when the time of stress shall come."

14787

No. 91.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE and ADMIRALTY.

SIR, Downing Street, 5 May, 1909.
I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before [the Army Council] [the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty], copies of telegrams* addressed on the 30th April to the Governor-General and Governors of the self-governing Dominions, suggesting the holding of a Conference to discuss the general question of the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire, with special reference to the resolution of the House of Commons of Canada of 29th March, and to the recent proposals from New Zealand and Australia.

2. I am also to enclose copy of a confidential telegram† from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, which crossed Lord Crewe's telegram of the 30th of April.*

3. This correspondence has also been communicated to the [Admiralty] [War Office].

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

15157

No. 92.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY and WAR OFFICE.

SIR, Downing Street, 6 May, 1909.
WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 5th of May,‡ I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the [Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty] [Army Council], the accompanying copies of telegrams§ from the Governors-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and Canada, on the subject of the proposed Conference to discuss the questions of Naval and Military Defence of the Empire.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

16464

No. 93.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 15 May, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office and to Admiralty, 24 May, 1909. Confidential. L.F.]

(Secret.)

MY LORD, Government House, Ottawa, 6 May, 1909.

I REGRET that I have not been able to obtain from Sir Wilfrid a more satisfactory reply to your cable of April 30th.¶ The first reply submitted to me stated that in the opinion of my Ministers no such Conference as that asked for by your cable was necessary.

I persuaded Sir Wilfrid to take back this cable, and to substitute for it one stating that although His Majesty's Canadian Government had not sufficient information to warrant them in advising as to the necessity of convening a Conference under the terms of Resolution I. of the Conference of 1907, my Ministers would have no objection to Sir Frederick Borden, the Minister of Militia, and Mr. Brodeur, the Minister of Marine, postponing their visit to London from June to July, so as to enable them "to meet the views of the Imperial authorities."

This suggestion of mine that the Ministers of Defence should visit London in July, so as to meet the views of the Imperial authorities (as expressed in your cable of April 30th), although approved by Sir Wilfrid when discussing with me the reply my Ministers should send, was afterwards whittled down by Council to the form used in the cable, viz.: that the Ministers of Defence would visit London in July "so as to suit the convenience of the Imperial authorities."

* Nos. 12, 13 and 14 in Dominions No. 13.

† No. 91.

§ Nos. 17 and 16 in Dominions No. 13.

¶ No. 15 in Dominions No. 13.

|| No. 14 in Dominions No. 13.

I have not thought it desirable to send back the cable submitted to me a second time, as it leaves the question of the Canadian Ministers of Defence taking part with the Ministers of Defence of the other self-governing Dominions in subsidiary conference an open one.

I am satisfied it will be impossible for Canada, with her Defence Ministers in London, to stand out of any subsidiary conference you may hold in pursuance of Resolution I. of the Imperial Conference of 1907.

Sir Wilfrid evidently does not at present wish Canada to take part in a subsidiary conference convened to discuss the general questions of the naval and military defence of the Empire, with special reference to the contributions which should be made by the self-governing Dominions. His excuse to the House of Commons for limiting the contribution of Canada to a resolution of sympathy at a time when New Zealand was taking definite action was that, while Canada was prepared to spend her last dollar and to shed her last drop of blood, if necessary, to maintain the naval supremacy of the Crown, it was desirable to proceed carefully on well-considered lines, and that, in pursuance of this policy, the first step should be one of consulting with the Imperial authorities as to the best way of implementing the resolution of the House.

Sir Wilfrid pointed out to me that the ignorance which existed in the Province of Quebec on questions relating to Imperial Defence, and the Provincial prejudice as to the possible consequences of any action associated in the minds of Canadians of French descent with a policy of militarism, made it desirable to go slow.

He further pointed out that these questions would naturally be submitted to the consideration of the next regular Imperial Conference, which must meet in 1911, and that he hoped he would by that time be able to carry the Province of Quebec, as well as the other Provinces of Canada, behind him, in support of such a policy of defence as might be resolved upon by the Conference.

He was glad that the Ministers of Defence should confer with the Imperial Naval and Military Authorities, upon technical matters, in connection with the organisation of a Canadian Naval Service, but did not favour the proposal that Canada in July next should take part in a Conference to consider matters of general policy.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

17562

No. 94.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received May 24, 1909.)

(Secret.)

MY LORD, Government House, Ottawa, Canada, May 11, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have had more than one long talk recently with Sir Wilfrid Laurier on naval matters.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier holds that any money withdrawn at present from the construction of much needed public works would be a diversion from the best and most effective contribution which Canada can make to the strength of the Empire. He points to the contribution of \$100,000,000 of public money to the Canadian Pacific Railway, and asks whether the construction of this railway, which has made Canada, has not been a more effective contribution to Imperial Defence than ten Dreadnoughts would have been. There can be only one answer to this question.

Sir Wilfrid's ambition is to complete the construction of two more trans-continental railways. He asks, will not these two new railways mean more to Imperial Defence than the number of Dreadnoughts purchaseable with the public money put into their construction?

The desirability of constructing the Georgian Bay Canal without further delay is admitted, not only for development, but for strategical purposes. Sir Wilfrid is unwilling at present, for prudential financial reasons, to embark upon this enterprise. The enlargement of the Welland Canal is also desired for the purpose of diverting to Montreal the lake traffic which now finds its outlet through United States ports. This work is also postponed for similar reasons.

In the opinion of Sir Wilfrid, the construction of these public works is the most

effective immediate contribution Canada can make to Imperial defence, and must rank in importance prior to the building of Dreadnoughts. The population of Canada is upwards of 7,000,000. When the two new transcontinental railways, the Georgian Bay Canal, and the Welland Canal enlargement are completed, and when Canada has increased her present population of 7,000,000 to 15,000,000 or 20,000,000, Canada will be able to contribute \$100,000,000 to Dreadnoughts, and will do so, if necessary. Any money diverted from the immediate task of building up the strength of Canada—even the appropriation of the small amount of \$10,000 for assisting Messrs. Baldwin and McCurdy to continue their aerodrome experiments at Baddeck, Nova Scotia—is regarded by His Majesty's Canadian Government as a false move.

Sir Wilfrid does not want Canada to be involved in any immediate contribution to a scheme of defence outside such measures as may be necessary for the protection of her own shores. He is willing to do whatever may be considered necessary in this direction, and with this object is sending the Ministers of Defence over to England to consult with the Imperial authorities. He does not wish to go further at present.

Although Sir Wilfrid is opposed to the idea of holding a subsidiary Conference in July, his reply to your cable of April 30th* is couched in terms which will enable the Canadian Ministers of Defence to take part in it. Pressure of public opinion here, as well as in England, Australia, and New Zealand, will probably make the co-operation of the Canadian Ministers of Defence with the Ministers of Defence of the other self-governing Dominions, in the July Subsidiary Conference, necessary.

Sir Wilfrid, as you are aware, has as genuine and deep-seated a conviction as any member of the Peace Society on the question of armaments. He regards them with all the horror of a man who sees in them only the advancing shadow of impending national bankruptcies. He will not admit that there is any necessity for taking immediate action. He repeats that Canada will be ready to shed her last drop of blood, and to spend her last dollar, to maintain the naval supremacy of the Crown; but he will not do anything to prevent that supremacy from being challenged.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

17106

No. 95.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE AND ADMIRALTY.

SIR,

Downing Street, 26 May, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 5th instant,† I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, for the information of the [Army Council] [Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty], the enclosed copies of correspondence‡ as noted below regarding the proposed Conference on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

SCHEDULE OF ENCLOSURES.

1. Governor, New Zealand. Telegram. 7 May.
2. To Australia, Canada. Telegram. 10 May.
3. Governor, Transvaal. Telegram. 10 May.
4. To Australia, Canada, New Zealand. Telegram. 12 May.
5. Governor, Cape. Telegram. 12 May.
6. Governor-General, Canada. Telegram. 12 May.
7. Governor, Orange River Colony. Telegram. 13 May.
8. Governor-General, Australia. Telegram. 14 May.
9. Governor, Natal. Telegram. 14 May.
10. To Governor, New Zealand. Telegram. 17 May.
11. Governor, New Zealand. Telegram. 20 May.
12. To Cape, Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony. Telegram. 21 May.

* Nos. 14 and 15 in Dominions No. 13.

† Nos. 18-25, 27, 28, 30 and 31 in Dominions No. 13.

‡ No. 91.

17562

No. 96.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE and ADMIRALTY.

(Confidential.)

SIR,

Downing Street, 1 June, 1909.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office of the 24th of May,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, for the information of the [Army Council] [Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty], copy of a despatch† from the Governor-General of Canada on the subject of the views of his Ministers as to the naval defence of the Empire.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

18749

No. 97.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE and ADMIRALTY.

[Answered by Nos. 99 and 102.]

(Confidential.)

SIR,

Downing Street, 8 June, 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence as to the defence of Australia, I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, for the confidential information of the [Army Council] [Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty], copy of a telegram‡ from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia conveying, on behalf of his Ministers, an offer of a battleship to the Empire, together with a copy of his reply.§

2. Lord Crewe will be glad to learn whether, in the opinion of the [Army Council] [their Lordships] any further communication should be returned to this offer at the moment or whether the matter should not be left as it is for consideration at the forthcoming conference.

3. I am to add that a copy of this telegram has also been communicated to the [Admiralty] [War Office].

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

19649

No. 98.

TRANSSVAAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received June 12, 1909.)

(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

M'babane, May 17, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram addressed to you from Bloemfontein on the 10th May,|| I have the honour to enclose for your information, a copy of a letter from General Botha, dated 10th May, on the subject of the Defence Conference.

I have, &c.,
SELBORNE,
Governor.

Enclosure in No. 98.

GENERAL BOTHA to the EARL OF SELBORNE.

South African National Convention,

Bloemfontein, May 10, 1909.

DEAR LORD SELBORNE,

IN reference to your letter of the 3rd instant, enclosing a copy of a telegram

* L.F. transmitting copy of No. 93.
§ No. 35 in Dominions No. 13.

† No. 94.

‡ No. 32 in Dominions No. 13.
|| No. 19 in Dominions No. 13.

from the Secretary of State to the Governor of the Cape Colony, I have discussed with the other Prime Ministers the Secretary of State's invitation therein contained to representatives from the South African Governments to the Conference on the naval and military defences of the Empire. Along with my colleagues I appreciate deeply the courtesy of His Majesty's Government in extending this invitation to us, and I need not assure you how anxious I am of accepting it on behalf of my Government. You will, of course, understand, as, indeed, the Secretary of State clearly anticipates, that it will not be possible for any of us, in view of the great political change now pending in South Africa, to take a very active part in such a Conference or to adhere to any policy which might seem to bind the Union Government which will so soon replace us. At the same time we agree with the Secretary of State that the presence of South African representatives at the Conference will not only give it greater completeness but may help the future Union Government towards formulating some general scheme of South African defence, which may as far as possible be in harmony with the systems prevailing in other parts of the Empire.

With reference to the question as to when we could attend this Conference, it was the view of us all that the delegates from the South African Governments who have to go to London in connection with the passage of the South Africa Act through the British Parliament should leave South Africa at the end of June and so arrive in London in the middle of July. The members of the Governments who are on this delegation could then make the necessary arrangements to attend also, as far as possible, the sittings of this Defence Conference.

It has not yet been settled who the Transvaal delegates will be, but it is probable that there will be one or two others besides myself.

Believe me, &c.,

LOUIS BOTHA.

His Excellency the Earl of Selborne, G.C.M.G., &c.,
Government House, Bloemfontein.

20060

No. 99.

AUSTRALIA.

ADMIRALTY to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 16 June, 1909.)

SIR,

Admiralty, 15th June, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 18749, of the 8th instant,* in which is enclosed a copy of a telegram from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, conveying on behalf of his Ministers the offer of a battleship to the Empire, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state that they concur in the terms of the reply given by the Secretary of State, and that they consider it preferable that no further action should be taken pending the assembling of the forthcoming Conference.

I am, &c.,

C. I. THOMAS.

20258

No. 100.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9.35 a.m., 17th June, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram, 16th June,† Foxton left Melbourne for England "Oroya"; should arrive 19th July.—DUDLEY.

* No. 97.

† 19948; not printed.

20430

No. 101.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE and ADMIRALTY.

[Answered, concurring, June 30 and 29, 1909.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 25 June, 1909.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office of the 1st of June,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the [Army Council] [Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty], copies of telegrams from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and from the Governor of New Zealand, and of a despatch† from the Governor of the Transvaal respecting the Naval and Military Conference.

2. Lord Crewe proposes that the Conference should open on the 28th of July, and he would be glad to know if this date will be convenient to the [Army Council] [their Lordships]. He understands that General Botha is very anxious to leave England as soon as possible after the 1st of August, and Sir J. Ward will no doubt not be willing to remain in England longer than can be helped.

I am, &c.,

H. BERTRAM COX.

22034

No. 102.

AUSTRALIA.

WAR OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 2 July, 1909.)

SIR,

War Office, London, S.W., 30th June, 1909.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 18791/1909, of the 8th instant,‡ forwarding copies of telegrams from and to Australia, relative to the offer of a battleship to the Empire made by the Commonwealth Government.

2. In reply to Lord Crewe's question as to whether any other than the acknowledgment already made should be returned to the Commonwealth, I am to say that, from a military point of view, no further reply seems necessary at this stage, and that the Army Council think that the matter might now be left for consideration at the forthcoming Conference.

I have, &c.,

R. H. BRADE.

21946

No. 103.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.§

TELEGRAM.

(Sent 6.5 p.m., 6th July, 1909.)

Please inform your Ministers Defence Conference will meet on 28th July. Delegates will be informed on arrival in England.—CREWE.

23522

No. 104.

CANADA.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 14th July, 1909.)

[Copy to Admiralty, 22 July, 1909: not printed.]

[Acknowledged 22 July, 1909. No. 467.]

(No. 343.)

Ottawa, 3rd July, 1909.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of news-

* No. 96.

† No. 100, Nos. 36 and 38 in Dominions No. 13, and No. 98.

‡ No. 97.

§ Sent to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony.

paper cutting containing a report of a conference at Montreal between the Honourable L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, and a deputation from the "Chambre de Commerce" of that place, at which the Minister referred to the policy favoured by Canada as regards naval defence.

I have, &c.,

C. FITZPATRICK,
Administrator.

Enclosure 1 in No. 104.

MONTREAL "STAR," 22 June, 1909.

GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF NAVAL DEFENCE.

Honourable L. P. BRODEUR MAKES STATEMENT THAT CANADIAN NAVY IS CANADA'S POLICY.

A conference of the highest importance took place at the Government offices yesterday afternoon between Honourable L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, and a deputation from the Chambre de Commerce. Two important pronouncements were made by the Minister:

- (1) That the maintenance of a Canadian navy was the policy of the Government in regard to Imperial defence.
- (2) That if only one dry dock to accommodate large vessels is to be built on the St. Lawrence, then the city of Quebec would seem to have the more advantageous situation.

The primary object of the deputation, which was headed by Messrs. Isaie Préfontaine, F. C. Larivière, C. H. Catelli, Fortunat Bourbonnière, A. N. Brodeur, L. J. A. Surveyor and others, was to urge on the Minister the claims of Montreal as the proper place for the location of a dry dock. Mr. Préfontaine, however, raised incidentally the question of naval defence.

NAVAL DEFENCE QUESTION.

"This dry dock at Montreal," he said, "might serve not only for the repairing of vessels, which would not keep the workmen occupied, but also for the construction of vessels and even for the construction of vessels for naval defence." Mr. Préfontaine read the resolution which the delegates of the Chambre de Commerce would bear to the coming conference of the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire at Sydney, Australia.

"That the Congress reaffirm the principle which is its duty as autonomous colonies,* to participate in the defence of the Empire, while retaining their right of initiative as to the nature and form of this participation."

Honourable Mr. Brodeur replied in regard to the question of naval defence:

THREE PROPOSALS UP.

"There are three proposals made: To offer to England one or two Dreadnoughts which would be her exclusive property; secondly, to contribute annually a round sum which might be used without our knowledge; the third, which is that of the Government supported by the Opposition, would be to construct a Canadian navy. This policy should not strike anyone as surprising. It is quite natural. States of South America, even smaller than Canada, such as Colombia, Paraguay, have their own navy. The Canadian Government wishes to participate in the defence of the Empire, but at the same time to safeguard its autonomy and the control of its contributions."

COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND GOVERNMENT.

In discussing the representations in regard to the dry dock, Mr. Brodeur said that the Government at the last session had recognized the claims of the commercial interests of Montreal by passing a law offering a guarantee of three and a half per cent. on capital invested to any private company undertaking to construct a dry dock. Several companies had already made offers to the Government in this regard.

Among other proposals was one which had been submitted to the Harbour Commissioners for the construction of a dry dock near Viauville.

"But," said Mr. Brodeur, "the company demands an excessive subsidy, about \$1,500,000, which is equivalent almost to the cost of two dry docks. However, the Government is ready to give all reasonable aid to any project of construction."

Discussing the comparative claims of Montreal and Quebec, the Minister remarked that happily accidents to large vessels had been rare, thanks to the policy of improving the channel, which was kept extremely well lighted and which the Government was having deepened to a depth of thirty feet at lowest water.

"However," he continued, "It is evident that the St. Lawrence needs a dry dock. The Shipping Federation seems to be in favour of having one at Quebec preferably, for accidents are more numerous below that city than elsewhere. The shipping men of Montreal say, 'better one at Quebec than none at all.' In any case, the Government will seriously study this project for a dry dock and will give a decision which will answer the greatest needs of commerce."

* Sic: See French version in Enclosure 2.

FRANCO-CANADIAN TREATY.

Mr. Brodeur mentioned, in speaking of the dry dock, that one of the obstacles to the ratification of the Franco-Canadian treaty was, in its desire to push the development of the Canadian ports, the Government had introduced a clause stating that, to benefit by the preferential tariffs, the French merchandise must be conveyed to Canadian ports and not through the United States.

The Minister of Marine also said that he had decided, in regard to English goods, that they should not enjoy preferential duties after 1910 unless they discharged their cargoes in Canadian ports.

Enclosure 2 in No. 104.

MONTREAL "LA PRESSE," 22 June, 1909.

LA CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE ET LA MARINE CANADIENNE.

L'honorable M. BRODEUR reçoit une importante délégation et, après avoir parlé de la cale-sèche, il fait des déclarations significatives sur la création d'une flotte pour notre propre défense.

La Chambre de Commerce est allée, hier après-midi, en délégation auprès de l'honorable M. Brodeur. Au cours de la discussion, le ministre de la Marine a fait d'importantes déclarations, tant au sujet de la construction d'une cale-sèche à Montréal, qu'à celui de la défense militaire et navale de l'Empire. Elles seront, à coup sûr, accueillies avec satisfaction partout.

La délégation se composait de MM. Isaie Préfontaine, président de la Chambre; F. C. Larivière, 2e vice-président, J. Fortier, trésorier; Fortunat Bourbonnière, secrétaire; C. H. Catelli, A. N. Brodeur, L. J. A. Surveyor, U. Garand, J. B. A. Lanctôt, &c.

Au nom de la délégation, M. C. H. Catelli expose que la Chambre, à sa séance du 2 juin dernier, a adopté une résolution en faveur de l'établissement prochain d'une cale-sèche à Montréal. Actuellement, un vaisseau ayant besoin de radoubage ne peut trouver une cale-sèche avant d'atteindre Halifax, si ce n'est à Lévis, pour les bateaux de moindre dimension.

L'hon. M. Brodeur répondit en discutant longuement le projet de la cale-sèche. Le gouvernement a reconnu ce fait, en passant à la dernière session une loi offrant une garantie de 3½ pour cent. pour l'intérêt du capital investi, à toute compagnie privée qui entreprendrait la construction d'une cale-sèche. Plusieurs compagnies ont fait, à ce sujet, des offres au gouvernement.

L'une, entre autres, a soumis à la Commission du Havre, qui l'a étudié, un projet de construction d'une cale-sèche, près de Viauville, mais elle demande une subvention excessive, environ \$1,500,000, qui équivaldrait presque au coût de deux cales-sèches. Quoi qu'il en soit, le gouvernement est prêt à donner toute l'aide raisonnable à un projet de construction.

A ce sujet, il s'élève la question de savoir quel port doit avoir la cale-sèche, Québec ou Montréal. Plusieurs sont d'avis que deux cales-sèches pourraient être construites, l'une à Québec et l'autre à Montréal. Il est évident en tout cas que le St. Laurent doit en posséder une. La "Shipping Federation" semble être en faveur d'en avoir une avant tout à Québec, car les accidents sont plus nombreux en bas de cette ville qu'ailleurs.

Avant de quitter ce sujet, M. Brodeur mentionne qu'un des obstacles principaux à la ratification du traité franco-canadien, fut que dans son désir de développer le mouvement des ports canadiens le gouvernement avait introduit une clause, statuant que, pour bénéficier des taux préférentiels, les marchandises françaises devaient être transportées aux ports canadiens, et non passer par les ports des Etats-Unis.

M. A. N. Brodeur fait alors remarquer que certaines compagnies de navigation océanique ont un tarif différentiel en faveur des portes américains contre les portes canadiens. Il croit que le gouvernement devrait intervenir sur ce sujet.

Le ministre de la Marine répond que le gouvernement ne peut atteindre toutes ces compagnies, mais il a décidé, quant aux marchandises anglaises, qu'elles ne jouiront des droits préférentiels, à partir de 1910, que si elles sont déchargées aux ports canadiens. Ainsi on atteindra, par l'expéditeur, les compagnies de navigation.

M. Isaie Préfontaine fait alors remarquer que la cale-sèche projetée pourrait servir non seulement au radoub, ce qui ne serait pas suffisant pour occuper ses ouvriers, mais aussi servir à la construction des vaisseaux. Et là-dessus, se pose la question connexe: pourquoi ne pas l'employer à la construction des vaisseaux destinés à la défense navale du Canada?

C'est une question d'actualité, et, à ce sujet, le président donne lecture de la résolution que la Chambre a décidé de présenter au prochain congrès des Chambres de Commerce de l'Empire, qui doit avoir lieu à Sydney, Australie, en septembre. La voici:

"Il est suggéré: Que le Congrès réaffirme le principe qu'il est du devoir des colonies autonomes de participer à la défense de l'Empire, tout en conservant leur initiative quant à la nature et la forme de cette participation."

L'honorable M. Brodeur répond qu'il est heureux de voir que la résolution qualifie le Canada du nom de colonie autonome. Mais, grâce aux larges idées de l'Angleterre, il est plus cela réellement. Le Canada, c'est, comme les autres grandes colonies anglaises, une puissance autonome et l'Angleterre l'a volontiers reconnu aux deux dernières conférences impériales.

Quant à la question de la défense navale, il y a trois théories: l'une serait d'offrir à l'Angleterre un ou deux "Dreadnoughts" qui serait sa propriété exclusive; l'autre serait de contribuer annuellement une somme ronde, dont nous ne connaissons pas l'emploi; enfin la troisième, qui est celle du gouvernement, appuyé en cela par l'opposition, serait de construire une marine canadienne. Cette politique ne doit pas surprendre. Elle est bien naturelle: Des états de l'Amérique du Sud, même moindres que le Canada, tels la Colombie, le Paraguay, ont leur propre marine. Le gouvernement canadien veut participer à la défense de l'empire, mais garder son autonomie et le contrôle de ses deniers.

En terminant le ministre félicite les membres de la Chambre de s'occuper ainsi activement des affaires publiques et de les étudier pour le bien du pays.
 Avant de quitter le ministre, M. Préfontaine le remercia, au nom de la Chambre, de son aimable accueil et des assurances qu'il leur avait données sur les importantes questions discutées.

37592

No. 105.

AUSTRALIA: NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL and GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4.45 p.m., 23rd November, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to Admiralty, 26th November, and to War Office, 23rd December, 1909. L.F.]

Confidential. First Lord of the Admiralty thinks it may be worth while to let your Government know that from the point of view of securing favourable terms when placing orders here for large armoured cruiser which they propose to build, it will be an advantage for them to be able to come to a decision as early as possible; firms tendering now on low prices.

Similar telegram sent to [New Zealand] [Commonwealth] Government.—CREWE.

39873

No. 106.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.30 a.m., 9th December, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by Nos. 107 and 110.]

Commonwealth Parliament having agreed to naval proposals made at the recent Imperial Conference on Defence and having passed Naval Loan Bill to provide necessary funds, Commonwealth Government would be glad if Lords Commissioners of Admiralty would arrange for construction without further delay of the armoured cruiser of the "Indefatigable" type, to be followed by the three unarmoured cruisers of improved "Bristol" type in their turn. The destroyers and submarines will be the subject of special despatch.—DUDLEY.

39873

No. 107.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 441.)

My LORD,

Downing Street, 10 December, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's telegram of the 9th instant,* on the subject of naval defence, and to request you to inform your Ministers that I have forwarded a copy of it to the Admiralty and have asked the Lords Commissioners to arrange for the construction of the armoured cruiser of the "Indefatigable" type, to be followed by the three unarmoured cruisers of the improved "Bristol" type.

I have, &c.,
 CREWE.

* No. 106.

39873

No. 108.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

Downing Street, 11 December, 1909.

SIR,

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 26th November,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the enclosed copy of a telegram† from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia reporting that the Commonwealth Parliament have agreed to the naval proposals made at the recent Imperial Conference on Defence, and, having passed the Naval Loan Bill, desire that arrangements may be made for the construction of the armoured cruiser of the "Indefatigable" type, to be followed by three unarmoured cruisers.

Lord Crewe will be glad if the Lords Commissioners will cause the necessary action to be taken in accordance with the request of the Commonwealth Government.

I am, &c.,

C. P. LUCAS.

40659

No. 109.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.45 a.m., 16th December, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to Admiralty, 21st, and to War Office, 23rd, December, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 111.]

My Government have much pleasure in informing you that Defence Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament unanimously for the purchase of Dreadnought for presentation to British Government.—PLUNKET.

39873

No. 110.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 6.15 p.m., 16th December, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to Admiralty, 21st, and War Office, 23rd, December, 1909. L.F.]

Your telegram 9th December.† His Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction that Commonwealth Parliament have accepted naval proposals resulting from Defence Conference. Admiralty have been asked to take desired action.—CREWE.

40659

No. 111.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 6.15 p.m., 16th December, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to Admiralty, 21st, and to War Office, 23rd, December, 1909. L.F.]

Your telegram 15th December.‡ His Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction that Defence Bill has been unanimously passed by Parliament of New Zealand.—CREWE.

* L.F. transmitting copy of No. 105.

† No. 106.

‡ No. 109.

41925

No. 112.

AUSTRALIA.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.25 a.m., 29th December, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by L.F. on No. 113.]

Confidential. My telegram 9th December,* Australian naval unit three destroyers now being built Clyde. Government of Commonwealth of Australia propose to build remaining three destroyers in Australia, and Government will be glad to have views of Admiralty and their assistance in project; also any suggestions or recommendations concerning the destroyers to be built.—CHELMSFORD.

41925

No. 113.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to ADMIRALTY.

[Copy to Governor-General, 6 January, 1910. Confidential. L.F.]

SIR, Downing Street, 31 December, 1909.
In continuation of the letter from this Office of the 21st December,† I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a telegram‡ from the Officer Administering the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia on the subject of naval defence.

2. Lord Crewe will be glad to know what reply should, in their Lordships' opinion, be returned to this telegram.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

IX.

Imperial General Staff.

33814

No. 114.

AUSTRALIA.

COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 16 September, 1908.)

[Answered by No. 115.]

Commonwealth of Australia, 72, Victoria Street,
Westminster, S.W., 15 September, 1908.

SIR, I HAVE the honour to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that I have been instructed by my Government that Major-General J. C. Hoad, C.M.G., Inspector-General of the Military Forces, is proceeding to England on certain special duties.

2. This officer arrives in London to-day and he is directed to confer with the General Staff of the War Office as to the way of making an immediate beginning in carrying out the broad principles of the resolution adopted at the last Imperial Conference dealing with the establishment of the General Staff for the service of the Empire.

3. It is also desired that he should be afforded opportunities of attending any manoeuvres or military operations of interest which may take place during his visit to England.

* No. 106.

† L.F. transmitting copies of Nos. 109, 110, 111.

‡ No. 112.

4. I attach a memorandum which shows the proposals that were approved by my Government in regard to sending an officer home and which constitutes the instructions of Major-General Hoad, and I would be glad if the War Office could be informed and furnished with one copy, and requested to give such facilities as may be necessary for General Hoad to carry out his instructions.

5. It appears to me that it would also be advisable for General Hoad to be brought into touch with the Imperial Defence Committee, and I therefore include a second copy of the instructions furnished to me, for the information of that Committee.

I have, &c.,

R. MUIRHEAD COLLINS,
Representative of the Commonwealth in London.

Enclosure in No. 114.

(Confidential.)

REPRESENTATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH ON THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

At the Colonial Conference of 1907 the following resolution was adopted:—

“GENERAL STAFF FOR THE SERVICE OF THE EMPIRE.

“That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognises and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organization of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire.”

From this it will be seen that it is intended the Commonwealth should be represented on the General Staff.

Mr. Haldane, in introducing the subject, stated:—

“In order to work on a common pattern it is necessary that we should have a common conception, and the common conception, a matter of great intricacy and great complication when you get to details, can only adequately be supplied by the most skilled advisers, and that is where the utility of the General Staff comes in. My main purpose in addressing the Conference is to suggest for your acceptance the opinion that the General Staff which we have created at home and which is in its infancy, should receive as far as possible an Imperial character. I will define what I mean. It is not that we wish in the slightest degree even to suggest that you should bow your heads to any direction from home in military matters, but the General Staff Officer would have as his function this: Trained in a great common school, recruited, it may be, from the most varying parts of the Empire, but educated in military science according to common principles, he would be at the disposition of the local Government or of the local Commander-in-Chief, whether he were Canadian, British, or Australian, or New Zealander, or South African, for giving advice and furnishing information based upon the highest military study of the time.

“Our great object must be to make the General Staff an Imperial school of military thought, all the members of which are imbued with the same traditions, accustomed to look at strategical problems from the same point of view, and acquainted with the principles and theories generally accepted at headquarters.

“I should suggest that you should send your experts over to the War Office to confer with our General Staff, and any other department, as to the way of making an immediate beginning in carrying out the broad principle which the resolution affirms.”

Mr. Deakin, in replying to the suggestions made by Mr. Haldane, said:—

"The General Staff is supposed to be the brain of the Army. Any proposition which would extend its activities or permit us to share them, would be heartily welcomed in the Commonwealth. A General Staff such as we possess naturally occupies itself with those problems which are peculiar to Australia and its very special situation. At the same time we quite realise that any situation, however special, requires to be dealt with in the light of certain general principles, and particularly of the latest developments of martial methods and organisation, and, consequently, I anticipate nothing but great advantage to us from any association with the General Staff."

In the first place, as suggested by Mr. Haldane, an officer should be sent to confer with the War Office as to the best way of making an immediate beginning in carrying out the broad principles of the resolution, also to discuss the lines on which the General Staff should be constituted in the Commonwealth.

While primarily his mission would be to discuss and arrange details for:—

- (a) representation on the General Staff;
- (b) formation of the General Staff for the Commonwealth;

this officer, who should be of senior rank, would be able to fully inform and endeavour to bring the Imperial General Staff and Defence Committee "in touch" with, and to guide matters of, Australian military interest, which may be under consideration, in accordance with:—

- (1) The requirements of Commonwealth defence from an Australian point of view;
- (2) The sentiment animating Australia in such matters;
- (3) The policy of the country with regard to defence as expressed in the Commonwealth Defence Act, which gives authority only for the raising and maintenance of troops for the defence and protection of the Commonwealth, and which stipulates that they shall not be required, unless they voluntarily agree to do so, to serve beyond the limits of the Commonwealth (*i.e.*, as mentioned by Mr. Haldane—they are troops organised for home defence).

The fact, however, that Australians are prepared to voluntarily take their part anywhere in the defence of the Empire is evident when it is remembered that over 16,000 officers and men went from Australia to South Africa during the campaign 1899-1902.

He would also discuss the desirability of initiating a scheme for ultimately uniting the forces of Great Britain and the Colonies in one general bond for common defence—bearing in mind the foregoing conditions.

The information that the officer thus representing the Commonwealth would give would afford the General Staff and Defence Committee an opportunity of becoming cognisant with the trend of thought on defence matters from a Commonwealth standpoint. He would also give definite information with regard to proposals of the Government for new scheme.

He could also give much practical information with regard to the formation and maintenance of cadet corps; possibly, in this respect, Australia may be said to "lead the way."

Whilst in England he could discuss and endeavour to put on a more satisfactory footing the conditions under which the exchanges of officers are made.

33814

No. 115.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to THE COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON.

SIR,

Downing Street, 17 September, 1908.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th of September* on the subject of the visit to this country of Major-General Hoad.

* No. 114.

2. Lord Crewe has asked the Army Council and the Imperial Defence Committee to afford to Major-General Hoad all possible assistance in furthering the purposes for which he has been sent to England.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

33814

No. 116.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

(Confidential.)

SIR,

Downing Street, 17 September, 1908.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the [Army Council] [Imperial Defence Committee], copy of a letter* from the officer representing the Commonwealth of Australia in London on the subject of the visit of Major-General Hoad to this country.

2. Lord Crewe would be glad if all possible assistance can be afforded to Major-General Hoad.

3. A similar letter has been addressed to the [Imperial Defence Committee] [War Office].

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

33814

No. 117.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 5 October, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency, to be laid before your Ministers, copy of a letter* from Captain R. M. Collins, C.M.G., on the subject of the visit of Major-General J. C. Hoad, C.M.G., to this country.

2. In compliance with the request of Captain Collins, I have asked the Army Council and the Committee of Imperial Defence to afford all possible assistance to General Hoad in connection with his mission, but I should be glad if you could point out to your Ministers that His Majesty's Government are somewhat embarrassed by the fact that they have received no official communication from Your Excellency on this very important subject, and that they have no actual expression of the views held by your Government on the important questions alluded to in the memorandum enclosed in Captain Collins's letter.

3. I enclose copy of a letter† which has been addressed by the War Office to Captain Collins on the subject of Major-General Hoad's visit.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

9005

No. 118.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 13 March, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office, 26 March, 1909. L.F.]

(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, 22 February, 1909.

I AM sending to your Lordship by this mail my official reply‡ to the contents

* No. 114.

† Enclosure in 35584: not printed.

‡ No. 5 in Dominions No. 14.

of your despatch, No. 4, of the 8th ultimo,* which dealt with certain proposals made by the General Staff of the Army to carry out the resolutions adopted by the Imperial Conference in 1907 regarding the formation of an Imperial General Staff for the defence of the Empire.

2. Upon receiving from Ministers their official minute on this subject, I drafted a cablegram to your Lordship, of which I enclose a copy, but prior to sending it I submitted it, under cover of a private note, a copy of which is also enclosed herewith, to the Prime Minister. The result of this private communication to Mr. Fischer was the receipt from him of a confidential letter, dated the 19th instant, addressed to myself, and as in this letter he has dealt very fully with the whole subject, I think it only right that I should forward a copy of it to you for the confidential information of His Majesty's Government.

3. The two principal points which are commented upon by the Prime Minister are these:—First, in view of the probable unification of South Africa in the near future, the present is an inopportune moment for seeking to elicit expressions of opinion from the several South African Colonies separately on this important subject. Second, it is very questionable in his opinion whether an organisation such as that suggested would be acceptable to the people of this Colony or of South Africa as a whole. Mr. Fischer supplements these views by adding "to sum up, I do not feel in a position to express sympathy with proposals which I think in any case premature, and with which, if my doubts are well founded, I could not agree."

4. My own view of what Mr. Fischer is anxious to express is that no organization such as the Imperial General Staff, with headquarters in London, would be likely to carry out its duties throughout the Empire without causing considerable friction, and that in order to avoid this it would be essential that the Colonies themselves should be at liberty to establish their own defence forces—accepting from the Staff in London such advice as they might consider necessary—but without any dictation whatsoever from that body.

I have, &c.,

HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS,
Governor.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

GOVERNOR to PRIME MINISTER.

(Private.)

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, Orange River Colony,

19 February, 1909.

DEAR MR. FISCHER,

WISHING to send a telegraphic reply to the Secretary of State regarding the subject of the subjoined minute of yours, I framed the attached draft, but as this goes perhaps further than what you state in the minute itself, I send it herewith to ask whether you have any objection to my sending it somewhat as I have worded it.

Sincerely yours,

HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS

Enclosure 2 in No. 118.

(Draft.)

The GOVERNOR to the SECRETARY OF STATE.

Reference your despatch, No. 4, of 8th January, Ministers wish me to say that whilst in full sympathy with general principles for military defence of Empire adopted by Imperial Conference in 1907, regret that it has not yet been found possible for this Colony to undertake the formation of any military force, and having no military adviser, they are unable to express an opinion regarding suggestions made for formation of Imperial General Staff.

Enclosure 3 in No. 118.

PRIME MINISTER to GOVERNOR.

(Confidential.)

Prime Minister's Office, Bloemfontein, Orange River Colony,

19th February, 1909.

DEAR SIR HAMILTON,

I AM always thankful for any suggestion from you as to the form in which to

* No. 2 in Cd. 4475] February, 1909.

word communications to the Imperial Government so as to make clear how earnest is our desire to co-operate with them, and fall in with their wishes whenever possible. It is with regret, therefore, that on this occasion I must express my doubt as to the advisability of concurring in the phraseology you suggest in your note, which I received this afternoon in regard to the minute on military defence in connection with the creation of an Imperial General Staff.

Since the matter has been kept pending so long—since the London Conference (1907)—it is a pity it was not kept in abeyance a little longer.

Our hands are more than ordinarily full with the question of South African Union which if brought about (as we have reasonable hopes it will be before long) will afford the best machinery for dealing with the question of the defence of South Africa; the time seems to me, therefore, inopportune for seeking to elicit expressions of opinion from the several South African Governments separately on this important subject.

But to revert to your letter, I wish to note that the subject, as submitted for our consideration in your Minute, No. 527, was the creation of an Imperial General Staff. I would not like to concur in a wording which, although only adopted for the sake of courtesy might later on be taken to imply an expression of views on that subject which may not be entertained by us. I fully recognise our responsibilities in the matter of local defence, and the necessity for co-operation between the Imperial Government and the Colonies thereon, and also in regard to the larger questions involved in the subject. I do not, however, with the information at present before me feel competent to form any judgment on the question. I do not even know the grounds on which the London Conference of 1907 (at which this Colony was not represented) approved of the general principles for the military defence of the Empire submitted to them. I could not, therefore, honestly express any sympathy with those principles which might possibly be taken to imply some responsibility, moral or otherwise, to prove that sympathy by deeds and not words alone. If, as seems to be the intention, the practical outcome of the application of the principle referred to should prove to be the creation of an Imperial General Staff, and if this should involve that such South African defence organization as the Colonies might see fit to establish would practically be under the direction of that staff so as to be obliged to adopt the methods of training and discipline prescribed by the same (matters on which I am as yet in the dark) I could not express sympathy with the scheme myself, and I feel sure it would not appeal to South Africa as a whole. Before, therefore, expressing sympathy with the scheme, I would like to feel assured that it would be suited to our special circumstances, and in accord with our own colonial methods and requirements. I am not at all convinced that any Imperial Military Staff if constituted and trained in Great Britain would be the best judges on these matters which are of vital interest to ourselves. I say this to indicate points of doubt and difficulty which, if not cleared up, would probably breed feelings of discontent and opposition to the proposed scheme instead of ensuring that harmonious co-operation which would be needed to make it a success. If, having admitted my ignorance, I were yet obliged to express an opinion, I would say that our defence organization, when formed, should not necessarily, in fact had better not, be cast in the same mould as the Imperial, that it should not take the form of a large standing army, but be more in the nature of a volunteer force, whilst the chiefs of this organization should be in constant consultation with the Imperial Military Authorities adopting all suggestions made by the latter as far as practicable and suitable here, it should be and remain entirely South African in its inception, training, and working; that whilst aiming at securing discipline, the training should be along the line, and in accord with the methods which would best suit the special circumstances of this country, and with which the bulk of those whose services are required would be most conversant.

In other words, that the country should look for its defence locally, as well as in the interests of the Empire, to a burgher force with a maximum of personal and a minimum of machine-like efficiency which, I fear, might be the result of adopting one uniform system of training throughout the Empire. To ensure the desired result there should be little or no Imperial military, and practically exclusive colonial experience, to direct and control the organization and the training of men under it.

To sum up, I do not feel in a position to express sympathy with proposals which I think in any case premature, and with which, if my doubts are well founded,

I could not agree, and if unfounded, I have so sorry an acquaintance as yet. For these reasons, therefore, in the absence of fuller information and expert advice, I would personally prefer to have the whole question left entirely open for the present, without any expression either of sympathy or otherwise on behalf of this Government; this was what the minute under consideration was intended to convey. I must ask you to take this as an expression of my individual views only, hastily jotted down to give you some idea of what I have in my mind on the question.

I return herewith the draft and annexures sent me.
Apologising for the length of my communication,

Believe me, &c.,
A. FISCHER.

7363

No. 119.

CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 179.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 13 March, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's despatch, No. 66, of the 15th February,* relative to the establishment of an Imperial General Staff, and to request that you will inform your Ministers that a copy has been communicated to the Army Council.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

16324

No. 120.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 125.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 26 May, 1909.

IN continuation of the letter from this office of the 5th of March,† I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Army Council, the accompanying copy of a despatch‡ from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole.

2. Lord Crewe will be glad to learn what reply should, in the opinion of the Army Council, be returned to Lord Dudley's despatch.

I am, &c.,
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

19407

No. 121.

WAR OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 11 June, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 123.]

SIR,

War Office, London, S.W., 10th June, 1909.

THE Army Council have had under consideration the subjects of military interest which they would desire to advise His Majesty's Government to bring before the Imperial Conference which is to be convened in 1911, and, *inter alia*, have further examined the question of the interchangeability of units between the Mother Country and the Dominions overseas.

The proposition was brought to the notice of the Colonial Conference of 1897 (Parliamentary Paper, No. C. 8596, pages 9 and 18), and was included in the pre-

* No. 1 in Dominions No. 14.

† 7698 (not printed): transmitting No. 2 in Dominions No. 14.

‡ No. 10 in Dominions No. 14.

liminary list of subjects for discussion at the Conference of 1907 which accompanied my letter of the 17th November, 1906.*

In Mr. Just's reply of the 18th January, 1907, No. 42489/1906,* a wish was expressed that the Secretary of State for the Colonies might be informed what definite proposals the Army Council had to make.

The principle of interchangeability between the military forces of the component parts of the Empire commands the ready assent of the Army Council, who have been glad, as Lord Crewe is aware, to give effect to it in the case of individuals a list of whom will be found at page 57 of the current Army List. They find, however, what under existing conditions they consider to be almost insuperable difficulties in the extension of the principle to whole units. The organization on a local or territorial basis of the Colonial forces and the limitation of their liability to service within the Dominion in which they are raised would militate against facility of interchange. Moreover, the cost of the scheme, regard being had to the comparative emoluments of soldiers overseas and at home, and the expenditure on transport, would be heavy and would not be easily susceptible of calculation or apportionment.

These considerations, taken in conjunction with the lack of unanimity in favour of the proposal disclosed in the proceedings of the last Conference (*e.g.*, at page 103 of [Cd. 3523]), convince the Council that it would be inexpedient to raise again this question in the immediate future as a substantive motion, and they would therefore be disposed, if Lord Crewe concurs, to allow the matter to lapse for the present.

I am, &c.,
R. H. BRADE.

19638

No. 122.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 12 June, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office, 23 June, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 77.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, May 24, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 30, of the 22nd of February last,† and in confirmation of my telegram of to-day's date,‡ I have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of a further minute from my Ministers relative to the question of the creation of an Imperial General Staff, from which it is to be understood that my Ministers desire to withhold expressing any views upon the subject until the meeting of the approaching Conference on Imperial Defence in London, and, therefore, their present minute may be taken as an answer to paragraph 3 of your Lordship's despatch, No. 4, of the 8th January.§

I have, &c.,
HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS,
Governor.

Enclosure in No. 122.

MINISTERS to GOVERNOR.

(No. 1779.)

MINUTE.

Ministers have the honour to refer His Excellency the Governor to their minute, No. 1779, of the 19th February last relative to the question of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole.

As this question will no doubt be considered at the Conference on Imperial Defence which will be attended by representatives of the Government of this Colony, Ministers do not propose to submit any views on the subject for the present.

A. FISCHER.

18th May, 1909.

* 42489/06: not printed.

† No. 5 in Dominions No. 14.

‡ No. 11 in Dominions No. 14.

§ No. 2 in [Cd. 4475] February, 1909.

19407

No. 123.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

SIR, Downing Street, 28 June, 1909.
I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 10th June* on the subject of the interchangeability of units between this country and the overseas Dominions.

2. In reply, I am to request you to inform the Army Council that Lord Crewe concurs in their view that this question should not be raised by His Majesty's Government at the next meeting of the Imperial Conference. It is, however, not unlikely that the question may be raised by Sir J. Ward or some other member of the approaching Defence Conference, and Lord Crewe presumes that, in that event, the Army Council will be prepared to discuss the practical difficulties involved either with the Conference as a whole or separately with any members who may be interested.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

20671

No. 124.

CANADA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

SIR, Downing Street, 29 June, 1909.
WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 28th instant,† on the subject of the proposed Imperial General Staff, I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Army Council, the enclosed copy of a despatch‡ from the Officer Administering the Government of Canada forwarding copy of a letter from the Department of Militia and Defence respecting the lines upon which it is proposed to carry out the organisation of the Canadian section of the staff.

Lord Crewe would be glad to be favoured with the observations of the Army Council regarding these proposals, for communication to the Dominion Government.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

23364

No. 125.

AUSTRALIA.

WAR OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 13 July, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 126.]

SIR, War Office, London, S.W., 12th July, 1909.
WITH reference to your letter, No. 16324/1909, dated 26th May, 1909,§ enclosing a copy of a despatch from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that they note with satisfaction that the Commonwealth Government concurs in the general principles relating to the creation of the Imperial General Staff, and fully realise that questions of detail in regard to the subjects alluded to in paragraph 2 of the Governor-General's despatch must be reserved for future discussion.

The Army Council have noted the provisions of paragraph 3, and the amplification of the principle of the full local control which is provided for on page 8 of the Imperial General Staff Memorandum is concurred in.

I am to add that the Earl of Crewe will doubtless agree with the Army Council that, in view of the forthcoming Imperial Conference, when matters connected with

* No. 121. † L.F. transmitting copy of 20670: not printed.
‡ No. 14 in Dominions No. 14. § No. 120.

the Imperial General Staff will be discussed, little advantage would be gained at the present juncture by entering into detailed correspondence on this important subject.

I am, &c.,
E. W. D. WARD.

23364

No. 126.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

SIR, Downing Street, 22 July, 1909.
I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant* relative to the Imperial General Staff, and to request you to inform the Army Council that his Lordship concurs in the view expressed in the last paragraph of your letter as to the inadvisability of entering into detailed correspondence on the subject at this juncture.

I am to take this opportunity to transmit to you, for the information of the Army Council, two copies of Commonwealth of Australia Provisional Regulations under the Defence Acts, 1903-4.†

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

25773

No. 127.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2 August, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 129.]

(No. 146.)

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne,
29th June, 1909.

MY LORD,
IN continuation of my cablegram, dated 28th May last,‡ I now have the honour to confirm the information contained therein to the effect that the Commonwealth Government have selected Colonel Bridges to be the Australian representative in London on the Imperial General Staff. The Government in making this appointment concurs with the duties proposed in the penultimate paragraph of Part II. of the Memorandum§ on the formation of an Imperial General Staff by General Sir William Nicholson, dated 7th December, 1908, and it is hoped that the War Office may be able to approve of Colonel Bridges taking up these duties at the conclusion of the Imperial Conference.

2. Colonel Bridges will be kept informed by the Defence Department of all matters connected with the military forces of the Commonwealth, and the Government would be glad if he could be consulted in the selection of Imperial officers for employment in the Commonwealth or in exchange for officers of the Commonwealth military forces.

3. The Government would also be glad if a General Staff Officer, First Grade, qualified for the position of Director of Training on the Australian General Staff, could be sent to Australia in exchange for Colonel Bridges. Both these officers would be paid their salaries by their respective Governments, but their travelling allowances would be defrayed by the Government with whose troops they are serving, and at the same rates.

I have, &c.,
DUDLEY,
Governor-General

* No. 125.
† 17988: not printed.

‡ Statutory Rules, 1909, No. 53 (see 23278: not printed).
§ See No. 1 in [Cd. 4475] February, 1909.

No. 128.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 130.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 12 August, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 31st May,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, for the consideration of the Army Council, the enclosed copy of a despatch† from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia relative to the appointment of Colonel Bridges as the Australian representative in London on the Imperial General Staff.

I am, &c.,

H. W. JUST.

25773

No. 129.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 298.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 13 August, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's despatch, No. 146, of the 29th June,† relative to the appointment of Colonel Bridges as the Representative of the Commonwealth on the Imperial General Staff, and to request you to inform your Ministers that a copy has been forwarded to the War Office for the consideration of the Army Council.

I have, &c.,

CREWE.

27994

No. 130.

AUSTRALIA.

WAR OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received August 21, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 132.]

SIR,

War Office, London, S.W., 20th August, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 25773/1909, dated 12th August, 1909,‡ enclosing a copy of a despatch from the Governor-General of Australia relative to the appointment of Colonel Bridges as the Australian representative in London on the Imperial General Staff, I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that they concur in the recommendations made by the Governor-General regarding the appointment, and will give Colonel Bridges every facility to acquire information on the various points indicated in the penultimate paragraph of the memorandum on the formation of an Imperial General Staff.

In regard to paragraph 3 of the Governor-General's letter, I am to point out that a General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, qualified for the position of Director of Training, could not be sent to Australia in exchange for Colonel Bridges, as both officers would, clearly, be performing duties in the interests of the Commonwealth, and in these circumstances, the principle governing the exchange of officers is inapplicable.

If, however, the Government of Australia is desirous of securing the services of a General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, for the position of Director of Training, on loan, such officer to be paid by the Commonwealth Government, the Army Council will be glad to accede to the request.

The Minister representing Australia at the Imperial Defence Conference has also applied for the services of an officer of the Home Regular Army as Inspector-General in Australia.

* 17988 : not printed.

† No. 127.

‡ No. 128.

The Army Council will be glad to take steps to secure the services of a qualified officer for this appointment in accordance with Colonel Foxton's application, which was sent direct to the War Office, and a copy of which, showing the conditions of service and emoluments, is attached to this letter.

I am to add that Colonel Foxton has been shown this correspondence and, it is believed, intends to communicate the substance thereof by cable to his Government.

I am, &c.,

R. H. BRADE.

Enclosure in No. 130.

AUSTRALIAN APPOINTMENTS.

Inspector-General.

Duties.—Is relieved of all responsibility for command and administration. Is required to ascertain and report upon the fitness and readiness of the troops for war and upon the efficiency and readiness of the coast defences. To secure uniformity of training throughout the Commonwealth. Supervise manoeuvres. Will furnish reports upon any special matter the Minister or Board may direct. He has a seat on the Council of Defence, which advises on questions of policy.

Headquarters, Melbourne

Appointment, four years.

Consolidated pay and allowance £1,200 per annum, with travelling allowance when absent from headquarters. Free passage for himself and family to and from the Commonwealth.

Director in General Staff at Headquarters.

This is a new appointment, and the duties have not yet been defined. They will probably be those of Director of Training under the Chief of the General Staff.

Headquarters, Melbourne.

To be paid by Home Government and travelling allowance when absent from headquarters to be paid by the Commonwealth Government.

J. F. G. FOXTON.

5 August, 1909.

29238

No. 131.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8 a.m., 1st September, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by Nos. 133 and 136.]

My despatch 29th June No. 146* in relation to Bridges' connection with Imperial General Staff. Commonwealth of Australia desire that his selection should be accepted as step towards adoption of principle of assimilating organization for war and making the General Staff an entity throughout Empire. If considered more desirable Commonwealth is willing to waive all conditions as to his employment while attached to Imperial General Staff, leaving War Office to allot such duties as may be considered best in defence of interests of Empire defence. An Imperial officer sent in exchange for Bridges would be employed similarly in Australia under the local Chief of General Staff on the general lines laid down in General Nicholson's memorandum.—DUDLEY.

29238

No. 132.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 135.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 2 September, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th of August,† I am directed by the

* No. 127.

† No. 130.

Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Army Council, the accompanying copy of a telegram* which has been received from the Governor-General of Australia respecting the conditions of the employment of Colonel Bridges on the Imperial General Staff, and of the Imperial officer to be sent to Australia in his place.

I am to enquire whether, in view of this telegram, the Army Council would desire to add anything to the terms of the War Office letter under reference, a copy of which is being sent to the Governor-General for the consideration of his Ministers.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

27994

No. 133.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 321.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 3 September, 1909.

WITH reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the 1st of September,* I have the honour to transmit to you, for the consideration of your Ministers, the accompanying copy of a letter† from the War Office on the subject of the appointment of Colonel Bridges as the Australian representative in London on the Imperial General Staff and the loan of an Imperial Staff Officer to the Commonwealth Government.

I am communicating your telegram of the 1st instant* to the War Office.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

30610

No. 134.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9.30 a.m., 14th September, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to War Office, 15 September, 1909. L.F.]

My telegram of 29th May‡ Commonwealth section of Staff has been formed, and regulations made on the general principles enunciated in General Nicholson's Memorandum, December 7th,§ and Major-General Hoad has been gazetted Chief of the section.—DUDLEY.

33672

No. 135.

AUSTRALIA.

WAR OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 13 October, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 139.]

SIR,

War Office, London, S.W., 12th October, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 29238/1909, dated 2nd September, 1909,|| enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Governor-General of Australia respecting the conditions of the employment of Colonel Bridges on the Imperial General Staff, and of the Imperial officer to be sent to Australia in his place, I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that they have already expressed their concurrence in the appointment of Colonel Bridges as the Commonwealth Representative on the Imperial General Staff in War Office letter dated 20th August, 1909.†

* No. 131.

† No. 130.

§ See No. 1 in [Cd. 4475], February, 1909.

‡ 18083; not printed.
|| No. 132.

2. The alternative suggestion proposed in the latter portion of the Governor-General's telegram raises a new question, and I am to say that there is, at present, no suitable appointment vacant to which Colonel Bridges could be appointed. If, however, after Colonel Bridges had been at the War Office for some time, and had made himself acquainted with the approved system of carrying out General Staff duties in the Regular Army, a suitable appointment could be found for him in this country, the exchange desired by the Commonwealth Government could be effected. In this case Colonel Bridges could be given the pay of that appointment, the emoluments granted him while in England by the Australian Government being correspondingly reduced. But, pending the selection of Colonel Bridges for such an appointment, it is considered that his emoluments, as well as the charges which will be incurred on account of the British officer to be appointed Director of Training in Australia, must be borne by the Commonwealth Government.

3. I am to add that, as nothing has been mentioned in previous correspondence in regard to the emoluments attaching to the appointment of Director of Training, but as the despatch from Australia, dated 29th June, 1909,* asks for a General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, it is suggested that, as an officer of that grading receives £800 per annum in London, £1,000 per annum would seem to be a suitable emolument for a General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, sent to Australia as Director of Training, with free passage for himself and family to and from Australia, and travelling allowance on the usual scale for an officer of colonel's rank, when absent from Headquarters on duty. The full consolidated rate of emoluments will be payable by Australia for the period of the passage out and home.

I am, &c.,
R. H. BRADE.

33672

No. 136.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 5.55 p.m., 4th November, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram 1st September.† War Office regret no suitable appointment at present vacant to which Colonel Bridges could be appointed. Should suitable vacancy occur at a later date, exchange could be effected. Meanwhile it is considered that emoluments to Colonel Bridges and also to British officer to be appointed Director of Training in Australia should be borne by Commonwealth Government. Despatch‡ follows by mail.—CREWE.

33672

No. 137.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 391.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 5 November, 1909.

IN continuation of my telegram of the 4th instant,§ I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency, for the consideration of your Ministers, a copy of a letter|| from the War Office concerning the employment of Colonel W. T. Bridges on the Imperial General Staff.

2. Your Ministers will observe that there is at present no suitable appointment vacant for which Colonel Bridges could be selected; but they will recognize, I feel sure, that administrative arrangements already existing must sometimes render it difficult or impossible to find immediately vacancies of the kind required in such cases.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* No. 127.

† No. 131.

‡ No. 137.

§ No. 136.

|| No. 135.

37894

No. 138.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 22 November, 1909.)

(No. 247.)

Commonwealth of Australia,
Governor-General's Office, Melbourne,
16th October, 1909.

MY LORD,

IN continuation of my cablegram dated the 14th ultimo,* relative to the formation of the Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff, I now have the honour to forward, herewith, a copy of the regulations which have been issued by the Commonwealth Government in connection with this matter.

2. In accordance with the suggestion of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, referred to in the memorandum of the War Office authorities, dated 12th February last, it has been decided to postpone for a time the appointment of General Staff Officers in commands (Districts).

3. Pending the issue of detailed instructions by the War Office, instructions have been given to the Chief of the Commonwealth Section that the mode of communication between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the local section shall be in accordance with my despatch to your Lordship of 8th April last, No. 78,† paragraph 4 (3).

I have, &c.,
DUDLEY,
Governor-General.

Enclosure in No. 138.

"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA GAZETTE," Saturday, 28th August.

No. 47.]

[1909.

(Extract.)

NOTIFICATION OF PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS, AND OF THE INTENTION TO MAKE
REGULATIONS UNDER THE DEFENCE ACTS, 1903-1904.

Department of Defence, Melbourne, 20th August, 1909.

Pursuant to the "Rules Publication Act 1903," notice is hereby given—

- (1) That His Excellency the Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, was, on the 20th day of August, 1909, pleased to make a Provisional Regulation under the Defence Acts 1903-1904 (Commonwealth Military Regulation 2A—Imperial General Staff—Commonwealth Section), to come into operation as from the 1st July, 1909, which Provisional Regulation may be cited as Statutory Rules 1909, No. 97.
- (2) That it is proposed to make a Regulation under the Defence Acts 1903-1904, and that the Provisional Regulation above mentioned is the draft of the proposed Regulation.
- (3) That copies of the Provisional Regulation may be purchased at the Government Printing Office, Melbourne, at the price of Threepence.
- (4) That any representations or suggestions made in writing by any person interested will be taken into consideration before finally settling the proposed Regulation.

JOSEPH COOK,
Minister of State for Defence.

Copy of "the Regulation" referred to.—

STATUTORY RULES, 1909.

STATUTORY RULE No. 97.

Approved 20th August, 1909, to come into operation as from the 1st July, 1909,
as a Provisional Regulation:—

REGULATIONS (PROVISIONAL) FOR THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH.
Additions.

Add new Regulation—

2A. Imperial General Staff—Commonwealth Section. The Commonwealth
Section of the Imperial General Staff shall comprise:—

- (a) The Head-quarters Section;
- (b) The General Staff in Districts.

The control and direction of the Section shall be vested in the Chief of the
Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff, who will be
assisted at Head-quarters by—

- (a) Director of Defence Organization;
- (b) Director of Military Training;
- (c) Director of Intelligence.

The Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff in Districts shall
consist of such officers of the Permanent and Citizen Forces as may
be approved.

No. 298-309.

Department of Defence, Melbourne, 28th August, 1909.

MILITARY FORCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

His Excellency the Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Federal
Executive Council, has been pleased to approve of the following changes, &c., in
connexion with the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, viz.:—

Imperial General Staff.—Commonwealth Section.

Major-General J. C. HOAD, C.M.G., to be Chief of the Commonwealth Section,
Imperial General Staff, with effect as from the 1st July, 1909.

Captain F. A. WILSON, D.S.O., Royal Field Artillery, to be Director of Military
Training, with effect as from the 1st July, 1909.

Colonel the Honourable J. W. McCAY, V.D., to be Director of Intelligence in
addition to his duties as Officer Commanding the Australian Intelligence Corps,
with effect as from the 1st July, 1909.

37894

No. 139.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

Downing Street, 6 December, 1909.

SIR,

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th October,* I am directed by the
Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, for the observations of the Army Council, the
enclosed copy of a despatch† from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of
Australia relative to the formation of the Commonwealth Section of the Imperial
General Staff.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

X.

Copyright.

46843

No. 140.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| (1. Canada.) | (5. Cape of Good Hope.) |
| (2. Newfoundland.) | (6. Natal.) |
| (3. Australia.) | (7. Transvaal.) |
| (4. New Zealand.) | (8. Orange River Colony.) |
- (Confidential.)

MY LORD,
SIR,

Downing Street, 2 January, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch, Confidential, of the 23rd of October last,* I have the honour to transmit to [Your Excellency] [you], to be laid before your Ministers, the accompanying copies of the text† of the Copyright Convention signed at Berlin on the 13th of November.

2. I propose in due course to forward to you full reports of the proceedings of the Conference, which are to be published as a Parliamentary Paper, but in the meantime I have thought it desirable to communicate the text to your Government [(1, 2, 3, and 8) in order that they may take it into account in deciding upon the proposal contained in my despatch, No. [(542), (132), of the 3rd of September,‡] [(306), (108), of the 2nd of September,§] for the holding of a subsidiary Conference between the representatives of the self-governing Dominions and of His Majesty's Government to discuss questions respecting Copyright. I take this opportunity of stating that I should be glad to receive a reply to that despatch at the earliest possible date].

3. Your Ministers will observe from the enclosures to this despatch that the ratification of the Convention, if it is decided that His Majesty's Government should ratify it, must be deposited not later than the 1st of July, 1910.

4. I may add that His Majesty's Government are about to appoint a Committee to examine the revised Convention in relation to the existing Copyright Law, and it is hoped that their report will form a useful basis for the discussion in the Conference.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

9006

No. 141.

CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 26 June, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 143.]

(No. 353.)

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 26 May, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to request that Your Excellency will be so good as to invite the attention of your Ministers to my despatch, No. 542, of the 3rd of September,‡ on the subject of a proposed subsidiary conference on the question of copyright.

2. I have to inform you that the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia have appointed Lord Tennyson to be their representative at the conference, and that the Government of New Zealand have expressed their readiness to send a representative to such a conference.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

* No. 116 in Dominions No. 7.
† No. 113 in Dominions No. 7.

‡ In [Cd. 4467] February, 1909.
§ No. 114 in Dominions No. 7.

21816

No. 142.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

THE GOVERNOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1 July, 1909.)

(No. 54.)

MY LORD,

Government House, St. John's, 22 June, 1909.

REFERRING to your despatch, No. 132, of date September 3rd, 1908,* having reference to the Copyright Convention, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter from the Colonial Secretary covering copy of a report by the Attorney-General on the subject, dated 31st March.

I have, &c.,
WM. MACGREGOR.

Enclosure in No. 142.

SIR,

Colonial Secretary's Office, St. John's, Newfoundland, June 14, 1909.

REFERRING to Your Excellency's favour of the 8th instant, addressed to the Honourable the Prime Minister, covering despatch, No. 78, of 17th May, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in reference to the Copyright Convention, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of report upon this matter, of date 31st March last, from the Minister of Justice, which was considered at the meeting of the Committee of Council last evening. I beg to intimate that Ministers concurred in the suggestion of Mr. Morison, and a minute approving the sending of a competent person to represent Newfoundland at the Conference will be submitted in due course for approval by Your Excellency.

I have, &c.,
R. WATSON,
Colonial Secretary.

His Excellency

Sir Wm. MacGregor, G.C.M.G., C.B.,
&c., &c.

Attorney-General's Office,

St John's, Newfoundland, 31st March, 1909.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 19th, enclosing copy of Confidential despatch, dated January 2nd last, having reference to the Copyright Convention. I have also had under consideration despatch No. 132, dated September 3rd, 1908, forwarded by His Excellency the Governor to the late Prime Minister and the enclosure contained therein.

From these documents it appears that the Board of Trade has come to the conclusion that there is no prospect, in the immediate future, of there being such a general agreement between His Majesty's Government and the self-governing Dominions of the Crown as may result in the enactment of an Imperial Act dealing comprehensively with copyright in the Empire. His Majesty's Government have decided, therefore, to abandon for the present the proposed legislation dealing with this subject.

I have considered the list of suggested amendments upon specific points contained in despatch of September 3rd, 1908, and think that a discussion of them by a subsidiary conference, with a view to concurrent legislation, if an agreement can be arrived at, may assist in clearing away some of the difficulties which surround this vexed question.

Should such a conference be arranged I would advise the Government to give favourable consideration to the suggestion to send a competent person to represent Newfoundland at the Conference.

I have, &c.,
D. MORISON,
Acting Attorney-General.A. Mews, Esq.,
Deputy Colonial Secretary.

* No. 113 in Dominions No. 7.

No. 143.

CANADA.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 10 July, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, July 17, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 148.]

(No. 320.)

MY LORD,

Ottawa, 28th June, 1909.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 26th May, 1909, No. 353, and to my telegram of the 21st instant,* regarding the proposal to hold a subsidiary conference to discuss questions respecting copyright in the Empire, I have the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, an approved copy of a Minute of the Privy Council for Canada, which formed the basis of my telegram.

I have, &c.,

C. FITZPATRICK,

Administrator.

Enclosure in No. 143.

CERTIFIED COPY of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Administrator on the 21st June, 1909.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration despatches, dated, respectively, 3rd September, 1908, 14th September, 1908, 18th February, 1909, 12th May, 1909, and 26th May, 1909, from the Right Honourable the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the subject of the enactment of an Imperial Act dealing comprehensively with Copyright in the Empire and of the proposal for the holding of a subsidiary conference between the representatives of the self-governing Dominions and of His Majesty's Government to discuss questions respecting Copyright with a view to concurrent legislation.

The Minister of Agriculture, to whom the despatches were referred, states that, in his opinion, it is advisable, desirable, and in the interest of Canada, that the Dominion should be represented at the proposed Copyright Conference, and that a representative should be sent to meet the representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia and of the Dominion of New Zealand, the Governments of both countries having expressed their readiness to send representatives to the proposed Conference.

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Minister of Agriculture, advise that Your Excellency may be pleased to cable an answer in the sense of this Minute to the Right Honourable the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,

Clerk of the Privy Council.

28730

No. 144.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

[Copy to Board of Trade, 27 September, 1909. L.F.]

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| (1.) (Canada. No. 584.) | (5.) (Cape of Good Hope. No. 264.) |
| (2.) (Newfoundland. No. 144.) | (6.) (Natal. No. 188.) |
| (3.) (Australia. No. 343.) | (7.) (Transvaal. No. 303.) |
| (4.) (New Zealand. No. 180.) | (8.) (Orange River Colony. No. 161.) |

MY LORD,

SIR,

Downing Street, 24th September, 1909.

WITH reference to [(1) Sir C. Fitzpatrick's despatch, No. 320, of the 28th

* No. 141, and 21012: not printed.

June], [(2) Sir W. MacGregor's despatch, No. 54, of the 22nd of June], [(3) Your despatch, No. 321, of the 31st of December last], [(4) your despatch, No. 87, of the 23rd of November last], [(5) your despatch, No. 3, of the 5th of January], [(6) Sir M. Nathan's despatch, No. 276, of the 16th of November last], [(7) your despatch, No. 19, of the 18th of January], [(8) your despatch, No. 15, of the 1st of February].* I have the honour to request you to inform your Ministers that His Majesty's Government would suggest that it would be most convenient for the proposed subsidiary conference on copyright to meet in London early in the spring of next year, say, in March or April next. If your Ministers concur in this proposal, the exact date of assembling can be arranged by telegraph later.

2. [To Canada, Newfoundland, and New Zealand.] I shall be glad to be informed in due course of the name of the representative whom your Government desire to send to the proposed Conference.

2. [To South African Colonies only.] I regret that it has not been found practicable to defer the meeting of the Conference until after the Union of the four South African Colonies has been accomplished. But I would suggest that your Government should, in consultation with the other Governments, appoint a representative to watch over the interests of British South Africa. Such a delegate cannot, of course, pledge in any way the future Union Government, but it may be hoped that his presence and advice may assist in the formulation of proposals which that Government may be able to accept when they are submitted to them later.

3. Copies of the replies† which have been received from the Governments of the various self-governing Dominions to my despatches of the 2nd and 3rd of September‡ proposing a subsidiary conference are enclosed for the information of your Ministers.

I have, &c.,

CREWE.

SCHEDULE OF ENCLOSURES.

1. Officer Administering the Government of Canada, No. 320, 28th June.
2. Governor, Newfoundland, No. 54, 22nd June.
3. Governor-General, Australia, No. 321, 31st December, 1908.
4. Governor, New Zealand, No. 87, 23rd November, 1908.
5. Governor, Cape, No. 284, 30th November, 1908.
6. Governor of Natal, No. 3, 5th January.
7. Governor, Natal, No. 276, 16th November, 1908.
8. Officer Administering the Government of the Transvaal, No. 390, 2nd November, 1908.
9. Officer Administering the Government of the Transvaal, No. 19, 18th January.
10. Governor, Orange River Colony, No. 15, 1st February.

34183

No. 145.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 18 October, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 25 October, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 96.)

MY LORD,

Government House, St. John's, 7th October, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch, No. 144, of the 24th September, 1909,§ on the subject of copyright, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that my Ministers have no objection to the time suggested for the subsidiary Conference. The latter days of April would probably be most convenient for a representative from this Colony to attend the Conference, the name of whom will be submitted to your Lordship in due course.

I have, &c.,

RALPH WILLIAMS.

* Nos. 143 and 142 in this book, and Nos. 118 and 120 to 124 in Dominions No. 7.

† No. 117 to 124 in Dominions No. 7 and Nos. 142 and 143 in this book.

‡ Nos. 113 and 114 in Dominions No. 7.

§ No. 144.

No. 146.

SOUTH AFRICA.

THE AGENT-GENERAL FOR THE TRANSVAAL to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received November 24, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 147.]

SIR, 72, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W., 23 November, 1909.
I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Governments of the Cape Colony, Transvaal, Natal, and Orange River Colony have agreed that I should be the representative appointed to watch over the interests of British South Africa at the subsidiary Conference on copyright to meet in London about March or April, 1910. I understand that a despatch has been addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies informing him of my appointment.

I have, &c.,
RICHARD SOLOMON.

38197

No. 147.

SOUTH AFRICA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to THE AGENT-GENERAL FOR THE TRANSVAAL.

SIR, Downing Street, 8 December, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd November,* reporting that you have been appointed to watch over the interests of British South Africa at the forthcoming subsidiary Conference on copyright.

I am to state that Lord Crewe has been duly notified of your appointment by the Governors of the Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

41295

No. 148.

CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 752.)

MY LORD, Downing Street, 23 December, 1909.
WITH reference to the Acting Governor-General's despatch, No. 320, of the 28th of June,† and to previous correspondence relating to the proposal to hold a subsidiary Conference between representatives of the self-governing Dominions and of His Majesty's Government on the subject of copyright, I have the honour to transmit to you, for the information of your Ministers, the accompanying report‡ of the Committee appointed to examine how far the law of the United Kingdom would appear to require to be altered so as to enable His Majesty's Government to give effect to the Revised International Copyright Convention, signed at Berlin on November 13, 1908.

The appendix to the report will be transmitted at a later date, when it is published.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

41295

No. 149.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.

[Copy to Board of Trade, December 30th, 1909. L.F.]

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| [(1.) Australia. No. 456.] | [(5.) Natal. No. 237.] |
| [(2.) New Zealand. No. 226.] | [(6.) Transvaal. No. 393.] |
| [(3.) Newfoundland. No. 203.] | [(7.) Orange River Colony. No. 203.] |
| [(4.) Cape of Good Hope. No. 329.] | |

MY LORD,

SIR,

Downing Street, 24 December, 1909.

WITH reference to [(1 and 2) my] [your] despatch, No. [(1) 343, of the 24th

* No. 146.

† No. 143.

‡ [Cd. 4976].

of September*, [(2) 180, of the 24th of September*], [(3) 96, of the 7th of October†], [(4) 250, of the 28th of October†], [(5) 179, of the 25th of October†], [(6) 354, of the 8th of November†], [(7) 172, of the 1st of November†], I have the honour to transmit to [your Excellency] [you], for the information of your Ministers, copies of the Report§ of the Committee appointed to consider in what respects it would be necessary to amend the existing Law of Copyright in this country so as to enable His Majesty's Government to give effect to the revised International Copyright Convention signed at Berlin on the 13th of November, 1908.

2. The Appendices to the Report will be forwarded as soon as they have been issued.

I have, &c.,
CREWE.

41620

No. 149A.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 27 December, 1909.)

[Copy to Board of Trade, 5 January, 1910. L.F.]

(No. 271.)

MY LORD, Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 18th November, 1909. -
REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch, No. 343, dated 24th September last,* respecting the proposed subsidiary Conference on Copyright, to be held in London next year, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I am advised by His Majesty's Prime Minister of the Commonwealth that the Government concurs in the Conference being held at the time suggested and proposes to ask Lord Tennyson to represent the Commonwealth thereat.

I have, &c.,
DUDLEY,
Governor-General.

XI.

Silver Coinage.

19979

No. 150.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.45 a.m., 15th June, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Ministers request me to send you following message:—

Commonwealth of Australia would be glad if Royal Mint authorities can be informed it has been decided to introduce distinctive Australian coinage in accordance with Secretary of State's despatches, 18th December, 1907, and 3rd April, 1908.¶ It is desired that dies be prepared for 2s., 1s., 6d., and 3d. coins; design to be His Majesty's effigy on obverse and outline of map of Australia with word "Australia" across it on reverse; usual designation of His Majesty round rim of obverse. Denomination of coin round rim of reverse on which also date to be shown. Would be glad to learn if authorities recommend dimensions of coins to be different from existing coins in order to distinguish. It is desired that utmost expedition be used.

—DUDLEY.

* No. 144.

† No. 145.

‡ 37964, 38000, 38559, 37956: not printed (reporting Sir R. Solomon's appointment) see No. 146.

§ [Cd. 4976].

¶ Nos. 206 and 210 in Dominions No. 5.

No. 151.

AUSTRALIA.

COLONIAL OFFICE to TREASURY.

[Answered by No. 152.]

SIR,

Downing Street, 16 June, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th March, 1908,* I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, the accompanying copy of a telegram† from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the subject of the introduction of a distinctive Australian silver coinage.

2. Lord Crewe would be glad if their Lordships, provided that they see no objection to the proposals of the Commonwealth Government, would instruct the Deputy-Master of the Mint to prepare dies in accordance with the request of the Commonwealth Government.

3. It will be observed that the Commonwealth Government have abandoned the proposal to introduce decimal currency and that they are anxious to learn whether the dimensions of the coins should be different from those of the existing silver coinage in order to render distinction between the two easy.

4. I am at the same time to enclose copy of the despatch of 3rd April, 1908,‡ referred to in Lord Dudley's telegram, and to explain that copy of the despatch of 18th December, 1907,§ was enclosed in the letter from this Department of 25th February, 1908.||

I am, &c.,

H. BERTRAM COX.

20983

No. 152.

AUSTRALIA.

TREASURY to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 24 June, 1909.)

[Copy to Governor-General, 2 June, 1909. No. 242. L.F.]

SIR,

Treasury Chambers, 23rd June, 1909.

IN reply to Mr. Cox's letters of the 16th and 17th instant (19979/09 and 20177/09),‡ enclosing copy of a telegram from the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia relative to a proposal for the introduction of a distinctive Australian silver coinage, I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that the Deputy Master of the Mint has been instructed to prepare dies after the designs specified by the Commonwealth Government.

It is not considered necessary that the new coins should be of different dimensions from those already in use, as the variations of design will be sufficient distinction, and a difference of dimension is on other grounds undesirable.

I am to add that a shipment of the new coins will probably not be ready before the end of September.

I am, &c.,

T. L. HEATH.

COLONIAL OFFICE NOTE.—The designs of the coinage were decided upon after further correspondence, which is not printed.

XII.

Marriage Facilities.

No. 153.

THE REGISTRAR-GENERAL to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received 23 April, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 154.]

General Register Office, Somerset House, London, W.C.,

SIR,

22nd April, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir C. Lucas's letter of the 15th February,** and to transmit, for the consideration of the Secretary of State (1)

* No. 209 in Dominions No. 5.

† No. 150.

‡ No. 210 in Dominions No. 5.

§ No. 206 in Dominions No. 5.

|| 6615/08: not printed.

¶ No. 151 and one not printed.

** No. 128 in Dominions No. 7.

a revised draft Bill to provide further facilities for the marriage of British subjects residing in different parts of His Majesty's Dominions; and (2) a Memorandum setting forth in detail the principal arguments, both practical and sentimental, in favour of the proposed legislation.

I should have sent these documents at an earlier date, but I judged it desirable first to submit the draft Bill to the Registrars-General of Scotland and Ireland, in order to ascertain whether its provisions met with their approval. I have not yet been favoured with the views of the Registrar-General for Scotland, who has probably been fully occupied with pressing matters in connection with his approaching retirement; but I have received a reply from the Registrar-General for Ireland, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose.

I am, &c.,

WM. C. DUNBAR

Registrar-General.

Enclosure 1 in No. 153.

DRAFT BILL.

Marriage of British Subjects.

Whereas it is expedient that marriages between British subjects, one of whom dwells in the United Kingdom and the other in a British Dominion, Colony, or Possession should be facilitated;

Be it therefore enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

1. In the case of an intended marriage in the United Kingdom between a British subject dwelling in the United Kingdom and a British subject dwelling in a British Dominion, Colony or Possession in which Notice for Marriage can be given or banns published and a Certificate issued by a competent Officer stating that all legal requirements have been complied with in accordance with the laws and regulations of such Dominion, Colony, or Possession, it shall be lawful for such Certificate to be accepted as authority for the Marriage by the Registrar or the person whose duty it is to register or solemnize the Marriage in respect of the party dwelling in such Dominion, Colony, or Possession, in the same manner as if it has been a Certificate issued by the Registrar of another district in England or Ireland, and by the Registrar or Session Clerk in another parish or district in Scotland.

2. When the necessary arrangements have been made in a British Dominion, Colony or Possession, by Statute or otherwise, it shall be lawful, in the case of an intended Marriage in such British Dominion, Colony or Possession between a British Subject dwelling therein and a British subject dwelling in a place in the United Kingdom, for the party dwelling in the United Kingdom to give Notice of Marriage in like manner and on payment of the like fee as if that party were about to be married in that place, and in England and Ireland the Notice shall be given to the Superintendent Registrar or Registrar, and in Scotland to the Registrar of the Parish or District, and the Superintendent Registrar or Registrar in England and Ireland shall deal with the Notice and give a Certificate for Marriage in like manner and on payment of the like fee as in the case of a Marriage by Certificate without licence in his District, and in Scotland the Registrar shall deal with the Notice and give a Certificate for Marriage in accordance with the terms of the "Marriage Notice (Scotland) Act 1878."

3. When the Marriage is not Solemnized within three months next after the date on which the Notice for it has been given to and entered by the person empowered to receive and enter such Notice, the Notice shall be void and the intended Marriage shall not be Solemnized under that Notice.

4. A caveat against an intended Marriage under this Act may be entered in England or Ireland in like manner and on payment of like fees as in the case of an intended Marriage of two persons dwelling in England or Ireland.

5.* If any person enters a caveat against an intended Marriage on grounds which the Superintendent Registrar, Registrar or, in case of appeal, the Registrar

* NOTE.—The Registrar-General for Ireland is of opinion that this power should be vested alone in the Registrar-General so far as Ireland is concerned (see copy of his letter herewith).

General declares to be frivolous, that person shall be liable to pay as a debt to the applicant for the Certificate such sum as the Superintendent Registrar, Registrar, or in case of appeal, the Registrar General considers to be the proper compensation for the damage caused to the applicant by the entering of the caveat.

6. An objection may be entered against the granting of a Certificate under this Act in Scotland, in the like manner as prescribed by Part II. B. of the Schedule to the "Marriage with Foreigners Act, 1906."

7. Any person who knowingly and wilfully makes a false Oath or signs a false Notice under this Act for the purpose of procuring a Certificate under Section (a) shall suffer the penalties of perjury.

8. His Majesty the King in Council may make regulations:—

(a) Prescribing the forms to be used under this Act, and making such other provision as may seem necessary or expedient for carrying into effect the purpose of this Act; and

(b) Revoking, altering, or adding to any Order in Council made under this Act.

9. This Act shall not extend to the Marriage of any of the Royal Family.

10. This Act may be cited as the "Marriage of British Subjects (Facilities) Act."

Enclosure 2 in No. 153.

MARRIAGE OF BRITISH SUBJECTS (FACILITIES) BILL.

Among the anomalies in the existent marriage laws of this country is the fact that no provision has been made for facilitating marriages where one party resides in the United Kingdom and the other in a British Colony or Possession. An Englishman or woman desiring to be married to a British Subject resident in some part of the King's overseas dominions cannot obtain from any civil authority any document in furtherance of such a marriage, nor can legal notice of such marriage be given in this country. On the other hand any person coming to this country from our overseas dominions who desires to marry in this country cannot do so without fulfilling English conditions as to residence and notice.

The law has made provision to facilitate the marriages of British subjects one of whom resides in a foreign country by the Foreign Marriage Act of 1892, and to facilitate marriages between persons one of whom is British and the other a foreigner by the Marriage with Foreigners Act of 1906. It is only those persons who reside within the British Empire and outside the United Kingdom who find themselves absolutely ignored in this respect.

This anomaly it is the object of the Bill now proposed to remove.

In the report of the "Royal Commission on the Laws of Marriage (1868)," the Commissioners laid down among the essentials to a sound marriage law:—

(1) "That as far as is consistent with securing correct information preliminary to the marriage contract and with ensuring due evidence of the marriage contracted, it is of the utmost importance that every reasonable and proper facility be given for celebrating marriage," and

(2) "That it is the duty of the State to discourage and place obstacles in the way of sudden and clandestine marriages."

Generally speaking the existing procedure for marriage in the various parts of the British Empire may be grouped into:—

(1) Marriage by Certificate or Banns,

(2) Marriage by Licence.

The former method generally involves a longer period of notice and residence and is comparatively inexpensive; the latter costs more in money but requires a shorter time for the completion of the formalities. Thus in England a civil marriage by certificate costs seven shillings and involves a residence by both parties for seven days before notice can be given, while an interval of 21 complete days must intervene after the day of notice before the marriage may take place. Civil marriage by licence costs £2 12s., and involves a residence of 15 days by one party before the

notice, while one week day must intervene between the notice and the marriage; in this case residence in England on the day on which notice is given is all that is required of the other party. In the Cape of Good Hope for civil marriage by notice a residence of 21 days is necessary and there is no fee for the marriage, while for marriage by licence £5 must be paid but no residential qualification is required.

From these examples it may be seen that the facilities for marriage are largely dependent upon monetary considerations.

Let us take two recent cases which have come before the notice of this Department. In the first an Englishwoman going out to the Cape desired to be married immediately on her arrival there. She was a member of a Congregational Church and the Minister wrote here on her behalf. We could only reply that the Superintendent Registrar could not accept any notice for the marriage, and that the alternatives were, either to have the banns called in the Parish Church—a course to which many Nonconformists have a strong objection, and for which moreover it is doubtful whether there is statutory authority—or for the parties to pay £5 for a licence in Cape Town. This is quite a typical case, and for one of these that comes under the notice of the Registrar General there must be many more that do not. In the other case the marriage was to take place at Lambeth in a Baptist Chapel. One of the parties resided in Canada and was only able to be in England "between boats," i.e., about a week. Consequently the marriage had to be by licence with its attendant expense.

In each case facilities existed but these were to be obtained only on payment of increased fees, surely the least satisfactory way of dealing with so important a social contract as marriage. How far do such marriages fulfil the conditions laid down as essential by the Royal Commission of 1868?

In the case of marriage by licence in the Cape of Good Hope, no notice of marriage is given either in this country or in the Colony; a simple declaration of no legal impediment and the payment of a fee of £5 being all that is necessary by way of legal preliminaries. So far from placing any obstacle in the way of sudden and clandestine marriage this seems rather to facilitate it, for the laws of this country give no opportunity for due notice of the marriage to be given in the district of residence of the bride, although she is desirous of giving this notice.

The object of giving public notice of an intended marriage is to allow of any proper legal objection being taken before the marriage is solemnized. To achieve this purpose it is obvious that the district or place in which the party or parties reside and in which at least one of them is presumably known, is the one where such notice ought to be given. What knowledge of a young woman resident in Blackburn can we expect to find in Cape Town? Or, in the second case, of what value from this point of view would notice in Lambeth be for the man arriving from Canada on the day on which the notice is given?

The importance of providing facilities for notice of marriage to be given in the district of residence cannot be too strongly urged.

There is, however, another consideration which should not be ignored, and that is the feeling of security which the giving of public Notice of an intended marriage produces on the mind of the party giving it. This is particularly the case with women, and it is not the least hardship from their point of view that they should have no opportunity provided of giving such a notice. The popular view of marriages is not based upon the legislative enactments as to their validity so much as on a general and indefinite conception of what is necessary to render a marriage legal and binding, and it is of the highest importance that this general conception should be in accord with the legal position. It is not too much to say that many a woman has left this country to be married in one of our Colonies, miserably apprehensive as to the validity of the tie she is about to contract, because she has not been able to give public notice of her intended marriage in the place where she lived and was known.

The Cape of Good Hope has already passed special legislation, authorising the acceptance as authority for a marriage in the Colony of a certificate of banns proclaimed in the country of residence where the party resides outside the Colony. But in England the legal publication of banns is restricted to the Church of England and there is no provision for the publication of banns for a marriage outside the United Kingdom. Section 33 of 4 George IV., Cap. 76, limits the Act to England,

and it is extended to Scotland and Ireland by the Acts 49 and 50 Vict., Cap. 3, and 62 and 63 Vict., Cap. 27.

The proposed Bill would go far to remedy this state of things. It would, in the case of marriages solemnized in the United Kingdom, enable a certificate of notice given in a British Colony in the place where one of the parties resided to be accepted in England, and thus secure any safeguard which is to be gained by the giving of public notice. Under our present law this safeguard is non-existent, for notice for such a marriage must be given in England, and as has been already pointed out, such a notice in so far as it relates to a person domiciled in a distant part of the Empire is valueless. In the case of a marriage in the Colonies the Bill will provide the machinery whereby arrangements may be made with Colonial Governments for a certificate of notice given in the United Kingdom to be accepted in the place where the marriage is to be solemnized. This is a triple advantage: (1) it would enable notice to be given in the place where it is effective; (2) it would enable a woman to be married immediately on her arrival without the payment of additional fees; and (3) it would give her the feeling that she had gone through a legal preliminary in the place of her domicile, and that her intended marriage had been published among those by whom she was known.

The Bill will secure, in so far as it is possible for our Legislature to do so, *through the State*, those proper facilities which should exist for marriages between persons resident in different portions of the British Dominions, and will remove the reproach that while our marriage legislation has taken count of many other contingencies, nothing has been done for this important and increasing class of marriages.

These are the immediate practical advantages of the proposed Bill. Beyond these there is the point that this little Bill adds another slender tie to the sentiment of the unity of the British Empire. The Registrar General's Regulations contain this paragraph: "No civil preliminaries can be taken in this country for a marriage to be celebrated in any British Colony or British Possession abroad, notwithstanding one of the parties may be resident here," and it is difficult to conceive anything more calculated to destroy that sentiment of unity. If the Bill had no recommendation beyond this sentimental one it would, nevertheless, on that ground alone be worthy of support. It is permissive and modest in its character, and can be brought into operation without involving friction of any kind, and perhaps it is not too much to hope that the advantages under it will lead, in the course of a very few years, to its universal adoption throughout the British Dominions, and that this may prove the first step toward an assimilation of the principles of marriage law throughout the Empire.

General Register Office,
Somerset House, W.C.

Enclosure 3 in No. 153.

General Register Office, Charlemont House,
Dublin, 15th March, 1909.

SIR, I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant (R/09), and to state that the draft Bill enclosed therewith appears to meet all the requirements of the case as regards Ireland, except that in this country it would not be advisable to confer on local officers the power of adjudicating damages under Section 5, which should be vested alone in the Registrar General.

I am, &c.,
R. E. MATHESON,
Registrar General

The Registrar General,
General Register Office,
Somerset House, London, W.C.

13700

No. 154.

COLONIAL OFFICE to the REGISTRAR-GENERAL.

SIR,

Downing Street, 23 December, 1909.

I AM directed by the Earl of Crewe to inform you that he has had under his consideration your letter of the 22nd of April,* on the subject of the proposed legislation to provide further facilities for the marriage of British subjects residing in different parts of His Majesty's Dominions. Lord Crewe has not yet received any expression of the views of the Registrar-General for Scotland on the subject.

2. Lord Crewe has no objection to legislation of the nature indicated in the memorandum enclosed in your letter, but I am to point out that the draft Bill which accompanied your letter is still open to possible objection on the constitutional ground that it purports to legislate for matters occurring in a British Colony. In particular, Section 3 provides that the notice shall be void if the marriage is not solemnised within three months, and that the intended marriage shall not be solemnised under that notice. To enact such a provision would be to legislate for matters occurring within a Colony, and it is possible that the wording of Section 2 as it at present stands might be considered in the Colonies to be objectionable.

3. In his Lordship's opinion, the Bill should be confined to providing that where the law of the Colony provides for notice of marriage being given there in respect of a marriage to be celebrated in the United Kingdom, His Majesty may, by Order in Council, declare that the Act applies to that Colony, and that thereupon a certificate of the notice of marriage issued in the Colony shall be accepted as if it were a certificate of notice issued in the United Kingdom, and that where a Colony has legislated to provide for the acceptance of a marriage notice issued in the United Kingdom as a notice for a marriage in the Colony, the Registrar or other appropriate officer may issue a certificate of the notice for a marriage to be celebrated in the Colony.

4. Lord Crewe would, therefore, be glad if the draft Bill as amended could be submitted for further consideration.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

XIII.

Suez Canal Dues.

17570

No. 155.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received May 16, 1908.)

(No. 97.)

MY LORD,

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, 14th April, 1908.

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch, No. 203, dated 31st October, 1906,† respecting the charges on shipping using the Suez Canal, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a communication addressed to my Prime Minister by the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the Commonwealth, in which it is suggested that the time has arrived when this matter should receive reconsideration with a view to a further reduction in the rate of charges.

2. In his memorandum to me upon this matter, my Prime Minister states that "This question continues to excite considerable interest in Australia, where every step that tends to facilitate intercourse between the Commonwealth and Great Britain will be warmly welcomed."

I have, &c.,
NORTHCOTE,
Governor-General.

Enclosure in No. 155.

The Associated Chambers of Commerce of the
Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Exchange,
Sydney, New South Wales, 24th March, 1908.

SUEZ CANAL DUES.

SIR,

REFERRING to previous correspondence on this subject, I shall be glad to hear if you have been able to make any material progress in your negotiations with the British Government, for reduction of the dues charged on shipping making use of the Canal, as the matter is one of great importance to the producing interests of Australia, seeing the very high charges collected from cargo steamers renders it almost prohibitive for those vessels to use the Canal, when trading with Australia, notwithstanding the fact that the passage via Suez Canal would be considerably shorter and less boisterous than via Cape of Good Hope.

I find that the Canal Company has paid another high dividend to its shareholders, so that the British Government, at the present time, have received back their originally invested capital, plus $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. interest, and in addition thereto, have now received a sum of £7,654,000, at least three-fifths of which has been paid by British shipping.

Although it is a matter which you cannot well take up in your correspondence with the Imperial Government, yet it is a fact, that a large section of British ship-owners claim that the present London Committee of the Suez Canal Company does not contain an equitable representation of British shipping interests which make use of the Canal. The London Committee consists almost exclusively of what might be termed "Mail Line interests," which it is well known do not on many occasions see eye to eye with the owners of tonnage catering more particularly for cargo.

The commercial community of Australia appreciate the action you have taken in the past, regarding the Canal charges, and hope that you will not lessen your efforts in endeavouring to secure a material reduction. I therefore hope that you may be able to communicate to me that some satisfactory progress has been made, so that I can communicate same to the commercial community at our approaching meeting in Brisbane, on 19th May next.

The Honourable
The Prime Minister, Melbourne.

I have, &c.,

J. MAITLAND PAXTON,
President.

CO 686/2/5

Printed for the use of the Imperial Conference.

Dominions
No. 12.
CONFIDENTIAL.

EXTRACTS

FROM

PROCEEDINGS OF COLONIAL CONFERENCES

RELATING TO

DEFENCE.

COLONIAL OFFICE,
July, 1909.

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I.

COLONIAL CONFERENCE, 1887.

A.

EXTRACT FROM OPENING STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (SIR H. T. HOLLAND), 4TH APRIL, 1887.

* * * * *

Now the first subject referred to in Mr. Stanhope's letter of invitation was organization for military defence, and he was justified in saying that the question is at once urgent and capable of useful consideration. For myself, I shall not consider this Conference to fail if it does nothing more than place military and naval defence on a sound footing.

Before dealing with naval defence, I wish to make some general observations on land defence, with a view to show the pressing necessity of defending certain stations, and the steps that have been taken up to this time in that direction.

Prior to 1878 little had been done to modernize the external defences of the Empire. While the fortresses at home and abroad had been to a great extent re-constructed and re-armed, the coaling stations were for the most part undefended, or retained obsolete smooth-bores and methods of defence dating back to the beginning of the century. At the same time, vast Colonial progress had been made, which, while it added strength and prosperity to the Empire, at the same time greatly increased its vulnerability.

In addition to the internal trade of the Empire, a great carrying trade has grown up; a trade depending for its existence on security, and involving, therefore, new responsibilities. During the same period steam has become the motive force on which the movements and the fighting capability of ships of war depend, so that failing an assured coal supply, no navy, however powerful, will be able to operate with effect in distant waters. The introduction of steam power affects the question of Imperial defence in another direction also. By its means rapid and certain naval combinations can be made, so that the liability of the outlying ports of the Empire to sudden attack, no longer impeded by wind and weather, is vastly increased. Similarly, the development of the telegraph cable systems of the world has further facilitated rapid and unexpected measures of aggression.

The apprehension of war in 1878 brought these facts into strong relief, and the first Colonial Defence Committee was appointed to consider what steps could be taken at short notice to provide some measure of security for Colonial Ports. On the recommendations of this Committee, considerable sums were expended at various ports, and such armaments as were available were hastily sent out and mounted as satisfactorily as the emergency permitted. The entire recommendations of this Committee were not, however, carried out, since it was recognized that defences thus extemporized could have little permanent value, and that the time had come for a thorough investigation of the defensive requirements of the Empire as a whole.

Accordingly, in 1879, a Royal Commission was appointed "to enquire into the defence of British Possessions and Commerce abroad." The labours of this Commission extended over two years and a half, and resulted in the collection of a great mass of information on various subjects directly and indirectly connected with the question of Imperial defence, while definite recommendations were made as to the selection of coaling stations, and the general adjustment of the relative standard of defence to meet Imperial requirements, and their report forms the basis of the action which is now being taken in relation to the coaling stations.

The matter of the report of the Royal Commission may be classed under three heads:—

- A mass of evidence bearing on the question of Imperial Defence generally.
- Considerations relating to the defensive requirements of the self-governing Colonies, especially those of Australia and New Zealand.
- Similar considerations in relation to Crown Colonies.

A great portion of the evidence laid before the Royal Commission was given on the distinct understanding that it should not be made public, as it was clearly undesirable and unwise to place at the disposal of the Intelligence Departments of Europe detailed information as to the strength and weakness of the Empire, together with the officially recorded views and recommendations of an authoritative and specially qualified body of Commissioners.

It appeared to my predecessors, however, in the case of the self-governing Australasian Colonies which have undertaken the responsibility of their own defence, that the opinions and recommendations of the Royal Commission relating to this group of Colonies should, as a whole, be confidentially communicated to their Governments; and this course was accordingly adopted in 1883.

With regard to the Crown Colonies, for whose defences the Imperial Government, through the Secretary of State, is directly responsible, it was considered undesirable that such detailed communications should be made.

I now propose to refer to some of the main considerations which guided the Royal Commission in its recommendations, and to which I may safely allude. Thus it may not be out of place to call attention to certain figures in relation to the trade and shipping interests, which are very striking, and serve to bring out forcibly the extent to which the prosperity of the Empire depends upon the reality of the available defensive power. It is not too much to say that the whole fabric of the commercial system of the Empire, on which the well-being, and even the existence, of the Colonies, in a great measure depends, is ultimately based upon the defensive power capable of being exerted in time of war.

The value of British ships and of the freight they carry annually was estimated in 1881 to be not less than £900,000,000 (and, I may add, must now be 1,000 millions), of which it is estimated that in the direct trade of the United Kingdom only, £144,000,000 is afloat at any one time; but British interests in sea-borne commerce are really larger, for much of what appears to be foreign trade is either British property or security for British advances. In a war with a maritime power, British interests would be exposed to risk to the extent of two-thirds of the sea-borne trade of the world.

The progress of British shipping—especially of steam shipping—has been very great in recent years. In 1880 the merchant navy of the British Empire equalled in tonnage all the other navies of the world put together, and exceeded them in value and power, owing to the greater proportion of steam ships. This is still true. It may indeed be stated broadly that the sea-going registered tonnage of the world was in 1885-6 close upon 6½ million tons; and of this total, 4½ million tons—more than two-thirds—belong to the British Empire. Great improvements have been made in steam ships, both in increasing speed and in diminishing the consumption of fuel. One ton of coal will now do twice as much work as the same quantity did twenty years ago. A first-class steamer could reach any part of the world without coaling on the way; indeed, such a ship, if filled with coal, could steam for 100 days continuously at an average speed of 11 knots an hour. In practice, the amount of space in a ship that can be devoted to coal is comparatively small, and depends mainly upon the conditions of trade with respect to freight, so that the best steam ships cannot altogether dispense with intermediate supplies of coal, while frequent coaling is a necessity to the slower classes of vessels.

The number of steamers having an ocean speed of 14 knots and upwards is small in proportion, though annually increasing. These vessels, most of which are owned in Great Britain, would be of great value in war; they could outstrip any ship of war, and would require no protection on the high seas. The great bulk of trade is carried on in ships of speeds varying from 8 to 12 knots, which, in time of war, would be exposed to serious danger. In the present circumstances of trade merchant ships could not be adequately protected by convoy, even if ships of war could be spared for the purpose. They must rely, therefore, for security upon such general protection as the navy may be able to afford.

The question of coal supply in relation to Imperial requirements, and also to those of possible enemies, has been carefully considered.

An enemy could obtain coal:—

- (a) In his own ports, or in those of an ally.
- (b) In the ports of a neutral State.
- (c) By seizing it in British ports or in captured trading vessels.
- (d) By supply from colliers at sea sent on to pre-arranged rendezvous.

As to (a), France and other foreign Powers have made great and costly preparations for supporting the operations of their fleets in distant seas.

As to (b), the supply of coals to belligerents in the ports of neutral States is regulated by the laws of those States subject only to the condition that a neutral State must give equal facilities to all belligerents. The rules relating to the supply of coal which accompany every declaration of neutrality by Her Majesty's Government, if universally adopted, would not prevent a belligerent ship from obtaining a full supply of coal in a neutral port, should such port be at a long distance from any port of her own country. It is, moreover, difficult to enforce the rules; and it is doubtful whether the ships of a strong naval Power would submit to their operations being crippled for want of coal by the regulations of a small State in a distant port.

As to (c), coal stored in undefended British ports would be at the mercy of any armed hostile cruiser.

As to (d), the supply from colliers at sea can only be prevented by constant vigilance at foreign ports, followed by prompt action on the part of the fleet.

The necessity of having secure and well-defended coaling stations as the basis of all naval action for the protection of the Imperial commerce and interests is apparent.

Two classes of coaling stations are required:—

- (1) Refitting stations and harbours of refuge in which coal is stored in large quantities. These must be strong enough to resist such attacks as may reasonably be expected, so that Her Majesty's ships may look with the full assurance of certainty to finding in them, at all times, the means of repair and all necessary supplies; while merchant ships will find a refuge from pursuit and the means of coaling in security. The defence of these ports involves a heavy expenditure of money and large garrisons; their number therefore must be as limited as possible.
- (2) Stations at which coal is, and always must be, kept for the navy, but for which it is unnecessary to provide an extensive system of defence. Where the question is simply one of maintaining a stock of coal in security, the defence of a harbour is not always a necessity; the object may be attained by keeping the coal inland and guarding it by a small redoubt beyond the range of artillery fire from ships.

In addition to the Imperial fortresses Malta, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and Halifax, it would seem necessary to defend on an adequate scale, Cape Town and Simon's Bay, St. Helena, Sierra Leone, Port Louis (Mauritius), Aden, Colombo (Ceylon), Singapore, Hong Kong, Port Royal (Jamaica), Port Castries (St. Lucia), and Esquimaux, in addition to minor coaling stations.

Since the issue of the Report of the Royal Commission modifications of various kinds have been adopted. Military progress, especially in relation to armaments, has made great strides, and the guns which are being provided under the existing scheme are more powerful and accurate than those with which the Commission had to deal. It cannot be hoped that finality has in any sense been reached, but the works which are now in process of construction are such as will lend themselves to revision and re-armament at comparatively small expense in the future; while the magazines and other accessories of the defence may fairly be regarded as little likely to be affected by future advances in the power of the attack.

While the defence of British commerce and possessions abroad must be based on the action of a strong navy vigorously handled, and by means of a system of protected coaling stations rendered free to act all over the world, there remains the passive defence of exposed property locally accumulated, as well as the temporary shelter of the slower class of merchant steamers and sailing vessels. In the case of many of the coaling stations the measures of defence now in progress do not merely provide protection for naval stores and coal supply. A great wealth of private property both on shore and afloat will at the same time receive protection, while the defended ports which are being created will provide shelter for slow mercantile steamers and sailing ships at the outset of war, before the action of H.M. Navy has had time to make itself felt. The scale of defence adopted may thus be extended beyond the requirements of a mere protected coal depot, and the defences of coaling stations constitute in some cases an insurance of Colonial property.

On these grounds the Imperial Government has invited certain Colonies where there are mixed Imperial and Colonial interests to share the cost of the necessary

defences. Hong Kong, Singapore, Mauritius, and Ceylon have agreed to the principle of a joint advantage, and are contributing in the aggregate £276,820 towards defences. You will find in some tables which I propose to place in your hands statements of Imperial and Colonial expenditure, under various heads, showing what has been done in connection with the defence of these Colonies during recent years. It will be observed that under the scheme in progress the Imperial and Colonial charges will amount to £882,150 (not including a sum of nearly £200,000 for submarine mine defence) and £276,820 respectively. (Table B.) These amounts do not include a sum of £82,312 incurred on works and mines in accordance with certain recommendations of the Colonial Defence Committee of 1878, given in Table A; besides further sums on works expended between 1879 and 1884, which are not given in detail. Table C shows that the total Imperial expenditure on armaments and stores, exclusive of mines, provided for Colonial stations between 1878 and 1884, amounts to £102,500; and the total provision up to date for these services amounts to £482,474. On the other hand, the self-governing Australian Colonies have from an early period shown great earnestness in defending their own ports, and have agreed in principle to combine for the defence of other ports with which their interests are directly connected. At the present moment the defences of Port Philip and Port Jackson are, having regard to their geographical position, among the strongest in the world.

The heavy expenditure incurred up to date by the great responsible government Colonies is given in a separate statement, so far as replies have been yet received to a telegram and circular despatch sent in January last. It will be seen that the Cape of Good Hope has spent on war expenditure a sum of £1,434,276, and the conditions of the Colony have been such that their military expenditure has been mainly incurred on *personnel*, which has hitherto prevented them from undertaking any considerable or permanent works of defence. Victoria has spent no less than £1,681,110 on her total military defences, and contemplates a further expenditure of £436,000. As I have already pointed out, the Colony is to be congratulated on the complete security which its principal port and city will attain by its wise and liberal policy. When the returns are complete I have little doubt that the other responsible government Colonies will show that, in proportion to their wealth and requirements, they have not neglected their responsibilities in the matter of defence.

While comparatively few of the many commercial ports of the Empire can be defended on a permanent and considerable scale, a moderate local defence for exposed towns can nevertheless be provided, in some cases at a small cost. A port which can offer no defence, even against a boat's crew, is at the mercy of any unarmoured ship or armed merchant vessel, which, in default of any possible resistance, would be able to impose requisitions of money, stores, or valuable goods of any kind. An unarmoured vessel can, however, be fought by field guns mounted in temporary batteries; mines of simple form can be easily laid down; and a small trained force on shore, especially if roughly entrenched, would be able to defeat any landing party which a single ship would be likely to risk in a venture by which no military advantage could be gained. The number of ironclads available for an enemy's offensive operations is limited, and their movements would be watched and defeated as far as possible by H.M.'s Navy. Hence, in many cases, it is mere depredations by single unarmoured ships of war or armed merchant vessels which have to be feared. Small and inexpensive measures of local defence would be able to render such depredations difficult, if not impossible; and the security thus obtained would sufficiently justify the moderate expenditure involved.

In 1885 the present Colonial Defence Committee was appointed in order to facilitate the carrying out of measures involving the action of several departments. This Committee has since made recommendations on a variety of subjects laid before it, as will be seen from the printed papers which I propose to place in your hands. Among the measures carried out by the Colonial Defence Committee I may mention the creation of a convenient and permanent record of Colonial Defences, and the preparation of local schemes of defence.

Turning then to naval defence. In the first place, as I have already stated, the trade carried on in merchant vessels must rely for security upon such general protection as the navy may be able to afford.

The possibility of reinforcing the navy with fast merchant steamships, of which, owing to the late remarkable progress in shipbuilding, there is now a considerable number built and owned in the United Kingdom, must not be lost sight of.

These vessels compare favourably with ships of war in point of speed, and far surpass them in coal-carrying capacity. Their speed will secure them from pursuit, and their comparative independence of coaling stations will enable them to traverse great distances and keep the sea for long periods of time. Although incapable of meeting an enemy's regular cruisers, they would be effective against ships of a like nature employed against our commerce, and would be invaluable as look-out ships, as a means for conveying communications between the Colonies and the United Kingdom, or carrying instructions to ships on distant stations, especially in the event of communication by telegraph being suspended. It is very desirable to encourage the owners of these ships to comply with such regulations as the Admiralty may lay down as to construction and otherwise, so as to enable them to receive moderate armaments, and armaments suitable for them should be provided and stored in different ports.

This matter has received very full consideration, and the Admiralty can now count on many of the fastest steamships in the world, which, with armaments ready prepared, will be able to reinforce the navy on the outbreak of war.

The desirability of strengthening the fleet in Australian waters by the addition of a local force has been discussed in detail by Admiral Tryon, acting in concert with the Premiers of the self-governing Australian Colonies. Papers containing the latest proposals of Her Majesty's Government will be submitted to the Conference.

To sum up this head:—Among the subjects directly or indirectly connected with defence which it appears desirable that the Conference should discuss are:—

- (1) The local defence of ports other than Imperial coaling stations. Among the latter the most important are Thursday Island and King George's Sound, respecting which papers will be laid before you, and I do not doubt the Conference will agree with me in the opinion that a decision should be arrived at in regard to this important question.
- (2) The naval defence of the Australian Colonies. This question has been discussed at much length by Admiral Tryon, and papers will be laid before Conference showing the present position of the matter.
- (3) Measures of precaution in relation to the defences of Colonial ports.
- (4) Various questions arise in connection with the military aspects of telegraph cables, their necessity for purposes of war, and their protection. On these matters the delegates may wish to offer their opinion.
- (5) Questions relating to the employment and training of local or native troops to serve as garrisons of works of defence may fitly be considered.
- (6) Finally, the delegates will be able to state their views as to the defences with which they are concerned, and to obtain recent information with regard to military progress and the opinions now generally held.

I will only add, in the words of Mr. Stanhope, that it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in calling this Conference, "to commit either the Imperial Government or any Colony to new projects entailing heavy expenditure, but rather to secure that the sums which may be devoted to this purpose may be utilized to the fullest extent, with complete knowledge of all the conditions of the problem."

B. PRECEDENCE OF COLONIAL NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT.

I desire to draw your attention to a subject of importance with reference to Colonial naval and military forces, though I know it cannot now be discussed. Several questions arise with regard to the position of the Colonial land forces, both in relation to each other and to the British army. In the event of the forces of two or more Colonies being brought together either for active service or for the purpose of manœuvres, it would be necessary to establish an *order of precedence* which, if

not clearly laid down and understood in advance, would evidently lead to friction and confusion of authority. A rule of precedence is, therefore, necessary, and "the only authority in the Empire who can give such precedence is the Queen." No rule of precedence could well be applied except in accordance with the precedence in seniority of the Colonies. Thus the regular forces of any Colony might receive precedence according to the seniority of the Colony among forces of the same arm of other Colonies. The regular forces of any Colony should receive precedence over all the militia and volunteer forces of the same or of all other Colonies. Similarly, militia, or militia-volunteer forces, would take precedence by the seniority of their Colony over similar forces of other Colonies; and militia would take precedence of all volunteer forces of all other Colonies.

The question of the precedence of officers is somewhat more difficult, and the only solution appears to be that all commissions should be granted by the Queen, for which purpose it would apparently be necessary only that the Colonial Governments should pass Acts authorising Her Majesty to grant them. It is stated that the Queen has power to regulate the rank of Colonial officers under her prerogative. This rank should be substantive as regards other Colonial forces, but honorary as regards the regular army. It would at any time be possible for Her Majesty, if so advised, to confer substantive rank on the officers of Colonial forces acting with the regular army.

As regards the question of relative precedence of the Imperial forces and reserves and Colonial forces, it seems desirable that the latter should rank after corresponding forces of the former on all occasions when they are employed together. Such occasions would necessarily be rare, and it is almost inconceivable that Imperial volunteers should ever act with Colonial volunteers.

Questions of precedence of Colonial forces among each other might well be considered by an inter-Colonial body, who should be asked to recommend rules for Her Majesty's approval.

As soon as these questions have been settled, it appears most desirable that the names of all the officers of Colonial forces of all kinds should be shown once a year in the Army List. They would be grouped under the head of "Colonial Forces," and shown in the order of Colonial precedence.

A further question arises as to the terms of obligation of service of Colonial forces. It is extremely important that these terms should be assimilated.

The following are proposed:—

1. To serve at all times in the defence of their Colony.
2. With the assent of their Colonial Government, and, in the event of that Government providing the means, to aid Her Majesty in any wars in which she may be engaged.
3. In such a case the command must be vested in the commanding officer of Her Majesty's troops.
4. When serving within the Colony to be subject to Colonial law; when serving with Her Majesty's troops beyond the Colony to be subject to the Army Act and the Queen's Regulations.

Similarly, the status and precedence of the naval forces of the Colonies with respect to each other and to the Imperial navy should be defined and laid down, and the names of Colonial naval officers shown annually in the Navy List.

May, 1887.

H. T. HOLLAND.

II.

COLONIAL CONFERENCE, 1897.

A.

EXTRACT FROM OPENING STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (MR. CHAMBERLAIN) 24TH JUNE, 1897.

DEFENCE.

I have said that the question to which I first directed your attention—that of closer relations—is greater than all the rest. I may say that it covers all the

rest, because, of course, if Federation were established, or anything approaching to it, all these other questions to which I am now about to call your attention would be settled by whatever was the representative body of the Federation, and, among them, and in the very first rank, must of necessity come the question of Imperial defence. Gentlemen, you have seen something of the military strength of the Empire; you will see on Saturday an astounding representation of its naval strength, by which alone a Colonial Empire can be bound together. You are aware that that representation—great, magnificent, unparalleled as it will be—is nevertheless only a part of the naval forces of the Empire spread in every part of the globe. The great Mediterranean fleet is still at its full force; the fleets on the various stations are all up to their normal strength, and the fleet which you will see on Saturday next is merely the Reserve and the Home fleet, ready to go anywhere, at any time, in the interests of the Colonies and of the United Kingdom.

This gigantic navy and the military forces of the United Kingdom are maintained, as you know, at heavy cost. I think the charge upon the Exchequer is at the present time something like 35 millions sterling per annum, and it constitutes more than one-third of the total income of the country. Now, these fleets, and this military armament are not maintained exclusively, or even mainly, for the benefit of the United Kingdom or for the defence of home interests. They are still more maintained as a necessity of empire for the maintenance and protection of Imperial trade and of Imperial interests all over the world, and if you will for a moment consider the history of this country during, say, the present century, or, I would say, during the present reign, you will find that every war, great or small, in which we have been engaged has had at the bottom a colonial interest, the interest, that is to say, either of a colony or of a great dependency like India. That is absolutely true, and is likely to be true to the end of the chapter. If we had no Empire there is no doubt whatever that our military and our naval resources would not require to be maintained at anything like their present level.

Now I venture to say that that must necessarily be the case in the future. Look at the condition of the Colonies. Assume—although I am almost ashamed to assume it even for the purpose of argument—assume that these Colonies were separated from the mother country. What would be the position of the great Dominion of Canada? The Dominion of Canada is bordered for 3,000 miles by a most powerful neighbour, whose potentialities are infinitely greater than her actual resources. She comes into conflict in regard to the most important interests with the rising power of Japan, and even in regard to some of her interests with the great empire of Russia. Now, let it not be supposed for a moment that I suggest as probable—I hardly like to think that it is even possible—that there should be a war between Canada, or on behalf of Canada, either with the United States of America or with any of the other Powers with which she may come into contact, but what I do say is this, that if Canada had not behind her to-day, and does not continue to have behind her, this great military and naval power of Great Britain, she would have to make concessions to her neighbours and to accept views which might be extremely distasteful to her in order to remain permanently on good terms with them. She would not be able to, it would be impossible that she should, herself control all the details of her own destiny; she would be, to a greater or less extent, in spite of the bravery of her population and the patriotism of her people, she would still be, to a great extent, a dependent country.

Look at Australia again. I need not dwell on the point at any length, but we find the same thing. The interests of Australia have already, on more than one occasion, threatened to come into conflict with those of two of the greatest military nations of the Continent, and military nations, let me add, who also possess each of them a very large, one of them an enormous, fleet. There may be also questions of difficulty arising with Eastern nations, with Japan or even with China, and under those circumstances the Australasian Colonies are in precisely the same position as the Dominion of Canada. In South Africa, in addition to the ambitions of foreign countries, to which I need not further allude, our Colonies there have domestic rivals who are heavily armed, prepared both for offence and for defence; and again I say, nothing could be more suicidal or more fatal than for any of those great groups of Colonies either to separate themselves in the present stage from the protecting forces of the mother country or to neglect themselves to take their fair share in those protective resources.

What, then, I want to urge upon you is, and in doing so I think I am speaking to those who are already converted, that we have a common interest in this matter,

and certainly it has been a great pleasure to us, a great pride to us, that Australia, in the first instance, offered voluntarily a contribution in aid of the British Navy besides taking her full share of her own military defences. Now we have to recognise that the Cape Colony has followed in that patriotic course. I do not know upon what conditions these gifts may be offered or continued, but, at all events, the spirit in which they have been made is most heartily reciprocated in this country. The amount, of course, is at the present time absolutely trifling, but that is not the point. We are looking to the Colonies as still children, but rapidly approaching manhood. In the lifetime, perhaps, of some of us, we shall see the population doubled, and certainly in the lifetime of our descendants there will be great nations where now there are comparatively sparse populations; and to establish in the early days this principle of mutual support and of a truly Imperial patriotism is a great thing of which our Colonial statesmen may well be proud.

I shall be very glad to hear the views of the Premiers in regard to this question of any contribution which they think the Colonies would be willing to make in order to establish this principle in regard to the naval defence of the Empire. As regards the military defence of the Empire, I am bound to say that we are still behindhand, although a great deal has been done in recent years. As you know, the Colonial Defence Committee of experts has been sitting, and has accomplished already, with the assistance of the Colonies, a very great improvement in the state of things which existed before; but I cannot say, from the information at my disposal, that with all the magnificent resources of the Colonies their organisation at present is satisfactory. This is more a matter of detail, and I do not propose to dwell upon it now, but I would remind the Premiers assembled that if war breaks out war will be sudden, and there will be no time for preparation then. Therefore it is of the first importance that we, all having a common interest, should have beforehand a scheme of common defence against any possible, or, at all events, any probable, enemy, and we ought to have these schemes of defence before us. In the case of some of the Colonies schemes have already been prepared; in others, no scheme has been prepared or concerted up to the present time, and I believe it is most desirable that that omission should be repaired. It is also most desirable, in Australia especially, and to a lesser extent, although still to an important extent, in South Africa, that there should be an uniformity in regard to the military preparations. An uniformity of arms is, I need scarcely say, of immense importance, as it gives us interchangeability of weapon, and there are also uniformity of equipment, some central provision for stores, and for the military instruction of the local forces, all of which can be arranged with the assistance of the Colonies, and, I believe, very much to their advantage.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY FORCES.

But I am looking forward to something more than that. The interchangeability in the several groups is a matter of great importance, but how much greater it would be if there were interchangeability between the whole forces of the Empire, between the forces which you have in the several Colonies and the forces of which you have seen some examples at home since you came to these shores. That is a matter which also can be arranged and to which we shall bring at all events the utmost good will. If you have, as Canada has at Kingston, an important military college it may be possible for us to offer occasionally to the cadets of that college commissions in the British Army. But a still more important matter which has suggested itself to my mind, and which now I desire to commend to your earnest attention, is a proposal which may be described as the interchangeability of military duties. To put it into plain English it means this: that, for instance, a Canadian regiment should come to this country, take up its quarters for a period of time, at least 12 months, with the British army, and form, during the whole time that it is in this country, a part of the British army, and that in return a similar regiment of British troops, or a brigade of artillery or cavalry, should go to Canada and should reside and exercise with the Canadian army, and form a part of that army. The idea is that this should be chiefly for the purpose of drill and instruction, and I cannot doubt that it will be of enormous advantage to the Canadian troops and to the troops of the Colonies to measure themselves against the regular army and to learn the discipline and the manœuvres which are practised on a large scale in this country.

But my imagination goes even further. It seems to me possible that although

in the first instance the idea is that such a regiment coming to this country would come solely for that purpose and would not be engaged in military operations, yet, if it were their wish to share in the dangers and the glories of the British army and take their part in expeditions in which the British army may be engaged, I see no reason why these Colonial troops should not, from time to time, fight side by side with their British colleagues. That, however, is a matter which, like everything else which I am putting before you, is not a recommendation which has any pressure behind it; it is merely a suggestion to be taken up by you voluntarily if it commends itself to your minds. What I have suggested might take place with regard to Canada I believe might equally take place with regard to such fine forces as those of which we have seen representatives from some of the Colonies of Australia, and might take place also with regard to the South African Colonies.

B.

Thursday, 1st July, 1897.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I think it was understood that we should take up the question of naval and military defence.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Yes.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: And, of course, we are in this position that we have at the present time the arrangement running with the Australasian Colonies under which they make a contribution on certain conditions; we have from the Cape an offer which has not yet, I think, been formulated, but to which Sir Gordon Sprigg referred; Canada has made no offer; I do not know whether the most convenient plan might not be to ask Captain Beaumont, who is here on behalf of the Admiralty, to state what the Admiralty feel with regard to the present arrangement with Australasia. Sir George Turner would be glad if you would tell the Conference exactly what the present arrangements are and what modifications, if any, the Admiralty desire, and the reasons why they desire them.

Captain BEAUMONT: I am sorry, sir, that I am not in a position to speak for the Admiralty; I have not received instructions on that point, but having had an opportunity of hearing the subject discussed at the Colonial Defence Committee, I might, as a member of that committee, give the view of the committee.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Please will you state first what the present arrangement is.

Captain BEAUMONT: Stating it from memory, the present arrangement is that a certain contribution is made from each Colony for the support of a certain number of ships; certain of those ships being at the entire disposal of the Imperial authorities, but restricted in their action, both in peace and war, to certain limits round the Australian Continent. The number of ships that are actually kept in commission during peace time is less than the total number of ships that are supported by the Australian contribution, but the arrangement is that on the outbreak of war the full number shall be put into commission, and that a certain proportion of that number shall be kept in New Zealand waters.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: Would you be kind enough to state what the contribution amounts to?

Captain BEAUMONT: I could not say what it is.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: It is about £120,000 a year.

Captain BEAUMONT: If I had thought that that would have been wanted, I would have brought the actual agreement.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: The actual agreement is a schedule to one of our Victorian Acts. If we could get the Victorian volume, or the South Australian volume, we could very soon pick it out for you, about 1887.

Mr. KINGSTON: It is 1887.

Captain BEAUMONT: But the whole point turns upon the conditions which are made with regard to the use of the ships; both in peace and war the contribution depends upon the ships remaining within the Australian waters, and in war time a

certain proportion of the ships it includes being in New Zealand waters; that is the essence of the conditions.

Mr. REID: The geographical limit extends far away from the Australian Colonies.

Captain BEAUMONT: Practically about 1,000 miles; not in every direction, but east and west, practically about 1,000 miles; the limit to the north is much nearer.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: Here is the agreement.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I think we have got the general character of the agreement; we can go into detail after; we want to get the objection or the modifications which are suggested.

Captain BEAUMONT: The objection, if I may give my opinion upon that point, as I have no instructions, the objection certainly is the restriction to the use of the ships, and a general desire that there appears to be that the contributions should entitle special Colonies to have ships in their waters both in peace and, probably, in war; for it is not only the case in the Colonies, it is the case everywhere, that ships are looked upon specially by the contributor as a means of local defence, and it can be easily understood that when there is a limited number of ships, to divide the ships is to practically destroy their power of operating as a squadron.

Mr. REID: I think that the main idea in the Colonies at the time they consented to make this contribution to bring into existence an Australian squadron of that sort was that it was in harmony with the principle then prevailing, that the Colonies should first of all maintain their land defences, and secondly, add this sort of outer line of local defence. That, I think, was the Colonial idea; that this was merely an extension of local defence quite independently altogether of the Imperial naval defence of the Empire as a whole, so that that restriction was carrying out that idea, not that we were giving to the Imperial navy as a whole, but giving so as to add another line to what I might call our inner defence, as compared with the defence of the Empire. The alteration would, of course, enlarge the basis of the contribution to the Imperial Navy. It is a very important question.

Mr. KINGSTON: I should like to say that I think the object of this squadron was to provide for the defence of the floating trade in Australasian waters, and I am speaking without a reference to the Act, but I think that is specifically set out in the preamble to the various adopting Acts.

Mr. REID: It goes all over the world.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: In the Colonial trade.

Mr. REID: Well, of course, that is our inner line of defence.

Mr. KINGSTON: And I think there was an expressed provision that it was not to remove any liability of the Colonies to maintain their existing defence.

Mr. REID: I think our Colony and other Colonies that adopted this Act are rather strong upon this point; although they are limited in number they are determined, and if that stipulation is removed I feel myself that I shall have some difficulty in getting a renewal of the agreement; there would be a great outcry.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Is the feeling of the Colonies mainly that the money which they contribute towards the defence of the Empire should be spent in Australian territory?

Mr. REID: That is the general idea. They have not advanced to a stage at which they would say, "Well, we are part of the Empire, and we must bear some share of the defence of the Empire as a whole"; but in an emergency you would find they would cast all those narrower ideas to the winds; they would be ready to do anything, go anywhere; but in times of peace the Australians are very narrow in their contributions to anything. I feel I should have difficulty.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: It seems at first sight to persons who are not acquainted with the strategical considerations which move the authorities in considering the general question of the defence of the Empire; it does seem not at all unnatural that those who contribute towards this defence should think that they ought to take care that they will be defended. Upon that principle, as well as upon the principle that the money which they contribute should be spent locally, I can understand the objection which the Australian Colonies feel to remove these restrictions. What I want Captain Beaumont to do is to put clearly before us the considerations which move the strategical authorities here to object to that arrangement. For instance, suppose war breaks out, what is the Admiralty going to do with regard to the defence of the Australian Colonies; how far would this arrangement help them, or how far would it assist them?

Captain BEAUMONT: It is very difficult, of course, to foresee what the action of the Colonies will be in war, but the tendency in peace is to localise the use of the ships; to prevent their being used as squadrons to operate against an enemy.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: But in time of peace there is no enemy.

Captain BEAUMONT: But in time of peace they require the ships to be actually used in the waters, and to appear in each Colony at intervals.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I want to separate the two things. What is your objection as a naval man to such localisation of the force in time of peace? Then we can consider what objection there is to its localisation in time of war.

Captain BEAUMONT: The station has now become large, the interests are large, and the warships that are maintained on the station are just sufficient for the Imperial duties, and to remove them and to restrict their use in time of peace is naturally inconvenient. The service is not conducted with a due regard to the Imperial interests as a whole, as it might be if those restrictions were not constantly being urged.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: What are you speaking of when you speak of the station?

Captain BEAUMONT: The Australian station. The station extends to almost the whole of the South Pacific.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then the Imperial interests require that a considerable squadron should always be in Australian waters; how does this arrangement in any way interfere with this?

Captain BEAUMONT: Ostensibly placed there under the Imperial authority, the ships are, and should be, therefore, counted as part of the squadron, and should do their share in visiting the islands, and protecting British interests in the farther and most distant parts of the station.

Sir JOHN FORREST: They are always round the Pacific Islands; they never come to us, I know.

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: I think what in your mind is not quite clear, Mr. Chamberlain, is this—that the Australian station comprises half the Pacific. Therefore the waters of the Australian station are larger, much larger, than the Australian waters as regarded by the Colonies, and the duties of the squadron are very large, and carry them very much to the different islands in the Pacific outside.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: And to limit that we agreed to pay a considerable sum every year.

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: You agreed to pay a considerable sum every year in order that the ships may be mainly employed on your coasts.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: A certain number of ships.

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: A certain number of ships; the duties of the squadron extend far beyond the waters in which you were to place those ships.

Sir JOHN FORREST: You do not complain of that, do you?

The SECRETARY OF STATE: What I would like to ask is this: the interests of the Australasian Colonies are very great in those islands in the Pacific. They are our principal interest. We have interfered again and again, and we are likely possibly to be called upon to interfere in the future, in order to secure those islands, and other islands which are at present independent practically, as part of the future inheritance of Australia. Therefore it is in the interest of the Australasian Colonies that the fleet which is called the Australian Fleet should at all events be permitted to visit all the islands in which those interests exist.

Sir JOHN FORREST: They do so.

Mr. REID: It is only reasonable. No reasonable man could object.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: If Captain Beaumont's position is as, Sir John Bramston says, that the limits are too narrow, I imagine that there would be no difficulty whatever—we are now speaking of times of peace—in extending those limits so as to take in all in which Australasia is interested.

Mr. REID: Oh, no doubt.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: What we are afraid of is this: we are afraid of being in this position. Suppose a war broke out, these vessels might be taken away altogether from Australia and used to attack the enemy's commerce in another part of the world, leaving us defenceless, after we had paid a very large sum. That is our fear.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Pardon me, Sir George, that is the second point to which I am coming. I want first to deal with the state of things in time of peace, when there is no enemy.

Mr. SEDDON : That was the condition mentioned in the agreement; during the time of peace these vessels should be employed in the same way as are other vessels of war on this station. That was the memorandum from the Governor, I think, of New South Wales to the other Commissioners, and was agreed to, and the limits are now fixed under the agreement, and if this means an extension of the limits, the Admiralty should have sent proposals to us to see whether they are reasonable, and then it is for us to say whether or not we agree to them, if that is really what is to be done; and instead of doing it in that way, to give them to the admiral of the station to do as he likes. If it is only done with a view to getting an extension of limits in time of peace, let us have it; let us see what the limits are, and we will deal with it on fair lines. The Premiers should understand that the following is what was aimed at: "That a sufficient naval defence force should be raised and equipped and manned by the Imperial Government for the defence of Australasia"; that was the footing that that started upon, that was the inception, and I say that any departure from that is a departure altogether from the arrangement, because there you have the first condition laid down by men who were sent here: "That a sufficient naval defence force should be raised, equipped, and manned by the Imperial Government for the defence of Australia." That was the commencement; that was the spirit in which the whole thing was entered into; and the agreement which was entered into by the Colonies, and I have no hesitation in saying that kept on those lines the Colonies are still prepared to contribute their fair quota for the maintenance and the equipment of that naval defence force. We pay 5 per cent. on the total cost.

Sir E. N. C. BRADDON : We are constantly asking the Imperial Government to protect more our interests in the Pacific, and it is by this fleet that that protection could best be effected.

Mr. REID : To any extension of the limits I am sure no Government could reasonably object. It is so essentially our own interest and our own business that no Government could be so unreasonable as to demur for a moment to any correction of the limit which would include all Australian interests, that is to say, of a local character.

Sir GEORGE TURNER : We do not want the vessels taken away altogether from Australia at the time they might be required to protect our Colonial trade.

Mr. REID : That is the other side.

Sir GEORGE TURNER : That is the only thing we are afraid of.

Mr. REID : That is the other side, which we have not come to yet.

The SECRETARY OF STATE : I think that is a perfectly satisfactory statement, that is to say, if it be found in time of peace that the work of the fleet is unnecessarily restricted, so that it does not extend to all Australian interests, the Premiers will be very glad to consider any amendment which is required.

Mr. REID : Certainly; it is quite within the principle of what we have done.

Mr. KINGSTON : I am inclined to think that an application was made for an extension of the definition of the station some time back, and that was agreed to.

The SECRETARY : Yes, that is so.

Sir JOHN FORREST : That was not very large.

Mr. KINGSTON : No, not very large.

The SECRETARY OF STATE : There is the much larger question, which is, the use of the fleet, or the restrictions upon the use of the fleet, in time of war. That is a question of immense importance, but I think we cannot discuss it under existing circumstances. We must make a further application to the Admiralty; I have made an application to the Admiralty to have their views formally before us, and they must send us someone who can speak in their name and give us authoritatively what their view is. I will not trouble Captain Beaumont to attend any further.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER : I understood that the question was whether the Colonies would be prepared to contribute to the general fund for the protection of the Empire at large; that was the question before the Conference, as I understood it. I see by the answer of the Australian Colonies that they are ready to contribute for a force, provided it be applied to the protection of their own waters. I have not seen any answer yet from them to the more general question which you put forward as to whether or not the Colonies would be prepared at this moment to contribute to the defence of the Empire.

The SECRETARY OF STATE : Yes, I think I would say the principle is this : We accept in the fullest possible way the obligation to defend the Colonies; but we think that it is to the advantage of the Colonies, as well as this country, that the mode and method of defence should be left to the naval authorities, that they should

not be hampered by what I call political restrictions in time of war, and that if they are so hampered it takes away all the value of the fleet, or the ships which may be provided by the Colonies. That, I think, is the principle; but I do not feel that we can, with advantage, discuss it further until we have some more authoritative information before us.

Mr. KINGSTON : I do not know if you are taking it that all the Colonies would be prepared to agree to a renewal on the same lines, because I do not think that that would be precisely the South Australian position. They would prefer that the Australian contribution were expended locally in the maintenance of crews or reserves, whose services could be utilized on the fleet itself; that undoubtedly is the view of South Australia.

Sir GEORGE TURNER : On which fleet?

Mr. KINGSTON : On this Australian squadron. That is undoubtedly the view of South Australia, and considerable attention has been given to the matter by our naval authorities, and I should be happy to forward for Imperial consideration their recommendations on the subject.

Sir JOHN FORREST : When is this agreement up—soon, is it not?

Sir GEORGE TURNER : It has about two years yet to run.

Mr. KINGSTON : And at present I take it that any extension of the objects of the squadron would alter altogether its character. The agreement which was come to in 1887 was for the establishment of a fleet for the protection of the floating trade in Australasian waters, and to that of course Australia has contributed at the rate of 5 per cent. on the prime cost of the vessels and practically the cost also of the maintenance of the fleet on a peace footing.

Sir JOHN FORREST : But there is a large fleet besides those two ships, you know.

Mr. KINGSTON : Yes, but I mean that this is a special agreement with which we are dealing for a special purpose.

The SECRETARY OF STATE : Then if you were once to argue it as though each Colony were to provide its own defence, where would Australia be? What kind of defence would Australia have for £120,000 a year; that is rather the question.

Mr. KINGSTON : We spend more than £120,000 a year.

The SECRETARY OF STATE : The fleet, I am speaking of?

Sir E. N. C. BRADDON : That is the contribution?

The SECRETARY OF STATE : That is the contribution for the fleet; the military defence is another matter altogether.

Sir GEORGE TURNER : But you defend other portions of the Colonial empire without a shilling; no other portions of the Colonial empire contribute a shilling for their own defence.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG : We go to large expense in looking after our own local ports.

Sir GEORGE TURNER : We do not deny that; we do all that in addition.

Mr. HARRY ESCOMBE : Certainly, in that sense we look after our ports and leave the squadron free.

Mr. KINGSTON : So do we.

The SECRETARY OF STATE : Many of the Crown Colonies contribute very large sums indeed to the provision of coaling stations and fortifying ports.

Sir GEORGE TURNER : We support all our fortifications. In Victoria we have spent about three millions of money on fortifications, and £200,000 a year on our defence.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER : The question put was this : Were the Colonies prepared to contribute to the general fund so much per cent., or any at all, for the maintenance of the fleet? I think I understood from Mr. Chamberlain that he had received an answer from Australia and South Africa, but not from Canada. So far as I can see, there has been no answer at all. There has been this answer only from the Australian Colonies, that they will provide the money for a particular purpose. That is not the thing at all. What I understood was in your mind was a general contribution, that they would spend so much a year for the maintenance of the fleet; as I understood, were the Colonies prepared to give something at the present time towards that same object? That was the view, I think.

The SECRETARY OF STATE : Yes, subject to this : that I do not at all doubt that we might agree to conditions in regard to such contributions, but I think we do hold very strongly that those conditions should not tie our hands in time of war; that it would be most dangerous to the Colonies, and that they would be entirely misunderstanding the situation if they thought that a local force of this kind would

give them the protection which we want them to have; that it would be very much better that their protection should be part of the general defence of the Empire than that it should be a special and localised defence. Those who have read those extremely interesting and valuable books of Captain Mahan will find that he lays it down in a most definite way, and all our naval authorities agree, that the principle of defence is to attack the enemy's fleet, and if the ships of the so-called defending power are to be kept in particular waters and localised, they will probably be cut up in detail, and they certainly will not be successful in defence, whereas if they always are on the heels of the offensive fleet that fleet will be powerless to do any harm.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Do you not think, sir, the feeling which now prevails in the Australian Colonies leads their representatives here to say that they have no hope of maintaining that contribution at the present time in time of peace unless there was a local squadron in their waters of the same strength and still stronger in time of war. I do not think that would be wise—I do not think so—but I am very much afraid it would be just as strong again in time of war.

Mr. SEDDON: You see, how the thing started was this: The Imperial authorities had a naval force in Australian waters; we in the Colonies did not think that force was strong enough and we then made the proposals to contribute conditionally upon that being brought to a given standard, and we fixed the point, the number of ships, the class of course has not been maintained. We fixed then the limit known as Australian seas; that was agreed upon at the time. Mr. Chamberlain says now that the altered circumstances make it imperative that the squadron there shall, if anything, be strengthened, and that it shall be maintained there because we have the fleet of Japan which has been strengthened and made very much more powerful now than it was at the time this agreement was made. We have the same in China. There we have in the west and still further; there they are all the time, so that if it is ever a question of attacking parties and getting our squadron together for that purpose, there is where the necessity would arise. And the force against us is greater than it was at the time we entered into this agreement. What we feel is this, that we may have this fleet, this Australian squadron, drawn from the Australian seas, sent to either of the Capes, utilised there, leaving us helpless against what may come from either east or west as the case may be, and that is why we say we may for years have been contributing in time of peace, then when the trouble comes we have really no defence at all.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: All our inter-colonial trade might be ruined and no one there to help us.

Mr. SEDDON: And no one there to help us.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Your contribution is not restricted by any condition, but left free to be carried on by the naval authorities just as they think best. You say "No, we want to control our contribution."

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We want it to be used there.

Mr. SEDDON: The different admirals on the station have been driving at this for years, I think. They asked for absolute control and not for the restrictions there are at present; that is really the position.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: You cannot agree to that.

Sir JOHN FORREST: We would not get the vote.

Mr. REID: That is the trouble; we could not get the votes. The people look upon this squadron which they contribute to as a line of Australian defence.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: A kind of insurance.

Mr. REID: The inner line in the Imperial line of defence but an outer Australian line of defence. Everyone must admit that the exigencies of war might require us up at the Mediterranean somewhere, or at Hong Kong, or away over at the Sandwich Islands. We all must feel that no one can tell the precise part at which the fleet might be called to fight foes; we all feel that, but we look to the fleet as an Imperial weapon to deal with those exigencies. This force we look upon, not as an Imperial weapon so much as a sort of more or less fixed line of reserve, inner reserve, for the protection of trade. The Admiralty is quite right in wishing to get freedom, absolute freedom, perfectly right from their point of view, but our point of view is so different, we have to get our people to contribute.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Well, Mr. Reid, the question is this: has the Imperial sentiment through the Colonies come to that stage of development that they are willing to contribute their share to the Imperial fleet, which would be an Imperial fleet.

Mr. REID: Apart.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Apart from these local considerations which you speak of.

Mr. REID: Have you tried your Parliament on that subject?

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: No, never; the question has never been brought before them.

Mr. REID: No Colony is more loyal, no Dominion is more loyal, than Canada, and it would encourage us very much in Imperial sentiment if you would stimulate our sympathies in that way.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I do not know that it can be said that the Dominion of Canada is more loyal than your Colony. The only ground upon which it can be approached is the Imperial sentiment, and whether it has come to this state of development that you are willing to contribute to the Imperial fleet. You say it has not. In Canada it has not been discussed at all, but we have done a good deal in the way of spending money for the defence of this Empire, very much in the same way as our Australian Colonial sisters have done. Looking after No. 1 first, we have spent money in building railways from a strategical point of view, helping on fortifications on land, and so on, at Esquimalt I mean; but the question as to whether or not money should be contributed to the Imperial fleet or not has not been agitated; up to the present time it has been regarded rather as an academical question than a practical one; but now it is put to us as a practical question: are the Colonies prepared, apart from their local sentiment, from the Imperial idea alone to contribute money towards the maintenance and development of the British fleet? No doubt Canada will consider it and give an answer.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: And I would add to that, that I think that if they were willing to do so it might be possible to make arrangements which would be satisfactory to them in time of peace so far as the material interest is concerned.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Yes.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: That is to say that we should keep so considerable a squadron, probably more than anything represented by their contribution, in their waters, and that the money spent there would probably be more than the contribution; that is a matter of detail which we could arrange and which might ease matters with the constituencies in these Colonies.

Mr. REID: In committee of supply in Australia there is an intensely critical and narrow local spirit at all times, and it is a sort of spirit you cannot get away from. It does not perhaps fully reflect the opinion of the population, but it prevails. It is quite consistent that those very people, if war threatened, would be ready to vote any amount and go by the thousand to fight for the old country; but the Australians have two different feelings. When it comes to business he is as keen a hand as you can deal with; when it comes to the patriotism on the platform he is most gushing, and you have to reckon with him in those two ways; but when it comes to a time of action he is up to his form, and will be ready to make good all his demonstrations of loyalty; but it is very difficult to get him to take up this partnership with the British Empire, which is a gigantic concern, in view of the fact that in most Colonies their financial position, well, it has been strained, especially of late years, most of them, in fact, some of them, wealthy Colonies though they be, their finances are so strained just now that if Sir George, for instance, or Mr. Kingston, or Sir Hugh Nelson, were to propose £50,000 as a contribution towards the Imperial fleet, I bring myself, too, in with the smaller people, we should be met with a tremendous outburst, I am afraid, that would do more harm than good, that would cast a slur on the feelings which prevail.

Sir H. M. NELSON: We will talk loyally.

Mr. REID: I calculate my influence in that way, and I do not think I could. I have a considerable influence, as we all have in our Parliaments. Mr. Kingston and I have been in some time only because we have influence with our Parliaments, and yet I believe if we did our best we would not advance that project one inch at the present time.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: There are other considerations, Mr. Reid. There is the difference between the mother country and the colonies; the mother country has little to spend on public works. Her chief item of expenditure is on the army and the navy. The Colonies have an enormous amount to spend on public works for the development of their own country, building railways, harbours, and works of whatsoever kind, and you cannot look for much more than they now give. When you speak for Australia, you might speak for Canada as well.

Mr. REID: Indeed!

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Any sum we could give would be a mere drop in the bucket compared with the enormous expenditure.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: From our point of view it is only a question of sentiment and the establishment of a principle and laying the foundation stone. There is no importance to us in getting £120,000 a year from Australia towards a charge of £22,000,000 from our own resources.

Mr. REID: No; I think, as I think most of us must feel, that the result of an effort to extend that principle of contribution at the present time would be the reverse of what you would desire. That is my feeling.

Sir JOHN FORREST: I would like to say, sir, that, as far as I know, generally speaking for my own Colony, we would be quite willing to continue to contribute, but our difficulty is very much increased by the fact that we are told, "Why contribute? No other self-governing Colony in the Empire, except the Australian Colonies, contributes to the navy, and why should we contribute?" That is the argument which is against us. If it were done throughout the Empire, of course it would very much strengthen and assist us; if, for instance, the great Dominion of Canada were to contribute.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: The geographical conditions are not at all the same. We do not feel the necessity of having a fleet to protect us as you have. You are so isolated and so far away that in the case of war you have no defence at all. Canada is an inaccessible country; the only accessible way being by the St. Lawrence, and it is easily guarded.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: There is this to be said for Canada, that having a land frontier of 3,000 miles she does keep up a very large military force; in proportion much larger than the Australian Colonies.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Not much larger than all the Australian Colonies put together.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I think so.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: No, I do not think so.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: About 35,000.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Take the whole forces in Australia, that is the way to compare it, and I think you will find we are not far short of Canada.

Mr. SEDDON: In New Zealand what does it cost for defence? We have borrowed money for harbour defences and defence works, half a million. There has been a further sum expended, we are paying now interest upon moneys borrowed for defence purposes, £20,000 a year; we pay £21,000 a year to the squadron, and we have then our defences, and they cost us £60,000; for a population of 700,000 people we pay £100,000 a year for defence, the native wars cost us £11,000,000, and I say what we have done in New Zealand for its defence, and what we are doing there is as much as they are doing in the United Kingdom or in any other Dependencies; and it should be taken as a whole, and if you take the whole and spread it over the past and present population we have, I say we are paying as much in the Colonies as they are doing in Britain for defence.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Oh dear no; the navy alone costs us 10s. a head of our population; the navy alone more than 10s. a head.

Mr. SEDDON: Seven shillings and sixpence.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: £22,000,000 a year, and the population is less than 40,000,000.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: The outlay on the army and navy is £40,000,000.

Mr. REID: But for a young Colony you can quite understand things—

Mr. KINGSTON: I take it, sir, there is no other part of the Empire which contributes anything towards the expense of a squadron for the protection of the floating trade of any part of the Empire?

The EARL OF SELBORNE: We have got the offer from the Cape.

Mr. KINGSTON: The offer from the Cape?

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: And I ought to say that the expense of land defence in the Cape Colony is enormously in excess of anything that is done by any Australian Colony though with a smaller population.

Mr. KINGSTON: We have the offer from the Cape, that is as far as this matter is concerned the Australian Colonies have been contributing at the rate of £126,000 a year for the last eight or nine years, over one million pounds. Now, the suggestion is whether or not we would be prepared to consent to either one of two things—first, an alteration of the limits of the station. I have no doubt that any alteration

which was necessary for preserving the trade which the fleet was intended to protect, the floating trade in Australasian waters, would be very fairly considered; but as regards the other matter of the contribution generally to the expense of the Imperial navy alone, though we in our little Colony are perfectly prepared to take our fair share of any Australian expenditure of which we approve, I do not think there would be the shadow of a chance of getting anything of the sort, and I do not think the feeling which it is desirable to encourage between the Colonies and the mother country would be increased by an attempt at anything of the sort.

Mr. SEDDON: I must correct that impression of the Secretary of State. I have here the amount stated in a memorandum of 1886. The cost per head of the population for the Imperial navy to the British taxpayers is there estimated at 7s. 6d. a year.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: It has enormously increased since then; that was before these great additions to the navy.

Mr. SEDDON: Yes.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Well, I do not think we can carry that any further.

Captain BEAUMONT: I should like to say, sir, that so far as I know there has been no desire to alter the agreement.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: If that is the view of the Admiralty—

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: I think it should be understood, Mr. Chamberlain, that the proposals I make in regard to Cape Colony are not affected at all by anything that has taken place here to-day.

Captain Beaumont withdrew.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: £126,000 to the navy would be a drop of water in the bucket.

LAND DEFENCE.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: There are certain questions in regard to military defence, and Captain Nathan is here to make some statement on behalf of the Colonial Defence Committee as to the course they have taken. Would you do so, Captain Nathan, just stating what they are?

Captain NATHAN: One of the suggestions, which was made some time ago, was with regard to an interchange of military units between the Colonies and the mother country. The suggestion was made originally in Canada by General Herbert, when commanding the Militia there, and it is one which the Colonial Defence Committee view with great favour, and consider to be a practical step towards Imperial unity, and one not involving any expenditure or only an expenditure which would be trifling. A practical method of carrying it out would be, in the first instance, for the permanent force of Canada, which is a small one, probably at present about 800 men, to furnish a battery to be stationed at, say, Aldershot, and form part of the Imperial army. At the same time its place might be taken in Canada by a battery of the Imperial army, which would do the work which is at present done by a battery of the Dominion permanent forces—that is to say, assist to train the militia. A battery is mentioned, being a small unit which Canada might well provide at present. Of course, the principle admits of general extension not only in the Dominion but also in time, possibly, to Australia and the Cape. That is one point.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I think Canada would be prepared to accept that under an Act of Parliament.

Captain NATHAN: If Canada would be prepared to do that—

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I think so; it is a matter which has been put before myself and the Minister of Militia, and we were prepared to recommend it. Unfortunately Mr. Borden has met with a very severe accident, and he has not been to his office for some time; I have reason to believe, although I cannot give a positive assurance, that Canada will be prepared to act upon that suggestion for an exchange of units.

Captain NATHAN: I might mention that a somewhat similar thing to what is now proposed has been done on a small scale in Canada already by a company of the Imperial Regiment at Halifax being temporarily transferred to Fredericton, and a company of the local regiment of Fredericton going to Halifax, and this, I believe, has been a great success.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Perhaps, dealing with the first point, we could prefer the proposal and send it officially to the Government of Canada as the most convenient way.

Captain NATHAN: The most convenient way, I think, would be that Canada should make the proposal.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Oh, very well.

Mr. REID: How many men, now, would there be in a battery; about 140? I may say, on behalf of New South Wales, we have a pretty considerable force, about 400 or 500 men, that are most favourable to the proposal, and I will consult our Government when I go back; I think we should all be very favourable to that.

Sir H. M. NELSON: The only expense would be the expense of the passages of the men?

Captain NATHAN: The only expense would be the expense of the passages of the men.

Sir H. M. NELSON: Personally, I should be very favourable to it.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: They probably would be glad to volunteer.

Mr. KINGSTON: I think our engagement is for three years?

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Our engagement is five years; we might provide for that in our general Bill.

Mr. SEDDON: Ours is three years. I think we should be all in favour of an interchange. We have not so many men in our New Zealand permanent forces, but we could send a detachment of the permanent artillery; we could send them here for training and the home Government could send us an equal number; there would only be the cost of transport.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: What time would it be for—12 months?

Captain NATHAN: I think longer than 12 months; they would not get the full advantage in less than two years.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Of course they are highly trained with us in our Colonies; they have a good foundation.

Captain NATHAN: Yes, but we want them to do something more than to make a trip; we want them to work with our men for a little while in order that they may mutually improve each other.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Yes.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: I understand that Captain Nathan suggests that the Colonies should make the proposal.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Yes.

Mr. KINGSTON: I suppose it would be a matter of arrangement with each individual Colony.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: I think we ought to consider it at our next Premiers' Conference and let it come as a united offer from the Colonies. By the time we get back it will be October and we meet probably in January.

Captain NATHAN: I may say that it is not a thing that can be done without a great deal of discussion. There are difficulties of payments and legal difficulties, but they are all difficulties which could be overcome.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Legal difficulties?

Captain NATHAN: Well, difficulties about a man serving out of his Colony.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: That is easily settled by legislation.

Captain NATHAN: They are all difficulties that can be settled.

Mr. REID: A man going out to the Colonies is obliged to fall in to the military system there and be under the Colonial Commandant.

Captain NATHAN: Yes.

Mr. SEDDON: Where the objection would come in in payment would be this. He would be serving in the Colonies on English pay; there would be a natural soreness, of course, that an Englishman should only be getting the English pay, while the Colonials would be getting 5s. a day in England.

Captain NATHAN: That was a difficulty which was foreseen by the Colonial Defence Committee, and in regard to Canada they considered that the most simple and satisfactory way would be for the lending authority to continue to pay wholly for its own corps. Thus the British unit in Canada would receive pay and allowances from the Imperial Government on the same scale as corps now stationed at Halifax. In the same way it would be easier for the Colonial corps in England to keep up their distinctive pay and allowances if the Dominion bore the charge. That seems to be the best arrangement, but I do not know that we can discuss all the difficulties now, because there are a great many.

As to the next question, that of federal defence in Australia, it was decided at the meeting of Premiers at Hobart that federation is essential to any complete scheme of Imperial defence. That was the first resolution.

Sir E. N. C. BRADDON: Of the Sydney Conference?

Captain NATHAN: Of the Sydney Conference. The Colonial Defence Committee quite understand that. They think, however, a great deal might be done without waiting for federation, and that anything that is done will be of advantage. There have been two conferences of Commandants in Australia, and they both made proposals, in fact similar proposals, for a federal force. The Colonial Defence Committee consider that this force might be prepared now; that is to say, that troops might be told off to form a force which would only assemble in the event of war. The better course, which will be possible when federation has been accomplished, will be to place all federal troops permanently under one military head; but some advantage will be gained by merely telling off the federal troops now. The Colonial Defence Committee have made definite suggestions as to how this might be done in their remarks on the various local schemes of defence.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: That is really a question of organisation.

Captain NATHAN: It is a question of not putting aside the proposals of the commandants but working to them as much as possible.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: What is it they desire us to do more than we have done?

Captain NATHAN: To keep certain corps for a federal force. The commandants proposed that in this federal force there should be one battery of horse artillery which was to be furnished by Victoria. That battery then existed, but has since been done away with.

Mr. REID: The federal units were to be provided without at all dislocating the existing system of defence; it would not involve an increased expenditure at all.

Captain NATHAN: No.

Mr. REID: It would simply involve a unit within a unit, a federal unit within the local unit.

Captain NATHAN: That is it.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: But are we not providing now, by the various Acts we are trying to pass, that the whole of our force could be utilised in any portion of Australasia when required?

Captain NATHAN: Yes.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: That is what we are attempting to provide, if I recollect aright.

Sir JOHN FORREST: It is an Act which does not apply to all the Colonies.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, I know, have practically agreed upon a new Defence Bill to enable the forces to be sworn in, that they can be called upon and required to serve in any portion of Australia.

Sir JOHN FORREST: Under the Federal Council Act we could do that.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We are not all in the Federal Council.

Sir JOHN FORREST: You are in.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We are in, of course.

Mr. REID: The advantage of this scheme would be that everything could be worked out to the smallest detail. There is a good deal to be worked out. Everything would be worked out so that if danger came, as it might come at any moment, the unit would be complete in all its parts, and could be moved away with its train. It is a very serious matter to send men away. Possibly there is a lot to be thought out in the way of equipment and supplies. The advantage of the scheme, it has always struck me, was that we would have that corps, with all its equipment, ready to be moved away at a moment's notice. The mere getting an Act of Parliament to enable us to send men when the danger suddenly came is not enough; we might have the men, but not all the things necessary to make them a fighting force.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Are these to be permanent men?

Captain NATHAN: No, they are to be parts of the present forces.

Mr. REID: No, they are part of the local force.

Mr. KINGSTON: It would be very inconvenient and troublesome to provide for a federal force before you had a federal authority to control it.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: That is one of the difficulties. But there is an existing force in each Colony.

Mr. REID: Yes.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: How is that force to be used in time of war when Aus-

tralia is threatened? A certain portion of it is assigned to local stations in each Colony for the local defence. Beyond that each Colony has a certain number which you want to form into a federal force, to be moved on the outbreak of war to the threatened Colony.

Mr. REID: Yes, should occasion arise.

Mr. KINGSTON: Leaving the other portions in their local stations.

Mr. REID: Exactly.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: That other portion would be scattered all over the Colony; it would not be centred in any one spot. There would be a certain portion at Ballarat, a certain portion at Bendigo, miles apart.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: Quite so. The chief point is that each of these available units should know beforehand what it is going to be used for, and on the outbreak of war it should proceed to the point of concentration where they would meet, and then they could be moved off to the threatened Colony.

Mr. REID: The numbers of men in the chief capitals of the Colonies are sufficient to form a federal unit in a military area.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Yes, but they are always changing; with us, they are ever changing; they are not permanent men.

Mr. REID: This was agreed to at two conferences of Commandants. Their scheme has been discussed, criticised in a most careful way, and it has been agreed to by the Colonial Defence Committee; and it has always appeared to me that the Premiers of these Colonies owe a very great responsibility to their people in regard to it. Supposing at any moment war breaks out suddenly between Great Britain and some other great power. The point of attack might be in Victoria. I do not think that we rise to our responsibilities sufficiently, if we do not provide some scheme by means of which at once, without confusion, with perfect order and discipline, each Colony can send a force to that point of attack.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Are we not endeavouring to do that by passing this Act of Parliament, which requires a man to serve in any Colony? Then it is a matter of administration for our responsible officers to see that the force is ready and able to be moved wherever it is required. We cannot put that on the Premiers.

Mr. REID: My point is this, that everything that this scheme involves can be done by the Governments without an Act of Parliament.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We cannot make our men serve in New South Wales.

Mr. REID: That is coming to a later point, when the men have to be sent away. My point is that we can get a system ready beforehand. It may take two or three years to pass your Act of Parliament. The danger may come before the Act. Then you rush to pass an Act of Parliament. But you have not got your organisation then. Organise first; pass your Act if you can; but if the pressure of business prevents that, have your organisation.

Mr. KINGSTON: In South Australia all our men are liable to serve in the other Colonies.

Mr. REID: Yes, but I do not think by that observation you understand what it is we want to do; we only want to have a scheme worked out so that you may know at any moment what you have to do if war breaks out.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: That is it.

Mr. KINGSTON: There is a scheme of local defence already elaborated.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: Yes, that is local for each Colony.

Mr. KINGSTON: We have debated it.

Mr. REID: We want something over and above that; something of a federal scheme, and although there are difficulties in working this out, that is purely a matter for the military experts. If you, as Premiers, will give the instructions, your military Commandants will soon work out a scheme to deliver all the necessary stores, the necessary batteries, and the necessary preparations, so that they would be able, at any moment, to indicate to you what troops, of what arms, and what stores were to be sent to the threatened parts.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: There is no objection to that, if that is all we are wanted to do. There cannot be the slightest objection to having a scheme ready. They want more than that, it strikes me.

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: Oh, no.

Mr. REID: It would involve no more expense. The men would be simply a more efficient fighting force, with these federal duties upon them, than before.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: How are you to have the fighting force. Are you going to pick out certain individuals and say, "You will be a federal force raised for the defence of the Colony?"

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Captain Nathan will perhaps answer that question. Captain NATHAN: Certain units have been by your Commandants told off as a federal force. The practical point of the whole thing is for you Premiers to give your sanction to the scheme which has been got out by your Commandants, that is, to make it an authorised scheme. If weak points are found in it, it can be revised occasionally, but the point is to have an authorised scheme, and to work to that in time of peace.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: These units are battalions or batteries, as the case may be?

Captain NATHAN: Or companies?

The EARL OF SELBORNE: Or companies of the existing forces who are over and above after the existing local defence has been provided for.

Captain NATHAN: Yes; the remarks on the local schemes of defence show how both can be provided for.

Sir H. M. NELSON: It involves so much expense.

Captain NATHAN: It involves no further expense.

Mr. REID: No, it is existing men, not a single extra man.

Sir H. M. NELSON: We have all our men assigned already in our scheme of defence, every one of them.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We are told we have not got enough men, and we want more in our Colonies.

Sir E. N. C. BRADDON: Would there not be some expense in obtaining uniformity of armament and equipment?

Captain NATHAN: That is a point which I will deal with later on.

Mr. REID: Whether you are going to a town five miles out of Sydney, or five hundred miles out of Sydney, it is all the same thing.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: If an invasion takes place by a force at Melbourne, you do not expect Queensland and West Australia to sit still and say it is the business of Victoria.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: It is not to their interest to do it. They dare not do it. They must come to our assistance. That is all done, as I understand. The Commandants have agreed to their scheme, and are we to be asked, as Premiers, to revise their scheme?

Captain NATHAN: No, to sanction it, to authorise it.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: And that sanction may be revoked the next day.

Mr. REID: It involves certain administrative arrangements within our local forces to carry out the scheme, before that it is worth nothing.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: It requires something to be done which we have no legal power to do.

Mr. REID: We have legal power to make internal local arrangements.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: As I understand, we are asked to say certain batteries, or certain men in certain places, can be used for federal defence, if necessity arises.

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: Not quite that. I think Lord Selborne could tell it to you in two minutes.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We would require an Act of Parliament to enable the troops to serve outside the Colony in which they were enlisted.

Mr. REID: Getting into the position of doing a thing, and the act of doing it, are two different things. If you are in a position to come to the help of a sister Colony that is attacked suddenly, in 10 minutes you could pass the Act necessary to send the forces there; but it takes more than 10 minutes to get your forces equipped and organised; you do not want to send a rabble without proper equipment, and without any cohesion; all that takes time.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: You do not get cohesion unless you have them trained together.

Mr. REID: It does not cost money. Surely, it is one of our serious responsibilities. You spend £200,000 a year for these soldiers and all these expenses; surely it is a valuable feature of such expenditure that you have not only got the men within reach to go to the assistance of the people in your Colony, but you have got within your force a unit—which means a great deal in military affairs, I believe it means everything, the difference between a rabble and an army, or a disciplined force—you have a unit which (having passed an Act, which would take ten minutes perhaps in time of emergency), you have got a force of men you can send to Victoria, not to embarrass the people in Victoria, not to have the people in Victoria

rushing round to find things for them, the muskets, rifles or cloaks, or food, or ammunition.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Nobody objects to any of that.

Mr. REID: Well, why not start it? Let us start it.

Mr. KINGSTON: It is suggested at this table that we should approve some scheme.

Mr. REID: No, it is simply brought up for general consideration. We have worked out schemes in the Colonies.

Mr. KINGSTON: Work the schemes out.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: I am afraid there is more in it than appears to us here.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I do not think so. What we thought was that you would like to hear from persons who are really competent to express an opinion of the immense importance of greater organisation than you have at present.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: What do you mean by greater organisation?

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Well, you are all acting as though war was impossible; war comes very suddenly, if it comes; and, undoubtedly, you are not prepared for war, in spite of the large sums which you are all, separately, contributing, and this is a proposal which does not go very far, but it is a proposal which would take into account the possibility of war. You should make your arrangements beforehand, not your legal arrangements, but your arrangements of organisation beforehand, be prepared for it; and what is required is that you should authorise your military authorities to make these arrangements. Once you give them the authority to do it, they are capable of doing it; they will not ask you for information upon military detail.

Mr. SEDDON: Do I understand, Mr. Chamberlain, that there is a legal difficulty in the way? I was advised, in respect to sending a contingent home, that after the men left New Zealand our control was gone, and we had to get a separate agreement made with each of the men before our authority could actually be given effect to. What was desired here was that there should be an Act passed through the Imperial Legislature, empowering the Colonies to pass laws allowing of the employment of their soldiers outside their own limits for this particular purpose.

Captain NATHAN: That is not necessary; South Australia and Queensland have already done that for themselves, and that was another point I was coming to.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We are endeavouring to do it; we are endeavouring to agree upon a uniform system; we have practically agreed upon it.

Mr. KINGSTON: As I understand, it is proposed to give our military authorities power to make regulations for organisation involving expense for this, that, and the other without our first seeing these arrangements and approving them. I am not prepared to do anything of the sort. They can make suggestions for the consideration of the Government, and they are always at liberty to do that.

Mr. REID: The Government will not propose military organisation. There may be some soldiers—

Mr. KINGSTON: They recognise the necessity of subjecting the proposals of military men to a very careful scrutiny.

Mr. REID: No doubt; but in the meantime the trouble might come before we are federated, and you might get a rabble instead of a disciplined army.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Certainly.

Mr. REID: You would be quite ready to consider the scheme.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: I think it might be left to us now; I will look into it and see.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: What is the next point, may I ask?

Captain NATHAN: The Colonial Defence Committee have been informed that Victoria and New South Wales are at present considering the question of their military law with a view to greater uniformity, and the Committee suggest that one military law ought to do for the whole of Australia; that the whole ought to be uniform, and that this might easily be accomplished by a general Act being drafted at the next conference of Commandants out there, and each Legislature then passing the same law.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: They are doing that, the Commandants. We are being guided by our Commandants as to what the contents of our Bill should be.

Captain NATHAN: There are already divergencies between the Acts of Queensland and South Australia.

Mr. REID: In the last Acts?

Captain NATHAN: In the last Acts there are divergencies; differences which do not seem to be justified by any special conditions of the Colonies.

Mr. KINGSTON: What divergencies are you referring to specially?

Captain NATHAN: It is desirable to have uniform military legislation as much as possible throughout the Empire.

Mr. REID: We have passed resolutions in our conferences in that sense.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: The Bill is practically agreed to.

Captain NATHAN: The Bill is practically agreed to only in Victoria and New South Wales. At present the Bill is for Victoria only possibly; there is no general Bill.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Each Colony would practically pass the same Act.

Captain NATHAN: Will pass?

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Yes.

Captain NATHAN: Then it is thought also that Canada might consider that Act also.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: With a view of uniformity?

Captain NATHAN: With a view of uniformity.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Yes.

Captain NATHAN: Uniformity also comes in in the question of arms. There has recently been a certain amount of correspondence on the subject, and I believe the War Office are going to make an offer to furnish the Colonies that require it on favourable terms with rifles using the same ammunition as is used by the Imperial small arm. That does not apply to Canada, Canada having gone to a large expense in providing herself with Lee-Enfield magazine rifles.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: That is the last rifle.

Captain NATHAN: Yes.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: The point of that, Captain Nathan, is that there would be nothing more serious in war than to have two different kinds of ammunition.

Captain NATHAN: Yes.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: They would be always getting the wrong ammunition or the wrong rifle.

Captain NATHAN: Troops cannot act together with different ammunition, and the object is that they may act together to the best advantage.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: That scheme will be submitted to us.

Captain NATHAN: Yes.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: The offer will be made.

Captain NATHAN: Yes, I understand the offer will be made.

Mr. SEDDON: What is your rifle?

The EARL OF SELBORNE: The Lee-Metford.

Mr. KINGSTON: A magazine rifle.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: Then what I think is suggested is the converted Martini-Henry, what they call the Martini-Enfield.

Mr. HARRY ESCOMBE: That is '303.

Captain NATHAN: The next point is with regard to the local organisation for defence. Quite apart from the question of federal defence schemes, most of the Colonies have drawn up schemes for local defence. There have been very excellent schemes put forward by Victoria, New South Wales, Natal, and nearly all the Colonies, and these are revised year by year to meet altered circumstances in order to make them more perfect. The result of this has been, as far as my Committee can see, of very great advantage to the Colonies. Their organisation since these schemes were started, about ten years ago, has very much improved, and the Committee are exceedingly anxious that the one or two Colonies who have not drawn up schemes of defence should now do it. It is merely a matter of organisation, and involves no money. Nothing has been done in New Zealand, and little in Tasmania.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Have you got a scheme for Canada?

Captain NATHAN: Canada? Yes; we have a scheme which was prepared by the military authorities for the Imperial fortress of Halifax. But we have no proper scheme, and, as far as we know, the existing military organisation is not by any means fit for the requirements of a big war, if it should ever come, on the land frontier of Canada.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Have you a correspondence at the present time with the Department?

Captain NATHAN: I will hand you some correspondence afterwards.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: So the only three Colonies where schemes do not exist are Canada, Tasmania, and New Zealand.

Captain NATHAN: In Tasmania there is a scheme, a very old one, but it has never been revised, and it is no longer suitable. A similar remark applies to Western Australia. No scheme has ever been drawn up for New Zealand.

Sir JOHN FORREST: You want a fresh scheme?

Sir E. N. C. BRADDON: You want a fresh scheme?

Captain NATHAN: Yes.

Mr. SEDDON: I think as soon as ever we get our harbour defences completed at Auckland, we are going to start from that and submit a scheme.

[Captain NATHAN made a remark to the effect that the discussion on military matters should be treated as strictly confidential.]

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Yes, what you said just then is important. You see the reports of these proceedings may be published.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: I hope not; I suggest we do not publish anything.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I am quite content that nothing may be published.

Mr. REID: It is for the use of Her Majesty's Government. People make mischief out of everything.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: People misconstrue everything that is said. Many of them would misunderstand; taking one paragraph, they would misunderstand and others would misconstrue.

Captain NATHAN: The question of military manufacturing and educational establishments in the Colonies is the next one for consideration. There has been a proposal to establish a cordite factory in Australasia. My Committee think that that is important.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: Who proposed that?

Captain NATHAN: It has been proposed in Australia; we do not know by whom it was originally suggested.

Mr. SEDDON: It was submitted to the Victorian Government by a manufacturing firm here.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We have a bargain, I am sorry to say, which lasts a great number of years with a company, out of which it is very difficult for us to get.

Mr. REID: That has been taken over.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: No, some other one has been taken over. This particular one has not been taken over.

Captain NATHAN: The reason of the Committee's recommendation that a factory should be established is that they consider that Australia should be independent of over-sea transport for her warlike stores in time of war.

Mr. REID: There is no doubt about that.

Captain NATHAN: Canada has already got an ammunition factory.

Mr. SEDDON: New Zealand is in the same position as Victoria: tied down to the ammunition company for some time for ammunition. Might I ask you, Captain Nathan, is it cordite that they intend to supply for ammunition?

Captain NATHAN: Cordite is used for the small arm ammunition in the Imperial service, and the Colonial small arms should take the same ammunition.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Our difficulty is we have to import pretty well everything that goes into the cartridges; in time of war we might not be able to get it into our Colony. What the Colonial Defence Committee ought to aim at, if possible, is to advise us how, within our actual sources, we could manufacture everything that would be required.

Captain NATHAN: That is what we want to do, as far as possible.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Something like that would assist us wonderfully.

Captain NATHAN: Yes.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: I mean we are sending our Secretary of Defence through for the purpose of consulting here with you on the whole subject.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: Is it a question of some private firm setting up a factory, or is it a question of the Colonial Premiers asking for the advice of the Colonial Defence Committee as to whether the factory should be established by Government or a private firm?

Captain NATHAN: They have not asked for advice.

Sir H. M. NELSON: We are told that Nobel has bought out the factory in Victoria.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: No, they bought out some factory, but it is not the Colonial Ammunition Company with which we have the contract.

Sir H. M. NELSON: I thought it was.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: No, it is some other. It is some blasting company.

Captain NATHAN: The Colonial Defence Committee suggest to the Premiers of Australasia the establishment of a central school of instruction on the lines of Kingston College, Canada.

Mr. SEDDON: Has Kingston College in Canada been a success?

Captain NATHAN: It has been a success in one way that I can speak of; it has turned out some very excellent officers for the Imperial forces.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I can say I think that the Military College has been a great success until a few years ago, but I am sorry to say that the man we have had at the head of the College allowed it to go down a little. We hope that with new management it will be restored to its former standard, which was very good, I believe.

Captain NATHAN: It certainly was good in the sense of turning out some excellent officers.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: That is all you can ask for.

Captain NATHAN: Yes.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Is it not far better for us, instead of having an establishment ourselves, to send every year a certain number of men to the best establishment here where they then get all the latest information and bring it back and impart it to our other men, cheaper for us and better for them? I should have thought so.

Mr. REID: You would educate a smaller number by that means than by having a college.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: They get all the latest information and the practical working here which we could not give them. Look at the distance they would have to travel in our country to any central establishment.

Captain NATHAN: Kingston College is not for training officers in military duties, but for training boys to be officers. They may also learn to become engineers and to do other work.

Mr. REID: A sort of preliminary college.

Captain NATHAN: Yes, it corresponds somewhat to the Royal Academy at Woolwich in this country, as regards the training of boys to be officers and to be engineers.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: They need not all necessarily be professional soldiers as well.

Captain NATHAN: Oh no.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: They may enter private professions or join military forces.

Captain NATHAN: Yes, and there is a matter arising out of this that has been under the consideration of the Colonial Defence Committee. We cannot quite understand here how it is that the appointments in the permanent force are not necessarily given to cadets of Kingston College, and it seems to us that the Dominion ought to encourage the college in the same way as the Imperial Government does.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I should believe so. On general principle that would seem natural enough; but I could not give you any satisfactory answer, and, in fact, I am not posted at all.

Mr. KINGSTON: Is this Kingston College a Government institution?

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Oh yes, it is maintained altogether by the Government.

Mr. KINGSTON: How much does it cost you, about?

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I could not tell you.

Mr. KINGSTON: It costs a pretty large sum.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I could not tell you exactly the cost.

Mr. KINGSTON: Could you give us an approximate value?

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: No, I could not.

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: It appears in the Estimates.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: If you get the Estimates I could find it.

Captain NATHAN: That is all I have to bring before you.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Will you pardon me, Mr. Chamberlain. Another matter has been brought to my attention. We have never discussed it in Canada, I must admit, but it has been brought to my notice by an application made to me by the city of Toronto; not by the city, but by the citizens of Toronto—to have a recruiting bureau in the Colonies. I will tell you—I will repeat what I said a moment ago, that it has never been discussed in Canada, so far as I know. Different citizens of Toronto have written asking me to bring the matter to the attention of the military authorities here; this is as good an occasion as any. They would find

ample and very good material for recruiting the army out of the northern and large cities in Canada.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: At English wages?

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: At English wages. I cannot give any information upon the matter, but I was asked to bring it to the attention of the military authorities, and I would ask you to consider it.

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: What is the cost of a passage first.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: For a man?

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: For a man.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I suppose 30 dollars—£6; it is a very low price.

Sir JOHN BRAMSTON: That adds, of course, to the cost of recruiting.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: We have always thought that in the Colonies, where wages were so much higher, they would not look at the English shilling.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: There is a condition of things existing, I am sorry to say, which I believe would induce many men to enlist. In all our large cities at the present time you can always find ample and good material, I think, for recruiting.

Captain NATHAN: It is rather a matter which works into the suggested exchange of units, and if the Dominion Government brings that question up the question of a recruiting dépôt might be brought up with it.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I do not know whether that and a recruiting dépôt could be worked together; I never contemplated that point. The fact is, I take very little interest in military affairs in my own province. I just give you the thing for what it is worth. I could not offer any opinion upon it.

Captain NATHAN: But you might bear that in mind in connection with the other question.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Yes.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then there is another question, if we have dealt with the questions raised by the Colonial Defence Committee. I have been endeavouring, but I have not yet succeeded in obtaining an absolute answer—I have been endeavouring to obtain from the War Office and the Admiralty an offer of arms to the Colonies at low prices.

Captain NATHAN: I mentioned that.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We will be very glad to get that offer in Victoria, because they are pressing me very strongly now to find £50,000 for rifles. If the War Office is willing to make an arrangement with us to assist us, we will be very much obliged.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: It is very desirable to have the same bore, if possible.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: It is very desirable to have uniformity in everything, and I think something that ought to be insisted upon, which is easily practicable, is that all alterations in the Colonies in regard to military matters should be submitted to the Imperial Government and acted upon upon a general plan. One Colony then would not have one system and another Colony another.

Captain NATHAN: That is, of course, what my committee desires to do, and a great many Colonies have taken us very much into their confidence; not Canada I am sorry to say. From Victoria we have got a whole heap of matters here in the last year, which have been submitted by the Government of Victoria, and we have endeavoured to advise on a uniform plan so as to get a general scheme carried out in all parts.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: I might say that we derive a good deal of useful information and assistance from what you do for us in regard to many matters.

Mr. REID: So do we; so do we in New South Wales.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then that is all you have to bring before us.

Captain NATHAN: That is all.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I do not know if there is anything that any member of the Conference would wish to ask?

Mr. REID: What would be the cost of altering the Martini-Henry to the Martini-Metford rifle?

Captain NATHAN: £1 12s. 6d.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: Could you, without much trouble, give us the force in the various Colonies.

Captain NATHAN: Yes, if you will allow me I will give you the various papers.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: All I want, just roughly, is the number of permanent men, and the number of militia and volunteers in the different Colonies; I did not know whether you would have a record in your office.

Captain NATHAN: I have, yes; I will send it to you.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: I thought you might have a record in your office approximately what we have.

Captain NATHAN: I have, and I will send it to you.

Captain Nathan withdrew.

C.

5th July, 1897.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

Mr. KINGSTON: On the question of defence. I mentioned that there was a written representation by our naval authority with which we sympathise and which I do not propose to read, but I should like it to be before the Premiers generally, and I take the opportunity of handing it in.

(Confidential.)

H.M.C.S. "Protector," Port Adelaide,
27th January, 1897.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to put forward the following suggestion as worthy of consideration when discussing the revival of the agreement between the Imperial Government and the Australasian Colonies for the maintenance of the Auxiliary Squadron.

"That instead of a money contribution the Australasian Colonies should furnish an equivalent in trained seamen for the Royal Reserve for service in Australasian waters and contiguous seas."

The sum paid by Australasia would suffice to raise a reserve force of 5,000 men, a number sufficient to furnish a strong reserve, not only to the Australasian but also to the China, Pacific, and East India Squadron.

The advantages of such an arrangement over that at present in force would be for the Imperial Government:—

(1.) A strengthening of the Royal Naval Reserve, the most pressing want at this moment, and one which, owing to the great and increasing percentage of foreign seamen in the British Mercantile Marine, there is not any prospect of remedying.

(2.) Australasia as the dépôt whence to draw such a reinforcement has special strategic advantages of extreme value to the supreme sea power.

All squadrons "east of Suez and west of the Horn" could be more rapidly and safely reinforced from Australasia.

The home base would be lightened of this duty, and it would permit the concentration of all efforts on the points needing greatest attention—the European waters and the actual seat of war.

The reinforcements from Australasia would not be in such danger of interference *en route* by possible enemies as if sent from Great Britain.

(3.) The Australian reserves might also take the place of a certain proportion of continuous service trained men, whose services might be better utilised in the battleship squadrons in European waters.

Australasia, while immediately sharing in the advantages of increased naval strength, would gain others of economic value in peace time.

(1.) The money contribution would be circulated in Australia, instead of leaving the Colony.

(2.) The fierce competition that has so lowered the condition of the British merchant seamen as to threaten his extinction has already been felt, though at present in a less degree, in Australasia.

The same causes will have the same effect in Australasia, unless remedied. The expenditure of the contribution on our seamen will afford them a strong measure of "protection."

A retainer of £12 per annum paid to a trained seaman will give him an advantage over the foreigner who works for lower pay and who will soon rule the sea labour market.

(3.) The advantages to any country of having their ships manned, and all their sea industries worked, by their own kith and kin need no setting forth.

Sea defence is of vital importance to island peoples. There can be no sea defence without seamen. If our shipping and our sea trade is manned by foreigners who have no interest in defending us, we shall have neither seamen nor sea defences.

The £12 per annum retainer would pay 5,000 men, and leave nearly £56,000 for a gunnery school, training establishments, payment of training staff, and material. In the training the local naval defence ships could be apportioned a part, just as the drill ships are in the United Kingdom.

A general outline only has been stated of the broad lines upon which a fresh agreement might be entered into that would advantage all concerned, both in war and peace time; details would, of course, be subject for future discussion.

In the proposed arrangements it should be stipulated that there should be no reduction in the present naval strength of the ships on the Australasian station.

It will be objected by the British taxpayer that he will then be called upon to pay the whole of the Auxiliary Squadron, while Australasia pays only for the drilling of men in Australasia, although intended for Imperial as well as Colonial service.

A sufficient answer to this will be that the Australasian expenditure will strengthen not only our own squadron, but all the squadrons in the Pacific, China, and East Indian waters, in which British interests are very great—and strengthen them with a certainty not otherwise possible; also, there will be some reduction in the cost of the Australian Squadron, as they will be partly manned by our reserve men in course of training.

For Australasia the encouragement of all measures that may tend to naval advancement, the fostering and development of conditions that tend to future naval strength, is of special importance, and, situated as she is geographically, will have the most vital influence on her future.

Recent changes in the East, the rise of Japan as a naval power and her well-known aspirations, the establishment of Russia at Port Arthur may have in the future an effect which will be undesirable to Australasia—the “New Hebrides” question of the next generation may be one much more threatening to our well being—and one which Australasia, unable to take upon herself an honourable share in the burden of resisting, would be unable to evade.

The suggestion here put forward would go far in the desired direction. It is best that every growing community should also grow in the art of taking care of itself, which, with us, a long and close study of the history of my profession tells me, must always be the naval art.

By the training of our seamen we should be taking the first step in that direction and following our national instinct and traditions.

From the sentimental and patriotic aspect there could be no plan more certain to bind us to the motherland than one by which our own seamen will take the place in the fleet that “holds the command of the sea as a trust for the civilized world.”

I have, &c.,
W. R. CRESWELL,
N. C.

The Hon. the Chief Secretary.

D.

8th July, 1897.

NAVAL CONTRIBUTION.

(At this stage the Right Honourable G. J. Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Admiral Sir Frederick William Richards, and the Premiers of other than Australian Colonies, joined the Conference.)

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Mr. Goschen has been kind enough to attend to explain to the Premiers the views which the Admiralty take with regard to the question of naval contribution. It is a matter of interest to all the Colonies, the Australian Colonies, the Dominion of Canada, and the South African Colonies.

Mr. GOSCHEN: I have been asked to make some statement with reference to the attitude of the Admiralty as to Colonial contributions towards Naval Defence, and in particular as to the agreement with the Australasian Colonies.

I may say generally that we are content to abide by the existing agreement. The declarations which have been made on one of the earlier days of the Conference by some of the Colonial Premiers have convinced me as to the difficulties which would beset other methods of Colonial contribution, and so, I repeat, we are content to abide by the existing agreement. We would be perfectly prepared to hear any

argument against it, or for modifying it; but as matters now stand, and in view of what I have learnt of what has passed in this room, we should certainly not propose to give notice for the termination of that agreement, and we should leave it as it is, and administer it as it has been administered hitherto.

The question may be looked at from three points of view—from the political point of view, from the strategical point of view, and from the purely Admiralty and Naval point of view. From the purely Admiralty and Naval point of view we can work the agreement, and we should wish to work it on the same lines as those on which we work it at present. From the political point of view I can of course only speak as an individual member of the Government; but as First Lord of the Admiralty and a member of the Government, I value the principle which is involved in the contribution of the Colonies to the Navy which was settled some years ago; and I think it would be a great pity and a retrograde step if such ties as have been established were to be cut. Sir Gordon Sprigg has sent us a very gracious proposal from the Cape, which shows the development of that system. We should be very glad to open up negotiations with Canada, if not precisely on the same lines, because its situation is somewhat different, yet on other lines.

I come back to the point that we value generally the contributions to the Navy, not only for their amount, because, I frankly admit that, with our present vast estimates, a contribution of £126,000 is not an item to which we should attach, at the Admiralty, any great importance. Of course I cannot speak for the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Well, that being so, from the political point of view, I myself am in favour of the maintenance of the agreement. I have said that from the Naval point of view I am also in favour of the maintenance of the agreement. Though I do not mean to say that it assists us to any great extent, it does produce between the Admiralty and the Colonies certain ties which we value, and which I should be very sorry to do anything to loosen.

From the strategical point of view, we should be glad that the Admiralty should have a free hand. I was glad to see that it has been acknowledged by the Premiers that the operations of the Australian squadron in the Solomon Islands, and generally in the Pacific groups, have a distinct Colonial as well as an Imperial interest, and that no complaint could be raised against the employment of ships on the Australasian station for purposes so distinctly Colonial as many of these purposes are, though such employment might carry the ships to a considerable distance from the continent of Australia. But, apart from this, the object for which we want a free hand is to be able to conduct the defence of Australia on the same principles as those which we should follow in the defence of our English, Scotch, and Irish ports, principles which exclude our undertaking to detach ships to particular ports. For instance, we could not undertake to post one ship at Sydney, another at Adelaide, and another at Melbourne. We must rely upon the localities themselves for the defence of these ports, while, on our part, we undertake that no organised expedition should be directed against any part of Australia. No organised expedition could be sent either from Japan, or from the United States, or from France, without the full knowledge of the Admiralty. That I assume. We are too ubiquitous for any such expedition to be secretly organised. If it were organised, our whole strength would be directed to defeating such a movement. I see it has been suggested in a previous discussion that possibly we might, under stress, take away the ships which may be on the Australian station, and for which you have partly paid and on which you rely, in order to send them to some distant quarter. But I cannot conceive any case, unless we lost actually our sea power, when we should think it our duty not to defend so valuable a portion of our Empire as Australia, New Zealand, and Tasmania, for the safety of which we hold ourselves responsible in the same way as we hold ourselves responsible for the safety of the British Islands. I put this very strongly so that there may be no apprehension. In all our strategical combinations we have never conceived the possibility that we should expose such possessions as the Australian Colonies.

Mr. REID: I may say, Mr. Chamberlain, if I may be permitted to make an observation, that I accept and adopt every word in the statement which has been made by the First Lord of the Admiralty. I am prepared to strenuously move for the renewal of the treaty; in fact, you yourself are, Mr. Goschen, unless it is disclaimed.

Mr. GOSCHEN: Yes, unless notice is given.

Mr. REID: And I do strongly regard that agreement as an additional tie. I also regard it as—though a very feeble one—some small acknowledgment of

the duty which the Colonies owe to the Empire. I would not like to push our financial contributions further at present, because, as you know, we have in the Colonies a great deal of work to do, which makes it difficult for them to add to their obligations at present for self-defence; but I have listened to the statement from the First Lord of the Admiralty with the greatest possible satisfaction.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: I may say, sir, for the Colony of Victoria, that we willingly contribute the amount that falls to our lot, and I have no doubt will be prepared to continue to contribute that amount; but by some means or other a rumour, which appeared to us to have foundation, had reached us that it was the desire of the Admiralty to have full control of the squadron in time of war; and as we were paying, to us, a considerable sum for the purpose of having that squadron there to assist in the defence of our inter-colonial trade if war did break out, we felt that if that was put altogether in the power of the Admiralty to take ships away from us and send them tens of thousands of miles away to attack the commerce of an enemy at the time when we wanted the ships there to defend us, it would be very hard indeed for us to induce our people to contribute the money. I am pleased indeed to have had the opportunity of meeting the First Lord of the Admiralty, who has disabused our mind of that unfortunate rumour; and, as far as my Colony is concerned, I have no doubt we will willingly continue to contribute the amount, and perhaps in a few years' time, as things get better in the Australasian Colonies, we might be able to add to the amount which we have already voted, and give a contribution which will be a greater assistance to the British Government than the small amount which we now contribute.

Mr. GOSCHEN: Let me say another word on the suggestion of which mention has been made, that it was the desire of the Admiralty to have full control of the Australian squadron in time of war, even so far as to send the ships paid for by the Australian Colonies thousands of miles away to attack the commerce of an enemy. This rumour has probably originated from our claiming freedom in the sense in which I have claimed it.

If it has been said that we want to have the full and free disposal of our ships, this certainly, as far as my own policy and that of the present Board is concerned, does not mean that we claim to withdraw the ships built under our agreement with the Australian Colonies, and to send them to the Cape or to China, but that we desire freedom so to manage the ships as best to protect that zone and that sphere to which they belong, if we heard that an enemy were planning an expedition towards the coasts of Australia. In such a case we might possibly gather the whole of our ships together, and taking such other precautions as might be necessary, use them regardless—regardless is, perhaps, too strong a word—but use them as we should see best for the protection of the general interests of that part of the Queen's dominions.

I know that an erroneous impression has existed that, not only in the Colonies, but at home, we should station ships to defend particular ports. Take Liverpool, for instance. We, the Navy, are under no guarantee to defend Liverpool. The defences of Liverpool are in the hands of the Army, who practically manage the torpedoed and the mines, the shore defences in fact. It is the army ashore which is responsible, with such co-operation as might be necessary, if a comparatively large expedition were to threaten the place. This is the freedom which we claim.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: That is provided for in the agreement.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We know it is provided for in the agreement, but as we understood it, that was the alteration the Admiralty were now seeking to get, that the agreement should be modified so as to give full power to the Admiral to move about wherever he liked. As far as concentrating the forces to defend a particular spot of Australasia we could not for a moment raise any objection to that course. While you would be concentrating your force we would be concentrating our forces on the same spot.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: Within the limits of his station the defence of Melbourne might best be provided for, say, at Thursday Island, New Caledonia, or any other place rather than locally. It would depend on the position of the enemy.

Sir GEORGE TURNER: We realise that, but our fear was that when it was necessary to protect our inter-colonial trade the Admiral at his own will might take away the ships and send them to the Cape for other purposes altogether.

Mr. SEDDON: It is not rumour upon which that was based at all; it was a speech by the Duke of Devonshire in which he clearly laid down the alteration of

the agreement that the Admiralty contemplated. That has been further amplified by what Mr. Chamberlain has said here in reference to attacking an opposing naval force without qualifying it with the statement that this attacking [force] would be kept in Australian waters; and then, further than this, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a speech which he delivered, left it almost as open as the speech of the Duke of Devonshire, but the explanation we have had to-day has put entirely another face upon it.

Mr. GOSCHEN: The misunderstanding has arisen, I have been told, from the interpretation of a speech of the Duke of Devonshire. I know that speech well. It did not for one moment, to my mind, justify the fear that we should, in breach of our agreement with Australia, claim to withdraw the ships from thence which had been paid for by Colonial contributions. The principal point in that speech was a protest against the idea of what I call hugging the shore—against the idea that protection by the Navy superseded the necessity for shore defences. It laid down the principle that our policy must be aggressive, seeking out the enemy, a policy which, as regards Australia, might aim at attacking the possessions of other powers at war with us in the Australian zone, or at seeking out their ships within the Australian station wherever they might be. Hence our claim for freedom for the Navy. Hence the duty of the Colonies as well as the mother country to look after their shore defences. I do not say that we should not prefer contributions without any tie whatever, but I do not make such a demand, and, so far as the policy of the present Board of Admiralty is concerned, I am prepared to stand by the existing agreement.

Mr. SEDDON: Then, of course, before the Duke of Devonshire spoke at all, the Admirals on the station, not one, but the Admirals on the station, have talked about the feeding grounds of commerce and the attacking of the commerce at the Capes, and altogether I think you will clearly understand how the anxiety has arisen in the Colonies. Of course you say that we are to protect ourselves against raiders: there is not a single Colony of us that has got anything to protect ourselves with on the ocean. All we can do is to protect ourselves so far as our defences on land will do so—our artillery and naval volunteer forces and harbour defences would prevent vessels entering our ports. There is another point I should like to bring under the notice of the Admiralty, that is, whether or not under the altered circumstances they would take into consideration the strengthening of the Australian squadron by a better class of vessels than the "Ringdove" and the "Karrakatta." These boats might be right enough for attacking native villages and punishing offenders. It is a matter that might be considered by the Admiralty. We will not press it as a claim, but merely direct attention to it.

Mr. GOSCHEN: I think Sir Frederick Richards will be able to tell you that we have been replacing these ships as their commission is ended by more powerful and more efficient ships. Is that not so, Sir Frederick?

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: Quite so, but on the Australian station the five cruisers and two torpedo gunboats, specially provided under the agreement remain and are re-commissioned periodically.

Mr. GOSCHEN: You mean in the particular agreement.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: The Australian agreement, those built under the Imperial Defence Act, such as the "Mildura" or the "Karrakatta." The financial part of the agreement is based on complements; it may be a complement of 200 men or of 90 men. Of course, if you take a larger ship, a first-class cruiser, with treble the number of men carried by a third-class cruiser, it alters the financial conditions altogether.

Mr. SEDDON: I admit that; I want to say here that I should not be doing my duty to the Colonies were I not to call the attention of the Board of the Admiralty and the Premiers here that the class of boat that I have mentioned now must be well known to the Admiralty as being of no use whatever in case of attack either from the east, if some of the powerful cruisers they have there were to come down, and the same from the west.

Mr. GOSCHEN: Well, you know you must draw distinctions between ships that are under the agreement and the squadron that we keep there in addition, because under the agreement you have a certain number of ships on the cost of which you pay interest.

Mr. SEDDON: Quite so.

Mr. GOSCHEN: Besides that, there are other ships; there is the flagship, the "Orlando." The "Orlando" is a powerful ship, and when ships are withdrawn.

and when Sir Frederick Richards has proposed to me to send out one ship to relieve another—I am not speaking of your special ships under the agreement—I have noticed that it was a newer ship and a stronger ship than the ship that was going to be replaced, so that we have our eye upon this matter, and it is our interest, as I take it to be—your interest, I mean—that we should not starve the Colonies, the Colonies being part of the Empire for which we are responsible.

Mr. SEDDON: They were on the station when the arrangement was made, and, as business men, it is a question whether you will go on contributing moneys for maintaining a class of vessel on the station which is no earthly use.

Mr. GOSCHEN: They are always being used.

Mr. SEDDON: They are being used for going to the islands or making surveys; that is the only use that is made of them.

Mr. GOSCHEN: Making surveys? Is anything more important? What will Sir John Forrest say to that?

Sir JOHN FORREST: You have not got any surveyors though it is a service of great importance.

Mr. SEDDON: We have had to pay for our own surveys in New Zealand; we are not called upon to pay for surveys made in the interests of the other Colonies.

Mr. REID: They are all of a certain class specified in the agreement, and a little better, I think.

Sir JOHN FORREST: Well, they have been there for the last 18 years.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: We have relieved the "Ringdove" by a new vessel, the "Torch."

Sir JOHN FORREST: But the "Karrakatta" and the "Mildura"?

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: They are new ships.

Mr. REID: They were built under this agreement and they have got colonial names.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: They were specially built under the Imperial Defence Act.

Mr. REID: And got the colonial names in pursuance of this agreement.

Mr. GOSCHEN: They were built under the Imperial Defence Act—specially built. During their construction—I know that myself, because I was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time—during their construction you agreed to pay on a certain cost. We improved the ships because there were some later improvements out, and they cost considerably more than we were bound to make them by the agreement, and they were specially constructed for the Australian service. Those are five cruisers and two torpedo gunboats, the "Mildura," and the others, whose names I forget.

Mr. SEDDON: What is the name of the torpedo boat?

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: The "Karrakatta" and the "Boomerang" are the two torpedo gunboats.

Mr. REID: They were specially built for that kind of service.

Mr. GOSCHEN: We have more than carried out our contract.

Mr. SEDDON: I am not saying that you have not, but I say this, that it would pay New Zealand, and as far as New Zealand is concerned I would prefer to pay more and to have a better class of boat than to maintain the present contract with the present class of boats; that is what I mean to say clearly.

Mr. GOSCHEN: If you all say the same, we will consider the point; that is to say, if you will contribute more.

Mr. SEDDON: I should like that phase of the question gone into—whether the Admiralty consider that under all the circumstances it would be desirable that the contract ought to be strengthened in that direction. I say that it would be much better to extend the agreement in that direction than to keep us with the class of boats as they are now.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: Those are all practically new vessels and they are all good fighting ships, every one of them.

Mr. SEDDON: The "Royalist" and the "Pylades."

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: They have special duties, you see; they have the whole police of the ocean to look after on the Australasian station and they have got sail power; they are vessels that do their work thoroughly; there is the "Pylades" and the "Royalist"; we could not work the mastless ships so conveniently among the groups of islands in the Western Pacific.

Mr. GOSCHEN: You require a special class of ship.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: The getting of coal would be a serious difficulty.

Mr. GOSCHEN: You do not pay for those at all. I am quite prepared to say that, having due regard to the necessities of other parts of the Empire, we look upon the Australian station as one of our very important stations. Looking to the preparations of other powers and what could be done against them, we take every precaution that could well be taken, and quite recognise our responsibility for the defence of the Australian waters on the lines I have indicated.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: And as regards the flagship, it is proposed to relieve the "Orlando" by one of the first-class cruisers.

Mr. SEDDON: I have done all I want to do by calling attention to it, and as I say, the small boats are serviceable in connexion with the islands; we do not pay for those, I know that, they are the class of boats that are in the agreement; but I say they might be suitable elsewhere, and they might be replaced by more powerful boats, and we would contribute to that and leave it to the Admiralty to determine how the squadron in Australian waters can be strengthened.

Mr. GOSCHEN: But you see we have got to look not only to defence in time of war, but we have got to look at what Sir Frederick Richards has very properly called the policing of the seas. We have continual demands to go to this island or to that island; there is the labour traffic, you have got to deal with that, and these smaller ships, with their sail power, are particularly adapted for this service, and have been chosen to be able to cruise conveniently in the islands.

Mr. SEDDON: The only other question I wish to call the attention of the Admiralty to is the keeping under the agreement of two of these vessels; you have allowed us two first-class cruisers which were not commissioned; they were left out of commission in Sydney; that is their station, and we have no reserve in the Colonies upon which we can draw. If emergency arose the time it would take to commission them would be such that with the close proximity we have both east and west to these powerful navies of the nations there, that we should be at their mercy. I would ask that the Admiralty would consider as to an alteration in respect to commissioning those vessels, and as to how, in case of necessity or emergency, those ships could be found with a complete service in good time—how they would be commissioned. That is a matter of some moment. As I say they are relying upon obtaining the men, which is all right; we have plenty of sailors and men on board these steamers as far as number is concerned, but every one on board these cruisers must be specially efficient, and I assert that within a reasonable time we could not commission them.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: In the case of war being imminent the old gunboats that you speak of as being no good for fighting would probably turn their crews over to the modern ships in reserve.

Mr. GOSCHEN: Police ships.

Admiral Sir FREDERICK RICHARDS: And surveying vessels.

Sir HUGH NELSON: There was a suggestion made that we should have on the spot a reserve of men that would always be ready for the Navy in case they were wanted.

Mr. KINGSTON: I would like to say that it is a recommendation by our local naval authorities that, instead of a money contribution, the Australasian Colonies should furnish an equivalent in trained seamen for the Royal Reserve for service in Australasian waters and contiguous seas. The reasons for this recommendation are contained in the report by Captain Cresswell which I handed in at the last meeting and which is now in print. I do not know if Mr. Goschen has seen or considered it.

Mr. GOSCHEN: Yes.

Mr. KINGSTON: But it would be a great advantage to me, if such is the case, if I might be furnished with any remarks in regard to it.

Mr. GOSCHEN: I could say a word or two upon it, and that is, that the training of seamen now is a totally different thing from what the training used to be. To train for the men-of-war without the proper gunnery establishments, without the torpedo establishments, without all the engineering appliances, where they are to learn the use of the new guns and the new machinery, are operations much more difficult than the public generally think as to the ability to train in any particular spot. In the old days it would of course have been much easier—we could have had a Naval Reserve; men drilled and disciplined, which is already something.

Mr. KINGSTON: You notice that Captain Cresswell's recommendation contained a suggestion that a considerable portion of this fund should be expended—between £50,000 and £60,000 annually on a gunnery school, training establishment, payment of training staff, and material. Would that to some extent meet your objections?

Mr. GOSCHEN: I did not notice that particularly. Well, it would be difficult to organise anything of the kind, and I daresay it would only be in one Colony that you could have it established.

Mr. KINGSTON: It would be available for all.

Mr. GOSCHEN: It might be available for all, but I think we should have to man it with a number of gunnery officers from our other establishments. I think it would be difficult. I would say that any suggestion for increasing the ties between the Colonies and ourselves in the way of naval defence I would gladly consider, but I cannot hold out much hope that we shall be able to adopt this particular plan.

Mr. KINGSTON: It would, of course, give the Australians an increased interest in the fleet if there was a local reserve of about 5,000 men.

Mr. GOSCHEN: As I say, I will look further into that. I have not examined that point so carefully as some of the others.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then as regards Canada I think that it raises questions so very different from those of the Australasian Colonies and questions which perhaps it would be undesirable to discuss in public. I think that if Sir Wilfrid Laurier agreed it would be better that he should have a private interview with you than that we should enter upon a discussion here unless Sir Wilfrid would like to make some general observations.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: No, I have nothing of any general information to offer Mr. Goschen except that the question I can acknowledge does not assume the proportion that it has assumed in other parts of the Colonies.

Mr. GOSCHEN: What?

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: That the question of the contribution to the Navy has not reached the same degree of importance as it has reached in other Colonies. As to that it is altogether with us a new question which has never been discussed at all. Though we are by the side of a powerful nation, still there is no such thing as a thought of war in Canada. I find since I have been in England that the thought of war is present perhaps at all times here amongst all classes of the community, but with us, in Canada, we never think of it. It is true we are by the side of a powerful nation, we are always with them; but we look upon our conflicts with them as family troubles which mean nothing very serious. Perhaps there may be some practical points which had better be reserved for confidential discussion than for discussion here.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then as regards the offer which Sir Gordon Sprigg has alluded to on behalf of the Cape Colony, I do not think that at present he has formulated it definitely, and perhaps that also would be better reserved for private discussion with Mr. Goschen.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: Very much, sir. I may say that was what I was myself going to propose. I thought it would be convenient if I could discuss the matter with the First Lord of the Admiralty and lay before him the proposals I would make. I would say that I did not come here with the view of making any bargain whatever with the Admiralty; what I propose will be unconditional. The Admiralty has at present a naval station at Simons Bay. From that station the ships work eastward and westward on the African coast—very much upon the west coast for the protection of the Crown Colonies there; but I regard the possession of South Africa as essential to the existence of England as an Empire, and I have no doubt whatever that in the interests of the Empire that will always be a station, and there will always be a considerable force there; but I can conceive it possible that a great emergency might arise that would render it necessary to concentrate a powerful fleet in some part of the world, it might be at a distance from South Africa, and it might then be necessary to withdraw a considerable portion or even the whole of the squadron now on the African coasts. In that case I should, on behalf of the Colony, recognise that emergency, and consider that the Admiralty were doing what was required in the interests of the Empire as a whole; and it might be necessary for us, even out there, to make some sacrifices in order to support the interests of the Empire. That is the position which I take up here, and it is upon that that I shall base the proposals which I shall be prepared to submit to the First Lord of the Admiralty. The agreement which we enter into will be a provisional agreement; it will be subject to the ratification of the Cape Parliament at its session next year, and I have no doubt whatever of being able to obtain that ratification to such an agreement as we may be able to enter into.

Sir JOHN FORREST: I should like to say, sir, that the Colony I represent, contributes its share on the basis of population—it is getting bigger every day—

we are quite willing, at any rate I am quite willing, to continue the agreement. I should like to say, however, that there is a considerable amount of dissatisfaction expressed that the ships do not come to us often enough. We pay our contribution regularly. We very seldom see the ships. They come to King George's Sound on their way out and that is counted a visit, and they come to King George's Sound, which is a good harbour, and stay there for weeks sometimes, but as for going up to Fremantle, where the harbour is not so good, they very seldom do it, and if they do, anyone would suppose that war was waging because they stay about a day and away they go.

Mr. GOSCHEN: I was just looking to see. I have brought down the Admiral's letters in which he says that he had just been there or that he was going to Western Australia.

Sir JOHN FORREST: I think he knows we are a little sore about it.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Sir Edward Braddon has been obliged to leave. I just want to get on the notes the statement which he has left:—"I endorse what Mr. Reid has said, and am confident that Tasmania will combine with other Colonies of Australasia in continuing her contribution towards the auxiliary squadron. At the same time I would impress upon the Admiralty the urgent necessity for a survey of the west coast of Tasmania—a coast that, while unsurveyed, is a menace to vessels of all classes that pass it."

Mr. SEDDON: I would move that the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer with reference to the Australasian—

Mr. GOSCHEN: Not Chancellor of the Exchequer!

Sir GEORGE TURNER: The First Lord of the Admiralty would very often like to be Chancellor of the Exchequer at the same time, I think.

Mr. SEDDON: "That the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty with reference to the Australian squadron is most satisfactory, and the Premiers of Australasia favour the continuance of the Australian squadron under the terms of the existing agreement."

The SECRETARY OF STATE: It has been moved and seconded—it only applies to the Australasian Premiers—those in favour say "Aye."

Mr. KINGSTON: I do not propose to vote for that at present. I shall prefer to consider the alternative proposition of our naval authorities more fully. I understand that Mr. Goschen will kindly furnish us with more information in regard to it.

(At this stage Mr. Goschen and Admiral Sir Frederick Richards retired.)

E.

Colonial Defence.

COLONIAL PREMIERS AND COLONIAL DEFENCE, 1897.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COLONIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

(For the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.)

Mr. Chamberlain considers advantage should be taken of the presence of the Colonial Premiers in this country in connexion with the celebration of Her Majesty's Diamond Jubilee to discuss with them various questions of interest to the Empire at large, and has asked for suggestions from the Colonial Defence Committee as to the defence matters which should be discussed, and for the views of the Committee in regard to them.

After careful consideration of the subject, the Committee recommend the following topics, stated in what appears to be their order of relative importance, for discussion:—

- I. Colonial assistance towards the maintenance of the Imperial Navy.
- II. Uniformity of military laws, regulations, and conditions of service.
- III. Uniformity in arms, equipment, stores, &c.
- IV. Preparation of defence schemes, and organisation of Colonial forces in accordance with them.
- V. Interchange of military units between Great Britain and the self-governing Colonies.
- VI. Federal defence of adjacent Colonies.

- VII. Colonial military manufacturing and educational establishments.
 VIII. Regulation of civil population and utilisation of private property in war.

The views of the Colonial Defence Committee on these subjects are given in the following notes:—

I.—Colonial Assistance towards the Maintenance of the Imperial Navy.

The Committee understand that the agreement with the Australasian Colonies entered into in 1887 was to be for a period of 10 years calculated from the date of the first vessel being put in commission, and that it only terminates if and provided notice has been given previously, viz., at the end of the eighth year or of any subsequent year, and then two years after such date. Under these circumstances the agreement cannot now be terminated before the 27th January, 1901. The Committee also understand that Sir Gordon Sprigg has been requested by the Cape Parliament to enter into negotiation with Her Majesty's Government with a view to arranging some basis of contribution by the Cape Colony towards the Imperial Navy.

The Committee consider that if agreements are to be made with other Colonies than the Australasian they should be drawn upon a common basis.

* * * * *

II.—Uniformity of Military Laws, Regulations, and Conditions of Service.

The Colonial Defence Committee have been informed that the Governments of Victoria and New South Wales are at present considering the question of their military laws with a view to obtaining greater uniformity. The subject is of too technical a matter to be discussed in detail with the Premiers, but the Committee suggest that before further legislation is undertaken a complete Act, generally suitable to the six Colonies of Australia and Tasmania, should be drafted and discussed by a Committee of the Commandants of those Colonies, and introduced, with such modifications as the Commandants may suggest, in the various legislatures. The issue of generally uniform Regulations based on this Act should then follow, modified, if necessary, for each Colony to meet its special conditions.

The Committee see no reason why New Zealand should not also join in the framing of such an Act and Regulations, most of the provisions of which would further be suitable to the conditions of Canada, the Cape of Good Hope, and Natal.

Those parts of Imperial Acts and Regulations which are applicable to the Colonies should be embodied in Colonial Acts and Regulations. The Imperial Official Secrets Act should form part of the Law of every Colony.

The Acts at present governing the military forces of South Australia and Queensland might form the basis of a general Defence Act for the Colonies, and Section A. of the Australian Federal Defence Agreement, amended to February, 1896, which has already received the concurrence of the Australian Commandants, might also usefully be consulted in its preparation.

III.—Uniformity in Arms, Equipment, Stores, &c.

The Colonial Defence Committee made recommendations on this subject in their Memorandum No. 90 M., and the Australian Inter-Colonial Conference of Ministers of March, 1896, laid down in their Third Resolution that uniformity should be secured as soon as practicable as a necessary step towards a complete scheme of Australasian defence. It should be pointed out to the Premiers of Australasia that the best way to secure uniformity in most matters is by definite regulations being agreed to at the periodical meetings of Commandants, and then being put into force in the various Colonies. It might be suggested that New Zealand should in future send a military delegate to Australasian Military Conferences when such matters are discussed. An attempt should also be made to produce uniformity in arms, equipment, stores, &c., in South Africa. This part of the subject is now under consideration of the Colonial Defence Committee on reports that have been referred to them relating to the military forces of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal.

The equipment regulations in the Imperial Service should be followed wherever possible.

The most important matter in which uniformity should be insured throughout the Colonies is with regard to small arms. A decision of Government may shortly be expected on the Colonial Defence Committee's recommendations that Martini-Enfield rifles may be supplied to the Colonies at advantageous rates, and in the case of Colonies already armed with Martini-Henry weapons that credit should be given for such small arms received in exchange for those of '303-inch calibre sent to them. The Colonies should be pressed to take advantage of this decision, if favourable, to re-arm all their forces with '303-inch small arms, and provide in addition the reserve recommended in Memorandum No. 90 of the Colonial Defence Committee. It should be pointed out that whether the Lee-Enfield magazine or Martini-Enfield single-loader rifles and carbines are adopted, the great desideratum of all Colonies having small arms using the same ammunition will be attained. This question affects the self-governing Colonies of Australia, New Zealand, the Cape, and Newfoundland. Canada and Natal have already provided themselves with small arms of '303-inch calibre. More are required in Natal as a reserve.

The adoption of one pattern of field-gun with cordite ammunition, already recommended to the Australian Colonies and New Zealand in Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 65 M., dated the 12th June, 1896, might be urged on the Premiers of those Colonies.

IV.—Preparation of Defence Schemes, and Organisation of Colonial Forces in accordance with them.

The Governments of the Cape Colony, Natal, South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland have prepared and submit annually revisions of schemes by which their existing military and naval resources are to be utilised for the defence of these Colonies.

The Premier of Canada should be urged to press on his Ministry the necessity of a similar scheme for the defence of the Canadian frontier, and of giving effect to the recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 59 M., dated the 27th March, 1896, on the defence of the Dominion.

The Premier of Western Australia should be asked to hasten on the preparation of a defence scheme for that Colony, and the organisation of its military resources for the defence of Albany and Fremantle, as recommended in the Colonial Defence Committee's Remarks, No. 146 R., dated the 19th August, 1896.

Similarly, a defence scheme for Tasmania should be pressed for. None has been received since 1888. The Colonial Defence Committee last drew attention to this in their Memorandum, No. 58 M., dated the 5th March, 1896.

The attention of the Premier of New Zealand should be drawn to the inefficient military organisation of that Colony, as pointed out in various remarks and memoranda of the Committee, and most recently in their Remarks No. 153 R., dated the 1st February, 1897, on Colonel Fox's Report of 1896. A defence scheme should be drawn up, and the forces organised for the protection of the four defended ports of Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton, and Dunedin.

The Committee consider that the importance of these schemes cannot be over-estimated. Not only does their preparation enable the strategic conditions of the Colonies to be correctly appreciated and defects of existing organisation and deficiency of existing *personnel* and *matériel* to be clearly perceived, but as soon as a Colony is in possession of a complete and satisfactory scheme, it will be saved from panic and consequent loss in the event of war or anticipation of war, by the knowledge that all its resources for defence can at once be brought into play.

V.—Interchange of Military Units between Great Britain and the Self-governing Colonies.

This subject was originally brought up with regard to Canada by Colonel Herbert, then General Officer Commanding Canadian Militia, in a Memorandum dated the 10th May, 1894, printed as Enclosure 1 hereto, in which he proposed that a battery of Canadian Permanent Artillery should be stationed in England, and that a field battery of Royal Artillery should take its place at Kingston, Canada. The suggestion has not yet been acted upon. It would probably be desirable that the subject should be officially mooted in the first instance by Canada, but if the proposal is likely to be entertained by Her Majesty's Government, it might be informally discussed with Mr. Laurier.

The Committee are in favour of this scheme, which, if adopted, would be a practical step in the direction of Imperial unity. They foresee many difficulties, but they are difficulties which it should be possible to overcome. With regard to the financial arrangement, the most simple and satisfactory would be for the lending authority to continue to pay wholly for its own corps. Thus the British unit in Canada would receive pay and allowances from the Imperial Government on the same scale as corps now stationed at Halifax. In the same way, it would be easier for the Colonial corps in England to keep up their distinctive pay and allowances if the Dominion bore the charge. With the small permanent force at present kept up by Canada, exchange of batteries would probably be more convenient than exchange of battalions. If the latter became possible, the recently expressed wishes of the Colony might be met by sending there again the "Royal Canadians."

If the interesting experiment of an exchange of units with Canada succeeds, it will be for later consideration as to how far the principle can be extended to other self-governing Colonies.

VI.—Federal Defence.

The Premiers of the five Colonies of Australia and of Tasmania should be urged to approve and make definite arrangements for the adoption of the scheme of federal defence that has been agreed to by the military representatives of the Colonies in two Conferences, in so far as it deals with each Colony detailing a portion of its troops as a federal contingent, and preparing this portion for combined offensive or defensive action with the contingents of the other Colonies in the event of war. The Colonial Defence Committee have shown generally how this may be done in recent remarks on the defence schemes of South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland. When the principle has been accepted and worked to in each Colony, it will be easy to modify the details of its contingent as may be found necessary for various reasons, at periodical Conferences of Commandants.

There seems no reason why the definite adoption of the scheme, as regards the necessary action within Colonies, should await their general federation, though undoubtedly the combined action of the Colonies in war is likely to be more effective if their troops have been controlled by a central staff before they are brought together for purposes of actual operations.

The enrolment of men for service outside the limits of their own Colony, as provided for in the South Australian Defence Act of 1895, is obviously a necessary preliminary to the formation of federal contingents, and is recognised as such in the Second Resolution of the Inter-Colonial Conference of Ministers, held at Sydney in March, 1896.

The Committee believe that some additional strength might be acquired by the South African Colonies by the organisation of their local forces with a view to combined action under certain contingencies; this matter they have now under consideration.

VII.—Military Manufacturing and Educational Establishments in the Colonies.

The establishment of a cordite factory in Australia, stated in the Fourth Resolution of the Inter-Colonial Conference of Ministers of March, 1896, to be "a matter of urgent importance," will probably be mentioned at the Conference of Premiers. In view of the undoubted importance of Australia being independent of over-sea transport for her warlike stores in time of war, the Committee recommend the proposed establishment of a factory; they suggest also that New Zealand should obtain the material for her ammunition from this factory.

The establishment of a central arsenal for Australia might also be suggested. A note on this subject by the Artillery Adviser to the Inspector-General of Fortifications is printed as Enclosure 2 to this Memorandum.

The greater efficiency that would be derived from officers of the Australasian forces from the establishment of a central school of instruction on the lines of Kingston College, Canada, might be impressed on the Premiers of Australia and New Zealand. If such a college were started in Australia, the Imperial Government would doubtless assist towards its support by giving regularly to its graduates a certain number of commissions in Her Majesty's Army. The establishment of a similar college for the Cape and Natal would also seem worthy of the consideration of the Governments of those Colonies.

The Colonial Defence Committee understand that Her Majesty's Government

have now under contemplation the granting of a certain number of civil Colonial appointments to graduates of Kingston College, Canada, and would point out that, judging from the proved efficiency of Royal Engineer officers coming from that College in carrying out engineering works in Africa, Colonial engineering appointments might be included among those for which its graduates might be made available. The Committee consider, however, that the main support for the Canadian College should be derived from the Dominion Government, which should make the fullest use of it by giving to its graduates all Commissions in the Permanent Active Militia. As far as they can learn, this is not at present the case. All graduates of the College given civil appointments in Canada should belong to a reserve of officers.

VIII.—Regulation of Civil Population and Utilisation of Private Property in case of War.

It was proposed by the Colonial Defence Committee, in their Memorandum, No. 50 M., dated the 21st November, 1895, that a general Act to give the necessary powers with regard to the above to all Colonial Governors should be passed by the Imperial Government, but it is now understood that there would be difficulties in the way of passing such an Act, and no action in the matter has yet been taken.

In their recent remarks, No. 152 R., dated the 31st December, 1896, on the last revision of the Cape of Good Hope defence scheme, the Colonial Defence Committee suggested that a copy of the Secret Orders in Council of the 26th October, 1896, should be sent to the Governor of the Cape, with instructions to communicate them, should he consider this desirable, confidentially to his Ministers, and to confer with them as to the advisability of passing an Act through the Cape Parliament to give to the Governor in the event of attack or anticipation of attack on the Colony special powers similar to those which Orders in Council confer on the Governors of certain Crown Colonies. The Colonial Office, in sending the remarks of the Committee to the Governor, stated that no action should be taken for the present on this paragraph. It was thought that the subject might more conveniently be discussed with Sir Gordon Sprigg when in England.

The advisability of all the Governments of self-governing Colonies introducing legislation to confer on Governors in Council the necessary powers might be suggested to the Premiers.

The Orders in Council above referred to deal with Gibraltar, Malta, St. Lucia, Sierra Leone, St. Helena, Mauritius, Ceylon, Hong Kong, and the Straits Settlements.

In addition to these Colonies and to those having representative government, there remain Bermuda, Jamaica, and Barbados, where it would be desirable to be able to confer similar powers on the Governors, but where there is no power of legislating by Order in Council, and where the non-official majorities of the legislative bodies would probably prevent the matter being dealt with by these bodies. If an opportunity offers it might be desirable to consult with gentlemen from these Colonies, and in any event action taken in the matter by the elected Assemblies of the self-governing Colonies would strengthen the hands of the Imperial Government in dealing with the West Indian Islands.

M. NATHAN, Secretary,
Colonial Defence Committee.

June 12th, 1897.

Enclosure 1.

INTERCHANGE OF UNITS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA.

MEMORANDUM BY MAJOR-GENERAL I. J. C. HERBERT.

Ottawa, May 10, 1894.

It is generally admitted in Canada that the presence of the Imperial troops in the Dominion assisted very materially in developing a military spirit in the population. Those troops, possessing thoroughly trained officers and non-commissioned officers, furnished training schools, in which all ranks of the Canadian Militia received a sound instruction in their drill and duties. The withdrawal of these troops left the Canadian Militia without any efficient system of training, without instructors, and without a model of military organisation and efficiency. The natural result was 20 years of steady deterioration of the Militia Force.

2. The Permanent Force of Canada was raised to remedy this state of things.

It has succeeded to a limited extent only. The following are the principal causes of its failure :—

- (1) Officers to whom the command of this force has been entrusted, and in some cases also the duty of raising and organising new levies, have had a very imperfect training and no practical experience in military command.
- (2) Commissions have been given without sufficient reference to natural fitness, or to the technical or educational qualification of the person appointed. Elements, undesirable from a moral as well as a military point of view, have thus been introduced, together with the spirit of insubordination inseparable from a system of patronage. The result has been to lower the force in the public estimation, and to prevent its acquiring the prestige which should attach to a regular military force.
- (3) Officers, and, to a certain extent, non-commissioned officers, have looked upon their appointments as sinecure situations. The higher sentiment of duty which is required in any army has therefore not been properly understood, nor has there been much voluntary professional study.
- (4) The nature of the organization was necessarily rudimentary in its early stages. It has continued in this rudimentary state, because those in command have not realised the necessity for development, nor the practical methods to be adopted towards that end.

3. Notwithstanding this experience, I am strongly of opinion that the policy of maintaining a strictly Canadian permanent or regular force, is a sound one, from a military as well as a political point of view, and recent changes have done much to remedy some of the evils complained of. It is, however, universally recognised that no force which is purely local in its character can be maintained at a high standard of efficiency, and that long continuance at the same station, absence of competition, and constant inspection by the same officer all tend to produce deterioration.

4. The question therefore arises : "How are the Canadian regulars to be raised to the standard of efficiency of Her Majesty's regular troops, invested with a measure of prestige in the eyes of the Canadian public, and deprived of their thoroughly local character?"

I would suggest, as the most effective method, that the Canadian "permanent" or regular units be made interchangeable with similar units of the Imperial regular army, or, in other words, the application to Canada, in an extended form, of a principle which is already followed in providing for the defence of Her Majesty's Indian possessions. By this means a Canadian permanent unit raised and organised in Canada would be transferred to the home establishment of the Imperial Army, made a charge upon Imperial funds, and quartered for a term of years at a large station, such as Aldershot. In return a unit of similar strength would be transferred to a Canadian station, and become a charge on Canadian funds for a similar term of years. To take an example : "A Field Battery R.C.A., leaving its horses and material at Kingston, would take over those of a field battery of Royal Artillery of a similar strength at Aldershot, which would be transferred to Kingston, taking over the horses and material which it would find there. When the organisation of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry is further advanced, a similar interchange of a battalion could be effected.

5. Each Government would necessarily be required to bear the charge of transport for its own troops, *e.g.*, British troops *en route* to Canada would be paid for by the Imperial Government; Canadian troops *en route* to Great Britain by the Canadian Government, and would likewise assume naturally the burden of the non-effective charges of its own service. There are certain points of difference between the two services, such as the rates of pay and the scales of rations, and allowances, which would require discussion in detail, and there are points connected with command which would require definition; but these matters present no difficulties which are incapable of adjustment, provided their discussion is approached on the basis of the broad principle underlying this scheme, *viz.*, the admission of regular troops, raised and paid in Canada to a partnership in the Imperial Army.

6. I submit the following as some of the advantages which would follow from the adoption of this principle :—

(a) *Military.*

- (1) An increased efficiency of Canadian troops from contact with masses of British troops in Great Britain.

(2) The furnishing of correct models of military organisation to the militia forces in Canada by the presence of British troops amongst them.

(3) The Canadian officers would be improved both individually and as a whole by contact with professional soldiers, and would become better qualified to organise and train the militia force of the country.

(4) The Canadian public would cease to look down upon its own permanent force, but would, on the contrary, regard it with pride if it were considered good enough to be placed on an equal footing with Her Majesty's regular forces.

(b) *Politically.*

(1) The interchange of British and Canadian troops would be a living sign of the solidarity of Her Majesty's Empire, and it would especially enhance, in the eyes of foreign States, the political importance of the self-governing Colonies of Great Britain.

(2) It would promote a mutual and close personal acquaintance between the mother country and Canada which could not fail to be of benefit to both.

(3) Ever since the conquest of Canada the value of discharged soldiers as colonists has been a marked feature in Canadian history, and is noticeable even in the present day. The scheme proposed would undoubtedly have the effect of retaining many of this useful class in Canada.

(4) It may almost be stated as an axiom that British capital follows British troops.

(5) The problem of the mutual support of the parts of the Empire for the military defence of common interests would be approached in a practical manner, and detached from the question of fiscal systems, which has hitherto been inseparable from the academical discussions upon it.

(6) I have herein roughly sketched the ideas which I submitted to you recently in conversation. Should you on further consideration regard the scheme as practicable, this Memorandum, though necessarily imperfect, may furnish sufficient material on which to base a communication to Her Majesty's Imperial Government.

I. J. C. HERBERT,
Major-General, Commanding Canadian Militia

To the Honourable Minister
Militia and Defence.

Enclosure 2.

NOTE ON A PROPOSED CENTRAL ARSENAL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN COLONIES.

1. Such an Arsenal should be established on a site having immediate access to a good harbour for facilities of transport. At the same time it should not be on the coast in any position where it would be exposed to attack by troops landed from ships or to bombardment from the sea.

2. The objects to be attained by the establishment of an arsenal are :—

- (i.) The manufacture of all such articles of war material and equipment as could be economically made in Australia.
- (ii.) The execution of all ordinary repairs to guns, mountings, and small arms and war material generally.
- (iii.) The storage and care of all war material not in actual use by the ships or troops of the several Colonies; and of any reserves of ordnance and ammunition, &c., which it may be thought advisable to maintain.

(i.) As regards manufacture, it is not likely that the possible demands would warrant the establishment, at present, of factories for guns and their carriages, or for the manufacture of small arms, or of projectiles for ordnance; but there appears no reason to doubt that all harness and saddlery, accoutrements and stores of a like nature, could be manufactured locally, and that there would be sufficient demand from the various Colonies to warrant the establishment in the arsenal of a factory

for this purpose. A clothing factory either in, or in connexion with, the arsenal and under the direction of its head might also be established.

As regards small-arm ammunition, the best arrangement would probably be that which appears at present to be more or less accepted, viz., to hold out inducements, by the promise of orders of a stated amount annually for a term of years, to local manufacturers to set up machinery for the purpose of its manufacture; and similar inducements might be held out to make worth while the local manufacture of cordite for military and naval use; at present it is believed that all powder for these purposes is imported, a condition of things which might lead to dangerous complications in time of war.

All supplies, of whatever sort, obtained locally should, before being accepted, be submitted to an examination and test by an inspector of warlike stores at the arsenal.

Laboratories for making up cartridges and filling shell would be required, and should be a part of the arsenal.

(ii.) As regards repairs, a workshop fitted up similarly to a Class 1 Ordnance Store workshop of the Imperial Service would probably suffice to execute all repairs which do not amount to an actual re-manufacture. The shops should be under the direction of an official of corresponding qualifications to those of an Inspector of Ordnance Machinery in the Imperial Service.

(iii.) As regards storage, the arsenal should contain stores for the reception of ordnance, small arms, and war material generally, which are not required for actual use, and which it is thought advisable to keep in a central reserve; also for the reception of such articles sent for repair that are awaiting return to their stations. Store magazines for reserve ammunition, and ammunition awaiting issue, should be provided in, or in connexion with, the arsenal.

3. The departments of the proposed Central Arsenal would be :—

A harness and saddle factory.

A clothing factory.

Repairing shops.

A laboratory.

A store department, charged with the receipt and issue and care of all stores, whether made in the arsenal or obtained from outside.

Over all would be a Director, and under him an inspection staff.

4. At each headquarter station of the various local defence forces (except where the Central Arsenal would be) small repairing shops, similar to those of Class III. in the Imperial Service, would be required, to execute minor repairs, for which it would not be worth while to send the articles to the Central Arsenal. The efficiency of these shops could be ensured by placing them to some extent under the control of the Director of the Central Arsenal and supplying the artificers from that arsenal.

5. The advantages which may be expected to accrue from such a system of centralising in the Australian Colonies the supply and storage of war material would be as follows :—

- (1) Greater facility in obtaining uniformity of pattern in arms and equipment of the different forces.
- (2) Saving of expense by economy of management, and by making many articles and executing many repairs which must now be obtained from, or executed, outside the Colonies.
- (3) War material not actually in use, or in charge of troops, would be well looked after, and kept in repair, and up to date, as regards pattern, by competent artificers, instead of, as must at present occasionally occur, deteriorating from unavoidable neglect.
- (4) The manufacturing resources of the whole of Australia in respect of ammunition and stores could be more easily made available to meet the requirements of any individual Colony.
- (5) Many stores now imported would be made locally, thus giving employment to local labour, and obviate the danger of failure of supply in time of war.
- (6) Repairs of greater magnitude could be executed locally than could possibly be done in such small workshops as each individual Colony would be able to maintain; and the employment of more highly skilled (and

paid) artificers would be possible in the case of such an arsenal than would be justified in the case of small local workshops where the demand for their labour would be intermittent.

- (7) Such an arsenal would form a nucleus for future expansion, so that as the population and trade and consequent need for larger defensive forces, naval and military, increase, a great manufacturing establishment would arise, which would eventually render the Colonies nearly, if not quite, independent of all sources of external supply.
- (8) The interchange of guns, &c., between different Colonies would be facilitated; for instance, if one Colony is in possession of guns which it no longer requires, they could be sent to the arsenal, and if afterwards required by other Colonies would be issued to them.

6. The Central Arsenal would be presumably placed under the control of the Federal Council of Defence, when established, to whom its director would be responsible, and who would determine the sums to be contributed by each of the Colonies towards its establishment.

Once established, the arsenal should be self-supporting, that is to say, a proportion of all charges for wages, administration, and wear and tear of machinery should be added to the actual cost of all stores issued from, or repairs executed in, the arsenal.

Pending the establishment of such an arsenal, it would be perhaps well to ascertain whether certain stores could not be more economically obtained from the very efficient Government factories in India than from England. And should such a factory be started, it might be advisable in the first instance to obtain a certain proportion of the staff of artificers from the same source.

A. C. HANSARD, Major, R.A.,
Artillery Adviser to Inspector-General of Fortifications.

THE COLONIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

In 1887 a paper was laid before the Colonial Conference, then assembled in London, recounting briefly the measures that had been taken in the preceding 10 years in relation to Colonial Defence. It described the reasons that led to the formation of the present Colonial Defence Committee in 1885, its constitution, and the work that had been carried out by it in the two years of its existence. It is thought that it would be convenient at the present time to repeat the information concerning this Committee given in the former paper, and to complete this information by summarising its labours, and, as far as possible, their results during the 12 years that the Committee has been at work.

Formation of Committee.

2. In 1885, an incident on the Afghan frontier resulted in an alarm of war throughout the Empire, and the receipt from the Colonies of a number of communications with reference to their defence, which, requiring joint decisions of the Colonial Office, Admiralty, and War Office, could not be dealt with by existing machinery with the rapidity required by the importance of the subject at a time of political tension. On the suggestion of the Honourable R. H. Meade, then Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Colonial Defence Committee was formed of members representing the three Departments concerned, with instructions to report directly to the Secretaries of State for War and the Colonies and the First Lord of the Admiralty.

When the war scare was over, it was found convenient to retain the Committee, of which the objects were subsequently defined as follows :—

- (a) To discuss and work out details of questions relating to Colonial defence, in which the Admiralty, War Office, Colonial Office, and Treasury are individually or collectively concerned, and which have been referred to the Committee by any one or more of the Departments above named, or by the Joint Naval and Military Committee on Defence.

- (b) To advise the Secretary of State for the Colonies in relation to local forces and defences in Colonies where no Imperial establishment is maintained.
- (c) To prevent the delays and misunderstandings which may arise from inter-Departmental correspondence.
- (d) To ensure as far as possible a uniform treatment of questions of Colonial defence.

Constitution of Committee.

3. When the Committee was first formed it consisted of the Inspector-General of Fortifications as President, the Assistant Director of Artillery, the Naval Adviser to the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies as members. Shortly afterwards the Assistant Quarter-master-General joined the Committee to represent the staff of the Commander-in-Chief. In 1887 the Director of Military Intelligence was added to assist in deliberations affecting the military strategy of the Empire; in 1888 a representative of the Treasury joined to take part in deliberations affecting the Imperial Exchequer, and in the same year the Director of Naval Intelligence took the place of the Naval Adviser to the Inspector-General of Fortifications as representative of the Admiralty. Except for some minor alterations in the designation of the appointments held by its members, the constitution of the Committee has not changed since that date, and it is now as follows:—

- President: The Inspector-General of Fortifications.
 Members: { The Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office.
 A representative of the Treasury.
 The Director of Military Intelligence.
 The Director of Naval Intelligence.
 The Assistant Adjutant-General for Mobilisation.
 The Deputy Inspector-General of Ordnance.
 Secretary: A military officer.

The Admiralty have reserved the right of adding another naval officer to the Committee should they consider this desirable.

A list of the officers who have served on the Committee since its first formation is given in annexed Table I.

Work of Committee.

4. The Committee has held 105 meetings, at which it has dealt with about 850 agenda, or an average of somewhat over eight per meeting. The work that has been done may be divided under the following heads:—

- (i.) The consideration of general and miscellaneous subjects and the preparation of memoranda thereon. Of such memoranda, 107 have been printed.
- (ii.) The editing and consideration of Colonial schemes of defence and the preparation of remarks thereon for transmission to the Colonies. Some 85 schemes have been edited, and 10 have been received printed from the Colonies. Remarks relating to these schemes, and also to various other reports, numbering 163 in all, have been drawn up and printed.
- (iii.) Recommendations and opinions given upon War Office or Colonial Office papers.

(i.) A list of the printed Memoranda of the Committee is given in annexed Table II.* It includes the instructions (No. 19 M.) by which the preparation in all Colonies of Schemes of Defence for utilising existing resources in war to the best advantage was first initiated, and the further recommendations (No. 46 M.) for giving greater completeness to these schemes and securing their execution on a more uniform basis. Memorandum No. 16 M. has resulted in the preparation of the Returns of Naval and Military Resources now annually sent in by all Colonies, which form an invaluable record of the defence forces of the Empire, outside the

* Not printed here.

United Kingdom, Egypt, and India, in a form convenient for reference. The approved garrisons of the Imperial coaling stations have been mainly based on recommendations contained in Memoranda Nos. 31 M. and 74 M. In Nos. 57 M. and 90 M. the general principles of Colonial defence, as accepted by Her Majesty's Government, have been laid down. Other printed general Memoranda of the Committee deal with cable communications; with the regulation of traffic in Colonial ports in time of war; with measures of precaution at Colonial ports as regards the landing of the troops of foreign Powers for drill, the entry of foreign ships, and the guarding of works of defence from inspection; with the necessary uniform to secure belligerent rights for local levies; with the regulation of civil population and utilisation of private property in time of war; and with the supply of small arms to Colonies. As will be seen from Table II,* a large number of Memoranda deal with the defences and defence forces of individual Colonies.

(ii.) A list of the printed Remarks of the Committee is given in annexed Table III.* They deal with the Defence Schemes already referred to, with Reports by Local Joint Naval and Military Committees, prepared under instructions drawn up by the Imperial Joint Naval and Military Committee on Defence, and with various printed papers received from Colonies, mostly annual reports, on local forces.

The main object of the Defence Schemes is that, the moment it is decided that war preparations are to be made, every man concerned will immediately carry out the duties to which he has been told off and with which he has been made conversant in time of peace. No time or resources will be wasted. The present state of these schemes is shown in Table V. annexed, from which it will be seen that they have been prepared for all the more important Colonies, with the exception of Newfoundland, Canada (General Defence), and New Zealand, while in most Colonies they have been revised to date. Western Australia, Tasmania, the West Indian Colonies (where there are no Imperial troops), and Lagos are behindhand in the matter of keeping their schemes up to date.

The remarks of the Colonial Defence Committee on the reports of the Local Joint Naval and Military Committees, called for by the Imperial Joint Naval and Military Committee on Defence, have been, except as regards a few minor points, concurred in by that body and sent to the Colonies concerned.

Advantage has been taken of the various printed reports on Colonial forces received from Colonies to point out the most pressing steps that should be taken to bring these forces up to a uniform standard of excellency.

(iii.) A list of subjects other than those dealt with in the printed memoranda and remarks of the Committee, but concerning which they have made recommendations in minutes on War Office and Colonial Office papers, for the consideration of those offices and for communication, when necessary, to the Colonies concerned, is given in Table IV.*

Procedure of Committee.

5. The procedure of the Committee is governed by rules approved by the Secretaries of State for War and for the Colonies, and by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. The defence schemes for the four Imperial fortresses are sent to the Committee by the War Office, and those for other Colonies by the Colonial Office. Other matters are referred to them by one or other of these offices, by the Admiralty, or by the Joint Naval and Military Committee on Defence. Occasionally reference has been made direct to the Committee by Agents-General of the self-governing Colonies. Though the Committee think it most desirable that their assistance should be given to the Agents-General whenever it may be required, they hold it more convenient that the reference to them should be made through the Colonial Office, to whom in such cases they send their replies.

Papers referred to the Committee are circulated to members with such further information obtained from the Colonial Office, War Office, and Admiralty as may be necessary for their consideration. The members consult the Departments they represent in so far as this appears to them desirable. Advantage is taken of the presence in this country of military and civil officers, and other gentlemen possessing special Colonial experience, and they are invited to give information when questions affecting the Colonies to which they belong are under discussion.

* Not printed here.

A meeting is arranged as soon as there are a sufficient number of subjects to be dealt with and the results of the discussion are embodied in the printed memoranda and remarks above referred to, or in minutes on papers. Drafts of all the printed documents are sent before final issue to the members of the Committee for them to see that their views are represented. If the matter dealt with in any particular document lies within the administrative powers of the Department of State to which, when approved by the Committee, it is sent, action is taken by that Department. Where inter-Departmental agreement is required, it is sent by the office receiving it to the other two for their concurrence. If a Treasury question is involved, the War Office, Admiralty, or Colonial Office, as the case may be, addresses the Treasury as soon as this concurrence has been obtained.

When the Committee was first formed, at a time when war was imminent, a somewhat simpler and quicker procedure was adopted, and this would probably be reverted to if it again became necessary.

6. It is thought, however, that the conditions which obtained in 1885, and resulted in the reference home of many questions from various Colonies at a time when war was daily expected, have now permanently passed away. Every Colony now knows, or should know, the extent to which it may rely on protection from the Imperial Navy, and how far it is expected to provide for its own defence from its own resources. Those Colonies that have not made the defensive provisions that have been within their power are aware that no dislocation of Imperial forces will be made to the detriment of the Imperial scheme of defence for the protection of local interests against raiding attack. All parts of the Empire should now be able to organise their defence with rapidity, with completeness, and with confidence.

If this result has been even partially achieved, a long step has been taken towards enabling the Empire to put forth its full strength in a great struggle.

Much yet remains to be done. In the organisation of land forces, some Colonies are far below the average standard, while in others various conditions have contributed to make it difficult to keep up even the small number of troops which represent the minimum of safety. The additional strength which would be derived from the federation of neighbouring Colonies for mutual defence, though acknowledged in principle, has not yet, except in Canada, been brought into existence by practical legislation. Again, conditions which may doubtless arise in the wars of the future, when troops of various Colonies will work together, and with Imperial forces, make it advisable that their training, organisation, and armament should be further assimilated, while those differences which enable the forces to develop best in their special local circumstances are still maintained. Finally, the vast influence which the British Navy, wielded by a central authority, exercises on the destinies of the Colonies, requires to be yet more fully and more practically recognised.

The Colonial Defence Committee have in view these developments in the future, as well as the maintenance of the great advances that have already been made from the conditions of the past. They are fully aware, however, that the best interests of the Colonies demand that their military and naval expenditure should be moderate and they consider that moderate expenditure if wisely directed is sufficient to secure safety. They look upon it as one of their chief functions to prevent the Colonies from spending money on measures of defence not absolutely necessary, and to advise them so that available resources for these purposes are entirely expended in the most profitable manner. They have evidence, from papers that now come to them, that this fact is realised by several of the self-governing Colonies, and also that, both with regard to these Colonies and those directly under the Crown, the Committee are becoming more and more in a position to render effective aid to Her Majesty's Government towards the perfection of a uniform, sufficient, and complete scheme of colonial defence.

M. NATHAN,
Secretary,
Colonial Defence Committee.

June 11, 1897.

TABLE I.

LIST of MEMBERS of COLONIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE since its Constitution in 1885.

	From	To
PRESIDENT.		
<i>The Inspector-General of Fortifications.</i>		
Major-General (afterwards Lieut.-General) Sir Andrew Clarke ...	22.4.85	25.6.86
Lieut.-General Sir Lothian Nicholson ...	8.7.86	17.4.91
Major-General (now Lieut.-General) Sir Robert Grant ...	18.4.91	—
MEMBERS.		
<i>The Director of Military Intelligence.</i>		
Major-General (afterwards Lieut.-General) H. Brackenbury ...	27.6.87	31.3.91
" (General) E. F. Chapman ...	1.4.91	31.3.96
" Sir John Ardagh ...	1.4.96	—
<i>The Director of Naval Intelligence (before 1888, the Naval Adviser to the I.G.F.).</i>		
Captain T. S. Jackson, R.N. ...	22.4.85	5.4.86
" C. C. Drury, R.N. ...	6.4.86	10.1.88
" Hall, R.N. ...	11.1.88	9.11.88
" (afterwards Rear-Admiral) C. A. G. Bridge, R.N. ...	10.11.88	31.8.94
" L. A. Beaumont, R.N. ...	1.9.94	—
<i>Representative of the Colonial Office.</i>		
The Honourable (afterwards Sir) R. H. Meade ...	22.4.85	28.2.97
E. Wingfield, Esq. ...	1.3.97	—
<i>Representative of the Treasury.</i>		
G. L. Ryder, Esq. ...	1.3.88	—
<i>The Assistant Adjutant-General for Mobilisation (before 1891, Assistant Quartermaster-General).</i>		
Colonel Lord W. F. E. Seymour ...	11.85	30.9.88
" Sir Francis de Winton ...	1.10.88	2.10.89
" J. W. Crealock ...	23.5.90	24.5.91
" C. Grove ...	25.5.91	16.11.94
" Honourable N. G. Lyttelton ...	5.12.94	—
<i>The Deputy Inspector-General of Ordnance (before 1895, Assistant Director of Artillery).</i>		
Colonel H. le G. Geary ...	22.4.85	9.1.90
" C. H. F. Ellis ...	10.1.90	9.1.93
" N. L. Walford ...	10.1.93	9.1.97
" R. A. Montgomery ...	10.1.97	—
Secretary.		
Captain H. Jekyll ...	22.4.85	8.7.85
" (afterwards Major) G. S. Clarke ...	9.7.85	11.92
Major (afterwards Lieut.-Colonel) W. Peacocke ...	2.11.92	30.4.95
Captain M. Nathan ...	1.5.95	—

TABLE V.

LOCAL DEFENCE SCHEMES, showing present state.

Group.	No.	Colony.	Does Printed Scheme exist?	Date of Last Revision.	Remarks.
North America	1	Newfoundland...	No	...	Proposals of C.D.C. for defence not at present accepted.
	2	Canada:			
		Halifax ...	Yes	January 1897.	
		Esquimaux ...	No	...	Defence works are now approaching completion, and Scheme has become necessary.
		General ...	No	...	Scheme last called for in C.D.C. Memorandum No. 59 M. of 27.3.96.
	3	Bermuda ...	Yes	January 1896.	
	4	Bahamas ...	No	...	
	5	Turks and Caicos Islands.	"	...	
	6	Leeward Islands:			
	7	Antigua ...	"	...	The organisation of small volunteer forces for the protection of these colonies from external aggression, and for the maintenance of internal order, is now commencing.
West Indies	8	Montserrat ...	"	...	
	9	St. Kitts and Nevis.	"	...	
	10	Virgin Islands	"	...	
	11	Dominica ...	"	...	
	12	Windward Islands:			
	13	Grenada ...	"	...	Proposals of C.D.C. for defence not accepted.
	14	St. Vincent ...	"	...	Ditto.
	15	St. Lucia ...	Yes	May 1896.	
	16	Jamaica ...	"	January 1897.	
	17	Barbados ...	"	June 1888	Proposals of Local Committee of 1888 now out of date.
Mediterranean	18	Trinidad ...	"	June 1887	General arrangements of defence discussed on various papers, but no satisfactory Defence Scheme up to date exists.
	19	Tobago ...	No	...	
	20	British Honduras	Yes	July 1887	General arrangements of defence discussed on various papers, but no satisfactory Defence Scheme up to date exists.
	21	British Guiana ..	"	December 1895	General arrangements of defence discussed on various papers, but no satisfactory Defence Scheme up to date exists.
	22	Falkland Islands	No	...	Defence of Islands now under consideration of Admiralty.
	23	Gibraltar ...	Yes	March 1897.	
	24	Malta ...	"	January 1897.	
	25	Cyprus ...	"	February 1887	Local committee's proposals of 1887 now out of date.
	26	Gambia ...	No	...	
	27	Sierra Leone ...	Yes	January 1896.	
West Africa	28	Gold Coast ...	"	December 1896.	
	29	Lagos ...	"	April 1888	Scheme now out of date.
	30	St. Helena ...	"	September 1896.	
	31	Cape of Good Hope.	"	January 1896.	
	32	Natal ...	"	September 1896.	
	33	Mauritius ...	"	October 1896.	
	34	Ceylon ...	"	January 1894.	
	35	Straits Settlements.	"	December 1896.	
	36	Labuan ...	No	...	
	37	Hong Kong ...	Yes	January 1896.	

Group.	No.	Colony.	Does Printed Scheme exist?	Date of Last Revision.	Remarks.
Australasian	36	Western Australia.	Yes	July 1887	Scheme imperfect, and now out of date. Revision last called for in C.D.C. Remarks, No. 146 R., dated 5.8.96.
	37	South Australia	"	June 1896.	
	38	Victoria ...	"	November 1896.	
	39	New South Wales.	"	September 1896.	
	40	Queensland ...	"	January 1897.	
	41	British New Guinea.	No	...	
	42	Tasmania ...	Yes	January 1887	Scheme now out of date. Revision last called for in C.D.C. Memorandum, No. 58 M., dated 19.3.96.
	43	New Zealand ...	No	...	Scheme last called for in C.D.C. Remarks, No. 153 R., dated 1.2.97.
	44	Fiji ...	"	...	Raising of local forces now under consideration of Colony.

COLONIAL DEFENCE.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COLONIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

About six years ago the Colonial Defence Committee drew up a Memorandum laying down certain general principles which they considered should be kept in view by the various responsible Governments of Australasia in dealing with questions affecting defence.

These principles have been generally accepted and acted upon in the Australian Colonies, though at times action is still taken there not entirely in accordance with them, while from other parts of the British Empire proposals are still received based on erroneous conceptions of the true policy of a great State having vast interests to defend in all quarters of the habitable world.

The Colonial Defence Committee, therefore, consider that the time has come when advantage will be derived from a further enunciation of the principles which have guided and still guide them in making recommendations to the various Departments of State with regard to the defence of the Colonies.

2. The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attack from over the sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognised by the Admiralty, who have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against organised invasion from the sea. To fulfil this great charge, they claim the absolute power of disposing of their forces in the manner they consider most certain to secure success, and object to limit the action of any part of them to the immediate neighbourhood of places which they consider may be more effectively protected by operations at a distance.

It is recognised, however, that Her Majesty's ships, engaged in hunting out and destroying the squadrons of an enemy, may not be in a position to prevent the predatory raids of hostile cruisers on British ports. The strength of such an attack will vary in the different parts of the world, according to the strengths of possibly hostile navies, the proximity of their bases, and the troops that are or could easily be brought there in anticipation of war. It also varies from time to time with changing political combinations. But it is improbable that a raiding attack would be made by more than a few ships, nor could it be of any permanent effect unless troops could be landed. In no case could a greater force than a few thousand men be collected and conveyed without such arrangements and preparation as would bring the operations under the category of those dealt with by the navy. Against a raid of the nature indicated it has been considered necessary to make secure those places which are essential to the navy for coaling, refitting, and

repairing. Ports for this purpose have been selected by the Admiralty, and Imperial resources in men and money available for use abroad have been concentrated on their defence. Many of the Colonies have contributed largely to their own military protection. In Australian waters defence for naval purposes has been provided by the Colony of New South Wales in the protection that has been given to the port of Sydney, while the defence of certain mercantile strategic positions has been undertaken mainly by the Australian Colonies whose commerce they will protect.

3. Apart from the harbours fortified for the navy, there are other ports which, though they do not enter into what may be called the general strategic scheme, are also liable from their commercial importance to predatory raids, and which require measures of defence for the protection of the special interests involved. The resources of places which, in the opinion of an enemy, would justify the very considerable risks which a raid on them would involve are generally sufficient to admit of the provision of local defence by local means, and where the liability to attack and the resources to resist attack co-exist, it has been held to be the duty of the Colony to make provision for adequate defence.

In dealing with places of this nature the Committee have advocated the creation of sufficient fixed defences to resist occupation by hostile cruisers, but more especially the provision of troops sufficient to deal effectually with such forces as an enemy must put on shore to enable him to secure any permanent advantage from his attack. Troops without works may defeat an enemy and frustrate his object. Works without troops are useless and delusive. It is necessary to lay stress on this fact, as fortifications give an appearance and feeling of security which is not justified unless they are fully garrisoned by well-trained men and supported by mobile forces, and because expenditure on defences, involving a heavy outlay at one time and little at another, can be more easily fitted into the exigencies of fluctuating budgets than expenditure on troops, which must be constant to be effective. When money is made available in time of anticipated war, there is a tendency to spend it in increasing fortifications and armaments, sometimes already on an unnecessarily elaborate and extensive scale, while in time of external quiet and internal financial depression there is a tendency to reduce to a dangerous extent the military forces, which can only be of value if constantly kept up to a state of efficiency in numbers and training.

4. It is scarcely necessary to point out that the system of defence for the whole Colonial Empire must take fully into consideration the special conditions of the various Colonies. The organisation of forces in a vast continent like Australia must differ from that of the small body of men whose duty will be to protect the single port of a West Indian island. The Colonies of Australia should be in a position to afford each other mutual support by combined offensive or defensive action. An armed police force, prepared to resist the few troops that might be landed from a single cruiser, may suffice to guard the smaller interests of a West Indian town. Again, the defence of Canada, with its long land frontier, obviously requires to be treated on a different basis from that of the small island of St. Helena.

To enable them to deal with these varying conditions on the basis of the general scheme for the defence of the whole Empire, the Colonial Defence Committee have recommended that a scheme, drawn up on certain indicated lines to show the probable strength and nature of attack on each Colony, and how its existing resources could be utilised to the best advantage for defence, should be submitted annually for their consideration and remarks. Such schemes are now regularly received from all the Crown Colonies, and from most of those that are self-governing. The clearer perception of the strategic conditions of each place which is shown in the later schemes, and the increase in their definiteness and practicability as they are revised year by year, lead the Committee to attribute the greatest importance to them, and strongly to urge those Colonies which have not already done so to at once take this step towards informing themselves as to what would be their weak points in war, and what means they have for remedying them. Defence schemes are not of mere academic interest. If war with a great power were to break out to-morrow there would be no new data available on which to draw up such schemes if they did not already exist. They would have to be hastily compiled, considered, and adopted, and would probably be considerably above or below the requirements of the case, unnecessarily dislocating the civil progress of the country in the former case, and dangerously risking its safety in the latter.

5. In addition to the schemes which deal, as above stated, with the organisation of existing resources for purposes of defence, various annual reports of the commandants of the military and naval forces of the self-governing Colonies have been referred to the Committee, as well as proposals which have been received from time to time by the Colonial Office from the Colonies with reference to alterations in their *personnel* and *matériel*. This has enabled the Committee to advise on the organisation, conditions of service, training, and equipment of colonial military and naval forces, and on the fortifications and armament of the many defended places abroad. The Committee can, of course, only advise, and, for reasons of local policy or expediency, or for other causes, it has not always been possible for the Colonial Governments to accept the advice that has been given. The failure to do so has sometimes involved them in expenditure which to the Committee has not appeared essential, while sometimes they have effected economies which to the Committee have not appeared wise, and thus have in part marred the completeness of the general scheme of national defence to which so much importance is attributed.

It will be convenient to repeat here the principles which are now guiding the Committee in advising on the more important details with regard to the above subjects.

6. The military forces of each Colony, when more than a detachment of volunteers or armed police, should be under a carefully selected officer, who should be appointed for a definite number of years, and who should be directly responsible to the Defence Minister in self-governing, and to the Governor in Crown Colonies, for the administration and for the maintenance of the efficiency of the military forces in time of peace, and, except when Colonial forces are co-operating with Imperial forces under a senior officer, for the conduct of all military operations in time of war. The Committee attribute great importance to the duties and responsibilities of the military commandant being clearly defined, and to his powers, especially in war, being large. Until such time as the training of officers of local forces shall have been carried to a standard that will make it possible to select from among them officers equal to the very responsible duties involved in the command of all the troops of a Colony, it will be necessary, in the interests of the Colonies, to give these commands to Imperial officers.

Where the troops of adjacent Colonies are likely to co-operate, a Council of Defence of those Colonies should appoint a general officer with staff for the inspection of the troops in peace and for the conduct of joint operations in war.

Where a Colony is divided for purposes of defence into several districts, each district should be under an officer appointed to its command who should be responsible for the defence organisation of that district to the military commandant of the Colony.

In Colonies where there are extensive artillery defences and a considerable artillery force, a specially selected officer should be appointed from the Royal Artillery for a definite number of years to command the artillery of the Colony in peace, and to serve as artillery staff officer to the military commandant in peace and war. Such an appointment would only be necessary in the self-governing Colonies until local officers become available who are well acquainted, both theoretically and practically, with modern artillery *matériel*, and with the latest approved methods of utilising it and the artillery *personnel* to the best advantage.

The corresponding appointment under similar conditions of an officer from the Royal Engineers is advisable where there are extensive submarine mining defences, or where large military works are in contemplation or in progress.

7. The selection, appointment, and conditions of service of the officers in the various branches of the colonial forces are not altogether satisfactory, and require to be assimilated in the various parts of the Empire, and especially in adjacent Colonies.

Each Colony should have a reserve of qualified officers, who should be available, under definite arrangements, to make up the full number required for the forces on war footing with a small additional number to replace casualties. Canada possesses excellent material for such a reserve in the graduates of the Kingston Military College, and the matter has also been kept in view in some of the Australasian Colonies.

As many colonial officers as possible should be passed through military schools in the first instance, and should occasionally attend classes of instruction afterwards. The concentration of the military education of officers in Australia at one centre would tend to economy and efficiency. It was recommended by a Royal Commission

as long ago as 1882, and would probably follow on confederation, as in the case of Canada.

The higher instruction of officers has been assisted in some of the Australian Colonies and Canada by sending selected officers to courses in England and India. The results are reported to have been very satisfactory, and the system is considered a good one.

The United Service Institutions of New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland, have been established to contribute by lectures and discussions on military and naval matters towards raising the standard of technical knowledge of the officers of the military and naval forces of those Colonies, and the Military Institutes of Toronto and Quebec to serve a similar purpose in Canada. The Colonial Defence Committee look on these institutions as most useful, and hope to see similar institutions established in other Colonies.

8. The colonial military forces consist of regular or permanent troops, militia, either partially paid or unpaid, volunteers, and armed police. The Colonial Defence Committee attach the greatest importance to the assimilation of the troops in adjacent Colonies, and they consider that, as far as the local circumstances permit, the conditions of service should also be similar to those in the corresponding forces in the Imperial army.

In self-governing Colonies there should be, as there mostly already is, a small body of regular or permanent troops to look after armaments, defence works, and stores, and to assist in the training of the militia and volunteer forces in peace. They would form a strong nucleus for the more technical corps in war, and should include, until they attain a standard of recognised efficiency, a certain number of warrant officer or N.C.O. instructors from the Imperial service.

The Committee consider that a better general result has been, and is likely to be, given where the bulk of the colonial forces are partially paid than where the entirely voluntary system is adopted. The latter is fairly applicable in towns and well-populated districts, where it is possible frequently to get men together for parades without seriously interfering with their ordinary avocations; in rural districts the men cannot, as a rule, be assembled with sufficient frequency without pecuniary loss, and payment should be made to them.

In those Colonies where armed police are maintained, they should be liable to serve against foreign aggression as well as for the maintenance of internal order, and arrangements should be made to replace them in the latter duty at time of anticipated attack by special or rural constables as far as this can be done consistently with safety.

Militia, volunteers, and armed police should be separately organised, but arrangements should be made for their working together at peace manoeuvres, or in war operations, and also for their working with Imperial forces if called upon to do so.

Colonial troops should, as a rule, be organised in battalions of infantry, squadrons or regiments of mounted troops, batteries or companies of artillery, companies of engineers, and companies of armed police, but they should be told off to the higher units of a field force in Colonies where field operations are anticipated, and to definite duties in the combined action required for the defence of coast or land positions.

The Colonial Defence Committee attribute the greatest importance to the organisation of the departmental services, without which the smallest operation in war becomes impossible. Definite arrangements for supply, transport, and medical services should be made beforehand for every defended port and every contemplated field operation. Much can be done in this direction without expenditure by mere registration of doctors and nurses, and of sources of supply, horses, vehicles, labour, and superintendence, and more by the small payment of retaining fees to secure services which might otherwise not be available in the hour of need. The departmental services, to be completely satisfactory, should, however, be thoroughly organised in time of peace.

9. With regard to the conditions of service in Colonial regular and militia forces, it will suffice here to state that the Committee consider a short period—say three years—with thorough training to be more advantageous than the same training spread over a longer period. Re-enlistment and re-enrolment should be possible for further yearly periods and retirement from active service should be followed by a period in the reserve dealt with below.

Permanent troops should always, and partially-paid troops should when called out for training or in anticipation of war, pass under the Army Act of 1881 for discipline, and volunteers and armed police should also come under it when acting with regular troops, or in operations against an enemy.

The Colonial Defence Committee consider that the conditions of service for (1) regular forces, (2) militia, (3) volunteers, and (4) armed police, in all parts of the Empire should be as uniform as the varying circumstances of the different Colonies will allow, and that this principle should govern local legislatures in framing their Military Acts.

Such Acts, besides dealing with enlistment or enrolment, length of active and reserve service, application of Imperial Army Act and Army Regulations, &c., should also lay down definite regulations for training. These at present vary greatly in different Colonies, and, while taking into consideration the high intellectual and moral standard of the material generally available for the forces in the self-governing Colonies, the training at present given in some of them may be considered sufficient; in others this is not the case.

The Committee attach the greatest importance to combined training in camps of exercise, and in rehearsal of the approved schemes of defence; but they would point out that unless the soldier has previously received sufficient recruit's instruction and company training, he will not be in a position to derive full advantage from larger operations. Thorough training in small units is the first step towards making a soldier efficient.

10. The Colonial Defence Committee have always strongly advocated the formation of reserves for all colonial forces. They consider that a proper reserve system will enable the peace establishments to be kept low, and insure their being brought up to war strength with trained men. They attach great weight to the first of these considerations, as they recognise that it would seriously militate against the civil interests of the Colonies to keep a large force permanently with the colours, or liable to be constantly taken away from their ordinary avocations for the frequent training necessary to make a short-service militia efficient. They also deprecate any system which in time of emergency floods the ranks of the permanent or partially-paid troops with a number of untrained or slightly-trained recruits.

They therefore recommend that all men that have passed through the ranks of the permanent or partially-paid forces should be registered for a definite period as reservists, liable to be called out in the event of national emergency, and their addresses and changes of address should be recorded, and that they should receive an annual retaining fee, carrying with it the obligation of attending certain drills. The number of men so registered should be sufficient to bring the peace up to the war establishment and to provide a small additional number to replace casualties, and the period of service in the reserve should be about twice as long as that in the active forces, reduced, however, when the strength of the reserve allows of this being done without falling below the total laid down as necessary.

11. Passing to the question of equipment, the most important item is the small-arm, and concerning this the Committee are guided in their recommendations by the following principles:—

- (1) All troops in a Colony to have small-arms of the same calibre.
- (2) Troops in Colonies which may have to act together to have small-arms of the same calibre.
- (3) Troops in Colonies where they may have to act with Imperial forces to have small-arms which will take the Service '303' ammunition.
- (4) Cavalry and artillery to be armed with carbines, and, as a rule, other troops with rifles.
- (5) Machine-guns to take the cartridges of the small-arms used in the same Colony.
- (6) Small-arms to be provided for 50 per cent. over establishment and reserves of men.

12. Field artillery, in connexion with Colonial defence, is required either for operations with a field army or in connexion with the land defence, and the defence against landing parties of a coast fortress or coaling station. In the former case it is essential that the batteries should be able to move rapidly, and over long distances, complete with ammunition columns. In the latter case rapid movement is equally essential, but only over short distances, and prolonged action will not be called for; a single battery will probably suffice in places only liable to a raiding

attack. All guns in a Colony should take the same ammunition, and it will be best to adopt, as far as possible, a field gun used in the Imperial Service.

13. It is scarcely necessary to point out that in all Colonies a sufficient reserve of uniform, equipment, harness, saddlery, and stores, for at least the full strength of the war establishment of all arms of the Colonial force, should either be kept in store, or there should be means provided for its rapid supply by local manufacture. The Committee have seen with satisfaction that much has been done in some Colonies towards supply from local sources, and they recommend that this object should constantly be kept in view. It is advisable that clothing and equipment should, as far as is consistent with local conditions, be of similar patterns for the different branches of the service in the different Colonies. Uniform should be plain, serviceable, and cheap. Khaki has been found in India to be the most suitable colour. There should be a uniform system in all Colonies for distinguishing the different services, arms, and grades, and the system should be similar to that adopted in the Imperial Service.

14. The Colonial Defence Committee have frequently dealt with the question of guns for the defended ports of the Empire, and have pointed out that a medium B.L. and lighter Q.F. armament is, in most cases, sufficient coast defences. The reasons that have led them to this opinion are the great advantage that shore guns have over those on ships, and that unarmoured or lightly armoured vessels are especially at a disadvantage in fighting shore batteries mounting even light artillery. Against cruisers a medium gun will amply suffice, and by its greater handiness and speed of fire will prove more effective than the heavier natures. The cost of armaments and emplacements rapidly rises as calibres increase, and by restricting the size of their guns in the future the Colonies will secure economy, efficiency, and simplicity at the same time.

The substitution of more modern guns for armaments now mounted will, of course, become desirable from time to time, especially when such guns can be worked by a smaller number of men; such substitution, when it is undertaken, should be considered for the whole armament of a port. Otherwise there results a multiplication of calibres and patterns, which add greatly to the difficulties of training the gunners and working the guns. It is scarcely necessary to add that every gun mounted should be maintained thoroughly efficient, with a full supply of all the ammunition and necessary stores for working it.

15. With regard to coast works, it is unnecessary to say more here than that, where their position renders them liable to boat attack, they should always be protected from a sudden rush by an unclimbable fence or ditch.

Land works are sometimes necessary to protect a port from hostile parties landed out of range of the coast batteries and attacking from the flanks or rear. They will usually consist of field defences. Clearing of foreground and, occasionally, demolitions will also be necessary. All details concerning them should be carefully worked out beforehand.

More extended works will, of course, be necessary in the case of attack from a land frontier, and will require more complete study and preparation.

16. Certain Colonies have provided themselves with local floating defences to supplement the fixed defences of their ports. Since the completion of the latter the Colonial Defence Committee have attributed less importance than formerly to the small colonial navies, considering that it is generally difficult to obtain from floating harbour defences an effect commensurate with the outlay entailed by them. Where, however, there is a sufficiently spacious area of navigable water apart from the fortifications to permit local defence ships to manœuvre, this objection does not apply. Colonial warships, where maintained, should be kept in a thoroughly efficient condition both with regard to *personnel* and *matériel*.

17. There are many points in addition to those touched on above concerning which the Colonial Defence Committee have offered advice to the Colonies in the past, and are prepared to do so in the future, but which it is obviously inadvisable to deal with in a memorandum for general information. In this connexion they would repeat a paragraph from a former Report:—"The necessity for preserving secrecy in regard to the position of guns and details was brought before the Colonial Conference in 1887, and has at various times been impressed upon the Colonial Governments. It is earnestly hoped that these warnings will in future be acted upon."

18. The Committee would also take this opportunity of pointing out that they

can more satisfactorily assist the Colonial Governments in dealing with questions of defence, if all general reports and important proposals of their military advisers are referred to the Committee through the Colonial Office as soon as possible after being considered by the Governments. The Committee completely recognise that, for financial and other reasons, possibly of a confidential nature, and of a political rather than of a military character, it may often not be practicable to give effect to the recommendations that are made. They think, however, that they would be in a better position to follow and advise upon the general military policy of the Colonies if the recommendations were always communicated to them, accompanied, if necessary, by the confidential opinions of the Governments and Governors thereon.

19. In conclusion, the Committee are led to refer, by the prominence which has of late been given to the question of federal defence, to the mutual co-operation of the Colonies for this purpose in time of war. It will be obvious that at present such co-operation must be mainly confined to adjacent Colonies, such as those of Australia, and, in a smaller degree, those of South Africa. In Australia this subject has been considered with happy results by the Federal Military Conferences of 1894 and 1896, and more recently at a meeting of Premiers at Sydney.

Doubtless a time will come when the increasing strength and resources of the self-governing Colonies will enable them to materially assist the mother country, by placing at her disposal for operations in any quarter of the globe bodies of troops formed from the excellent material of strong, self-reliant colonists, but at present the development of their own vast territories in time of peace, and the effective protection of them in time of war, is undoubtedly the best contribution the Colonies can offer to Imperial defence. To this, however, there is an important exception. England may be engaged in the future, as she has frequently been in the past, in a war which carries with it no danger of attack on the Colonies. In such a case the offer of assistance from them would be prized, as it has been on more than one occasion, not only for its real value, but also as evidence of that solidarity on which the greatness of the British Empire must ultimately rest.

M. NATHAN,

Secretary, Colonial Defence Committee.

December 31, 1896.

III.

COLONIAL CONFERENCE, 1902.

A.

EXTRACTS FROM OPENING SPEECH OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (MR. CHAMBERLAIN), 30TH JUNE, 1902.

* * * * *

As regards Imperial defence, I propose to lay before you, for your information, a paper which will show the comparative amount of the ordinary naval and military expenditure of the United Kingdom and of the different self-governing Colonies. You will find that in the case of the United Kingdom the cost of our armaments has enormously increased since 1897. That increase is not entirely due to our initiative, but it is forced upon us by the action of other Powers who have made great advances, especially in connection with the navy, which we have found it to be our duty and necessity to equal. But the net result is extraordinary. At the present moment the Estimates for the present year for naval and military expenditure in the United Kingdom—not including the extraordinary war expenses, but the normal Estimates—involve an expenditure per head of the population of the United Kingdom of 29s. 3d.—29s. 3d. per head per annum.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Is the military and naval together?

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Military and naval together. In Canada the same items involve an expenditure of only 2s. per head of the population, about one-fifteenth of that incurred by the United Kingdom. In New South Wales—I have not the figures for the Commonwealth as a whole, but I am giving those as illustrations—and I find that in New South Wales the expenditure is 3s. 5d.; in

Victoria, 3s. 3d.; in New Zealand, 3s. 4d.; and in the Cape and Natal I think it is between 2s. and 3s. Now, no one, I think, will pretend that that is a fair distribution of the burdens of Empire. No one will believe that the United Kingdom can, for all time, make this inordinate sacrifice. While the Colonies were young and poor, in the first place they did not offer anything like the same temptation to the ambitions of others, and, in the second place, they were clearly incapable of providing large sums for their own defence, and therefore it was perfectly right and natural that the mother country should undertake the protection of her children. But now that the Colonies are rich and powerful, that every day they are growing by leaps and bounds, their material prosperity promises to rival that of the United Kingdom itself, and I think it is inconsistent with their position—inconsistent with their dignity as nations—that they should leave the mother country to bear the whole, or almost the whole, of the expense. Justification of union is that a bundle is stronger than the sticks which compose it, but if the whole strain is to be thrown upon one stick, there is very little advantage in any attempt to put them into a bundle. And I would beg of you in this relation to bear in mind that you are not asked—your people are not asked—to put upon their own shoulders any burden for the exclusive advantage of the mother country. On the contrary, if the United Kingdom stood alone, as a mere speck in the northern sea, it is certain that its expenditure for these purposes of defence might be immensely curtailed. It is owing to its duties and obligations to its Colonies throughout the Empire; it is owing to its trade with those Colonies, a trade in which, of course, they are equally interested with ourselves, that the necessity has been cast upon us to make these enormous preparations. And I think, therefore, you will agree with me that it is not unreasonable for us to call your serious attention to a state of things which cannot be permanent. I hope that we are not likely to make upon you any demand which would seem to you to be excessive. We know perfectly well your difficulties, as you probably are acquainted with ours. Those difficulties are partly political, partly, principally probably, fiscal difficulties. The disproportion to which I have called your attention cannot, under any circumstances, be immediately remedied, but I think that something may be done—I hope that something will be done—to recognise more effectually than has hitherto been done the obligation of all to contribute to the common weal. In respect to this matter we again owe it to the initiative of the Government of New Zealand that proposals have been laid before us for our consideration. I myself intend to circulate papers which bear upon the subject, and which will explain to you the views which are taken by the Admiralty and the War Office upon these matters, and at subsequent meetings of this Conference I shall, with your permission, invite the attendance of representatives of these Departments, and I hope at the same time you may see fit to bring with you any Ministers or other officials whose advice and assistance you would desire in the consideration of the matter.

Gentlemen, I think I have said all, perhaps, even more, than I need to have said in opening this Conference. In conclusion, I would add that I cannot conceal from myself that very great anticipations have been formed as to the results which may accrue from our meeting. Possibly those anticipations are too sanguine; possibly they have been formed by persons who are insufficiently acquainted with our difficulties, and do not make allowances for the obstacles in our way. The questions have, I think, occupied greater attention in this country than they have, perhaps, at present in the Colonies, which have been taken up with matters of more exclusively domestic concern. But here, no doubt, there is a readiness, and I would say an anxiety, to see these important questions dealt with, and dealt with in a fashion which will bring us more closely together. We, in the United Kingdom, for centuries past have been holding our house like a strong man armed against all our enemies. We have felt throughout all the period the burdens as well as the privileges and advantages of empire. We see now that all other nations are also arming to the teeth. I want you to consider for a moment what is the present position of the smaller nations with whom in population you may more closely compare yourselves. What is the position of such nations in Europe as Greece, the Balkan States, or Holland, or the South American Republics? Why, gentlemen, they are absolutely independent nations, accordingly they have to bear burdens for their military or naval defences, or for both, as the case may be, to which yours bears no proportion whatever. I point out to you, therefore, that in the clash of

nations you have hitherto derived great advantage, even from a purely material standpoint, from being a part of a great Empire. But the privileges which we enjoy involve corresponding obligations. The responsibilities must be reciprocal and must be shared in common, and I do not think that any empire may be said to be on a sure foundation which is not based upon recognised community of sacrifices.

B.

4 July, 1902.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Mr. Chamberlain and gentlemen, the Admiralty has circulated a memorandum which I think you all have before you. We endeavoured in the memorandum to confine ourselves to setting forward the nature of the problem which the Admiralty has to face on behalf of the Empire, and to indicate the extent of the burden which is thrown on the mother country. I need not say that I shall be happy to answer any questions that any of the Colonial Premiers here present might wish to ask in elucidation of the general principle and the facts stated in the memorandum. I would propose, if Mr. Chamberlain and the Premiers agreed, that when the Admiralty come to a detailed discussion with any Colony or group of Colonies, that those discussions should be held separately. The Admiralty is entirely at the disposal of Ministers if they will be kind enough to visit us and discuss the problem with us so far as it concerns their own Colony. To-day I will merely endeavour to lay emphasis on two points which are contained within this memorandum. The first on which I would lay the greatest possible stress is the reason why we have eliminated from this memorandum any allusion to the word "defence." There was a time in this country, not so very long ago either, when naval strategists regarded the naval problem mainly from the point of view of defence. That, I submit, is altogether heretical. The real problem which this Empire has to face in the case of a naval war is simply and absolutely to find out where the ships of the enemy are, to concentrate the greatest possible force where those ships are, and to destroy those ships. That is the only possible method of protecting this Empire from the efforts which other navies may make to damage her commerce or her territory. It follows from this that there can be no localisation of naval forces in the strict sense of the word. There can be no local allocation of ships to protect the mouth of the Thames, to protect Liverpool, to protect Sydney, to protect Halifax. If we make any such attempt of the kind we should only be inviting disaster. I will give you an instance of what I mean. We have a well-known British squadron—the Channel Squadron. Does that mean that in case of war that squadron would necessarily remain in the Channel? I think, if you ask me, the least likely place for that squadron to operate in is the Channel. It would be sent to the Mediterranean or elsewhere, wherever the greatest concentration of our ships might be required to meet the ships of the enemy. In further illustration of this point I would direct attention to the recent French naval action to which, I think, allusion is made in the memorandum. The President of the French Republic has recently issued a decree largely strengthening the naval forces of France in Far Eastern seas, and placing the cruisers, though divided into two squadrons, under the command of one admiral. Now, the design of that movement is obvious, and I have no doubt whatever that, regarded from the French point of view, it is quite sound. It is to concentrate as much strength as they can afford in cruisers so as to inflict the utmost damage on our commerce in time of maritime war. We have a powerful squadron on the China station; we have another squadron on the Cape; another in the East India; another in Australasian waters. This French squadron might be able to destroy some of these detached squadrons of ours if they did not mutually support each other. If we are anchored, as it were, these squadrons on the respective stations to which they are attached in time of peace, it would be perfectly possible for these combined French squadrons to deal with each of them separately and independently, and to inflict an immense amount of damage upon us, and then, of course, when once our men-of-war had been disposed of—then, and not till then, would they turn their attention to the trade. You must remember that, gentlemen, nothing would suit us better than that the French should ignore our ships of war and turn their attention to the trade from the beginning. That would mean the dissemination of their forces, and we should be able to catch them in detail and deal with them. But they would do no such thing. Their first effort would be to destroy the sheep dogs, and then

they would prey on the flock. It follows from a consideration of those principles that whatever local distribution of forces may be advisable and feasible in time of peace, in time of naval war there must be only one authority with full power and responsibility to the Empire to move the ships, to concentrate them where they can deal the most effective blow against the forces of the enemy, and that any separation of responsibility, any diminution of the power of that central authority, any risk of hesitation or delay in making a conjunction of the squadrons where they can deal the most effective blow, might have disastrous consequences.

The second point on which I want to lay special stress is this. At present there is only one agreement between the Imperial Government and any group of Colonial Governments in respect of naval affairs, although we have received generous—and independently preferred—aid from the Cape and from Natal—I allude to the Australasian Agreement. Now, gentlemen, I attach great importance to that agreement, because the statesmen who negotiated it and signed it have led the way in what I may call the Imperial consideration of this question of naval policy. But like every document that commences a policy, it has faults, and to my mind there is no fault greater in it than this, that the relations of the Australasian Governments to the Imperial are simply that of the man who pays to the man who supplies. The Australasian Governments pay us a certain contribution; for this contribution we supply them with a certain article. Now, this is good so far as it goes, but it does not, to my mind, go far enough. It does not give our New Zealand and Australian fellow-countrymen the sense of personal interest, of personal possession in the British Navy, which I most of all desiderate for the future, and I want not only the Colonial Governments to understand that on the naval protection of the Empire, exercised through a wise naval strategy, depends our future existence as a United Empire, but I want them to regard the navy as their own, at least, as much as ours, and with that object I wish to see in the navy more Colonial officers and a contribution of Colonial seamen. I want, in fact, if I may use such a term, to increase the maritime spirit of the Empire. After all we are not in this country all sailors, yet we are all imbued with the maritime spirit. Here you have the great Colonies covering vast geographical tracts of country; is there not a danger that in the far interior, unless we take precautions, the maritime spirit may be lost? I want to bring Australasia, Canada, and South Africa to understand, in the sense that the average Englishman understands it, that the sea is the one source of our greatness and our power; the one bond of union; the real source of our strength—if I may use such a mixed metaphor—that the sea is to the Empire as the breath of life; but it cannot be done, I opine, so long as we are only receivers of money. I want to see New Zealand and Australian seamen in our navy, Canadian and South African officers. I want to see from all parts of the Empire a personal contribution to the navy, so that it may not only be an abstract Admiralty to govern the navy, but an Admiralty that has won the confidence of the Colonies because the Colonies understand its policy, and because in each Colony there are officers and men belonging to the navy—an integral portion of the navy. Those are the two points, gentlemen, on which I wish to lay special stress, and I can only conclude, as I began, by saying I am here at your service to answer any questions which you may wish to address to me.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Do you propose to lay any definite suggestions at this stage of the Conference?

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: We are, of course, prepared with definite suggestions. I did not know whether you would like to have them raised in general form at the meeting or whether they should be raised separately between the Admiralty and Canada and New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia and Natal and the Cape. We have them here if the Conference desires to have them.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I take it that the details in any case would have to be discussed probably separately, and that that would be the most convenient and the quickest way of getting through our business; but I think that the Conference would probably like to discuss the general principles. What I rather anticipated was that you might be prepared to express in general terms what the Admiralty conceived would be the best scheme for carrying out the object which you have described, and also that we should take up the actual motion which is before the Conference in the name of the Premier of New Zealand. I do not know whether I am speaking the views of my colleagues, but I imagine they would like to have your proposals as well as the proposals of New Zealand before them before a general discussion begins.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Well, then, if I may supplement my remarks on the suggestion of Mr. Chamberlain, of course I start with the Australasian Agreement. Sir John Forrest and the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian station, Sir Lewis Beaumont, have had many conferences on this subject. The memorandum which is now being circulated gives to the Conference the effect of carrying out the scheme on the general lines of the discussion between Sir John Forrest and Sir Lewis Beaumont. The general purport of it is this, that a certain squadron of up-to-date cruisers would be attached to the Australian station. Of these cruisers we desire that at least one, if not two, should be manned exclusively by Australasians under the command of Imperial officers. We desire to establish a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve in New Zealand and Australia composed partly of men trained in this cruiser manned by Australasians and partly out of such materials as may be available from the existing naval brigades. The contribution which would be regulated under that scheme is stated in this memorandum, which of course can be discussed, and I want it to be clearly understood that the basis we have taken is the basis of discussion taken by Sir John Forrest with Sir Lewis Beaumont, and we thought that a fair and wise starting point. There will be no difficulty in time of peace in arranging that this squadron should be attached to Australasian waters, with this proviso, that I think it would be a real advantage for the ships of the squadron, especially for the ships manned by Australasians, that they should go to China, the East Indies, the Cape, and elsewhere, and work with the ships of other squadrons, but whenever they so do that ship could be replaced by a substitute from the squadron which she had gone to join. Therefore I do not think there will be any difficulty in time of peace as to the proper allocation of the force whose headquarters would be Australasian. But the principles which are laid down, and on which I wish to lay great emphasis, are that in time of war this squadron must be available to fight the opponents, the attackers of the Empire, in whatever part of the eastern seas their ships are to be found. If the Admiralty knew from their intelligence that the French squadrons were moving eastwards towards Hong Kong it should be possible for our Board to send the Australasian squadron to join the China squadron to meet these French squadrons and fight them. Those principles *mutatis mutandis* could be applied to any of the other groups of Colonies. This scheme may be taken as one which would be applicable to the altering circumstances of each case, either to Canada or South Africa, and not only applicable as a whole, but applicable in such parts as might be more feasible at the present moment in respect of those other groups of Colonies.

There is one old Colony, of course, to which this particular form of agreement could not apply: that is Newfoundland, but then I hope the Admiralty will be able to debate with the Prime Minister and arrive at an understanding as to that scheme for the establishment of a Naval Reserve, which was temporarily suspended owing to the fact that we found we had proceeded beyond our legal power. I may say that an Act of the Imperial Parliament recognising the enrolment of Colonial fishermen in the Royal Naval Reserve has now passed through all its stages in both Houses of Parliament and is only awaiting the Royal Assent, so that there is no further hindrance to arriving at an understanding between His Majesty's Government and Newfoundland on that point.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Mr. Seddon, perhaps you would be good enough to explain and develop the proposals which you have brought to the notice of the Conference?

Mr. SEDDON: Mr. Chamberlain and Gentlemen, the motion of which I have given notice is applicable to the Naval Reserve as well as to the land forces, and in discussing this question we must of necessity divide the two. I may say that at the present time there is practically a scheme in existence similar to what is proposed. First, you have in Newfoundland the scheme which has been mentioned by Lord Selborne. Now, the principle they have gone on is that the Colony provides the main part of the equipment and the transport. The Imperial Government provides an amount, which I think is £5 per head annually, which is allowed to those who are enrolled, the conditions being that those enrolled are for the service of the Empire wherever it is desired to send them. In Australia they have what is known as a partly paid force. The capitation grant, I think, is the same as is paid to the men in Newfoundland. Whether they could, under existing conditions, be sent outside the Commonwealth is a matter of doubt. I may say that the question was raised when we were enrolling members of the contingents, and we were advised in New Zealand that there must be an agreement in each case; that

we could pass a law applicable within the Colony, but outside the Colony our power is limited; that that could only be done by the Imperial Legislature. However, the matter was got over by an agreement being entered into. Now, it would appear to me that we ought to take advantage of the existing conditions, to enrol a permanent force in each of the self-governing colonies, whose services would be available in such parts of the Empire as might be agreed upon between the Imperial authorities and the Colonial Governments. I take it that the returned members of the contingents would form the nucleus of these reserves. I take it that the men themselves would be very pleased to continue as members of an Imperial reserve. I do not think they will go back to volunteer corps, or continue service simply as volunteers, but I believe they would form part of those reserves. I believe that at the present time, while the feeling is warm, that a movement such as this would be acceptable to the people in the self-governing Colonies.

This brings me, of course, to the important part, that of general defence. I may say that one of the great difficulties in all self-governing Colonies in respect to defence has been the finding of the capital required for equipment and for harbour defence. As you are aware, a very large amount of money has been voted for rifles, and objection has been taken to that being continued. If some means could be evolved for getting over that difficulty, the question of the maintenance or renewal—I think there would not be the same demur from the Colonial Parliaments. I might give you cases which bear out what I am saying. At the last Conference, there was a gift of a line of battle ship, presented by the Cape Colony to the Mother Country, and later on, and on reflection, the Cape authorities came to the conclusion that it would be better to pay an amount—an annual amount—for the maintenance and save themselves the finding of the capital amount required to pay for a cruiser. That simply demonstrates the position of the Colonies in hesitating to increase their indebtedness, so it is impossible, with the claims now upon us, to take it from current expenditure. In this case, even supposing the Colonies were to pay the interest on the moneys found for this purpose, it would be a big saving to the Colonies, because the Imperial authorities obtain their money at a much less rate of interest, and, as I say, it could be done either by Imperial guarantee of the moneys required, or it could be done by the Imperial authorities making it a condition that the Colonies pay the interest.

Now on this, further I may say, and speaking as the Defence Minister of the Colony of New Zealand, the defect in respect to our land forces is the want of the necessary batteries of field artillery. I think we have only one battery, one up-to-date battery, in the Colony at the present time, and the war in South Africa has demonstrated the absolute necessity there is for a thorough up-to-date equipment in this respect. Not only that, but we shall also require heavier guns, which have proved so serviceable. I speak, of course, for my own Colony, and I think probably other Colonies will say in the same way that we are not equipped in a proper way, and if we were to ask our respective Parliaments, at least I know, speaking for New Zealand, if you were to ask the Parliament to provide the necessary amounts required you would be immediately faced with a difficulty probably as a result, and the imperfect conditions now existing would continue.

Coming to the naval side of the question, I would say at once, speaking for New Zealand, that I repudiate any idea of providing or setting up a navy or the purchase of ships for ourselves. The conclusion that we have arrived at, and I do not think there is the slightest chance of it being modified, is that we must depend alone upon the Imperial Navy. This providing of vessels and men-of-war from Colonies has been tried, and you have an object lesson in Victoria at the present time in the gunboat "Cerberus," and I think there was another Colony that sent a boat to China during the recent crisis there, which was also an object lesson when you contrast the battleship of to-day with the South Australian cruiser. For that purpose of contrast it was right enough. The question of expense would be unwarranted under these conditions. I say at once, then, speaking, of course, for the Colony of New Zealand, that we are not going to attempt in any way, shape, or form, to build or buy men-of-war for ourselves. As to forming a naval reserve manned from the Colonies to man the cruisers that you propose to keep in reserve, I look upon that as being an absolute necessity. The time which would be lost, the difficulty encountered, would enforce anyone who has considered the question to come to the conclusion that we ought to have in these Colonies men who could man these vessels. I may say that we have our naval volunteer corps attached to our principal ports, and they are well trained. That has been demon-

strated, and referred to with great pleasure by the Admirals in charge of the station; but there is more required in this respect. When the cruisers belonging to the squadron are in the Colonial harbours, I think arrangements should be made to take your naval brigade men—the officers and men of naval brigades—and train them on these men-of-war. Of course, if necessity arose, and men were wanted, we would know where we could get them, and I believe, although they belonged to the volunteer corps only, in case of necessity you would find them volunteering for sea service just as we had the men volunteering for South Africa. In this respect I apply the same argument, would it be better to have men on reserve, trained stokers, seamen, and gunners whom you could depend upon and call upon to meet the emergency, and who should be trained in the Colony for the purpose? I therefore say that the resolution was framed with that intention, and I hope it carried the intention, of meeting the difficulty, both with respect to the land force, and also in respect to the naval force. There would be no cost in respect to the naval force for equipment; the Colonies, as far as we have gone, have the means of training with guns on shore, but we lack the training on board ship, which is essential. In that respect I have pointed out that something should be done with the cruisers, when they are in the harbours, to meet this difficulty, and I believe that when the men were attending to this training the Colonies would pay them the difference between what is paid by the Imperial authorities and what men would require before they would enrol for service.

Now, then, I come to the question which was raised by Mr. Chamberlain the other day which no doubt underlies what has fallen from Lord Selborne, and that is the general contribution by the Colonies to the Imperial Government for the maintenance of the Imperial Navy. I think we should, in respect to this very important question, state explicitly what probabilities there are of the respective self-governing Colonies so contributing. Lord Selborne has referred to the fact that we have the Agreement in respect to the Australian squadron. Although not holding a responsible position at the time in 1887, yet I took a great interest in the matter, and I could state clearly what was the moving spirit which caused the Agreement to be made. It was felt at the time that there was a weakness in respect to the naval defence of Australia and New Zealand. There was a necessity to strengthen the naval force in that part of the Empire, and the result was the Agreement that has now been referred to. I may say that I have a note in reference here to the memorandum prepared by the Admiralty that the words included now, at least, suggested now, I believe, would have been agreed to at the time, namely, that the men-of-war should be stationed there and kept there in the time of peace. I do not think myself that if that had been suggested at the time there would have been the slightest objection to the inclusion of those words. But in time of peace they desire for many reasons that the ships of the squadron should be kept in Australian and New Zealand waters. First of all, I say, there is the sentiment to have the vessels and the men-of-war coming into the harbours brought before the notice of the people, and the people allowed to visit as they do, and every opportunity given. It keeps up our national sentiment, and it is a good thing to have. New Zealand, it would appear from the terms of the Agreement, was a little exacting at that time because we stipulated that there should be at least two cruisers always in New Zealand waters. Well, I may say that the reason why those words were included was that we thought probably the attractions of Australia were so great that we should never see a man-of-war at all in New Zealand waters, and we desired to have two at all events in our waters. If you look back to the history of the period you will see there was a danger as far as New Zealand was concerned which was thought not to be so applicable to Australia. Australia, of course, had her defence so far as the other Colonies were concerned, and they were only placing New Zealand on the same footing as they themselves had put themselves when this condition was included. But I think the Admiralty will admit this, that on each occasion when they had asked for that condition and limitation to be waived to meet emergencies that had arisen, the reply has been in each case in the affirmative and without the slightest hesitation, so I think we may face the conditions and the cases as they arise. I agree with Lord Selborne, and we all know, that those best able to direct are those in charge of the British Navy. We and they know the weakest spot, what I may term the feeding ground, would be the Capes. Were anyone going to strike a blow and to stop the food supply of the Mother Country or to strike a blow at the commerce of the Colonies, they would not trouble themselves about the coasts of New Zealand or Australia, they would go where there was a

concentration of merchant vessels, and it would be, of course, I think, essential and necessary that there should be no restriction whatever, that complete directions should be left to those having the responsibility for the naval forces of the Empire for the time being.

Now then, as I have said, of course we must come to this general question of the contribution. Mr. Chamberlain, in his opening address, referred to the fact that the total amount contributed by the Colonies *per capita* for defence purposes was as stated under the head of the Military and Naval Expenditure in 1898-1899. I do not know, in the first place, why the year 1898-1899 should have been selected. I have to-day brought the New Zealand Year Book as far as regards our Colony; probably other Prime Ministers will do the same; and I notice here that in New Zealand the amount per head is based upon an expenditure of £126,307, whereas our expenditure for 1900 was £160,178, and our expenditure, of course, last year is very much larger still. I take it myself that our expenditure per annum per head directly is about 5s. However, relative to the cost available for the purpose of the Mother Country, the contrast would look unfavourable to the Colonies and I think, in justice to the Colonies, we might be pardoned if we were to show what we in New Zealand have to bear, and which renders it impossible for us, under existing conditions, to do much more than has been done at the present.

	£	s.	d.
Customs Revenue per head of European population for the year 1900	2	16	10
Total Customs duties	2,107,354	0	0
Total Excise duties	89,284	0	0
Direct taxation, land, and income tax	468,393	0	0
Expense on establishment of National Defences 1900-1901 (equal to 4s. per head of population)	160,178	0	0
Taxation per head of mean population, 1901	3	19	6
Rate of revenue per head of mean population	7	14	4
Revenue for the year ending March 31, 1901	5,906,916	0	0
The ordinary expenditure	5,479,703	0	0
Public Instruction (or equal to 12s. per head of population)	481,087	0	0

Now what we do is entirely outside the cost thrown upon us as a self-governing Colony. We have burdens cast upon us that are not thrown upon the people of the Mother Country at all. Private enterprise has supplied the Mother Country with that which we have to do ourselves in the Colonies. There is the development which must proceed and which entails upon us a very heavy expenditure. We have, for instance, the question of public instruction, which, in our Colony—I think it is all the same in Australia—is equal to about 12s. per head of the entire population. Then—perhaps as you know—there is 5s. per head of the entire population for old-age pensions in the Colony; so that outside this of course we have other functions and duties—as I told you—with their attendant cost. Some, of course, are more than self-supporting, but there will, of necessity, before many years to come, especially in respect to development, be costs entailed upon the self-governing Colonies which are not entailed upon the people of the Mother Country, and I say that they must go on, and will be for years a loss to the people. I make this reference because it is a duty that we owe to the people of the Mother Country. The heavy burden they are bearing for defence as compared with what we are paying. Without some explanation it would appear as though the Colonies and Dominions beyond the seas were acting selfishly in the matter. But I will conclude my remarks under that head with saying, that, in this development of the self-governing Colonies, the people of the Mother Country—our people at home—profit very largely in that development, and it does not cost them anything whatever; the entire cost is thrown upon the self-governing Colonies.

Mr. Chamberlain referred to the question that if we contributed directly for the purposes of Imperial defence that would, of course, bring with it representation. I speak for myself—other Prime Ministers will also do the same—I say that some representation of the Colonies is desirable. It would be of benefit both to the Colonies and the Mother Country and would keep them in closer touch. But I am afraid that if that can only be obtained through and by the Colonies directly accepting the responsibility and contributing directly to the Imperial defence, it will be some time before the Colonies will have that representation. I say so now.

I think it is time to speak plainly so that there will not be any misunderstanding. I may say during the time we have had the burden cast upon our Colonies in respect to the war in South Africa, whilst we have there accepted voluntarily a responsibility—a responsibility such as has been suggested here—it was done voluntarily and unconditionally when the emergency arose. I believe myself it would in the future come voluntarily; it would be as freely granted in other respects; but to do it by an agreement or to ask us to come to do it by an agreement, in my opinion, would not meet with favour in the Colonies—at least, I speak for my own Colony. But indirectly I cannot say the Colonies are—I speak for my own Colony—prepared to help the Mother Country. We do not state specifically in granting the benefit to her what the money is to be applied for, but if we give to the Mother Country advantages which we do not give to other countries, and under which the manufacturers of the Mother Country profit, then I say that it is a contribution. Ten per cent. preference on British goods imported into New Zealand means £150,000 a year. I may say at once that New Zealand is prepared to give that and ask for nothing in return. If the Mother Country likes to assist in the way of helping us by taking our products we shall be very pleased to have her assistance; but we can, I think, give a preference and thus indirectly do that which, if asked for, would not be granted.

I will not say anything further on that point because we have the larger question of finance and tariffs, which we must defer to another occasion, beyond saying that it would be equal to paying the interest on five millions of money at three per cent., and, correspondingly, you might say that the Colony of New Zealand by paying this would be paying the interest on five battleships that might cost a million each. I say I think that is a fair contention, and that we might raise it under this head. This resolution, Sir and Gentlemen, as far as land forces is concerned, was referred to the Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament in New Zealand and they agreed to it. The Defence Committee at home has had the matter under review and they have come to the conclusions on the matter which are now put before the Conference. Of course, members can see this for themselves, but still I may say that the conclusions arrived at by the Defence Committee is that the proposals are feasible and that some amendment might be made applicable with advantage, and that being the case, although the resolution as now worded may require some modification or amendment, I should be quite willing to meet the wishes of the members of the Conference and to modify it if it is a question of getting a start made in the direction indicated. I therefore have pleasure in placing it before the Conference for consideration and, if necessary, modification, and I hope I have made it clear what is intended. If there is any further information required I shall be only too pleased to answer any questions that may be put by those present.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: May I ask you one question, Mr. Seddon; I only want to understand clearly what you have proposed. You have spoken at the conclusion of your remarks of an indirect contribution which you would be prepared to make, and have added that you thought a direct contribution could not be granted, but I do not understand that to apply to the existing contribution.

Mr. SEDDON: Oh, no; in fact, as you will have seen by the other notice of motion, we have—as far as New Zealand is concerned I am empowered to say that we are prepared, the altered conditions being such as they are to-day as compared with those which prevailed before—we think there ought to be an extension in respect to the Australian squadron; there ought to be an improvement in respect to the class of cruisers.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Yes.

Mr. SEDDON: And that being so, correspondingly, and on the same basis, we should be prepared to pay an increase.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Yes, that is what I understood.

Mr. SEDDON: I wished to make it clear there was no intention of waiving or annulling the Agreement with respect to the Australian squadron, and in lieu thereof making a direct grant to the Imperial Navy. That is the point I wished to make clear.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Sir Edmund Barton asks what is the precise date at which the Agreement expires?

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: It continues until the—

Sir EDMUND BARTON: It was for 10 years, and then there was to be a termination on notice, and the notice was two years, was it not?

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Yes.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then may I ask one more question, and this time

from Lord Selborne? Let me understand, Lord Selborne. The memorandum which you have put before us deals exclusively with the Australian and New Zealand position, and although you say it is applicable to Canada there is no question of detail as applicable to Canada. Have you any statement that you propose to bring forward?

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Not prepared at present. It is easy to apply the same principle to the North American problem.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Yes, but it would be impossible for the Canadian Ministers to consider such questions without knowing what the alteration which you suggest in the character and class of the ships would be, what the additional expense would be, and what is the contribution that you think it would be fair for them to bear.

Mr. SEDDON: I would ask one question from Lord Selborne. I find myself face to face with a serious difficulty on the legal position under the Act—I presume the Australian Act is the same as ours. The Agreement was for a given period of ten years, and then subject to notice, an agreement was made at the beginning of the Act and scheduled in the Act, but our Auditor-General refused to allow me to pay the contribution last year on the ground that the Act was definite for ten years and that the agreement under the Act would not entitle us to pay. There was some delay until I was able to pay it out of the Consolidated Fund, and that was the legal question. They say it would require an amendment of the Act.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: That is a new point; I will look into it. I had not thought of it.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I think, Mr. Chamberlain, I understand the proposition of Lord Selborne so far as Canada is concerned, though he has said he has not prepared it nor put it in print; and if I understood his remarks correctly, he stated that the figures put before us referring to New Zealand and Australia might also apply *mutatis mutandis* to Canada as well. I understand, therefore, the proposition made by Lord Selborne is that New Zealand and the continent of Australia should make a direct contribution in money to the Imperial navy of a sum amounting to £367,000. The words are:—

“To maintain on the Australian Station some such naval force as was discussed between Rear-Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont and Sir John Forrest; the form which the proposals of the Admiralty would probably take would be a squadron necessitating a total expenditure by the Commonwealth and New Zealand, as given in the following statement and appendices:—

“A payment by Australia and New Zealand of £367,000 per annum, of which the shares would be:—

Australia	£304,515
New Zealand	62,485
	£367,000 ”

As I understand, Canada would be expected to make some similar contribution, which would not be less, according to the larger population of Canada, I imagine, in the computation of Lord Selborne, than £500,000.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: The net result of the sketch scheme applicable to Australasia works out at about 2s. 1d. per head of population.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Well, I have only the figures given here. Without going into the total expenditure per head, Mr. Seddon in his remarks enlarged upon the position taken up by Lord Selborne, and has gone into the question of military expenditure. Mr. Seddon, I think, made some remarks in connection with the observations made by Mr. Chamberlain the other day in his very able speech which had also occurred to me. You stated, Sir, in your opening speech that the contribution for Great Britain for Imperial military and naval expenditure was 29s. per head of the population and that the contribution of Canada amounted to only 2s. per head. I think it is a little larger, but it is not worth while going into the subject. At all events, it is about 2s. per head; there is a little more, perhaps, but I take it at 2s. The Australian Colonies' contribution would be a little larger. But if you permit me to observe upon a remark you made the other day, it seems to me, if we made a comparison between the small Colonial expenditure and the large British expenditure, an initial mistake was made in this, that it is impossible to judge of these questions by assuming that the level in development and in wealth

of the Colonies is the same as the wealth and development of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom to-day forms one of the largest—I do not speak of the Empire, I refer to the United Kingdom itself—one of the largest nations in population in Europe, the third, if I mistake not. Its population is exceeded only by the population of Russia and Germany. It exceeds the population of its old rival, France. In Canada we have an immense territory, ten times over the territory of Great Britain. We have five and one-third millions of population. We have to create everything in Canada; we have to develop everything in Canada; and we have to take out of the Dominion Treasury sums of money for a class of services which is borne in the United Kingdom by private individuals and private capitalists. I do not know, I speak under correction, that the Government of Great Britain has ever expended a farthing in the construction of railways. Private capital can do that.

The SECRETARY FOR WAR: We spent £6,000,000 in Uganda for the development of railways.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I spoke of the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom not one penny has been spent for the development of railways.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Not in the United Kingdom.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: We have in Canada contributed largely to the building of the Grand Trunk, we have built the Canadian Pacific Railway almost entirely at our own cost; we are every day spending much more money on railways and public works generally. Since I had the great pleasure of listening to Mr. Chamberlain's speech, I have had the opportunity of glancing over the Year Book, and I do not find that last year a single penny has been spent in public works in Great Britain by the British Government. If on the one hand you spent 30s. per head on the military expenditure, in Canada we spent last year \$20,000,000 at least on public works, canals, railways, harbours, improvements in rivers, and so on, but the finances of Canada never were more flourishing than they are at the present time. We have a surplus by balancing yearly expenditure and yearly revenue of at least between \$6,000,000 and \$8,000,000, and every dollar of the surplus is spent on public works. And not only that, but we borrow money constantly. We are always adding to our debt for the benefit of the country and the building of new public works. We have a trans-continental railway, and we may have another one complete perhaps within 10 years. The country is developing in all directions, and Canada is so situated that the cost of railway construction is very great, because the population of Canada is in groups scattered all over the continent. If we were to put the figures—I have not had time to do it—on one side what is expended by the Government of Great Britain on military and naval expenditure, and, on the other hand, what Canada is spending every year for public works, I think the difference would not be very very great, so that at the very outset we are met with a difficulty which to my mind seems to be very nearly insuperable, if not absolutely insuperable, to the contemplation of the Colonies—I speak for my own at all events—coming into making a direct contribution to the Imperial Exchequer either for naval or military expenditure. It is just as well in these matters that we should be perfectly frank and go into discussion upon what we can and cannot do, and I believe that everybody will admit that the conditions are not parallel which exist in Great Britain and which exist in the Colonies. I am happy to say that I think at this moment our Colonies are in a flourishing condition; at all events, speaking for my own, we are in an extremely flourishing condition, but the difficulties which beset us are very great, and I would not like at this moment to give a final word; but I simply throw out at once an objection which to my mind presses very heavily on any such system as has been advocated by Lord Selborne. I did not exactly understand, if I may call the attention of Mr. Seddon to the matter, the remarks which he made. As I understand, he rather spoke in the same direction as I do now, that it would be difficult for the Colonies to assume any more burdens than they carry at the present time, but I assume that was the tenor of his remarks, and if I understood correctly what he stated, he spoke his mind in the way that I have spoken my own mind.

Mr. SEDDON: I would like at this stage to state that in getting out this return they have only taken the expenditure out of the consolidated revenue on defence, but we have an expenditure out of loan for harbour defences which amounts to a very large sum. I have the amounts here. I have taken them from our Year Book. They have only taken the amount expended out of the consolidated fund, and the

harbour defences and the equipments, the payment of the rifles, the payment of the batteries, all that is coming out of loan.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: That is quite right, but we have done exactly the same with our own returns. We also are borrowing enormous sums of money, which we are not taking into account.

Mr. SEDDON: I was going to ask that question whether, under that head of capital expenditure, it is capital expenditure, or whether it is merely maintenance.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Only maintenance.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: The House of Commons has sanctioned liability for £27,000,000, under naval and public works. That is not included.

Mr. SEDDON: As long as it is clear that it is on the same basis, that is all right.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Mr. Chamberlain and Gentlemen, I take it that in this stage of the discussion it would be better to go into the general principles and discuss the position in which the Colonies which we represent respectively stand, than to address ourselves closely to any specific proposal that may give a closer approach to any action, but I think we all do want to understand at first what is our position relative to this question, not only as regards public opinion but as regards our capabilities. I have been pleased to hear from Mr. Seddon and Sir Wilfrid Laurier the references which they have made to the self-governing colonies in respect of works of internal development and the varied subjects of government which are undertaken in those Colonies beyond those which fall as a rule upon the taxpayer of Great Britain. It is just as well to clear the ground upon matters of this kind by a frank statement, in order that whatever we may be asked to do it may very soon be seen what only we are able to do. Now, Australia stands in precisely the same position that Canada and New Zealand do. The mere maintenance of life, liberty, and the security of property are not the only subjects of government. The Government undertakes, and with the support, of course, of Parliament, a vast number of matters which are elsewhere confined to the action of private enterprise. It undertakes in these respects the work of the community. Chief among these are railway extensions, but there are many other subjects of public development by which we endeavour to increase the capabilities of the countries in which we live, and these are capabilities any increase in which, no doubt, is open to the participation of the rest of the Empire. Now these are works which must at once, and at the outset, be admitted to seriously limit our capabilities in the direction of a direct contribution. The taxpayer who is relieved of, or who have never been subject to, the burden which falls on the taxpayers in our struggling communities can more easily perhaps afford a large contribution to naval and military defence than can the one I have first mentioned, who is undertaking the pioneer work of younger communities, and I think this is a consideration upon which we cannot dwell too strongly in order to make it clear to those who are carrying on government at the seat of Empire what these limitations are, because then it becomes a question not of what we would like to do, but of what we can do.

I would also like to make clear on behalf of the Australian Commonwealth other serious limitations of its capacity which I am happy to think may only apply to its earlier years but which, nevertheless, are of vast importance at the present moment. In order that a constitution might be adopted by popular vote it was necessary to include in it certain financial provisions. Of these one casts upon the Government of the Commonwealth the necessity of returning to each State year by year for the first five years, and not merely year by year, but by payments month by month—returning I say to each State all the revenue collected in that State on behalf of the Commonwealth less the proportion of that State in the Commonwealth expenditure, or rather, less the money spent by the Commonwealth Government in that State. The worst, of course, is this, you have to apply a uniform tariff for the first time, and these different communities each of them has had a tariff in many points dissimilar to all the others. Some have been high tariff States; some have been low tariff States. A tariff necessarily must strike some line between extremes in each direction, so that those interests may not be destroyed which under any different attempt at adjusting the question would have to go down. It results that some of the States will have money, and one of them a vast quantity of money, beyond what their previous tariffs have yielded to them, while others are receiving considerably less; but unfortunately for the Commonwealth—I will not say unfortunately, for that was the scheme by which we were enabled in large measure to achieve federation—the money which goes back to those States it is open to them to spend for their own purposes: and it results that one State will be receiving probably over

£1,000,000 more than it has been in the habit of receiving before the federation, while others will be receiving less—one other will be receiving as much as £300,000 to £400,000 a year less. Now that system necessarily imposes upon the Commonwealth the obligation of making such returns as will not in any way embarrass the financial position of any component State, and therefore returns have to be made to the States under a tariff which might perhaps be lower if different conditions prevailed, but returns have to be made to the States for the objects which I have endeavoured to outline, and these returns are not available for any objects of defence.

Now the second limitation which is imposed upon the Commonwealth is this, that for at least ten years after its institution it cannot spend for the purposes of Government of the Commonwealth more than 20 per cent. of the net Customs and Excise Revenues received. That is a clause familiarly known as the Braddon Clause, proposed by my friend Sir Edward Braddon. This again imposes a serious limitation, because, taken in connection with the sections which I have outlined, it increases, it may be for a good public object as far as internal government is concerned, the limitations upon the expenditure of the Colony. We have not yet reached, within the Commonwealth, the limit of one-fourth, but we have before us problems such as those which have demanded solution in the early progress of the Canadian Dominion, such as, for instance, trans-continental railways. It is demanded of us to build shortly a railway which would cover a space of 1,100 miles, within the States of Southern and Western Australia, and we shall then form a continuous chain of communication by rail from points far north of Brisbane, in Queensland, to the City of Perth. It will be also demanded of us very soon to take over what is called the Northern Territory of South Australia. I think the Government of that portion of the country has a history which is familiar to many at this table, and there is no doubt that if that is taken over there will be another serious burden, and then we shall probably have to begin the construction of another trans-continental railway. At the risk of being tedious I have to mention these things in order to make clear to all of us, who are endeavouring to operate with a common object, how difficult it is for some of us to rise to the level which is expected of us at this stage.

With regard to the first problem of naval defence, I must say that it has struck me that the only reasonable solution, as far as those whom I represent are concerned, at the present time is not at present to attempt the construction or rather the obtaining of the nucleus of a navy of our own, because, however strong the public feeling may be in that direction, and there are some indications of support of such a proposal, I should find a very great difficulty in finding the money for the purpose, and the less difficult of the two in that regard is a proposal similar to that which the noble lord who opened the discussion to-day has set before us. But at the outset I am again obliged to say that the financial limitations that I have spoken of would render it impossible for us to go quite so far. That is a subject to which I shall give the utmost further consideration, because I should like to fall in, as far as is reasonably possible, with the proposals which have been made, of course subject to the approval of Parliament, which must supervise in any case. But I find I cannot go any further than say this to-day, that I think my colleague will agree with me, I mean Sir John Forrest, that the increase of naval contribution, embodying, as it would, I suppose, the three requirements mentioned by Mr. Seddon, and specially the withdrawal of obsolete or worn-out ships, and the replacing them, during the whole currency of the Agreement, with modern cruisers, and adding torpedo catchers or destroyers as required. I take it that a proposal of that kind offers not only more advantage, but is a much nearer approach to a feasible solution, than any proposal for us at the other end of the world to ask you at present to supply us with a navy of our own. That is a matter entirely for future consideration. As to the earlier part of Mr. Seddon's proposal, I take it—and I shall be corrected if I am wrong—that he refers to a system, so far as sea service is concerned, similar to what is proposed in the detailed proposals by the maintenance of "five Katoombas," and I am strongly of the belief that, so far as means will allow us to do, we should endeavour to maintain men who would be fit to act as reservists, fit to act on sea service in times of emergency, and that we should ask the Imperial Government for such terms as we can arrange, if on the ships of the regular squadrons provision of that kind cannot be made, to enable us and New Zealand to deal with the subject in something similar to the way proposed, by regular training on board vessels such as are mentioned in these proposals, which may not any longer be

likely to be used for warships, but would nevertheless provide efficient training ships.

So far for the proposals which my friend Mr. Seddon has made, and to the extent which I have mentioned, I should be in favour of them. I do not think, however, it is necessary to include in those proposals, if I may say so, a stipulation for service in emergency outside the Dominion or Colony, and I would say why I think a proposal of that kind in times of peace would not add to the probable carriage or success of measures to carry out those propositions. In Australia the notion of insisting on service outside does not happen at the time to be popular. That we found out in a discussion in Parliament of our military defence proposals; but as Mr. Seddon has also pointed out with, I think, admirable correctness, when emergencies do arise there is no objection—there has been, at any rate hitherto, no objection raised—to service outside the Colonies. There has been superabundant spontaneous offer; the action of Governments in permitting such agreements as have been signed by men volunteering to serve has not been seriously questioned except by a very inconsiderable minority. From my own experience I should therefore say that in Australia and in New Zealand too it would be a matter of course without any such stipulation that any force raised for the other purposes indicated in Mr. Seddon's resolutions would easily be available in time of emergency. The embodiment of these stipulations would, I think, diminish the chance of success in carrying such proposals. Our people are like their countrymen here. They will do much in time of warlike emergency which in time of peace they would decline to bind themselves beforehand to accomplish.

Mr. SEDDON: I beg your pardon, Sir Edmund Barton. Why they included those words in the resolutions was as to whether the Imperial authorities would prefer that there should be such a stipulation.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Yes, in order that that might be discussed.

Mr. SEDDON: And not the Colonial.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Quite so; but of course I am looking at it from this point of view: that in order to make any proposals of this kind effective there must be concurrence on the part of the Colonies concerned, and I am looking now to the readiest way of obtaining such concurrence on that point: therefore I would suggest that so far as any action of the Colonies is concerned there should be no exaction of service in the case of emergency outside the Dominion or Colony, which, I take it, Mr. Seddon proposes, that the words to be understood before the phrase are "not only within but" outside. I have to add to what Mr. Seddon has said about the conditions under which contingents were raised in New Zealand, a statement that we met with a similar difficulty in Australia, as existing Defence Acts of the separate States embodied in only one case provision for service outside the States concerned; and I have already said what I think will probably be the fate of an attempt to require service outside the Dominion with which I am concerned; but, in raising our contingents, we have found that the existence of the legal obstacle which Mr. Seddon has mentioned, has obliged us also to proceed by way of individual agreements on the part of the men; but I think I may say this, with some assurance, that in this case also, independently of this question of Military or Naval Reserves, and as a matter applying to the whole military systems of the various States of the Commonwealth which are now amalgamated into one, there is not in my opinion the slightest probability of any holding back on the part of the men in future from offering service, or any reason to fear a falling off in the spontaneous offers for that service arising out of any absence of conditions that they may volunteer for outside service. I think a fear of that kind might be dismissed as not raising a real difficulty.

We, sir, I think, are in agreement with Mr. Seddon in another matter. The state of public sentiment and feeling in the Australian Colonies and in New Zealand is as strong as it well can be in favour of providing at any moment of emergency all possible assistance to the defence of the Empire, and in proportion as the integrity of the Empire is threatened in any part of the Empire, will be the need of assistance that Australia and New Zealand will offer, no matter whether they themselves are the point of attack or not. That, I think, may be taken as an assurance which will work out to this extent, that though those countries will not be able to reduce any terms of assistance by way of land force to a specific agreement, there will be a response to any suggestion made to us, or a response to the known requirements of the Empire with or without any suggestion which will be fully equivalent to the extent of our means whether it is in men or money. I may be sorry that we cannot

at this time formulate that matter, but I do say this again, speaking with some confidence, that the response in any emergency will be, in my belief, greater, freer, more enthusiastic, if matters are left to spontaneous action, than it will be if you endeavour to bind us down by any formal resolutions or by other measures. It may be that those who are accustomed to see these matters regulated in quite a different way will be somewhat surprised to find this state of feeling and opinion. To us, however, it is natural and normal, because we think what does attach us to the Mother Country is the link of relationship and affection, and the affection wells up with overflowing strength whenever any question of the defence of the Empire, whether at our own doors or anywhere else, arises, and I should really advise, with Mr. Seddon, that matters military should be left as they are now, at any rate until some change in public opinion arises, and I cannot say that I expect any early change in that respect.

Before I sit down I should like to say that public men fully realise in Australia that an attempt at the close localisation of local forces is not to the general interest. I know there are many among us who would fight very hard to have any auxiliary squadron, as it has been called in the past, tied to Australian waters, but I think that as thought goes on in this matter, it will be realised that the most effective blows struck in defence may be struck at a distance, and while they appear to be aggressive, may be in reality the best means of successful defence. One need not hesitate an expression of that opinion, when it is the opinion of all the experts of all nations, I think, and is, moreover, an opinion verified amply in British history. I am not prepared to go in any great detail into the general question at this moment, but I have thought it advisable that before we attempt to come to any set resolutions, we should all of us rather follow the example of others in impressing upon you what are our difficulties, and so enable the Conference perhaps to arrive more easily at an understanding in this matter. That will no doubt, as far as we are concerned, be marked by an attempt to assist to the extent of our possibilities the Imperial defence, but I have been obliged to make it quite clear how limited these possibilities are at the present stage although they may be in a few years more ample.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: Mr. Chamberlain, I have to point out that the Cape Colony stands in a very different position in regard to its population to that of the Colonies whose representatives here to-day have spoken. The population of Cape Colony is 2,355,000. Of these, the white population is only 517,000. Those are the figures ascertained as late as last year. We had not had a census taken for 10 years, but I had a calculation made on the well-known principle of growth of population, and that brings out the figures which I have just named. Now to the 517,000 I add 83,000 as representing what I may call the coloured population, as distinguished from the aboriginal natives, the people of mixed blood—brown, we call it—or half-castes and Malays; that would give a population of 600,000, on which calculation our expenditure ought to be based, because the vast native population of aboriginal natives amounting to 1,750,000 is really a source of danger to us. It is on that account that we are obliged to keep up the large military force which is permanently maintained in the Cape Colony. At any time we may be landed in a native war in the future as we have been in the past. A large number of these people are in a state of barbarism, or just emerging from barbarism. Some have advanced a little way in civilisation, and others higher, but they should be written off altogether as regards any calculation of the cost per head for the maintenance of our military force. The expenditure upon military forces in the Colony as it will appear upon the estimates which are now being framed for the present financial year amounts to £420,000 a year, and £30,000 a year as the contribution for the navy, that is £450,000 a year altogether. Now, if it be asked, what is the expenditure per head of the population, as I have defined it, you will find it works out at 15s. per head of the white and coloured population as distinguished from the barbarian population, which cannot be reckoned in the calculation. Well, I think it must be acknowledged that that is a very large contribution indeed to make, and I must say at once that I am not prepared to add anything to that very large expenditure, simply because the Colony is not in a position to afford it. The only exception that I would make with regard to that is this, that if some scheme were formulated, and there was a disposition on the part of the representatives of the other Colonies to have something definite, I would be prepared, on behalf of the Cape Colony, to increase somewhat the contribution of £30,000 a year which we make at present towards the expenses of the navy. Reference has been made to that contribution by Mr. Seddon. What occurred was this. When I was here five years ago I proposed, on behalf of

the Cape Colony, to give a battleship. Well, when we came to discuss that afterwards, before our Parliament met and after it had met, it was thought that, on the whole, it would be better to give a contribution amounting to the annual interest of the price of a battleship, rather than give the ship itself. That was formally decided upon, and, as a matter of fact, the £30,000 meant a larger contribution from the Colonial funds than would have been the case if we had actually ordered and built it ourselves. Such a ship as we gave would not have cost a million of money. We should have had to raise a loan in order to build the ship, but the expense altogether would not have amounted to quite £30,000 a year; but we made it £30,000, and that we are prepared to continue to pay.

Mr. SEDDON: That fortifies my statement of the facts.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: Yes.

Mr. SEDDON: That is exactly what I stated.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: Yes, just so, I only want to state how it arose, and, as I have said, if some definite agreement can be arrived at, I would, on behalf of the Cape Colony, be prepared to agree to some addition to the £30,000 a year.

I must say that the Colony is not in a position, considering the character of its population, to pledge itself unreservedly to send a contingent in the event of a war in any other part of the Empire. I think it would not be a right and a safe thing for the Colony to pledge itself to do so, but I entirely agree with the view that has been put before the Conference by Sir Edmund Barton that the sentiment of union exists, and if a war should unhappily occur in any other part of the Empire and the Imperial Government needed help from its Colonies, I am quite sure the Cape Colony would be one of the first to render that help, provided they were not in any dangerous position themselves. It might happen that there was an outbreak in some part of the world which required a very large Imperial force to face it, but it might happen at the same time that we had some outbreak in our own native territories, and then we should not be in a position to send any considerable force by way of a contingent. I mention that as a reason why the Colony could not safely bind itself beforehand, but at the opening of the Conference and following a remark made by Sir Edmund Barton I said, and so I say again to-day, I look to the sentiment which exists in the different Colonies of the Empire to render the assistance which should be needed when the time arrives. I am certain the Cape Colony would be prepared to do what the other Colonies of the Empire have done on behalf of South Africa.

And now, with regard to the expenditure which has been incurred in the Cape Colony. From the latest figures I have to hand I think I can put it down that the total expenditure of the Cape Colony in connection with the war and suppressing the rebellion will be £2,750,000, which you will see is a very large contribution for a colony like the Cape, because the figures given here show the total contribution of all the other Colonies of the Empire to the cost of the war as £1,859,000; therefore the Cape Colony has, as a matter of fact, expended about £900,000 in war and the suppression of rebellion more than all the rest of the Colonies of the Empire together.

Mr. SEDDON: We are paying the interest now on the cost of the Maori war, which amounted to several millions.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: So are we. Now I am not taking any credit to the Colony on account of our large expenditure. I consider that as there was a great rebellion in the Colony, as well as a war which affected us so materially, and the first duty of the Government is to repress rebellion wherever it arises in the Colony, the Colony was simply doing its duty just the same as I am quite sure if in any other Colony of the Empire rebellion were to arise the Government of that Colony would do its duty in the same way, and would incur a very much larger expenditure than might be incurred by any other Colony where no rebellion or no war existed. The Cape Colony has simply done its duty, but I have pointed out the enormous expenditure which it has incurred which is not generally known, and owing to that it involves us in a considerable debt, and that is an additional burden which the people of the country will have to meet, and that is an additional reason why the Colony will not be in the position to very materially increase the expenditure which it already has to meet for military and for naval purposes. I think it is scarcely necessary for me to go any further into the matter this morning. I shall be quite prepared when a definite resolution is submitted to state how far the Colony is prepared to go in a financial direction, but it must be with the limitations I have laid down, that it is not for me on the part of the Colony to enter into a general Imperial defence scheme

which would require at any time, however unfortunate it might be for the Colony, that a considerable military force must be sent away from its shores. I cannot possibly bind the Colony to do that. I think it well to intimate beforehand the line upon which I have gone, and the terms which I am prepared to recommend on behalf of the Colony. Of course I would not for a moment like it to appear that I, on behalf of the Colony, hesitate to pledge the Colony to provide its just share of the vast expenditure which has been incurred by the Imperial Government on behalf of the Empire at large.

Sir ALBERT HIME: Mr. Chamberlain, I should like to emphasise what has been said by those who have spoken before me with regard to the difficulty of comparing the expenditure per head of population in the Colonies with the expenditure per head in the Mother Country. As has been very well pointed out, the demands in the Colonies upon the revenues are far and away greater and more numerous than they are in the Mother Country. Works of all descriptions, railways, public works, harbour works, and every kind of service which is carried on at home as a rule by private enterprise has to be carried out in the Colonies by the Governments themselves. Then, sir, with regard to the expenditure per head of the population on naval and military services in the small Colony which I represent, it is hardly fair, I think, to include the enormous native population as well as the Indian population. The population I see is put down as 902,365 in 1898. Well, of that population only about 60,000 would be Europeans, and it seems to me to be hardly fair to lump the natives, who entail large responsibilities upon the Government—to include them in the calculation of the contribution per head of population. If the Europeans only are taken into account the expenditure by Natal would be very large per head of the population.

That expense, sir, is put down here, although I think it is an excessive amount, at £231,371, and if that be divided by 60,000, which is the European population, that brings it to nearly £4 per head of the European population for expenditure on naval and military services. In Natal, sir, we have two forces. The first is the permanent force, the Natal Police. We have about 600 or 700 mounted European police there, the permanent force of the Colony. They are liable for service anywhere. We have also a volunteer force which entails a very heavy expenditure, £66,000 is the estimate next year for our volunteer force. That volunteer force is approximately 2,000 out of a population of 60,000; 2,000 volunteers—1,500 mounted and 500 artillery and infantry. Under our volunteer law those volunteers are liable for service both within and without the Colony, and they have been used during this recent war, some outside the Colony as well as within the Colony. I think, though, that it is hardly desirable that there should be any fixed rule that our volunteers should be liable for service in any part of the Empire, because being only a very small European community, we cannot afford to send away any large force out of our own Colony where they might be wanted at any time, and I think, therefore, until we have a federation of the South African Colonies, it would be very difficult for the individual Colonies to do more than offer a contribution in money to the naval and military expenditure of the Empire. When we get confederation, there may be a bigger scheme in connection with the whole matter, and the question of the permanent naval reserve which has been spoken of by Lord Selborne might very well then be dealt with, but I think it will be seen that for a Colony of about 60,000 European inhabitants a permanent naval reserve on a scale which would be of the slightest use is almost an impossibility. We have, it is true, sir, a small naval volunteer force, consisting of about 150 men. If we had some means of training these men, some ship available for training these men, they would be available and no doubt they would make a useful force, but we have no means of training them excepting of course our own steamers in the harbour of part Natal, and therefore they could not be regarded as ready for service unless they received some other and better training than they now get. I may say that we have also got at this time two batteries of artillery which are available for service in the Colony, and we have incurred considerable expenditure in fortifying the port of Natal. We have got two batteries of heavy guns which overlook the entrance and have been paid for entirely out of our own funds—out of the revenues of the Colony.

It seems to me, sir, that Natal and the Cape must at present be treated somewhat differently from other portions of the Empire, partly on account of their different circumstances, namely, that we have such an enormous native population, partly on account of the fact that we are not yet confederated, although we hope that we shall

at an early date be confederated, and for these reasons it must be seen that we can hardly be expected to deal with this whole question of defence in the same way as it can be dealt with by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In the meantime, sir, our Parliament at its recent session, just before I left Natal, passed a resolution in which it recognised that it is the duty of the Colonies to contribute towards the maintenance of the Imperial Navy, and I think, sir, I should give you the actual terms of the resolution. The terms of the resolution are of follows:—

"This House reaffirms the principle that this Colony should contribute towards the cost of maintaining the British Navy, and is of opinion that the question of annual Colonial contributions towards the maintenance of the navy is one that might with advantage be discussed at the forthcoming conference of Prime Ministers in London."

I was authorised at the same time, sir, to say to the Imperial Government, on behalf of Natal, that we should be prepared to pay the interest on the cost of either a battleship or a first-class cruiser, anything up to £35,000 per annum, in lieu of the small contribution we now give in the way of coal, but which has not yet been largely taken advantage of by the Admiralty. We recognise, sir, that we are doing very little towards assisting the Imperial Navy, and we wish spontaneously to do more than we have been doing up to the present. We, therefore, offer, and I am empowered now to offer, to the Admiralty the interest on the cost of a battleship up to £35,000 of revenue, whatever may be the actual amount, and of course I cannot say what is the cost of building a first-class cruiser or a first-class line of battleship. I do not think, sir, that it is possible for us at the present time to do more than offer to make an annual contribution. We thought in Natal it might be feasible for all the Colonies to agree on that point, that we should each make an annual contribution according to our means, and that the joint contributions of the various Colonies would amount to a considerable sum, which would be of material assistance to His Majesty's Government in connection with the maintenance and upkeep of the Navy. I do not know whether the other Colonies are prepared to fall in with this view. From what has fallen from some of the gentlemen who have spoken, I fear that they are not all prepared to agree to the proposal that we should do something in this direction towards the support of the Imperial Navy. There is no doubt a good deal of sentiment in it. I think Imperial sentiment is a matter which should be encouraged, and we in Natal do encourage Imperial sentiment, and we think that by this contribution we shall certainly prove that it is our desire to show that we are an integral portion of the Empire, to which, I believe, we are all proud to belong. I hope, sir, we may arrive at some decision of this kind, that we can each give a certain contribution to the Imperial Navy.

I would say that whilst it may be right and proper, and I think it is right and proper, that the Colonies should not be bound down by a hard and fast line or rule or legislation to keep up a certain force which should be available for service at any time if called upon in any part of the Empire, yet I agree with those who have spoken before me that if the need should ever arise every one of the self-governing Colonies would be prepared to come forward as they have come forward during the recent war, and to give assistance to the utmost of the power of each Colony wherever it may be required throughout the Empire. I think I can say that that is in the mind of every Prime Minister who has already spoken, and I believe it is what would be done on any future occasion if the need should arise, and that we should not be found wanting. I do not know, sir, that I need add anything more. I have made the proposal which I have just read out to you in this resolution of ours.

Sir ROBERT BOND: Mr. Chamberlain, my lords, and gentlemen, it was with very much satisfaction indeed that I heard Lord Selborne state this morning that the slight hitch that had occurred in connection with the establishment of a naval reserve in the Colony of Newfoundland had been removed. This is especially gratifying to me, because the Government of the Colony entered into the movement with very much enthusiasm, as did also the people of the Colony; and the success that has attended the movement so far has been so marked that I think it would have amounted to a calamity if anything had been allowed to occur to interfere with the further progress of that scheme. Since our last meeting I have been thinking how we can as a Colony do something more to aid in the matter of Imperial defence; and I have thought out a proposal which I would respectfully submit for the consideration of the Conference, a proposal which, if acceptable to His Majesty's Government, the Colony would be prepared to aid in carrying into effect.

In the first place I will, with your kind permission, proceed to deal as briefly as possible with the peculiarly advantageous strategic position which Newfoundland occupies in regard to the ocean grain route, and secondly the command of the cables. After dealing with the beneficent results that will be certain to accrue from utilising the strategic position of the Colony, I shall outline a proposal in the carrying out of which the Colony would, to some extent, at any rate, participate. In order to give point to a portion of my argument, I shall be obliged to make special reference to the trade of the Dominion of Canada; and I trust that my distinguished friend, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, may be able to approve and endorse the observations that I shall make. One of the most serious economic and strategic situations, arising out of the recent steamship combine arranged by Mr. Pierpont Morgan, is that the Trust menaces the ocean grain route and makes the British Isles even more dependent than ever on the United States for the supplies required to feed the inhabitants during a prolonged period of warfare. Located in Newfoundland, on the eastern rim of the American Continent, with the great sea-road passing almost within sight of our doors, we can note a phase of this subject which strikes us as being of momentous import, although it is probably overlooked by those in England who are studying the more immediate consequences of the new arrangement.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I beg your pardon; I do not wish to interrupt you; but does not that come on at a later stage—the question of the shipping subsidies; you are not now referring to the question which we have been discussing, which is really of the contribution, direct or indirect, the Colonies will be able to make to naval defence.

Sir ROBERT BOND: I was leading up to that, but if you think it better that the statement, which is necessarily a lengthy one, should come on later, I will defer my observations.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I think perhaps it will be more appropriate to bring it on when we come to discuss the question of steamship subsidies which is put down on the paper.

Sir ROBERT BOND: What I was going to deal with was the advantage of fortifying and garrisoning St. John's and another port in Newfoundland, and making St. John's a naval station, to which scheme the Colony would contribute. However, if you think it better to defer the matter for another occasion I shall be very pleased to bring it up again, or to submit a memorandum dealing fully with the subject.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Well then, gentlemen, I think as several of our colleagues have other engagements, it would be desirable, as speedily as possible, that we should conclude the present day's proceedings. We have had an extremely interesting general discussion upon the whole subject; and in regard to that I personally wish to make only one or two remarks. What I really rose to say was whether we can now come to some practical progress on the subject we have been discussing. The remarks which I have to make refer to a very great deal of competent criticism on the comparison laid before the Conference between the military and the naval expenditure of the Mother Country and the Colonies. Of course, any comparison of that kind is inadequate to show the whole state of the case. It was not put for that purpose; nor, indeed, do I rely upon its absolute accuracy. It was merely to suggest the extreme disproportion which prevails at present. I agree with what Sir Gordon Sprigg and Sir Alfred Hime have said, that the case of the South African Colonies is distinct from others, and probably if the charge is to be calculated per head, it should be counted upon the head of the taxpaying population, and I can hardly include in that term the vast aboriginal population which contributes very little indeed to the taxes. It would be fair, therefore, to make a very considerable alteration on that account. And I am fully sensible also of the very large expense which has been borne both by Natal and the Cape in connection with the war, although I believe I am right in saying that up to the present time neither Colony has put a single penny of new taxes upon its population. Now, that is a very different position to the position of the Mother Country.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: We have not had the opportunity.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Well, you have hitherto been able to do without putting new taxes upon the population, whereas we have been compelled to place something like £27,000,000 of extra taxation upon the whole community of this country.

Then I come to one other comment, a general comment which is made on behalf of all the Colonies, that in making a comparison we ought to take account of the

expenditure of the Colonies upon public works at home. It is said we have not spent a penny upon railways. I am prepared to say that I wish very much we had, because if we had taken up the railways ourselves from the first, we should now have been deriving a large income from them which would have reduced the taxation of our people, and you no doubt do regard all this expenditure not as a loss, but as an investment, and when Mr. Seddon, for instance, speaks of the population of New Zealand as bearing 5s. per head for old age pensions, I must remind him that they get it back in that form, whereas for the military and naval defence of the Empire, of course, we get nothing back except the general security of the whole Empire. All these things, I am sure, I may be allowed to say, remind me a little of a personal experience of mine. When I was canvassing the other day for the great University of Birmingham, I went to a very wealthy friend of mine to ask him for a large contribution. I was told by him that the fact was that he had just been building a very large house and that the cost of that had been so much beyond anything that he had expected that he really was unable to afford me any contribution.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Did he say it was a guest house?

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I am sure you will readily understand that I do not speak so much to those who are representatives here as I speak through them to their population, who want, I consider, a certain amount of education upon this subject, and what I should say, if I were speaking in Australia or in Canada at the present moment, is this:—What would you do, where would you be, if you were absolutely independent nations? In spite of what you are spending for old age pensions, and railways, and all those other things, you would have to spend a vast deal more than you are spending to make an adequate, or any kind of proportionate, preparation for your own defence. To a large extent your liability is relieved by the action of the Imperial Government; but I am quite sure that recognizing this fact you would be prepared to meet us in as generous a spirit as is possible.

Now I come to the question of further progress. I think it is perfectly evident that the first point is to deal with such a memorandum as has been placed before us with regard to the naval provision in Australian waters. The facts are these. There is a squadron there provided for under an existing agreement. It is admitted that the squadron is altogether inadequate and quite insufficient for any modern purpose.

Mr. SEDDON: Hear, hear.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: It is clear, therefore, that the squadron should be greatly improved in its character, and, as I understand, both Mr. Seddon and Sir Edmund Barton, although they cannot promise to do all that is asked of them or to make any large contribution, are prepared to consider what shall be the exact composition of the new squadron and how far they would be prepared to increase their present contribution for the purpose of having an improved fleet in Australian waters. That is a question in which the rest of the Conference can hardly be said to be interested. It is entirely personal to Sir Edmund Barton, Mr. Seddon, and the First Lord of the Admiralty. I would suggest, therefore, as the first practical step towards a general conclusion, that we should ask those three gentlemen to make an arrangement and to discuss this matter in private and to come to us—as I hope they will—with some settled conclusion. Then, I take it, we shall follow that up by a similar conference between Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and any members of his Ministry whom he would desire to associate with him, and the Admiralty with regard to the situation in Canada. And again Sir Alfred Hime and Sir Gordon Sprigg can deal separately with the question as it affects their two Colonies, and in that way, I think, when we get reports of these interviews—these private interviews—we shall be in a position to see how far it can be embodied in anything like a general resolution, or how far we shall have secured a general result by these separate negotiations. If the Conference can adopt that suggestion, I would say that, in my opinion, it would be undesirable that we should go on at once with any discussion with regard to the military defence of the Empire. That is partly a question of expenditure; I believe it is principally a question of organisation; but at all events I think it would be convenient that we should know exactly what is going to be done with regard to naval defence before we take up another—although a kindred—subject. And under those circumstances what I propose to put forward for consideration is that at the next meeting we should leave defence, and take up the question of commercial relations. The next meeting will be on Tuesday at 11 o'clock, if that is agreeable.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: I may say I entirely concur in the proposal you have made. The sooner we can make appointments with the different Prime Ministers and Ministers concerning the matter the better. I do not propose now to take up the different points such as Mr. Seddon and others have raised, because the time is already far advanced. I think I can make an exception in the case of the representative of the Colony of Natal, and say that I do with great pleasure accept the proposal which Sir Alfred Hime has made on behalf of Natal, which, if I may be allowed to say so, is a very distinct advance. There is only one further point upon which I would make a remark, and that is with reference to the point Sir Wilfrid Laurier raised, and with which Mr. Chamberlain has partly dealt. It is not accurate to say that the United Kingdom spends no money on public works. I have not mentioned in the memorandum I have circulated that the House of Commons has for naval works alone and in addition to the annual estimates authorised a present loan expenditure of £27,000,000, and I would desire also to remind the Conference that the British taxpayer by no means gets the benefit himself of all the expenditure for which he pays. A large proportion of naval expenditure is not spent in the United Kingdom at all; a large portion is spent actually in the Colonies. In Sydney, Halifax, Cape Town, the naval expenditure is large; at Cape Town, for instance, the House of Commons has authorised the construction of large docks.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: SIMONS TOWN.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Yes; in Cape Colony, I meant.

Sir GORDON SPRIGG: Yes.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: In SIMONS TOWN, and this is an expenditure which, though it is for the advantage of the Empire, is not to the personal advantage of the British taxpayer who has to pay for it, but of the Cape Colonist who does not.

C.

25 July, 1902.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Mr. Chamberlain and Gentlemen,—On the last occasion when I had the pleasure of attending here Lord Selborne opened the Conference on the question of Imperial defence from the standpoint of the navy, and we have before us with regard to the army a notice of motion formulated by the Government of New Zealand to the effect: "That it is desirable to have an "Imperial Reserve Force formed in each of His Majesty's Dominions over the seas "for service in case of emergency outside the Dominion or Colony in which such "Reserve is formed. The limits within which such Reserve Force may be employed "outside the Colony wherein it is raised to be defined by the Imperial and Colonial "Governments at the time such Reserve is formed, and to be in accordance with "any law in force for the time being respecting the same. The cost of maintaining "and equipping such Imperial Reserve Force to be defrayed in such proportion "and manner as may be agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Govern- "ments."

That has developed further than the motion, and although I heartily concur with the terms of the motion generally, I may perhaps be allowed to say that what I may be able to say to-day is not in any way based on that resolution. The question of our Imperial land forces is one which has not been brought forward either by the momentary impetus of the late war or by anything but a desire for a settled policy in this respect, and I would venture to point out that our whole progress in this country for the last 20 years has been to some such end as that which we are now asking you to put your seal upon. National defence had been allowed to go very much backward during the "seventies." During the "eighties," sir, very considerable progress was made, especially after Lord Randolph Churchill's resignation as Chancellor of the Exchequer, which was based upon and which formed a subject of a trial of strength as to whether our coaling stations for the navy and national defences should be maintained. Since then attempts have been made from time to time to estimate what our land forces might be called upon to undertake. Those attempts have become more necessary year by year. It is practically impossible to exclude from our minds the necessities not of offensive but of defensive action for the maintenance of our Colonies and Dependencies all over the world, and the Government have, within the last two years, definitely stated, I think almost for the first time, how they adjust our land forces at home, and what proportion they hold in readiness for the protection of our interests in other parts of the globe.

Perhaps I might recapitulate the views which I put before the House of Commons, now 18 months ago, on behalf of the Government, and which, after long discussions, were accepted, and have been practically generally agreed to by Parliament. We are prepared—and our organisation enables us in the future—to send 120,000 regular troops abroad to any part of the British Empire which may be threatened. We keep up a home field army of another 120,000 men; we keep 120,000 men for our garrisons; we have a large number—somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000—employed in various positions for the defence of London and for strategic positions which might be threatened in case of invasion. But large as these proportions may sound, they are certainly not deemed too large by our military advisers, in view of the possibility of our at any time losing the command of the sea, and I would venture to remind the Conference that what Great Britain does off her own bat towards defence of Colonies and Dependencies is not limited by her power to send 120,000 men to any threatened position in case of emergency. We have close upon 80,000 British troops in India. We have always some 30,000 in the Colonial garrisons, and at present—and probably for some long time to come—we must, in view of South Africa, look to keeping a larger number than those. Therefore, we have, either abroad at this moment or liable to go abroad on any emergency, close upon a quarter of a million of men. And I would point out that this is not a force kept for ambitious schemes or offensive operations or for an attempt to involve ourselves in the great quarrels of our neighbours in Europe. We have only got to look to the illustrations of the late war to see that in fixing 120,000 men as our contingent, we are rather under than over the mark of what we might be called upon to send, having in view that we have had to send double the number, with your assistance, for the defence of two of our Colonies.

I recognise that in bringing these subjects before you I am bound to show that the Mother Country is doing her part. I do not think that anybody will contend that a nation which keeps 110,000 or 120,000 men permanently abroad under a system of voluntary enlistment, and is prepared to send the same number in the case of emergency, is not doing her share in protecting her Colonies and Dependencies which are relying upon her assistance. On the other hand it largely held—speaking in this room, by our military advisers it is strongly held—that circumstances may occur in which it is most desirable that we should have a call on further troops. Of course we should have a certain number at home which, if the sea is safeguarded, we should, as we did in the case of South Africa, send out; but the whole secret of success in war is time, and we can never count on having so much time as we have had in the late war. We should never count—either in respect to politics or as to time—on having an enemy who would enable us to make up during the war the deficiencies which we found at the beginning. I should like to speak, if I may, quite frankly to the Conference on this subject. In the Boers we had an armed enemy—not an army—shrewd and brave and provided with good weapons; but they neglected at the beginning of the war obvious opportunities—obvious and many opportunities. I am not a tactician, but I have studied the opinions of those who have written and who have given me their advice. I might point out that there were incidents earlier in the war, there were occasions when a powerful and determined enemy, properly organised, could have taken advantage of our early reverses and could have moved with great effect upon our communications. That was not done. But the forces were not an organised army. Again, in individual battles there were many opportunities of which a determined leader, who had an organised force at his disposal, would have broken our line—very often a long extended one—and would have put our troops to a much more severe test than even they were put to. I only mention that fact for this reason, that we have to consider what will be the effect if we found ourselves pitted against European troops. We should have both these contingencies, which were neglected by the Boers, to look to. My object in mentioning this is to remind you that we had largely to rely—both in our own and in our Colonial levies—on relatively untrained troops. I admit to the full that our levies, that is to say, our yeomanry and other hastily levied troops, differed extremely in their composition and in their military quality. They all improved enormously after some months; but no general commanding the British troops would have been willing, on the conditions in which many of them went out, nor would it have been fair, to put them against European troops; and the same, in a lesser degree, holds good as regards the Colonial force sent to our support. They differed, and they were bound to differ exceedingly, in their military quality, especially at the beginning and on first landing; but it is not disrespectful to them to say that, with the training which they had received

before they landed, there was a considerable number of those troops which no general would have had a right to pit against European troops without further training, and it is exceedingly important to us in laying down our plans of action for the future to know to what extent we can depend in an emergency upon Colonial support. Of course, I realise in regard to all these questions that we should not ask for—that we should go too far if we asked for—any general promise of support in the emergency which has not arisen; but what I do trust very strongly is this: that in case of an emergency and in case of different Colonies being willing to come to the support of the Mother Country in such emergency, they should be in a position to do so with a body of troops, however moderate in number, which could be put in line with our own regular troops against a European Power. I am not, of course, speaking of action on the Continent of Europe, but it will not be necessary for any of us to go far to conceive cases in which in support of our Colonies it might be necessary to send a large British force and, in some cases, in quarrels in which Great Britain's interest would be considerably less than that of the Colony affected. Therefore, I am not asking that this should be regarded simply as a donative on the part of the Colonies out of loyalty. I ask it rather on the ground of reciprocity, and I ask it also because, if you take some parts of the world in which our interests might be threatened, it must be perfectly obvious that it would not be in the power entirely of the Mother Country to perform her part of the business as effectively without some support.

Take, for instance, the case of China. We have recently come to an agreement with Japan—an agreement which you will recollect is not one for offensive action since it only comes into force in the case of aggressive action by other Powers. Obviously in any plan of campaign which might be found necessary to protect our trade with China against encroachment and against aggression we should be glad, and we should wish, to give Japan, our ally, every support in our power. It is equally obvious that our interests would be strongly threatened in other parts of the globe at the same time. A campaign between two great Powers is not fought out solely on the spot at which the quarrel has arisen. In the case of any trouble which threatened our Indian Empire we are bound to send large reinforcements from here. In the case of war which involved European Powers our striking effect would necessarily be exercised on some of their dependencies. That is all Great Britain ought to be prepared to do; but by propinquity and also from other causes nothing could assist us more than if that quarrel, forced upon us by others, also obtained for us the support of the different Colonial Governments; than that we should be able to count on being able to support our ally in China with a small body, but, at the same time, a well organised body, of Colonial force from those Colonies which are nearest and which are most conveniently situated for supporting us in China.

Well, now, what is the present position? We have had a memorandum which, I think, has been probably read by all the authorities who are present, and which shows that we have nominally of all ranks a very large permanent force in Australia, something like 27,000 men; in Canada, 38,000; in New Zealand, 17,000; and making up with South Africa, say, probably, something like 100,000 men. Well, what is the military value of the force? That is the question we have to put to ourselves, what is its military value for the defence of the Colonies themselves, and what is its military value for assistance to the Empire at large to the extent to which it is asked to contribute. Well, I hope I shall not be accused, if I am frank, of in any way disparaging our Colonial troops. I began by saying that all, and more than all, that may be said as to their diversity may be said as to the diversity of the Imperial forces outside the regular army, but the diversity is exactly what Lord Roberts and my other military advisers are engaged in reducing to the best of their ability, so that we may know exactly what we have to depend upon.

Take the case first of all of Canada; Canada has nearly 40,000 men. We know that in no part of the Empire has better fighting material been found in the recent war than among the Canadians, but I see from the last annual report from the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, a report which was referred to in high terms in a recent debate on the Militia in the Canadian Parliament, that the city corps have absolutely no training whatever in the field duties of a soldier and that the rural corps "will never be made even fairly fit to take the field with the limited period of annual training that they receive under existing conditions." In the urban corps it is further stated to be impossible at present to give anything beyond theoretical instruction in the more important duties of a soldier, such as

scouting, outpost work, entrenchment and tactical exercises. As regards the cavalry the General Officer regretted his inability to report that as cavalry they can be considered to be in any instance more than barely efficient. Beyond that, we know that Canada has at present no trained staff, or a system of training of staff officers, and very recently a rifle has been adopted in Canada which, although carrying the same cartridge as our British rifle, is of a different pattern, which in itself we think is a little unfortunate, as breaking the uniformity and the interchangeability from the one to the other in case troops are employed together. Anybody who reads the report will see that, however fine might be the patriotic ardour and keenness of Canada at a given moment, troops hastily improvised from such material can only be placed by a General against trained troops with very considerable caution.

Well, then again, in regard to Australia, there was a military Committee of Inquiry which was assembled last year by the Commonwealth Government to report on the organisation and the state of instruction of the guards of the various Australian States. Those reports point out much that I daresay might have been said with equal truth of our organisation here no more than 15 or 20 years ago, but I hope we have progressed here. The troops vary very much in quality and are deficient as regards the departmental corps which are necessary to accompany them in the field—army service corps and ordnance and army medical departments. In some States there are none. Victoria has only a reserve of 17 rounds of small arms ammunition per rifle. Western Australia only 28 rounds reserve, and again there has not been any military administrative staff to deal with supply or other arrangements, and only in one State is there periodical inspection of ammunition and warlike stores. The engineer units do not receive a continuous annual training, and, like the great variety of armaments and ammunition, anybody who reads these reports will see that however magnificent the material, however loyal and patriotic the feeling, you can only treat contingents which are got together on the spur of the moment and hastily improvised as a moral force, a moral support to the Empire at a critical moment, but not one on which the Empire would be justified in relying in any way to the exclusion of its own regular troops; and my point is that cases must and will arise in which we shall have to ask, in which we shall require, a larger force than we have of our own, and in which the Colonies who send it us on the ground that they think us worthy of support in a particular emergency should be prepared to send us reliable forces.

Now, your time is of value, and I do not want to enlarge on the many other features which are put before me by my military advisers on this subject, but what I would ask is this, that out of this very large number of men who are only trained in some degree in the Colonies, we must look, even if it was for only one in four, to be specially trained and to be held in readiness for such an emergency. I propose that those men should be trained with a liability to oversea service, that they should realise that they are a part of the Army Reserve of the Imperial Force, that their services are absolutely pledged in the event of the Government to which they belong proffering assistance to the Imperial Forces in the emergency. I would ask that they should receive such training as might be agreed upon between our military authorities and the Government concerned, and that they should be fully organised and fully equipped with a view to acting together and drilling together in the battalions or regiments with which they would take the field. I do not want to go into the details of the question because I think perhaps it is a question where we want first to have the principle decided. I do not want to go into the questions of what their status would be with regard to other corps; whether there should be any attachment to the regiments at home; whether there should be any exchange of units which has often been talked about and was talked about at this Conference in 1897; whether the officers who are to accept service in this particular force should have any claim on Imperial commissions.

All those, I think, are questions which we must take up and deal with, but, of course, there is the great question of expenditure. I would point out that this is not a large financial question. The number of men asked for is so comparatively small that it is unlikely that there would be a difficulty in getting men to pledge themselves, and the reserve pay which we give after all only amounts to £9 per man per annum. That reserve pay, over a force of 20,000 men, would only amount to £180,000 a year over the whole of the Colonies, and I am by no means prepared to say, in looking to the last paragraph of Mr. Seddon's motion, that it would not be a fair thing to ask the Imperial Government to assist in that respect in

case they really had a call on those troops. Of course, if these troops are entirely under the control of the Colonial Government, and if their Colony says, which it very possibly would, "We will not pledge ourselves to send you any men until we know the emergency and until we have the assent of our Parliament for agreeing to take part in that particular emergency," it would probably be held that so long as the Colonial Government kept the control as to the employment of the troops, they should pay them. For ourselves, if it is held that any troops are part of our recognised Army Reserve, I think it would not be unreasonable for the Imperial Exchequer to bear some portion of the charge. I will not develop the question further, but I would point out that when I have spoken of £180,000 divided between the whole of the Colonies, I am speaking of a relatively small figure compared to that which has been recently added to our Estimates. On a most careful review by the Cabinet of the necessities of the case within two years—the years 1900 and 1901—we have added no less than £9,000,000 sterling to the peace Estimates for the army, and therefore the expenditure which I suggest may possibly not be grudged by the Colonies, though I think it may be met by retrenchment in some other quarters. In respect of figures it would only represent an expenditure in the whole of the Colonies of one-fiftieth of the sum which, in two years, the Imperial Government has had to take upon its shoulders. I would only urge before I sit down that these proposals are dictated not in the least by any idea of entering into an ambitious competition with other nations as to the extent of our land armaments. But up to now Great Britain has always been the last in the field. We cannot afford to be the last in the field. If we are forced into defensive action for any of our dependencies we are bound to be able to strike as quickly or quicker than any other Powers. That is the object of the whole of our present organisation at the War Office, which has advanced most rapidly within the last two or three years, and I sincerely trust that the Colonial Governments may see their way to giving us, in this particular form, the support which they have given us in so unstinted a manner under the circumstances of the late war.

SIR FREDERICK BORDEN: I scarcely expected to make a statement at this stage. However, perhaps I may as well say what I have to say now. I am sure we all sympathise fully with the wish expressed by the Secretary of State for War to perfect in every possible way the defences of the Empire. I think the Colonies, the larger Colonies, at any rate, have shown their sympathy in the most practical manner with that view, and with that desire. (Mr. Seddon: Hear, hear.) Perhaps as I am not charged with discussing the question of the policy of this proposal, I may proceed at once to refer to the position of affairs in Canada. I cannot speak for any other Colony, because I am not sufficiently acquainted with them, but having been Minister for Defence in Canada for six years, I am, to some extent, familiar with the conditions there, and, I think, with the feelings of the Militia and the people generally with reference to this matter. The Secretary of State for War has referred to the condition of the Militia in Canada as a defensive force, and has quoted one or two extracts from the last report which has been issued by the General Officer Commanding the military, which I find are also in this paper to which he then referred. I think that that extract is somewhat misleading; rather unfair. General O'Grady Haly was referring in detail to the condition of the Militia, but I think that if the whole report were carefully read, the inference would be that the Militia of Canada is in at any rate a much more effective condition than it was five or six years ago, and that its present position when compared with five or six years ago gives promise that within a very short time, within the very near future, it will be an effective force. I may say with reference to that, that the object we have in view is to make that force self-contained, self-reliant, absolutely complete within itself. The Secretary of State has referred to the fact that we have adopted the Ross rifle. I should not go into that here, but I may say it was only done after having submitted the whole question to a Committee composed of the best men we have, one of whom certainly was an expert who had been educated in this country, and who is at the head now of our arsenal in Quebec—Major Guadet—and the report made by that Committee was that the rifle known as the Ross rifle was at least as good as, and in some respects better than, the service rifle in this country. The cartridge fired by it is the same as that fired by the service rifle—so-called in this country—and I might point out in this connexion that I believe there are two or three rifles in use in the Imperial army, and they do not all fire the same cartridge.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Is that so?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I have heard that. At any rate, there are two very different rifles which are, I believe, in use. However, I will not enter into a controversy, but simply say this, that the distinguishing mark between this rifle and the service rifle is that it is a straight pull rifle. That is simpler and there is no reason why a man who has used the service rifle, either the Lee-Metford or the Enfield rifle, could not learn to use it in five minutes. I proved that myself. I went to the rifle range last year and used the Ross rifle after five minutes' examination of it with perfect ease, although I had not seen the rifle before. So I do not see any great difficulty in that. One objection made is that the parts are different and it would be necessary to have a separate supply. I am told by Sir Charles Ross that there is no reason in the world why each soldier should not be supplied, when going into the field, with the only two or three parts which can possibly be damaged, and the rifle could be restored without delay. However, I have said enough on that.

Now, it seems to me that the whole result of all this discussion comes to this, that we should have in the different Colonies as efficient a force as possible. The suggestion made that there should be a special force known as an Imperial force, for service abroad, is one that I cannot subscribe to, because, I believe, in the first instance, it would have a derogatory effect upon the Militia itself; and I am quite confident, from what I know of the Militia of Canada, that to have such a force receiving special favours, specially equipped, specially drilled and trained, would have an unfavourable effect upon the Militia at large. I would propose, as an alternative, that the force, if necessary the numerical strength of the force, be reduced, and that the whole force that we have be made effective and efficient. I think the experience of the South African war has proved conclusively the strong desire on the part of the Colonies to assist the Mother Country in the event of any emergency arising. Now, the point is to have such a force as will be ready at a moment—I agree entirely with the Secretary of State for War—to have an efficient force which could be called upon for service at any moment. It seems to me that there we come to one and the same point, and upon that we absolutely agree. I do not think it is necessary that a set of men shall be labelled that they are set apart for any particular service, but that our Militia should be made absolutely effective, or our Volunteer forces, so that when the moment arrives, we can take part, and assist the Imperial Army.

Now, I may venture to say, as the character of the force in Canada has been somewhat called in question in this paper, that we have done a great deal towards making our forces effective. Let me say as an illustration of what we can do that we fitted out a force—I am speaking now of our own Canadian contingent, for which we did everything—in the short space of 14 days. The first contingent was fitted out, equipped, and embarked, composed of 1,000 men, drawn from 3,000 miles of country from one end of Canada to the other, fully equipped, and I believe satisfactorily equipped. That was the first force which was sent out from Canada under Colonel Otter to South Africa. A few weeks after we fitted out a force of 1,200 men—600 of Field Artillery and 600 mounted men—within something like a month, or, it may be, three weeks. Well, I think that that is a pretty fair answer to the charge that the Militia force is utterly inefficient or is not, at any rate, an efficient or an effective force. We have, within five years, improved our headquarters' staff. We have created an Army Medical Service there which, I think, is a very good one, and compares perhaps favourably with any other Army Medical Service Corps. We are now engaged in organising, and have an officer here at this moment being educated to take charge of, and to organise, an Army Service Corps in Canada, which we hope to make efficient. We have established a reserve of officers. We recognise the fact that it is of the utmost importance to have educated officers. We have a Royal Military College, which I am sorry to say has not secured many officers to our own Militia, but it has sent many distinguished officers to the Imperial Army. We hope, however, having passed a Pension Act, that now we will be able to offer something to the young men coming out of the Royal Military College, and that in the future we shall have each year additions to our permanent forces from the Royal Military College.

We are constantly addressing our efforts towards increasing in every possible way the efficiency of the forces, and, in one word in conclusion, I wish to repeat what I have said before, that I am personally aware of the fact, and I know that the Militia of Canada is in the utmost sympathy with the objects we have in view here, but that I conscientiously believe that we are going on as well as and as

rapidly towards that end as we can possibly do, in our own way, and that efficiency of our military forces—at any rate, I speak of Canada—is the goal to which we shall look and that in time, a very short time, I believe, we shall be able to show you that we have an efficient force.

I would like to say one word as to the expenditure. When the Confederation was formed in 1867 there was a tacit understanding between the authorities, between the Government of Canada of that day and the Imperial authorities, that we should spend one million dollars a year on the Militia of the country. That expenditure has gone up to two millions. To-day we are spending one million and three quarters. I am not now at all referring to the South African expenditure, or to the fact that at the present moment we are garrisoning Halifax at a cost of one thousand dollars a day, but I mean the ordinary expenditure on revenue account. This one million and three quarters, and the additional expenditure on capital account brings it up to two millions—

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Dollars?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Yes; two million dollars. It seems to me that that shows fairly well that we appreciate the importance of defence, and that we are moving in that direction, perhaps not as rapidly as we ought, but at any rate, we are moving in that direction, and I speak for the Canadian Militia, and for the feeling and sentiment among all classes of people in Canada, and say that I am sure that if any emergency arises, you will always find the Militia and the country ready to do what they have done and even more, and that we shall have reached each year a greater stage of efficiency, which will enable us to co-operate more readily and with still better results.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: I am sure we are all obliged to the Secretary of State for War for the clear and informative statement which he made, and which in itself must be of very great advantage to the whole of the Conference; and the considerations he has deduced from the war itself are specially instructive. I suppose, notwithstanding the opinions we have so often heard expressed outside, there will be no one at this Board that will not recognise the difference between fighting men under the conditions of the Boers and meeting a highly equipped European army, and there are those who might be able perhaps to meet the Boers at their own game in some instances without having the amount of training which, under different conditions, and on a different field, would be necessary to meet a European force. I am also impressed with one necessity, which appears as a minimum of requirement, in Mr. Brodrick's statement, and that is the necessity for endeavouring to assimilate the arms and the equipment of the various parts of the Empire, at the very least.

As to the rest, I share Sir Frederick Borden's doubts as to the possibility of raising, to put the matter as nearly as I can in Mr. Brodrick's words, "a force to be set apart, a force to be specially trained ready for any emergency, to be treated as part of the armed forces of the Imperial service, and the men to be absolutely pledged to that service." I think, with Sir Frederick Borden, that there will be very great difficulty with the Colonial services in carrying out that proposal, and there would be less difficulty in assimilating arms and equipment, and in endeavouring to have our men, who may be called the Militia, trained, as well as armed and equipped, as nearly as possible according to the methods which approve themselves to the Imperial services. The Ross rifle may be a better rifle than any that exists in the service, and it might be a very hard thing, and would, no doubt, be a very hard thing, to ask a great Dominion like Canada to abandon the small arm which it has adopted. On the other hand, it may be that the Ross rifle, if tested here, would approve itself to the Imperial services, but it is a consideration which I only wish to mention, and for this reason, that however good a particular arm may be, it is better almost to sacrifice something in the mere point of efficiency if we can obtain uniformity of conditions which will enable our troops, from whatever part of the Empire they come, to be brigaded together in time of action. That is the real requirement which manifests itself now after what the Secretary of State for War has said, and considering, as I do, that the maintenance of such a reserve as is indicated both by Mr. Brodrick and by Mr. Seddon will be difficult, if not impossible, I should be disposed to suggest some form of resolution that may approve itself to Mr. Seddon, adopting that part of his resolution which is common to all of us. The resolution I suggest is:—

"(1.) That it is desirable that each self-governing Colony should

"endeavour to assimilate its arms, ammunition, and equipment as far as possible to patterns adopted for the Imperial Army."

"(2.) That the respective Governments recognise the wisdom of establishing factories and works for providing arms, ammunition and equipment for their requirements."

We may not be able, all of us, to get on more common ground than that, and what is desirable at a Conference of this kind is to find out what common ground there is, and to apply the principles which govern it all round. It seems to me that by beginning in this way, and with respect to all the services in this matter, the Conference can proceed from little to more, until we cover a larger field.

With reference to the report of certain military men, a military Committee appointed by the Commonwealth, which points out the diversity, the lack of periodical inspection, save in one State, and the irregularity of arms and equipment which prevailed in Australia, a word of explanation as to that may be useful.

This Committee was appointed by the Commonwealth Government in view of the work before it of welding into one amalgamated body the half dozen military systems which had prevailed in half a dozen separate States. The work of welding them into one is now proceeding, but it cannot come to a satisfactory conclusion until a Federal Defence Act is passed, and the passage of such an Act will be part of the work of next session. In the meantime the matters which are commented upon by the officers forming the Committee concerned, while they are patent facts, are such diversities within Australia as she will rectify for herself as opportunity allows. Of course, that is a work of time. It is not a work that is likely to be delayed, because it is one into which my hon. friend, Sir John Forrest—and I am sorry he is not well enough to be here to-day—but this is a work into which he has put his heart, and we all know what a resolute man he is when he makes up his mind. But the lesson to be drawn from the report is the lesson that the differences in arms, in equipment, and in system generally, should be wiped out, as between those who have hitherto had separate administrations. If the lesson is true as far as Australia is concerned, surely, as we are likely to be linked together in future struggles for the defence of the Empire, it is a lesson which should be drawn for the Empire itself, and to the whole of the extent of these points I think we ought to co-operate with the War Department, and to remove any differences which may stand in the way of perfectly effective action when troops are brigaded together. Differences in arms, differences in the way in which small arms may be used, such differences in the parts as may prevent a soldier to whom they may be served out from understanding them when troops are brigaded together, these are matters which should give way before the necessity of assimilating small arms, ammunition, and equipment throughout the Empire to every extent that is really practicable.

A consideration that is very strongly put forward by Mr. Brodrick is one that I think must appeal to all of us. In warfare, the best chance is with the man who gets in the first blow. If it has been the fact that the Navy has been reasonably prompt, it is also admitted to be the fact that the Army of Great Britain has generally been the last to act. Diversities in equipment, and in arms and matters of this kind generally are the very matters which delay the process of getting ready for action. Similarly, uniformity in these matters is the very thing which will expedite action. Therefore, the greatest help I think that we can render to the Empire, in playing our part of being ready, is to wipe out differences within ourselves in these points, and also to arrive at some common system with the Empire in respect of such matters as arms and equipment. I could wish to have gone further, but I have already pointed out what is public opinion already in Australia, and we can go no further than public opinion will take us.

I should like to name another matter while on this subject. Reference has been made to the number of the permanent forces, which I take to mean what we call permanent forces together with the Militia. There has been a little paper which has been published in the Commonwealth, which shows the state of the forces there in point of numbers.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Is this it?

Sir EDMUND BARTON: That is the permanent, or partially-paid, Volunteers, but I was going to add to that. This is it. I am much obliged. This is a statement

showing the number in each of the several States of permanent soldiers, Militia, Volunteers, and members of rifle clubs. That shows:—

Total permanently employed	1,457
Militia	18,603
Volunteers	8,860
Members of rifle clubs	29,250

Now, these rifle clubs—of course there is a far larger proportion in one State, and there is already a strong opinion, one with which I am not in accord myself, that one lesson to be drawn from the Boer War is that former ideas as to the necessity of discipline and training have got to be modified, and that such necessity exists to nothing like the substantial state in which it is supposed to exist. I cannot say I agree with that, but as I say that leads to the strong opinion that safety is to be found in large numbers of Volunteers and members of rifle clubs. We hear frequently the expression:—"Take a man to the butts, put a rifle in his hand, make a good marksman of him, and then he can defend his country as well as anyone." I do not agree with that. But this is an opinion we have to reckon with, and calls for more expenditure on Volunteers and rifle clubs, and the contraction of expenditure with regard to the force which I regard as the really valuable one, and that is the Militia. Now, we have in Australia, as I pointed out, some 18,000 militia. In times like these, retrenchment is in the air, but nevertheless we are spending in respect of military forces on a reduced estimate something like £600,000 a year, which is equivalent to three million dollars, and that is apart from loan expenditure on fortifications and the like. Now, we shall, no doubt, be asked to provide more liberally for Volunteers and rifle clubs, and less liberally for Militia. That is a tendency which I mean to resist, but it is a tendency which shows that when we are with Sir Frederick Borden in endeavouring to perfect, as far as we can, our Militia, not in respect of one portion of it, which is specially set aside, but in respect of the whole, so as to make the whole available in times of emergency, that we shall be, in doing that, taking a burden upon ourselves, a burden which may be sufficient for us to sustain as regards this branch of the service for the present. To set apart persons specially for service abroad is a thing which is foreign to the sentiment of the Colonies at the present time. They would not agree with us if we attempted to make any such reservation. They would not like to see a difference drawn in any way between men who are serving in the same battalions or in the same ranks, or in different battalions in the same forces, in respect of the purposes for which they were intended, because they wish their primary purpose to be considered to be that of the defence of the Australian shores, while they are perfectly ready in times of emergency not to contribute merely a quota, but to contribute to the whole extent of their ability, and with a liberal view of their ability, when any necessity arises. Now these are the conditions which prevail amongst us, and I have endeavoured to point them out in order to give scope for general discussion, but I think the considerations which I have named point against any endeavour to set aside a portion of our forces for a special purpose, while they do point towards an assimilation on the part of all the Colonies concerned of their forces in respect of arms and equipment to those of the rest of the Empire, so that when the call is made the answer shall be as prompt and as effective as it can possibly be.

Mr. SEDDON: In the first place I desire to thank the Secretary of State for War for the able and instructive address that one and all of us have listened to with very great pleasure, and that liberal—I may take it—suggestion made by him on behalf of the Imperial Government will, as far as New Zealand is concerned, I think, tend to solve the difficulty which has stood in the way of giving effect to the report which was submitted to our Parliament, and the scheme which was suggested by myself with respect to having an Imperial Reserve formed in New Zealand. I think I may say that I am disappointed at the stand or attitude of Canada, evidence of which was given explicitly and clearly by the Minister of Defence for the Dominion, and having the knowledge of his people and the condition of things, it is not for me to attempt to controvert what he said; but I would point out that there is the danger which has been pointed out by the Secretary of State for War, and must say for myself that I did not take it from the Secretary of State for War that his contention was that we could not equip rapidly, or the men would not be forthcoming; but I took it that his statement was explicit and, I think, well founded, namely, that you may have men in Canada within a fortnight or three weeks when you put these

men as against highly-trained European soldiers. What then would be their position? The Secretary of State for War, I think, has put it clearly, and, speaking of military defence for the Colony of New Zealand, I take it that our forces—and reports will prove—I can say that I think they will compare very favourably with the Canadian Militia, and yet I should be very sorry myself to see those men fighting in a large body against the highly trained European soldier. I think the same thing might apply also to the Colonial Forces, that is the Militia and Volunteer Forces in Australia, and I have a very high authority on the question for Australia; I have Major-General French's Defence Scheme. He, I believe, was the Commandant of New South Wales, and in the scheme he recommends what has been suggested in the motion now before the Conference, and that which has been indorsed by the Secretary of State for War, by the War Office, and he gives very good reasons for its being done in this suggestion, which is dated the 8th May, 1900, and his scheme is practically almost on the lines which was submitted to the New Zealand Parliament, and upon which we passed legislation. I would ask that this report of Major-General French, or his scheme, might form part of our papers, Mr. Chamberlain, with the scheme submitted by me to the New Zealand Parliament also, and later on there are minutes upon the defence of Australia by Major-General Hutton, the Commandant, dated at Headquarters at Melbourne, 7th April, 1902, and in this paper there is information which I believe will be valuable to those who now have the responsibility for dealing with this very large question. Probably it would be better if this, coming from the Commandant of the Commonwealth, should be handed in by the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, and he would then hand in the paper from the Colony.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: I have had this.

Mr. SEDDON: I think it would be a very valuable paper if it were made a part of our proceedings.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: I have no objection, Mr. Chamberlain, to your circulating it.

Mr. SEDDON: Also the other one from Major-General Hutton. Of course, he is for the Commonwealth, and it was sent to me in connexion with the scheme that I had then suggested, and we interchanged our schemes.

I will now come to the necessity for supporting, as I do, the Secretary of State for War. First of all in your Volunteer forces, or your Militia forces, you may have trained, but you cannot rely upon the men going when you want them. It is all very well to strike the first blow, and strike it efficiently and promptly, but you must have beforehand a force that you can rely upon going.

We, of course, did—the whole of the Colonies did—very excellent work, and we did it rapidly in equipping the men that we sent to South Africa, and for the particular class of fighting they were most suited, and most of the men that were first sent were well trained, but it cannot be said either by Australia, or by Canada, or by New Zealand, of the last men that we sent that you would take them as being the most effective or the best marksmen, or that they had received even an efficient militia or volunteer training. That being the case, I concur with the Secretary of State for War that under changed conditions it is better for us to have these men prepared and ready, and that could be depended upon. In other words, I feel myself—I do not say it at all disparagingly—but there may be a difficulty in raising Army Corps which have been submitted for the Mother Country. There may be a difficulty in what I take it is this, that outside those Army Corps, under altered conditions, it is prudent, and to the best interests of the Colonies and the Empire, that we should have practically an armed corps outside the Army Corps suggested for the Mother Country itself. That is the view I take, and I will come later on to the practical difficulty; at least, I will endeavour to meet some of the suggested difficulties that have been put before the Conference. First of all, as to creating ill-feeling or heartburning in respect of the Militia, if men who are trained, that is, of course, some men are paid extra, and you will have this distinction of the two forces, and the distinction would create heartburning. Why, that obtains at the present time in the Colony of Australia—the Commonwealth; they have at the present time a partially paid force of men receiving £8 a year.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: About £6 10s.

Mr. SEDDON: I beg your pardon, £6 10s. a year. Now, there is no heartburning between the Volunteers and the Militia and that partially paid force at the present time. I believe in Newfoundland they have a naval reserve partially paid; at

least, there is a sum paid annually. I have not heard myself of any heartburning or difficulty in respect of that; and I fail myself to see where men have pledged themselves to a special service when called upon that there would be any difficulty as far as the men are concerned, if the question is put this way, stripped altogether of the Colonies, from the Colonial Government. Do we, does Canada, does Australia, or will New Zealand object to the Imperial authorities recruiting in either Canada or Australia? We had better come down to the position. I say that there are men there, and trained men too, who would be prepared to serve outside New Zealand. But why they should be treated differently to the ordinary Volunteer or Militia is this: Your Volunteers, and I say it here, as Defence Minister for many years, where you are depending upon voluntary service you cannot get the men; the men cannot afford to give the time necessary annually to be trained so as to render them specially efficient if required for service with Imperial forces against the highly-trained armies of Europe, and this payment, as I take it, is an amount given to the men so as to enable them to devote sufficient time to be properly trained to meet an emergency that might arise. Now the whole thing, I think, is in that, and after what the Secretary of State for War said to-day, one of the difficulties in Australia—I speak, of course, subject to due deference to the Prime Minister representing Australia, and I have a section in my own Colony who object to an increase of defence expenditure, and who would object to pay out of the Colonial Exchequer the extra amount required to meet this training and equipment of men for service outside the Colony.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Is the partly-paid force that you are referring to the Militia?

Mr. SEDDON: Yes.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: In Australia.

Mr. SEDDON: Now, if that is met as between the respective Governments and the Imperial Government, one of the main difficulties I think is removed. I am speaking of course for my own Colony, I said to the Conference before, and I repeat it, there is a determination in all the Colonies I know, at least in my own Colony there is a determination there, that we shall not have a paid standing army. Any attempt in that direction, in my opinion, would be met by strenuous opposition; but, on the other hand, the difficulties that I have said exist and the necessities that have arisen, I believe myself if the leading men would take the matter up there would be no difficulty in having these reserves; in fact I suggest to the Premier of the Commonwealth whether he might not ask those of his own partially paid forces now, who are receiving the £6 a year, "Will you volunteer for service within given limits?" and out of the force which he already pays there would be a large number of men who, for a little extra, would in all probability be prepared for service outside the Commonwealth.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Might I, as a point of information, mention this? We have been discussing a Defence Bill, the second reading was carried, but there was no opportunity to take it through Committee owing to the long discussion on the tariff and to other causes. There was in that Bill a provision for service in emergency outside the Commonwealth. Although the second reading of the Bill was carried, there was scarcely a voice in the Parliament that supported the inclusion of such a provision as a matter of law.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Was it made quite clear that such troops would only be employed with the consent of the Colonial Government?

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Oh, yes; any question of that kind would have had to struggle very hard for its life. The whole matter was discussed. Sir John Forrest made a long speech on the matter, and I took occasion to review the whole debate. I took a note of nearly every speech myself. I think the Parliament was almost unanimous—the whole House of Representatives—on that subject.

Mr. SEDDON: I am differently situated, because we have already placed upon our Statute Book an Act which would enable this to be done, and we have in New Zealand the same objection generally to an increased expenditure, the same feeling as exists in Australia. But there is this to consider, Canada is differently situated, and there is not the same danger or necessity as far as Canada is concerned as there is in Australasia, as I will point out very shortly. The changed conditions respecting Australasia arise from the fact that there is a change in the balance of power. There is no longer that isolation that we had. Although America is a friendly Power, she has drawn nearer to us in annexing the Hawaiian Islands; she has

now—she is now at the Philippines and at Porto Rico. Then you have Russia coming through China in the Indian Ocean, and you have, of course, Germany at Samoa, and you have the French, who are always on the alert, and are strengthening their position, if you look at what has been the force that they have had at Noumea, the strengthening of her naval force also there. All this I say has so changed the position in respect to Australasia that we should be better prepared than we are now. When I say better prepared, I do not mean in respect to defending Australia or New Zealand. With nearly 20,000 Volunteers in New Zealand, and with the force they have in Australia, there would be no danger as far as any force landing, nor could it land, but if it did land, with the experience we have of what the Boers could do in South Africa, there is no fear under that head either as regards Australia or New Zealand.

But each and all the speakers have said we should be prepared to strike the first blow and to strike it expeditiously. Now, where is that to be done? Where could you get a force that could strike that blow more expeditiously than a force which could be depended upon taken immediately from Australia and New Zealand, and within the radius and within the limits, and where it could be and would be necessary to strike an effective blow, if it were in connexion with any of those Powers or their territories that I have just now been enumerating? I say myself, looking at it from an Australasian standpoint, that with the danger that we have, and we concur as we have concurred practically that, in respect to the Naval squadron, a blow would be struck, and we should agree in time of war to withdraw that squadron to strike this blow, equally with that, that contention holding good and being agreed upon, then I say, to make it still more effective, if you have a land force specially trained, and that could go at once and fight side by side with the Imperial forces, that in my opinion would be a great strengthening of the position as far as Australasia is concerned; and it is that more than anything else and owing to these altered conditions, that I think has caused the military authorities in the Colonies, the Commonwealth, or the State of New South Wales, and present Commandant of the Commonwealth and myself as Defence Minister of New Zealand to submit the schemes which are in the hands of members for consideration.

Now, I am of this opinion further, that the matter should be considered not from a local Australian, Canadian, or New Zealand standpoint, but from that of the Empire, and what would weigh with me, I think, should weigh with every member of the Conference, is what has been expressed by the Secretary of State for War, and which I have no doubt has been given under the advice of those who are entrusted with the military affairs of the Empire—the experts. That being the case, I think the matter should be further considered.

The next question that I would desire to touch upon is what was said by the Secretary of State for War in respect to the number of men that is maintained by the Mother Country. Well, under the altered conditions again I desire, with due diffidence, to say I do not think myself that the strength which has been mentioned is at all too great, in fact I am inclined to think that it will require to be strengthened. The manner of doing it must be left to those having the responsibility, but you find here that the Mother Country, according to this statement, is weakened to the extent that there are 30,000 now in the respective Colonies, and I take it that in that respect of course it must be weakened. I do not know what is done in Canada. We have now a force in New Zealand or in Australia, and this must be Colonies posted outside, but there may be of course Crown Colonies where a foreign power might strike just as we should strike at some of their Colonies, and this expense is in connexion with those Crown Colonies. I take it that is so. But this brings me to a point that I would urge upon the Secretary of State for War. I do not know whether the other Prime Ministers agree, but I believe myself it would be an advantage if you had in Australia, in New Zealand, and the Colonies those troops or regiments of the Imperial forces. We ought to have them trained with our men so that they could work together with highly trained officers and men. Under the altered conditions I believe myself, I speak for my own Colony, that would be acceptable. There was a time when the Colonies, probably the Secretary of State for War or Mr. Chamberlain may remember it, objected, or at least there was no objection, but they were not favourable, to the maintenance of Imperial troops in the Colonies. Under the altered conditions and the dangers that I have just now mentioned, I believe myself, that to meet difficulties that may arise in the places that I have mentioned it would be an advantage to have these Imperial forces located closer to hand than you have

them at the present time. As you are strengthening of course your naval force under the same circumstances, the question naturally arises would it not be an advantage to have this done in the Colonies? If so, you would have the advantage of having your men nearer the scene of operations, and at the same time they would be there with us for the purpose of assisting in the training of our militia, our officers, or perhaps our navy, this reserve force. There has been, as far as Canada is concerned, and as far as Australia is concerned, and as far as New Zealand is concerned, some doubt as to the organisation of the land force. The best way, I think, to have an improvement made, or a suggestion of an improvement, and as to knowing the position in case an emergency did arise as far as Canada is concerned, or Australia, or New Zealand, I would say why not let General Roberts or some of your highly trained men, something above the ordinary commandant officer, or officer that you could send out, why not let him come to the Colonies, confer with the commandants, the Minister of Defence, and those at the present time engaged in connection with our land forces, and in each place they would then, by being on the spot, point out the weakness existing. Recommendations coming from such a source would, in my opinion, be bound to be attended to by the Defence Ministers of the Colonies and lead to improvement. That is really what I have to say and say so as a Minister of Defence. We get a commandant who is an artillery officer, well then we go in for artillery. We get a cavalry officer and then the artillery goes. The harbour defences: we get an expert, a naval officer, and then it is all expenditure on your harbour defences. That has been the experience of all the Colonies. And in one way or another, we have practically thrown thousands and thousands of pounds away.

Sir ALBERT HIME: I do not agree as to that; so far as we are concerned I do not agree that it is the experience of all the Colonies.

Mr. SEDDON: At all events it has been our experience.

Sir ALBERT HIME: It has not been our experience.

Mr. SEDDON: I think the suggestion I have thrown out will be of service if something can be done in the direction indicated. The question now, as I take it, before the Conference is whether we shall have a departure in the direction of navy men highly trained that can be depended upon for services outside the Colonial limits. For myself, I think it could be done. I would ask, at all events, the Conference to consider the resolution of which I have given notice. I cannot say I agree with the suggested resolution of Sir Edmund Barton, the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth. That seems to be putting aside altogether the question of the Imperial Reserve and simply advocating the manufacture of arms and ammunition within the respective Colonies and an entire change from what was intended by the resolution of which I have given notice, and underlying throughout is the desire to place at the disposal of the Imperial Government within given limits, I do not think you would get many from the Colonies that would go and serve in India. Canada, of course, as I tell you, is differently situated to what we are in Australia and New Zealand, and she is not situated as we are. I will say and repeat there are altered conditions which should be provided against, and to that extent there may be of course something in Sir Edmund Barton's contention, but on the broad ground that we have men in the Colony who would serve outside the Colony, we have never had any difficulty whatever; in fact we have had five men offering to one that was required, and if the men are there, and it is men that is wanted, and there is a difficulty in the Mother Country there are two difficulties. First, in my opinion, there will be the difficulty in getting the men; and secondly, if you have them here they are too far away from the scene of operations, and by having highly-trained men in Australasia who would be depended upon they could strike an effective blow and strike it quickly. Such being the case, I will ask the Conference to agree to something being done in the direction indicated. To stand and wait, as we did before, for spasmodic action, and then pick up the material to hand notwithstanding that you have your Volunteers highly trained, still I do not know that that meets the position. Under these circumstances, I again urge the Conference to do something in the direction indicated by the resolution.

Mr. FULLER: Mr. Chamberlain, it will not be necessary for me to say many words on the very interesting question that the Conference has been discussing. Sir Gordon Sprigg made a statement, I think, to the effect that while the Government of Cape Colony hoped to increase its naval contribution the circumstances—the internal circumstances—with which it has to cope render it almost impossible for them to pledge themselves to any military assistance to the Imperial Govern-

ment. It is perfectly well known that we have a very large native population, men, a large proportion of them still living a tribal life and still savages, and that periodically there have been native outbreaks. This commits the Cape Colony to a very serious military or quasi-military expenditure, and in addition to the war loan which we have contracted recently of nearly £3,000,000, we have an outlay of a clear £250,000 to £500,000 annually to provide in case of an outbreak. And these periodical outbreaks unfortunately have not been unfrequent. I have been connected with the Colony for over 30 years—35 years—and during that time there have been six or seven native outbreaks, more or less serious, that have had to be met, very often with the assistance of the Imperial Government. Under these circumstances, Sir Gordon Sprigg felt, and I am sure rightly felt, that we could not give any pledge of military assistance to the Empire. At the same time there is all the feeling and all the desire to give such help, and I am perfectly certain that those who form the military powers in Cape Colony would fall in, if the circumstances of the country permitted, with such a proposal as has been made for a perpetual Imperial Reserve. I cannot judge of the condition and position of other Colonies, but I cannot see why if the circumstances of the country permitted there should not be a volunteer force of that kind, that is, I mean, an Imperial Reserve formed from those who form the volunteer service, the additional expenses to be met by the Imperial Government itself. And I think it would have a great moral effect in connection with the maintenance of the prestige of the British Empire, and that we should all strive if possible to bring about such a state of things. I am not sure that we shall not set you the example before long in South Africa. At all events, I am sure of this, that you would have plenty of men who would form part of such a reserve force, and that among them would be found a great many of the Boers with whom you have been fighting in the recent war. I have no more to say than that we are not prepared to make any definite pledges with regard to military defence while we do hope to increase our contribution to the Navy.

Sir ALBERT HIME: Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Gordon Sprigg and I handed to the First Lord of the Admiralty a few days ago a statement which set forth our views not only with regard to the Naval Reserve, but also with regard to the provision of men required for any other purpose, and we gave our reasons in that statement why it was impossible for us to pledge our Governments to supply any given number of men for service outside our respective Colonies. The chief reason, I think, that was given, Lord Selborne will correct me if I am wrong, was the enormous preponderance of the native population in our respective Colonies, which necessitated our keeping up a large force, and rendered it undesirable that that force should be taken away, as its absence might be taken advantage of by those large native populations. I would refer particularly to my own Colony, Natal, where we have an European population of from 60,000 to 70,000, all told, and a native population—I include the recently added territories, Sir—of about one million. It must be evident to the Secretary of State for War and to yourself, that with such an enormous native population we must be prepared at any time for emergencies in our own Colony; but, at the same time, Sir, I am glad to say that we have a thoroughly efficient force of both police and volunteers, and that force is trained—very highly trained—and would be available for service on an emergency even outside the Colony. Our volunteer law provides that our volunteers shall be available for service within or without the Colony, and during the last war, Sir, they were most anxious to serve outside the Colony; they clamoured to be taken forward when the troops advanced outside our Colony, and a great many of them were employed outside Natal. To show the efficiency of the volunteer force, Sir, I think I might be allowed to say that within forty-eight hours of the time when they got the order to mobilise they were all in their places, most of them in Ladysmith, having been collected from all parts of the Colony. We have, Sir, in Natal, the annual training which is required to keep men in a proper state of efficiency; but we have also regular monthly drills. We have two batteries of artillery—at least, I hope we have by this time, Sir; we had the second in course of formation when I left; we have 2,000 volunteers, nearly all mounted, thoroughly well-armed and equipped, and our police force, which are the permanent force, Sir, has now been increased to about 1,000 men, in order to take charge of the new territories and police those territories. We have recently appointed to be our Commandant of Volunteers, Colonel Leader, a well-known officer, who has served through this last war, and he may be relied on, I think, to keep our volunteers in a high state of efficiency. We have our medical corps, our veterinary corps, our ambulance corps, and the necessary

transport arrangements, so that at any time our volunteers can be mobilised at very short notice indeed. I believe myself that although we do not think it desirable, for the reasons which I have already given, to pledge ourselves to keep up a permanent force or to keep up a reserve force for service outside the Colony, the greater portion of our volunteers, and, if necessary, the whole of our police, would be ready for service in any part of His Majesty's Dominions if the emergency should arise.

I have said that I consider these men are highly trained, and are fit for service alongside and to be brigaded with His Majesty's troops, and they have so proved themselves. With regard to arms and ammunition, Sir, our desire is to assimilate them in every possible way to the service weapon and the service ammunition of the British Army, and we are now waiting simply for the pattern to be determined upon of that service weapon in the British Army. I think it has not yet been decided upon. The Secretary of State for War will tell me if I am wrong, but I understand there is a much shorter weapon now being considered for issue to the Imperial troops. As soon as the weapon has been decided upon we shall arm our volunteers and police with the same weapon. When confederation comes, when our various Colonies in South Africa are confederated, then, I think, Sir, will be the time to consider whether we cannot have the permanent reserve force available, so that the Imperial Government can lay its hand upon that force and use it for service in any part of the Empire, and that they shall know what the strength of that force will be. At present, Sir, we are so many individual units separated by different kinds and descriptions of government, it is impossible to come to anything like united action, but if in the near future, as I hope will be the case, we get confederation, then, Sir, I do think that we might provide for a permanent reserve force, ready for service in any part of His Majesty's dominions at any time if called upon. I would like to say, Sir, with regard to our volunteers, in order to keep them efficient, our mounted men, all of them, get £10 a year for the purpose of keeping their horses. The long service men, that is the men after three years in the volunteer service, get £3 a year extra. They all get 6s. a day when they are called out for annual training or any kind of service; if kept in the field for more than 60 days at a time they get 9s. a day—the ordinary mounted troopers. Our expenditure is very heavy indeed, and we do not grudge that expenditure, because we want to keep our volunteers and our police in the highest possible state of efficiency, so that they may be ready at any time.

I would like to add, Sir, that we encourage in every possible way the use of the rifle. We have our cadet corps, which is a very good training indeed for the future volunteers of the Colony. We have a cadet corps in all the schools. The boys who enter our cadet corps in all the Government schools of the Colony get grants also—each efficient cadet. We have rifle associations, which are supported by grants from the Government also, and recently, Sir, it may be within your knowledge, we have passed a Bill confirming the principle of compulsory service for every male between the ages of 18 and 55. That has passed a second reading and will be brought in again, Sir, in a more complete form to be passed into law at the next general session of the Legislative Assembly. I think, Sir, I have told you the reasons why it is impossible for us to give the pledge that has been suggested by the Secretary of State for War, at the same time I feel certain that you may rely upon the Colony of Natal, and I believe you may also rely on the Cape Colony, to render material assistance to the Mother Country in any part of the world if any emergency should arise.

Sir ROBERT BOND: Mr. Chamberlain, in the Colony that I represent there has been no attempt, Sir, at anything like military organisation unless the police force may be regarded as a kind of quasi-military force. We have such a force, efficient, as we consider, for local protective purposes, very well skilled in the use of arms. A portion of the force is a mounted force. There are also four rifle brigades, numbering some 560 odd, young men, averaging about 16 years of age. Those rifle corps may possibly form a nucleus for the establishment of a militia force at some later period, but I should like to be entirely frank, Sir. I think that any assistance that the Colony of Newfoundland may be able to render in the form of defence service must be in the direction of a naval reserve. The avocations of our people are such that they are scattered over a large extent of coast line, something like 4,000 miles, and you will appreciate, Sir, the great difficulty there would be in bringing a scattered population together for the purposes of drill and organisation.

That would not apply as regards the naval reserve, inasmuch as during the

period of the year when the fishermen are not engaged in their ordinary avocation they could be brought on for the period of two or three months to a drill ship, and there undergo the necessary training. A few days ago I had the privilege of placing in the hands of Sir John Anderson a memorandum in relation to the subject of defence. I understand that that paper was forwarded to Lord Selborne, and since then I have had an opportunity of discussing the matter with him. I have also placed myself in communication with my colleagues in the Government, and I am in hopes, Sir, of being able to lay before Lord Selborne in a day or two their views as to what may be done by the Colony in connection with further help in the way of naval reserve. The fact that our naval reserve may be called upon for the purpose of Imperial defence, the knowledge that they may have to leave the Colony, and go to other parts of the Empire, in the defence of the Empire has, I think, Sir, been more in the way of an inducement to our people to enter that force than if they were merely formed for local protective purposes. I say this in response to an observation which was made by Mr. Seddon a few moments ago, in regard to our naval reserve, namely, that the knowledge that their services might be called upon in remote parts of the Empire did not deter Newfoundland from entering His Majesty's service. The sentiment in the Colony of Newfoundland is entirely patriotic and British, and I think it has been, I would repeat, an inducement to these young men to join the naval reserve force, the knowledge or fact that they may be called upon at any time to aid in the defence of the Empire.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Gentlemen, we have had a very interesting discussion, but I am afraid that I cannot congratulate myself upon the probability of our arriving at any unanimous and definite conclusion. The proposal which has been made to you by the Secretary of State for War is, I think I may say, substantially the same as that which was suggested in the resolution which has been brought to your notice by the Prime Minister of New Zealand. It is, of course, that the whole of the Colonies together should agree to keep a permanent reserve force of limited numbers always ready for service outside the limits of the respective Colonies. It is suggested that the expenditure which such a force would require would not exceed £180,000, and I think the Secretary of State for War thought it was not beyond the means of the Colonies to provide that sum, especially as savings might be made in other directions by reducing the number of the ordinary militia. At all events, £180,000 a year would practically be about 4d. a head—not more—upon the whole population of the Colonies represented. It is not, therefore, a matter of great importance. That is the proposal. I should say, that clearly it is not put before the Colonies with any idea whatever of forcing their hands, or of putting any pressure upon them in any emergency, which may hereafter arise, to give us assistance which otherwise they would not be ready to afford. That idea has never entered into the head of the Imperial Government. We are perfectly satisfied with the results of voluntary, purely voluntary, and spontaneous offers. We trust entirely to them in the future. We have no idea in the future of any more formal or definite arrangement, and of course it is understood in any such proposal as we have been considering that it would not be operative in any case unless the Government and the Parliament of the Colonies concerned approved of the proposed use to be made of this particular force. Well, we have to consider two points. Is such a proposal in itself desirable? Is it practicable? Is it desirable? In the course of the discussions—previous discussions—and also the discussions to-day, the phrase has been used by ourselves, as well as by the representatives of the Colonies, “the arrangements and provisions by which the Colonies “could come to the assistance of the Mother Country.” But really, I think, that phrase is an inaccurate one. It is not so much a question of the interests of the Mother Country which is at stake; it is really a question, primarily, of the interests of the different Colonies concerned, and, secondly, of the interests of the Empire as a whole. But it is not the interests of the Mother Country in the same sense. We are not likely, I think, to ask for assistance to prevent Great Britain from being invaded, nor do I anticipate, nor do I think it within the reach of probability, that we should ever be engaged in an European war solely on account of the interests which may be considered to be directly English or directly those of the United Kingdom. If, unfortunately, we should happen to be engaged in such a struggle, it is almost certain to be in connection with some question in which the Colonies, or one of the Colonies, is primarily interested. I think the greatest importance ought to be attached to the remarks of Mr. Seddon in regard to these matters which come more particularly under his purview in connection

with Australasia; but similar remarks may be made with regard to every other Colony. If you look to the diplomacy of Great Britain at the present time, in what does it consist? The smallest proportion of it is concerned with matters which are exclusively matters concerning the United Kingdom. It is almost entirely in regard to matters in which the Colonies are concerned. We have a diplomatic controversy and contention with the United States of America continually in regard to the interests of Canada. At the present moment in regard to some most serious questions of boundary involving deeply the interests and security of Canada. We have in the same way a controversy with France with regard to the New Hebrides and with regard to other matters in which Australia is interested and concerned. We have controversies with Germany in regard to many questions which arise in different parts of the world, and always something which concerns the self-governing Colonies or concerns our Crown Colonies and Dependencies. And, therefore, it is not for ourselves; it is not a selfish proposal that we are making, it is a proposal conceived, at any rate, as we believe, in the interests of the Colonies. We believe it to be an essential in the altered condition of things due to the extraordinary development of all military armaments, and to the improvements which have been made in quick communications; we believe it is essential in the interests of the Colonies that they themselves should be able to lay their hands upon a force which could at any moment be placed in line and pitted against the most highly-trained European forces. We think at present that the force does not exist in any single one of the Colonies. Sir Frederick Borden has told us and we readily recognised the quickness and the admirable way in which a force was sent from Canada at the outbreak of the Boer War to our assistance in South Africa. Yes, but what does it amount to? A thousand men, 1,000 out of a population of five millions. What we say is that, if, instead of sending 1,000, you had had on three weeks' notice to send 10,000 or 20,000 men; in that case the arrangements of the force would have been very different from the actual arrangements of the much smaller force which you were able to send at so short a notice. And it is in order that there might be a considerably enlarged force as well prepared as the small forces which were sent at the outbreak of the war to take part in any war that may hereafter arise, and because we think it is necessary that such a force should exist, that we pressed this suggestion upon you. I say then that in our view, in the interests of the Colonies, very much more than in the interests of the United Kingdom, it is desirable that there should exist such a reserve force in each of the Colonies. What use should be made of it we leave entirely to the spontaneous wish and desire of the Colony itself at any time in which an emergency might arise.

But, is it practicable? Well, we are told by the representatives of the Great Dominion of Canada and by the representative of the Commonwealth of Australia, that in the present condition of public opinion in those Colonies it would not be practicable to give us the assurance that any such scheme could be carried out. Gentlemen, I regret very much that such should be the case. Of course I am not competent to question it in any way. You alone are entitled to speak for your several Colonies, and it would be useless for me to pretend to dispute the statements which you have made. That being the fact, I am bound to say that in my opinion, public opinion in these Colonies must be very backward. I think it will have to progress, and that it will in the natural course of things progress, especially as the dangers which lie all round you are better appreciated. I know very well, of course, that at the present time these great Colonies have been free from anything in the nature of an attack upon themselves—it is all very well to rest upon that, but you may easily be too optimistic, and I think that anyone who takes even a superficial view of the present state of the world must feel that it is desirable that all in proportion to their means should be fully prepared for any emergency. But if you say that is not the case at present, it would be useless I think to proceed with Mr. Seddon's resolution or put it before the Conference, which evidently is unable at present to accept it. I can only hope that in the course of time the example which may be set by others will lead the Dominion and the Commonwealth to re-consider the decision at which they appear to have arrived at at the present time. That does not apply of course to New Zealand, where Mr. Seddon represents a very different, and, if I may be allowed without presumption to say so, I think a much wiser opinion. I think the suggestion which Mr. Seddon has made on behalf of his Colony is worthy of most careful consideration, and I would suggest that, as we cannot come to a common conclusion on the matter, Mr. Seddon should have a private conference with the Secretary of State

for War, and I have no doubt that between them they might hit upon a plan, which at all events will apply to New Zealand even if it does not apply to any other Colony, and I am sure that in dealing with the principal matter my right honourable friend, the Secretary of State for War, will also take into consideration the suggestion which Mr. Seddon has made for sending to New Zealand a representative force of the British army to drill with any such force as might be established there.

As regards the two Colonies in South Africa, of course we must admit that their position is somewhat exceptional, but I do not gather from what has been said either by Mr. Fuller or Sir Albert Hime that it might not be possible there to do everything we desire or that we think necessary. Mr. Fuller, I think, quoting Sir Gordon Sprigg, was laying stress only on the fact that Sir Gordon Sprigg said that he did not see how they could, in addition to the contributions they were making to the Navy, make an additional pecuniary contribution with regard to military defence. Well, that is a question for discussion. We should have to see whether a proposal of the kind we are making would involve any extra expense or any serious expense, and, if it did, it might be a matter for consideration how far the Imperial Government could join, co-operate with the Cape Government in providing for it, but in the meantime I do not gather that Sir Gordon Sprigg has committed himself against such a proposal as is now before us, namely, that a portion, at all events, of the Cape defensive force should be organised and drilled in such a way as to constitute a force which might, if all other circumstances permitted be available for exterior purposes and for offence or defence outside the limits of the Colony. And I think I may say that the same idea is not excluded by Sir Albert Hime. It might be possible to make such arrangements as would secure that a portion of the forces were drilled, organised, and maintained in a position to enable them to take their place in a European line of battle if it were desirable or necessary, whereas as regards the greater portion of the forces we know perfectly well that such an amount of drill and discipline is unnecessary in order to enable them to meet the ordinary exigencies of native warfare. Therefore, if I am right in that, I should also suggest that both Sir Albert Hime and Mr. Fuller, whose conditions are very much alike, would also have a private interview with the Secretary of State for War, and see how far they might make progress in the direction I have suggested. Unless Mr. Seddon would see any objection to that proposal I think we might consider then that the discussion on this branch of the question is closed so far as the Conference is concerned, although, no doubt, the Secretary of State will be good enough to report any results at which he may arrive with the Premiers of the Colonies concerned.

Mr. FIELDING: Permit me to say, Mr. Chamberlain, on the part of Canada, that the objections that are raised are not based upon financial reasons. It is not a question of our share of the sum of money which the Secretary of State for War mentions. That is not a very large sum, and I do not think there is in our Colony such a demand for retrenchment in this direction as is said to exist in Australia and New Zealand. Our difficulties are of a different kind, which it would not be necessary to enter into now, but I would not have it understood that the objections Canada takes are based upon the cost of the proposal at all. We are ready to spend that much money, and more, on our own organisation at home, which, we think, is a part of the best Imperial system, but I merely wish to guard against a suggestion that our objections are based upon the cost; that is not so.

Mr. SEDDON: So far as the Commonwealth is concerned it is altogether on a question of expense. I did not quote it, but New Zealand at the present time is spending on her defence about £200,000 a year. That is with a population of 750,000—750,000 to 800,000 all told—whilst according to Militia Defence you are spending £500,000 with a population of five millions, so that I think on the score of expense New Zealand compares much more favourably in that respect than Canada does. I would also like to say that our Volunteers at the present time—we might put it on record here from the last Report, dated March 22nd, 1902—number 19,612 men and officers out of a population of three-quarters of a million. At the present time that does not include the riflemen, who amount to about another 7,000, so that in respect to expenditure—in respect to the number of men—I think I may claim fairly that New Zealand has done its very fair share. I would wish, with the consent of the Conference, Mr. Chamberlain, to put in the Report of the Joint Defence Committee, which gives information which would be of value, I am sure, to other members of the Conference, and reasons for the stand taken by the New Zealand Parliament with respect to this matter. It might be of use, Mr. Chairman,

and I would like to hand this to the Secretary—the Joint Defence Committee's Report.

(Document handed to Secretary.)

I shall accept the suggestion of the Chairman and confer with the Secretary of State for War; but I would like it to be clear. As I understand, there is a difference between what has been stated by the Chairman just now and what was stated by the Secretary of State for War. I understood the Secretary of State for War to say that the cost would be £180,000 per annum, equal to about £9 per head of the force that would be deemed necessary, and I also understood from him that in respect to that matter—that £180,000—the question of expense would not stand in the way, but that the Imperial Government would be prepared to defray a portion of it. The Secretary of State in his speech just now inferred that the whole of it should be found by the Colonies. I did not understand so from the Secretary of State for War.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I think that is a matter for discussion, Mr. Seddon.

Mr. SEDDON: I want to get it correct, because we have your view, Mr. Chamberlain, on the one hand that we are to find the whole of it, and from the Secretary of State for War, I understood something different. I wanted to get things cleared up as we went along.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: May I say one word, just to clear that up? In regard to the general discussion, I have really nothing to add, practically, to what fell from the Secretary of State for the Colonies; but it is, perhaps, desirable that I should just say as much as this, that while I fully recognise the value of the discussion we have had to-day, I am a little disappointed at the reception these proposals were met with, both from Canada and from the Commonwealth Government. As regards the Canadian proposal I ought to say at once that while we should welcome anything which would bring up the Canadian forces to a more effective level, unless there is some radical change in the period of training, and in some other matters, it would be impossible for us to hope that those forces, in all 38,000 or 40,000 men who are at present enrolled, could be brought up to such a standard of efficiency as we desire. With regard to Australia and the suggestion of Sir Edmund Barton, there is not really, I think, very much gained by the proposal which he made. That is practically the goal to which we are already moving with regard to equipment, and it is not merely a question of organisation, but it is a question of training, and on that I put, like Mr. Seddon, very great weight. What I would urge is this. I am a little disappointed at this time that we cannot take action at present. At this moment we have a large number of men in the various Colonies who are fit to become reservists of an Imperial force, men who have already served in South Africa; therefore, the expense of training to the Colonies will for some years to come be much less than it would be by enlisting fresh men. I had hoped that we might have arrived at something which would have enabled us to get hold of these men, and Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion that I should meet Mr. Seddon, and discuss the matter as far as it concerns New Zealand, I gladly accept. What I threw out with regard to their payment as reservists was this: if the Colonial Government holds in its own hands the power to decide whether they should be employed or not, then I should think the taxpayers of this country would probably feel that it was for the Colonial Government to pay until the moment that they come into the Imperial Service. If on the other hand any Colonial Government saw its way to allow them to become reservists at the call of the Imperial Government, then I think it would be a fair subject for discussion whether the Imperial Government should not meet some portion of the charge, but I think, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies said, that is a question we had better discuss quietly, and make our report.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then as regards the future, I understand that the Prime Ministers, some of them, are going to Scotland, and therefore will not be back, at any rate, until Tuesday. I think it would be necessary to have another meeting for military and naval defence, at which the Secretary of State for War, and the First Lord of the Admiralty will report the result of their private interviews, and we can get a record of what has been done in regard to both those matters. And we could also at the same time take up these subsidiary questions: Army and Navy Supply and Contracts, to be raised by the Government of the Commonwealth, and the Commissions in the Army and the Navy, to be raised by the Government of New Zealand. That would make one meeting at a later date, when

these private Conferences have been completed. Then we have to consider the motion of the Government of New Zealand with regard to periodical Conferences. I do not think that this will take very long, and there are several other miscellaneous matters, as for instance, the mutual protection of patents, uniform laws with regard to the merchant shipping, imperial stamp charges on Colonial bonds, ocean cables, which might be taken at the same time, and I would suggest that those should be the subject of our discussion on Wednesday next, if that is convenient. Then there is a matter which concerns only the Commonwealth and New Zealand, namely, the relations with the Islands of the Pacific. I should like to make an arrangement with Sir Edmund Barton and Mr. Seddon at some time convenient to them, when we could discuss the matter. We will deal with it by ourselves of course. On Wednesday we take up the question of periodical Conferences, and the minor matters which are down on the paper.

Mr. SEDDON: Will the Secretary of State for War for a moment just think over this phase of the question, that I suggested about the payment, when if entirely at the call of the Imperial Government for service anywhere, that in that case the Imperial Government will be prepared to pay some of the cost. If that control is left entirely to the Colonial Government then the Colonial Government should do it. What I suggest, and you may take that from me, is that we should agree beforehand as to a given limit within which the men in the reserve would be called upon to serve.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: That is a point I think you and I had better talk out together.

Mr. SEDDON: Fix the given limit beforehand, and after that we fix that limit, then the other question could be considered.

D.

WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY.

30th July, 1902.

Admiral CUSTANCE: Will you allow me to state that I represent the Admiralty here?

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Very good then, you will please open the matter. This is the Admiralty's suggestion.

Admiral CUSTANCE: Perhaps I may explain the position that exists in this country now. There are three things that the Admiralty wish. The first is that a ship should be able to communicate with any station all over the world, that some system should be in force everywhere, which would be of general application. The other two questions are as regards interference during both peace and war. By that I mean that if a ship desires to communicate with a station, a third ship or station can prevent communication, which of course is undesirable. The third point is the control of communication during war. The Government of this country do not see their way to legislate to provide for these two questions—interference and control. Arrangements have therefore been made with Lloyds and Marconi under which Lloyds have a right to use the Marconi arrangements for certain stations, and the Admiralty work some of those stations, and Lloyds work the others in peace. In war the Admiralty would have the right to go into Lloyds' stations and control them. So far, you see, it is provided for. But the Marconi Company still have the right to put up any number of other stations, over which the Government would have no control, excepting the general control which the Crown has in case of an emergency—an undefined control. Sooner or later it is probable that some legislation will have to be passed to provide for this state of things, but in the meantime the question is hardly ripe for doing anything. That is the position, Mr. Chamberlain, as it is at present. The question is not ripe really. It is only partially provided for, and it may come up in the future. The demand for legislation may come up in the future; what shape it may take it is impossible for us to say.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: At present the sole object of the Admiralty is to warn the Conference that propositions will be made in the future for legislation which we in this country hope they may adopt in the Colonies also, is it not?

Admiral CUSTANCE: That is so.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Nothing, practically, arises to-day?

Admiral CUSTANCE: No, nothing.

Sir ALBERT HIME: It has been raised already, I think; the question of the Marconi system being under the control of the various Colonies. I think we have been asked by telegraph whether we would approve of that.

Mr. SEDDON: But is not this the position? And we would like, I think, to be entitled to some lead from the Admiralty; but we were notified through the Colonial Office not to enter into any arrangements.

Sir ALBERT HIME: Not to enter into any arrangements without consulting them.

Mr. SEDDON: And until something is done we are practically hung up, and this may, of course, prove detrimental. How long will it take before you are in a position to give the Colonial Prime Ministers a lead on the subject? We are entitled to know; we cannot indefinitely, and we are not prepared indefinitely, as far as New Zealand is concerned, to hang the matter up.

Admiral CUSTANCE: I understand that the Colonies were asked, if they made any agreement, that there should be a proviso enabling them to take control in the event of war.

Sir ROBERT BOND: That was the exact position. I remember a communication from the Colonial Office to the Government of Newfoundland, as we had entered into an arrangement with the Marconi Company for the erection of three stations at Labrador. The arrangement that we made with the Marconi Company was to the effect that they were to erect the stations for us, we paying them a certain sum and granting them a royalty, which should extend over a period of ten years, after which the whole property became that of the Government of the Colony. Virtually they have no control whatever. It is the property of the Government as soon as erected, the only interest of the Company being that we pay them a royalty, which extends over the ten years, for the use of the instruments.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I was under the impression, I confess, that the Admiralty had a definite proposal to make, but, under the circumstances, all that we have to ask of the Colonial Governments is that they shall not make any definite arrangements without first communicating with us. If we are then unable to give them the lead, which Mr. Seddon very naturally asks for, they will have, of course, to act on their own discretion, but it is clear it is an entirely new arrangement, at present only insufficiently understood, and with changes, new inventions, continually being made, so that it may be a little difficult definitely to settle what necessary precautions we shall have to take, but, in the meantime, I think we cannot go further than to ask that we should have the opportunity of communicating again with the Colonies before any definite arrangement is come to.

Mr. SEDDON: What caused the urgency is this: We have practically decided that there should be communication between Honolulu and Fanning Islands. It may be that the distance might be bridged by wireless telegraphy being established at that distance between Fanning Island and Honolulu. To lay a cable would cost £200,000, and that might be saved or avoided. And there seems to be a decision arrived at in connection with the experiments taking place in Canada, and the Pacific Cable Board will have to deal with this matter very shortly, and that will begin as the result of the experiments taking place in Canada now with Marconi's wireless telegraph. I only wish, of course, that some decision should be come to early so that we know where we are, because, of course, if it is satisfactory to go to Fanning Islands from Honolulu it would be satisfactory for us to establish it between Australia and New Zealand, and if so, there is an advantage in expedition and in getting to know the mind of the Admiralty on the matter. I assume that the Imperial Government will take it for granted that we shall work in unison with them as far as we can with respect to the matter.

Mr. FIELDING: There has been already an arrangement entered into by Canada with the Marconi Company. I do not know whether it has come to the notice of the Admiralty, or is in any way objectionable. The Marconi Company have no charter in Canada, and they have no special rights whatever. It is an ordinary business arrangement, whereby we agreed to encourage them in the erection of their station. We give them about £16,000 on condition that if the experiment proves successful we shall have a large reduction in rates for commercial purposes. That is to be our compensation. Meanwhile they have been allowed to build the station, but they have no corporate existence in Canada, and the arrangement is purely of a business character. They have no legal rights, and there will be nothing to prevent us doing what the Admiralty require us to do. They have built this station, which

belongs to themselves, on our own territory, and it will have to be subject to such legislation as the Imperial Parliament or the Canadian Parliament deem necessary for Imperial or Canadian purposes. So I do not think there will be any difficulty in meeting all the wishes of the Admiralty in this matter.

Admiral CUSTANCE: All that the Admiralty asked for in the case of Canada was that the Government should retain the power to obtain control in the event of war.

Mr. FIELDING: That is not touched in the agreement. It is not forbidden. It is a natural right, which we certainly should have anyhow.

Admiral CUSTANCE: There is no intention to fetter the Canadian Government in any way, or to interfere except in the case of war. They should put in a clause that would enable you to take control of the station.

Mr. FIELDING: It was not until afterwards that we made the agreement. I do not think we received any intimation from the Colonial Office.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I do not remember.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: As regards the Pacific cable, the cable has not yet reached the Fanning Islands, so there is no immediate hurry, and as His Majesty's Government are represented on the Board, I do not see any difficulty in inserting such a clause as might be requested. I do not think there will be any unnecessary delay; but it is really a matter of common interest, and we shall all be anxious to determine what legislation there should be, and any precautions which may be necessary to take against danger.

Mr. FIELDING: We have no legislation whatever on the subject, except an appropriation of money to pay the Marconi Company. Our hands are not tied in the least by any legislation.

E.

ARMY AND NAVY SUPPLY CONTRACTS.

5th August, 1902.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then the Secretary of State for War is with us, but he has to leave in order to keep an appointment with the War Office Council, and therefore I propose to take the question of the Army and Navy contracts, which is brought forward at the instance of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Mr. Chamberlain, I have a resolution to propose in reference to the question of Army and Navy Supply Contracts. I have no doubt that this question has been the subject of correspondence for some time between other self-governing Colonies and the War Office through the Colonial Department, and there has been a long correspondence with the Commonwealth commencing with the statement by cable:—

"A feeling prevails in the Commonwealth that Australian producers and merchants have not received adequate consideration in connection with letting of contracts for supplies for the use of the Army in South Africa. It is suggested that more consideration be given to offers of Australian produce when made direct by Australian houses, as against offers made by firms in South Africa and elsewhere of goods which may be Australian, but which it is open to them to furnish from South America or other countries. Attention is directed to the enormous profits reported to have been made by South Africa Cold Storage Company during past year. Consider substantial saving would be effected if War Office authorities were in direct relation with Australian firms."

That was followed by considerable further correspondence, which it may be necessary to refer to presently, but which it would be only encumbering the matter to quote now. The point of the matter seems to have been this, and it was desired that in future contracts fuller and more explicit information should be given beforehand, in order to enable Colonial producers to have an opportunity of tendering on the best terms possible for them to offer. On the occasion which has become the subject of question, the trouble that most affected Colonial producers was this: papers came out, enabling them to tender in the alternative, whether for delivery in harbours, or in store ships, or for delivery on the spot, practically on the field of

action. As these tenders were in the alternative, the Australian tenderers chose the former of these alternatives, not knowing, as was the fact, that there was a preference for the latter alternative. There has been no suggestion that anything indirect was done in the matter. The effect, however, was this, that from want of some fuller information, which might possibly have been published at the time at home, those who tendered did not know that in tendering for one form of supplies they were offering that which was foredoomed to be fruitless, and they felt, of course, correspondingly disappointed. That was the subject of correspondence, and a reason was given—I forget what the reason was—but it was shown clearly, I think, that there was nothing done which could by any possibility be intended to militate against the interest of the Colonial producers, but nevertheless, in that case the damage had been done. This was the case of the well-known contract which was entered into by Messrs. Bergl & Co. on behalf of a combination, including some Australian producers. But this was a contract, or a tender, rather, for delivery wherever the troops might need the meat, no doubt the best form in which the Office could have had it. But on our pointing out that in a contract of this kind there was no security that any preference would be given to Colonial producers, a note was very promptly obtained from Mr. Bergl, undertaking that so far as was practicable the supplies would be obtained from Colonial sources. Unfortunately, it appears, that did not come to pass, because, if our information is correct, the first cargo, and perhaps others afterwards, was from the Argentine Republic, which is outside the Empire. Now, the object of the resolution is to ascertain whether we can lay it down that the products of the Empire shall, so far as practicable, be preferred to the products of foreign countries: that that should be laid down as a principle, and that all tenderers for such contracts should be informed in each of the Colonies in explicit terms of the full needs according to circumstances. And that there should be this further advantage, that because of the means of distribution and the knowledge which the Governments have in Australia, and to which they pay considerable attention, notice of all tenders called for such contracts shall be communicated not only to the Press but also to the several Colonial Governments through official channels. The resolution is very widely drawn so as to comprehend all the Colonial interests concerned, and not in any way to attempt to prefer any one Colony over another, but its object is to lay down the principle and to see that so far as possible notice shall be sufficiently and explicitly communicated through the Government as well as through the Press. I do not expect, of course, that a proposal of this kind will escape without comment and criticism, but at the same time I think it does lay down a reasonable principle and a reasonable means for carrying the principle into effect. I move the resolution:—

"That the Premiers of the self-governing Colonies suggest that in all Army and Navy Supply Contracts, products of the Empire be preferred to the products of foreign countries as far as practicable, and that tenders for all such contracts should be invited in the Colonies in explicit terms, and after full notice according to circumstances. They further suggest that notice of all tenders called for such contracts should be communicated not only to the public through the Press but also to the several Colonial Governments through official channels."

Mr. SEDDON: I notice that the correspondence from the New Zealand Government on this question has not been included in the paper. That correspondence would have thrown some further light upon the question, but generally on this question we go upon the same lines as Australia, and there is no doubt there was only allowed six days for contractors or tenderers to get their tenders in from New Zealand, and the condition laid down in the specification was that the tenders must be in accordance with the specification and be lodged in the War Office, London, at a given date, and as the time when they got the specification to the time that tenders were to be lodged in London was only six days, to tender in accordance with specification was a moral impossibility. What I think should obtain should be that ample and proper time should have been given, so that the Colonial tenderers might have had the opportunity of putting in their offers on the same terms as those who are at home. It does not follow, as is contemplated by the War Office, that the tenderers have their offices in London or could tender in London; it will require to be done direct from the Colonies.

Then we come to the question really at issue, and that is this. It is quite possible that you might get tenders at less prices from other nations. It is possible

that you may get from the Argentine tenders lower than you can get from either Australia or New Zealand. There are two things, at all events, as against tenders being accepted upon that ground solely. One of them, and material, is that if you do give a little more to your Colonies you get an advantage in return indirectly and directly, because you are helping to develop the country which is your own, and you are strengthening the people that will help you in any emergency that may arise. And then in addition to that there can be no doubt that you get better quality. I think that all round we have had that demonstrated here in London in respect to the beef from the Argentine, and the Australian and New Zealand beef, the Australian mutton and New Zealand mutton, and also mutton from the Argentine. That being the case, I contend that it would be an advantage for His Majesty's Government to give this matter greater consideration in the future than it has had.

And I may ask the question, do other nations do it? Does Germany go outside herself for her supplies? Does France go outside herself? Well, I am informed that they do not. If that is the case, I think it is a very good lesson for us to take to heart, and I am satisfied myself that where it was possible to obtain the supplies I question very much whether these other nations would go outside themselves.

The third point is whether or not we can furnish a sufficient supply. I am pretty well satisfied myself that we could. If at the present time, so far as Australia is concerned, they might have to cut it short for a little time, I am satisfied myself that if the Colonies knew that there were orders of this sort they would be able to meet the wants and requirements of the Army and Navy with respect to meat and produce. I only thought it would save us if we had for our surplus this market, it would prevent what has been an almost ruinous competition with those foreign nations who are in the same market as ourselves here in the Mother Country and in other markets.

I come now to this question of remounts which appears on the paper. It may be that, as regards the price of horses, we have not supplied as cheaply as they were supplied by other countries, but I think it will be shown, if you take the work that has been done by the horses supplied by the Australasian Colonies, they were cheaper in the long run. Our New Zealand horses especially, I believe, have in respect of work done proved very valuable and worth more than those obtained from foreign countries and from the Mother Country. Then I put it again that in regard to this matter we were able at this time to get horses for South Africa, as we have no conflict with other countries. Complications may arise in which we may not be able to get horses or supplies of cattle or meats, and therefore, under the circumstances, it is advisable to be independent in case any such contingency might arise. The Colonies, in my opinion, should breed for remount purposes. We in New Zealand are going into it whether we get any market at home or not, and I have no doubt that Australia, which is a country eminently fitted for breeding remounts, would do the same. It is a question of laying down the principle first whether or not, if we prepare for meeting the demand, we may anticipate fair consideration at the hands of the Imperial Government. Under these circumstances I shall support the resolution proposed by the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Before anyone else speaks upon the subject, may I ask a question? The resolution as it stands appears to apply entirely to the contracts made by the Imperial Government. Is it intended to be reciprocal? Is it, for instance, proposed that a Government contract in Canada, in New Zealand or Australia, is to be subjected to the same conditions and to be upon the same terms?

Sir EDMUND BARTON: In the first place, Mr. Chamberlain, I should say with regard to your question, that there would be a very strong tendency to deal with the United Kingdom in preference to other countries, apart from those who are able to supply us in our own country. But I am not clear that your question covers the whole ground, for this reason, that the Colonies place duties on a larger number of articles than Britain. To give preferences on goods the subject of these tariffs is a total impossibility in the case of Great Britain, who does not tax them, and therefore she would have to seek some other means in which to give reciprocal treatment to the Colonies for their Customs concessions. In that case, however, there are ways outside the tariff in which Great Britain could extend us reciprocal treatment. This is one of them. Stamp charges on Colonial Bonds might be another, but I submit that the whole ground of reciprocity is not covered by the tariff. Otherwise, if we were dealing with this matter at all in the sense of a business bargain, then as tariff matters now stand the reciprocal treatment that Great Britain could give would only be infinitesimal compared with the relative sacrifice of revenue that the

Colonies would have to make in order to carry out their own tariff concessions. So I submit the whole ground is not covered by the consideration you have raised, because the area of reciprocity is wider than that of tariffs or of Army and Navy Supply contracts, if either class is taken separately. You could not give us substantial preference on the one and we could not reciprocate on the other.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: The way, Mr. Chamberlain, is this. This resolution is confined only to war supplies and the Colonies would have very little opportunity of offering contracts of that nature, and therefore I do not think the question put by Mr. Chamberlain would be likely to arise, but on general principles I would be disposed to say this: there would be no objection at all, and that if the Government is to try and get supplies where it can from its own people, it would be natural that it should give them the preference, but if the Government has to go out of its own territory to get those supplies which it cannot get within its own territory, then, what I submit is, that if the Colonies can be considered in preference to a country abroad, if you can get as good an article from your Colonies as you can get in foreign countries, you would give the preference, I am sure, to the Colonies, rather than go abroad. Also, in all the Colonies represented here, if they could not get their supplies within their own territories, they would give the preference certainly to the United Kingdom rather than to a foreign country. To summarise the whole thing, I think the tendency is, or ought to be at all events, that, so far as possible, internal trade ought to be encouraged, and that would be one efficient form of doing it.

Mr. SEDDON: I may say, speaking for New Zealand, we held the same view, and I may say, with regard to the wide range of supplies for the New Zealand Government, we have endeavoured on each and every occasion to obtain contracts from the Mother Country. We are quite prepared to continue that course, not to get outside that which can be supplied within ourselves. With respect to reciprocity in regard to supplies for our Army and Navy in New Zealand, certainly we should obtain the supplies from the Mother Country.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: We get our supplies of arms, ammunition and equipment from the Mother Country, except so far as we obtain them from local people.

Mr. SEDDON: I do not think we have gone outside. We have not done as the Mother Country has done, we have not bought what was required for our forces outside the Colony, or at least outside the Empire. Speaking broadly on the question asked by the Secretary of State, may I say that this resolution deals simply with the meat contract, and I introduced the question of remounts. I say, at all events, so far as we can we shall reciprocate.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I think the principle applies equally to Government contracts which are not intended for the Army and Navy service. If it be desirable to keep trade within the Empire, as I think it is, it applies equally of course to any country and to any Government contract.

Mr. FULLER: Perhaps, Mr. Chamberlain, I may be allowed to state the practice of the Cape Colony. We are very large buyers, perhaps our purchases in the way of railway plant and other things amount to between £3,000,000 and £4,000,000 in the year, and our invariable practice is to give preference to British tenderers, even to the extent of 10 or 15 per cent. If there was a Continental tender equal to the English tender, other things being equal, the English tender would be accepted. If the English tender were 10 or 12 per cent. more, other things being equal, the British tender would be accepted; but in certain cases where it made a difference in some descriptions of railway plant of 30 or 40 per cent. occasionally the orders have been placed on the Continent, but I may say that as a matter of fact at least nine-tenths of all our contracts and orders are placed with English firms; that is the practice in the Cape.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: One word of explanation I would like to add. Of course, it is impossible for the Government of the Commonwealth in anything which may be added to this resolution to bind the Governments of the six separate States, each of which keeps in its own hands the contracts for railway construction and maintenance, and to a very large extent other public works also remain in the hands of the individual States, therefore it is impossible for me, in respect of those States in regard to any public works, to take any step that would bind them. I think that is quite clear. On the other hand the benefits of a resolution like this will apply equally to all the States, and it might be that the Governments of those States would take the view which, I think, in principle might be taken of endeavouring as far as possible to give to the United Kingdom or to other parts of the Empire orders which cannot be executed within the particular State or within the Commonwealth. I

should like to add as to remounts that the way this question has presented itself in our part of the world is that it would be perhaps a wise thing if the requirements, the ordinary requirements, of the Imperial Government with respect to remounts were made known, and the proportion of them which it would undertake to take from the several Colonies, so that there might be something in front of horse-breeders; also if it were to be made known to them what precisely was the type of horse required. Of course, it cannot be expected that without information of that kind, the type of horse would be found otherwise than by accident. If the type of horse were made known and also the number which the War Office would be ready to take every year, there is no doubt not only that the type of horse which I suppose is fairly described in the Indian papers which have been published could be and would be largely bred, but they would be bred in greater numbers than the War Office could require, so that there would be a reserve in case of further necessities if war broke out.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Mr. Chamberlain, I am not very sorry that this resolution has been brought forward, because so far as I am concerned—the department over which I preside—I am very much in sympathy with it, and shall be glad to do everything we can to give effect to the principle. But I am also glad that it has been pushed forward, because I think it will enable us to get rid of a certain amount of misapprehension as to what has occurred. In the first place, I think an immense amount of interest and criticism has been excited by the very large profits made on the meat contract in South Africa, but although I have not been able to go into details of the accounts, which of course the Company is not bound to render to us, I have a strong impression that we should be quite wrong in supposing that those profits have been made to a large extent on the meat imported. There is no question that at the time the contract was made it was almost an impossibility for Lord Kitchener to foresee to what extent cattle would be captured, and under all the circumstances, seeing that the contractors would have to supply the troops in the field, they consequently asked for and obtained a considerable margin between the price at which captured cattle were to be handed over to them and the price at which they were to be distributed slaughtered to the troops as they were required; and my impression is that they got very nearly the whole of their profits in that way. But what I point out is that the best tender we have had from Australasia for delivery, not in the field, but at a Cape port, was 6½d. per lb. ex-store ship, and under the contract to which I have been alluding, not the Bergl contract, but the old one, under which such a great profit was made, the contractors were only paid 7d. per lb., and for that they had to distribute the frozen meat throughout South Africa. Consequently it is obvious they remained content at a lower figure than that at which the Colonies, after due consideration, were willing to supply it, and, therefore, while it is very natural that everybody should have wished the Colonies of the Empire to have a fair share of the great bulk of profit while there was anything to be made, I fancy the main profit was made as between the store cattle which were taken in various battles and subsequently slaughtered and distributed to them.

Then, when we come to the Bergl contract, I think that there again there is some misapprehension as to what actually took place. I think there was a feeling, which took the form of one or two telegrams from Prime Ministers in the Colonies, that Colonial interests had been overlooked. Well, that really was not so. It was quite true that there was hardly sufficient time given, but circumstances occur during operations in the field which sometimes cause delay. We were asked specially to allow Lord Kitchener to send home one or two officers to confer with us before the terms of a contract was settled. Lord Kitchener was most anxious to keep down the expense and we did confer with those officers, and in the end no very considerable time was left for the contracts. That I think can mend itself in the future.

But Sir Edmund Barton says, that unfortunately it had not been pointed out to the Colonial producers that there were alternative terms offered for delivery at the port or for distribution, and that they did not know that the distributed alternative was the better one, the more palatable to the Government. Well, that is true. On the other hand I am afraid there again the figures would not have assisted Sir Edmund Barton in getting the contract, because the contract for delivery at the port was 6½d. frozen meat ex store ship, and the contract which was put forward by Mr. Bergl and accepted by the Government was 5½d. for delivery at any place in South Africa, and that contract is in force at the present moment, and the contractors under that are delivering the frozen meat at any point at which it is

required by the troops in South Africa, so that I think under any circumstances the contract was accepted lower. Would the Colonial producer tender for produce under those terms?

Then again, in accepting Mr. Bergl, Lord Stanley, who has specially considered this contract, specially had regard to the fact that he and his co-contractors were themselves connected with certain meat-producing firms in Australia, and we were certainly under the impression that in so doing we were largely safeguarding the certainty of a considerable Colonial share being taken in the contract, and there is no doubt on the other hand that we should have been unwise if we had limited the exportation to Colonial produce entirely. I have not a word to say against the words "as far as practicable," but as a fact, wherever the tide has been seen, especially in Parliament, where there is great sympathy for the view expressed here, to be setting in favour of Colonial produce, prices unquestionably show a tendency to harden. And, of course, dealing with the matter on a very large scale, as we had to do, we then had to be very careful. A difference of a halfpenny a pound makes a great deal of difference. I should like to see some discussion take place as to the scope of the resolution too. I think Sir Wilfrid Laurier rather narrowed it in the few remarks he made, because he said that at present it was confined to war contracts for supplies. Now that is not so. It is all Army and Navy supplies. It is intended for time of peace as well as time of war. That, I think, is the view of everybody present.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Yes.

Mr. SEDDON: Yes.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Therefore, we had to be the more careful. I do not think that with regard to future wars there need be very much of the difficulty we have experienced. Of course, we shall certainly largely avail ourselves of the experience gained, and we shall keep our eyes open and we shall keep ourselves informed of the sources of supply in the Colonies both with regard to produce and with regard to remounts. And in time of peace I do not see the slightest difficulty in carrying out the whole spirit of the draft resolution.

But I am afraid there is more difficulty in regard to remounts than is generally supposed. I fought a very heavy battle for the Colonies in the matter of remounts. I am speaking round this table, I may say that I received during this year from Lord Kitchener a strong request that the supply of remounts from Australia should be brought to an end. Several cargoes had arrived which he had considered unfit to put into the field.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Where did the inspection of them take place?

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: In Australia.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: By remount officers?

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: By remount officers. I telegraphed to the Governor-General to ask him whether he could not assist us to some better sources of supply before we drew any hard and fast line in any way closing up with Australia. Whether he communicated with Ministers or not I do not know, but at all events he communicated with the authorities there and he put us in the way of making some fresh contracts, but I do believe, not to make a long story of it, from the best information I can get, that we have pretty well pumped out Australia—I do not know that we have New Zealand—for the class of horse that we require, and it would not be surprising if we had done so, seeing of course that all the horses taken were horses which were used for other purposes.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: You wanted a class of horse that there had been no encouragement to breed up to that time.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Quite. Well then, when we come to our difficulty with regard to annual contracts of course what has been said with regard to giving further information and stating our ordinary requirements, that very obviously could be done, but as I stated in the House of Commons last night our normal requirements are really too small to enable us to make a market. We only require from 2,000 to 2,500 horses for the army a year—a normal year. That is practically nothing. We could get the whole lot in Ireland alone. To attempt to spread them over Canada, Australia, and South Africa, would really make so small a matter as to make it hardly worth the while of breeders to consider, and although Lord Stanley has been engaged on a consideration to what extent we could establish some sort of touch with Colonial producers in time of peace it is a most difficult subject simply for lack of proper employment to give them.

Mr. SEDDON: Could you not get your horses for India from Australasia?

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: We get horses for India there. Does New Zealand supply no horses for India?

Mr. SEDDON: Oh yes, but they go privately; private speculators buy them in New Zealand and then sell them to the authorities in India.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: We should confer with the India Office, and see whether it is possible by clubbing together our requirements whether we could make some more general arrangement.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Would you answer this question, whether the remount stations, the breeding stations in India, are any of them supported by Government, or are they run on private lines?

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Yes. That is a big question. I do not know really which you favour.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: I have got the idea, from that very valuable Blue Book containing all the pictures, that some of these stations are supported by Government.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Yes; but at present you have nothing supported in England. The Government of India simply buys in the market, does it not?

Lord STANLEY: Yes.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: As far as Australia is concerned.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: We will confer with the India Office.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: The question is this: there are British or Indian Government establishments in India for breeding remounts; are there any in Australia?

Lord STANLEY: Oh, no.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: That is what Mr. Brodrick means.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Then just one moment as to Canada. I fully hope that we may be able to keep in touch with the Canadian market in various respects; but I may say, in return, I hope we shall have great support from the Canadian Ministers. We have had very great difficulty about some of these Canadian contracts. I conferred with one or two gentlemen who came over here on behalf of the Government, and they admit in certain contracts they have themselves not been satisfied with the way in which they have been carried out. On the other hand, they demur rather to the inspection in South Africa and the rejection of some supplies.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Not horses?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Hay.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: We have had questions as to hay; we have had questions as to canned meat on which I think in the end it was admitted that there was more on our side than was admitted originally, and we had a question also of oats. There was some unfortunate clashing with regard to the purchasing of horses between our remount officers and those purchasing them for contingents. I believe there is no question but some of the horses rejected by our remount officers were purchased afterwards for contingents at higher prices.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I have heard the reverse said. My impression was the reverse.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I dispute that.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: I was only going to say that I think in these contracts in future the two parties must work together, because it is very undesirable that there should be this sort of friction; and there has been a certain amount of friction about those contracts which it is my great object to endeavour to avoid. But speaking generally with regard to giving a proper time we will see that there is time in which these contracts can be considered. With regard to the form of tender we will endeavour to make it such as is most convenient to Colonies to accede to, and without pledging myself that we will give any particular percentage of advantage to the Colonies, within a reasonable limit we shall of course prefer Colonial to any other products. More than that I can hardly be expected to say. With regard to the spirit of the resolution we are entirely in favour of it.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Will Mr. Arnold Forster, as representing the Admiralty, make a statement?

Mr. ARNOLD FORSTER: I can state exactly how we stand with regard to Admiralty contracts for Colonial products. Practically there are three classes of articles largely or to some extent used by the Navy—meat, coal, and a small quantity of nickel. The meat is divided into three classes—the fresh meat, the salt meat,

and the canned meat. The fresh meat used in the Mediterranean stations at Gibraltar and Malta is to a large extent chilled, and we have stipulated that all that chilled meat shall be Australian meat, and so it is. The salt beef is a diminishing supply in the Navy. It is being replaced by the chilled meat and by the canned meat. We have made attempts to obtain salt beef in casks from Canada, and we are trying now an experiment with Canadian packed pork; we have not yet received any satisfactory consignment of salt cask beef from Australia or New Zealand, and we are not yet aware that any has been successfully brought through the tropics. This is not a very important branch of our supply, because it is, as I say, giving way to the chilled meat and the canned meat. The principal item of supply from the Colonies is the canned meat, and we give very large orders for it. We have eight Australian firms upon the list, two Canadian, and five American firms. The amount which is purchased for this country is not the whole of the amount which is purchased for the Navy. The supplies of the Australian squadron, the China squadron, and the Indian squadron are very largely drawn from Australia for those parts of the world. The Australian canned meat now competes, and very successfully competes, with the American canned meat, and we have been practically buying exclusively Australian canned meat until the present year. In the present year, owing to the great drought in Australia, we were able to obtain only one-half of the supply of the required brands from Australia, but, of course, we shall be very glad to go back to the previous arrangement as soon as the Australian firms are able to furnish us with what we require. I should say that the Canadian firms who were asked to tender this year have not been able to do so, but they expect to be able to come into the competition at an early date.

The point has been raised that we might enlarge our list by going direct to canners in Australasia, but there are objections which are felt both by the War Office, I believe, and by ourselves to adopting that course. We are informed, and I think it is the fact, that all the principal firms have agents in this country, and we are not only ready but willing, we are anxious, to add to that list any approved canners who are brought under our notice. But there are very strong motives for confining ourselves to those who have agents in this country. In the first place we are dealing with people who can act directly, and not only can they act directly to obtain these orders, but they can confirm these orders directly by telegraph from their principals. But there is this further point, that supposing we receive a consignment direct from a manufacturer in Australia, and that consignment is not up to sample and does not meet our requirements, we have no means of disposing of it. If we buy through an agent and any of the goods that are sent over here do not meet our requirements the responsibility lies with him of disposing of them, and practically he does dispose of them without any difficulty. Therefore, we prefer, as the War Office prefers, to continue the plan of dealing only with those who have agents in this country, though we are very glad to add to the list of firms as soon as we can find qualified persons to put on to it.

The other matter is coal, and we have done all we can in the matter of coal. Our power is limited in advance in this matter by the strict conditions of efficiency, for so much of the coal which is obtainable does not approach the steaming qualities of the Welsh coal which we are supplying to the Navy. But we have made a large number of attempts to utilise any coal which can be obtained in the Colonies. There are seven different kinds of coal on the Atlantic on the eastern side of Canada which have been tried with varying, but on the whole, I am sorry to say, not with satisfactory, results, as high quality steam coal. We have tried four or five different kinds of coal, I think five different kinds of coal on the western side, and though the quality on the whole is more satisfactory than that on the eastern side, it has not been largely used, in the first place because it does not give the full efficiency of the Welsh coal, and in the second place because the Pacific Squadron is at the present time a small one. But it is used for short passages and no doubt in war time will be used for the ships of the squadron. The Australian coal is not of any value at present for the Navy, but New Zealand coal, as is well known, is of very high quality, at least certain portions of the yield are, and we have made special arrangements with the Westport Company in New Zealand for the supply of ships on the China station, and we draw the whole of the output of the mine from the Colony and convey it in a special ship to supply the needs of the China station. Natal has for some time past been giving us a supply of Natal coal, but now as a result of a correspondence which has taken place between the Colonial Office and

the Government of Natal, Natal has agreed to substitute a payment in lieu of the coal. There is an interesting problem now arising with regard to the quality of the Transvaal coal. The Vereeniging coal is believed to possess very satisfactory steaming qualities, and we hope at an early date to satisfy ourselves whether it is coal which we can use if it be brought down to the coast.

The last subject is a very small one, but it is of some importance, that is the question of nickel. At present we are bound by existing contracts to use the Caledonian nickel, which is becoming a very important element in the manufacture of armour, but we are quite aware of the value and importance of the Canadian nickel deposits, and I can say that at the Admiralty we are doing all we can to ascertain how we can best obtain the valuable supplies of the Canadian nickel, and I hope to send some expert person to inquire into the sources of supply and the conditions under which it can be obtained.

I think that really exhausts the matters which are of real importance. There is, at the Admiralty, as has been stated by Mr. Brodrick, as there always has been at the War Office, a desire to do all we can to make use of supplies from the Colonies. We are doing so on a very large scale, and we are doing it on conditions which we believe to be favourable and acceptable to the Colonial exporters.

Mr. SEDDON: When you say Australia, do you not mean Australasia, or only Australia?

Mr. ARNOLD FORSTER: When I said Australasian, what—

Mr. SEDDON: You said the number from Australia who supplied canned meats that were on the list.

Mr. ARNOLD FORSTER: Yes; I should have said Australasia, eight.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: While assuming that we are fairly agreed as to the principle, we could not accept the resolution exactly as it stands. I think it goes farther than the Prime Minister really meant it to go. For instance, it speaks of all contracts. That, therefore, will apply to contracts which are made within the country, and which are filled within the country. For instance, supposing we wanted butter for the Curragh Camp in Ireland. According to the literal interpretation of this resolution, we could not get butter from Ireland without having in the first instance sent to all the Colonies to know what the price of butter was in their respective countries. That, of course, is not intended.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Certainly not. I meant supplies drawn from outside the United Kingdom.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Therefore, in order to make some other points clear and also to widen the operation of the resolution, I would suggest some rather different words. I would say that in view of what Sir Edmund Barton has said, what is quite clear, that the Prime Minister in his case could not pledge the several States, that the form that the resolution should take is only that of an expression of opinion; it does not of course, bind anyone absolutely to carry out the opinion expressed. The words I suggest are:—

"That in all Government contracts, whether in the case of the Colonial or the Imperial Governments, it is desirable that, as far as practicable, the products of the Empire should be preferred to the products of foreign countries."

"With a view to promoting this result it is suggested that where such contracts cannot be filled in the country in which the supplies are required, the fullest practicable notice of the requirements and of the conditions of tender should be given both in the Colonies and the United Kingdom and that this notice should be communicated through official channels as well as through the Press."

Mr. SEDDON: There are one or two points I should like to have cleared up by Mr. Brodrick. Mr. Brodrick said that the price of the meat from Australia was 6½d. That was the frozen meat offered to be landed in South Africa, was it not? And 7½d., I understood, was the price that the meat under the contract was delivered at. Well, the New Zealand firms were in a difficulty about tendering, because delivery in South Africa was in the hands of a combine, and they could not very well deliver. Then, as regards the alternative form of tenders, the time for the formal contract themselves—what they said was—it was allowed to run thus far before the tenders were called for, and there certainly was an interval without any contract in hand at all for these. Then I wish to remove the idea from the mind

of the War Office that the Colonies objected to Bergl's tender. We did not, because we considered it was, failing that which we urged, the next best thing to do. There was an Australian and a New Zealand firm in it, and we knew that they would get some supplies from the Colonies. I do not wish it to be considered for a moment that we have found fault because it was Bergl's tender. Under all the circumstances in that connection we agreed that it was probably the next best thing that the Imperial Government could do to accept Bergl's tender. I would like to ask, in respect to the Australian and Chinese Stations—Mr. Arnold Forster has mentioned that the Mediterranean Station was supplied by meat from Australia. That is the chilled meat and the canned. I presume that applies to the Chinese—to the China Station?

Mr. ARNOLD FORSTER: I think we have made an experiment, but it is not done as a regular matter of course, because we have no difficulty in obtaining meat on the China station. But we have tried it. We have had one cargo over.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: If there are no other observations, I will put the Resolution.

Mr. ARNOLD FORSTER: May I ask, Mr. Chamberlain, in regard to the Admiralty, would that oblige us to publish the tenders simultaneously in Australia and here, because in that case our view is, as I was saying just now, it is much more convenient to deal with the agents here, and if we were to bring the tenders to their notice, would not that be sufficient?

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Yes. This Resolution suggests that whatever you may do with regard to the acceptance of tenders that you should give notice of your requirements, and of the condition of your tender in the Colonies.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Through whatever channels you can.

Mr. SEDDON: We have firms in New Zealand who can supply canned meats and who are not on your list. That there are only six on your list proves that at once. Taking Australia and New Zealand, there is only a very small proportion of those who are engaged in the canning of meat, and able to meet your supply who are on the list.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: We cannot place every one on the list.

Mr. SEDDON: No; I would not say that every one should be placed on the list, but it would help if the notice was given, as specified by the resolution, in the Colonies, and I take it that the War Office intended that, because they notified us they were calling for tenders for the first time.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Before you put the motion, I would like to ask one question. I was at Aldershot the other day and I was told there with reference to the large contracts for beef that it was a condition in those contracts that only British-grown beef was to be supplied. I thought that was rather extraordinary, and, of course, my information may not be correct, but it seemed to me to be important enough to bring to the notice of Mr. Brodrick, because it seemed to me to be an extraordinary thing if the prohibition is imposed.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: I will just remind you of the very remark that Mr. Chamberlain made just now, that it is almost impossible to ask for tenders for butter for the Curragh from all over the Empire, when butter can be got close by. The object in putting down British-grown meat is that we have with very great difficulty brought Parliament here to agree that a certain proportion,—as much as, I think, 50 per cent., is it not?—of the meat forwarded may be frozen or refrigerated meat, and we have only recently raised the mutton given from one day to two. That mutton is almost exclusively from the Colonies, but I do not think our own producers here would see their way to allow us to import beef here from the Colonies instead of taking the meat from our own market, which has at once a supply.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Yes, and it was distinctly stated by Sir Edmund Barton that he only wished his resolution to apply to those products which could not be filled in the countries which required the supplies. It is not intended to throw open a trade which is at the present time fully filled by local products to the Empire, but, of course, where a country requires supplies, and where the supplies cannot be filled either entirely or wholly by themselves, then the object of the resolution is to see that they are obtained, as far as possible, from the Empire and not from foreign countries.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: That I must admit, Sir. It is clear that the self-governing Colonies of the Empire would confine their contracts within their own bounds,

as far as they could. That being so, it is necessary to extend the principle and make it reciprocal in operation.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Yes. Then I put the resolution.

The following resolution was put to the Conference and unanimously adopted:—

"That in all Government contracts, whether in the case of the Colonial or the Imperial Governments, it is desirable that, as far as practicable, the products of the Empire should be preferred to the products of foreign countries.

"With a view to promoting this result it is suggested that where such contracts cannot be filled in the country in which the supplies are required, the fullest practicable notice of the requirements and of the conditions of tender should be given both in the Colonies and the United Kingdom and that this notice should be communicated through official channels as well as through the Press."

F.

COLONIAL NAVAL AND MILITARY CADETS.

8th August, 1902.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: As usual, we find ourselves a little hampered, I am afraid, by important engagements of some of our number. The Appropriation Bill is on to-day in the House of Commons, and the Secretary of State for War has to return there in order to answer some questions. I think, therefore, that in the first instance we had better take the resolution that is down on the paper with regard to naval and military cadets. As regards the proposal in the resolution to increase the number of such candidates, and that greater facilities should be given to enable young Colonists to enter the Navy and the Army, I will leave my colleagues of the Admiralty and the War Office to discuss the matter with the Prime Ministers, but as regards the last sentence in the resolution I must make an appeal to Mr. Seddon to withdraw it. The last sentence is: "That those officers with only limited means may be enabled to maintain adequately their position as officers and remain in His Majesty's service." If that means anything, it means that Prime Ministers are asked to recommend to His Majesty's Government an alteration in the organization or, at any rate, the pay of the officers of the British Army. Now, I really think that upon reflection the Prime Ministers will see that it will be going a little beyond the scope of such a Conference as this. I do not think that if we were to make similar suggestions which must strike us with regard to the present arrangements in connection with the discipline and the remuneration of the Colonial services, that the Colonial Ministers would be willing to discuss it with us. I think they would naturally say: "That is entirely a matter for us," and therefore I would suggest reciprocally to Mr. Seddon that that last paragraph should be omitted, and that we should merely discuss the number of cadetships to be allotted.

Mr. SEDDON: I should be most happy to fall in with the suggestion if the construction placed upon that paragraph by the Secretary of State was the right construction, but I claim that it is not what was intended, and what I wished to make clear was this, that all the pay they now receive, if it were not for other conditions which the officers themselves bring about, owing to custom and practice, and which is countenanced, the pay is sufficient, but it is a well-known fact throughout the Colonies that the sons of men of limited means cannot, under existing conditions, maintain their position as officers in the Army, and it is on account of that, and it is not on the question of pay. It is the expensive way of living which is countenanced by the officers themselves and which is well known, and time after time in a disagreeable way it comes up. Only the other day one of the officers in a cavalry regiment, whose father was allowing him £200 a year told me that he would have to throw it up, that it was impossible to get on unless you fell in with the practices, otherwise you would place yourself in a false position with your brother officers. And it is with a view to remedying this and not with a view of increasing the pay that that addition has been made to the resolution. And then there is another thing. You have had a case here the other day in the Horse Guards. There is a case on record where a subaltern from the Colonies refused to fall in

with the surroundings, bitterness was engendered, and it resulted ultimately in a most deplorable condition of things, so much so that when enquiries were made into it, the Colonel was dismissed, or called upon to retire on account of the affair, and other officers were also punished. As far as we could gather there was nothing at all against the young man except that he had not the means to carry on and do as the others were doing. That is the reason why I added the words of the last paragraph of the motion. We do not at all object to the present rate of pay. I believe myself that the present rate is sufficient if we can do something to remedy the state of things which now exists, and which I beg leave to say must be known to the Department, as this is not the first time that this question has been brought up.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I beg pardon. Before anything is put, as a matter of order, I think my friend Mr. Seddon's explanation makes the matter much worse, because what he really invites us to do is to enter into a discussion on the discipline and the practice and the conditions of the British Army, and really on behalf of His Majesty's Government, I could not undertake a discussion of the kind in the present Conference.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: In explanation, there is one word I may say. Of course this is a matter in which we are very much interested, reducing the expenses of officers so as to enable, as far as may be, a man of limited means to remain in the Army, but it must be recollected that our candidates for the Army are three, perhaps four, in number for every commission we can give; and there is a natural indisposition on the part of Parliament to meet a very heavy charge in order not to interfere with the stamp of officers—because if you have only to take one out of four you ought to get a very good man—but to make provision for a class of officer who cannot find £50, or from that to £100 a year, to supplement the pay. I only want to say one word. I quite agree with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that we cannot enter into a discussion of the discipline of the Army here, but I say this, that there have been cases in which Colonials—one or two Colonial officers—have not found themselves comfortable in regiments, and in those cases it is often found to be due not to insufficiency of means, whether it affects an Englishman or a Colonial, but, as a matter of fact in either case it generally happens that the officer in question has as a rule rather mistaken his profession, or is not a congruous person with his brother officers. The only difference in the two cases is that when this happens with regard to an Englishman, we hear nothing about it, but that when it happens to be a Colonial, it excites some feeling in the Colony, but I can assure Mr. Seddon that the War Office take good care that there is the utmost equality shown in the treatment of all classes of officers.

Mr. SEDDON: In that case, in the face of what has been said by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, I shall not press the latter part of the resolution, although I must confess I thought that a question in which the Colonies were as much concerned as the Mother Country, for you have cadet candidates from the Colonies, and special arrangements are made for their admission to the Army. Having made new regulations, and made special provisions that they should enter into the Army, I should have thought it was our duty, if they were placed at a disadvantage, that we should discuss it, but seeing the Secretary of State for the Colonies does not think so, and the Secretary of State for War does not think so, I will not press that matter any further. I will take another opportunity or some other means of bringing it forward.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then, Mr. Seddon, do you wish to add anything to your resolution in regard to the first two paragraphs?

Mr. SEDDON: Yes; it is quite clear that under the altered conditions, there must be amended regulations. There is no provision made, of course, for the Commonwealth of Australia, relative to the admission; it was formerly the different States which had a number of cadets allotted to them. I think there are two to Victoria; two to New South Wales; one to Tasmania every two years; and so on. Now, there are two questions involved, one is, as I have said, owing to the Commonwealth being now created, I take it you will recognise the Commonwealth in respect to admissions of cadets for the Army and Navy the same as you have done Canada. Then with the increasing population, and the increased military spirit and desire, we think that there ought to be an increased number of cadets from the dominions beyond the seas. And then there is another question, and that is as to the conditions of admissions and the conditions in which candidates are to be examined and are passed. There is no doubt you have advantages in the Mother

Country which we have not in the Colonies. I think a reconsideration of the subjects—the pass subjects—should be given. I have often heard complaints from candidates in the Colonies, and from these would-be candidates, that your present regulations require remodelling. On this point I received a cable last night from the Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand that the matter has been brought forward. I do not know whether it has been brought forward in the House of Representatives in New Zealand or otherwise, but he says there is a very strong feeling there, and he hopes I will press for a reconsideration and amendment. The time is so limited this morning that I shall not say anything further now. I hope the resolution will commend itself to His Majesty's Government and the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. I move the resolution.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Had not the resolution better be read?

The SECRETARY OF STATE: The resolution is:—

"That the Prime Ministers of the Self-Governing Colonies suggest that the question of the allotment of the Naval and Military Cadets of the Dominions beyond the Seas be taken into consideration by the Naval and Military Authorities, with a view to increasing the number of such candidates; that, consistent with ensuring suitable candidates, as far as practicable greater facilities than now obtain should be given to enable young Colonists to enter the Navy and Army."

Mr. SEDDON: I think I ought to mention that on the point of facilities, first of all, you do not all—young officers who have served in South Africa—I think that is the amendment, or addition. Secondly, parents. You admit on your present conditions that the sons of those who have been killed or who have died in the Army are entitled to be cadet candidates, and there is a certain number, I think, given each year on the recommendation of the Secretary of War, but limited purely to the sons of officers in the Army. Now, I think, the sons of the officers who have been killed in South Africa should be included, and the Secretary of State might take that into consideration in nominating under the regulations. The regulations we wish should be amended in this respect to meet the altered conditions.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: I personally shall be very glad to subscribe to the motion of Mr. Seddon, but I am obliged to say this, that the whole question of the education of the Army, and therefore of the excellence of the candidates, is at this moment under consideration, and a report has been made by a Departmental Committee, and I feel that until I have had an opportunity of much fuller consideration of the report I shall not be able to give a decision. All I can say is that, as far as the grant of commissions is concerned, we will look with a very friendly eye on the possibility of helping in the direction that Mr. Seddon desires.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Lord Selborne, do you wish to say anything on this point?

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: I have not much to say, except that the matter has already had the attention of the Board of Admiralty, and we are preparing in a draft agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand to allot a definite number of cadetships in the Government of the Commonwealth and New Zealand every year, in addition to that in lieu of their share in the six or eight cadetships that ordinarily fall to the Colonies at the present moment. It is a matter for mutual discussion and consideration to settle the exact terms on which these cadetships shall be given. It occurred to me it might be wiser to allow the Secretary of State to nominate a considerable number to compete among themselves in Australia, but that is a mere point, in no way affecting the general principle. I think I may say we have already anticipated Mr. Seddon's suggestion.

Mr. SEDDON: In that case there is a slight alteration I want to make in the resolution before we go on with the discussion. It is not the number of cadets, it is the commissions I want it to apply to. "Commissions" instead of "cadets." Commissions for cadets in the Colonies.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Does any other Prime Minister wish to speak to this resolution of Mr. Seddon's? If not, I shall put the resolution to the Conference as amended:—

"That the Prime Ministers of self-governing Colonies suggest that the question of the allotment of the Naval and Military Cadets to the Dominions beyond the Seas be taken into consideration by the Naval and Military Authorities, with a view to increasing the number of commissions to be

"offered; that, consistent with ensuring suitable candidates, as far as practicable, greater facilities than now obtain should be given to enable young Colonists to enter the Navy and the Army."

The resolution was put to the Conference and declared to be carried unanimously.

MILITARY DEFENCES.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: Then, Mr. Brodrick, have you anything to say upon the subject of your negotiations with Mr. Seddon and with the Cape and with Natal with regard to Military Defence?

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Well, I have circulated a memorandum which practically covers the whole ground. I believe there is no difference of opinion practically between the three Prime Ministers and myself with regard to this Memorandum, except as regards the point Mr. Seddon has raised as to the third paragraph. He has rather taken that paragraph to mean what it was not intended to mean, and I do not think it bears that construction, that this provision would be for general service abroad, and not limited merely to the three parts of the earth that he speaks of in his own Memorandum—South Africa, China, and Canada. What I intended to convey was, we quite understood that to be his offer, but we on our part considered that in the event of a campaign on the north-west frontier of India the employment should not be objected to. That is only our suggestion. We quite understood the nature of his proposal, and as the matter now stands the Prime Minister of the Cape, by communication through Mr. Fuller, and the Prime Minister of Natal have both accepted the principle of keeping a body of troops for Imperial service, limited only in their case by numbers in view of the native population and the necessary considerations relative to them.

With regard to New Zealand, Mr. Seddon, I think, sees no difficulty in proceeding to raise a force of 4,500 men on the lines which he has suggested, and therefore, I think the position with regard to those three Colonies has come to the point where we had better make definite proposals in writing to the Colonial Office, and allow the Colonial Office to negotiate and put it before them in a formal manner. Beyond that I think I have nothing to say. The Commonwealth of Australia and Canada were taken out of the negotiations after what passed last time, and I can only express the pious hope that those two great Continent authorities will find themselves some day or another, after seeing the start that is made, able to consider something on similar lines.

Mr. SEDDON: I would say that the point at issue between the Secretary of State for War and myself is this: In the memorandum prepared by him, he lays it down clearly that the men should be placed in the same position as the reservists at home. If that be the case then His Majesty's Government would consider the pay of the men. If, on the other hand, it was to be for the Colonial Governments to fix where they were to serve, and they were not to be treated as reservists, the same as the reserves or the regular Army at home, in that case the extra cost should fall upon the Colonial Parliaments. That is the point raised. There is a way of getting over that difficulty. I say fix beforehand the limit beyond which you would not ask them to go. They would not enlist to serve in Europe; I do not think that they would enlist to serve in India from the Colonies, but excluding Europe and India I believe that within limits that should be fixed beforehand; once that is to your satisfaction it is equal to accepting what you laid down in the first instance, placing them in the same position as the reserves or the regular Army, and only calling them out in times of national danger and difficulty. If we can arrange as to the limits beforehand, you have gained all that you seek, and I, on behalf of our Colony, knowing men will only enlist knowing where they have to serve, I believe under these conditions you may get them to enrol.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: That is to say, if our proposal takes this form, we have a complete call on those troops for three special places fixed beforehand, and we propose to pay so much; for employment anywhere else, we should be dependent upon the will of the Colonial Government at the time.

Sir ALBERT HIME: Might I say, Sir, with regard to the memorandum which has been circulated, there is just one paragraph, the penultimate paragraph which does not agree with the conclusion arrived at, which Mr. Fuller and I agree to act

upon. I think I sent to Sir John Anderson the correct one. This is the one I received from Sir William Nicholson:—

"The possibility of affiliating the Colonial units rendered available for Imperial service to regiments of the Regular Army was mentioned as being likely to render service in such units more popular."

That has been altered in the circulated one to:

"It was considered that having regard to the reputation won by Colonial contingents in South Africa, it would be better not to affiliate the Colonial units organised for Imperial service to regiments of the regular Army."

I do not subscribe to that, sir, because I think it quite possible that Natal and the Cape would like to have these units affiliated to Imperial regiments.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: We were not quite certain on that point, as New Zealand are taking an opposite view.

Sir ALBERT HIME: I sent it to Sir John Anderson.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Send it to us by letter and it will be for us to put it in train.

Mr. FULLER: I think it should be left an open question.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: There still remains, as I understand, to be settled the exact limitations within which the New Zealand troops should be called out.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: I understand Mr. Seddon's offer is firm for South Africa, for China, and for Canada, but it is not firm for the north-west frontier of India, and we can therefore only put that as a proposal to him for further consideration, but so far as those limits are concerned for which he asks us to pay £6 a year for each reservist it would be for those three places and no more.

Mr. SEDDON: I think I suggested extension to the islands in the Western Pacific.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: I have hardly had notice of this.

Mr. SEDDON: I am not in favour of those forming the reserve in New Zealand being made part of Imperial regiments.

[The Conference then consulted in private.]

On resuming—

NAVAL DEFENCE.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I will call upon Lord Selborne to make a statement in regard to naval defence.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: I need, not, Mr. Chamberlain, trespass long on the time of the Conference. I met the Prime Ministers of the Cape, Natal, of the Dominion, the Commonwealth, of New Zealand, and of Newfoundland. I have repeated to them the arguments that I used in my previous memorandum and round this table, and which you, Mr. Chamberlain, have used in your discussions with the Prime Ministers. I have pointed out to them how essentially the conditions of sea warfare differ from the conditions of land warfare, and how essential it appeared to me to be to consolidate the naval strength of the Empire so that the whole of it might at any one moment be thrown on the attacked spot. I also ventured to point out—and although my arguments were not always of course concurred in by the Colonial Prime Ministers, yet I wish to take this opportunity of thanking them for the extreme courtesy and friendliness with which they listened to my frank observations—I pointed out to them how great a relief of the burdens of the Colonial taxpayer the burden which the British taxpayer bore on his shoulders conferred. I pointed out how large was the contribution of the British taxpayer compared to the Colonial taxpayer to naval defence, and I also pointed out how different the circumstances of the Colonial taxpayer would be, if he had not the British taxpayer to depend on in this matter. As I say, my argument did not always carry conviction, but our Conferences were of the most friendly sort. As a result, Cape Colony and Natal have offered to the British Navy £50,000 and £35,000 a year without any conditions, as a general contribution, and I wish to say emphatically how much the Admiralty appreciate this mark of confidence. Newfoundland has offered to contribute £3,000 a year to a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve in Newfoundland not to be less than 600 men, and to contribute £1,800 for the proper equipment of the drill ship to be stationed in the island. The Dominion of Canada

has not been able to make any suggestion for a naval contribution. An agreement with the Commonwealth of Australia and with New Zealand is almost concluded. I think I may say that on the general lines of the Agreement there is no further question at issue between us. Australia offers £200,000 a year and New Zealand £40,000 a year, half the cost, that is, of the maintenance of an improved Australian squadron and for the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve in New Zealand and in Australia, the reserve to consist at first of 700 seamen and stokers and 25 officers. I have great pleasure in offering a definite number of naval cadetships to New Zealand and Australia. The exact terms on which those cadetships shall be given in the Colonies shall be a matter of consultation between the Admiralty and the Colonial Governments. Further, we propose that one ship on the Australian Station should be manned exclusively by Australians and New Zealanders. That I think is a great advance, and in respect, of course, of questions of local pay and the detailed regulations of establishing this ship on the best basis, we desire to avail ourselves in the freest manner of the advice of Sir Edmund Barton and Mr. Seddon.

The only point really which remains now for discussion is one in which the interest of the Admiralty is less than that of the Commonwealth or New Zealand. It is as to the exact number of ships of the squadron which should have their recognised base in time of peace in New Zealand waters. I have pointed out to Mr. Seddon that with the numbers for which he has asked it would be very difficult to work the station, and that it could not be done at all if he did not agree that the Commander-in-Chief should be allowed liberally to interpret the words of the section. Mr. Seddon assured me that we should find no unreasonable objections on his part, but he claimed that the number of ships mentioned in the final section of the draft agreement should be those whose base should be in New Zealand waters. The representatives of the Commonwealth have not been able to assent to that, and that is the one question that remains to be decided. I inserted the clause as desired by Mr. Seddon, warning him that, as he knew, the Commonwealth had not accepted it, in order that the Agreement should otherwise be complete and that point might receive final consideration and decision. I have embodied at greater length the result of these Conferences in the Memorandum which I have handed in to the Secretary here with the letters from the Prime Ministers of Cape Colony and Natal and Newfoundland as appendices, and I would propose to add this agreement as another appendix when it is finally settled. That memorandum is nothing but an expansion of what I have said here, and I would ask leave to hand it in.

Mr. SEDDON: But has it been referred to those interested for perusal before you do so?

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: I have only just handed it in.

Mr. SEDDON: In the case of the Colonial reserve Mr. Brodrick sent his draft memorandum first to us for our comments upon it. I think Lord Selborne should do the same before putting it on the official record of our proceedings.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: By all means.

Mr. SEDDON: Before it is circulated or printed I think it should be seen by the Prime Ministers.

The SECRETARY: It would be more convenient to circulate it in print.

Mr. SEDDON: I do not know whether the point may be proceeded on now, we seem to be getting narrowed down now; it is not for me to embark upon it, but I do not know whether Sir Edmund Barton has noticed it or not.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: What is that, Mr. Seddon?

Mr. SEDDON: As the draft agreement stands it states the base would be the ports of New Zealand and Australia, the sphere of operations should be Australian and New Zealand waters. My suggestion was that there should be a base of operations in peace and a base of operations in war, and the extended limits should come into force in time of war, and in peace it should be Australian and New Zealand waters. That of course was not carried out, but I—

Sir EDMUND BARTON: It would be easy to carry out the agreement if something of what you suggest were inserted in it.

Mr. SEDDON: Only deciding in the Conference afterwards.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: No, I suggest leaving it as it is. It

would be the Australian station, but if you once put in a distinction in case of war public attention will be called to the fact, and people will be saying, what does it mean?

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Leave out "in case of war."

Mr. SEDDON: Very well, I say in that case I have no objections. It is immaterial to me, because in time of peace Clause 13 ensures to New Zealand two vessels in addition to the—

The SECRETARY OF STATE: How is the proportion maintained? I suppose that there should be some proportion between the amount of contribution—

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Mr. Seddon wants three-elevenths of the ships for a payment of one-sixth of the contribution.

Mr. SEDDON: It is not a question of proportion; it is a question of what is the proper thing to do with the ships on the stations. There is an agreement to add the three drill ships, of which New Zealand is to have one and Australia the other two. Then, in respect of the original standing agreement, that two other ships then in commission should be stationed in New Zealand waters, I simply ask that the conditions which there obtain should be maintained in that respect, and I base my demand on this, that we now have an extended New Zealand, by the islands of the Pacific, and those islands which previously have been served by one of the boats taken from Australia. Included in those islands now I was quite prepared to include Fiji and Tonga, that they might also be served too by one of the New Zealand vessels, but with that exception then I think it only reasonable that we should have the same number of boats, or I should be prepared to take the suggestion made by Lord Selborne that we should have one of the second-class cruisers. I am quite prepared to take one second-class cruiser or two other ships at the discretion of the Admiralty. With the exception that although the contribution as far as money is concerned is as stated by Sir Edmund Barton, we must admit at once the main contribution is neither Australian nor New Zealand; it is found by the Imperial authority.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: It does not alter the position as between us.

Mr. SEDDON: We have always had two ships; that, at all events, is the position.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: I shall not trouble the Conference with any lengthened remarks just now, Mr. Chamberlain, except to say that I feel myself unfortunate that I am not able to agree with my friend Mr. Seddon; that in fact I absolutely disagree with him. The relations of New Zealand and the Commonwealth in this matter are, *prima facie*, where there has been no intervening factor, determined by the proportions which they pay. Those are based on population. The seaboard of Australia is enormously larger than the seaboard of New Zealand. The fact that some of the sloops might be required to patrol islands under New Zealand influence in the Pacific is balanced by the fact that we require to patrol the coast of British New Guinea, which the Commonwealth has taken over, and may in the near future be required to patrol other parts of the South Sea Islands. But I take that not to be a factor at all, for this reason, that both during the last agreement and during the currency of this one it has been and will be the fact that the squadron will undertake the patrol of the Pacific Islands, no matter whether they are under the control of the Commonwealth or New Zealand, and the dominating factor of the situation seems to me to be this, either Australia and New Zealand should be two separate stations or sub-stations, or one. If they are separate I quite understand Mr. Seddon bargaining for a certain measure of protection both in peace and war time. That could be defined and distinct. If they are to be administered as one, the safest thing for both of them is that the naval force should be administered and be under the direction, *quâ* that station, of the Admiral commanding the naval force. That seems to me the only way in which the fullest measure of protection can be obtained by New Zealand as well as by Australia, and it is upon that principle that I base my inability to agree with Mr. Seddon as regards the thirteenth clause. I do not want to anticipate any further discussion that may take place, but before we meet, I should like to ask Lord Selborne if he would consider the advisability of allowing us to open up the question of the proportion of naval cadets, and also if he will allow the twelfth clause with a slight alteration to be inserted at the end of Clause 2. Clause 2 speaks of the sphere of operations and lays down in clear terms that of course there may be occasion for the squadron to be withdrawn to other parts of the eastern seas. If Clause 12 were

added at that point as a proviso or as a succeeding clause it would come in most conveniently.

"That nothing in the Agreement shall be taken to mean that the Naval force herein named shall alone be used in Australasian waters should the necessity arise for a larger force."

And those by whom this Agreement, whatever it may be, was made would perceive that the arrangement was reciprocal.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Agreed.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: It would be very useful. It would show not only that the Australian Squadron might be called away to the defence of the Empire elsewhere, but that the other two squadrons in the same seas might be equally called to assist them.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Granted.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Instead of "shall alone be used," introduce the words, "be the only force used."

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: Certainly.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: To make that more intelligible to "the man in the street," if I may use that expression.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: This matter of course concerns the Commonwealth, New Zealand, and the Imperial Government. Properly it would not be necessary to trouble the Conference with it further, but we must arrive at some method by which we can obtain an agreement upon the points which still remain open. I confess I am not very hopeful that Mr. Seddon will convert Sir Edmund Barton or that Sir Edmund Barton will convert Mr. Seddon, and under these circumstances I venture to make a suggestion, and that is, that they should agree to some sort of arbitration. I do not know whether they would allow, for instance, the First Lord of the Admiralty to decide these points of detail. As representing the Imperial Government he has, of course, a very large interest indeed in the success of the scheme, and the Imperial Government will contribute one-half of the cost, but if there is anyone else in which the two gentlemen named would have greater confidence we might get it referred outside the Conference. I am afraid that argument has gone almost as far as it can go on the one side or the other, and what is wanted is a decision by some impartial person.

Mr. SEDDON: I quite agree with you. I do not think it is possible for arrangement, and whilst, of course, admitting what Mr. Barton says as to the coast line of Australia is correct, with respect to the number of the ports, we have got five to their two. There are only two in Australia.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: That is news to me.

Mr. SEDDON: When they were separate States there was only one port—so said the people of Sydney—and that the port of Sydney, and I think you will find that on record. Of course, Victoria used to claim that the superior port was Melbourne, and Queensland, of course, Brisbane, and the rest nowhere. Things have changed now. The position is this. It was conceded that two ships should be given to New Zealand. At the Conference in 1887 that was conceded. That is in the present agreement. If we do not alter that agreement they receive the two boats, and I am not prepared of my own motion now to agree to any alteration in this respect, but it will be seen that New Zealand now includes some of the islands which used to be served from Australia. They are now part of New Zealand, and I am quite prepared to take an extended boundary including the islands of Fiji and Tonga, and let them be termed the New Zealand waters apart from Australia. I agree that we practically go back to the first position, which was one first-class boat for New Zealand as Lord Selborne suggested, fix it as one second-class cruiser for New Zealand and then a boat will be saved. I think that is the solution of it.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: I know that this will only lead to subsequent discussion, and I cannot stop. I can only say as regards the proposal for arbitration it would be welcome, if it were not for the consideration that I think we might, either of us, be accused of shirking our responsibility.

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY: How is the question to be settled?

Sir EDMUND BARTON: I think we ought to have some further conversation.

Mr. SEDDON: I will accept the suggestion that we take one first-class cruiser, or as an alternative I will accept two sloops.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: You will be getting more than your one-sixth share. I think we might have ten minutes' conversation.

The SECRETARY OF STATE: I think we must leave it to you, Lord Selborne, to have further talk with Sir Edmund Barton and Mr. Seddon.

G.

THE IMPERIAL RESERVE.

11th August, 1902.

Mr. SEDDON: On the question of the Imperial Reserve I have written to Mr. Brodrick, the Secretary of State for War, and I have informed him that, owing to the conditions which now exist, the New Zealand Government withdraw altogether the proposals I submitted to him in Conference with reference to the Imperial Reserve. That will leave it to the Secretary of State for War if he thinks it advisable later on to enter into negotiations with the New Zealand Government, apart altogether from the Conference. That is a way out of the difficulty, and the only way that I see.

Sir EDMUND BARTON: Does that apply to both military and naval?

Mr. SEDDON: The withdrawal does not apply to the Australian Squadron. As far as the Australian Squadron is concerned I am still of the opinion I have mentioned that if everything else failed, I was quite prepared to meet that situation by adopting the same course. But there is an existing agreement and that partnership, of course, cannot be closed by me or by the partners, unless after a consultation with my colleagues, so that I propose to continue that with respect to the Imperial Reserve; it has led to a situation which to me was unexpected; however, I see no other way out of the difficulty.

* * * * *

H.

DEFENCE APPENDICES TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF 1902.

APPENDIX I.

BRITISH EMPIRE.

MILITARY AND NAVAL EXPENDITURE, 1898-99.

Year ending.	—	Population.	Military Expenditure (Ordinary Services).	Military Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval Expenditure.	Naval Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval and Military Expenditure.	Naval and Military Expenditure per head of Population.
Estimates 1902-3.	UNITED KINGDOM ...	41,454,621 (Census, 1901.)	£ 29,310,000	£ s. d. 0 14 1½	£ 31,255,500	s. d. 15 1	£ 60,565,500	£ s. d. 1 9 2½
30.6.99	CANADA ...	5,312,500	533,553	0 2 0	NIL.	NIL.	533,553	0 2 0
"	NEWFOUNDLAND ...	210,000	8,800	0 0 10	NIL.	NIL.	8,800	0 0 10
"	NEW SOUTH WALES ...	1,356,650	185,699	0 2 8½	47,207	0 8½	232,906	0 3 5
"	VICTORIA ...	1,163,400	130,640	0 2 3	57,823	1 0	188,463	0 3 3
"	QUEENSLAND ...	512,694	68,285	0 2 8	28,200	1 1½	96,485	0 3 9½
"	SOUTH AUSTRALIA ...	370,700	15,762	0 0 10½	16,642	0 10½	32,404	0 1 9
"	WESTERN AUSTRALIA ...	171,032	12,336	0 1 5½	4,626	0 6½	16,962	0 1 11½
31.12.99	TASMANIA ...	182,508	8,922	0 0 11½	5,065	0 6½	13,987	0 1 6
31.3.99	NEW ZEALAND ...	756,505	105,477	0 2 9½	20,830	0 6½	126,307	0 3 4
30.6.99	CAPE OF GOOD HOPE ...	2,265,556	307,714	0 2 8½	30,000	0 3½	337,714	0 2 11½
"	NATAL (Population for 1898).	902,365	219,371	0 4 10½	12,000	0 3½	231,371	0 5 1½
		13,203,820	1,596,559	0 2 5	222,453	0 4	1,819,012	0 2 9

APPENDIX II.

CANADIAN, AUSTRALIAN, AND NEW ZEALAND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	Number of Men.	Expenditure.	Number per 1,000.	Expenditure per Head of Population.	Proportionate Number for United Kingdom.	Proportionate Expenditure for United Kingdom.
		£		£ s. d.		£
Canada ...	8,400*	620,000†	1½	0 2 4	70,000	4,900,000
New South Wales ...	6,208	391,620	4½	0 5 9	189,000	12,075,000
Victoria ...	3,897	138,327	3½	0 2 3	140,000	4,725,000
Queensland ...	2,903	203,164	6	0 8 7	252,000	18,025,000
South Australia ...	1,494	82,068	4	0 4 6	168,000	9,450,000
Western Australia ...	1,165	51,646	6½	0 5 8	266,000	11,900,000
Tasmania ...	796	38,393	4½	0 4 6	196,000	9,450,000
New Zealand ...	6,000‡	334,000§	8	0 8 8	336,000	18,200,000
UNITED KINGDOM ...	30,863	—	—	—	—	—
	355,753	222,974,000	8½	5 7 2	355,753	222,974,000

* Including garrison sent to Halifax to relieve Imperial Garrison.

† Excluding Lord Strathcona's expenditure.

‡ Approximate.

§ Excluding liability for pensions, £3,000 per annum.

|| Excluding public subscriptions, which are included in the figures for the Colonies, where possible.

APPENDIX III.

COLONIAL TROOPS FOR IMPERIAL SERVICE IN WAR.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COLONIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has referred to the Colonial Defence Committee, for their consideration, a copy of the following Notice of Motion which has been formulated by the Government of New Zealand for discussion at the Conference of Colonial Premiers to be held shortly after the Coronation:—

"That it is desirable to have an Imperial Reserve Force formed in each of His Majesty's dominions over the Seas for service in case of emergency outside the Dominion or Colony in which such reserve is formed. The limits within which such reserve force may be employed outside the Colony wherein it is raised to be defined by the Imperial and Colonial Governments at the time such reserve is formed, and to be in accordance with any law in force for the time being respecting the same. The cost of maintaining and equipping such Imperial Reserve Force to be defrayed in such proportion and manner as may be agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Governments."

The Secretary of State for War, at the suggestion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, has referred to the Committee a paper drawn up for the War Office by Lieutenant-Colonel Altham, C.M.G., Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters, on the organization of Colonial troops for Imperial service. The paper is printed as an Appendix to this Memorandum.

2. The principle brought forward in the Notice of Motion is identical with that embodied in "The New Zealand Defence Act Amendment Act, 1900," which was discussed by the Colonial Defence Committee in their Memorandum No. 271 M, dated the 2nd August, 1901. In that Memorandum they pointed out that the Act represented the first attempt by a Colony to evolve such an organization of its military resources as would enable it to place in the field trained troops available for Imperial service outside the Colony, and they expressed the opinion that the measure constituted an important step towards facilitating the conception and execution of comprehensive schemes of Imperial defence.

Such schemes, drawn up to meet the conditions of the various wars in which the British Empire might be engaged, involve the despatch by sea of a certain

number of expeditionary forces as soon after the outbreak of war as naval conditions permit. These forces may be required to reinforce the local troops in any part of the Empire specially exposed to attack, or may be directed against outlying possessions of an enemy in order to deprive him of the means of carrying on naval operations in the neighbouring waters. For such purposes, troops despatched by the self-governing Colonies would be of special value: no European Power other than Great Britain is in a position to draw on large communities of white subjects outside Europe for military assistance, and the action of expeditionary forces based on Australasian and Canadian ports might be of great importance during the early stages of a war. But in order that the operations of the various expeditionary forces should be effectively combined, it is essential that the co-operation of all should be assured, and that each force should be efficient in all respects for the service required of it.

3. Lieutenant-Colonel Altham's paper, written from the point of view of the Department of the Headquarter Staff, which has recently been charged, under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, with the preparation and maintenance of detailed plans for the military defence of the Empire, lays special stress on these two essential points, and makes definite suggestions in regard to the organization of contingents for Imperial service from the self-governing Colonies.

The Colonial Defence Committee are in entire accord with the principles laid down in this paper, and are of opinion that the detailed proposals in regard to organization are based on a correct appreciation of the military resources and requirements of the various Colonies, and deserve the most favourable consideration of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

4. It is fully realized that arrangements for ensuring the combined military action of all parts of the Empire in times of great emergency must be dependent on the voluntary co-operation of the self-governing Colonies. In such a contingency it will be essential to success that the military forces of the Empire should be employed against the common foe in conformity with one general plan, and that the supreme military control of those forces should be vested in one central authority. The disadvantage of divided military counsels and disconnected enterprises in war is apparent from the study of all military history.

The general plans for the defence of a great nation against the most serious dangers which it may be required to face must be drawn up in peace time, as on them should be based the organization of the national forces and their preparation and training for war. But it is necessary for the preparation of such general plans and for the due elaboration of subsidiary schemes of offence and defence that the central authority which is responsible for the defence of the Empire as a whole should know in peace what forces are likely to be at its disposal in time of war.

For these reasons the Colonial Defence Committee earnestly hope that the great self-governing Colonies may be able to give some assurance as to the strength of the contingents which they would be able to place at the disposal of His Majesty's Government for extra-Colonial service in a war with a European Power. On the other hand, the Committee suggest that it would be of advantage if the Imperial authorities could confidentially communicate to the Colonial authorities the general nature of the duties which it is proposed to assign to their contingents in such a war.

5. The two points embodied in the second and third sentences of the Notice of Motion are dealt with on lines differing somewhat from the provisions of the New Zealand Act already referred to.

In the Act it was proposed to fix the limits within which the Imperial Reserve Force might be employed on Imperial service by subsequent Act or by Resolution of both Houses of the Colonial Legislature. It is now proposed that these limits should be defined by the Imperial and Colonial Governments at the time such reserve is formed, and should be in accordance with any law in force for the time being respecting the same.

It is no doubt necessary that the individual enrolling in the Imperial Reserve should be aware before enrolment of the extent of his liabilities; but a geographical definition of the limits of service in a public Act will be attended with difficulty, and possibly open to objection. It would be preferable that enrolment in the Imperial Reserve should simply be for general service in the event of war with one or more European Powers. These conditions appear to be sufficiently definite for

the individual, while they leave the mode of employment of the force to be settled, as already explained, between the Imperial and Colonial Governments.

6. The concluding sentence of the Notice of Motion lays down that the cost of maintaining and equipping the Imperial Reserve Force is to be defrayed in such proportion and manner as may be agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Governments.

The New Zealand Act of 1900 was silent on this point, but it was implied that no expenditure from the British Exchequer in time of peace was involved—a course which certainly avoided questions of divided responsibility and some other difficulties. Although the cost of the present scheme is very small compared with that already borne by the taxpayer of the United Kingdom for the defence of the Empire, the principle of Imperial subsidies for the maintenance in peace of Colonial troops is a new one, and the matter is one that cannot be dealt with apart from the general question of the incidence of the cost of Imperial defence, which, the Colonial Defence Committee understand, is to be discussed in its most important aspect—viz., that of naval expenditure, at the Conference of Colonial Premiers. The Committee therefore confine themselves to expressing the hope that the present scheme, of which the initiative is due to the Government of one of the self-governing Colonies, will not be allowed by those Colonies to fall through on financial grounds. The cost involved is small in proportion to the direct advantage to the Colonies themselves of having at hand troops organized and available at short notice for expeditionary service, while the possession of such forces, which it would be impossible to supply by means of extemporised efforts, would enable them to take an active share in protecting and securing their own interests which are inseparable from the general interests of the Empire.

J. E. CLAUSON, Secretary,
Colonial Defence Committee.

June 13, 1902.

APPENDIX.

THE ORGANIZATION OF COLONIAL TROOPS FOR IMPERIAL SERVICE.

[By Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Altham, C.M.G., Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters.]

General Principles.

Prior to the outbreak of the war in South Africa, so far as any general scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole had been considered, it was assumed that the military responsibilities of our great self-governing Colonies were limited to local defence and that the entire burden of furnishing reinforcements to any portion of the Empire in which a hostile attack in force might be directed, as well as of all offensive operations, must fall on the regular army. There may possibly have been some pious hope that in time of need the Colonies might rally to the Mother Country, but no definite arrangements were made, nor were inquiries even on foot, as to whether such aid might be expected, and, if so, in what strength. Indeed, the necessity for it was by no means realized and its reliability was doubted.

2. The experience of the South African war has, however, established two important facts:—

- (a) That the regular army, as organised before the war, was by itself quite inadequate in strength to the military needs of the Empire.
- (b) That the self-governing Colonies are willing and able to assist in making good some part of the deficiency in military strength which the war has disclosed.

3. The present war has in fact been a valuable illustration of the necessity for organizing the defence of the Empire against far graver contingencies. Unless such preparation is made, the continuance of the Empire is doubtful, if not improbable, and it is essential to preparation that it should be definitely known in peace what forces can be relied on in war.

Success in a great war can only be ensured by a continuous policy of careful organization and preparation in peace.

4. For these reasons the definite organization in peace of the assistance which the Colonies would be willing and able to place at the disposal of the Imperial military authorities in war is a vital matter.

5. Before approaching the solution of this question it is desirable to recapitulate briefly certain general principles:—

- (a) The main burden of a great struggle between the British Empire and one or more States of European race or descent must be borne by the white subjects of the King.
- (b) Military contingents therefore of other than men of European descent need not be considered with regard to this particular problem, although the great value of the Indian army, and the usefulness of the African and other native forces are fully recognized.
- (c) The white population of all Colonies other than the great self-governing Colonies being very small, their power of contributing substantial aid to the Empire would be insignificant and would for practical purposes only suffice for assistance in local self-defence. The problem therefore is narrowed to the consideration only of the case of the self-governing Colonies, *i.e.*, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa.
- (d) Under the existing conditions of the political constitution of the Empire there is no central authority vested in the Imperial Government, which is empowered to draw up in London and enforce throughout the Empire a definite uniform organization for Imperial service.

We can only make suggestions to the self-governing Colonies and rely on the goodwill and loyalty of their various Ministries to give effect to our suggestions. In making these suggestions, however, we may well call attention to the self-evident fact that in a great war the Empire must stand or fall as a whole, and that therefore in assisting the Empire, wherever assistance is needed, the Colonies will but be defending themselves.

- (e) To secure, however, the willing co-operation of the self-governing Colonies in establishing a sound military organization for mutual aid, it is necessary to have most careful regard to local conditions and developments. So long as essentials are secured, the greatest local freedom should be given as to details.
- (f) There are only two conditions really essential:—
 - (i.) That the supreme authority, which is responsible for the defence of the Empire as a whole, should be able to rely with certainty on Colonial contingents of definite strength being available for defensive or offensive operations in any part of the world, as soon as His Majesty's Navy has acquired such command of the sea as will permit of transmarine movement of troops.
 - (ii.) That these contingents should be efficient both in equipment and training.

6. Having regard, therefore, to these preliminary considerations, it would appear expedient to state briefly the main features of the existing military organization of each group of the self-governing Colonies, and then to examine how far such organization can be utilized to further the object in view.

Australia.

7. The six Colonies of the Commonwealth of Australia have each a separately organized military force, serving under varying conditions. The whole of these forces were, on federation, placed under the control of the Federal Government, and, as soon as a headquarter staff has been appointed, the conditions of service will no doubt be assimilated throughout the Commonwealth. Broadly speaking, all six Colonies, except West Australia, have three categories of troops:—

- (1) Permanent Corps.
- (2) Partially paid or Militia.
- (3) Volunteers.

West Australia has only two, permanent and Volunteers. The following was the existing strength of the force in each Colony on the 31st December last:—

—	Permanent.	Partially Paid.	Volunteers.	Total.
New South Wales	646	5,987	3,232	9,865
Queensland	293	3,021	714	4,028
South Australia	43	2,889	—	2,932
Western Australia	522	2,174	—	2,696
Tasmania	27	262	1,735	2,024
Victoria	389	3,484	2,462	6,335
Total	1,920	17,817	8,143	27,880

All the above forces are recruited by voluntary enlistment, but in the Colonies of Queensland, South Australia, and Tasmania every male inhabitant between certain ages is legally liable to compulsory military service in the case of invasion or insurrection.

The permanent forces consist mainly of Staff, Artillery, and Engineers. The pay of privates, sappers, and gunners varies from 2s. 3d. to 7s. per diem.

The partially paid forces are enlisted for a short term of years, and their course of annual training comprises a varying number of drills (*e.g.*, in the case of Victoria, 15 half-days and 24 night drills), a period of from four to eight days in camp, and an annual course of musketry. The system of payment also varies. In Victoria, for instance, privates completing all the above requirements receive £7 10s. per annum. In New South Wales payment is made at the rate of 8s. for a full day's drill, 4s. for half-day, and 2s. for each night drill, with an annual bonus of £1 if efficient. In South Australia there is also an annual allowance of from £1 to £4 for the men, and £3 to £7 10s. for the officers.

The Volunteers are run much on the same lines as those in the United Kingdom. The Colonial Defence Committee have recommended their abolition and that, with the exception of a nucleus of permanent troops, the Australian forces should be composed entirely of partially paid troops.

As each Colony has at present a separate military ordinance or defence Act, the conditions under which the various forces are liable to be called out for active service somewhat vary in their terms, but speaking broadly, there is a general liability, "in the event of war or danger of war," to service in any part of Australia.

8. These various forces have been organized for the separate defence of their respective Colonies, and for each Colony a local scheme of defence has been drawn up by the local authorities. Fortunately, however, the Colonial Defence Committee have for years been given annually an opportunity of criticising these schemes, and the constant supervision of that body has ensured the observance of sound general principles and the maintenance of a uniform system of defence. The schemes are all based on the general principle that Australia will be protected by the Navy from organized attack on a large scale. They look only to the protection of the important ports in the temporary absence of His Majesty's ships by means of fixed defences and moderate garrisons, and to the provision in each Colony of a field force to repel any attempt to land on the undefended coast-line.

9. The possibility of co-operation between the forces of the various Australian Colonies in external enterprises in war has, however, been for more than ten years in the minds of the military authorities in Australia.

In May, 1890, the Colonial Defence Committee pointed out that "the rôle which the Australian Colonies will probably play in the event of war is not likely to be limited to the passive defence of ports little liable to attack. These Colonies will doubtless desire that a solid guarantee for future security should be taken, and it is evidently essential to success in this sense that their land forces should be organized on a common basis, so as to be capable of being brought together for concerted action. The possibility of being able to take a vigorous offensive at the outset of war against points which might subsequently prove menacing would be a strategic advantage of the first importance."

This suggestion was carefully considered at conferences of the Commandants of the Australian forces held in October, 1894, and January, 1896, and a provisional scheme was drawn up under which certain existing units were selected from each Colony and allotted to an "Australian Field Force," which was thus built up to a

strength of one mounted brigade and one infantry division. The mounted brigade included three regiments of mounted rifles, a battery of artillery, ammunition column, mounted detachments, engineers, &c., its total war establishment being 2,670. The division included a brigade division of field artillery, a company of engineers, and departmental details, having a total war establishment of 9,526.

In their recent Memorandum, No. 254 M, which was specially drawn up on the 3rd April, 1901, for the guidance of the Commonwealth Ministry in carrying out the federation of the military forces of Australia, the Colonial Defence Committee again drew attention to this matter, and pointed out that federation will make it now possible to provide a homogeneous and efficient force "which can to some extent undergo combined training in peace and which will be capable of rapid mobilization in war."

In a subsequent Memorandum, No. 281 M, dated the 1st November, 1901, on the armament of field artillery in Australia and New Zealand, the Colonial Defence Committee have further suggested that, as the Australian has proved in South Africa his special aptitude for the rôle of mounted rifleman, the Federal Field Force should be organized in two mounted brigades and one infantry brigade; that the mounted brigades should be drawn from the pastoral districts, where the physical qualifications of the inhabitants fit them specially for this work; and that the infantry brigade should be built up from general service companies raised from those members of certain corps who would be willing to undertake liability for extended service in time of war.

These suggestions have been recently approved by the Secretary of State for War, and transmitted to Australia by the Colonial Office.

10. As yet no further practical steps have been taken in Australia to complete the organization of the Federal Field Force proposed by the Colonial Defence Committee, but there are grounds for hoping that the general principles involved are acceptable to the minds of Australian statesmen, and that as soon as the working machinery of an Australian Headquarter Staff has been set in motion the question will be definitely taken up and the necessary legal powers obtained from the Commonwealth Legislature.

Having regard, then, to the principles already submitted in sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) of paragraph 5, we shall do better if we utilize and adapt to our purpose these ideas, which we have developed almost to fruition in Australian minds, than if we attempt to thrust upon them fresh proposals. A force of two mounted brigades and an infantry brigade would probably give a total strength of about 9,000 men. In time, Australia may fairly be expected to considerably increase this.

11. As regards Australia, therefore, it is submitted that it should be the policy of His Majesty's Government to encourage an organization for Imperial service on the following lines:—

- (1.) The field force of the strength above suggested, viz., two mounted brigades and one infantry brigade, to be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for general service, in the case of war between Great Britain and one or more European Powers, as soon as the naval authorities are in a position to undertake the responsibility for the movement of troops by sea.
- (2.) This contingent to be termed "the Imperial Australian Force"; its officers to be nominated by the Governor-General on the advice of his Ministry and granted by the King temporary rank in the Army; the right to be reserved to His Majesty to appoint, on mobilization, a General Officer to take supreme command and a Headquarter Staff, but the latter to be selected, in the main, from Australian officers.
- (3.) Officers and men belonging to the force to be trained in peace time on the same system as that adopted for the partially paid forces of Australia, but to engage for periods of not less than two years to serve in war wherever required. In consideration of this agreement, all officers and men who carry out the conditions of their annual course of training to be given a retaining fee (in addition to their military pay).
- (4.) All units of the force to be inspected in the field annually by the General Officer Commanding in Australia, and his Report to be forwarded by the Commonwealth Ministry for the information of the Commander-in-Chief.

- (5.) Officers and men, on mobilization, to receive pay at the same rates as those adopted for the permanent forces of Australia. When serving outside Australia they will be subject to the Army Act.
- (6.) Mobilization stores, to enable the force to take the field fully equipped, to be maintained locally in Australia.
- (7.) All other details of organization to be settled by the local authorities, but so far as possible the officers and men should be organized in peace in the battalions, regiments, and brigade divisions, or at least in the batteries, companies, and squadrons to which they would belong in war. The scheme for bringing these units together into a higher organization on mobilization must be carefully worked out in peace, and be complete in every detail.

12. It will be observed that the above lines are suggested as those on which the Commonwealth Ministry should be encouraged to work. How and in what form these suggestions can be best laid before the Australian Ministry is a delicate matter which needs careful consideration. It is believed to be the policy of His Majesty's Government not to press the self-governing Colonies in such matters, but to look rather to the Colonies to take the initiative. It is understood, however, that the subject of colonial co-operation in Imperial defence is likely to be mentioned at a Conference of Colonial Premiers, which will probably be held on the occasion of the King's Coronation; if so, this would be an admirable opportunity for the free exchange of the views of His Majesty's and the Colonial Governments. The matter is, however, one on which it is desirable that the Colonial Office should be consulted, and possibly it may be also thought expedient that the details of this scheme should be referred to the Colonial Defence Committee for consideration.

New Zealand.

13. The military forces of New Zealand consist of—

- (1.) Permanent militia.
- (2.) Militia.
- (3.) Volunteers.

Force (2) comprises all male inhabitants (except volunteers and seamen) between the ages of 17 and 55, and is liable to an annual training not exceeding 168 hours in the year, but at present it is neither trained nor organized.

The strength of the trained forces of the Colony was as follows on the 31st December last:—

	All Ranks.			
Permanent	299
Volunteers	17,003
Total	17,302

The New Zealand forces have, in training, organization, and discipline, been in past years somewhat behind the Australian Colonies. Nevertheless, New Zealand may take great credit in that it is the first and, as yet, the only Colony in the Empire to enact legislation permitting the enrolment of colonists as an Imperial reserve. The section of "The New Zealand Defence Act Amendment Act, 1900," creating this Reserve, is printed in the Appendix of Memorandum No. 271 M, of the Colonial Defence Committee, which discusses in detail the effect of this measure. It will be observed that the Committee recommend that the Reserve should be organized as a separate Field Force on the same lines as the Australian Field Force.

The Secretary of State for War has approved of this recommendation, and it may therefore be assumed that the same policy should be adopted as regards the treatment of this question in New Zealand as has been already proposed for Australia. The contingent from this Colony might be termed "the Imperial New Zealand Force," and the conditions suggested in paragraph 11 might be applied *mutatis mutandis*.

The present war has caused a remarkable military revival in the Colony, and during the last year the Mounted Rifles increased in strength from 1,194 to 6,474, and the Infantry from 4,997 to 7,873. If these figures are maintained, it would seem possible to organize, for Imperial service, a Mounted Brigade and two battalions of Infantry, say, in all about 4,000 men.

South Africa.

14. The excellent material which exists in the manhood of South Africa for building up in the future a valuable addition to the forces of the Empire is very manifest. The war has further shown that life on the veldt even in peace time ensures the possession of that readiness of resource and natural instinct which are essential to a soldier in the field under the conditions of modern war. It is evident that men in possession of these natural advantages require less training for war than lads born and bred in the large cities of civilized countries.

It may be hoped in the future, therefore, that we may be able to take advantage of this admirable recruiting ground, and that both the Dutch as well as the English colonists of South Africa may some day fight for the Empire side by side with the Regular Army. It is obvious, however, that at the present moment the consideration of any scheme for the organization of an Imperial South African force would be mere academical labour.

Canada.

15. The Canadian military force consists entirely of militia, in which all male inhabitants of Canada between the ages of 15 and 60 (excepting only Ministers of religion, Judges, professors, &c.) are liable to serve.

This force is divided into—

- (a) Permanent.
- (b) Active.
- (c) Reserve.

The two first classes are recruited by voluntary enlistment; the third, which is untrained and unorganized, comprises the rest of the male population.

The establishment of the first two classes are as follows:—

	All Ranks.
Permanent	1,021
Active	37,131
Total	38,152

The active Militia undergoes an annual training, the rural corps go into camp for twelve days, the "city corps" being drilled in towns. In his annual Report of January last, the General Officer Commanding Canadian Militia states that the city corps have absolutely no training whatever in the field duties of a soldier, and that the rural corps "will never be made even fairly fit to take the field with the limited period of annual training that they receive under existing conditions." In the event of war with the United States it is on this Canadian Militia that must depend the entire safety of Canada until reinforcements arrive from England. The defence of Canada in such a contingency is probably the most difficult military problem that the Empire could ever face, and it may, therefore, be concluded that the best way in which Canada can co-operate in Imperial defence is by making her militia an efficient force. It is more important that the Canadian Ministry should be strongly pressed to take this reasonable precaution than that they should maintain contingents for general Imperial service.

16. Nevertheless, the services rendered by Canadians in South Africa, as well as the history of the last Anglo-American war, show that the Canadians are excellent fighters, and would be a valuable addition to the Imperial forces. It is reasonable to assume that Canada will desire to co-operate with Australia in any steps that may be taken for creating a permanent organization of Colonial Imperial forces, and, if such a desire be felt, there are strong political reasons for encouraging it. Moreover, it is possible that, by the example of a Canadian Imperial force, the Militia generally might be worked up to a higher standard of efficiency.

The strategical position of Canada makes it, however, unwise that any very large contingent should be drawn from her defence force unless the strength of that force should in the future be increased. It is suggested, therefore, that if a Canadian Imperial force be organized, it should be limited, for the present, to a brigade division of field artillery and a brigade of infantry. The force might be organized on lines similar to those suggested for Australia.

General Summary.

17. The proposals made in this paper contemplate, therefore, the organization of the following Colonial troops for general Imperial service in war:—

Colony.	Units.	Approximate Strength.
Australia	2 Mounted Brigades 1 Infantry Brigade	9,000
New Zealand	1 Mounted Brigade 2 Infantry Battalions	4,500
South Africa	[?]	[?]
Canada	1 Brigade Division, Field Artillery 1 Infantry Brigade	3,000
	Total	16,500

E. A. ALTHAM, A.Q.M.G.

War Office, November 25, 1901.

APPENDIX IV.

MEMORANDUM ON SEA-POWER AND THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN IT.

The importance which attaches to the command of the sea lies in the control which it gives over sea communications. The weaker sea-power is absolutely unable to carry to success any large military expedition over sea. The truth of this is shown by reference to the history of the past.

In ancient times the Greek victory of Salamis threatened the Persian communications across the Dardanelles, and doubtless this danger contributed to bring about their retreat into Asia.

The failure of the famous Syracusan expedition was due to the defeat of the Athenian fleet, and had its modern counterpart in the failure of Admiral Graves off the entrance to Chesapeake Bay in 1781. In both cases the army had to surrender because its communications were cut. The defeat of Nikias dealt a heavy blow to the supremacy of Athens, and may, perhaps, be said to have been one of the principal events which led to her downfall. The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown was the prelude to the independence of the United States.

The main cause of the failure of the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt was the defeat of the French fleet at the Nile, which was the first step towards cutting his communications with France, and the subsequent surrender of the French army.

On the other hand, the advantages which accrue to the stronger sea-power, after it has won the command of the sea, are equally illustrated by historical example.

The fall of Quebec and the conquest of French Canada was mainly due to the fact that our superior sea-power closed the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the French and opened it to us. In any similar struggle in the future, this route will be as vital as in the past.

The expedition to Egypt under Abercromby in 1801, the Peninsular war, the expedition to the Crimea, the South African war just concluded, are all instances of great military enterprises which could only have been carried out by a nation holding the command of the sea.

The command of the sea is determined by the result of great battles at sea, such as Salamis, Actium, Lepanto, those which led up to the defeat of the Armada, and those between the Dutch and English in the 17th century, in which each side concentrated his whole available force for the decisive struggle.

To any naval Power the destruction of the fleet of the enemy must always be the great object aimed at. It is immaterial where the great battle is fought, but wherever it may take place the result will be felt throughout the world, because the victor will afterwards be in a position to spread his force with a view to

capturing or destroying any detached forces of the enemy, and generally to gather the fruits of victory, in the shape of such outlying positions as the New Hebrides, Fijis, Singapore, Samoa, Cuba, Jamaica, Martinique, the Philippines, Malta, or Aden, which may be in possession of the enemy, his shipping and commerce, or even to prosecute such overseas campaigns as those in the Peninsula and South Africa.

Stress is laid on the importance of the great battle for supremacy, because the great development of the navies of France, Germany, the United States, and Russia, indicate the possibility that such battles may have to be fought in the future. It is the battleships chiefly which will have to be concentrated for the decisive battle, and arrangements with this object must be made during peace.

The geographical conditions and the varied interests of the maritime powers prevent such complete concentration in modern times as was practicable in the past. Thus Russia divides her battleships between the Baltic and Pacific; the United States between the Atlantic and Pacific; both Germany and France have concentrated in European waters, where therefore, the greater part of the British battleships are massed, leaving a detachment only on the China Station to "contain" or hold in check any hostile force in those seas while the decisive struggle is being fought out elsewhere.

Our possible enemies are fully aware of the necessity of concentrating on the decisive points. They will endeavour to prevent this by threatening our detached squadrons and trade in different quarters, and thus obliging us to make further detachments from the main fleets. All these operations will be of secondary importance, but it will be necessary that we should have sufficient power available to carry on a vigorous offensive against the hostile outlying squadrons without unduly weakening the force concentrated for the decisive battle, whether in Europe or elsewhere.

The immense importance of the principle of concentration and the facility with which ships and squadrons can be moved from one part of the world to another—it is more easy to move a fleet from Spithead to the Cape or Halifax than it is to move a large army, with its equipment, from Cape Town to Pretoria—points to the necessity of a single navy, under one control, by which alone concerted action between the several parts can be assured.

In the foregoing remarks the word *defence* does not appear. It is omitted advisedly, because the primary object of the British Navy is not to defend anything, but to attack the fleets of the enemy, and, by defeating them, to afford protection to British dominions, shipping, and commerce. This is the ultimate aim.

To use the word *defence* would be misleading, because the word carries with it the idea of a thing to be defended, which would divert attention to local defence instead of fixing it on the force from which attack is to be expected.

The traditional rôle of the British Navy is not to act on the defensive, but to prepare to attack the force which threatens—in other words, to assume the offensive. On one occasion England departed from her traditional policy, and acting on the defensive, kept her ships in harbour unrigged and unmanned, with the result that the Dutch fleet sailed up the Medway and burnt the ships of war at their moorings.

The strength and composition of the British Navy, or of any British squadron, depends, therefore, upon the strength and composition of the hostile forces which it is liable to meet.

The great increase which is now being made in the strength of the principal navies is shown in the following table, in which all small vessels are omitted:—

	France.		Germany.		Russia.		United States.	
	1902.	1907.	1902.	1907.	1902.	1907.	1902.	1907.
Battleships, first and second class.	27	35	13	26	17	25	10	18
Cruisers	47	65	28	43	20	33	26	41
Estimated total personnel required on mobilisation.	64,000	78,000	31,800	42,900	45,600	53,000	32,500*	48,000
Personnel on active list ...	51,300	—	33,400	—	60,000	—	33,000	—

* This was the number in the Spanish-American War.

The corresponding figures for the British Navy in 1902 are:—

Battleships (first and second class)	44
Cruisers	127
Personnel required to man war fleets	129,704
Effective personnel on active list	113,292

To meet the increase in foreign navies great additions will be required in the immediate future to the British Naval force.

The total estimated National Expenditure for 1902-3, exclusive of war charges, amounts to £129,159,000, of which the Navy Estimates account for £31,255,500, or about one-fourth, which is equal to a contribution of 15s. 1d. per head of the population of the United Kingdom. If this were divided equally per head among the white population of the Empire, the charge per head would amount to 12s. 0½d. For the actual naval expenditure per head in the several parts of the Empire, see Appendix A.

The annual value of British trade, which it is the ultimate object of the Navy to protect, amounted in 1900 to:—

	£
Trade of United Kingdom with foreign countries	665,895,000
British dominions beyond the Seas	211,555,000
Total trade of United Kingdom	£877,450,000
Total trade of British dominions beyond the Seas with foreign countries and among themselves	327,500,000

Of this last about one-third is estimated to be inter-colonial.

It will be seen that about one-fourth of the total trade of the empire is not directly connected with the United Kingdom.

The question may with advantage be further considered with reference to:—

1. European Waters.
2. Atlantic Ocean.
3. Eastern Seas and Pacific Ocean.

The greater part of the navies of France, Germany, and Russia are concentrated in European waters, the numbers elsewhere being:—

	France.	Germany.	Russia.	Great Britain.
Battleships	12	11	4	4
Cruisers	—	—	5	39

The main portion of the British Navy must therefore be concentrated in those European waters which will probably be the scene of the decisive battles.

The foreign Powers whose naval forces in the Atlantic Ocean require consideration are:—

France.
United States.

The whole naval force of France in the Atlantic is now under one command, with bases at Martinique in the West Indies, Dakar on the West Coast of Africa, and ports in France.

A squadron based on Martinique would threaten all our West Indian trade, as well as those parts of the British dominions which lie in those seas.

The trade which passes within striking distance of Dakar cannot be placed at a less value than £140,000,000 per annum, of which about one-fourth is with South African ports, one-third with Australasia, and one-fourth with South America. South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand are therefore each interested in the

maintenance of a squadron on the West Coast of Africa sufficiently powerful to dominate any French force operating from that point.

The British Trade in the North Atlantic to the continent of North America amounts to upwards of £200,000,000 per annum, of which about five-sixths is with the United States.

The trade of Canada in 1900 amounted to £76,582,000, of which about £31,341,000 was with the United Kingdom, £1,882,000 with other British Dominions, and the remainder with Foreign countries, including the United States. The attack on this trade which would offer the best prospect of success would be by ships operating from ports in France. Canada would therefore be interested in the success of the British squadrons employed on the coast of France as well as in that of the North American squadron.

About one-third of the navy of the United States is usually on the Pacific Coast or in the Eastern Seas, and the remainder in the Atlantic.

Should Great Britain be unfortunately involved in a war with that country, the assistance which could be given to Canada would depend on her communications being kept open with Great Britain. Ability to do this would depend upon the strength of the British fleets on the coast of America, which in case of simultaneous complications with another Power would be determined by the force which could be spared from European waters. Canada is therefore interested in the strength of the British fleet as a whole.

The force which Great Britain maintains at present in commission on the North American and West Indian, the South-East Coast of America, and Cape of Good Hope stations consists of 1 battleship and 13 cruisers, besides smaller vessels.

For details of the forces maintained in the Atlantic Ocean, *see* Appendix B.

The cost of maintaining the British squadrons on these stations, exclusive of any interest or sinking fund on the first cost of building is £802,000 per annum (for details, *see* Appendix A. 1). This is included in the General Naval Vote, which is borne by the United Kingdom aided by annual payments, spontaneously offered, by the Cape of Good Hope of £30,000 and by Natal of £12,000 in lieu of 12,000 tons of coal.

The foreign Powers which have Possessions and maintain naval forces in the Eastern seas, by which is meant the waters of Australasia, the China Seas, and the Indian Ocean, are—

Russia,	United States,
France,	Holland,
Japan,	Germany.

The strength of the forces is constantly changing.

The present Russian naval force in the China seas consists of—

4 battleships,
5 cruisers,

which may shortly be augmented by—

2 battleships,
4 cruisers.

With the smaller vessels the strength of the crews will be, roughly, 13,000.

The present French naval force in the Eastern seas and Pacific Ocean consists of—

1 battleship,
8 cruisers,

besides a number of smaller vessels; the strength of the crews being about 5,000.

The President of the French Republic has recently issued a decree, which, if

carried out, will increase the French naval forces in the China Seas, Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Australasian waters to—

2 armoured cruisers,
3 very fast corsair cruisers,
7 2nd or 3rd class protected cruisers,

and place them under one command with bases at Saigon, Diègo Suarez, and Noumea, the whole force being divided into two squadrons free to cruise in Eastern seas.

The Japanese Navy consists of—

7 battleships,
24 cruisers (principal),

besides a large number of smaller vessels; the strength of the Japanese *personnel* for 1901 was fixed at 27,961.

Each of the other foreign squadrons is weaker than either the Russian squadron or the Japanese Navy.

(For details of these forces, *vide* App. B.)

The British force which is now being maintained on the China, Australia, East Indies, and Pacific Stations comprises—

4 battleships,
28 cruisers,

besides a number of smaller vessels, the whole manned by upwards of 17,500 officers and men.

The ultimate aim of the British squadrons is by the destruction of the ships of war of the enemy to protect British dominions and British trade.

The importance of the former is too obvious to be dwelt upon, the magnitude of the latter in Eastern waters is shown in the following table, which gives the total value of the exports and imports of 1900 in the States mentioned :—

	With United Kingdom.	Inter-Colonial with Commonwealth.	With other British Dominions.	With Foreign Countries.	Total.
	£	£	£	£	£
Commonwealth of Australia.	50,582,000	27,264,000	11,675,000	25,053,000	114,574,000
New Zealand	16,764,000	—	4,502,000	2,627,000	23,893,000
India	66,124,000	—	26,214,000	49,874,000	142,212,000

Thus, less than half the trade is with the United Kingdom, and yet the cost of maintaining the British squadrons in the Eastern Seas and Pacific, which are ultimately charged with the protection of the whole, is thus apportioned :—

Great Britain	£1,994,400
Commonwealth of Australia	75,500
New Zealand	15,500
India	161,600

The total charge, exclusive of any interest or sinking fund on the first cost of building, amounts to £2,247,000 per annum (for details, *see* Appendix A. 1).

Admiralty,
June, 1902.

APPENDIX "A."

BRITISH EMPIRE.
NAVAL EXPENDITURE.

Year.	—	Population.	Naval Expenditure.	Naval Expenditure per Head of Population.	Remarks.
1902-3	United Kingdom ...	41,454,621	£ 31,255,500	s. 15 1	
	New South Wales ...	1901. 1,352,509	1900. 47,831	8½	
	Victoria ...	1,199,068	59,401	1 0 nearly	
	Queensland ...	496,596	34,796	1 2	
	South Australia ...	362,604	17,594	11½	
	Western Australia ...	182,553	4,732	6½	
	Tasmania ...	172,475	4,970	7 nearly	
	Total—Australia	3,765,805	169,324	10½	
	New Zealand ...	772,719	20,924	6½	
30.6.99	Canada ...	5,312,500	Nil	Nil	
"	Newfoundland ...	210,000	Nil	Nil	
"	Cape of Good Hope (White).	538,000	30,000	1 1¼	£30,000 paid annually towards expenditure of Imperial Government.
1898	Natal ...	53,688	12,000	4 5¼	£12,000 paid in lieu of 12,000 tons of coal.
31.3.99	*India ...	216,710,483 Europeans 168,000	413,747 (for year 1900)	—	

* Includes £100,000 contribution towards H.M. Ships on East Indies Station, and £61,000 subsidy to Admiralty for manning and maintaining H.M. ships for naval defence of India.

APPENDIX "A. 1."

TABLE showing the Annual Cost of Maintenance, exclusive of first cost of building, of the British Squadrons in I.—Atlantic Ocean; II.—Eastern Seas and Pacific Ocean:—

I.—ATLANTIC OCEAN.

	£
North America and West Indian ...	330,000
Cape of Good Hope ...	396,000
South-East Coast of America ...	76,000
Total ...	£802,000

II.—EASTERN SEAS AND PACIFIC.

	£
China ...	1,430,000
East Indies ...	303,000
Australia ...	312,000
Total Eastern Seas ...	£2,045,000
Pacific ...	202,000
Total ...	£2,247,000

APPENDIX B.

The following tables give the principal Foreign Powers on the NORTH AMERICA, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, SOUTH-EAST COAST OF AMERICA, PACIFIC STATIONS, and in the EASTERN SEAS on April 15th, 1902. (The names of Battleships and Cruisers only are given, for smaller vessels the total numbers of each class):—

I.—ATLANTIC OCEAN.
NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.

Classification.	Name.	Date of Launch.	Year.	Tons.	Measured Mile Speed.	Remarks.
UNARMOURD.	"Tage" ...	1886	1886	7,459	19.2	Besides these France could draw on all ships in Home waters.
Cruiser, 1st Class, Protected Cruisers, 2nd Class, Protected.	"Suehet" ...	1893	1893	3,362	20.4	
Cruiser, 3rd Class, Protected Special and smaller vessels	"Ialy" ...	1891	1891	4,406	20.0	
	"D'Estrees" ...	1897	1897	2,421	20.5	
	2 ...	1887-1890	1887-1890	231-1,478	8.5-10.6	
UNARMOURD.	"Vinetta" ...	1897	1897	5,791	19.2	Besides these Germany could draw on all ships in Home waters.
Cruiser, 2nd Class, Protected Cruisers, 3rd Class, Protected.	"Gazelle" ...	1898	1898	2,690	20.2	
	"Falke" ...	1891	1891	1,555	15.5	
	JAPAN (NH.)					
UNARMOURD.	"Utrecht" ...	1898	1898	3,960	21.0	
Cruiser, 2nd Class, Protected Gunboat	1 ...	1877	1877	870	9.3	

About two-thirds of the United States navy is usually in the Atlantic.

UNITED STATES.

HOLLAND.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE AND SOUTH-EAST COAST OF AMERICA.
(All on Cape Station except where stated in the column of Remarks.)

Classification.	Name.	Date of Launch.	Load Displacement.	Measured Mile Speed.	Remarks.	Classification.	Name.	Date of Launch.	Load Displacement.	Measured Mile Speed.	Remarks.
		Year.	Tons.	Knots.				Year.	Tons.	Knots.	
		RUSSIA (Nil).				ARMoured.	GREAT BRITAIN.				
		FRANCE.				Battleship, 3rd Class ...	"Monarch" ...	1868	8,845	15.2	
Special and smaller Vessels	3 ...	1883-1887	167-600	8.5-9.5		UNARMoured.					
		GERMANY (3 Surveying.)				Cruiser, 1st Class ...	"Gibraltar" ...	1892	7,700	19.7	
		JAPAN (Nil).				Cruisers, 2nd Class ...	"Forte" ...	1893	4,360	19.3	
		UNITED STATES.					"Terpeichore" ...	1891	3,400	20.0	
ARMoured.						Cruisers, 3rd Class ...	"Cambrian" ...	1893	4,360	19.3	South-east Coast America.
Battleship, 1st Class ...	"Iowa" ...	1896	11,340	17.0	S.E. coast America.		"Pearl" ...	1890	2,575	19.2	
UNARMoured.							"Blanche" ...	1889	1,580	16.7	
Cruiser, 2nd Class, Protected	"Atlanta" ...	1884	3,300	15.6			"Barracouta" ...	1889	1,580	16.7	
		HOLLAND (Nil).				Sloops ...	3 ...	1888-89	1,140 to 1,170	14.0	2 South-east Coast America.
						Gunboats, 1st Class ...	5 ...	1886-98	710 to 805	13.2-13.7	
						Special Service Vessels ...	2 ...	1890	90	10.5	Zambesi River.
						Torpedo Boats ...	4 ...	—	28 to 60	16.9-18.6	

NOTE.—Besides the above, on the S.E. coast of America the *Argentine Republic* has a fleet of 1 3rd Class Battleship, 4 Coast Defence Ships, 4 1st Class Cruisers, 3 2nd Class Cruisers, 1 3rd Class Cruiser, 3 Destroyers, 12 Torpedo Boats, and 10 small Ships.
Brazil has 2 Battleships, 3rd Class; 3 Coast Defence Ships, 2 2nd Class Cruisers, 4 3rd Class Cruisers, 1 Sloop, 5 Torpedo Vessels, 10 smaller Vessels, 13 Torpedo Boats, and 2 Submarines.

II.—PACIFIC OCEAN.

Classification.	Name.	Date of Launch.	Load Displacement.	Measured Mile Speed.	Remarks.	Classification.	Name.	Date of Launch.	Load Displacement.	Measured Mile Speed.	Remarks.
		Year.	Tons.	Knots.				Year.	Tons.	Knots.	
	RUSSIA (Nil).						GREAT BRITAIN.				
	FRANCE.						UNARMOURED.				
UNARMOURED.						Cruisers, 1st Class	"Grafton"	1892	7,350	20.0	
Cruiser, 2nd Class, Protected	"Protet"	1898	4,001	20.2	{ See remarks against French Squadron in Eastern seas.	Cruisers, 2nd Class	"Amphion"	1882	4,300	16.6	
Special and smaller Vessels	4 ...	1885-1899	637 to 1,575	10.5 to 13.0		"Phaeton"	1882	4,300	16.6		
						Sloop	1 ...	1900	980	13.25	
						Torpedo Boat Destroyers	2 ...	1895	360	30.0	
						Torpedo Boats	2 ...	1885	40	—	
	GERMANY AND JAPAN (Nil).										
	UNITED STATES.										
ARMOURED.											
Battleships, 1st Class	"Wisconsin"	1898	11,553	17.2	Training ship.						
	"Oregon"	1893	10,288	16.8							
UNARMOURED.											
Cruisers, 2nd Class, Protected.	"Boston"	1884	3,035	15.6							
Cruisers, 3rd Class, Unprotected.	"Philadelphia"	1889	4,410	19.7							
	"Mohican"	1872	1,900	10.6							
	"Marblehead"	1892	2,089	18.4							
	"Bennington"	1890	1,710	17.5							
	"Concord"	1890	1,710	16.8							
Sloops	3 ...	1874-97	1,000-1,400	10 to 12.9		2 of these are Training ships.					
Gunboat	1 ...	1888	892	11.8							
Torpedo Boat Destroyer	1 ...	1898	279	30.1							
Torpedo Boats, 1st Class	3 ...	—	—	—							
	HOLLAND (Nil).										

NOTE.—Besides the above, *Chili* has a squadron as follows:—1 Battleship, 2nd Class; 2 Coast Defence Ships, 2 1st Class Cruisers, 3 2nd Class Cruisers, 2 3rd Class Cruisers, 3 Torpedo Vessels, 9 Destroyers, 5 Torpedo Boats.

RUSSIA.

III.—EAST

Classification.	Name.	Date of Launch.	Load Displacement.	Measured Mile Speed.	Remarks.
ARMOURD.					
Battleships, 1st Class ...	"Peresvyet" ...	1898	12,764	19.1	The Russian Squadron may shortly be increased by:— 2 Battleships. 3 1st-Class Cruisers, Protected. 1 2nd-Class Cruiser, Protected.
	"Petrovskiy" ...	1894	10,960	16.8	
	"Poltava" ...	1894	10,960	16.3	
Cruisers, 1st Class ...	"Sevastopol" ...	1895	10,960	17.5	
	"Gromoboi" ...	1899	12,364	20.0	
	"Rossiya" ...	1896	12,200	20.2	
	"Rurik" ...	1892	10,933	18.7	
Gun Vessels ...	"Adm. Nakhimov" ...	1885	8,500	17.0	
	"Varyag" ...	1892	1,492	15.0	
UNARMOURD.					
Cruiser, 1st Class, Protected ...	"Varyag" ...	1899	6,500	23.6	
SMALLER VESSELS.					
Sloops ...	4 ...	1878-86	1,200-1,335	13-15	
Torpedo Vessels ...	2 ...	1893	400	21.0	
Mining Transports ...	2 ...	1899	2,500	17.5	
Destroyers ...	21 ...	1898-01	200-350	26-29	
Special and smaller Vessels ...	6 ...	1885-97	700-960	11.5-13.0	
Torpedo Boat, 1st Class ...	10 ...	1886-98	76-140	19.2-25.0	
Torpedo Boat, 2nd Class ...	7 ...	1877	23-31	16.0	

FRANCE.

ARMOURD.				
Battleship, 3rd Class ...	"Redoutable" ...	1876	9,224	16.0
Cruiser, 1st Class ...	"Vauban" ...	1882	6,110	14.3
Gun Vessels ...	2 ...	1885-91	abt. 1,700	11.6 & 15
UNARMOURD.				
Cruiser, 1st Class, Protected ...	"D'Entrecasteaux" ...	1896	7,995	19.2
Cruisers, 2nd Class, Protected ...	"Pascal" ...	1895	3,951	20.0
	"Friant" ...	1893	3,882	19.2
	"Bugeaud" ...	1893	3,809	18.9
	"Catinat" ...	1896	4,048	19.6
Cruiser, 3rd Class, Protected ...	"Infatigable" ...	1899	2,435	21.0
Sloop ...	1 ...	1897	1,276	15.0
Destroyer ...	1 ...	1898	200	33.6
Special and smaller Vessels ...	24 ...	1881-1900	125-1,680	9-13
Torpedo Boat, 1st Class ...	1 ...	1901	85	24.0
Torpedo Boats, 3rd Class ...	5 ...	1880	32	17.0

Decree of April, 1902, directs that French Navy in Eastern Seas to consist of:—
2 Armoured Cruisers.
3 very fast Corsaire Cruisers.
7 2nd and 3rd-Class Prot. Cruisers, with bases at Saigon, Diego Suarez, and Noumea.
East Indies.
East Indies.
Captured from Chinese.
4 of these in East Indies.

GERMANY.

ARMOURD.					
Cruiser, 1st Class	"Furst Bismarck"	1897	10,482	19.0	Will be increased by one Cruiser, 1st Class, about October.
UNARMOURD.					
Cruisers, 2nd Class, Protected...	"Hertha"	1897	5,569	19.2	
	"Hansa"	1898	5,791	19.2	
Cruiser, 3rd Class, Protected ...	"Thetis"	1900	2,600	21.7	
Cruisers, 3rd Class, Unprotected	"Bussard"	1890	1,555	16.5	
	"Geier"	1894	1,597	16.4	
	"Seeadler"	1892	1,614	15.8	
	"Cormoran"	1892	1,612	16.0	
Sloop	1	1887	1,102	14.2	In Australia.
Gunboat	4	1898-99	881-961	14.5	
Destroyers	2	1898-00	200-344	27-33	
Special Vessels	3	1879-00	35-834	10-12	1 in Australia.

UNITED STATES.

ARMOURD.					
Battleship, 1st Class ...	"Kentucky" ...	1898	11,540	16.9	
Cruiser, 1st Class ...	"New York" ...	1891	8,200	21.0	
Coast Defence ...	"Monterey" ...	1891	4,084	13.6	
	"Monadnock" ...	1883	3,990	12.0	
UNARMOURD.					
Cruiser, 2nd Class, Protected ...	"New Orleans" ...	1896	3,437	20.0	
Cruisers, 3rd Class, Protected ...	"Isla de Cuba" ...	1886	1,125	14.0	
	"Isla de Luzon" ...	1886	1,125	14.0	
Cruisers, 3rd Class, Unprotected ...	"Yorktown" ...	1888	1,710	16.1	
	"Don Juan de Austria" ...	1887	1,130	14.5	
Sloops ...	6 ...	1863-97	1,000-1,397	11.2-15.5	
Special and smaller Vessels ...	19 ...	1883-96	140-4,360	7.5-12	

HOLLAND.

ARMOURD.					
Coast Defence ...	"Piet Hein" ...	1894	3,464	16.2	
UNARMOURD.					
Cruisers, 2nd Class, Protected ...	"K. Wilhelmina der Ned." ...	1892	4,527	16.5	
	"Gelderland" ...	1898	3,969	20.0	
	"Noordbrabant" ...	1899	3,969	20.0	
	"Friesland" ...	1896	3,838	19.5	
	"Zeeland" ...	1897	3,838	19.8	
Cruiser, 3rd Class, Unprotected ...	"Java" ...	1885	1,280	12.6	
Gunboat ...	12 ...	1887-00	541-800	12.5-14	
Special and smaller Vessels ...	4 ...	1877-01	690-866	8.6-10.0	
Torpedo Boats ...	3 ...	1888-00	82-101	21.2-24.3	3 of which are surveying vessels.

ERN SEAS.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Classification.	Name.	Date of Launch.	Load Displacement.	Measured Mile Speed.	Remarks.
ARMOURD.					
Battleships, 1st Class ...	"Glory" ...	1899	12,950	18.2	
	"Albion" ...	1898	12,950	18.2	
	"Ocean" ...	1898	12,950	18.2	
	"Goliath" ...	1898	12,950	18.2	
Cruisers, 1st Class ...	"Creasy" ...	1899	12,000	21.0	
	"Orlando" ...	1886	5,600	18.1	Has been relieved by "Amphitrite."
UNARMOURD.					
Cruisers, 1st Class ...	"Terrible" ...	1895	14,200	22.1	
	"Argonaut" ...	1898	11,000	20.75	
	"Blenheim" ...	1890	9,000	21.1	
	"Endymion" ...	1891	7,350	20.0	
	"Royal Arthur" ...	1891	7,700	19.7	Australia.
Cruisers, 2nd Class ...	"Talbot" ...	1895	5,600	19.5	
	"Eclipse" ...	1894	5,600	19.5	
	"Pique" ...	1890	3,600	19.75	
	"Arethusa" ...	1883	4,300	16.6	Detached from Pacific.
	"Highflyer" ...	1898	5,600	20.0	East Indies.
	"Fox" ...	1893	4,360	19.3	
Cruisers, 3rd Class ...	"Fearless" ...	1886	1,580	16.7	
	"Pomona" ...	1897	2,135	20.0	
	"Peregrine" ...	1897	2,135	20.0	East Indies.
	"Cossack" ...	1885	1,770	16.5	
	"Phoebe" ...	1890	2,575	19.2	
	"Aroher" ...	1885	1,770	16.5	
	"Pylades" ...	1884	1,420	12.6	
	"Katumba" ...	1889	2,575	19.2	Australia.
	"Mildura" ...	1889	2,575	19.2	
	"Tauranga" ...	1889	2,575	19.2	
	"Ringarooma" ...	1889	2,575	19.2	
	"Wallaroo" ...	1890	2,575	19.2	
SMALLER VESSELS.					
Sloops ...	8 ...	1891-1900	960-1,070	13-13.25	1 Australia.
Gunboats, 1st Class ...	10 ...	1886-1899	710-805	12.6-19	4 East Indies.
Gunboats, 2nd Class ...	1 ...	1877	455	9.4	4 Australia.
	2 ...	1877	366	8.2	
Destroyers ...	7 ...	1895-1898	275-340	27-33.6	
Special service ...	9 ...	1882-1901	85-1,130	9-13	1 East Indies.
Despatch Vessels ...	"Alacrity" ...	1885	1,700	17.5	
Torpedo Boats, 1st Class ...	13 ...	—	28-101	17-22	7 East Indies.

JAPAN.

ARMOURD.					
Battleships, 1st Class ...	"Mikasa" ...	1900	15,200	18.0	
	"Hatsuse" ...	1899	15,200	19.1	
	"Asahi" ...	1899	15,250	18.3	
	"Shikishima" ...	1898	14,850	19.0	
	"Fuji" ...	1896	12,450	18.5	
Battleships, 2nd Class ...	"Yashima" ...	1894	12,300	19.2	
	"Chinyen" (late "Chen-Yuen.") ...	1882	7,220	14.2	
Coast Defence ...	"Fuso" ...	1877	3,717	13.0	
	"Heiden" ...	1888	9,067	11.0	
Cruisers, 1st Class ...	"Iwate" ...	1900	9,750	21.7	
	"Idzumi" ...	1899	9,750	22.0	
	"Adzuma" ...	1899	9,436	21.0	
	"Yakumo" ...	1899	9,850	21.0	
	"Tokiwa" ...	1898	9,700	22.7	
	"Asama" ...	1898	9,700	22.1	
Cruiser, 3rd Class ...	"Chiyoda" ...	1890	2,450	19.0	
UNARMOURD.					
Cruisers, 2nd Class, Protected ...	"Chitose" ...	1898	4,898	22.7	
	"Kasagi" ...	1898	4,784	22.7	
	"Takasago" ...	1897	4,180	22.5	
	"Akitsushima" ...	1892	3,100	19.0	
	"Yoshino" ...	1892	4,150	22.5	
	"Hashidate" ...	1891	4,210	16.0	
	"Matsushima" ...	1890	4,210	16.0	
	"Itsukushima" ...	1889	4,210	16.0	
	"Naniwa" ...	1885	3,650	18.7	
	"Takachiho" ...	1885	3,650	18.7	
Cruisers, 3rd Class, Protected ...	"Chihaya" ...	1900	1,250	21.0	
	"Akashi" ...	1897	2,700	19.5	
	"Suma" ...	1895	2,700	20.0	
	"Idzumi" ...	1883	2,920	17.0	
	"Saiyō" ...	1883	2,264	14.0	
	"Hi-yō" ...	1878	2,248	13.2	
	"Kongo" ...	1878	2,248	13.2	Training hips.
Cruisers, 3rd Class, Unprotected ...	"Miyako" ...	1877	1,800	20.0	
	"Yaeyama" ...	1889	1,583	20.0	
	"Takao" ...	1888	1,750	15.0	
	"Musashi" ...	1886	1,478	12.0	
	"Katsuragi" ...	1885	1,478	12.0	
	"Yamato" ...	1885	1,478	12.0	
	"Tenryū" ...	1883	1,540	12.0	
	"Kadmon" ...	1882	1,345	12.0	
	"Tsukushi" ...	1882	1,340	16.0	
Torpedo Vessel ...	1 ...	1894	830	21.0	
Destroyer ...	14 ...	1898-02	279-373	30.5-31.2	
Mining Transport ...	1 ...	1888	4,120	13.0	
Special and smaller Vessels ...	13 ...	1879-91	433-911	8-13.0	
Torpedo Boat, Divisional ...	7 ...	1886-00	113-203	19.5-29.0	
Torpedo Boat, 1st Class ...	31 ...	1892-00	80-109	20.3-26.5	
Torpedo Boat, 2nd Class ...	26 ...	1886-01	52-73	19.5-21.0	
Torpedo Boat, 3rd Class ...	1 ...	—	16	10.6	

APPENDIX IV.

DETAILED PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

If it were desired to maintain on the Australian Station some such naval force as was discussed between Rear-Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont and Sir John Forrest, the form which the proposals of the Admiralty would probably take would be a squadron necessitating a total expenditure by the Commonwealth and New Zealand, as given in the following statement and Appendices:—

For details
see Ap-
pendix A.

A payment by Australia and New Zealand of £367,000 per annum, of which the shares would be—

	£
Australia	304,515
New Zealand	62,485
	<hr/> £367,000

would amount to very nearly 1s. 7½d. per head of the population of those Colonies; to which must be added the cost of the Reserves, which cannot be estimated with any accuracy but should be within £100,000. This would bring the total payment to something less than £467,000 per annum, or a little more than 2s. per head of population, *see* Appendix A.

This would enable the Admiralty to build and maintain at Imperial rates of pay five second-class cruisers of improved "Challenger" type, three being kept in commission and two in reserve.

One or more of these cruisers in commission might be manned, as far as possible, by Australians and New Zealanders paid at special rates; and if this is accepted the additional charge per annum for each ship would be £26,000, assuming the special rates of pay to be the same as those given to the crew of the "Protector," which means an additional charge of 1½d. per head of population per ship.

It is probable that the special rates of pay finally decided on may be considerably less than the above.

The ships in reserve would be manned on mobilisation by crews partly drawn from the squadron and partly entered locally, but arrangements should be made to provide trained reserve men for this purpose; this would necessitate the maintenance of a reserve as follows:—

Seamen	1,100
Stokers	400
	<hr/> 1,500

These men would carry out their annual drills on board the five ships of the "Katoomba" class which, when relieved, would be available for that purpose and could be stationed at suitable ports for this duty.

The extra annual cost would be—

Maintenance of five "Katoombas" as drill ships ...	£ 72,500	} Imperial rates.
Pay, retainers, and clothing allowance to 1,100 seamen reservists ...	11,265	
Pay, retainers, and clothing allowance to 400 stoker reservists ...	4,000	
	<hr/> £87,765	

These figures are Imperial rates; the rates of pay of the reservists in Australia cannot at present be determined, but the total would probably approximate £100,000, or about 5½d. per head of population. If the number of drill ships is less than five, a reduction of £14,500 per ship would follow.

In order that officers born in Australia and New Zealand should be able to rise to the highest posts in the Royal Navy, they must not only be borne on the Imperial List, but must be entered and trained as other officers, and these ships would therefore be officered by officers on the regular List of the Navy; the presence in the Navy

of a due proportion of officers born in the British dominions beyond the sea being ensured by a sufficient number of nominations.

In addition to the ships above named, the Imperial Government would maintain in the Eastern Seas a force which would vary with the strength of the foreign squadrons in these waters, and a portion of which would either be permanently kept on the Australian Station or would visit it from time to time.

It would be understood that any ship manned by Australians and New Zealanders would be liable to service in any part of the Eastern Seas, but if temporarily removed from Australian waters in time of peace would be replaced by a corresponding ship from the China or East Indies Station.

While the Admiralty would undertake not to remove without replacement any of the ships provided under the special agreement with the Commonwealth and New Zealand from the Australian Station in time of peace without the consent of those Governments, it must be understood that they would be quite free to utilise them during a maritime war wherever in the Eastern Seas the most effective blow could be struck against the forces of the enemy.

The proposed scheme might come into force with the "Katoomba" class as soon as arrangements can be made. The "Karrakattas," being useless on the Station, should return to England.

In the event of the proposal to man a certain number of these ships by Australians and New Zealanders being accepted, the conditions under which they should be entered for service in a ship in commission would have to be hereafter decided, and also the regulations for the reserve.

It may be pointed out that the Admiralty are endeavouring to make Australasia a base of coal and supplies for the Squadrons in China and the Indian Ocean; the coal for the China Squadron is now obtained from Australia and New Zealand, and also a large quantity of provisions for the China and East Indies Stations, and it is further proposed that a portion of the coal for the East Indies Station should also come from Australia and New Zealand.

Admiralty,
June, 1902.

APPENDIX A.

COMPARISON OF PRESENT AND PROPOSED STRENGTH AND COST OF THE PART OF THE SQUADRON IN AUSTRALASIAN WATERS WHICH IS PAID FOR BY AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

PRESENT SQUADRON.

In Commission.

3 Cruisers
1 Gunboat

In Reserve.

2 Cruisers
1 Gunboat

SUGGESTED SQUADRON.

In Commission.

3 2nd-class Cruisers,
about 5,600 tons.

In Reserve.

2 2nd-class Cruisers,
about 5,600 tons.

COMPLEMENTS.

PRESENT.

In Commission.

3 Cruisers, 3rd cl. 656
1 Gunboat ... 93

749

SUGGESTED.

In Commission.

3 Cruisers, 2nd-class 1,515

It will be seen that the complements will be increased by 786.

COST.

The charge for building and completing for sea the ships provided by Australia and New Zealand may be taken as:—

PRESENT SHIPS.

£849,764

The average annual charge for maintenance may be taken as:—

£118,500

3 in commission, Imperial Rate 192,000
2 in reserve ... 50,000

Total ... £242,000

The annual contribution based on allowing 5 per cent. interest on the first cost of the vessels, and providing for the cost of maintenance would be:—

PRESENT SHIPS.

Interest ... £ 35,000
*Maintenance ... 91,000
£126,000

SUGGESTED SHIPS.

£ 125,000
242,000
£367,000

Of which, in 1901-1902,—

Australia actually paid £ 104,548
and New Zealand ... 21,452
Australia's share would be £ 304,515
New Zealand's ... 62,485

These figures are based on ships being manned by Imperial crews. If it is decided that one or more are to be manned by Australians and New Zealanders the following alterations are necessary:—

For each Cruiser manned by Australians and New Zealanders at special rates (those given to crew of "Protector" being taken) a maximum additional charge of £26,000 per annum or 1½d. per head of population would be required.

COST OF RESERVES.

†Maintenance of five "Katoombas" as drill ships 72,500
Pay, retainers, and clothing allowance to—
1,100 Seamen Reservists ... 11,265
400 Stoker Reservists ... 4,000
Imperial rates.
£87,765

These figures are given at Imperial rates (i.e., the cost of R.N.R. men in United Kingdom). At Australian rates this would be considerably more, and would probably approximate £100,000.

This would bring the total naval expenditure up to £467,000, or 2s 0½d. per head of population—

Of which Australia's share would be ... £ 387,490
and New Zealand's share would be ... 79,510

* In the original agreement the cost of maintenance to be paid by Australia and New Zealand was not to exceed £91,000.
† If it is found possible to do with a less number of these ships, a reduction of £14,500 can be made for each.

COMPARISON OF PRESENT STRENGTH AND COST OF THE PART OF AUSTRALIAN SQUADRON PAID FOR BY AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WITH THAT PROPOSED BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THAT BY THE ADMIRALTY

Present Strength.	As Proposed by Commander-in-Chief, Australia.	As suggested by Admiralty.
In Commission:— 3 Cruisers, 3rd Class. 1 Gunboat.	1 Cruiser, 1st Class, of "Royal Arthur" type. 3 "Challengers."	3 2nd-Class Cruisers (about 5,600 tons).
In Reserve:— 2 Cruisers, 3rd Class. 1 Gunboat.	1 "Challenger."	2 2nd-Class Cruisers (about 5,600 tons).

COMPLEMENTS—SHIPS IN COMMISSION.

3 3rd-Class Cruisers ... 656	1 1st-Class Cruiser ... 570	3 2nd-Class Cruisers (about 5,600 tons) ... 1,515
1 Gunboat ... 93	3 "Challengers" ... 1,515	
Total ... 749	Total ... 2,085	Total ... 1,515

COST.

(a.) FIRST COST COMPLETE FOR SEA, INCLUDING ARMAMENT.

5 3rd-Class Cruisers and 2 Gunboats ... £ 849,764	1 Cruiser, 1st Class... 510,663 4 "Challengers" ... 1,739,404 £2,250,067	5 2nd-Class Cruisers (about 5,600 tons) ... 2,500,000
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(b.) ANNUAL CHARGE FOR MAINTENANCE—IMPERIAL RATES.

*Annual Cost of present Ships paid for by Australia and New Zealand ... £ 118,500	1 Cruiser, 1st Class, in Commission ... 65,700 3 "Challengers" in Commission ... 192,000 1 "Challenger" in Reserve ... 25,000 £282,700	3 2nd-Class Cruisers in Commission ... 192,000 2 2nd-Class Cruisers in Reserve ... 50,000 £242,000
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The annual payment, based on allowing 5 per cent. interest on the first cost of the vessels, and providing for the cost of maintenance at Imperial rates would be:—

Interest ... £ 35,000	Interest ... £ 112,500	Interest ... £ 125,000
*Maintenance ... 91,000	Maintenance ... 282,700	Maintenance ... 242,000
Total ... £126,000	Total ... £395,200	Total ... £367,000

It will be noticed that the suggestion of the Admiralty involves a saving of £28,200 per annum over that of the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

* In the original agreement the cost of maintenance to be paid by Australia and New Zealand was not to exceed £91,000.

APPENDIX B.

MEN.

TABLE showing COMPLEMENTS of different SHIPS and the NUMBER of MEN required to man the proposed ships in Reserve, assuming that Crews are required for the Four "Algerines."

Ship.	Military Branch.						G. and T. Ratings included in preceding columns.								Engine Room Branch.				Artisans.							Medical Branch.	Writers S.S. and Staff.	M.A.A. and Ships' Police.	Miscellaneous and Domestic.	Marines.			
	C.P.O., and P.O. 1.	P.O. 2, L.S.	A.B. and Ords.	Boys.	Signal Branch.	Sail-maker.	G.I.	C. of G.	2nd C. of G.	S.G.	Q.G.	T.I.	L.T.O.	S.T.	C.E.R.A.	E.R.A.	Chief Stoker.	Leading Stoker.		Carpenter's Mate and leading shipwright.	Shipwright, L.C.C., C.C.	Blacksmith, Plumber, Cooper.	Painter.	Chief Armourer, Armourer, Electrician.	Armourer's Mate and Armourer's Crew.								
																		1st Class.	2nd Class.														
"Challenger," complement of ...	17	18	166	28	13	1	3	11	11	27	13	1	4	10	3	9	6	11	5	25	3	5	3	1	3	2	2	4	4	17	2	2	52
"Ringarooma," " " ...	8	8	52	11	8	—	2	8	8	12	6	1	4	15	2	6	3	7	3	48	2	3	3	1	1	2	1	2	1	11	1	1	20
"Algerine," " " ...	5	4	27	5	4	1	1	6	6	9	4	—	1	2	1	2	3	2	1	14	2	2	—	1	—	1	1	1	1	8	1	—	11
Ratings required for 2 "Challengers" on Mobilisation.	34	36	332	56	26	2	6	22	22	54	26	2	8	20	6	18	12	22	10	190	6	10	6	2	6	4	4	8	8	34	4	4	104
Ratings required for 2 Merchant Cruisers.	18	34	200 (R.N.R.)	—	6	—	1	—	—	17	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	2	4	70	
Total ...	52	70	332 + 200 (R.N.R.)	56	32	2	7	22	22	71	34	2	8	20	6	18	12	22	10	190	6	10	6	2	6	6	4	8	10	34	6	8	174
Ratings available in Reserve at Sydney.	8	—	41	—	1	1	1	—	—	8	—	2	3	8	—	17	—	21	—	41	6	6	6	1	1	3	1	6	2	7	2	7	55
Ratings required to complete ships in Reserve and 2 Merchant Cruisers.	44	70	291 + 200 (R.N.R.)	56	31	1	6	22	22	63	34	—	5	12	6	1	12	1	10	149	—	4	—	1	5	3	3	2	8	27	4	1	119

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OFFICERS.

Ship.	Military Branch.												Engineer Branch.		Medical Branch.	Paymaster Branch.	Chap. and N.I.	Carpenter.	Marine Officer.
	Captain.	Commander.	Lieutenant, G.	Lieutenant, T.	Lieutenant, or Commander, (N.)	Lieutenant.	Sub-Lieutenant.	Midshipman.	Gunner.	Gunner, T.	W.O. for Q.D.D.	Boatswain.	F.E. or C.E.	E. or A.E.					
"Challenger," complement of ...	1	1	1	—	1	3	1	10	1	1	1	—	1	3	3	2	1	1	1
"Ringarooma," " " ...	1	—	1	—	1	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	1	1	2	—	1	—
"Algerine," " " ...	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	—
Officers required for 2 "Challengers" on mobilisation.	2	2	2	—	2	6	2	20	2	2	2	—	2	6	6	4	2	2	2
Officers required for 2 Merchant Cruisers.	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Total ...	2	4	2	—	2	8 + 2 R.N.R.	2	20	4	2	2	—	2	6	6	6	2	2	2
Officers available in Reserve at Sydney.	1	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	3	2	1	2	—	1	—
Officers required to complete ships in Reserve and 2 Merchant Cruisers.	1	4	2	—	1	7 + 2 R.N.R.	2	20	4	1	2	—	—	4	5	4	2	1	2

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APPENDIX V. (1).

1900.

New Zealand.

DEFENCES OF THE COLONY.

STATEMENT by the Right Hon. R. J. SEDDON, Premier and Minister of Defence, respecting HARBOUR DEFENCES, COLONIAL DEFENCE FORCES, IMPERIAL RESERVE, CADET CORPS, RIFLE CLUBS, and other Matters connected with the DEFENCES of the COLONY.

MR. SPEAKER,

HONOURABLE members will, I hope, agree with me that it is consistent with one's duty to the Empire and to the colony, and not out of place, to give attention at this juncture to the all-important subject of our defences, and, if possible, to evolve a means of perfecting, extending, and strengthening the same, both for internal and external purposes.

The equipping and sending of our contingents, and the lessons taught by the war in South Africa, must not be ignored. We must not be blind to the altered conditions that have arisen during the last few months, and which at present may appear trifling, but which in years to come may be a source of anxiety to the colony and the Empire.

There are also eventualities that may arise in connection with the adjustment of affairs in China; and, taking the outlook as a whole, it is prudent for us to complete our harbour defences, increase and fully equip our Volunteer corps, give a military training to our youths, encourage rifle-clubs, and, in addition, create a reserve force equal to any emergency.

The chief drawback has been the finding of the capital required for the completion of our harbour defences, the equipment of the defence forces, the purchase of great and small arms and munitions of war. Important as these are, still, the opening-up and roading of our land, the construction of railways, and the development of our industries have been such a tax upon our resources that expenditure in regard to harbour defences, defence forces, rifle-clubs, and cadet corps has had, perforce, to be curtailed.

I therefore, with much reason, urge that it would be of advantage to the Mother Country and to the colonies if the moneys required for harbour defences and for arming the defence forces were raised by the Imperial authorities and advanced to the colony, which should pay interest thereon at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum. In the calculation of this interest the difference between the rate at which the colony could raise the moneys and the rate at which it is obtained by the Imperial authorities would form a sinking fund to pay off the principal within a reasonable time.

The proposal that the Imperial authorities should find the capital is warranted by the fact that the imperfect defences of the colonies would be remedied. There would also be the direct advantages to the Imperial authorities and the Empire in having a reserve force established ready for any contingency that might arise, and in having the most modern guns and small arms in the colonies, to the use of which our forces would be trained, and be available whenever required.

There are in New Zealand thousands of men capable of bearing arms, many of them trained, good riders, and good shots; yet we have in the colony rifles only for one-fourth of their number. Again, there is a large number of men of the native race who are well capable of bearing arms. In the past we have had a taste of the fighting qualities of the Maoris, both of those against and those with us; in fact, had it not been for the "friendlies" the troubles would not have ended so speedily or successfully as they did. All now, I am happy to say, are desirous of upholding the *mana* of our gracious Sovereign, and were *pouri* (sorrowful) at not being allowed to go with our sons in the contingents to South Africa. The time has long since arrived when we may with confidence trust those of the native race who enrol themselves in our Volunteer corps, and accept them to form part of the Imperial Reserve Force suggested in this memorandum.

I consider that, in addition to the 303 rifles now in the colony, to provide Volunteer corps in the South Island, the new corps enrolled and to be enrolled, the men in the Imperial reserve, and to have a reasonable stock in reserve, 30,000

magazine rifles are required. The cost of same, with freight, &c., added, would be about £120,000.

In the past, many companies of Volunteers and rifle-clubs have offered their services, which have been refused on account of the capital required for arms and equipment not being available. This also applies especially to the want of field batteries, and the completion and full equipment of harbour defences.

CLASSIFICATION.

The defence forces of the colony should be divided into the following classes, viz.:—(a) Permanent Artillery, for harbour defences; (b) ordinary Volunteer Forces; (c) Imperial and Colonial Reserve Forces; (d) rifle-clubs; and (e) cadet corps.

VOLUNTEERS.

When the present Commander of the Forces took office our Volunteers numbered about 4,200. The number of officers and men now enrolled totals 11,500. There are, in addition, some 90 corps offering their services, which, if accepted, would bring our total Volunteer Force up to over 18,000 officers and men. Most of the corps now offering their services are mounted. We take it for granted that, approximately, half would be mounted and the other half infantry. The present capitation grant for infantry is £2 10s., and for mounted corps £3 10s. The total amount required for capitation would therefore be £54,000 per annum. To this must be added, for accoutrements, water-bottles, haversacks, bandoliers, &c., £1 per head per annum or £18,000, which would bring the total cost up to £72,000.

To have our Volunteers efficient, increased training in camp is essential, and an additional payment may be found advisable. I estimate this at £8,000, bringing the total required to £80,000. We have now an up-to-date field battery, and other batteries have been ordered. The cost of these if manned by Volunteers would be at least £1,000 each, but if manned by permanent men and provided with horses £12,000 would be required.

To make our Volunteers efficient in shooting, ranges are necessary, but with the increasing population of our centres these are difficult to get. In the past there has been a great oversight in this respect, and we find ourselves in the position at the present time of having no suitable range available for the Volunteers in the large centres of population. To make the necessary provision now would entail a cost of £20,000, and when this is done (and the sooner it is done the better) a law should be passed that no person acquiring properties adjacent to or in the vicinity of these ranges should have any claim against the colony. Rifle-ranges are as essential to our welfare as our railways are, and they should be protected and maintained for all time.

IMPERIAL RESERVE.

In respect to the formation of an Imperial reserve the following shall apply:—It should be open to all officers and men belonging to the ordinary Volunteer corps to become efficient in both services, and to enlist for, say, three years in the reserve forces. The officers and men so enlisting should receive a fixed annual sum on being certificated as efficient, and be required to go into camp at stated periods for, say, four weeks in each year, the drills and camping as a Volunteer to count as part of the said four weeks. When in camp they should receive a sum amounting to at least half that now given under the Militia regulations. The Imperial Government should provide the capital required to purchase field batteries, rifles, and equipments of the force, the colonies paying a sum equal to one-half the interest on the first cost. In respect to all the forces when on service outside the colony the Imperial Government should provide the horses (when in the colony the men to provide their own horses), the payment of capitation and the payment of the forces when in camp in the colony, or on service outside the colony within prescribed limits, to be adjusted between the Imperial authorities and the colonial Governments on a population or other equitable basis. The reserve forces should be open for service within territorial limits to be agreed upon between the Imperial and the colonial Governments. The pay of the officers and men when on service outside the colonies should not be less than that which is being paid to the Fifth Contingent at present serving in South Africa.

Estimating the strength of our Volunteer corps at 18,000 men, we may reasonably expect that 8,000 of their number will enrol in the Imperial reserve. This

number, together with 2,000 men of the Maori race who would join the reserve, would bring the number up to 10,000 men. Putting the capitation on those efficient at £5 per capita, the annual cost would be £50,000, to which must be added the pay during the time the men are in camp—say about £50,000 more. Therefore there would be in this colony 10,000 men available, at an annual cost of £100,000. Taking it for granted that, in like proportion to population, the same number of men would enrol in the Australian Colonies and Tasmania and estimating the population of Australia and Tasmania at 3,500,000, the proportion would be 43,750 men. Added to the 10,000 in this colony, this would produce a reserve force of 53,750 men, or, in round numbers, an Imperial reserve of 50,000 men, at an annual cost of £1,000,000.

The captious critic may look upon this scheme as chimerical, and I had some doubts myself when, on the 11th May last, in a memorandum to His Excellency the Governor, I first outlined the scheme; but since then Major-General French has expressed the conviction that a force could be formed on the lines indicated, and, seeing that the drilling and training in camp of the Volunteers would count for that required by the reserve, there is little doubt that the number estimated by me would be reached.

RIFLE-CLUBS.

In respect of the formation of rifle-clubs, a club should consist of not less than 20 or more than 40 members; and in localities where volunteer corps have been formed only ex-Volunteers who have had not less than three years' service should be enrolled.

In localities where there are no Volunteer corps, rifle-clubs may enrol members who have not had Volunteer service.

Members of rifle-clubs should, where practicable, attend a prescribed number of drills and parades in the course of the year, the instruction being in respect to handling arms and firing exercise. The Government to supply rifles and ammunition to enrolled members of rifle-clubs at cost price.

After one year's enrolment members of rifle-clubs shall be tested at target practice, and on being able to make the minimum number of marks at the prescribed ranges, and having attended the prescribed number of drills and parades, they shall be entitled to receive a certificate as being efficient.

For the first year every enrolled member of a rifle-club shall receive a free grant of fifty rounds of ammunition, and thereafter to every efficient member of a rifle-club there shall be allowed a free grant of one hundred rounds of ammunition, to be used at matches or at practice.

Members of rifle-clubs also to have concession in the shape of free railway passes when attending rifle-shooting competitions.

CADET CORPS.

As has been stated by me in reply to questions, cadet corps should be established. They should be under the control of the Education Boards and the Education Department. A light rifle, similar to that used in the Colony of Victoria, should be provided for the use of, say, 20 of the elder boys in each school. The total number of boys who are in the Sixth Standard, or have passed it, is, say, 7,500, and the cost of giving one-fourth of them rifles would be £3,750.

In addition to the school cadet corps there are a number of youths in the colony who are not old enough to join the Volunteer corps, and the formation of these cadet corps and the enrolment of these youths would be of material advantage. The number likely to be enrolled is estimated at 5,000; the cost of rifles and equipments, estimated at £3 each, would make a total of £15,000.

The necessity for the establishment and enrolment of these cadet corps any one who has given this subject any consideration must readily admit. You commence to train the boys in the school; after leaving school they enrol in the ordinary cadet corps; and then, when they come of age, they will enrol in Volunteer corps. You take them from the schools and keep them under military training until they attain the Volunteer age. At the present time the lads, from the time they leave school until the time they attain the age at which they could be enrolled in the Volunteer corps, have their ardour damped, as well as their liking for drill; and this has been the means of preventing them from enrolling in the Volunteer Forces of the colony. No such thing as conscription is at all necessary in this colony; and I am satisfied that, if the suggestion now made should be given effect to, we

should have in the course of a few years fully 20,000 Volunteers equipped and complete.

NAVAL RESERVES.

In respect to the naval branch of the Imperial and Colonial Reserve Forces, arrangements should be made for the drilling of our Naval Volunteers, on a certain number of days in each year, on the cruisers belonging to the Australasian Squadron, these cruisers to be at the several ports in the colonies at times fixed for the purpose.

CONVERSION OF STEAMERS.

There are many of the merchant steamers coming to the colony which could be converted into cruisers. At present the officers and engineers on those steamers cannot qualify for the Naval Reserve. If they were allowed to have short periods of service on the cruisers when both steamers and cruisers were in port, these officers and engineers would in time qualify for the Naval Reserve.

EQUIPMENT OF STEAMERS.

There should be naval guns, equipment, and munitions of war for these colonial steamers convertible into cruisers, to be left at a depot within the colony, to be approved by the Imperial authorities; not necessarily at a port, yet safe from seizure, and within easy reach.

AUSTRALASIAN SQUADRON.

Owing to the altered conditions it is necessary that the Australasian Squadron should be strengthened by raising the class of vessels and increasing the number of cruisers, the colonies to pay the increased cost, on the basis of the present agreement.

Several of the cruisers now in the Australasian waters, not being up to date, and not belonging to the squadron, should be withdrawn and replaced by a better and more useful class of cruisers.

MILITARY CONFERENCE.

With the developments that have taken place in South Africa the difficulties met with by the Australasian Colonies in enrolling, equipping, and despatching contingents for service outside the colonies point to the fact that a conference of Imperial officers, Commanders of the Forces, and Defence Ministers would be of great service in working out a scheme such as is here proposed; and should Field Marshal Lord Roberts be able to accept the invitation to visit the colonies, he should be invited to preside at such conference. Failing this, the Imperial authorities should be asked to send one of the British generals who has taken part in the South African campaign to preside at such conference.

APPENDIX V. (2).

1900.

New Zealand.

JOINT DEFENCE (SECRET) COMMITTEE.

(Reports of the).

ORDERS OF REFERENCE.

Extract from the Journals of the Legislative Council.

Thursday the 26th day of July 1900.

Ordered, "That Standing Order No. 162 be suspended, and that a Secret Committee be appointed, consisting of 14 members, to whom shall be referred all matters affecting defence, with power to confer and sit together with any similar Committee that may be appointed by the House of Representatives, and to agree to a joint or separate report; the Committee to have power to call for persons, papers,

and records; five to form a quorum: to consist of the Hon. Colonel Baillie, the Hon. Lieut.-Colonel Bonar, the Hon. Lieut.-Colonel Feldwick, the Hon. Surgeon-General Grace, C.M.G., the Hon. Major Harris, the Hon. Honorary Lieutenant Jennings, the Hon. Captain-Commandant Johnston, the Hon. Mr. T. Kelly, the Hon. Captain Kenny, the Hon. Lieut.-Colonel Pitt, the Hon. Mr. A. L. Smith, the Hon. Mr. L. Walker, the Hon. Major-General Sir G. S. Whitmore, K.C.M.G., and the Mover."—(Hon. Mr. W. C. Walker.)

Extracts from the Journals of the House of Representatives.

Tuesday the 24th day of July 1900.

Ordered, "That a Secret Committee be appointed, consisting of 15 members, to whom shall be referred all matters affecting defence, with power to confer and sit together with any similar Committee which may be appointed by the Legislative Council, and to agree to a joint or separate report; the Committee to have power to call for persons, papers, and records; five to be a quorum: the Committee to consist of Lieutenant-Commanding J. Allen, Captain Carncross, Mr. Hardy, Mr. McNab, Captain Napier, Captain Palmer, Lieutenant Rhodes, Captain Russell, the Hon. Major Steward, Captain Symes, Captain Willis, Captain Hon. J. G. Ward, Mr. Lethbridge, Captain Stevens, and the Mover."—(Right Hon. R. J. Seddon.)

Friday the 20th day of July 1900.

Ordered, "That Paper No. 101H, Statement by the Right Hon. R. J. Seddon, Premier and Minister of Defence, respecting Harbour Defences, Colonial Defence Forces, Imperial Reserve, Cadet Corps, Rifle Clubs, and other Matters connected with the Defences of the Colony, be referred to the Defence Committee."—(Right Hon. R. J. Seddon.)

Tuesday the 14th day of August 1900.

Ordered, "That Paper No. 138H, Report on the Defence Forces of New Zealand, by Colonel A. P. Penton, R.A., Commander of the Forces, and Paper No. 139H, Copy Correspondence between the Right Hon. the Premier, His Excellency the Governor, and His Excellency the Admiral, in reference to the Defence Scheme propounded by the Right Hon. the Premier, be referred to the Defence Committee."—(Right Hon. R. J. Seddon.)

Tuesday the 28th day of August 1900.

Ordered, "That Paper No. 161H, Letter from Major-General Hutton, commanding 1st Mounted Rifle Brigade, South Africa, with reference to the New Zealand contingents, be referred to the Defence Committee."—(Right Hon. R. J. Seddon.)

INTERIM REPORT.

The Joint Defence (Secret) Committee have the honour to report as follows:—
"That the Government be recommended to accept the services of all the Volunteer corps offering; which, with those now accepted, will bring up the Volunteer Force of the Colony approximately to eighteen thousand (18,000)."

ALBERT PITT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Chairman.

16th August 1900.

REPORT.

The Joint Defence (Secret) Committee of both Houses of Parliament, to whom was referred all matters affecting defence, with power to call for persons, papers, and records, and to whom was referred the statement made in the House of Representatives on the 20th July 1900, by the Right Hon. R. J. Seddon, Premier and Minister of Defence, respecting harbour defences, Colonial Defence Forces, Imperial Reserve, cadet corps, rifle clubs, and other matters connected with the defences of

the colony, have the honour to report that they have carefully considered the said statement, and have taken the evidence of the following witnesses thereon:—

His Excellency the Admiral commanding the Australian Naval Station (by written questions submitted and answered in writing).

The Right Hon. R. J. Seddon, Premier and Defence Minister.

Colonel A. P. Penton, Commander of the Forces.

Major Sir Arthur Douglas, Bart., Under-Secretary for Defence.

Mr. A. C. Whitney, manager at Auckland and attorney for the Colonial Ammunition Company (Limited).

Captain John Falconer, in charge of No. 2 Service Company at Wellington.

Mr. J. H. Witheford, M.H.R., Chairman, Auckland Harbour Board.

Surgeon-General the Hon. M. S. Grace, C.M.G.

Captain W. J. Napier, M.H.R., Captain, Devonport Coast Guard Artillery Volunteers.

Lieut.-Colonel White, commanding No. 1 Battalion Auckland Infantry.

Captain Coyle, No. 2 Service Company, Auckland.

The Committee have had before them a number of important documents and records relative to Colonial Defence, and after consideration of the evidence before them have the honour to report as follows:—

FORTIFICATIONS AND MINE FIELDS.

1. Your Committee are of opinion that it is necessary that the fortifications and harbour defences of the colony should be perfected, extended, and strengthened.

2. Your Committee, having regard to the fact of Auckland possessing the Calliope Dock, and having regard also to the fact of arrangements existing between the Admiralty authorities and the Auckland Harbour Board in reference to that dock for the procurement and maintenance of the necessary machinery and equipment of the dock, consider that it is of the first importance that the defences of the port of Auckland, both as regards fortifications, submarine mines, and the necessary Permanent and Volunteer Forces, should be completed without delay.

3. Your Committee are of opinion that the necessary quick-firing guns of the latest pattern and requisite calibre should be obtained for use at Auckland.

4. Your Committee consider that a sufficient stock of Westport coal should be always kept at Auckland for the use of Her Majesty's warships, the supply of coal to be maintained by being replenished from time to time, proper financial arrangements being made between the Imperial and New Zealand Governments in reference to such stock of coal.

5. Your Committee are of opinion that additional fortifications, guns of more modern types, and quick-firing guns are required for the complete fortification of Wellington. The mine-fields at Wellington require strengthening, and additional men to man and support the forts are needed.

6. Your Committee are further of opinion that the fortifications for the defence of Lyttelton require to be altered as regards the position of the guns (the guns at Ripa Island should be removed to the Heads), and by the introduction of the necessary quick-firing guns and completion of the mine-fields. Also that additional men are required to man and support the harbour defences.

7. Your Committee consider that the defences of Port Chalmers should be strengthened by the completion of the mine-field and necessary adjuncts, and by the addition of suitable guns.

8. Your Committee, having regard to the great importance of the Westport coal-fields, especially in time of war, and having regard also to the opinions with which they have been favoured by His Excellency the Admiral commanding the Australian Naval Station in respect of the necessity for fortifying Westport, are of opinion that the fortifications recommended by His Excellency should be undertaken and completed without delay.

9. Your Committee are of opinion that the necessary steam-launches (or miners) and pinnaces in connection with the several fortified ports in the colony should be procured, and be of an up-to-date class.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

10. Your Committee further make the following recommendations:—

(a) That an ample supply of ammunition for the guns in the forts, and the

requisite stores for the mine-fields and spare parts of the mechanism of the guns, be obtained and always maintained.

- (b) That the Volunteer Force of the colony be increased up to a minimum strength of all arms and ranks of 18,000, as mentioned in the interim report of your Committee.
- (c) That the field artillery of the colony be strengthened by obtaining three batteries (of newest type of guns) in addition to the field guns at present in the colony.
- (d) That eight Maxim guns of the latest approved pattern, together with the necessary ammunition, be obtained.
- (e) That 30,000 stand of arms, rifles, and carbines, of approved pattern, with necessary accoutrements, be obtained for the defence of the colony.
- (f) That the supply of small-arm ammunition be augmented as soon as possible to the extent that would be necessary in time of war, and that the supply in each Volunteer District in the colony be constantly maintained by fresh supplies from time to time at that standard.
- (g) That the present stock of bell-tents, marquees, and camp equipment, be increased so as to meet the requirements of the increased forces of the colony.
- (h) That the whole of the Volunteer Force of the colony should be properly equipped, such equipment to include overcoat and waterproof sheet (to be the property of the corps).
- (i) That the term of enrolment of Volunteers for service should in future be three years.
- (j) That Schools of Instruction be provided for Volunteer officers at Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin, at least; and that it be obligatory on officers and non-commissioned officers to attend at one of such schools for instruction for such period and to pass such examination as shall be prescribed by regulations.
- (k) That during camps of instruction Volunteers of all branches shall remain in camp during a period of seven whole days consecutively in each year, and shall be paid by the Government such wages in respect of such attendance as shall be prescribed by regulation.
- (l) That it is expedient and necessary that suitable rifle ranges be obtained in each Volunteer District where recommended by the Commander of the Forces. That the necessary legislation be passed to enable the Government to take the lands necessary for such rifle ranges, such lands to be taken as provided by the Public Works Acts, the value of the lands so taken or injuriously affected, and the compensation in respect of other lands not taken but injuriously affected, to be assessed on the basis of the land tax value, plus 10 per cent. That, except as above mentioned, upon any land being legally proclaimed a rifle range, no property owner or occupier shall thereafter have a right to any compensation in respect of such land being used as a rifle range, nor thereafter be legally able to object to any such land being used as a rifle range. And that the whole cost of maintaining rifle ranges and erecting targets thereon shall be borne by the Government.
- (m) That the existing payments for daylight parades of Volunteers be continued—a condition for payment being that one half of the nominal strength of a company shall be present on parade.
- (n) That any Volunteer who is absent from three Government parades consecutively without a certificate from the Volunteer medical officer of his corps, or leave in writing from the officer commanding his company, shall cease to be a member of the company, and shall not be eligible for enrolment in any other Volunteer company for a period of two years.
- (o) That for garrison artillery and Volunteer submarine miners the annual capitation be £3 10s. instead of £2 10s. as at present.
- (p) That the uniform and caps of the submarine branch of the service be restored to the pattern previously in use.
- (q) That the medical branch of the Defence Forces requires to be reorganised, and your Committee recommend that the general medical list be purged by striking the names therefrom and cancelling the commissions of

those medical officers who are unable to perform, or who have not hitherto performed, their Volunteer medical duties.

That the necessary medical and surgical appliances requisite for the Defence Forces be procured and maintained.

That proper arrangements should be made ensuring that the necessary field and base hospitals be available in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, and that the requisite arrangements should be made with the principal hospital at each provincial centre for the reception of patients from the field hospitals in time of war.

That the medical officer of each company should give lectures and instruction to a number of the members of his corps upon first aid to the injured.

That Volunteer medical officers be remunerated for their time in attending camps of exercise according to a scale to be fixed by regulations.

- (r) That the number and strength of bearer corps be increased, and that they be supplied with the necessary equipment, and that the necessary arrangements be made for the transport of wounded in case of hostilities.
- (s) That proper arrangements should be made ensuring that sufficient transport should be available to meet the case of a sudden outbreak of hostilities.

HEADQUARTERS STAFF.

11. Your Committee are of opinion that the headquarters staff in each Volunteer district in the colony requires organising, so as to put the same upon a more serviceable footing than at present exists.

IMPERIAL RESERVE.

12. With respect to the formation of an Imperial Reserve, your Committee recommend that the following provisions shall apply: It shall be open to all officers and men belonging to the ordinary Volunteer corps to become efficient in both services and to enlist for three years in the Reserve. The officers and men so enlisting shall receive a fixed sum of £5 per annum as a personal payment on being certified as efficient, and shall be required to go into camp at stated periods for, say, two weeks in each year, the drills in camp as a Volunteer to count as part of the said two weeks. When in camp, officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates shall be paid such amounts as are prescribed by regulations. The Reserve shall be formed only upon condition that the Imperial Government shall provide the capital required to purchase the requisite field batteries, rifles, and equipment of the force, the colony paying a sum equal to one half the interest upon such capital. The Imperial Government to provide all necessary horses for the Reserve when on service beyond the colony, but when in the colony the officers and men to provide their own horses. The payment of capitation and the payment of the Reserve when in camp in the colony to be adjusted between the Imperial authorities and the Colonial Government on a population or other equitable basis. When on service outside the colony within limits to be prescribed by Act of Parliament, the Imperial Government to pay the whole cost connected therewith. The Reserve Force to be liable for service as agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Governments; such agreement to be subject to confirmation and ratification by the New Zealand Parliament. The number of such Reserve Force shall not exceed, at the commencement, two thousand; one half at least to be field artillery and the other half to be mounted rifles. The pay of the officers and men when on service outside the colony shall not be less than that which is being paid to the Fifth Contingent at present serving in South Africa.

RIFLE CLUBS.

13. Your Committee are of opinion that the formation of rifle clubs should be encouraged as a part of the defence system of the colony, and upon conditions somewhat as follows:—

A club should consist of not less than twenty or more than sixty members; and, in localities where Volunteer corps have been formed, only ex-Volunteers who have had not less than three years' efficient service and are over 30 years of age should be enrolled.

In localities where there are no Volunteer corps, rifle clubs may enrol members who have not had Volunteer service; but no rifle club should be established within five miles of the headquarters of a Volunteer corps.

Members of rifle clubs should, where practicable, attend a prescribed number of drills and parades in the course of the year, the instruction being in respect to handling arms and firing exercise. The Government to supply rifles and ammunition to enrolled members of rifle clubs at cost price.

After one year's enrolment members of rifle clubs shall be tested at target practice, and on being able to make the minimum number of marks at the prescribed ranges, and having attended the prescribed number of drills and parades, they shall be entitled to receive a certificate as being efficient.

For the first year every enrolled member of a rifle club shall receive a free grant of 50 rounds of ammunition; and thereafter to every efficient member of a rifle club there shall be allowed a free grant of 100 rounds of ammunition, to be used at matches or at practice.

Members of rifle clubs also to have concession in the shape of free railway passes when attending rifle association competitions.

Rifle clubs shall form part of the battalion of the Volunteer District in which they are located, and be subject to the orders of the officer commanding such district, and shall be liable for active service on the declaration of war.

CADET CORPS.

14. Your Committee are of opinion that cadet corps in connection with the various schools in the colony should be established and encouraged. They should be under the control of the Education Boards and the Education Department. The Defence Department to supply a limited number of carbines and a certain quantity of ammunition for the use of elder boys in school corps.

In addition to school cadet corps, your Committee recommend the formation of cadet corps to consist of youths who have left school, but who are not old enough to join a Volunteer corps. These corps should be under the Defence Department, and subject to regulations to be prescribed.

DEFENCE STORES.

15. In the opinion of your Committee, matters of finance, the ordering and receipt of military stores, should belong to the Department of the Under-Secretary for Defence; on arrival in the central store they should be issued by that Department to the Commander of the Forces, who should be responsible for seeing that the minimum war standard of such stores is maintained; in addition to the central receiving store in Wellington there should be stores at the four chief Volunteer centres, so that the stores from the receiving store could be sent to each centre by the Commander of the Forces. The Commander of the Forces should report to the Minister quarterly as to the stores in hand, and the amounts required to bring them up to the minimum war standard.

FINANCE.

16. Your Committee recommend that the Imperial authorities be applied to by the Government of the colony to advance the capital necessary to enable the colony to carry out such of the above recommendations as may be adopted by Parliament, and upon the terms set forth in the statement made in the House of Representatives on the 20th July 1900, by the Right Hon. R. J. Seddon, Premier and Minister of Defence, referred to in the early portion of this report.

AMENDMENT OF DEFENCE ACT.

17. Your Committee recommend that an amending Defence Act should be introduced and passed into law during the present session, giving legal effect to such of the recommendations of your Committee as can properly be provided for therein, and that the Volunteer Regulations be also amended accordingly as may be necessary.

NAVAL RESERVE.

18. With regard to the subject of the establishment in this colony of a branch of an Imperial or Colonial Naval Reserve, your Committee consider the matter to

be one of such importance that they recommend negotiations being entered into by the Government of New Zealand with the Commonwealth of Australia and the Imperial Government, with a view of ascertaining whether some satisfactory arrangements can be made upon the subject.

CONVERSION OF STEAMERS.

19. Your Committee further recommend that the attention of the Imperial authorities be drawn to the matter of the conversion of merchant steamers trading to this colony into armed cruisers, and the proper equipment of such steamers as cruisers.

AUSTRALIAN SQUADRON.

20. Your Committee, having regard to the altered international political conditions, especially in China and the Pacific, recommend that representations should be made by the Government of this colony to the Commonwealth of Australia and to the Imperial Government as to the necessity of strengthening the Australian Squadron by raising the class and increasing the number of the cruisers composing that squadron; the increased cost to be paid by the Commonwealth of Australia and by New Zealand on the basis of the present agreement.

CONCLUSION.

This report of your Committee is submitted upon the assumption that arrangements will be made for the capital necessary for carrying out the recommendations of your Committee being advanced by the Imperial Government to the colony at a rate of interest satisfactory to the Parliament of New Zealand, and that a sinking fund will be provided for the ultimate extinction of the loan.

If such arrangements cannot be made, it is obvious that parts only of such scheme could be carried out by the colony, and then only by spreading the necessary capital expenditure over a number of years. If the colony has to undertake the work without assistance from the Imperial Government, your Committee submit for consideration the alternative of completing the fortifications of, say, only two ports in the colony; more especially as having regard to the fact that, owing to the rapid changes and improvements in artillery armaments, those now recommended to be purchased for the completion of the forts may in a few years be quite obsolete, and consequently a very heavy expenditure upon guns in the forts may become a dead loss to the colony.

The scheme submitted to Parliament by the Right Hon. R. J. Seddon, Premier and Defence Minister, on the 20th July, 1900, and which was referred to your Committee, has been taken by them as the basis of their report. Your Committee have dealt with the many important matters concerning the defences of the colony mentioned in that scheme, and with others which have been suggested during the course of the investigations of your Committee.

The capital cost of carrying out the improvement of the defences recommended in your Committee's report would be, approximately, £373,428, as shown in the estimate in Schedule A attached to this report.

The annual extra cost to the colony in respect of such improved defence, including interest and sinking fund, would be £59,303.

ALBERT PITT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Chairman Joint Defence (Secret) Committee.

21st September 1900.

ADDENDUM.

Resolved, on the motion of the Right Hon. the Premier,—“That this Committee desire to place on record their appreciation of the efficient services rendered by the Hon. the Chairman in the conduct of the Committee, and in connection with the preparation of this report.”

SCHEDULE A.

ESTIMATE of APPROXIMATE COST of modifying the present Armaments of the Forts at the Four Centres, completing the Mine-fields at Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton, and Port Chalmers, including erection of new Fort at Dorset Point, Wellington; fortifying Westport, and supplying extra Ammunition for Forts, so as to bring them up to a War Strength, but with one Submarine Mining Boat (for Wellington) only:—

Westport.

	£	£
Four 6-in. B.L. guns on H.P. mountings ...	Available.	
Two 6-pr. Q.F. guns ...	1,000	
Two Maxims on parapet mountings ...	900	
Works for armament ...	15,032	
Ammunition for 6-prs. ...	880	
		17,812

Auckland.

Three 6-in. Q.F. guns and mountings ...	10,500	
400 rounds ammunition per gun ...	9,240	
Two 12-pr. Q.F. guns, Fort Bastion ...	1,540	
Two 12-pr. Q.F. guns, Fort Resolution ...	1,540	
Ammunition for 12-prs. ...	1,632	
Alteration of works ...	2,000	
Electric light, Bastion ...	2,500	
Mine-field (complete block) ...	2,300	
		31,252

Wellington.

One 8-in. B.L. gun on H.P. mounting ...	Available.	
Two 6-in. Q.F. guns ...	7,000	
Ammunition ...	6,160	
Two 12-pr. Q.F. guns ...	1,540	
Ammunition ...	816	
Works ...	9,232	
Electric searchlight ...	2,500	
		27,248

Lyttelton.

Two 6-in. Q.F. guns ...	7,000	
Ammunition for ditto ...	6,160	
Barbette mountings for two 8-in. B.L. guns ...	3,500	
Works ...	16,228	
Electric light ...	2,500	
Mine-field ...	2,500	
		37,888

Dunedin.

Two 12-pr. Q.F. guns ...	1,540	
Ammunition for ditto ...	816	
Works, &c. ...	3,000	
		5,356
For workshops, water supply, &c. ...		5,000
Submarine mining boat ...		7,000

Total ... 131,556

Three batteries of field artillery ...	30,000	
Ammunition for same... ...	10,000	
Harness ...	972	
		40,972

Carried over ... 172,528

	£	£
Brought over ...		172,528
Eight Maxim guns ...		3,200
30,000 rifles and carbines ...	90,000	
Accoutrements for same ...	15,000	
		105,000*
Extra ammunition for Maxims and small arms up to war strength ...		40,000
Extra tents, marquees, and camp equipment ...		10,000
Overcoats ...	15,000	
Waterproof sheets ...	200	
		15,200
Rifle ranges, acquiring land, conducting and maintaining ranges, butts, &c., and targets ...		10,000
Additional medical equipment ...		1,000
Cadets ...		8,000
Extra submarine mining boat ...		7,000
Pinnaces ...		1,500
Grand total ...		£373,428

*N.B.—Of the £105,000 for rifles, carbines, and accoutrements, say, £42,000 would be recouped upon sale of, say, 12,000 stand of arms and accoutrements to members of rifle clubs.

ALBERT PITT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Chairman.

SCHEDULE B.

EXTRA ANNUAL COST in respect of Proposed Additional Defence Expenditure beyond Present Ordinary Vote.

	£
Extra capitation ...	25,600
Imperial Reserve: personal payment, 2,000 men at £5 each (colony's share) ...	5,000
Extra ammunition for field batteries ...	750
Extra small-arms ammunition, including that for rifle clubs ...	7,200
Rifle ranges ...	3,000
Headquarters staff ...	1,500
District headquarter staff, at four centres ...	1,050
One week's training of Volunteers and Reserve ...	3,000
Schools of Instruction ...	1,000
Annual interest upon £373,428, amount of capital proposed to be advanced by Imperial Government to the colony, say, at 3 per cent. per annum, including sinking fund ...	11,203
	£59,303

ALBERT PITT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Chairman.

APPENDIX V. (3).

MAJOR-GENERAL FRENCH'S DEFENCE SCHEME. (Australia's Mounted Men.)

Major-General FRENCH to the Right Hon. the PREMIER.

SIR,
THE present war in South Africa has demonstrated the fact that the defence of the British Empire in the future is not a question to be left wholly to the people

Sydney, 8th May, 1900.

of the British Isles, but that the English-speaking people throughout the Empire are willing to take their share in its defence, and provide the men, and possibly the money, therefor.

Having had an experience of a dozen years in Canada and a similar amount in Australia, mostly with colonial forces, I would like to make two points clear: (1) It is idle to hope or expect that any large force of Imperial troops, paid at Imperial rates, could be raised in these colonies for ordinary garrison work or duties in peace time. (2) It is equally certain that thousands of men can be raised in war time, who will engage for the war at a fair rate of pay.

With regard to the first point, I may mention that the minimum rate of wages for labourers on Government contracts has been fixed at 7s. per diem in this colony, and it is pretty much the same in the other Australian colonies. This will give some idea of the futility of attempting to carry out this matter.

The second point is one of the greatest possible importance to my mind. Few who have not resided in these colonies during the past six months could realise the intense enthusiasm and desire amongst all classes to take part in the war; this colony has sent some 2,700 officers and men, and as many horses, and the difficulty was not in finding the men, but in having to send away the thousands who could not be taken on. The other Australian colonies had a similar experience. At the present moment some 300 infantry that have been kept in reserve here have offered their services at the Imperial rates of pay rather than not go at all!

The real way, in my opinion, to help Old England to keep the flag flying all over the Empire is to form war reserves in the colonies. In doing so the specialities of the colonies should be borne in mind. Thus Canada, with her 75,000 sailors and fishermen on the Atlantic seaboard, should provide a large war reserve for the fleet, and probably would do so if the Admiralty, instead of framing cast-iron regulations suitable for Great Britain, would appreciate the fact that the most suitable time to carry out the training of these fishermen would be the time of year when they could not carry on their usual avocations.

Australia, on the other hand, could do little as a war reserve for the navy, but much for the land forces of all arms, and especially the mounted services. I have little hesitation in saying that the finest material for the light cavalry of the Empire is to be found in these colonies, where the ordinary daily work of the bushman is a constant rehearsal of the work of the cavalry scout. We have sent some 3,500 mounted bushmen to South Africa. There was little time for training or for selection of officers or N.C. officers; but, nevertheless, I am certain that these men will give a good account of themselves. But how much better if they had been trained, and properly equipped!

Now, my scheme, as far as Australia is concerned, is as follows:—

- (a) A war reserve of, say, 10,000 men, largely mounted men.
- (b) This reserve to be formed mainly from efficient officers and men who have passed through the ranks of the defence forces, and who agree to serve within or without Australia in war time. The 6,000 men now in South Africa would give this reserve a good start.
- (c) Rates of pay on active service as for the permanent forces of Australia.
- (d) A retaining-fee, or reserve pay, of £8 per annum for efficient privates of infantry, £12 per annum for troopers of mounted corps who have horses and saddlery fit for service, other ranks in proportion.
- (e) The requirements for efficiency to involve an annual course of training and musketry.
- (f) The reserve pay and pay on active service to be paid by the Imperial Government.

The approximate comparative cost of 10,000 Australian reserves at £10 per annum would be £100,000; whereas the cost of 10,000 regular British troops at an average of £100 per annum would be £1,000,000. As regards the pay on active service, the colonial Governments are now paying the difference between the Imperial and the colonial rates to their men in South Africa. They might well do so in the future in view of the substantial advantage of having 10,000 trained reserves kept up in Australia in peace time at no expense to them.

I may explain that my main reason for asking the publication of these suggestions is with the view of obtaining expressions of opinion from those interested in the defence of the Empire as a whole, and whose opinions carry weight. I had something to do from the military side in framing the Queensland Defence Act in

1884 when Commandant there. In 1894, when serving in India, I had the satisfaction of reading that at a meeting of the Australian commandants it was resolved that a Defence Act for all Australia should be prepared and based on the Queensland Act. I have now been asked to prepare such an Act, and it can readily be imagined what an immense advantage it would be if in the Federal Defence Act for all Australia, which must soon be brought forward, the necessary powers could be taken for the formation of a war reserve of the nature above indicated.

An experience of a quarter of a century in the colonies forces me to the conclusion that such a scheme, if feasible, would be mutually advantageous for the colonies and England, and beneficial to the grand Empire in which we live, and for which we ought to do our utmost.

Now is the time to act. If we wait till the cold fit comes on progress may be made impossible.

I am, &c.,

G. A. FRENCH,
Major-General Commandant New South
Wales Military Forces.

APPENDIX V. (4).

MILITARY FORCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

MINUTE UPON THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA, BY MAJOR-GENERAL HUTTON,
COMMANDANT.

Headquarters, Melbourne,
7th April, 1902.

Minute for the consideration of the Right Honourable the Minister of State
for Defence.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following Minute upon the Defence of Australia, together with recommendations based thereon:—

I.—STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

It is, on the one hand, certain that the geographical position of Australia renders it less liable to aggression from any foreign Power than most parts of the Empire; but it is equally certain, on the other hand, that Australian interests outside Australia itself are peculiarly open to foreign interference, and to possible destruction by an enemy in time of war. No expedition, whether despatched from an enemy's base in the Eastern Seas or from Europe, could hope to reach its destination until the British Navy had been definitely worsted. It has been publicly stated that the maintenance of sea supremacy may be assumed as the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire. (Duke of Devonshire, President of Council of National Defence, 3rd December, 1896.) As long, therefore, as Australia remains part of the British Empire so long will the inviolability of her shores and the security of her commerce depend in a large measure upon the power of Great Britain to maintain her supremacy at sea.

Oversea aggression could only be attempted (1) by a raid of two or more cruisers with a small striking force for the purpose of landing; (2) by a large and well-equipped force conveyed in numerous transports and escorted by an enemy's fleet.

The latter attempt may, under existing conditions, be considered difficult in the extreme, more especially in view of the military spirit which animates the inhabitants of Australia. No commander would venture to land small bodies of troops on the shores of this continent, knowing well that it would mean but to court disaster and consequent loss of prestige to the nation attempting it. Any force destined for aggression would have to be of sufficient strength to conquer and

hold either an important strategical position or a considerable portion of territory under the certain condition of jeopardising, if not losing completely, its communications by sea. To enable an enemy to undertake, with any hope of success, such operations on Australian territory a large expeditionary force of all arms, fully equipped, would be required. The small landing force available even from a strong fleet of cruisers would find such a task impossible.

Efforts at oversea aggression upon Australian soil will in all probability, therefore, be reduced to raids by an enemy's cruisers based on his defended ports. Such raids might be undertaken to extort an indemnity under threat of bombardment, or to destroy commerce, or to obtain coal.

It must, however, be remembered that the present prosperity of Australia, and its future commercial development, will largely depend upon its immunity from attack, and the supremacy of the Navy must be insured at all costs as the primary element of success. Australia must be prepared not only to protect the naval base of Sydney and to make secure the important strategical positions at King George's Sound and Thursday Island, so as to enable the navy to have all that it needs for free action at sea, but the great trades centres also, such as Sydney, Melbourne, &c., must further be rendered secure. It is practically impossible to undertake the local defence of the numerous bays, rivers, harbours, and estuaries which an enemy might avail himself of as a harbour of refuge or a rendezvous in time of war. This must be left to the general protection afforded by the navy. It is, however, necessary to deny access to all cities, towns, and harbours of commercial importance, and to make it impossible for a hostile expedition to establish itself upon Australian soil. To this end careful arrangements must be made to concentrate on any threatened point as many available field troops as circumstances may render necessary. It is hoped that the contemplated extension of railway communication between South Australia and West Australia may be accomplished at an early date, as without such extension West Australia is always liable to isolation in time of war. The Commonwealth has undertaken not only to protect each State against invasion, but on the application of the Executive Government of the State, to protect it from domestic violence (*vide* Constitution Act, sec. 119). Complete security for life and capital must therefore be insured not only for the population now existing in Australia against foreign aggression and domestic violence, but that security must be further assured in the eyes of the commercial world beyond its shores. It follows as a matter of vital importance that the security of Australia should be placed beyond doubt, and that the security to capital in this country should be assured in the event of any warlike complications.

The principles governing defence are not, however, limited to those of a purely passive kind. History has shown that the surest and best defence is by a vigorous offence. The successful defence of an island such as Great Britain has in the past been insured by means of warlike operations forced on the enemy, and fought out on other than English soil. During the last 150 years, five distinct threats of invasion have been made by England's enemies, and in no instance did England remain satisfied with preparations for passive defence only, but effected her object, and defeated her enemies, by a vigorous and successful offence. The same principle in a very large measure applies to the defence of Australia.

The defence of Australia cannot, moreover, be considered apart from the defence of Australian interests. Australia depends for its commercial success and its future development firstly upon its seaborne trade*; and secondly upon the existence, maintenance, and extension of fixed and certain markets for its produce outside Australian waters. It therefore follows that Australian interests cannot be assured by the defence alone of Australian soil. Defence is the primary duty of every State and of every citizen, yet the defence of Australian interests outside Australian waters is at the present time solely in the hands of the Imperial Government and of the Imperial Army and Navy. It is hardly consistent with the present development of Australia as a young and vigorous nation to neglect her responsibility for defence outside Australian waters, and in the robust period of her youth thus to rely entirely upon the strong arm of the Mother Country (*vide* final paragraph of Section. VI. and Appendix).

* The Exports and Imports from oversea countries alone for the year 1900 amounted to £47,816,438 and £43,164,922 respectively, being a total of £90,981,360.

It must be remembered that the rapid and continuous improvements in steam and telegraph communications have now destroyed the former isolation of Australia, and modern developments in the East have brought the States of the Commonwealth upon the arena of the Old World strife. The last six years have witnessed a momentous change in the balance of power in the East. The rise of Japan into an armed Power of the first magnitude; the acquisition of Port Arthur by Russia; the occupation of the Philippines, and of Guam (Ladrone Islands) and Tutuila (Samoa) by the United States; and of the remaining Samoan Islands and part of New Guinea by Germany; and the annexation of Madagascar as a colony by France, are facts of the gravest significance to Australian interests. The transformation of the United States into an oversea Power by her acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines, the development of Japan, the evolution of China, the opening of a Panama Canal at an early date, and the movement of Russia towards a port in the Indian Ocean with her increasing interest in Persia, all point to the Indian Ocean, the Northern Pacific, and the China Sea as the probable scene of the future struggle for commercial supremacy. Australia cannot in such an eventuality remain unconcerned. It may be assumed, therefore, that Australia will determine not only to defend her own soil, but to take steps also to defend those vast interests beyond her shores upon the maintenance of which her present existence and her future prosperity must so largely depend.

Two factors, therefore, may be considered as governing the future organisation and administration of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, namely:—

- (a) The defence of Australian soil.
- (b) The defence of Australian interests wherever they may be threatened.

(a) "*For the defence of Australian soil*" there are two essentials, namely, Garrison Troops, hereafter styled the Garrison Force, for the protection of certain pre-determined strategical centres and places of commercial importance; and Field Troops, hereinafter styled the Field Force, for those active operations which are, as has been shown, an essential element, in conjunction with the Garrison Troops, for the defence of such an extended area as Australia. It is not necessary that the troops for garrison duty as a whole should be mobile, but it is absolutely essential that the Field Troops be not only well trained, carefully organised, and well equipped, but also ready for active operations in the field at the shortest notice.

(b) "*For the defence of Australian interests wherever they may be threatened*" it will be obvious that the first essential is the sea supremacy which is guaranteed by the Royal Navy, and that the second is the possession of a Field Force capable of undertaking military operations in whatever part of the world it may be desired by Australia to employ them. The Field Force above indicated in (a) could, if necessity arose, be made available for this purpose.

II.—NUMBER OF TROOPS AVAILABLE AND REQUIRED, AND HOW PROVIDED.

It is now proposed to consider, in the first place, the minimum number of troops which will be required to fulfil the foregoing conditions, and in the second, how those troops are to be provided. As regards the first, it is only proposed in the present recommendation to deal with the troops which now exist in the six States under voluntary terms of service in accordance with the Estimates, 1901-2. The numbers should be taken as the very least which Australia requires for her protection, and may be considered as the peace footing of her future military force. As regards the second, the strong military feeling now prevailing renders compulsory service by conscription unnecessary. A voluntary military service is the pride of all Anglo-Saxon communities, and it is safe to accept the fact that whenever a national emergency occurs a sufficient number of citizens will always be found ready and willing to voluntarily undertake the duty of defence. The liability to serve should, however, always be maintained, so as to establish the principle of the privileged duty and sacred right of every free-born citizen to bear part in the defence of his country.

The most essential element, therefore, in the organisation of the future is to provide a military system which shall be elastic, capable of expansion, and which

shall form a carefully constructed framework into which the fighting material of the nation can be fitted when the emergency arises. This framework must consist (1) of a carefully considered and thoroughly complete military organisation; (2) of a well-trained, competent, and experienced staff of officers to lead and to administer; and (3) of modern and efficient equipment.

The following Schedule I. gives the number of troops available in each State :—

SCHEDULE I.

State.	Mounted Troops (Cavalry, Mounted Rifles, and Mounted Infantry).	Artillery.		Engineers.		Infantry.	Staff and Departmental Corps.*	Total	Field Guns.	Remarks.
		Field.	Garrison.	Staff, Field, and Electric Companies.	Sub-marine Miners.					
New South Wales	1,806	240	925	254	119	5,733	655	9,732	12	3 4-gun batteries.
Victoria	1,137	269	1,156	75	139	3,459	217	6,452	18	3 6-gun batteries.
Queensland	1,194	154	427	—	78	3,069	258	5,180	10	2 4-gun batteries and one section.
South Australia	741	101	240	—	—	1,849	70	3,001	6	1 battery.
Western Australia	480	180	121	1	—	1,320	88	2,190	8	2 4-gun batteries.
Tasmania	369	94	229	49	21	2,164	90	3,016	6	2 field, 2 mountain, and 2 siege guns.
Total	5,227	1,038	3,098	379	357	17,594	1,378	29,571	60	

* Does not include civilians permanently employed.

The following Schedule II. shows the proportion which each State should possess upon a population basis of the total number now available throughout the Commonwealth :—

SCHEDULE II.

State.	Total Population.	Male Population between Ages 18-60.		Military Establishments 31st March, 1901.		Number of Troops above or below the Proportion of Male Population.	
		Number.	Proportion to Total Male Population of Commonwealth.	Number.	Proportion to Total Military Establishments of Commonwealth.	Above.	Below.
New South Wales	1,352,509	375,100	·349	9,732	·329	—	586
Victoria	1,200,851	323,200	·301	6,452	·218	—	2,438
Queensland	496,596	154,200	·143	5,180	·175	938	—
South Australia	362,604	98,600	·092	3,001	·102	289	—
Western Australia	183,178	76,000	·071	2,190	·074	91	—
Tasmania	172,318	47,900	·044	2,016	·102	1,698	—
Total	3,768,056	1,075,000	1·00	29,571	1·00	3,024	3,024

Garrison Force.—The troops required for the protection of cities, towns, &c., should consist of troops raised in the localities which they will be called on to defend in war. The existing Volunteer Corps should be utilised for this purpose.

The existing defence schemes of each State indicate the force which is required for purely defensive purposes, and are taken as a basis for the Garrison Troops given in Schedule III., Column I.

Field Force.—This force requires the highest possible degree of training, the most complete organisation, and the latest modern equipment. The troops should be furnished entirely by Militia or partially-paid troops. The number now available in each State is as given in Schedule III., Column II.

SCHEDULE III.

STATE.	COLUMN I.						COLUMN II.						COLUMN III.	COLUMN IV.					
	Garrison Troops. (Existing Peace Establishment.)						Field Force. (Existing Peace Establishment, with slight modifications.)						Grand Total of Existing Military Establishments 31st March, 1901.	Field Force. (Proposed War Establishment.)					
	Mounted Troops.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Others.	Field Guns and Guns of Position.	Total.	Mounted Troops.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Others.	Guns.	Total.		Mounted Troops.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Others.	Guns.	Total.
New South Wales	225	815	3,048	794	4	4,912	1,009	170	2,758	283	10	4,820	9,732	3,754	689	4,351	1,255	32	10,319
Victoria	161	1,313	1,450	283	10	3,193	1,003	183	1,980	85	12	3,259	6,452	3,333	879	3,803	1,088	19	9,163
Queensland .. .	310	476	1,678	215	4	2,679	884	105	1,383	150	6	2,501	5,180	1,578	383	1,597	450	12	3,783
South Australia ..	112	341	937	119	6	1,507	630	—	894	28	—	1,492	3,001	1,007	265	1,166	329	9	2,707
Western Australia	120	211	840	34	4	1,205	360	90	480	55	4	985	2,190	508	134	589	166	4	1,397
Tasmania	180	259	1,426	107	2	1,972	189	64	738	53	4	1,044	3,016	478	126	554	156	4	1,314
Total	1,105	3,445	9,385	1,732	30	15,470	4,674	612	8,181	634	36	14,101	29,571	10,458	2,756	12,120	3,414	60	28,748

1. A slight increase in the Peace Establishment of the Troops allotted to the Garrison Force in Column I. will be required hereafter.

2. The proportion of the various arms in the Field Force upon the Peace Establishment now existing in each State, as given in Column II., will require some re-adjustment hereafter, in order to meet the proportion proposed in the War Establishments. It will be observed that the proportion of Mounted Troops to Infantry on the proposed War Establishment of the Field Force in Column IV. is much larger than in the existing Peace Establishment in Column II.

3. The figures given in Column IV., *exclusive of the totals*, are only approximate, as the exact allotment of each unit to the States has not yet been fixed.

4. It will be seen that the following Summary shows, upon a War Footing, 44,218 of all arms, with 120 Field Guns and Guns of Position, viz. :—

SUMMARY OF SCHEDULE III.

Arm.	Garrison Troops.	Field Force.	Total.
Mounted Troops	1,108	10,458	11,566
Artillery	3,445	2,756	6,201
Infantry	9,385	12,120	21,505
Others	1,532	3,414	4,946
Total	15,470	28,748	44,218

In the first instance, without adding to the existing numbers of the Military Forces, there will be available as a Field Force upon a peace footing 4,674 Mounted Troops, 612 Field Artillery, with 36 guns, and 8,815 Infantry, &c., making a total of 14,101. This Force will be increased upon war footing as proposed to 10,458 Mounted Troops, 2,756 Artillery, and 15,534 Infantry and others, with 90 field guns and guns of position.

I recommend that the Field Force shall be organised into six brigades of Light Horse, and into three brigades of Infantry, each complete, with all the necessary Departmental Troops, and with the latest modern proportion of Field Artillery. The large proportion of Mounted Troops to Infantry will necessitate a partial reconstruction of Infantry into Mounted Troops. This change is not only consistent with the characteristics of the Australian people, but provides exactly that description of fighting man which has proved so valuable in South Africa, and which, without doubt, would constitute a most powerful, if not a controlling, factor in any campaign in which Australian troops might be engaged.

Success in modern war, either for defensive or for offensive operations, can only be assured by deliberate, slow organisation in times of peace. History and modern events alike testify that armed men only, no matter how brave, and no

matter how deeply endowed with military qualifications, are powerless to successfully, and for any length of time, oppose an army which has in times of peace been perfected by measured organisation, matured by scientific preparation for war, and supplied with the latest military equipment.

It will be dangerous in the extreme to rely upon organising when the emergency arises, such troops as may be required for the defensive-offensive operations referred to, and it will be more especially unwise for a country which for some time at least must depend to a great extent for its warlike stores upon a distant land to postpone the provision of the requisite *matériel* of war until the moment of action arrives.

III.—ORGANISATION, INSTRUCTION, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT.

A. Organisation.—The organisation of the troops proposed for allotment to the Garrison Force requires little change. In order, however, to make the Field Force effective, very considerable organisation and partial reconstruction of some portion of the existing forces available will be necessary.

It is, moreover, obvious that all regiments of Light Horse, batteries of Field Artillery, and Infantry must be made similar in strength, and that the peace and war establishments for all branches of the force must be fixed. The creation or development of the departments which deal with transport and supply, with equipment, and with the care of sick and wounded, will have to be undertaken. These changes will entail comparatively small expense, and can be effected gradually. Every care should be taken to make the organisation capable of expansion, and to base it upon a territorial system.

B. Instruction of Officers and Staff.—The first essential of a Citizen or Militia Army must be the training of the officers and staff. The better and more intelligent the troops, the better trained and more experienced must be those who lead. A satisfactory standard of knowledge and proficiency can only in peace be effected by instituting Schools of Instruction for Militia and Volunteer Officers of all branches of the service and by despatching selected officers to England and to India to attend special courses. Sufficient pay must be allowed as compensation to officers who thus devote their time to their own instruction for the benefit of the State, and a bonus upon passing periodical test examinations should be granted. A system of special instruction for Staff Officers should be instituted, of which a prominent factor will be "Staff Rides upon Field Service Conditions." The expense of the foregoing need be small in comparison with its importance.

Sydney and Melbourne should form the centres respectively of the system of Schools of Instruction; the former for the States of New South Wales and Queensland, and the latter for Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia. Every facility exists at Sydney for the Schools of Instruction, which already exist in a limited form, together with the instructional troops required. A similar system should be created at Melbourne. Schools should also be formed as a part of this system in other centres, and at suitable times, so as to meet the local conditions.

I trust that the establishment of a Military College may at no distant date receive the favourable consideration of the Government. An adaptation of the system of organisation and of instruction carried out at West Point, in the United States of America, at the Royal Military College of Canada (Kingston, Ontario), and at the great public schools of England, would meet the requirements of such a college in Australia. A college thus created would be likely to give the most valuable results not only in furnishing a high standard of education in the technical professions of civil life, but in inculcating those principles of military science which were found to produce men possessing such eminent military qualities in the great War of Secession in America, and more recently in the case of the Military College of Canada during the campaign in South Africa. I would recommend that, as part of such a college, there should be a special branch which would undertake the training of Australian officers in Staff duties. The personnel of the college, and the instructional arrangements of the same, would be available for this further and more advanced course of military instruction, which is so essential for placing the professional knowledge of the officers of the General Staff in Australia on the requisite high level of military efficiency.

C. Training.—Secondary only to the instruction of officers is the training of the men. This to be effective must rather be constant each year than long in duration. Sixteen days per annum for Light Horse, Infantry, and Departments, and

twenty days for Artillery and Engineers, should be sufficient if properly and efficiently administered. This training should be carried out in two categories—one for the troops raised in the country districts, which should mainly be for a given period in camps of instruction, at whatever time of year may be most convenient to the industries followed by the men, and one for the troops raised in the cities and towns, whose employments do not admit of long absence, which should be, as at present, spread over the year by afternoon and evening training, with a short camp of instruction for three or four days at Easter, or during public holidays.

D. Equipment.—The existing equipment of the troops to be allotted to the Garrison Force may be deemed sufficient for the purposes of such troops. The equipment, however, which is available for the Field Force leaves much to be desired. There is in all the States a complete absence of any modern Infantry equipment, and only a small percentage of magazine rifles are available. The equipment of the Mounted Troops is equally incomplete, and only a small and quite inadequate supply of military saddles is available. The harness, equipment, and guns for Field Artillery are quite unequal to modern demands. A very small and quite inadequate quantity of Field Engineer or Field Hospital Equipment is available. Camp equipment and blankets are also inadequate. The supply of ammunition is in a very seriously defective condition.

It will be obvious, therefore, that a very considerable outlay in equipment is imperative. Troops without efficient and sufficient arms, ammunition, and equipment are useless for the purpose for which they exist, and are therefore a mischievous delusion. The condition of the forces of the six States is very diverse. In some instances arms and equipment are either obsolete or worn out, while in others deficiencies are comparatively small.

IV.—PERMANENT FORCE.

Any increase of the Royal Australian Artillery and of the Engineers is not at present necessary. The whole force of permanent troops should be maintained for purposes of instructing the Militia or partially-paid troops and Volunteers, as well as for supplying the skilled personnel required in connection with the guns, forts, and submarine mine defences. I have recommended a reconstruction of the former into three 4-gun field batteries, and into eleven companies of Garrison Artillery. The Field Artillery will supply the personnel for the Schools of Instruction of Field Artillery and of Light Horse; and the Garrison Artillery for the Schools of Instruction of the Garrison Artillery and Infantry. The Engineers will supply the personnel for the Schools of Instruction of the Field Engineers, Field Telegraph, and the Submarine Miners.

The officers of the permanent troops should be selected with the utmost care. They must be well educated and capable men, as they will be required in the future to supply Australia with her General Staff and Instructional Staff officers. Every opportunity should be taken of giving the officers of the General Staff and of the Permanent Corps opportunities of study in England and elsewhere, and of gaining experience whenever active operations are being undertaken.

The greatest pains should similarly be taken, by means of adequate pay and generous treatment, to induce steady, capable, and well educated men (preferably those who have served with credit in South Africa or China) to enter the ranks of the Permanent Force.

The future efficiency of the Commonwealth Military Forces must in a very large measure be in direct ratio to the quality and the efficiency of its General Staff Officers, and of the Officers and the Non-Commissioned Officers of the Permanent Forces and Staff. The administration and the instruction of a Citizen Army in time of peace must mainly devolve upon the permanent officers and non-commissioned officers, and in time of war a large and responsible share of duty will necessarily fall to their lot. No effort should be spared therefore to make military service in the Permanent Force attractive. It should be made clear that a certain and hopeful future is before all ranks of the permanent officers and men of the military forces of the Commonwealth. A prospect should be held out, by opportunities of advancement and of a fair pecuniary remuneration upon disability for

age or failure of health, which should not only satisfy the very proper ambitions of those now serving, but should attract into the service the best educated and most intelligent candidates for vacancies.

V.—RIFLE CLUBS.

The love of rifle shooting and the existing interest in rifle practice has been materially fostered by the institution of rifle clubs throughout Australia. The organisation of rifle clubs might be developed hereafter with great and increasing advantage, as soon as the future military organisation has been determined and carried out, and when the exact position which rifle clubs are to hold as an integral part of the Defences has been clearly defined. There is, however, a tendency to look on rifle shooting and rifle practice as a pastime rather than as an obligation seriously undertaken as an important element towards the national defence. The encouragement given to rifle clubs, and the financial advantages conferred by Government, should only be continued on the understanding that rifle shooting as practised in Australia is seriously undertaken, and is developed upon the latest modern lines, and further, that the members of the rifle clubs are prepared to undertake in some definite form a direct share in the defence of the country. The rifle clubs at present constituted in some of the States are organised on sound lines, and their members form a reserve to existing military units. In at least one instance, however, rifle clubs form an organisation apart, which, without officers, without military instruction, and without a system of military organisation, can at best provide only a certain number of partially armed men with an uncertain knowledge of the use of the rifle. The military value of such men as an integral part of the Defence Forces of Australia can be but small under the existing conditions, and this system requires modification.

One general system of organisation for the rifle clubs and rifle associations throughout the Commonwealth is necessary. The system of providing a Reserve from members of rifle clubs by affiliation to the various military units, which has proved to successfully answer the purpose in some of the States, should be taken as a basis on which to create such an organisation. The Reserve men thus provided will be available to complete the peace establishments alluded to above to the requisite strength of war.

VI.—CADETS.

A Cadet Military System exists in most of the States, and in one State has reached a very satisfactory standard of efficiency. I attach great value to the military training thus taught and military discipline thus impressed upon the rising generation, and I recommend that the system which has proved so successful in Victoria, under the Military Department, should be similarly developed throughout the Commonwealth.

VII.—MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENTS.

It will be necessary by degrees to create those Manufacturing Departments which are required to form the Arsenal for the future maintenance of the Defence Forces of the Commonwealth. This arsenal should include:—

- (1.) Storage Accommodation for Reserve Stores.
- (2.) Grand Magazine.
- (3.) Small Arms Ammunition Factory (including Steel Shell Foundry) and Cordite Factory.
- (4.) Small Arms Factory.
- (5.) Gun Foundry.

A site for the erection of the above will be required where communication by rail and by sea is easily accessible. It is obvious that a supply of coal and iron must be readily available, and that the site chosen could be satisfactorily and readily

protected from any possible attack. It is, moreover, necessary that the Arsenal should be so situated as to meet the demands of the Royal Navy in the present, and of the Australian Navy in the future. It should accordingly form part of the Naval base of Australia. An eligible site could be found in the vicinity of Sydney, which would fulfil all the above conditions.

Although the above Arsenal will require time to create, a beginning might be at once made by the selection of an eligible site, and by the removal of the Artillery workshops now in Victoria Barracks, Sydney. Accommodation for the large amount of stores and equipment required for the Field Force above alluded to should, moreover, be built as soon as may be.

VIII.—EXPENDITURE.

The total sum available under the Estimates of 1901-2 should be in the first instance sufficient for the present requirements, exclusive of the supply of equipment, &c., Section III.

The supply of equipment, arms, &c., which is of a pressing nature, might be defrayed from a loan. An approximate calculation of the immediate requirements has been made, by which the sum of, approximately, £500,000 will be sufficient to render the garrison force complete and the field force capable of carrying out its functions.

A table (Appendix "A") will be found at the conclusion of this paper which will be of interest. It shows the amount paid for defence per head of population in Great Britain, her self-governing colonies, and by foreign nations. It will be seen that the self-governing colonies contribute a small proportion only to Naval and Military defence in comparison with the amount paid by Great Britain and other foreign countries: thus, Canada pays one shilling and sixpence per head of population, Australia four shillings and sixpence, New Zealand seven shillings, and Great Britain twenty-three shillings and twopence.

I have, &c.,

EDWARD T. H. HUTTON, Major-General,
Commanding Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Melbourne, 7th April, 1902.

APPENDIX A.
TABLE showing COMPARATIVE COST OF MILITARY and NAVAL DEFENCE in GREAT BRITAIN, her SELF-GOVERNING COLONIES, and FOREIGN NATIONS.

Country.	Population.	Military.			Naval.		Defence Expenditure.		Per-centage of Total Public Expenditure devoted to Military Defence.	Per-centage of Total Taxation devoted to Defence.	Remarks.		
		Establishments.		Per-centage of Troops to Population.*	Budget.	Cost per Head of Population.	Budget.	Cost per Head of Population.				Total.	Per Head of Population.
		Peace.	War.										
Austria-Hungary ...	45,310,835 (31.12.00)	375,291 (99)	1,238,816 (99)	828	16,301,320 (01)	7.19	1,411,771 (01)	7.81	—	18.3	(a) Excluding Landsturm, about 3,000,000.		
Belgium ...	6,744,532 (31.12.99)	48,294 (99)	138,084 (99)	716	2,113,512 (99)	6.27	—	6.27	11.3	24.8			
France ...	38,641,333 (01)	616,475 (99)	3,091,350 (98)	1,595	27,744,581 (01)	14.36	13,171,468 (01)	6.82	19.5	22.3			
Germany ...	56,345,014 (1.12.00)	595,536 (99-00)	3,218,684(a) (99-00)	1,057	33,349,072 (00)	11.84	8,114,900 (00)	2.88	32.4†	—			
Holland ...	5,103,924 (31.12.99)	31,943 (1.7.99)	86,277 (1.7.99)	625	1,882,062 (00)	7.37	1,329,930 (00)	5.21	14.6	20.3			
Italy ...	32,045,404 (31.12.00)	226,603 (00)	2,294,629(b) (00-01)	707	10,965,800 (00-01)	6.84	4,893,386 (00-01)	3.06	15.6	20.8	(b) To this may be added the untrained portion of the Territorial Militia, about 1,250,000 men.		
Japan ...	43,760,815 (31.12.98)	157,829(c) (99)	603,116 (99)	361	3,822,748 (00-01)	1.75	1,794,401 (00-01)	0.82	14.6	24.0	(c) Active Army.		
Russia ...	129,000,000 (00)	1,092,444 (00)	2,841,962 (01)	347	34,615,121 (01)	5.37	10,032,018 (01)	1.56	20.1	39.7	(d) Does not include Landsturm.		
Switzerland ...	3,312,551 (1.12.00)	234,925(d) (1.1.99)	234,925(b) (1.1.99)	7,092	1,124,836 (00)	6.79	—	6.79	26.6	56.3	(e) 65,000 Regulars, 35,000 Volunteers for the Philippines, 101,536 Militia.		
United States ...	76,335,102 (00)	201,536(e) (00)	—	264	20,254,080(f) (00)	5.49	11,482,338 (00)	3.01	28.2	26.4	(f) Expenditure in 1901, 31,318,170l.		
Great Britain ...	40,555,489 (99)	662,818 (99-00)	783,541(g) (00-01)	1,634	20,617,200 (99-00)	10.17	26,594,500 (99-00)	13.11	15.0 (98-99)	—	(g) Includes Army Reserve, Colonial and Indian Troops.		
Canada ...	5,312,500 (99)	37,636 (30.6.99)	—	708	433,735 (99)	1.63	—	1.63	3.8	6.1			
Australia ...	3,768,056 (1.2.01)	29,571 (01-02)	—	785	681,485 (01)	3.6	178,065 (01)	0.95	2.6†	6.8			
New Zealand ...	796,359 (31.12.99)	10,040 (00)	—	1,261	234,344(f) (00)	5.88	—	—	3.2	6.2	(j) Includes constabulary.		

* These numbers were obtained by dividing the Peace Establishment by the Population.

† Empire.

‡ State expenditure included.

APPENDIX V. (5).

NAVAL DEFENCE: MINUTE BY SIR JOHN FORREST.

[NOTE.—This paper was not laid before the Conference.]

Department of Defence,
Melbourne, 15th March 1902.

Minute to the Right Honourable the Prime Minister as to Naval Defence.

I have the honour to submit for consideration my views as to the means to be adopted so as to provide for the Naval Defence of Australia.

I.—PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

1. It will, I think, be generally conceded that it is the duty of the Commonwealth to adequately contribute to the defence of Australia and of its floating trade. We admit this obligation in regard to our local military defence, but we must remember that naval forces require to be even more efficient than military forces, which have the great advantage of local knowledge to assist them in any active operations in their own country.

2. So long as the sea supremacy of the mother country is maintained Australia is fairly secure from invasion, but in time of war we would be exposed to attacks upon the floating trade and to raids on our coastal towns by powerful cruisers. It is therefore obligatory that adequate means should be taken to provide against such emergency.

3. Owing to the progress made by foreign Powers in the construction and maintenance of powerful sea-going cruisers, the present Auxiliary Squadron has become inadequate, and the Commonwealth is confronted with the immediate necessity of arranging for up-to-date naval protection being provided.

4. Rear-Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont, Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Station, has already given his views on the present necessities of Australian Naval Defence in a letter to the Governor-General, which was presented to Parliament on 16th August 1901, from which I extract the following:—

"(1) I can give what, in my opinion, are the obligations of the Federal Government in respect of the Naval Defence of the Australian Commonwealth.

(a.) They should cause to be maintained on the Australian Station, as defined by the Admiralty, a squadron of at least six cruisers in commission, two of them first-class cruisers of 7,000 to 8,000 tons displacement, and the others second-class cruisers of the improved "Highflyer" type.

(b.) There should, in addition, be two such second-class cruisers in reserve.

(c.) These vessels ought to be replaced gradually by more modern vessels as the development of naval construction renders it desirable or the increase of foreign fleets makes it necessary.

(d.) The vessels should be under the Admiral in command of His Majesty's ships on the station, the crews subject to the Naval Discipline Act, and embarked under the same terms of engagement as in the Royal Navy.

(e.) The head-quarters of the squadron ought to remain at Sydney, owing to the repairing facilities and convenience of the existing depôts there, but the ships should be attached in turn for ordinary peace service, when not required for fleet exercises, to suitable ports in each State, where the Federal Government should give facilities for the gradual establishment of the secondary naval bases which will be essential in war as regards coal, stores, and repairs.

"The above gives, in broad lines, the naval force adequate for the Naval Defence of Australia at the present time. It will be seen, from

the size and number of the ships required, from the necessity which will undoubtedly arise of replacing them from time to time by more modern ships, from the fact that they must be continuously manned by trained officers and men, and that the ships must not only be maintained in commission but must be gradually provided with new bases, that it is beyond the power of the Commonwealth at the outset to create such a force.

"(2) It follows, therefore, that such a force can only be acquired and maintained by arrangement with the Imperial Government, and I believe that if this course was adopted it would also follow that the greatest amount of good would be maintained at the smallest possible cost.

"(3) In view of the Federal Government providing for the immediate future an adequate and up-to-date sea-going fleet for the defence of Australian floating commerce and the protection of Australian territory, I consider that it should take no part in the creation or maintenance of Naval Reserves or State Naval Forces, which experience has shown cannot be utilized in a manner at all commensurate with their cost, or assist, except within too narrow limits, in the defence of the Commonwealth.

"The future may see the creation of an Australian Navy, but for the present the safety and welfare of the Commonwealth require that the Naval Force in Australian waters should be a sea-going fleet of modern ships, fully equipped, fully manned with trained crews, homogeneous as to type and personnel, and under one command.

"For the Federal Government to form out of the existing naval organisations a permanent force as the nucleus of the Naval Defence Force, the main body of which would be derived from Naval Brigades, as suggested in your Excellency's letter, would not be sufficient, unless the force is only intended to supplement the crews of His Majesty's ships in war; if not, then modern ships would have to be provided and maintained by the Federal Government for the officers and men of the Commonwealth Naval Force, in which they could be trained at sea, and a part maintained at all times in a state of efficiency and readiness for war, a system which would be much more costly and less efficient than if the ships and men were provided by arrangement with the Imperial Government."

We have in the above clear statement of Admiral Beaumont the opinion of an able and experienced naval officer on the question, and it is fortunate that we have been placed in possession of his views, inasmuch as they represent an expert and impartial opinion worthy of the greatest respect and entitled to the fullest consideration.

II.—EXISTING NAVAL FORCES.

5. The Commonwealth has taken over the local naval forces from the States of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia, which are at present maintained at an annual cost of about £75,000. These forces consist of 242 permanent officers and men and 1,637 partially-paid members of naval brigades.

6. For years past no means have been provided in New South Wales for giving to the local naval force any sea training. They have no ships and are, therefore, merely sailors drilled on shore, and would be of little value as a naval force in time of war. In Victoria there is the harbour defence ship, "Cerberus," and four torpedo-boats, but the existing means are inadequate for obtaining effective sea training for the men. In Queensland there are the gun-boats, "Gayundah" and "Paluma," and in South Australia there is the gun-boat, "Protector," and in both of these States a limited amount of sea training is carried out. The Colonial Defence Committee has stated, with regard to these local harbour defence ships, that it is difficult to obtain from them an effect commensurate with the outlay entailed.

7. These local forces, maintained under existing conditions, appear, therefore, to be of small value for naval defence, and if they are to be organised in the future, so as to provide a force of trained seamen, available for supplementing the crews and for the manning of sea-going cruisers in time of war, suitable ships must be provided in which to train the officers and men at sea.

III.—RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

8. Whatever may be done in the future, if we accept, as I think we must, Admiral Beaumont's opinion, that "it is beyond the power of the Commonwealth at the outset to create a force adequate for the Naval Defence of Australia, and that such a force can only be acquired and maintained by arrangement with the Imperial Government," it is absolutely necessary, for a time at any rate, to depend upon the Royal Navy for our naval defence. The Commonwealth under the existing agreement pays the Admiralty £106,000 a year, and New Zealand pays £20,000 a year; but, as a more powerful fleet is required, a greater contribution will be necessary under a new arrangement. I am informed that the cost of the annual maintenance of the "Royal Arthur" alone is more than our whole contribution of £106,000.

9. I would recommend that until a more permanent basis for the Naval Defence of the Empire is decided upon, the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth be carried out on the following basis:—

- (a.) That the existing agreement with the Imperial Government be readjusted and extended for ten years (unless cancelled sooner by mutual consent). The number and class of ships to be stationed in Australian waters, the annual contribution, and all other matters to be definitely dealt with in such revised agreement.
- (b.) That the existing Naval Militia forces be made effective for supplementing the manning of sea-going ships in time of war, and that two ships commanded by officers of the Royal Navy be allotted by the Admiralty for their naval instruction, and with that object to visit the various ports throughout the year. The militia naval forces to be available for the protection of the Commonwealth on land as well as on sea.
- (c.) That expert opinion be obtained as to what extent the "Cerberus," "Protector," gunboats, torpedo boats, and existing armaments can be profitably utilised.
- (d.) That the permanent naval defence forces now existing in Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland be reduced in strength, and only a staff sufficient for the instruction of the Naval Militia on shore be retained.

It would seem to be absolutely necessary that in any such new arrangement provision should be made for one or two powerful cruisers to be stationed in Australian waters capable of successfully resisting an attack by similar warships of foreign nations.

IV.—PROPOSAL FOR AN AUSTRALIAN NAVY.

10. If it were desirable for Australia to have a navy of her own, maintained altogether by the Commonwealth, we could in that case buy our own ships of war, man them in our own way, and be quite independent of the Imperial Navy.

11. In order to provide even the small squadron proposed by Admiral Beaumont of two first-class and six second-class cruisers, together with depôts and stores, would probably cost £3,600,000 on the following basis:—

Two first-class cruisers	£1,000,000
Six second-class cruisers	2,500,000
Depôts and stores, viz., naval yards, &c.	100,000
Total capital cost	£3,600,000

12. The maintenance of this squadron in Australian waters, if fully manned and equipped in a way that would enable it to engage successfully the first-class cruisers of the enemy, with two of the second-class cruisers in use for training, say 2,000 men of the Naval Militia, would probably amount to about one million a year, including interest at 5 per cent. per annum on the capital cost.

13. It has been proposed, and the plan is much favoured by some, that during time of peace a squadron thus organised should only be manned with sufficient men to maintain the ships in working efficiency, and should be wholly employed in training the Naval Militia, and that in time of war it should be fully manned by such Naval Militia collected from the several ports of the Commonwealth. There would no doubt be a saving in maintenance by this course, but Admiral Beaumont is of opinion that a squadron thus mobilised and manned would not be able to meet

on equal terms the powerful cruisers with highly-trained crews that would be certain to be used against us, and that "for the present the safety and welfare of the Commonwealth require that the Naval Force in Australian waters should be a sea-going fleet of modern ships, fully equipped, fully manned with trained crews, homogeneous as to type and personnel, and under one command."

14. I am not prepared to recommend under existing conditions the establishment of an Australian Navy. Even if it were established, I am afraid it would not be very efficient, for besides the enormous cost of replacing the fleet from time to time with more modern ships, there would be no change for the officers and crews, who would go on year after year in the same ships, subject to the same influences, and, I fear, with deteriorating effects.

V.—THE PERMANENT NAVAL DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE.

15. In regard to defence we must altogether get rid of the idea that we have different interests to those of the rest of the Empire, and we must look at the matter from a broad common standpoint. If the British nation is at war, so are we; if it gains victories or suffers disasters, so do we; and therefore it is of the same vital interest to us as to the rest of the Empire that our supremacy on the ocean shall be maintained. There is only one sea to be supreme over, and we want one fleet to be mistress over that sea.

16. We are bound also to consider and to fully realise that we belong to a nation which for centuries has been mistress of the sea, and that the position we occupy in Australia to-day in being all British territory, and having always enjoyed peace and security, is absolutely attributable to the protection given to us by the British flag.

17. We are accustomed to travel about the world for the purpose of trade or in pursuit of pleasure, and to feel when we visit foreign countries that our lives and property are secure and in specially safe keeping. We then realise fully the great privilege and advantage of being a British subject, and feel proud when we see the flag of our mother land everywhere in evidence, ready, willing, and able to protect us.

18. Our aim and object should be to make the Royal Navy the Empire's Navy, supported by the whole of the self-governing portions of the Empire, and not solely supported by the people of the British Isles, as is practically the case at the present time. It is, I think, our plain duty to take a part in the additional obligations cast upon the mother country by the expansion of the Empire, and the extra burdens cast upon her in maintaining our naval supremacy.

19. If a proposal were adopted that the Empire should have one fleet maintained by the whole nation, every part contributing to its support on some plan to be mutually arranged, probably on that of the comparative trade of each country, and not necessarily on an uniform basis of contribution, what a splendid idea would be consummated, and what a bulwark for peace throughout the world would be established! Besides which, we would be doing our duty to the mother country, which has been so generous to us during all our early years.

20. If the Federations of Canada and Australia and the Colonies of South Africa and New Zealand were to agree to this great principle of one fleet for the Empire's Naval Defence, then the question of contributions and all other matters connected with it could be afterwards arranged by mutual agreement. I cannot think that for Canada and Australia to each have a few war ships, and the Cape and New Zealand a few also, each independent of the other, is a plan suited to Empire; such a plan would seem to be in accord with the actions and sentiments of a number of petty States rather than in accord with the necessities and aspirations of a great free united people.

21. If such a plan can be brought about, it would be necessary for the "British Dominions beyond the Seas" to be adequately represented at the Admiralty, and I feel sure this could be arranged on a mutually satisfactory basis. In time of war there could not be any division of responsibility, and, until a more extended federation of the Empire is established, that responsibility would have to rest upon the Imperial Government.

22. It would be advisable that means should be provided for training boys in Canada, Australia, and other places, and for the drafting into the Navy of a certain number annually, and greater facilities might possibly be given for officers entering the Navy. By these means the personnel of the Navy would consist to some extent

of British subjects from different parts of the Empire, and this might in time have the effect of a greater personal interest in the Navy being taken by the people living outside the British Isles than has hitherto been the case when all have been recruited from the mother country.

23. Great Britain spends annually on her Army and Navy about £50,000,000 (not including the South African war), or about £1 5s. per head of her population. If the Australian Commonwealth contributed in the same proportion it would amount to something like £5,000,000 a year, whereas our entire military and naval defence vote does not exceed £800,000 a year, or only about 4s. per head of our population.

24. It may, of course, be said that in building up another Britain in the Southern Hemisphere, thus providing another home for our countrymen, and by extending British influence and trade, we have been doing a greater work for the Empire than by contributing towards Imperial naval defence, but I think the time has gone by for us to use such arguments, as both duty and stern necessity require that we shall stand shoulder to shoulder with the motherland in the determination to maintain inviolate the integrity of the Empire. That this is the sentiment deep-rooted in the hearts of the Australian people has, I am proud to say, been shown during the South African war, which we have made our own, proving unmistakably to the world that our interests in war as well as in peace are indissolubly bound up with the country from which our fathers came, and to which we are all proud to belong.

25. I would suggest that the Imperial Government should be consulted as to the advisability of holding a conference in London, at which representatives from Canada, the Cape, New Zealand, and Australia might be asked to discuss and if possible arrive at a conclusion as to the views herein set forth, or any others that may be submitted having for their object the strengthening of the Naval Defence of the Empire, and that the conclusions arrived at should be then forwarded for the consideration of the Governments and Parliaments concerned.

JOHN FORREST,
Minister of State for Defence.

APPENDIX VI.

MEMORANDUM BY MR. ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

The Secretary of State for War has discussed personally with the Right Hon. R. J. Seddon, Premier of New Zealand, the Right Hon. Sir A. Hime, Premier of Natal, and the Hon. T. E. Fuller, Agent-General for Cape Colony, the question of those Colonies furnishing from their Colonial Forces properly trained units, which would be available for Imperial service outside their Colonies in the event of a serious war.

It was agreed that, to ensure their fitness for immediate field service on the outbreak of war, such units should be so trained in peace time as not to be at a disadvantage if employed against the troops of European Powers, and that their equipment should be complete and efficient.

The Secretary of State for War pointed out that the men selected for Imperial service would not be called out for such service until the Reserves of the Regular Army at home were called out, that is, in case of imminent national danger or great emergency. If the Colonies concerned insisted on the consent of their respective Governments to the employment of these units outside the Colonies to which they belonged, any extra pay which might be granted to the men on account of their liability to extra-Colonial service, and the higher efficiency demanded of them, would fairly be chargeable to Colonial revenues. If, on the other hand, the units were placed at the disposal of His Majesty's Government, subject to the conditions specified above, it would seem not unreasonable that extra pay, equal to the pay of Reservists of the Regular Army, should be provided out of Imperial funds. When employed extra-Colonially for Imperial purposes, all charges would devolve on His Majesty's Government, the rate of pay suggested being that approved for the Imperial Yeomanry during the late war.

Mr. Seddon was prepared to consider the provision by New Zealand of a force of 4,500 men on the above lines, on the condition that they should be available only for service in South Africa, Canada, or China. As regards India, he considered that they should not be employed in that country, but it was urged by the Secretary

of State that in the event of a campaign on or beyond the north-west frontier of India their employment on active service in that direction should not be objected to, provided that they were not utilised for garrison duty in the plains.

It was recognised that under existing conditions in South Africa, more especially having regard to the large native population, the Imperial contingents which Cape Colony and Natal could supply would not be large, but if a beginning were made it was hoped that they might gradually be strengthened. Any risk of internal disturbance, owing to the withdrawal of the contingents, would be borne in mind by His Majesty's Government, on whom, as well as on local Governments, lies the responsibility of maintaining the internal tranquillity and external security of all parts of the King's dominions.

It was considered that, having regard to the reputation won by Colonial contingents in South Africa, it would be better not to affiliate the Colonial units organised for Imperial service to regiments of the Regular Army; but Mr. Seddon expressed a strong desire that British regular troops might occasionally be quartered in New Zealand.

It was understood that the units to be furnished by Cape Colony, Natal, and New Zealand would consist mainly of mounted men, that they would be periodically inspected by a General or other Officer of the Regular Forces, and that the duration and nature of their annual training should be enquired into and settled by the Colonial Governments in consultation with His Majesty's Government. The officers and men who have recently been employed on active service in South Africa would, however, be held to be reasonably efficient without undergoing any special preliminary training.

ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

War Office, 5 August, 1902.

In reference to above Memorandum I have received enclosed from Mr. Seddon, which I think it best to give *in extenso*.

The only difference between his proposal and that contained in my Memorandum appears to be on the following points:—

- (1) Equipment should be provided by Imperial Government, the Colonies paying the interest.
- (2) Liability of the force to serve on the N.W. Frontier of India.
- (3) Reserve Pay.—Mr. Seddon proposes £6 a year. My suggestion was £9, similar to the Home Reserve Pay.

The difference would, perhaps, be reasonable in view of the limit in liability for service.

It seems clear that the principle being agreed to, there will not be much difficulty in working out the details.

ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

August 6.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RIGHT HON. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR,
WAR OFFICE, S.W.

Hotel Cecil, Strand, W.C.,
6th August, 1902.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for War, and begs to acknowledge the receipt of his Memorandum of even date with reference to his conference with the Premier of Natal, the Agent-General for Cape Colony, and himself, on the question of those Colonies furnishing from their Colonial Forces properly trained units, which would be available for Imperial service outside their Colonies in the event of a serious war.

The Premier begs to observe that the Memorandum in question does not altogether fully put the position, and as the paragraph now stands an incorrect inference might be drawn. His view of the matter is consistent with what was referred to in his statement of the defences of the Colony, laid before the New Zealand Parliament, and approved of by Secret Committee, whose report was adopted by Parliament, in which it was laid down that the Imperial Reserve Force should be open to all officers and men belonging to the ordinary Volunteer Corps, to become efficient in both services, and to enlist for, say, three years in the Reserve Forces.

The officers and men so enlisting should receive a fixed annual sum on being certificated as efficient, and be required to go into camp at stated periods for, say, four weeks in each year, the drills and camping as a volunteer to count as part of the said four weeks. When in camp they should be paid a fixed allowance; the Imperial Government to equip or find the money for equipment, upon which the Colony should pay the interest. The Reserve Forces to be open for service within the territorial limits, to be agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and the annual capitation allowance fixed upon, say £6, to be provided by the Imperial Government. The pay of the officers and men outside the Colony, within the limits stipulated, not to be less than was paid to officers and men recently serving in South Africa.

The question at issue is that if officers and men are to go anywhere outside the Colony, then the Imperial Government should pay a sum equal to the pay of the reservists of the Regular Army. On the other hand, if they are to be only allowed to go with the consent of their respective Governments then the capitation grant should be chargeable to Colonial revenues.

What the Premier of New Zealand was prepared to consider was that the territorial limits within which the officers were to serve could be fixed at once, and he mentioned South Africa, Canada, China, and the islands of the Western Pacific, but excluding India. With these limits fixed beforehand, the capital required for equipment and the extra pay to be found by the Imperial Government could be determined. This is fair, because there is no special reason why the Colony should have an Imperial Reserve for service outside the Colony; and the lines upon which an Imperial Reserve might be formed having been approved by the New Zealand Government, to depart therefrom would militate against, and probably prevent, any Imperial Reserve being formed in New Zealand, which would be a matter for regret, seeing that the officers and men of the returned contingents in New Zealand would form the nucleus of the said Imperial Reserve.

The Premier has gone fully into the matter, and is afraid that if the Memorandum is allowed to go as it now stands it would lead to an incorrect inference being formed. The main point seems to him to have been overlooked, viz., that at the commencement the limits within which the officers should serve should be fixed. If these are agreed upon, the financial difficulty is solved.

It seems to him that no good purpose will be served by not speaking plainly on this subject. No Imperial Reserve can be formed within the Colony to be put on the same footing as the reserves of the Regular Army at home and for service anywhere within the Empire. It is by fixing the limits within which they may be called upon to serve, and having same defined beforehand, that the response and enrolment of officers and men would be obtained.

The Premier of New Zealand therefore desires that the Memorandum should be extended so as to embrace the points mentioned in this communication.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of the Premier's Statement of the Defences of New Zealand referred to in the first part of this Memorandum.

R. J. SEDDON,
Prime Minister of New Zealand.

With reference to the next to the last paragraph of the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War the subjoined note has been received from the Prime Minister of Natal.

Hotel Cecil,
7th August, 1902.

The Memorandum correctly reflects the results of the conversation which Mr. Brodrick and Sir W. Nicholson had with Mr. Fuller and myself, except in regard to the next to the last paragraph, which, so far as the Cape and Natal are concerned, should read as follows:—

"The possibility of affiliating the Colonial units rendered available for Imperial service to regiments of the Regular Army was mentioned, as being likely to render service in such units more popular. No decision was arrived at, as it was thought desirable to ascertain the feeling of the Colonies on this subject."

A. H. HIME.

APPENDIX VII.

MEMORANDUM BY THE CANADIAN MINISTERS CONCERNING DEFENCE.

The Canadian Ministers regret that they have been unable to assent to the suggestions made by Lord Selborne respecting the Navy and by Mr. St. John Brodrick respecting the Army. The Ministers desire to point out that their objections arise not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals would entail an important departure from the principle of Colonial self-government. Canada values highly the measure of local independence which has been granted it from time to time by the Imperial Authorities, and which has been so productive of beneficial results, both as respects the material progress of the country and the strengthening of the ties that bind it to the Mother-land. But while, for these reasons, the Canadian Ministers are obliged to withhold their assent to the propositions of the Admiralty and the War Office, they fully appreciate the duty of the Dominion, as it advances in population and wealth, to make more liberal outlay for those necessary preparations of self-defence which every country has to assume and bear.

That the taxpayers of the United Kingdom should desire to be relieved of some of the burdens which they bear in connection with military expenditure is quite reasonable. Canada in the development of its own militia system will be found ready to respond to that desire by taking upon itself some of the services in the Dominion which have hitherto been borne by the Imperial Government. What has already been done by Canada must give assurance of the disposition of the Canadian people to recognize their proper obligations.

In the early years of the Dominion an understanding was come to between the Imperial and Canadian Governments that Canada should expend about 1,000,000 dols. annually on her militia system. From time to time that expenditure has been voluntarily increased, and at present, apart from the special outlay in connection with the maintenance of the garrison at Halifax, the Dominion is expending about 2,000,000 dols. annually on her militia.

The efficiency of the Canadian Militia Service having been called in question, it may be of interest to note that many improvements have been made during the past few years; notably the organization of an Army Medical Corps and the creation of an Army Service Corps, the strengthening of the headquarters and district staffs, the exercise of greater care in the selection of permanent force officers, and the affording of greater facilities for the training of the officers of the active militia.

A Militia Pension Law has been enacted for the staff and the permanent force. Annual drill in camps of instruction for the rural corps, and at battalion headquarters for city corps, has been carried out each year during the past six years. A school of musketry has been established at Ottawa, with most encouraging results; rifle-ranges have been and are being constructed at the public expense at important centres all over the Dominion, and financial aid is being afforded to local corps in smaller places for the same object. Rifle Associations, whose members are pledged to military service, if required, are being organized, and their formation encouraged by the loan of rifles and by grants of free ammunition. A reserve of officers has been established, and improvements have also been made in several other important respects.

The work done by the Militia Department in sending contingents to South Africa may be fairly cited as proof of reasonable efficiency. Without referring to anything which was done outside of the purely Canadian contingents, it is worthy of mention that the first contingent, under Colonel Otter, composed of 1,000 men drawn from every section of Canada embraced within 4,000 miles of territory lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, was organized, fully equipped, and embarked within a period of 14 days; and that a second contingent, composed of 1,200 men, composed of Field Artillery and Mounted Rifles, was shortly afterwards similarly organized, equipped, and embarked within the space of three weeks.

But while thus calling attention to the progress that has already been made by Canada in her militia organization, the Ministers are far from claiming that perfection has been attained. If defects exist, there is every desire on the part of the Canadian Government to remove them, and for this purpose the advice and assistance of experienced Imperial officers will be welcomed and all reasonable efforts made to secure an efficient system.

At present Canadian expenditures for defence services are confined to the military side. The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well. On the sea-coasts of Canada there is a large number of men admirably qualified to form a Naval Reserve, and it is hoped that at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men and to the making of their services available for defence in time of need.

In conclusion, the Ministers repeat that, while the Canadian Government are obliged to dissent from the measures proposed, they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make expenditures for the purposes of defence in proportion to the increasing population and wealth of the country. They are willing that these expenditures shall be so directed as to relieve the taxpayer of the mother country from some of the burdens which he now bears; and they have the strongest desire to carry out their defence schemes in co-operation with the Imperial authorities, and under the advice of experienced Imperial officers, so far as this is consistent with the principle of local self-government, which has proved so great a factor in the promotion of Imperial unity.

London, 11th August, 1902.

APPENDIX VIII.

MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Accompanied by the Senior Naval Lord and the Financial Secretary, my colleagues of the Board of Admiralty, and assisted by the Director of Naval Intelligence, I have now had interviews with the Premiers of His Majesty's Government in Cape Colony, Natal, Newfoundland, and New Zealand, and with the Premiers and Ministers of Defence of His Majesty's Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of Canada; and, as the result, the Board of Admiralty have received the following offers of assistance towards the Naval Expenses of the Empire:—

- *Cape Colony :
£50,000 per annum to the general maintenance of the Navy. No conditions.
- *Commonwealth of Australia :
£200,000 per annum to an improved Australasian Squadron, and the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve.
- *Natal :
£35,000 per annum to the general maintenance of the Navy. No conditions.
- *Newfoundland :
£3,000 per annum (and £1,800 as a special contribution to the fitting and preparation of a drill ship) towards the maintenance of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve of not less than 600 men.
- *New Zealand :
£40,000 per annum to an improved Australasian Squadron, and the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve.

I wish to tender to the Colonial Ministers the hearty acknowledgment of the Board of Admiralty for the manner in which they have assisted them to arrive at the satisfactory result given above. As might be supposed, we have not always been able to see eye to eye on the questions discussed; but the interchange of views has been mutually frank, and governed on all sides by a desire to treat the defence of the Empire on a business footing, and to abandon the discussion of theories for the attainment of results immediately practicable. It is true that the Board of Admiralty have not in these conferences achieved all the results for which they might previously have hoped; but, on the other hand, it has been a great pleasure to them to hear from the Prime Ministers of all the self-governing Colonies a generous appreciation of the work of the Navy.

If the Parliaments of the above-named self-governing Colonies accept and

endorse these arrangements, a real step in advance will have been made in the organisation of the Naval Forces of the Empire.

In the first place, an increase in the number of modern men-of-war maintained in commission will have been promoted by the aid of British subjects in the dominions beyond the seas.

In the second place, the conditions attached to the various agreements will show how keen is becoming the appreciation throughout the Empire of the peculiar characteristics of Naval warfare, and of the fact that those local considerations which find their natural place in military organisations are inapplicable to Naval organisation. I would draw special attention to the improved composition and organisation of the Australasian Squadron when the new agreement will have come into force, and to the fact that Cape Colony and Natal have made their offer unfettered by any conditions, a mark of confidence and of appreciation of the Naval problem of which the Board of Admiralty are deeply sensible.

Thirdly, I hail with much satisfaction the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve in the Colonies. The circumstances of the population of Newfoundland are peculiar, and nowhere else probably within the Empire can so large a proportion of fishermen be found. A branch of the Royal Naval Reserve has already been founded there, and I look forward confidently to its steady growth. In Australia and New Zealand, although Naval Brigades have for some time been in existence there, and did excellent service in the recent China War, the formation of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve is a new departure. The formation of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve is not the only, or indeed the chief, step in advance, in connection with the *personnel* of the fleet, for it has been agreed that if possible one of the ships of the Australian Squadron in permanent commission shall be manned by Australians and New Zealanders under officers of the Royal Navy, and that 10 cadetships in the Royal Navy shall be given annually in Australia and New Zealand.

I have accordingly great pleasure in recommending to His Majesty's Government that the offers of assistance which have been received should be accepted.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier informed me that His Majesty's Government of the Dominion of Canada are contemplating the establishment of a local Naval force in the waters of Canada, but that they were not able to make any offer of assistance analogous to those enumerated above.

I have alluded to the fact that our interchange of views at the conferences have been characterised by mutual frankness, and I desire to put on record the facts and arguments which I thought it my duty to set forth.

In the first place, I pointed out that even after the Colonial Parliaments had ungrudgingly increased the proportion of their assistance towards the Naval Defence of the Empire, as recommended by their Ministers, the taxpayers of the British Empire would, in respect of Naval Expenditure, still be in the following relative positions:—

	Population (White).	Naval Contribution per Caput per Annum.
United Kingdom	41,454,621	s. d. 15 2
Cape Colony	538,000	1 10½
Commonwealth of Australia	3,765,805	1 0½
Dominion of Canada	5,338,883	Nil.
Natal	64,951	10 9½
Newfoundland	210,000	0 3½
New Zealand	772,719	1 0½

For the year 1902-3 the Navy Estimates amounted to £31,423,000, after deducting appropriations-in-aid other than contributions from the self-governing Colonies. Of this sum the self-governing Colonies would, on the basis of the new agreements, have paid £328,000.

This table shows how large a proportion of the burden falls upon the taxpayer of the United Kingdom, and although it is true that by far the larger portion of the money which he provides is spent within the United Kingdom, yet it so happens that more of the money provided by the taxpayer of the United Kingdom is spent in the British Dominions beyond the seas than the British Dominions beyond the seas contribute to the maintenance of the British Navy. Additional interest is lent to

the fact by an analysis of the trade which the British Navy has to protect. In the year 1900 the seaborne trade of the Empire may be roughly stated to have been worth between eleven and twelve hundred millions sterling; but of this vast sum a proportion of certainly not less than one-fourth was trade in which the taxpayer of the United Kingdom had no interest, either as buyer or seller, of the particular goods represented by these values. It was either inter-Colonial trade or trade between the British Dominions beyond the seas and foreign countries. The taxpayer of the United Kingdom has therefore the privilege, not only of taking upon himself the lion's share of the burden the interest in which is shared between himself and his fellow subjects in the dominions beyond the seas, but also a not less share of the burden in respect of interests which are not his own, but exclusively those of his fellow subjects beyond the seas.

I expressed my hope that this simple statement of fact would help the Colonial taxpayer to realise the extent of the advantage he reaps from the existence of one Navy for the whole Empire. He is not only relieved thereby of a heavy burden of taxation in time of peace, but in time of war he knows that to him, if faced by any possible coalition, is furnished the concentrated strength of one Navy under one command.

In reply to an inquiry, I undertook to endeavour to form an estimate of the Naval obligations which would be forced upon the British Dominions beyond the seas if they were nations with a separate existence, and not, as now, partner nations of the British Empire, and it was suggested that the proper comparison would be between the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand or the Dominion of Canada and some State with a population of about the same size.

I pointed out that if such a basis of comparison were chosen the annual Naval expenditure of Holland is £1,400,000, and that of Argentina £920,000, not to mention a past capital expenditure of several millions which must have been incurred in the creation of the fleets and for the proper equipment of dockyards and Naval bases. These countries were only taken because their populations roughly correspond in size with those of Australasia and Canada, and not because they are in other respects in any way comparable. Indeed, I submitted that this was not an adequate or satisfactory comparison. Each great group of dominions beyond the seas would, so it seemed to me, have to face the Naval position in which it found itself, and the governing conditions of that position would be the political and geographical environment of the group. As a matter of fact, each of these groups would find itself within the orbit of a great Naval Power. The Dominion of Canada would have to frame its Naval policy with a view to the Navy of the United States. The Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand would be forced to remember that France in New Caledonia, and Germany in New Guinea, are near neighbours, and that the Naval power of Japan is steadily increasing. Cape Colony and Natal would constantly find themselves reminded of the fact that France is their neighbour in the Indian Ocean, in Madagascar, and that the greater part of Western South Africa is German. It is not easy in either of these cases to see how it could be possible to avoid the influence of those forces which have forced Japan to become a Naval Power. The Naval Budget of Japan for the year 1901-2 was £3,700,000, and this sum included nothing for interest, sinking fund, or depreciation account in connection with former capital expenditure on stores, ships, dockyards, or Naval bases.

These are the facts and arguments which I felt it my duty to lay before the Premiers, and to which, whether agreeing or disagreeing, they have listened with that friendly courtesy which has made all our interviews so agreeable a recollection. I recapitulate them now because the danger to the Empire which I fear is that Canada, South Africa, and Australia, being in fact continents, should become too much continental and too little maritime in their aspirations and ideas. The British Empire owes its existence to the sea, and it can only continue to exist if all parts of it regard the sea as their source of existence and strength. It is therefore desirable that our fellow subjects in the dominions beyond the seas should appreciate the importance of Naval questions. If they will undertake a larger share of the Naval burden, well and good. But I regard it as of even more importance that they should cultivate the maritime spirit; that their populations should become maritime as ours are, and that they should become convinced of the truth of the proposition that there is no possibility of the localisation of Naval force, and that the problem of the British Empire is in no sense one of local defence.

The sea is all one, and the British Navy therefore must be all one; and its

solitary task in war must be to seek out the ships of the enemy, wherever they are to be found, and destroy them. At whatever spot in whatever sea these ships are found and destroyed, there the whole Empire will be simultaneously defended in its territory, its trade, and its interests. If, on the contrary, the idea should unfortunately prevail that the problem is one of local defence, and that each part of the Empire can be content to have its allotment of ships for the purpose of the separate protection of an individual spot, the only possible result would be that an enemy who had discarded this heresy and combined his fleets will attack in detail and destroy those separated British squadrons which, united, could have defied defeat.

SELBORNE.

August 7th, 1902.

APPENDIX.

MEMORANDUM from the PRIME MINISTER OF CAPE COLONY AND NATAL to the BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.

London, 8th July, 1902.

THE enormous preponderance of the native population in the Colonies of the Cape and Natal renders it impossible for us to agree to any proposal involving the obligation to furnish a military contingent in the event of a war in which the Imperial Government may be involved in any other part of the Empire.

Recognising, however, as we do, the absolute necessity for the maintenance of an efficient Navy if the Empire is to be held together, and regarding the Navy as the first security for the preservation of the people of South Africa, and especially of those residing in the two coast Colonies, we are prepared to submit to the Legislatures of our respective Colonies, Bills providing for contributions towards the cost of maintaining the Imperial Navy.

At present the Cape Colony contributes, under an Act of Parliament passed in 1898, the sum of £30,000 a year for that purpose. So soon as Parliament assembles a Bill will be submitted raising that sum to £50,000.

To the Legislature of Natal a Bill will be submitted providing for a yearly contribution of £35,000.

At a later period, when a Confederation has been established in South Africa, the question of training men residing in the two coast Colonies for service in the Imperial Navy will be brought under the consideration of their respective Legislatures, who will, we believe, be prepared to entertain such a proposal most favourably.

J. GORDON SPRIGG.
A. H. HIME.

LETTER from the ADMIRALTY to the PRIME MINISTER OF CAPE COLONY.

Admiralty,

11th August 1902.

SIR,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that they have laid before His Majesty's Government the paper signed by yourself and Sir Albert Hime, in which you recognise the absolute necessity for the maintenance of an efficient navy if the Empire is to be held together, and announce that you are prepared to submit to the Legislature of Cape Colony, as soon as it assembles, a Bill providing for an increase in the contribution towards the cost of maintaining His Majesty's Navy from £30,000 a year to £50,000.

His Majesty's Government accept with pleasure this spontaneous offer of assistance, and believe that with the united efforts of all His Majesty's subjects, both in the United Kingdom and in the British Dominions beyond the seas, the British Navy will be in the future, even more than it has been in the past, the protector of, and connecting link between, the widely extended parts of His Majesty's dominions.

I am to suggest to you that, with a view to setting forth the principles which should govern the development of His Majesty's Navy, it would be very advantageous to insert in the preamble of the Bill which you propose to lay before the Parliament of Cape Colony words recognising the importance of sea power, "in the control

"which it gives over the sea communications, and the necessity of a single navy under one authority, by which alone concerted action can be assured."

My Lords notice with satisfaction that you consider that when a Confederation has been established in South Africa, the question of training men for service in His Majesty's Navy will be brought before the Legislature, and that you believe such a proposal would be favourably entertained. To this my Lords attach much importance, as they fear that unless the British Continental Dominions beyond the seas retain a personal touch with the British Navy, British subjects living far inland may forget that the origin of the Empire depends on the sea, and that for its continued existence it is essential that in all its parts the maritime spirit should prevail.

A copy of the letter which has been addressed to Sir Albert Hime on this subject is attached for information.

The Right Hon.
Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, G.C.M.G.

I am, &c.,
H. J. VANSITTART NEALE.

LETTER from the ADMIRALTY to the PRIME MINISTER OF NATAL.

Admiralty,

11th August 1902.

SIR,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that they have laid before His Majesty's Government the paper signed by yourself and Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, in which you recognise the absolute necessity for the maintenance of an efficient navy if the Empire is to be held together, and announce that you are prepared to submit to the Legislature of Natal, as soon as it assembles, a Bill providing for a yearly contribution of £35,000 towards the cost of maintaining His Majesty's Navy.

His Majesty's Government accept with pleasure this spontaneous offer of assistance, and believe that with the united efforts of all His Majesty's subjects, both in the United Kingdom and in the British Dominions beyond the seas, the British Navy will be in the future, even more than it has been in the past, the protector of and connecting link between the widely extended parts of His Majesty's dominions.

I am to suggest to you that, with a view to setting forth the principles which should govern the development of His Majesty's Navy, it would be very advantageous to insert in the preamble of the Bill which you propose to lay before the Parliament of Natal words recognising the importance of sea power, "in the control which it gives over the sea communications, and the necessity of a single navy under one authority, by which alone concerted action can be assured."

My Lords notice with satisfaction that you consider that when a Confederation has been established in South Africa, the question of training men for service in His Majesty's Navy will be brought before the Legislature, and that you believe such a proposal would be favourably entertained. To this my Lords attach much importance, as they fear that unless the British Continental Dominions beyond the seas retain a personal touch with the British Navy, British subjects living far inland may forget that the origin of the Empire depends on the sea, and that for its continued existence it is essential that in all its parts the maritime spirit should prevail.

A copy of the letter which has been addressed to Sir Gordon Sprigg on this subject is attached for information.

Lieutenant-Colonel
The Hon. Sir Albert H. Hime, K.C.M.G.

I am, &c.,
H. J. VANSITTART NEALE.

LETTER from the PRIME MINISTER OF NEWFOUNDLAND to the FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

SIR,

Hotel Cecil, London, W.C.
REFERRING to my conversation with your Lordships, and subsequent interviews and correspondence with Rear-Admiral Custance, I am now in a position to

state that the Newfoundland Government will contribute towards the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve the sum of £3,000 sterling annually for a period of 10 years, provided the said force shall consist of not less than 600 men, the said annual payment to be proportionately reduced for each man less than that number.

The Colony will also pay over to His Majesty's Government the sum of £1,800 to defray the cost of "housing in" of H.M.S. "Calypso."

In the matter of the erection of a battery referred to in my letter to Rear-Admiral Custance of date the 1st instant, it is to be understood that, while His Majesty's Government cannot at the present time agree to erect a battery in St. John's, the matter is to be regarded as depending upon the success of the present movement.

This letter is to supersede all former correspondence and agreements.

The Right Hon. Lord Selborne,
Admiralty.

I have, &c.,
R. BOND.

LETTER from the ADMIRALTY to the PRIME MINISTER OF NEWFOUNDLAND.
Admiralty,

SIR,

August 1902.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that they have laid before His Majesty's Government your letter of the 5th instant, addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty, in which you state that the Newfoundland Government will contribute towards the branch of the Royal Naval Reserve established in that Colony the sum of £3,000 sterling annually for a period of 10 years, provided the said force shall consist of not less than 600 men, and also that the Newfoundland Government will place in the hands of His Majesty's Government the sum of £1,800 to defray the cost of "housing in, &c." His Majesty's ship "Calypso."

His Majesty's Government accept with pleasure these payments under the conditions specified in your letter, as an indication of the determination of the inhabitants of Newfoundland to share in the charge of maintaining His Majesty's Naval Forces.

The Admiralty will consider the question of the erection of a drill battery at St. John's if further experience shows that it will add to the efficiency of the Naval Reserve.

I am to add that your suggestion that all former correspondence and agreements shall be considered as superseded is accepted.

I am, &c.,

The Hon. Sir R. Bond, K.C.M.G.

DRAFT AGREEMENT between HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT of the UNITED KINGDOM, the COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, and the COLONY OF NEW ZEALAND.

The Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c., and the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia and of New Zealand, having recognised the importance of sea power in the control which it gives over sea communications, the necessity of a single navy under one authority, by which alone concerted action can be assured, and the advantages which will be derived from developing the sea power of Australia and New Zealand, have resolved to conclude for this purpose an Agreement as follows:—

ARTICLE I.

The naval force on the Australian Station shall consist of not less than the under-mentioned sea-going ships of war, all of which shall be from time to time throughout the terms of this Agreement of modern type, except those used as drill ships:—

- 1 Armoured Cruiser, 1st class;
- 2 2nd-class Cruisers;

4 3rd-class Cruisers;

4 Sloops;

And of a Royal Naval Reserve consisting of 25 officers and 700 seamen and stokers.

ARTICLE II.

The base of this force shall be the ports of Australia and New Zealand, and their sphere of operations shall be the waters of the Australia, China, and East Indies Stations, as defined in the attached schedules, where the Admiralty believe they can most effectively act against hostile vessels which threaten the trade or interests of Australia and New Zealand. No change in this arrangement shall be made without the consent of the Governments of the Commonwealth and of New Zealand; and nothing in the Agreement shall be taken to mean that the naval force herein named shall be the only force used in Australasian waters should the necessity arise for a larger force.

ARTICLE III.

This force shall be under the control and orders of the Naval Commander-in-Chief for the time being appointed to command His Majesty's Ships and Vessels on the Australian Station.

ARTICLE IV.

Of the ships referred to in Article I., one shall be kept in reserve and three shall be only partly manned and shall be used as Drill Ships for training the Royal Naval Reserve, the remainder shall be kept in Commission fully manned.

ARTICLE V.

The three vessels used as Drill Ships and one other vessel shall be manned by Australians and New Zealanders as far as procurable, paid at special rates, and enrolled in proportion to the relative population of the Commonwealth and New Zealand. If a sufficient proportion of men from either Colony should not on the aforesaid basis be forthcoming a sufficient number of men to complete the complements of the ships may be enrolled from the other Colony.

They shall be officered by Officers of the Royal Navy supplemented by Officers of the Royal Naval Reserve.

ARTICLE VI.

In order to ensure that the Naval Service shall include Officers born in Australia and New Zealand, who will be able to rise to the highest posts in the Royal Navy, the under-mentioned nominations for Naval Cadetships will be given annually:—

Commonwealth of Australia	8
New Zealand	2

ARTICLE VII.

The branches of the Royal Naval Reserve established in Australia and New Zealand shall be called into actual service by His Majesty in Council, acting on the advice of his Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand respectively.

The men forming the Royal Naval Reserve shall be divided into two classes:—

- (a.) Those who have served for three years on board one of H.M. Ships.
- (b.) Those who have not so served.

These men shall be trained on ships specially provided for the purpose.

The Officers of this reserve force shall be included on the list of Officers of the Royal Naval Reserve.

ARTICLE VIII.

In consideration of the service afore-mentioned the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand shall pay the Imperial Government five-twelfths and one-twelfth respectively of the total annual cost of maintaining the Naval force on the Australian Station, provided that the total amount so paid shall in no case exceed £200,000 and £40,000 respectively in any one year. In reckoning the total annual

cost a sum equal to 5 per cent. on the prime cost of the ships of which the Naval force of the Station is composed shall be included.

ARTICLE IX.

The Imperial Government recognise the advantages to be derived from making Australasia a base for coal and supplies for the squadrons in Eastern waters.

ARTICLE X.

1. This Agreement shall be considered to become actually binding between the Imperial Government and the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand, so soon as the Colonial Legislatures shall have passed special appropriations for the terms hereinafter mentioned, to which Acts this Agreement shall be attached as a First Schedule.

2. The Agreement shall be for a period of ten years, and only terminate if and provided notice has been given two years previously, viz., at the end of the eighth year, or at the end of any subsequent year, and then two years after such date.

ARTICLE XI.

1. The payments named in Article VIII. shall be considered as payments in advance, and shall first become due and payable six months after the Colonial Legislature shall have passed the special appropriation referred to in Article X.

2. The period of ten years referred to in Article X. is to be calculated from the date on which the Colonial Legislature passes the special appropriation referred to.

3. The payments under the existing Agreement and that Agreement itself shall terminate on the date on which the payments under the new Agreement commence.

4. The share of these payments due from each Colony shall be paid annually in London by the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth and the Agent-General of New Zealand, and, pending the appointment of the first-named officer, by such person as the Government of the Commonwealth may nominate, to such account as the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may direct.

ARTICLE XII.

In time of peace one of the drill ships referred to in Article IV. and one other cruiser shall be stationed in the waters of New Zealand and its dependencies as their headquarters. Should however such emergency arise as may, in the opinion of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, render it necessary to remove either or both of such ships, he shall inform the Governor of the reasons for such temporary removal.

SCHEDULE TO AGREEMENT.

LIMITS OF AUSTRALIA STATION.

The Australia Station, as referred to in Article II. of the foregoing Agreement is bounded—

NORTH.—On the North from the meridian of 95 degrees East, by the parallel of the tenth degree of South latitude, to 130 degrees East longitude, thence northward on that meridian to the parallel of 2 degrees North latitude, and thence on that parallel to the meridian of 136 degrees East longitude, thence North to 12 degrees north latitude, and along that parallel to 160 degrees West longitude, thence South to the Equator, thence East to the meridian of 149° 30' West longitude.

WEST.—On the West by the meridian of 95 degrees East longitude.

SOUTH.—On the South by the Antarctic Circle.

EAST.—On the east by the meridian of 149° 30' West longitude.

LIMITS OF THE CHINA STATION.

The China Station, as referred to in Article II. of the foregoing Agreement, is bounded—

NORTH.—On the North from the meridian of 95° of East longitude in 10° North latitude, along that parallel to the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula, thence by the shores of Asia as far as the meridian of 180°.

WEST.—On the West from the latitude of 10° North by the meridian of 95° East longitude to 10° of South latitude.

SOUTH.—On the South from the meridian of 95° East longitude by the parallel of 10° South latitude to 130° East longitude, thence North to 2° North latitude, and along that parallel to 136° East longitude, thence North to 12° North latitude and along that parallel to the meridian of 180°.

EAST.—On the East by the meridian of 180° from 12° North latitude to the point where the meridian reaches the shores of Asia.

LIMITS OF EAST INDIES STATION.

The East Indies Station as referred to in Article II. of the foregoing Agreement is bounded—

NORTH.—On the North by the southern shores of Asia, including the Persian Gulf, from an imaginary line drawn from Jebel Sejan on the African Coast to Cape Babel Mandeb on the Arabian Coast, to where the 10th parallel of North latitude touches the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula.

EAST.—On the East by the meridian of 95° East longitude between the parallels of 10° North and 26° South latitude.

SOUTH.—On the South by the 10th parallel North latitude between the coast of the Malay Peninsula and the 95th meridian of East longitude, and by the parallel of 26° South latitude between the 95th and 42nd meridians of East longitude.

WEST.—On the West by the 42nd meridian of East longitude between the parallels of 26° and 10° South latitude, by the 43rd meridian between the parallel of 10° South and the Equator, and by the East Coast of Africa between the Equator and Jebel Sejan.

APPENDIX IX.

SUPPLIES OF MEAT, PRODUCE, AND HORSES, REQUIRED BY THE WAR OFFICE AND ADMIRALTY, FROM AUSTRALIA.

LIST OF PAPERS.

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3620.

No. 1.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL LORD HOPETOUN to MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

(Received January 27, 1902.)

(No. 140.)

Commonwealth of Australia,
Melbourne, 19th December, 1901.

SIR,

ADVERTING to your despatch, No. 84, of the 18th October last, I have now the

honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a Minute which I have received from my responsible advisers, on the subject of the supplies of meat, produce, and horses, required by the War Office and the Admiralty, from Australia.

I have, &c.,
HOPETOUN,
Governor-General.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Commonwealth of Australia,
Department of External Affairs.

MINUTE FOR HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Mr. Barton presents his humble duty to Your Excellency, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 18th October, 1901, on the subject of the supplies of preserved meat obtained by the Admiralty and War Office, which was transmitted by Your Excellency on the 20th November last.

2. In connection with this despatch, Mr. Barton would be glad if Your Excellency would refer to your despatch (to which it is an answer) requesting that, in case of contracts to be entered into by the Admiralty and the War Office, timely notice should be given to enable tenders to be called in Australia and New Zealand.

3. Mr. Barton observes, with satisfaction, the letter from the War Office in which the Secretary of State for the Colonies is advised that every possible consideration will be given to the wishes of the Governor-General of Australia. It is not, however, stated what steps had been taken, and what changes in the existing methods had been made or were in contemplation, in order to carry out that intention.

4. Mr. Barton regrets to say that there exists throughout the Commonwealth a feeling that our merchants have not received adequate consideration from the authorities in connection with the letting of contracts for supplies required for use in connection with the war in South Africa.

5. Mr. Barton has the honour to enclose, for the information of Your Excellency, a copy of a letter which he has received from a number of firms in Sydney who represent exporting interests. He has received several verbal representations to the same effect as those contained in the letter, and strongly-worded articles have appeared in the public press from time to time, drawing attention to what is referred to as the indifference shown by the War Office to the interests of Australian producers.

6. Mr. Barton would be glad if the Secretary of State for the Colonies were asked to request the War Office to supply him with information as to the extent of the purchases of supplies from Australian firms. He would also be obliged if the goods purchased from firms in Australia can be clearly distinguished from those of goods alleged to be Australian, but purchased from firms in South Africa and elsewhere, as it has been publicly stated that goods have been supplied to the War Office authorities in South Africa which were represented as Australian, but which, as a fact, were not the produce of this country.

7. It is further represented to Mr. Barton that if tenders for supplies as required could be called in Australia, that system would lead to a great saving in the amounts to be paid by the War Office. The large profits said to have been made by business trading firms in South Africa, in connection with the supply of Australian meat, have been freely commented upon in mercantile circles and in the public press. It is represented that huge profits have been made—profits far in excess of any legitimate reward of the capital, labour, and enterprise invested in the industry. It is stated that if business had been carried on direct between Australian producers and the War Office much more economical terms could have been arranged, and large sums of money thus saved by the Imperial authorities.

8. Mr. Barton has reason to believe that a communication has been addressed to Lord Kitchener, drawing attention to the fact that the prices paid by the American Army authorities in the Philippine Islands for supplies of Australian meat are very much below those which have been paid by the Imperial authorities in South Africa for supplies of similar commodities, and this although the circumstances of the respective situations have been largely similar.

9. In a letter recently received from a responsible firm in this community it is stated that an offer could be made to supply, monthly, 2,000 tons of frozen beef, mutton, lamb, &c., ex store ship at Durban or Cape Town, at a price of 6½d. per pound all round. It has been announced that the firm in South Africa who have supplied large quantities of frozen meat for the use of the Army there have been receiving 9½d. per pound for mutton, so it is clear that the price quoted would represent a substantial reduction and consequent saving to the War Office.

10. Mr. Barton would, therefore, strongly urge that the foregoing statements be taken into consideration by the Imperial authorities, and ventures to express a hope that the result of such consideration may be a wider distribution of contracts and a more direct and economical method of business trading.

11. Mr. Barton desires to invite attention also to the question of supply of horses for use in the South African war. Paragraphs frequently appear in the public press notifying that large shipments of horses have been made from America, Russia, and other countries to South Africa. These paragraphs excite comment and cause enquiries to be made as to why the number drawn from this country is, comparatively, so small. Mr. Barton has received a communication on this subject from a responsible firm, which states that an offer was made through the Premier of Queensland some time ago to supply 600 horses per month for six months, and so far the offer has not been acknowledged, and is resultless. It is represented that the reason for this is not one connected with the price, as the price of the horses has not even been discussed between the syndicate responsible for the offer and the War Office. Mr. Barton is informed that the difficulty in the way is with respect to the form of contract proposed. The tenderers desire that the contract should be c.i.f., but the War Office authorities insist that all business connected with the shipment of Australian horses to South Africa must be done f.o.b.

12. Mr. Barton will be glad if it can be represented to the War Office that, in the opinion of Ministers, the c.i.f. form of contract would produce more satisfactory results, both to Australian merchants and to the War Office. The multiplication of contracts entailed by the f.o.b. system cannot be conducive to economy, and, further, the employment of the c.i.f. method would lead to the business being carried out by shipowners employed in the regular trade between Australia and South Africa, and whose vessels have been built and fitted expressly for such trade.

13. Ministers are desirous of encouraging by every means in their power the increase in the number of regular traders between Great Britain, South Africa, and Australia. It will be of great advantage if encouragement can be afforded to such companies, in preference to having business done by occasional tramp steamers belonging to firms which have no settled interests in the Australian trade.

14. In connection with this question of the respective merits of the two forms of contract, Mr. Barton suggests that a reference be made to Colonel Hunt, who has been for some time in the Commonwealth employed on duties in connection with the Remount Department of the Army in South Africa. That gentleman has been long enough in Australia to become fully acquainted with her conditions of trade, and he is consequently able to speak with authority as to the respective advantages for the Imperial authorities of the two methods of contract under review.

15. Mr. Barton is pleased to observe from the much fuller information afforded by the Admiralty that considerable portions of supplies required for the Navy are being purchased in Australian markets. He notes, however, that invitations to tender for preserved canned meat for the Navy generally are apparently issued only to Australian firms who have accredited agents in Great Britain. If that practice could be altered, so as to arrange that when invitations to tender for supplies were issued in England similar invitations might at the same time be publicly announced in the press of the leading cities of the Commonwealth, Mr. Barton thinks that the obtaining of suitable supplies would be greatly facilitated.

16. Mr. Barton trusts that the experience of the Admiralty in connection with the supplies of Australian and New Zealand salt pork, and salt beef, delivered in Sydney for the use of His Majesty's ships on the Australian, East Indian, and China stations is sufficiently satisfactory to induce them to widen the area which Australian merchants can supply. He believes that if such a course is followed, much general good feeling will be created in Australia, and complete satisfaction afforded to the Admiralty and to the consumers of the goods in question.

Mr. Barton will be pleased if early consideration could be given to the subjects dealt with in this minute.

Melbourne,
16th December 1901.

EDMUND BARTON.

SIR,

Sydney,

28th November 1901.

WE, the undersigned, producers and exporters of New South Wales, beg to draw your attention to the fact that we do not consider the War Office are drawing a fair quantity of the supplies required for the use of the Army in South Africa, from Australia. We think it will be very instructive if you can secure the figures of the War Office and Admiralty purchases from Australian firms in connection with frozen meat, beef, jams, butter, oats, flour, bran, and horses.

We would respectfully request that you cable Mr. Chamberlain, notifying him of the considerable dissatisfaction existing in the Colonies on this account and suggesting that you be given particulars of all requirements, the same to be notified here, tenders obtained, the price to be given by telegraph direct to the War Office. This is the only way the business can be conducted on its merits, and by direct dealings with the Australian houses, and the difference between the figures obtained by the latter from South African houses, as compared with the prices paid by the Imperial Government, will at once become apparent.

The advantage to the War Office in dealing direct, as far as frozen meat is concerned, with the producers here has been already pointed out, and the same remarks would apply in the case of other lines if notification were made here and time allowed for submitting offers.

Yours faithfully,

Meat Preservers. For the ROSEWATER PACKING
Co., LTD.,

J. ROBERTS, Director.

Flour Merchants. BRUNTON AND COMPANY.

Food Merchants. For and on behalf of
PARSONS, BROTHERS, & Co.,
PROP., LTD.,

E. F. PARSONS, Director.

Grain Merchants. JOHN BRIDGE AND COMPANY.

Flour Merchants. GILLESPIE BROTHERS AND CO.

Produce Merchants. H. PRESCOTT AND COMPANY.

Meat and Produce } BIRT AND COMPANY, LTD.,

Exporters. } E. C. BECKETT, Secretary.

The Right Honourable Edmund Barton, P.C., &c.,
Melbourne.

3620.

No. 2.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE and ADMIRALTY.

SIR,

Downing Street, January 31st, 1902.

WITH reference to your letter of the 13th January, C.P. 296/534, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to transmit to you, for the consideration of Mr. Secretary Brodrick

the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty } copy of a despatch from the Governor-General of Australia, enclosing a copy of a Minute from his Ministers on the subject of the supplies of meat, produce, and horses required by the Army and Navy.

2. It will be observed that Mr. Barton desires that early consideration should be given to the questions dealt with in his Minute.

3. A similar letter has been addressed to the { Admiralty.
War Office.

I am, &c.,

FRED. GRAHAM.

19065.

No. 3.

ADMIRALTY to COLONIAL OFFICE.

Admiralty, S.W.,

May 13th, 1902.

SIR,

WITH reference to your letter of 31st January last, No. 3,620, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that they have given their careful consideration to the despatch from the Governor-General of Australia, with accompanying Minute from his Ministers, on the subject of the supplies of meat, produce, &c., required for the Navy and Army.

My Lords desire me in the first place to reiterate the statement already made that they are fully alive to the advisability of developing, so far as possible, business relations with Colonial producers, and they have encouraged, and will continue to encourage, such relations by placing orders with Colonial firms whenever it is possible to do so consistently with due regard to quality and economy.

As regards the several points raised in Mr. Barton's Minute, it will be most convenient to deal with them paragraph by paragraph, premising that it is with the supply of Australian meat that the Admiralty is chiefly concerned.

Paragraphs 2, 7, and 15.—In respect of the suggestion that timely notice should be given of forthcoming contracts so as to enable tenders to be called in Australia, I am to observe that tender forms for canned meats are issued to the English agents of Australian packers, and it is understood that most, if not all, the leading Australian packers are represented in this country. These packers are kept acquainted by their agents with the Admiralty specification, and a price is arranged between the agent and the principal by telegraph, if necessary, and the tender form lodged by the English agent. The Admiralty only purchases meat of approved brands which have previously been tried and found satisfactory, and the meat is supplied under a two years' guarantee that all tins condemned during that period are replaced free of charge. To advertise in Australia, as proposed, would entail delay and possibly result in offers being made of brands either unsuitable for Admiralty requirements or of a quality unknown to the Department.

As a matter of fact, however, my Lords did cause notice of the preserved meat contract to be given by letter of 13th January last, C.P. 296/534, in which they requested that intimation of the anticipated requirements of preserved meats for Navy use might be communicated to the principal Colonial Governments, so that packers who were not already on the Admiralty List, and were desirous and capable of quoting, might make application, submit samples of their brands, and name agents in this country.

Paragraphs 3 to 12 relate chiefly to the War Department, but 7 has previously been touched on, and I am to observe with regard to paragraph 6 that this Department has already furnished to the Colonial Office a list of the Australian firms* accepted for meat contracts during three years past, together with a comparative statement of the quantities of preserved meats purchased from Australia and America during the same period.† (Admiralty letters of the 7th October 1901, C.P. 12161/15812, and of the 27th November 1901, C.P. 13819/18273.)

As regards the statement alluded to by Mr. Barton that goods purporting to be of Australian origin, which were not in fact produced in that country, had been supplied to the War Office authorities in South Africa, it may be observed that the departmental rule of dealing direct with manufacturers and producers, or when they live out of the United Kingdom with their sole agents, renders it very improbable that any goods bought by the Admiralty as Australian are not really the produce of that country.

Paragraph 13.—Of the eight steamers engaged for the conveyance of horses from Australia and New Zealand to the Cape since the Admiralty undertook the work in March 1901, six have belonged to regular Australasian lines, and the other two are vessels specially built for the work, which have already carried horses for the Government with marked success, and were tendered at much lower rates.

* See No. 5.

† The quantities are as follows:—

	lbs.
Australian tinned meats	2,241,750
American	400,000

the American meats including a considerable quantity, especially purchased without competition at the outset of the South African War, immediate delivery having been of importance at the time.

It may also be observed that whereas in the six liners the average mortality was 6 per cent., and the condition of the horses on arrival was unsatisfactory, the mortality in the only outside ship which has completed her voyage was 2·3 per cent., and the condition on arrival was reported good.

Paragraph 14 relates to the War Department.

Paragraph 15 has already been discussed, but my Lords would add that they will be very pleased to learn from the Commonwealth Government of the names of any first-rate packers of tinned meats in Australasia who are desirous of being included in the Admiralty List.

Paragraph 16.—Apart from the quantities of Australian preserved meat purchased in this country, large quantities of preserved meat, as well as of salt pork and salt beef, are obtained locally at Sydney for the Australian, China, Cape, and East Indian stations.

My Lords will be glad, if it should hereafter be found possible, as suggested by Mr. Barton, to widen the area of supply of Australian salt beef and pork. The quantities of salt beef and pork stocked at the Royal Victoria Victualling Yard at Deptford are at present chiefly obtained, the beef from the United States and the pork from Ireland and Denmark.

If Australian cask meat can be put on the home market of a suitable quality after its journey through the tropics, and at reasonable prices, the Admiralty will be glad to give it a trial. At present, however, my Lords are advised that Australian salt meat in casks has not been satisfactorily placed on the home market.

In conclusion, I am to request that an assurance may be conveyed to the Commonwealth Government that their Lordships will at all times be pleased to be furnished with particulars of any Australian or New Zealand manufacturers or producers who may be able and willing to quote for the supply of stores used in the Royal Navy, and that any applications from such firms will receive their Lordships' most favourable consideration.

I am, &c.

EVAN MACGREGOR.

20687

No. 4.

WAR OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received May 27, 1902.)

SIR,

War Office, London, S.W., May 27, 1902.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st January last, No. 3620/1901-2,* enclosing copies of a despatch from the Governor-General of Australia, and of a Minute from his Ministers, on the subject of the supplies of meat, produce, and horses required by the Army and Navy.

The subject is of importance, and has received full and prolonged consideration; nor need Mr. Brodrick add that it has been approached with every desire to give effect to the legitimate wishes of the Australian Ministers. But at the same time, the Ministers will understand that, with the great expenditure which the Home Government has to meet, especially at the present moment, economy, in so far as it can be combined with efficiency, must be his first consideration. In final resort the British taxpayer's claims must be paramount.

Looking at the matter from this double point of view, *i.e.*, the desire to foster trade with the Colony, and the necessity for safeguarding the interests of the mother country, I am to make the following observations on the Minute enclosed in your letter. For purposes of explanation it may be desirable to take the paragraphs of the Minute seriatim:—

Paragraphs 1 and 2.—The first paragraph needs no comment. With regard to the second, in which Mr. Barton emphasises a request that, when contracts are to be entered into, "timely notice" may "be given to enable tenders to be called in Australia and New Zealand," Mr. Brodrick does not know whether any particular contract is alluded to. In the case of the recent large South African contract for meat, timely notice was given, and similar notice will also be given when frozen meat is required at other important stations, such as Malta and Gibraltar, whenever fresh tenders are invited. As regards canned meats the Colonial firms have

* No. 2.

agents in Great Britain and tender through them, nor after the fullest consideration does the Secretary of State see his way to making other arrangements.

Paragraph 3.—An advantage has recently been given to the Colonies by authorising the issue of frozen mutton twice a week, instead of once, to troops at home stations.

Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.—Mr. Brodrick greatly regrets that there should be any feeling in the Commonwealth that Australian merchants have not received adequate consideration in connection with contracts for supplies in South Africa. He cannot but think that any such feeling is founded on a misconception as to the amount of the supplies actually obtained from Australian sources. With regard to this, Mr. Brodrick can, if it be so desired, give a list of the total orders given by the War Office to the Colonies; but in view of the exigencies of active service it would be quite impossible to call upon the supply officers in South Africa, whose energies are taxed to the utmost, to furnish lists of local purchases, distinguishing Australian from other goods. It is very doubtful whether the data on which lists of the kind would be based and without which no reliable result could be attained have in all cases been recorded.

Paragraphs 7 and 10.—Mr. Brodrick regrets that he cannot accept the contention that if tenders were invited in Australia great savings would result. Experience has rather shown that where it is announced that the Imperial Government intends to purchase in the Colony, the traders harden their prices. With regard to the contract for the supply of meat to the troops in the early part of the war, it has to be borne in mind that the Australian firms did not, so far as can be ascertained, possess the organisation or other facilities indispensable for dealing efficiently, and at short notice, with the quantities required to be delivered to troops disseminated over vast districts in a hostile country. Immediate action, and action on a very large scale, was imperative.

Paragraphs 8 and 10.—Mr. Brodrick has no knowledge of the communication believed to have been addressed to Lord Kitchener as to the relative cost of supplies to the Army of the United States in the Philippine Islands, and to the Army in South Africa. If, may, however, be remarked that the conditions both of supply and distribution differ widely, and no fair comparison can be made.

Paragraphs 9 and 10.—Mr. Brodrick would always be glad to consider any proposals of the kind. But it is to be observed that the offer at the price quoted—6½d. per lb. of frozen meat, ex storehouse—would not be advantageous. Under the contract now expiring 7d. per lb. was paid for frozen meat distributed throughout South Africa, and under the new contract, the price per lb., again so distributed, will be under 5½d.

Paragraph 11.—It is greatly regretted that there should be any feeling that the offer of horses was not fully considered. Such was not the case; the matter was considered, but the responsible officer did not recommend the purchase of the horses here in question. Apart from this, upwards of 22,500 horses have been obtained from Australia to the end of January last.

Paragraphs 12, 13, and 14.—The *c.i.f.* shipments, *i.e.*, shipments at a cost covering the cost of horses, insurance, and freight, were not abandoned without trial. Shipments on these conditions were recommended at one time by Colonel Hunt, but the complaints from South Africa were so numerous that they had to be abandoned in favour of the *f.o.b.*, *i.e.*, free on board shipments. The suggestion in paragraph 13 as to the employment of "regular traders" rather than "occasional tramp steamers" will be referred to the Transport Department of the Admiralty, which manages such matters for the War Office.

Paragraphs 15 and 16.—These mainly affect the Admiralty. It may be noted, however, that very considerable portions of the supplies required by the Army in South Africa have been obtained from Australia.

In conclusion, I am to repeat that Mr. Secretary Brodrick has every desire to encourage Australian produce so far as he can do so legitimately, and with due regard to the interests of the British taxpayer, and that he will always be ready to give full, and indeed sympathetic, consideration to any suggestion that may be made with a view to increasing the volume of Army supplies to be obtained from Australian sources.

He will be glad, whenever an occasion arises, of consulting the Ministers as to the best way of carrying these wishes into effect.

I am, &c.,

E. W. D. WARD.

20687.

No. 5.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

SIR,

Downing Street, June 11, 1902.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your letter,* on the subject of obtaining supplies for the Army from Australia.

2. Mr. Chamberlain will not fail to communicate a copy of your letter to the Governor-General of Australia, for the information of his Ministers, but, before doing so, he would be much obliged if he could be furnished with the approximate total of the amount of meat, grain, and horses obtained from Australia and New Zealand and Canada during the war. If Mr. Brodrick considers that such a return cannot be supplied, Mr. Chamberlain would be glad to receive a list of the orders given by the War Office to the Australian Colonies and Canada during the last two years.

I am, &c.,

H. BERTRAM COX.

24926.

No. 6.

WAR OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received June 20, 1902.)

SIR,

War Office, London, S.W.,

June 20, 1902.

In further reference to your letter of the 11th instant,† No. 20687/1902, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to forward, for the information of Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, the following approximate totals of the amounts of meat, grain, and horses obtained from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada during the war, viz. :—

Supply.	Australia.	New Zealand.	Canada.
Preserved meat...	28,000,000 lbs.		1,700,000 lbs.
Hay ...	196,800 tons.		205,000 tons.
Oats ...	404,000 tons.		17,000 tons.
Horses ...	21,458	1,422	13,612

I am, &c.,

G. FLEETWOOD WILSON.

35299/01.

No. 7.

LIST of AUSTRALIAN FIRMS accepted for ARMY MEAT CONTRACTS during the Three Years 1898-1900.

	1898.	1899.	1900.
Preserved beef ...	Australian Meat Company Ellis Bedford.	Australian Meat Company.	Australian Meat Company.
Preserved mutton...	Sydney Meat Preserving Company.	Sydney Meat Preserving Company.	Sydney Meat Preserving Company.
Corned beef ...	R. and W. Davidson...	Warrington Laing ...	
Salt beef at Sydney	...	Queensland Meat Export Company.	Queensland Meat Export Company.
Salt pork at Sydney	Clarencetown Curing Company.	Clarencetown Curing Company.	Clarencetown Curing Company.

* No. 4.

† No. 5.

III.

COLONIAL CONFERENCE, 1907.

A.

EXTRACT FROM OPENING SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN), 15 APRIL, 1907.

On this I may say, that I think the views sometimes taken of the proper relations of the Colonies to the Mother Country with respect to expenditure on armaments have been, of late, somewhat modified. We do not meet you to-day as claimants for money, although we cordially recognise the spirit in which contributions have been made in the past, and will, no doubt, be made in the future. It is, of course, possible to over-estimate the importance of the requirements of the over-sea dominions as a factor in our expenditure; but however this may be, the cost of naval defence and the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs hang together.

B.

20 APRIL, 1907.

MILITARY DEFENCE.

CHAIRMAN: We have now the advantage of the presence of the Secretary of State for War, who will give us his views. I think it will be the wish of the Conference that I should ask the Secretary of State for War to address us.

MR. HALDANE: My Lord Chairman and gentlemen, I think it will be for the convenience of the Conference that I should state very shortly what the point is that seems to us to be most important for discussion, and for arriving at some fairly clear conclusion.

To plunge at once into things, the effect of the war in South Africa made a profound impression on the minds of our advisers here. We realised that we had gone into that war without adequate preparation for war on a great scale, and that we had never fully apprehended the importance of the maxim that all preparation in time of peace must be preparation for war; it is of no use unless it is designed for that; it is the only justification for the maintenance of armies—the preparation for war. In consequence, when the war was over, the then Government set to work—and the present Government has continued the work—to endeavour to put the modern military organisation into shape. In 1904 a very important Committee sat. It was presided over by a civilian who had given great attention to the study of military organisation, Lord Esher, and it contained on it two very distinguished exponents of naval and military views, Sir John Fisher and Sir George Clarke, as its other members. The Committee reported, and its report contained a complete scheme for the re-organisation of the War Office and of the Army. That scheme was adopted by the late Government and has been carried on by the present Government. One broad feature is this, that our naval organisation has been the one with which we have been conspicuously successful in the history of this country as distinguished from our military organisation, and, therefore, as far as was possible, the naval organisation was taken as a type. But the broad feature which emerged with regard to military preparations was this: Count Moltke was able to organise victory for the Prussian and German armies in 1866, and again in 1870, because he and the general staff working under him were free to apply their minds wholly to war preparation. That he was able to do this was due to the fact that the organisation and business administration of the army in peace were kept entirely distinct from the service which consisted in the study of war problems and in the higher training of the staff and of the troops. That was the principle recommended by the Esher Committee, and it culminated in the provision of a brain for the army in the shape of a General Staff. That General Staff we have

been at work on for a long time past in endeavouring to get together. The task was not as difficult as it seemed at first, because the effect of the war was to bring to the front a number of young officers who had shown remarkable capacity and who constituted the nucleus of a serious and thoughtful military school. They were got together under the Esher re-organisation and virtually there has been a General Staff in existence for some time. But it was not until last September that it received formal and complete shape in the Army Order of that month. The General Staff is now a *de jure* body; it has been a *de facto* existing body for some time past. The result of this re-organisation, which is now complete, is that I am able to attend this Conference with certain distinguished officers who are with me to-day to furnish any information requisite. Sir Neville Lyttelton, the Chief of the General Staff, is by my side, Sir William Nicholson, the Quartermaster-General, is with him, and also Sir George Clarke, who played a great part in the Esher re-organisation, and who is secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee. I have also with me here General Ewart, Director of Military Operations, and General Haig, the Director of Military Training.

The practical point that we have to put before you is the desirability of a certain broad plan of military organisation for the Empire. We know that you have all got your own difficulties and the idiosyncrasies of your own people to deal with. No rigid model is therefore of use. But a common purpose or a common end may be very potent in furthering military organisation. For ourselves we have over here worked out our organisation quite definitely, and, indeed, the practical form of it is at present the subject of plans which are before Parliament. This conception of defence is that the Army should be divided into two parts with distinct functions. There is a part with defence as its primary main function, and it has no obligation to go over the sea. That is raised by the citizens of the particular dominion of the Crown concerned, simply for the purpose of home defence. There is the other part which exists not for local defence, but for the service of the Empire as a whole, the expeditionary force, which, in a country like ours, must be naval as well as military.—and I go further and say primarily naval. There is the Fleet, which, in order to make the defence of the Empire what we all hope and believe it is, and are convinced that it must remain if the Empire is to hold together, must have the complete command of the sea, and must be stronger than the fleet of any other Power, or, for that matter, of any other two Powers. And, in conjunction with that there is an expeditionary force consisting of regular troops which we have just re-organised at home. This expeditionary force, working in conjunction with the Navy, will be able to operate at a distance for the defence of the Empire as a whole. Behind that, which I call the first line, our conception is a second line consisting of those home defence troops of which I have spoken. The events of a few years ago showed that the Empire could act as a whole, and that in a supreme emergency these home defence forces would pour forth for the defence of something more than their own shores. But that rests upon voluntary effort and not upon any rigid pattern. Our main purpose in bringing this subject before you to-day is to emphasise the desirability so far as possible that these home forces of the various self-governing dominions of the Crown should be organised, if not to a common pattern—because rigidity of pattern we recognise is impossible with the varying circumstances of the various countries—yet with a common end in view and with this common conception.

At home we may have our territorial Army, if the scheme before Parliament just now goes through. That would be our second line. At home you, Sir Wilfrid, have your Canadian Militia, a creation which may be said in its function and purpose very much to correspond with what is in our mind in the territorial Army. Mr. Deakin has the same idea in his mind in organisation, and I think Sir Joseph Ward has also, and I believe the same idea is in the minds of the South African Premiers. So that it seems to me we have all of us got the broad idea of this distinction between the first, or expeditionary force, and the second or home defence line in our heads. If it were well worked out, if the fact is made to correspond to the idea, then it seems to me the Empire would be defended as no other nation in the world is defended, because its resources would be available from so many quarters. But in order to work on a common pattern it is necessary that we should have a common conception, and the common conception, a matter of great intricacy and great complication when you get to details, can only adequately be supplied by the most skilled advisers, and that is where the utility of the General Staff comes in. My main purpose in addressing the Conference is to suggest for your

acceptance the opinion that the General Staff which we have created at home and which is in its infancy should receive as far as possible an Imperial character. I will define what I mean. It is not that we wish in the slightest degree even to suggest that you should bow your heads to any direction from home in military matters, but the General Staff officer would have as his function this: Trained in a great common school, recruited, it may be, from the most varying parts of the Empire, but educated in military science according to common principles, he would be at the disposition of the local government or of the local Commander-in-Chief, whether he were Canadian, British, or Australian, or New Zealander, or South African, for giving advice and furnishing information based upon the highest military study of the time. The General Staff is a class by itself in the Army. It is so with the German Army, and it is so with the Japanese Army, it has just become so in the Russian Army, and it is so in the French Army. It consists of the most highly trained officers, picked men recruited for their known capacity, specially trained, and then detailed to be at the elbow of the commanding officer. The commanding officer, according to the theory of the General Staff, is unfettered; he has the complete power of accepting or disregarding the advice of his General Staff officer, but he has at his elbow somebody who is there with knowledge, with suggestion, with advice, furnished with all the resources which are supplied from the central school from which the General Staff officer comes, namely, the headquarters of the General Staff. If I may put it a little more in concrete, I will take an illustration, if I may, founded in Canada. In Canada you have made some progress yourselves with the idea of a General Staff, just as we have. You have, I think, some five General Staff officers in Canada at the present time. Now, as regards your General Staff officers, although you have a distinguished British General Staff officer with you, General Lake, there is no organic connection between what is your General Staff in embryo and our General Staff as we have just created it here. But supposing we were studying at home in the General Staff great questions of Imperial Defence, and, amongst others, questions of Imperial Defence in Canada, what an advantage it would be to us, and I think to you also, if we sent you a General Staff officer, in exchange for one of your General Staff officers, who should come over here and who should be working with us at the very problems which concern the defence of the Empire as a whole in Canada? And so with all the other affairs in the Crown's Dominions. It seems to me that we might broaden the basis of this General Staff which we have just created. It is a purely advisory organisation of which command is not a function. The beginning, of course, would have to be very modest. If these things were organised, and if we were to bring about such an interchange of officers as would tend to make the work of the General Staff in the largest sense the work of a military mind which had surveyed the defence of the Empire as a whole, it would, it seems to me, do much to bring about that uniformity of pattern in organisation and in weapons, and in other details regarding military matters, which is to some extent essential if there is to be effective co-operation in a great war. I have circulated four papers for the information of the Premiers. It is not probable in the pressure of other business that you have all had time to read them.

MR. DEAKIN: We only received them when we came here this morning.

MR. HALDANE: But I can give you in a few sentences the substance of them, and it the less matters if they have not been extensively read, because we are not proposing that they should be adopted as representing any hard-and-fast view.

The first of those papers, which are prepared by our experts here, deals with "the strategical conditions of the Empire from a military point of view," and it calls attention to the three great principles on which I have touched—first of all, the obligation of each self-governing community to provide, as far as possible, for its own local security; secondly, the duty of arranging for mutual assistance on some definite lines in case of supreme common need; and thirdly, the necessity for the maintenance of that sea supremacy which can alone ensure any military co-operation at all. Then the paper goes on to indicate what we are trying to do in making our contribution to this end: first, organising troops for home defence to repel raids—that is the territorial army; secondly a striking force, an expeditionary force is the proper phrase—the striking force is that small portion of it designed to act swiftly, and ready to assist any portion of the Empire; thirdly, a navy capable of maintaining command of the sea. Those principles may be said to represent the result of our reflections upon the events of the late war.

The second paper points out the importance of assimilating as far as practicable

war organisation throughout the Empire, and of adopting a uniform system of nomenclature in regard to such organisation. The value of any assistance which the self-governing Dominions may offer in the future to the mother country will be much increased if it can be given in the form in which it can readily be fitted into the organisation of an entire army in the field. On that I should like to emphasise the absolute necessity of turning our attention to this in times of peace. It is too late when war breaks out. You are at an enormous disadvantage if you commence to organise in concert for the first time after the breaking out of war. The third paper relates to the patterns and provision of equipment and stores for Colonial forces. The chief point made is that it is essential that the small arms supplied to any force which may have to act side by side with troops from the United Kingdom shall fire the same ammunition as that supplied to the latter. A difference in ammunition is one of the greatest curses in war time. This paper also emphasises the necessity for the provision of adequate reserves of stores in peace time. The fourth paper urges the desirability of the self-governing Dominions, where possible and without interfering with their own arrangements, giving their orders for ordnance stores, particularly arms and ammunition, through the War Office, and it points out that expedition and economy are likely to be secured if this is done. That is a business matter for discussion. There is a great deal to recommend it when you come to work it out in detail.

A very important thing touched on in this connection is the training of officers. We are just now endeavouring to organise a reserve of officers. We have had a Committee sitting which has presented a preliminary scheme, and I know that the question is also engaging the attention of the self-governing Dominions at this time. If we could do something to make that reserve of officers Imperial in the same sense as the General Staff is Imperial, so that you could give us from your reserve assistance in time of a great war, I am sure it would be a great source of strength. Besides, I need not point out that any organisation of this kind is of the very greatest assistance to peace, because it profoundly impresses the mind of foreign General Staffs, who cannot be sure what reserve we have behind us when we have troops and officers organised over this tremendously wide area. The general point made in this paper is that to attain these objects probably the most desirable of all courses is the one I have indicated, that the General Staff should be Imperial in the widest sense; and we point out that we shall welcome Colonial Officers in its ranks very cordially, and we shall be very glad to send officers to you to take their places in it. We do not want to ask you, unless you wish to do it, to double the number of your own officers by sending some here while you have to provide for other officers in their places at home. If you like we should be very glad to send out General Staff officers to take the places of those you send to us and in that way to provide a circulation. Our great object must be to make the General Staff an imperial school of military thought, all the members of which are imbued with the same traditions, accustomed to look at strategical problems from the same point of view, and acquainted with the principles and theories generally accepted at headquarters.

The Imperial Reserve of Officers is a thing which I think may be better discussed in detail. It is so complicated that I do not think we could profitably go into it in this very short Conference; but on all those points the War Office is a home for you so long as you choose to be here; and if any of the gentlemen present who would like to follow out these things more in detail will come to us, we have prepared all the information. We should be very glad if, for instance, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Frederick Borden will communicate with us, either personally or through General Lake, fully upon these points of detail as they come up; and I wish to say the same with regard to the other Premiers.

I think I have really now put before you the general points. There are some minor ones, which, again, are matters for discussion in detail. If we get into the field together it is very desirable that we should be under one military code, and as far as possible we ought to arrange that whatever local arrangements may require in time of peace, it should always be kept in view that for discipline there should be a certain military code in operation in time of war. How you would deal with that is rather a question for you. One knows the delicate susceptibility of people about anything like military rules in time of peace, but probably you, with your Legislatures, can solve these problems quite as easily as we can.

I think I may conclude by making a suggestion of the extent to which we can go in this Conference in a practical direction, I mean so far as this particular Conference is concerned. The working out of details, as I have said, may well be

done with Sir Neville Lyttelton and the General Staff at the War Office, and General Nicholson, the Quartermaster-General, is ready to assist in matters of administration and questions connected with it. But it does seem to me that it would be a great advance if we could agree upon a resolution in this Conference focussing the broad purpose. As I have said, we know that this thing must be founded simply upon the attaining of a common purpose, the fulfilment of a common end. It cannot be by the imposing of restrictions or by rigid plans which might not suit the idiosyncrasies of particular countries. I have drafted some words emphasising the question of the General Staff as the point, as the key to the attaining of the working out of the common purpose, which does seem to me to be possible as a common basis without in the least interfering with individual liberty. The resolution I have drafted is before you. I would like to say that if it is agreeable to the Conference to adopt some such resolution as this, I should not desire that we should stop there, but I should suggest that you should send your experts over to the War Office to confer with our General Staff, and any other department, as to the way of making an immediate beginning in carrying out the broad principle which the resolution affirms.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: My Lord, Mr. Haldane, and gentlemen, I am sure we have all been deeply interested in what we have heard from Mr. Haldane, and I may say in a general way that I am in very close sympathy with all he has said. There seem to be two ideas involved in the consideration of this matter. I will not say the chief, but certainly the first is the question of the defence of the different Dominions beyond the seas—I am not speaking now of these islands—particularly the defence of those Dominions against attack from without; secondly, as I understand Mr. Haldane, the agreement upon some method by which preparation might be made within those different Dominions for effective co-operation with the central forces of the Empire in the event of any severe strain or stress arising which would involve the integrity of the Empire. The first proposal is very easy, and I think, so far as most of the countries represented here are concerned, is being carried on to a greater or less extent. In Canada, without waiting to dwell in any detail upon what we have done, I think we have there made considerable progress within the last 10 years, and certainly very great progress since this Conference met five years ago. It should be pointed out at once, that so far as the Dominions beyond the seas are concerned, at any rate so far as Canada is concerned, we have no authority under our Militia Law to do anything beyond expend money and make preparations for the defence of Canada itself. We are absolutely limited in words to that. We cannot call our Militia out for active service for any purpose beyond the defence of Canada. Although Canada took part in the troubles in South Africa, it was done by a force which volunteered specially for the purpose and made a special contract for that purpose. I do not see very well how any responsibility could be undertaken to supply any force for any other purpose without an amendment in the law. Further, there is a provision within the law of Canada that if it is desirable to contribute a force to Imperial defence abroad, Parliament shall be called together, the idea being that each case shall be dealt with when it arises.

Now I come more to the concrete part of Mr. Haldane's statement, particularly to the most important proposal, the resolution which we have before us, with reference to the establishment of the General Staff. I would like to know exactly, if I could, whether it is intended that the General Staff which is responsible to the Home Government and to the Army Council and the Secretary of State for War, is to be linked in with General Staffs in the different parts of the Empire, or whether this central General Staff is to have independent authority throughout the Empire and in the different Dominions.

Mr. HALDANE: Not independent authority. It would be a training school which would send out and lend out experts. Members of your local General Staff might also be members of the Imperial General Staff.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: It seems to me that that is a most important consideration. I would certainly favour it strongly, and as you have said, Mr. Haldane, Canada has already established a General Staff in embryo, and we hope to develop it. We recognise the absolute necessity for the existence of such a body, but it really seems to me we should have our own General Staff responsible to the Canadian Government—and in the same way all the other Dominions—which might, as you suggested, I think, exchange officers with your Staff; but I scarcely think it would do to have officers in the different Dominions who were responsible in the first place to the Secretary of State for War here.

Mr. HALDANE: The Imperial General Staff for this purpose is a purely advisory body.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: So long as that is understood I would concur in that view, and I am very strongly indeed in favour of the idea of exchange of officers. I think we should do that, and we are doing it between the different departments of the various services of this country and the Dominion. I think, however, it is absolutely necessary that that point should be thoroughly established, because I can see difficulties in the way of an officer, for instance, in Canada considering himself to be in a position to advise, whether directly or indirectly, the War Office, without responsibility to the Minister who has charge of such matters in Canada and without responsibility to the principal military authority there. I do not wish to elaborate that point any further, but I am glad to know that you entirely concur in that view.

Mr. HALDANE: Certainly, and a memorandum will be drawn up by Sir Neville Lyttelton which will be submitted to you making that perfectly clear in detail, if we agree to carry this resolution into effect.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I will not detain the Conference by going into detail. I have read the paper proposed by the Army Council for discussion, and so far as a layman is able to express an opinion, it seems to me to be an admirable paper and one in which I thoroughly concur. There are, however, one or two points which I would like to mention, and one is in connection with the very first paragraph, where it is laid down that the fundamental principle of the maintenance of the Empire rests primarily on supremacy at sea. We must agree in that view, and in that connection I would like to submit the advisability—the necessity, perhaps—for the establishment in the different Dominions of factories, which will be able to manufacture arms, for instance, and guns and ammunition, and so on, which would render these communities safer in the event of the misfortune occurring of the sea control being temporarily lost. I noticed in one of the other papers submitted some reference to the necessity for having the different parts of the Empire—the forces of the different parts of the Empire—armed with the same weapon, or at any rate with a weapon using the same ammunition. In Canada we have encouraged the establishment of a rifle factory, which produces rifles firing .303 ammunition, although the rifle differs somewhat in mechanism. I would like to say here that I did my best to induce one of the factories in England to establish a branch in Canada some years ago to manufacture the Lee-Enfield rifle, but failed. I had to do the next best thing, that is to get someone who was willing to establish a factory, and that has been done, and we hope, although there has been some difficulty, that a very good rifle will be issued, and, in fact, it is now being issued to the troops. It seems to me, although nothing has been said about that in this very important paper, that that is a matter worth bringing to the attention of this Conference, and that encouragement should be given to the different Colonies to bring about the establishment not only of small arms factories but of factories which would manufacture ordnance as well.

With regard to one other matter which, as Mr. Haldane said, is a matter of minor importance, that of purchasing through the War Office such military stores as may be required, in the very connection which I have just mentioned I would like to say that in 1900 Canada wanted to purchase a considerable number of rifles here. I think I wanted to purchase 15,000 rifles. I found it impossible to secure a single rifle. After a time I was offered some 5,000 if I would wait long enough. That is a condition of things which may arise—we hope it will not—at any moment, and that is another argument in favour of having an independent source of supply within the Dominions themselves. It is also a reason why we should not be tied up absolutely to purchase either from the War Office or through the War Office. I agree that so far as possible it should be done. I agree absolutely that we should purchase the same types of guns, and guns that will use the same ammunition. So far as Canada is concerned, we made a contract some years ago with Vickers, Sons, and Maxim for the new artillery gun, and I believe the first delivery of those guns was made to Canada, but we were very careful to impose the condition that the guns must be in every detail first accepted by the War Office, and that the price we should pay should be the price paid by the War Office. I cannot see that there is any disagreeable competition in that. It has been suggested—perhaps not in those papers—that we are competing really with the War Office in giving an order of that kind. There can be no competition when we lay down as a very first principle that the price is to be the War Office price, and also that

the gun shall be precisely the same gun. Those are perhaps matters of detail, but I thought it only fair that I should make a statement as to what has actually happened in that respect.

Now, in conclusion, I have only to say that I am sure there is, so far as the Canadian people, and so far as the Canadian Militia, are concerned—and this will apply to all the military units of the Dominion—only one desire, that is, to prepare in every possible way for the full protection of our own territory. We have shown, by relieving the War Office of the responsibility for the maintenance of Halifax and Esquimalt, how far we are willing to go, and I think we showed a few years ago, in the contingents that were sent to South Africa, what the spirit is that animates the people of Canada when the Empire seemed for a time to be in peril. I only wish to add that I believe thoroughly in the idea suggested here as to the adoption of uniform organisation throughout the different parts of the Empire. There can be no difficulty whatever as to that. We in Canada have so organised our militia system from top to bottom, so far as we could do it. In the main we have adopted the principle that it is absolutely desirable that we should follow the lead of the War Office in all matters of organisation, provided you do not change too frequently here, so that we cannot keep up with you. There can be no difficulty in doing that, and it is certainly a desirable thing to do. I believe thoroughly in the exchange of officers. I absolutely concur in the ideas expressed as to the education of officers. We are very glad indeed that the War Office here is giving us certain facilities in the matter of educating our officers which we are trying to take the full advantage of. Altogether, I think that matters are working very harmoniously, and I see no reason in the world why a great deal might not be accomplished in the way of preparing for any supreme struggle which might take place—which we hope will not take place, but which may take place—in the matter of keeping in close touch with the organisation here in England, and in the matter of exchange of officers, and of bringing about a better understanding between officers and military affairs in the different Dominions and the central organisation here in the British Islands.

Mr. DEAKIN: My Lord, and Mr. Haldane, it is true that I have not seen one of the papers laid before us this morning, but have no doubt that has not been due to any omission on the part of your officers. Owing to the circumstances under which we are assembled, I have already had occasion to mention casually that on arrival we were overwhelmed with a mass of printed information, the value and extent of which I have already acknowledged, but which, under the circumstances of pressure which prevail, are really, though in our possession, beyond our reach; so much so, that, occupied as one has been with the question immediately preceding this, I was not even aware of the existence of these valuable papers. The mere glance I have been able to give to them discovers that they are indeed most useful possessions of this Conference. These will take a high place, I believe, among the sources of knowledge which, after this Conference, will be placed at the disposal of the public of this country, and particularly before the public of our own countries, where I am sure the study of these papers will be of the greatest value to us all. Then we have been indebted to the masterly and luminous exposition of the principles of military defence, which we have had the privilege of hearing from the Right Honourable the Secretary for War. I trust that my colleagues on the Conference will not shudder if I venture to suggest that the sooner that statement gets in full to the public of the Empire the better. Unless there be some reason, not apparent to me, I do not know why it should not at once appear and be communicated to all who are interested in it. That, again, will be a store-house to which we can refer for the elucidation of many matters. And for my own part, I wish that it would reach every citizen of all our dominions.

It is not necessary, especially after the inquiries and criticisms of our friend the Minister of Defence for the Dominion of Canada, to dwell upon the various points on which it can be suggested that the propositions submitted to us to-day might impinge upon the determinations of the Governments and Legislatures of the Dominions here represented. For my own part I feel no anxiety on that score, because the address which you delivered, Sir, displayed at every point a most distinct appreciation of our susceptibility. You made it perfectly clear that what is laid before us comes in the way of counsel, expert advice, well-matured advice, backed up by knowledge, but simply advice, which it would be well for all our Parliaments to take into consideration. That broad general principle having been

established I do not propose to dwell upon it in detail. So far as I follow it, that is not necessary. In particulars, we have the advantage of the comments of the Minister for the Department of Defence of the Dominion of Canada, who is necessarily much more in intimate relation with this matter than either my colleague or myself. We are associated with departments of peace and not of war, and the knowledge that we enjoy is that which is general to all members of the Cabinet. Still, I have been sufficiently informed by my colleagues through their advisers to be able to appreciate the fact that you have covered the whole ground upon this question. Besides that you have touched upon some matters which it is our desire to have specially considered. So far as I am able to judge, the proposition for the future use of the General Staff is one of as much importance as it is of obvious magnitude. The General Staff is supposed to be the brain of the Army. Any proposition which would extend its activities or permit us to share them would be heartily welcomed in the Commonwealth. A General Staff such as we possess naturally occupies itself with those problems which are peculiar to Australia and its very special situation. At the same time we quite realise that any situation, however special, requires to be dealt with in the light of certain general principles, and particularly of the latest developments of martial methods and organisation, and consequently I anticipate nothing but great advantage to us from any association with the General Staff. That will arise in a variety of ways under other proposals which have been brought forward. In the list of subjects laid before us the General Staff is properly put first, and really the particular questions afterwards suggested are, many of them, to be dealt with, if not by the General Staff, at all events in the light of its studies. Passing then to them, we find the first matter submitted is our adoption of similar armaments, and that is, I think, fully recognisable even by a layman as one of the essentials of effective imperial defence. We say yes to that proposal, so far as it can be carried out, without the slightest hesitation.

Next, apparently a little out of its logical order, comes the proposal for an interchange of units, which in our case appears almost impracticable. The great distance which separates us not only from this country, but from any other dominion in which such an exchange would be proposed, is one obvious obstacle, but a greater obstacle is that our force of permanent men is relatively small; it consists of well-trained experts whom we should be loth to part with, and a unit in that sense we could hardly spare even if its position was endeavoured to be taken by an equally competent unit abroad. We have no possible objection to urge to this proposition except in our own case the question of its practicability, that is as to the unit. As to the interchange of officers, I am specially asked by my colleague the Minister of Defence of the Commonwealth to press for an extension of that principle. We at present enjoy the privilege of exchanging with Canada and with India and with yourselves, single officers, sending to you and you sending to us. We find that in every way a useful practice, but we desire to carry it out on a larger scale, that is larger for us because ours must be on a small scale as I need not remind you. The proposal which you have made with reference to the exchange of officers representing our General Staff and those of the General Staff of this country exactly fits in with another request which we intended to prefer. This was that officers of higher standing than those which have hitherto been exchanged should be exchanged. It has been pressed upon me by my colleague that, if possible, these officers should not simply be attached to other men in this country of the same rank who are doing the work. We wish, if possible, that our men should be put to do the work; they may fail or they may do it imperfectly and that will have to be provided against, but we believe that without the actual pressure of active responsibility upon them you will not test their capacity and they will not learn the limits of their own knowledge. In the matter of interchange, I think you will find the most cordial approbation of your proposition from the Commonwealth and its Defence Department.

There is a question to which you have not referred, a minor question, but which arises in that connection with regard to the relative rank of officers in the forces of the Outer Empire and the forces of the Inner Empire. On this we hope to have the advantage of your counsel. As to the establishment of military schools, in that respect as in others, we are envious of the advance of our friends in Canada, and recognise that the course they have taken is one dictated by sound policy and experience. Our own difficulty is that the establishment of a true military college implies a minimum number of regular students year by year, whom at present we

hardly see our way to obtain, because of the want of adequate opportunities for such a number afterwards within our own forces. We appreciate the high class training which is obtainable in this country. It is more up-to-date than we could expect to be, but at the same time our circumstances are special. Take first of all the task of self-defence, which is touched upon in that very valuable memorandum. The defence of Australia means operations at such distances relatively to those of the United Kingdom, such enormous distances among a population, except upon the coast, so sparse, with difficulties of transport, transit, and concentration, all of them so absolutely altered by scale and circumstance from those of this country that, for the purposes of our own operations within the Commonwealth, the training of your colleges would require to be supplemented by practical training of our own. That raises particular issues upon which it would not be proper to detain you now, but it is perhaps as well to mention some of them. The need of adaptation is especially manifest in a democratic country such as ours, in which the officers are chosen from all classes, in which eighty-nine one-hundredths of them, like ninety-nine one-hundredths of our citizen forces, are composed of men who earn their own livelihoods by other callings. They devote their spare hours to defence purposes, and that earnestly, as well as most generously, becoming more effective in fact than they might appear to be, judging them merely by the tests of military parades. In Australia we have been rather subject to mockery because we have followed so closely some methods of the Imperial forces. As fast as they Germanised we Germanised, until some military experts have criticised us for failing to adapt our drill and operations to the country in which our men will require to act, dwelling too much upon getting them upon parade in exact line, at the exact angle, with the proper cap and belt. I admit that probably we are open to some of these criticisms, but are beginning to realise that there must be a greater amount of adaptation to our particular circumstances.

The question of military education generally is serious. We see our way to what those who advise us on these matters tell us is a sufficient military training for the men, with little alteration in our present system, mainly because none of our men are pressed men, all are volunteers, who join because they have an enthusiasm for the work. The consequence is that many of our commanders, men of experience, tell us that they find with our men a rapidity of progress, a readiness to submit to discipline, and a promptness in acquiring technical knowledge which they are not accustomed to find elsewhere. That is because every man takes a pride in his task and throws himself into it, because it is his chosen pursuit in addition to his ordinary labours. But while we feel hopeful about our men, we see that our weakness lies in the officering of such men. We recognise what you have wisely said that the most essential need of the Army now-a-days is of the up-to-date, intelligent, self-dependent military officer with a capable knowledge of his business and yet not a slave to the rules and theories of the study. Any advice upon that head we shall be most willing and ready to hear, because we recognise that this is the direction in which we most need to improve.

The other point upon which Sir Frederick Borden, with whom we quite sympathise dwelt, is the wisdom of our making provision to supply our own needs in times of emergency. I am happy to find, from my hurried glance, that the paper headed "Patterns and Provision of Equipment and Stores for Colonial Forces," states in paragraph 6 that the Quartermaster-General and the Master General of the Ordnance recommend that: "It is most desirable that the area of supply of the 'warlike stores under reference should be as wide as possible, and, therefore, the Colonial Governments should be urged to arrange for local manufacture and provision rather than to rely on the resources of the United Kingdom.'"

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I had overlooked that, sir.

Mr. DEAKIN: That recommendation exactly supplies what Sir Frederick Borden was desirous of securing, and also supplies what we feel in our remote position to be still more urgent. Our friends, Sir Wilfrid and Sir Frederick, in contrast with us, reside in the centre of modern civilisation, with highly equipped nations all round them; by rapid communication they are kept in a few days in touch with all. Our position at the other side of the globe, surrounded by alien races to whom we cannot look for aid or assistance in this matter, or indeed in any other, and far from any sources of supply of arms and material of war is very different, and we feel its urgency. We have an ammunition factory already in Melbourne, but although that meets our demand for small arms ammunition, we do not obtain a satisfactory

cordite supply. We have now under review, and intend to propose to our Parliament, such an extension of our local production as shall enable us to cope with future demands some years ahead. We have an ammunition reserve, of course, but in addition propose to cope with our demand by factories of our own. I propose at an early date to ask your colleague, the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether it will not be possible for us, with advantage to the Admiralty, and with advantage to ourselves, to enlarge any ammunition factories which we may be able to establish so as to afford the Admiralty some of the munitions it will need in time of war. Needless to say, if we are cut off from sources of supply the ships of the squadron in those seas are cut off also. If they are employing their ammunition, as it is to be hoped they would be, most effectively on any hostile ships with which they have to deal, the question of re-supplying their stores, without a visit to a very remote base, would of course be a very considerable matter for them. It would be an important matter for us if we can lease or establish a factory on such a scale that its output in any given year may be sufficiently large to make us independent of any of the reasonable requirements of war. That is to say, our factories to be reliable must be of a certain power. We can have a factory for ourselves, but it must be on such a scale that in time of war its complete output might prove utterly insufficient.

If, however, we are able to supply your naval requirements, or some of them, at your own rates, that is to say, the rates you would otherwise pay, making a fair allowance for any differences, that would be of great advantage to us. We do not want to make any business profit out of it, but we desire to have a factory always at work and on such a scale that when the time of war arrived it might readily be enlarged to meet even war necessities.

As regards the arms, Sir Frederick Borden has anticipated all that it is necessary to say. We have been driven to do business with private suppliers simply because the War Office could not supply us. Whenever we wanted arms the War Office wanted them most, and they had them first.

Mr. HALDANE: I think that was during the war, Mr. Deakin. I may say that just now we shall be only too glad to execute orders for any number.

Mr. DEAKIN: Exactly, you are always ready to execute orders when neither of us is under pressure. That is what has driven us outside. We know the value of the War Office criticism, but we also know that the War Office looks after itself before it looks after us, and when it is eager for arms or ammunition we have to wait. Any arrangement which can overcome that, and put us on a basis that for any reasonable demand we should be entitled to a certain proportion of your output of anything we do not make for ourselves, would be a great improvement. Just as you wish to know in advance what support you may expect from each part of the Empire, each part of the Empire is entitled to know what support in the way of arms and material it is entitled to expect from you in emergency.

Mr. HALDANE: I think we can do business on that basis.

Mr. DEAKIN: I hope so. I may say we do not take a narrow view of our military obligations or their development. The movement the public with us are taking to most kindly, and which has most promise in connection with our military strength, is the Cadet movement. We hope to have at least 30,000 cadets next year under training without counting those who have already passed through, and my colleague, who is sanguine, thinks we shall have 40,000 or 50,000 in a short time. They get a fair training with handy little rifles, amongst others the Westley-Richards, which is in favour. We had tenders a little while ago in which a Belgian firm who make a speciality of such rifles offered to supply these Westley-Richards at about 37s. or 37s. 6d., whereas from Great Britain they wanted 39s. We took the 39s. weapon without a moment's hesitation. That was to help British industry to turn out British weapons for British men. Although we have no complaint against Belgian workmen, it is not our business to encourage their factories when we can help factories for the manufacture of small arms here. We do not take a biased view, but where we cannot supply our own needs we do desire to support the factories of this country.

The training of cadets, of course, is a matter which will tell more in the future than in the present. We are passing them through now at the rate of some 16,000 a year. In our largest State, New South Wales, my colleague reminds me that they have been passing them through at that rate for a number of years. The consequence is that in a rudimentary knowledge of drill, getting them well set up, used to simple formations, and handling the rifle, they do very well. Rifle-shooting is

rather a national pastime with us; it is favoured everywhere. I have had made, and shall be glad to hand in, three maps, one showing that in every quarter of Australia there are rifle-clubs in active practice—from the extreme north at Thursday Island to the extreme south, Hobart in Tasmania, and to the extreme west in Perth. Wherever there is a settlement there is a rifle-club or there is going to be a rifle-club, and although we have not yet associated that movement with formal drill the desire to have rifle practice and be a good shot being strong, we have great anticipations. I will show you on another map that wherever there is a settlement, and almost wherever there is a school, there is to be a cadet corps in active operation. There is some kind of drill in every school. I will show you another map which exhibits every detachment of our forces, whether it is Artillery, Mounted Infantry, Infantry, or permanent forces, in different colours. You have only to look at the map to see in an instant what and where our forces are.

The question of patterns, the question of purchase of material, and the Military College having been touched on, the only matter remaining is a permissible parallel between the General Staff and the Committee of Imperial Defence in respect of which a Memorandum is laid before us. I am happy to know that you have complied with the request we have made to be somewhat more practically associated with this Committee, just as we desire a practical association with the General Staff. I find that your Imperial Defence Committee bears an analogy to this Conference itself, except that we are represented politically. Both are devised to facilitate common discussion and agreement, to advise in the case of questions of local or general concern which may be referred to us, and to bring experts into direct touch. Both are purely consultative bodies having no executive powers or administrative functions when national and colonial questions are discussed. We have already enjoyed the benefit of the advice of this Committee, generously given when it was asked by our Government in 1905, and we have now gained the further advantage of permission to send a representative to it when any questions we submit are to be dealt with. I would like to add that as this is the Committee of Imperial Defence, covering both military and naval affairs, we shall hope to be represented there occasionally. Although it is easy to put a question, it is not always easy to put it without undue prolixity in indicating precisely where our difficulties lie. We obtained a valuable report from the Committee of Imperial Defence, but it did not answer a number of queries in which we were specially interested, and which we hoped to receive advice upon. Now that we have permission to have a representative enabled to attend that consultative committee, we shall be able to point out just where our difficulties lie. Your reply would not be as the last was, most admirably drafted from a general point of view without meeting some of our particular difficulties at that time.

In conclusion let me once more say that your broad-minded view of Imperial possibilities in the way of military defence, and the way they can be utilised, is not only of the highest interest to us, but I can assure you will be practically reviewed in relation to our own circumstances with the warmest possible desire to co-operate with your office in the great projects you have clearly outlined to-day.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: My Lord, the value of the meeting of the Ministers from the self-governing countries will be enormously enhanced as the outcome of the discussion and the information which has been afforded to us to-day in regard to the defence of the Empire. I wish to say on behalf of the country I represent that I look upon it as of very great importance to have heard the views of His Majesty's Ministers of the United Kingdom upon this great question of the defence of the Empire. I have read some of the papers—not all of them—very closely, that have been furnished by your staff and I endorse the sentiment already expressed that they will be most valuable, although some of them are of a confidential character, for the information of Parliament as well as for the guidance of the Administration that it is my privilege to represent here.

I would like to say I clearly understood from the observations of Mr. Haldane that what is suggested by him is in the direction of suggestion and not anything binding on the part of the Colonies. What they may do will be of their voluntary act or of their voluntary co-operation and assistance in the direction of assisting and bringing about a general scheme that would be of advantage to the Empire as a whole. I am not going to take up the time of the Conference at any great length. I want to say that the aspect upon one point put forward by the Minister of Defence of the Dominion of Canada, as to the powers of his country to incur responsibilities outside of his own Dominion, apply with equal force to New Zealand. We are

responsible for the expenditure incurred for the protection of our own country. Our people in the past have shown their readiness and will do so upon every occasion in the future, I have no doubt whatever, to adopt flexible conditions to meet extraordinary circumstances should they arise. Upon some of the points referred to as to the obligations upon the Colony, my colleagues in New Zealand, and Parliament itself, will, I am confident, ratify and would undertake them in order to bring about a stronger and a better system for the general defence of the Empire. I do not purpose to go into details regarding the several suggestions. Reading them as a layman, though holding the position of Minister of Defence of our country, the proposals in the Memorandum signed by General Lyttelton are very valuable, and, generally speaking, those strategical conditions from the military point of view, our Colony would, I think, endorse. It is made very clear that it is the opinion of the General Staff, not the opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom. So far as trying to bring about uniformity from the expert point of view, I think the Council of Defence which we have established in New Zealand upon lines similar to that of the Old World would be very glad to co-operate with the military advisers of the British Government, who have in this Memorandum given most valuable suggestions. The possibility of assimilating war organisation throughout the Empire is a high and worthy ideal to aim for. It is of the first consequence to Britain itself to have a thorough organisation within its own borders as it is throughout the Empire for the purpose of maintaining its own position and that of its outlying possessions. We would be only too glad to co-operate in order to bring about that assimilation of organisation throughout the Empire.

In reference to the desirability of having uniformity in patterns and provision of equipment and stores for Colonial forces, generally speaking I concur with the reservation which is made in No. 6, which I think Mr. Deakin quoted from that Memorandum, where it is suggested that war stores and materials should be obtained if possible through the War Office so long as it is recognised that we have the right, if we go for the same quality of ammunition, to make it in our own country—with that reservation I cordially endorse the sentiments expressed in respect to that. We already make a large quantity of ammunition in our own Colony for our own use, and we are likely to extend it. The suggestion contained in some of these Memoranda as to our using the same class of arms and ammunition is highly important in view of any contingency that may arise in the future calling for common action outside of our own country, when we may require in an emergency to send our own men and our own arms to another country for the purpose of common defence to fight an enemy.

I would like very much to say that upon this question of the interchange of units and officers I hold a most pronounced opinion. Unlike my friend Mr. Deakin, I think that New Zealand could arrange for interchange of units. We have the Volunteer system there; we have for years had all the ordinary organisations referred to by Mr. Deakin in the matter of cadets and rifle ranges, and these are being excluded for private citizens all over the country. In connection with our Volunteer system, the only trouble we have is to keep the numbers down. All over our country we have the very best class of men offering to join our Volunteer corps. They are encouraged by men in every responsible position you can name in the country. Our captains of industry, our kings of commerce, the members of the Administration of the day, and the officials connected with our important State departments and the rank and file of these departments realise that it is upon the popular basis of a Volunteer system that we have to provide for the internal defence of our country, and in the event of trouble arising they are our source of internal defence, and we encourage it in every possible way. Now I have no doubt in my own mind that if there were—perhaps not in an extensive way in the first instance—an interchange of units of volunteers from both parts of the world, I do not say with the militia, because we have no militia in New Zealand, but if there was an interchange of units, as between the Old Country and ourselves, I have no hesitation whatever in saying that we would be able to get from time to time a body of men, not from any one particular part of the colony, but selected from various portions of it, with the instruction and the information upon detail so essential in times of trouble so that they may come back, and by permeating the country, so to speak, be able to inspire and infuse into others something of the enthusiasm you are trying to inspire in the Old World, and it brings about a feeling that the interchange of individuals amongst the rank and file tends certainly to a desire for unity and a desire for co-operation, and that that is not to be confined to the officers only.

Mr. DEAKIN: What about their livelihoods?

Sir JOSEPH WARD: I was just going to touch upon that. For my part I should be prepared, and I am quite satisfied my colleagues would, to see that a Volunteer company coming to the Old Country for the purpose of the interchange of practice and ideas, should be paid reasonably to enable them to do so, and the same system might with advantage apply in England itself. We need not aim at doing it on an extensive scale, but my belief is that it would be worth trying with the idea of bringing about that mutuality expressed in these important papers. The desire voiced by the Secretary of State for War to-day to try to have co-operation for the purpose of defending the Empire in times of trouble or stress is well worth working for.

Mr. DEAKIN: That does not put them back in their old employments; you pay them while they are away, but when they come home their places are taken by other men unless you make some extraordinary provision for it.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: That is so, but the same thing applied during the time of the South African War in all our countries; we had many men giving up their ordinary occupations and going out to fight.

Mr. DEAKIN: Many of them suffered for it afterwards, too.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: No doubt that is one of the difficulties that unfortunately are inseparable from the troubles of war, and I do not quite know how you could, in the event of Volunteers occupying a position of complete dependence in the country who would desire to come here for instruction, arrange for the continuance of their appointments in their own country until they returned. That to a large extent would have to be a matter for them to consider.

Regarding the interchange of officers, the suggestion of Mr. Haldane upon that is a most valuable one. We are doing it now to some extent at the invitation of the War Office; we are sending some of our officers now from time to time here for purposes of instruction, but if they were to provide now, which I understood to be referred to by Mr. Haldane, for allowing responsible officers from here to go out paid by the Imperial Authorities to take the place of the responsible officers we have in our country paid by us, so that in the interval the void created by the despatch of our officers to the old country would be filled by the men from here, both countries paying their officers, that is, that we paid ours and you paid yours, the purposes of information and instruction of officers and, in my opinion, it would be most valuable indeed. Up to now we have really had nothing of the kind. It seems to me that if we could have Imperial officers coming out to our country and our Colonial officers coming home here, each temporarily filling the position vacated by the other, it would, without additional cost to our respective Administrations, enable the changing of these officers to be going on for all time I should say, until that splendid scheme which is in all our minds of a common system of organisation with a view to having, in time of trouble, uniformity in all respects and consequently greater efficiency. A highly educated Empire staff from all standpoints is desirable. I should most heartily support that from the standpoint of New Zealand.

This Resolution which I have read carefully, while not expressing anything binding upon our respective countries, and which may require to be altered in some respects, would be a good thing for us, as the representatives of our respective countries, to affirm. It would show at all events that this Conference of responsible men meeting here "without" (as the Resolution itself expresses it) "wishing to commit to immediate action any of the Governments represented, recognises and affirms the need of developing throughout the Empire the conception of a General Staff recruited from the forces of the Empire as a whole." I am quite prepared to support a resolution of that kind. It does not take away from us the all-necessitous requirement of our own staffs being responsible to their own Governments, of the control of our own staffs. It does express a desire that we should recognise and affirm the need throughout the Empire of having a General Staff recruited from the forces of the Empire as a whole, and for my part I most cordially support that. Sir Frederick Borden has well expressed upon some material points the views that his Government entertain in the matter of protecting their position. Naturally we all require to do the same, and in conclusion I wish to say I am exceedingly glad of the opportunity of having heard from the Secretary of State for War his views upon this matter, and I hope the publicity Mr. Deakin has suggested can be done. I do not know whether we are to regard matters relating to

defence as confidential. Some of the matters we are dealing with necessarily should be confidential, but if upon such points as we are discussing here we could give out (I am referring to anything I am saying myself, of course) such portions or all of the speech of the Secretary of State for War, educationally it would be valuable to the people in our country, certainly. The expression of opinion of a gentleman occupying a position of such grave responsibility as the Secretary of State for War will be of intense interest to the public of the self-governing Colonies. If the principle of what is given out in the debate in the House of Commons could be applied in this instance it would do good, but how far the confidential can be removed from the discussion which has taken place I am not quite prepared at the moment to say. I am animated, as I am sure every one of us is here, with the desire to see the system made as valuable as possible for the Old and New Worlds, and without giving away any portion of it to those who want to know what we are doing, other than is absolutely necessary.

I wish again to express my personal appreciation of the information furnished to us and of the value of this contained in the official reports submitted. I believe a great deal of good will come, and the great organisation which the responsible authorities here are trying to bring about will be hastened forward. Speaking on behalf of my country, I am only too glad to assist my colleagues representing the other countries in improving as far as we possibly can.

Dr. JAMESON: I would ask my colleague, Dr. Smartt, who is specially qualified to deal with this subject, to speak upon it on behalf of our Government.

Dr. SMARTT: Lord Elgin, I am not desirous of unnecessarily taking up the time of the Conference, but while not, as yet, having had an opportunity of reading the Defence papers—which only came into my hands this morning—I should like to express to Mr. Haldane how much we are indebted to him for the able and lucid manner in which he has brought this matter forward, because it makes us realise that the Secretary of State for War and his technical and scientific advisers are prepared to profit from the experience of the past, and to do the best they possibly can to allow us to meet any contingencies that may possibly arise to the detriment of the Empire in the future.

So far as the Cape is concerned, I think we thoroughly endorse everything that has been said by the Secretary of State for War with regard to the General Staff and the interchange of officers. As the Secretary of State knows, some short time ago a conference was held between the various Colonies in South Africa, under the presidency of the High Commissioner. There the obligations which rest upon the individual Colonies, not alone to provide for their own local defence, but also to provide for the defence of the whole of South Africa, were fully recognised. A tentative arrangement was come to—naturally subject to the approval of the various Parliaments—whereby certain of our forces would be interchangeable in the event of any local emergency; and the principle was also recognised, and will naturally have to be accepted, or otherwise, by the various South African Governments. A point upon which I am extremely anxious to hear the opinion of my friend General Botha, is as to whether we should not disband and re-enrol our permanent forces on the understanding that they would be under obligations not alone to serve anywhere in South Africa, but, in an emergency—and with the consent of the Governments concerned—anywhere the Empire might require. I believe the feeling of the people of Cape Colony, and I hope the feeling of the general population in South Africa, will be favourable to such a proposition; and I think if that principle were accepted by the other Colonies, it would be the first nucleus of a real Imperial Army. So far as our permanent forces are concerned (I speak more of the Cape Police and the C.M.R.) I am perfectly certain that practically all of them would be prepared to be re-enrolled upon that basis, that is to say that they would be liable to be called upon for service in any part of the world where they might be required.

So far as our Naval defences are concerned, we have been only too anxious to see if we could do anything to improve those defences, and I trust that the result of the consultation we will have the opportunity of having with the Admiralty before we return to the Cape will be that, on behalf of South Africa, and certainly on behalf of the two maritime Colonies of South Africa, some arrangement will be come to with the Admiralty whereby we will, on the same basis as I have suggested with regard to the Military forces, enrol, under an Act of Parliament, a force of Royal Naval Volunteer Reserves who will bind themselves in time of war not only to serve within territorial waters, but to serve in any part of the world in which

the British Admiralty may require their services; because I feel strongly that it is not the contributions which we give to the Imperial Government (which, after all, are only a drop in the ocean) that are important, but that the great contribution we should give is *personnel* trained as efficiently as possible in order to make up the waste of war should any great difficulty arise.

It is hardly necessary for me to say any more, because I think this Resolution will be accepted by the Conference. I only wish the Resolution was worded a little more strongly, and—perhaps the Secretary of State for War may think it over—that it contained an expression of the opinion of this Conference that a certain portion of the forces of all the Colonies or Dominions beyond the Seas should be enrolled upon the basis that, with the consent of their Governments, their services would be available wherever required.

I may also, perhaps, Lord Elgin, as it is of such great importance, accentuate what has been so ably said by Mr. Deakin and by Sir Joseph Ward, that I do not think there is anything in the statement of the Secretary of State for War which should necessarily be withheld from publication. So far as the Empire is concerned, I am sure it will do a great deal of good; and I do not think, so far as foreign nations are concerned, that anybody can take exception to it. If they did take any exception to it, it would only be to assure them that, so far as the British Empire is concerned, it is determined to maintain and uphold its own interests in every part of the world, and that is not a position which any foreign nation could possibly take exception to. I therefore trust that the Secretary of State for War will consent to make public this most valuable statement which he has been good enough to lay before the Conference.

Mr. F. R. MOOR: My Lord, I have to thank the Government for having put before us so clearly and lucidly the views that are held here with regard to some organised system for common Imperial defence, and the resolution that is placed before us is one which I can give my sincere support to. I agree with the views that have been expressed by the previous speakers that, by having a common system, such as is indicated here, on these broad principles, that is one that can only lead to good.

The interchange of Staff officers, as indicated here, is one that will undoubtedly be of great advantage to the Colonies in the direction of keeping the Colonies duly informed and educated up to the latest standards of military thought and science. I feel sure that, as regards South Africa, our final military organisation with regard to that very important possession is still in the lap of the gods, inasmuch as we are not yet a federated country, but we all do realise that we have a common duty first in providing for an efficient local defence, and eventually in giving as much assistance as we possibly can to the Empire; but we do feel, Sir, that to carry this out efficiently it can only come about when we have obtained what we all hope will be in the near future—a Federated Sub-Continent.

We feel, Sir, that in that part of the world we are especially bound to take the gravest notice of our military efficiency. We not only hold a most unique position as regards the Empire in the event of a general war, being in such a very important position with regard to all the important trade routes, which is the Imperial aspect, but we also have a very unique position as regards our local environments with respect to the large native population, that it is our duty and our burden to govern and control. Having all these heavy obligations upon us we feel that it is only by a common purpose that we can carry out efficiently the conditions of the defence that will be satisfactory to ourselves in the first instance, and also, I trust, to the Home Government when our organisations are complete.

Speaking for the Colony I represent, I believe there, Sir, we are more or less in advance of any of the other British Colonies in the Empire. We have there a compulsory system as regards our Militia, and during the late disturbance with our natives we did find that this system of ours was fairly effective. There is no doubt it will have to be amended in some directions, but on the whole, Sir, it has worked well. We have also a very complete cadet system there in connection with all our Public Schools. All our young people have to go through a military training at these schools, not only in drilling and more or less discipline, but by annual encampments and efficiency in rifle practice. This movement is very popular among the young people, and to my mind is in the direction of the solution of that recognition by every citizen that in the hour of peril, whether it be in the Colonies, or whether it be in the United Kingdom, every man should do his duty with regard

to the defence of his country. We are training these young people and I think the fact of their being trained at this early age imbues them with a feeling that they do owe a duty to their country and also to the Empire.

Sir, I thank you for the broad lines on which you have put this very great question before us, and I feel that your views will have great weight with the people I represent, and I believe that your views will have great effect on the Conference we are now attending in the direction of promoting unity with regard to our common defence.

General BOTHA: I should just like to say a few words and to thank the Minister for War very heartily for the valuable information he has imparted to us. The position that we have got to take up to-day and to discuss is that of organisation of defence. If the Empire is to expand still more, this is one of the important factors in its expansion. We, in the Transvaal, are to-day in a difficult position. We are sitting there entirely without any means of defence, and if, for instance, the British Government were to remove the troops from there, our position would be hazardous. I have discussed the matter with Dr. Jameson and Mr. Moor, and my idea is that, if as yet we cannot bring about a general federation of South Africa we should at any rate attempt to federate on this question of defence. If we succeed in doing this, I think it will be a very effective way of aiding the Empire. I am not quite satisfied as to the exact binding effect of this proposed Resolution, and I should like to consider it further. What would be its exact effect is not quite clear to me. That is all I have to say.

Mr. HALDANE: I do not know really that I need take up the time of the Conference by replying, except in a few sentences. It is to me personally deeply gratifying to find that to so very great an extent we have all been thinking upon the same lines. It seems to me that this Conference is very much of a common mind about the broad principles which underlie this matter, but there are, of course, questions of difficulty. Dr. Smartt has raised a very important point as to whether it would not be possible for each of the self-governing Dominions of the Crown to raise a special contingent as I may call it, for service in the defence of the Empire. That would practically put that contingent into the first line, leaving the second line to be organised out of all the local forces. Well, of course one sees a great many problems that may arise at once as regards that, although it would be a most valuable thing if it could be carried out. One sees the difficulty—to whom would that force be responsible? Who would have power to call it out on the outbreak of war, and so on? Would it be a volunteer force or would it be a force which undertook the same kind of responsibility as the first line itself, namely to obey the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, whoever he may be, who was nominated to the supreme command of the war? Those are not insuperable difficulties by any means and I merely mention them to show that that is probably a point upon which this Conference cannot come to a detailed or definite conclusion without going into matters.

Dr. SMARTT: If I may say so, Mr. Haldane, I had considered that point and that was not my difficulty. The difficulty was that, say, in Cape Colony, we have our Volunteer Forces and what we call our Cape Police and our Cape Mounted Rifles. Under existing conditions, none of these forces can be called upon to serve outside certain areas. My idea was that certain of those forces should be disbanded (or whatever is the proper military term) and re-enrolled, so that the men could, with the consent and control of the country, be sent to any part of the world if circumstances required them, because, under existing conditions, if the people of the Colony desired that the services of these permanent Cape forces should be utilised, without special enrolment they could not be sent away without their special consent—which, though it would be readily given, would naturally cause delay. It was exactly the problem to which I think the Canadian Minister for War referred with regard to the contingents they sent to South Africa; viz.:—that they had really to get the consent of the men; there was no possibility of sending them, even with the desire of the Government and Parliament, owing to the character of their enrolment.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: We are entirely against discrimination of that kind in New Zealand. We would not favour that at all. I should like to say that, Mr. Haldane.

Dr. SMARTT: Do you mean under any circumstances?

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Yes, and for this reason—I would like to make it clear from the New Zealand point of view—we want to have our Volunteer system carried

out under a complete organised defence system in New Zealand, without distinction of any kind for over-sea purposes. We are against anything in the nature of a standing army. We have now in existence our Volunteers many of whom are actively engaged in helping to develop the country. We have a very large reserve force of private individuals who are qualified to serve anywhere, and we want to be in the position, in New Zealand, of allowing it to be a voluntary offering from the Government and the individual to fight over-sea when called upon for the Empire, and we know we could get thousands of them, and if we were to attempt to create a first line or company, whatever is suggested, to be always ready for over-sea defence, I think you would create internal difficulties amongst the ordinary, or rather regular, forces who would willingly and spontaneously go out and fight when the time arises. I believe, with all due deference to my friend Dr. Smartt, that it is far better to let the country as a whole realise, in the event of trouble arising, that we can draw upon our volunteers for wherever we are going to fight, not ear-marking them beforehand. A good system of defence in our own country for use externally when the time arises is the better course to follow. It would entail legislation in our country if anything of the kind were proposed, and our people in time of peace do not want to have paraded a permanent organisation to go outside the country to fight. That is the sort of thing that would deter them to some extent from general action when the time arises. I do sincerely hope at all events that Mr. Haldane will not, so far as New Zealand is concerned, expect us to go upon lines of that kind.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I would like to add a word. This very question was brought up at the Conference five years ago, and discussed thoroughly and disposed of, for that time at least. I, perhaps, cannot put the matter better than I put it then. I will read what I said then: "The suggestion which was made that there should be a special force known as the Imperial Force for service abroad is one I cannot subscribe to, because I believe, in the first place, it would have a derogatory effect on the militia itself. I am quite content, from what I know of the militia of Canada that, to have a special force receiving special favours, specially named, specially drilled and trained, would have an unfavourable effect on the militia at large. I would propose as an alternative," and so on, and I concluded:—"It seems to me that I do not think it is necessary that a set of men shall be labelled as being set apart for any particular service, but that our militia should be made absolutely effective, so that when the moment arrives we can take part and assist the Imperial Army by a voluntary enlistment."

Mr. HALDANE: I am, at the moment, keenly conscious of the difficulty which Sir Joseph Ward and Sir Frederick Borden have raised, because I have just had to face it in framing the scheme of our own second line at home, and perhaps I might read to the Conference the clause in which I came to the conclusion that I had gone to the utmost limit possible with the second line. It makes me think that what Dr. Smartt proposes is really in the nature of a special contribution of the Colony to the first line of defence, a most valuable thing, but it is outside the strict organisation of a second line force which is what we are mainly discussing here.

Dr. JAMESON: On behalf of the Cape, may I say that, while I quite agree with my colleague (in case there is any idea as to the Cape wanting to press this), this is perhaps one of these advanced ideas we have put forward already; perhaps it is a little too early to bring it forward, but no doubt it may grow and perhaps Dr. Smartt is quite right to throw it out as a consideration to think of for the next Conference on that basis.

Mr. HALDANE: It is one of these things which may well belong to a very immediate future—not far off—but I am now going to read from the Bill which comes up before Parliament for the final stage of the second reading debate on Tuesday. "Any part of the Territorial Force"—which is the second line force, which corresponds to the imperial second line we are discussing—the local forces all round—"shall be liable to serve in any part of the United Kingdom, but no part of the Territorial Force shall be carried or ordered to go out of the United Kingdom." Now we have this by way of proviso. "Provided that it shall be lawful for His Majesty, if he thinks fit, to accept the offer of any body of men of the Territorial Force, signifying through their commanding officer, to subject themselves to the liability (a) to serve in any place outside the United Kingdom; or (b) to be called out for actual military service for the purpose of defence in such places in the

"United Kingdom as may be specified in their agreement, whether the Territorial Force is embodied or not," and it goes on to say if they make the offer, and it is accepted, that offer measures their liability, and nobody is to be compelled to make such an offer, except by his own consent, with the matter carefully explained to him. That was the utmost we felt we could go to in the organisation of the second line, and it is in effect the change which was made in our Militia Act towards the end of the Peninsular War. We were driven to rely on the militia towards the end of the Peninsular War, and the substance of this clause was introduced as a modification of our Militia Act. However, I gather that you all, in Canada, in Australia, and in New Zealand, are very much in the same position with regard to that. That is very much the measure of what we want to do, and if you could get that amount of latitude that would enable you to organise your second line so that such a voluntary offer could be provided for and accepted, I take it that it would be a step on, Sir Frederick. I rather gather that you have some legislation you might have to modify in some slight degree to meet that, but whether it is so or not, that is a matter which, as we have said, can stand.

If the Conference is agreeable, as I think it is, to this resolution about the General Staff, I think it is highly desirable that we should pass it; there may be amendments upon it, of course, but I was going to suggest this, that if we do pass it, I hope the thing will not stop there. My office will be ready to take up the details of things and, although we say in the beginning, "That this Conference, without wishing to commit to immediate action any of the Governments represented," I hope the opportunity may be taken to follow up all these things we have discussed to-day. Sir Neville Lyttelton and the rest of us will put aside all other engagements; we know you are here and available only for about three weeks more and the most immediate duty we could fulfil would be to meet and confer with you and work these things out, so that I hope, if the substance of this resolution is agreed to, we may be able to take some immediate action in fixing in our minds the precise way to give effect to it and the other things we have discussed to-day.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Would it be possible, Mr. Haldane, to modify this resolution—I have not thought of the form of words, but in some way—by which we would agree to the idea of establishing General Staffs in each of the Dominions beyond the Seas, in each of our countries, and then go on as you put it so that these staffs should be interchangeable with each other, because I think it is not only desirable that there should be exchange between the Central Staff and any one of the Colonies, but exchange between the staffs of the different Colonies. I do not know whether that is desirable, but I do not like to lose sight of the idea that the different communities or dominions should have their own General Staffs.

CHAIRMAN: Might I suggest this? There is a general expression of opinion that it would be very desirable that the Secretary of State's statement should be made public, and I understand from him that there is no objection to that. In the statement, of course, is set forth in full what Sir Frederick Borden has been asking for and perhaps that would be the easiest way of doing it. There are one or two almost verbal amendments I think that have been suggested to me in the resolution itself, but otherwise it might stand. I think perhaps that the Conference might express approval of the Secretary of State's statement and then it might be recorded in the resolution and published.

Mr. HALDANE: I think there is nothing in what I have said to-day that has not been said several times not only in speeches, but in papers that have been published and are in the possession not only of the American General Staff, but I suspect of all General Staffs. They are very well informed of each others' proceedings and there is no secret in what we have discussed to-day; it is a fixing rather of the ideas that have already been given expression to.

Mr. DEAKIN: It seemed to me a digest of the discussions which have so far proceeded in your Parliament and in your Press.

CHAIRMAN: You will revise it?

Mr. HALDANE: I will revise it, and I will take care that there is no expression that can possibly be open to objection.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: The principle, I take it, is the establishment of an Imperial General Staff.

Mr. HALDANE: That is it.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: We have no Imperial Army.

Mr. HALDANE: No, you have an Army which serves for the defence of the Empire, and you have the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I think we are all agreed that this should be done, but there may be some of our people, whom we represent, who may be somewhat sensitive about being committed, as they might think they were being committed, to something like an obligation.

Mr. HALDANE: You observe the General Staff is a purely advisory body, and indeed you have done it in Canada just now because you have a very distinguished General Staff officer, General Lake, who is your own Staff officer, as any General Staff officer sent under this scheme would be,—absolutely your own officer at your own disposition.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Precisely, but we have not said much about it.

Mr. HALDANE: No, your deeds have been better than your words. You have had General Lake for some time and have been working it up.

Mr. DEAKIN: I have made a suggestion in the last line but three which would perhaps meet your point, Sir Frederick; instead of reading: "without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration shall be capable of advising respective Governments," and so on, it should read: "without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training and education."

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: That is important. Will you give me the words, Mr. Deakin?

Mr. DEAKIN: After the word "shall" in the fourth line from the bottom insert the words "at the request of" instead of "be capable of advising," and it reads on "the respective Governments advise as to the training, education, and war organisation of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire." That shows what I think was the clear intention that this staff should work with the respective Governments; it is the brain which is to be called upon by any nerve at the extremity and responds thereto.

Mr. HALDANE: The expert called in.

Mr. DEAKIN: Exactly, like the Committee of Imperial Defence; to make that clear I propose in the fourth line from the top after the words "recognises and affirms the need of developing" to insert "for the use of" instead of "throughout," and then omit the words "the conception of."

Mr. HALDANE: "For the service of the Empire."

Mr. DEAKIN: That is better—"for the service of the Empire a General Staff recruited" and so on.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I would say "for the service of the various Dominions."

Mr. HALDANE: "For the service of the various Governments of the Empire."

Dr. JAMESON: Why not the Empire by itself?

Mr. DEAKIN: We make that plain in the last part.

Mr. HALDANE: "For the service of the Empire."

Mr. F. R. MOOR: I think it would be better if instead of "that this Conference without wishing to commit to immediate action" we said "that this Conference without committing any of the Governments to immediate action."

Mr. HALDANE: Yes.

Mr. F. R. MOOR: I think it would be more decided and clear.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: In any case everything we do here has to be ratified by our Governments and Parliaments too.

CHAIRMAN: You cannot commit them.

Mr. HALDANE: I doubt very much whether these words are necessary.

Dr. SMARTT: I do not think we need them in at all; you might take out all the words after "Conference" down to the third line.

Mr. DEAKIN: I agree, but as they have been put in let it stand as it is.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I think it better to let them stand as they are.

CHAIRMAN: If we adopt the suggestion of using the statement of the Secretary of State, ought we not to put that in some form into the Resolution, "That the Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War?"

Sir JOSEPH WARD: I am quite agreeable, it is part and parcel of the motion, really.

Mr. DEAKIN: Will you put the whole Resolution, sir?

CHAIRMAN: Then the Resolution would run: "The Conference welcomes and

"cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War and resolves: That this Conference without wishing to commit to immediate action any of the Governments represented at it recognises and affirms the need"—

Mr. DEAKIN: Is "at it" necessary?

CHAIRMAN: No, I should think not—"recognises and affirms the need of developing a General Staff recruited from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall be a means of fostering the study of military science in the various branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, and undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall at the request of the respective Governments advise them as to the training, education, and war organisation of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire."

Dr. SMARTT: "Advise" alone is better.

CHAIRMAN: "Advise." That is the Resolution of the Conference.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I think I would like to defer this and have a third reading of this Resolution also, as we had with the former one. I see nothing to take exception to, but I would like to think it over.

CHAIRMAN: May I have the attention of the Conference? Sir Wilfrid Laurier would like to have what we call a third reading of this Resolution also, that is to say, that it should not be published until the next meeting, after it has been seen again.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I would like to look at it on Monday, although I may say I see nothing to take exception to at present.

Dr. SMARTT: I presume, Lord Elgin, that does not prevent the statement of the Secretary of State for War being published?

CHAIRMAN: No, we can get that out. There is one Resolution which is still at its third reading, Sir Wilfrid, with regard to Imperial Defence; I think we have practically agreed to it, but Mr. Deakin on that occasion wanted to see it again. This is how it ran: "That the Colonies be authorised to refer to the Committee of Imperial Defence through the Secretary of State for advice on any local questions in regard to which expert assistance is deemed desirable, and whenever so desired the representative of the Colony which may wish for advice will be summoned to attend as a member of the Committee during the discussion of the questions raised."

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Was that not settled long ago?

Mr. DEAKIN: I thought so.

CHAIRMAN: I understood it was reserved in the same way as the other point.

Mr. DEAKIN: I did not understand it was reserved, but merely asked that I should be allowed to mention it as I have done this morning in connection with the general question.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: It was settled by the very constitution of the Imperial Committee itself. Mr. Balfour—whose idea perhaps it was—on two or three occasions stated very clearly the objects, and I had the honour myself of attending a meeting of that committee in December 1903, for the very reason suggested in this Resolution. It hardly seems necessary to make it a formal resolution.

CHAIRMAN: It was the explanation I gave on behalf of the Prime Minister at the last meeting and it seemed to be acceptable to the Conference.

Dr. JAMESON: Surely there is no objection to emphasising it further by passing it now.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: It is a work of supererogation, I think.

Dr. JAMESON: Does it matter? It was not the case before that the Committee of Defence could invite a representative of the Colony, whereas now this goes a little further and says that practically a Colony has the right to be invited whenever anything in which it is concerned or upon which it has asked advice is being discussed by the Defence Committee. I think it does go a little further.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: It seems to me simply burdening this Conference with a Resolution about a matter which has always been done. There need be no expression of opinion by the Conference upon this point.

CHAIRMAN: I am entirely in the hands of the Conference.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I do not see what it is wanted for.

Mr. HALDANE: I do not think myself, if I may say so, that it is necessary. One is very familiar with the composition of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which is

a skeleton or nucleus body; I always attend it, but I am not a standing member of it. It has no fixed composition, but consists merely of the people who are summoned, and, of course, if any question arose affecting any particular Colony, its representative would attend. The Prime Minister is really the mainspring of the Committee, and he summons it as he wants it.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: He summons whomsoever he likes?

Mr. HALDANE: Whoever he likes and whoever is suitable.

Mr. DEAKIN: We did not feel entitled to suggest that we should be represented at our own pleasure—we did not feel justified in officially representing it. Accordingly this Resolution was submitted for the approval of the British Government and the members of the Conference to the proposition that in future any representative of a Colony which might wish for advice should be summoned upon its request to attend as a member of the Committee during any particular discussion. That gave us not merely an opportunity of being invited as guests but a right to be present on our own motion when matters in which we were concerned were under discussion. That seems to me a distinct advance.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: You think that is not included in the memorandum?

Mr. DEAKIN: It is included now in March 1907.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: I think that is a proper thing to do.

Dr. SMARTT: I think it would do a great deal of good. I will give the Conference a concrete case:—Some time ago the Imperial Government appointed a Defence Commission to inquire into the defences of the Empire. They came to Cape Colony and no doubt they inquired into the defences of the Peninsula, but they did not go into the matter with the Government in that confidential manner which, I think, if a Resolution of this sort is carried and approved of by the Imperial Government, would be the case in the future.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I thought that was included already.

CHAIRMAN: Then this Resolution may stand. We came to a final Resolution also on the question of the constitution of the Conference and that, of course, now will be published.

23RD APRIL, 1907.

MILITARY DEFENCE.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the first business is to finally approve the Resolution on Military Defence which was before the meeting on Saturday last. I understand that there is some suggestion from Canada.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: In the fourth line I would ask whether the words "to immediate action" do any particular good, and whether they might not be left out?

Mr. HALDANE: We thought that might be so. You mean missing out those words and going on to "any of the Governments"?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Yes.

Mr. HALDANE: I do not think those words mean anything. They look as if they suggested that there might be immediate action. Shall we strike out "without wishing to commit to immediate action"?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Simply reading it as "without wishing to commit any of the Governments."

Mr. HALDANE: Omitting the words "to immediate action."?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Yes.

Dr. JAMESON: Is there any harm in suggesting immediate action?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Is it any good?

Dr. JAMESON: Yes, I think it is a kind of fillip towards doing something, and not only talking about it.

Mr. HALDANE: I do not attach importance myself to it, one way or the other.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: "Without wishing to commit any of the Governments," I think it should be.

CHAIRMAN: Omit the words "to immediate action." Is that agreed to?

Mr. F. R. MOOR: I do not think it improves it.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Then as to the words "recruited," it seems to me "recruited" is hardly a word to apply to officers. "Selected" would, I think, be a better word.

Mr. HALDANE: "Selected" is, I think, a more appropriate word to apply to an officer.

Mr. DEAKIN: Do we gain anything by retaining any of these words "without wishing to commit to immediate action any of the Governments represented"? Would it not be advantageous to omit those words, and possibly substitute some other words for "recognises and affirms" to indicate clearly the view of the Conference?

Mr. HALDANE: "Is of opinion," for instance.

Mr. DEAKIN: Something of that sort, safeguarding the statement "without wishing to commit to immediate action." If we agreed to it we would not wish to commit our Governments to immediate action. We could not. It is a matter for themselves.

Mr. HALDANE: The Conference is not an executive Conference, and I should have thought if you omitted those words and put in such words as "is of opinion" it would make it quite clear that the Conference is expressing only an opinion.

Mr. DEAKIN: Yes.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: It is nothing more than an opinion there. It is to be left to the different Legislatures to legislate upon.

Mr. DEAKIN: I suggest the omission of these words, and the Resolution would then run: "That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War and is of opinion that for the service of the Empire a General Staff," and so on.

Mr. HALDANE: "Is of opinion that there is a need."

Mr. DEAKIN: Yes; "Is of opinion that there is a need of developing throughout the Empire."

Dr. JAMESON: Why substitute "is of opinion" for the more emphatic "recognises and affirms"?

Mr. DEAKIN: In order to emphasize the fact that we are not executive but merely a consultative Conference, and that the Governments are the people to decide. I have no objection to "recognises and affirms," but it is suggested that it might appear to go a little further than our function warrants.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: We say we are not, of course, committing our countries to immediate action.

Dr. JAMESON: We are only a conference and cannot do anything. Why should not we "recognise and affirm"? They are stronger words, and I do not see why we should weaken it.

Mr. DEAKIN: I have no objection to "recognises and affirms," but was endeavouring to meet Sir Frederick Borden's view.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: If the words "to immediate action" are left out, I am quite satisfied with the rest, and I have no particular objection then.

CHAIRMAN: It is suggested that the whole sub-sentence from "without" to "represented" should come out.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I would leave it as it is taking out the words "to immediate action"—"without wishing to commit any of the Governments" I think is better.

Mr. DEAKIN: We passed it in that form, but if we are altering it I think it is a great improvement to leave out all those words.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I would take out the words "to immediate action," and substitute "selected" for "recruited."

Mr. HALDANE: Yes, that is much better.

Mr. F. R. MOOR: Yes, that has been done.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: On this point may I ask for information? It is a thing we should know more about. How is this selection to be made? Would Mr. Haldane select from the different Colonial officers in Canada, for instance?

Mr. HALDANE: Our plan is this. We have a list of persons eligible for appointment to the General Staff. If you send over a name and say: "This is a man we recommend to you," we should of course ask you for his qualifications, and we should put him on the list, and then arrange with you from the names put on the list to select somebody for an appointment in exchange for somebody we sent to you.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I would like to have it understood, and I think this is what is understood really, that where there is a General Staff now in existence, as there is in Canada, members of that Staff should be selected to fill appointments on the General Staff.

Mr. HALDANE: Yes; you would not send people who were not on your General Staff.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: No.

Mr. HALDANE: No. Each country would have its General Staff organisation, either very much developed or rudimentary, as it might be, but you would send people from your Staff, whatever it was.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: And there would be no selection, as I understand, except through the Government of the particular country interested.

Mr. HALDANE: That is right. We should take nobody whom you did not recommend out of your General Staff. None of us would, of course, bind ourselves one way or the other; it would be a matter of convenience and arrangement; but we should take over here in the ordinary course naturally anybody you recommended as being well qualified from your General Staff, and at your request we should send you somebody whom you liked.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: And the responsibility for any particular officer so selected would continue to the particular Government under which he was serving.

Mr. HALDANE: He would be a member of their General Staff detailed for this general service.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Yes, I think that is so. There is one word here which it is thought might be improved—"fostering."

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I merely make just this suggestion, that instead of "which shall be the means of fostering the study of military science," we should say, "which shall study military science." I do not care very much which it is.

Mr. HALDANE: Yes, "which shall study military science in all its branches." That is quite as good. If that is agreed to I have no criticism upon it.

Mr. DEAKIN: I have some abbreviations to suggest.

Mr. HALDANE: Then it will be "which shall study military science in all its branches."

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I think that is all, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. DEAKIN: Will Sir Frederick Borden kindly listen to this, and see if it will not simplify it—"That this Conference," omitting the next two words, "cordially approving the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War"—omitting the next words and substituting "recommends to the Governments represented"—omitting the next words "the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff selected from the forces of the Empire." So that it would read: "That this Conference, cordially approving"—this is all we do—"the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, recommends to the Governments represented the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff selected from the forces." Would that meet your view, Mr. Haldane?

Mr. HALDANE: That meets my view. It is shorter, and I am in favour of anything that is short.

Mr. DEAKIN: It gets rid of a great many words; we cordially approve the exposition of general principles, and recommend to our Governments the need of developing a general staff.

Mr. HALDANE: "Recommend the desirability" might be better.

Mr. DEAKIN: Very good; I was only shortening it. It is at present rather winding.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Sometimes it is well to have these long statements, and I would let it stand as it is.

Mr. DEAKIN: At this stage I do not press it. We really accepted it, but when one commences to criticise it is hard to stop.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I would like it to stand as it is, with the two short amendments we have made.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Put in "selected" instead of "recruited," and leave out the words "to immediate action," and leave out the word "fostering."

CHAIRMAN: Then it reads: "That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognises and affirms the need of developing, for the service of the Empire, a General Staff selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches," and so on.

Dr. SMARTT: Surely that does not meet the case? I understood the feeling was that some of the Governments represented here might not be able to take part in

this at once. Consequently the Secretary of State for War very wisely put in "without wishing to commit to immediate action." But really we are now going to pass a resolution under which certain of the Governments will not be committed to anything except passing a pure opinion. They do not even commit themselves to act upon it in the near future, nor even in the distant future.

Mr. HALDANE: But having agreed upon the broad principle, we should now proceed to communicate with you with a view to seeing what you could do to carry this out, and as we are all of one mind we shall at least all approach the thing from a common point of view. We would take the first action in making suggestions to you for your consideration.

Dr. SMARTT: Then would not it be better to leave it as you worded it, "without wishing to commit to immediate action, recognises and affirms the principle of establishing"?

Mr. HALDANE: I do not think the words make much difference; but the point is, we have agreed on a general principle. That is the real importance of it. We could not bind or force any Government, nor do we want to. This is a deliberating Conference.

Dr. SMARTT: We do not force the Government, but we come to a conclusion as to the necessity of it as quickly as possible. That is what I want to see affirmed in the Resolution.

Mr. HALDANE: Do you think you add anything by putting in the words?

Sir JOSEPH WARD: You would not help it forward in any way by putting in "committing to immediate action." It would not get over the suggestion you are making as to any Government not taking action.

Dr. SMARTT: No, but it would really appear from the Resolution that, so far as possible, we were all desirous of immediate action and of this matter not being delayed.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: But we recognise and affirm the need for developing. What more can we do beyond that?

Sir JOSEPH WARD: So far as New Zealand is concerned, as soon as the Secretary of State for War communicates with us we will consider any proposals and deal with them.

Mr. HALDANE: By getting rid of the words "to immediate action" we have got rid of the suggestion that it is not to be immediate action.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Quite so.

CHAIRMAN: Then the Resolution is to stand.

The Resolution, as amended, was carried unanimously.

The full text of the Resolution was:—

GENERAL STAFF FOR THE SERVICE OF THE EMPIRE.

That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognises and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organisation of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire.

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23 APRIL, 1907.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we now proceed to consider Naval Defence, and we have on the agenda two resolutions, one from the Commonwealth of Australia and

one from New Zealand, and perhaps the most convenient course would be to proceed as we did the other day, that is to ask those who represent those two Colonies to first state their views. Will Mr. Deakin be ready to open it?

Mr. DEAKIN: Before Lord Tweedmouth speaks?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Whichever you like.

Mr. DEAKIN: Perhaps you would wish to indicate generally the policy of the Admiralty. As I take it, this is not merely a discussion on Naval Defence for New Zealand and Australia. Incidentally we have a special interest to consider, because we have an Act upon our Statute books, and the question of amending that Act by addition or variation is a subject which concerns us a great deal more than anybody else. But we have assembled first to take a general view of Naval Defence, and to be made acquainted with the policy of the British Government, presenting questions of great interest for the whole Conference. Incidentally one of these deals with the particular agreement relating to New Zealand and Australia. I do not know whether Sir Joseph Ward agrees.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Yes, I agree; I think it would be most valuable to hear the opinions of Lord Tweedmouth.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Lord Elgin, and gentlemen, I feel it a high privilege to sit at this table to discuss this matter with the Prime Ministers of the self-governing dominions of the King beyond the seas. My position, of course, is rather a different one from that of my colleague and good friend Mr. Haldane. As I understand, he gave you a vivid and interesting sketch of the new system of organisation of the Army, and explained to you how that new scheme might be adapted to your Colonial wants and wishes. My position is quite a different one. I cannot offer any sketch. I rather lay before you a completed picture. Our history undoubtedly is closely intertwined with the history of the Naval Service from earliest days, and though it is the fact, no doubt, that from time to time we have met with reverses and we have met with accidents, yet, on the whole, from the earliest days to the present moment the Navy has been able to defend the country, to defend the growing country, that is the Empire as a whole, and I do not think that any charge can be brought against it of ever, on any occasion, having failed. Well, gentlemen, that being the case, what I have in the first place to ask is, that you should place confidence in the Board of Admiralty, and in the present Government, for the future safety of the country. We welcome you, and we ask you to take some leading part in making more complete than it is at present the naval defence of the Empire. I wish to recognise all that our cousins over the sea have done in consequence of decisions of former Conferences. I know that you gave to the Government and to the Admiralty, with a free and unstinting hand, the help that you thought you could manage to give. Gentlemen, I have only one reservation to make, and in making it I ask that, as we have proved ourselves successful in the past, you should put your trust in us now. The only reservation that the Admiralty desire to make is that they claim to have the charge of the strategical questions which are necessarily involved in Naval Defence, to hold the command of the naval forces of the country, and to arrange the distribution of ships in the best possible manner to resist attacks and to defend the Empire at large, whether it be our own islands or the dominions beyond the seas. We thoroughly recognise that we are responsible for that defence. We want you to help us in that defence. We want you to give us all the assistance you can, but we do not come to you as beggars; we gladly take all that you can give us, but at the same time, if you are not inclined to give us the help that we hope to have from you, we acknowledge our absolute obligation to defend the King's dominions across the seas to the best of our ability.

Now, there is, after all, only one sea that laps around all our shores. The sea is the link that joins us together. It was the reason of your upspringing. It is our first defence. It is the origin of our great commerce. It is the outlet and inlet of our exports and our imports, and it is to us in these islands the channel through which we get the food and raw material which are so necessary to our vast population. There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there is one Navy, and I want to claim in the first place your help, and in the second place authority for the Admiralty to manage this great service without restraint. How great a part the sea takes in all our life, in all our prosperity, is, I think, best seen from the extraordinary amount of shipping that our country puts out. Last year, in 1906, Great Britain's output of shipping amounted to no less than 1,936,793 tons. The United States had an output of 486,650 tons; Germany, 384,614 tons, and France, 58,502 tons. The output of all foreign nations amounted to 1,319,900 tons,

so that last year Great Britain led by no less than 616,893 tons all the other nations in the world.

Mr. DEAKIN: Is that new shipping?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: New shipping.

Mr. DEAKIN: Commercial shipping only?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: No; it includes warships. I think in the British Return there were about 108,000 tons of warships. But with that enormous interest in the sea and in the shipping that goes on the sea, it is absolutely necessary that we should make the passage of that shipping across the sea safe. That is what we aim at securing, and that is what we ask your help in doing.

Mr. DEAKIN: Pardon me for interrupting, but when you speak about British shipping, does that include shipping constructed in other parts of the Empire, or only in the United Kingdom?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: That is within the United Kingdom.

Mr. DEAKIN: The total of the construction in the various Colonies is small?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: It is not very large. It amounted last year to about 26,000 tons. I have here a statement of the subsidies which in the past have been given by the various Colonies. Australia gives £200,000; New Zealand, £40,000; Cape Colony, £50,000; Natal, £35,000; Newfoundland, £3,000; in all £328,000.

Gentlemen, what I have to say is that the Admiralty and His Majesty's Government are perfectly ready to meet these contributors to Admiralty funds in a liberal and conciliatory manner. We do not wish to insist that the contributions from the Colonies should necessarily be in the form only of money. We are quite ready to enter into any arrangements with the Colonies that may seem most suitable to them, and which may seem to bring advantage to the Navy, and advantage to the Colonies themselves. I have here drawn up a short statement of what may be called the general principle with which the Admiralty desire to meet the representatives of the self-governing Dominions of the King beyond the seas. His Majesty's Government recognise the natural desire of the self-governing Colonies to have a more particular share in providing the naval defence force of the Empire, and, so long as the condition of unity of command and direction of the fleet is maintained, they are ready to consider a modification of the existing arrangements to meet the views of the various Colonies. In the opinion of the Government, while the distribution of the fleet must be determined by strategical requirements of which the Admiralty are the judge, it would be of great assistance if the Colonial Governments would undertake to provide for local service in the Imperial squadrons the smaller vessels that are useful for defence against possible raids or for co-operation with a squadron, and also to equip and maintain docks and fitting establishments which can be used by His Majesty's ships. It will further be of much assistance if coaling facilities are provided, and arrangements can be made for a supply of coal and naval stores which otherwise would have to be sent out specially or purchased locally.

I understand that, in Australia particularly, and in South Africa, it is desired to start some naval service of your own. Perhaps I might suggest that if the provision of the smaller craft which are necessarily incident to the work of a great fleet of modern battleships could be made locally, it would be a very great help to the general work of the Navy. You cannot take the small craft such as torpedo boats and submarines across the ocean, and for warships to arrive in South Africa or in Australia or in New Zealand or in Canada, and find ready to their hand well-trained men in good vessels of this kind, would be an enormous advantage to them. It would be an enormous advantage to find ready to their hand men well trained, ready to take a part in the work of the fleet. There is, I think, the further advantage in these small flotillas, that they will be an admirable means of coast defence; that you will be able by the use of them to avoid practically all danger from any sudden raid which might be made by a cruising squadron. What I should like to point out is that, above all things in this work, the submarine is probably the most important and the most effective weapon. It is the weapon with which you can meet a fleet attacking during the day, or individual ships attacking by day. I am assured by my advisers at the Admiralty that it is a most important weapon; that it has already reached very considerable development; and it is one on which we may rely with great confidence. That is a view that is very strongly taken by some of the leading men in the French Navy, who think that the submarine is really the weapon of the future. I believe myself that the provision of submarines and all the smaller

torpedo destroyers and boats would be of the greatest help to the Navy, supposing it were, as I hope it may not be, drawn into a war abroad.

We want to consult with you as to the details of this scheme. Of course if each separate colony is to be treated on a different footing, we are quite ready to do that and to make separate arrangements with each separate Colony according to its own wishes. I thoroughly recognise the great difference that there is between the conditions of one country and another. The desire of the Admiralty is to meet those wishes so far as they possibly can be met. I think perhaps it is impossible suddenly to make a change. I would suggest that a beginning should be made, and that probably the best way to start would be to allocate to local purposes certain portions of the subsidies already given. The particular purposes to which that money should be devoted should be discussed in detail between the representatives of the various Colonies and the Admiralty, so that a thoroughly good scheme might be worked out in the end. At the same time we do not put aside the payment of the subsidies at all. From those Colonies who are desirous of continuing altogether on the lines on which they have gone in the past we shall be very glad to accept their contribution, and accept it gratefully, and do the best to apply the money in a useful manner.

Then I should like to say a single word on the further point of the provision of docks and coaling facilities in the Colonies. The enormous development of the modern warship entails important consequences. These great modern warships require large docks to contain them. I think we are getting on well with the provision of docks. At this moment in our own country and abroad we have, I think, 13 Government docks which will take in our largest ship, the "Dreadnought." I think in the course of the next two years we shall have four more, which will make about 17 altogether. But it is very desirable that we should have in all parts of the world docks which could take such great ships, supposing they were to meet with an accident or were to receive damage in war. I do not know whether Sir Wilfrid Laurier would consider that there might be some chance of Canada doing that in Esquimalt and Halifax, which have now been handed over to the Canadian people. We have already a dock at Simons Bay which will take a "Dreadnought," but all through the Empire it would be a great thing to find big docks at hand in the event of any accident or damage that might happen to a ship. It is the same thing with regard to coal. Coal is the life of a modern warship. It is an absolute necessity. There are great difficulties in getting it. We are better off, no doubt, than other Powers in that respect because we have coaling stations already scattered here and there over the whole world, and now there are many new inventions and new developments in methods of coaling on the sea and at the coaling depôts. But it is a subject to which I should like to direct the attention of the Prime Ministers as one of the things which are of the greatest use to a fleet at sea.

Gentlemen, I have come to you absolutely frankly to tell you how we hope to be able to meet you. I am anxious to hear what the representatives of the various Colonies want to do. They have already put forward two resolutions, and I think it would be well that I should hear what they have to say, and I should also like to be made aware of what the representatives of each Colony think as to how far they could meet the suggestions that I have ventured to make.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Will you first call upon Australia and New Zealand, as they have proposed resolutions?

Mr. DEAKIN: The resolutions of Australia and New Zealand, after all, are quite subsidiary to the main principles on which his Lordship has addressed us. Speaking for myself, may I say that I quite appreciate the frankness with which your Lordship has approached the subject, and the light you have thrown upon it. I am not surprised at the attitude of the Government, because I have sufficient familiarity with the references which you and also your colleagues have made to this great subject, but at the same time must admit my own want of competence to deal off-hand with the major questions which you have raised, either directly or by necessary implication—they are of the first importance—without some little further consideration.

The main views you have submitted, so far as I have followed them, relate to the question of Colonial co-operation in the Naval Defence of the Empire. This divides itself into two parts: first, a provision for local defence, which again divides itself into the defence which is to be used, so to speak, by the localised bodies or other agencies, and next the localised Imperial Squadrons, if I may distinguish them by that title. Beyond these local defences comes the question of the possibility of a

general defence not localised, upon an Imperial scale, whose obligations would be adapted to the varying circumstances of the different parts of the Empire—varying as between themselves, and varying again from those of the United Kingdom. Any consideration I have ever been able to give to this question has led me to the reluctant conclusion that so far we are unable to find any scheme of the measure of responsibility either particular or general. I would be very glad to be enlightened upon this subject. None of the assessments and estimates made for the purpose have appeared to me to include all the factors to be taken into account, or to have furnished anything like an exact proportion between them. Those are the main issues, as I follow them, which are inseparably associated with the scheme that you have submitted very clearly to us. Afterwards, when we have considered such general questions of contribution and co-operation, the matter which particularly interests New Zealand and ourselves is as to the local form of that co-operation. Australia's responsibility is now fixed on a monetary standard, and we submit that this is not the most acceptable standard for Australia, nor is it likely to further the objects that we have, or the objects that you have, in maintaining the present contribution. But that, as already stated, is a subsidiary question.

The larger principle of the relations which self-governing Colonies should hold to the Imperial Naval Defence should first come under consideration, because that is the major premise of which the form of any contribution is after all only a minor matter. I must confess myself quite unable to criticise with sufficient pertinency the larger principle of this question at this moment. There are others here not under my disability—for instance, Mr. Brodeur, who represents the Naval Department of Canada, but so far as I am concerned I wish time for further consideration.

Let me, however, by way of addition mention one matter which arose out of the address of your colleague, the Secretary of State for War, affecting the possibilities of the development of local supplies of ammunition within the Commonwealth. These are a necessity in most States, but of far greater urgency in Australia than elsewhere. We desire to see established cordite and ammunition factories which should be sufficient for our own wants. These wants in time of peace are necessarily very small, while in time of war, with the possibility of interruption of communications, they would be very large. Our difficulty, therefore, is to face the cost of establishing or subsidising factories for the manufacture of this ammunition within our own borders, because of that enormous difference between the regular demand upon the factories and their machinery and the extraordinary demand for which they ought to be equipped to some extent. Possibly in the matter of cordite ammunition for small arms, we do not see much difficulty. We think we can establish a factory which would meet our wants fully in peace, and reasonably in war, keeping reserves always in hand. But if we could enlarge the scope so as to supply the squadron or squadrons in our seas with, at all events, part of the ammunition and the cordite they require, that would enable us to conduct that factory on a much larger scale. It is not a desire to make a profit out of supplying the naval wants, but simply to keep the factory going on a greater scale, and enlarge its capacity so that it might be less inadequate in time of war. Of course we recognise the great difficulty in the testing of this cordite, which is now very elaborately carried out with a great number of guns of different types. It is necessary to test the cordite for a gun of a particular type in a gun of that type, but as it happens, at the present time that need not be an insuperable objection, because we have quite a variety of guns in Australia, many more types than we ought to have had, since they have not conferred upon us that defensive strength which we should have enjoyed if we had been limited to a few types. Opinions have varied in the Admiralty and War Office, as they must vary from time to time, and we have had the full effect of the variations. However, under the circumstances, the report of the Committee of Imperial Defence advises us to lay aside quite a number of these guns, and they are of the same types, or sufficiently near to the types, of guns which we would require for testing purposes. Now, until those guns are worn out—and then the question of supplying them might be a more serious matter—they would perhaps suffice for the application of tests. We would be able at least to commence with them. I am not pressing for an answer to-day. I have expressed already my inability to cope off-hand with the great questions you have raised, without more time for consideration. Nor would I ask for a reply on this point until we have told you what we can offer. In making this proposition for the supply of ammunition we do not expect that the Imperial Navy should accept from us cordite or any other supplies any less efficiently tested than they are here. We accept that.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: It would be absolutely necessary that we should test the cordite in the most effective manner.

Mr. DEAKIN: Absolutely necessary.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: There is another thing to be remembered, that as far as our knowledge at present goes of cordite, or a large class of cordite at any rate, provided it is kept at a low temperature under 60 degrees its life is very long—certainly 60 or 70 years—whereas when it is long affected by a high temperature it goes bad.

Mr. DEAKIN: I am aware of that. Of course that estimate of the very long life of cordite is still theoretical, because there has been no cordite of that character for 60 or 70 years, though all the scientific calculations point that way. We see no difficulty in the conditions of temperature. If we make cordite we must fulfil those conditions; if we do not fulfil them we cannot do business. We do not look for mere profit. To sell you an inferior explosive for the protection of our own shores and shipping would be short-sighted economy; but on the assumption that we are able to satisfy you as to tests and storage, it would, or might, make a considerable difference to us even if we had only the supplying of certain portions of the annual ordinary consumption of the squadrons in the Indian, China, and Australian seas, the present area within which our squadron operates. It would be inexcusable to bring forward a detail of this kind, were it not to give you the opportunity of consulting your officers in the hope that you may in some way or other help us to improve our means of ammunition supply, which would then be available for your squadrons in all grave emergencies. Other members of the Conference more competent than myself should cope with the great questions raised. We should have an opportunity of seeing your remarks in print. They most decidedly are serious enough for much consideration. Clear as is your exposition, it raises so many matters of moment to us that, to treat them as they deserve, more time for reflection and more detail would be required. I therefore do not touch on the question of coaling or the variety of other interesting problems suggested.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Elgin, and Gentlemen,—I begin by saying that the value to the different countries—I speak, of course, specially for the one that I represent—of having an opportunity of hearing the views of Lord Tweedmouth, as First Lord of the Admiralty, to whom we look as the head of the Naval Branch, is very important indeed. I want to convey for New Zealand my concurrence in the expressions that Lord Tweedmouth has given utterance to, that we should have confidence in the Board of Admiralty, and in the British Government in connection with the Navy. I subscribe to that absolutely. The people in our country believe—and, of course, I am speaking on behalf of the people of our country—that the great interests, enormous as they are, extending throughout the Empire, must of necessity receive first consideration at the hands of the Board of Admiralty and of the British Government of the day. I am very glad indeed to hear Lord Tweedmouth say that it is his desire to make the position of the Empire more secure than it is at present. That great object is at the bottom of the representation that the Colonies have here in connection with Defence matters. We want to assist as far as we can in making our general position stronger and more secure than it is at present, though it is happily very strong indeed. I want to say that I fully endorse the view expressed by Lord Tweedmouth, that there is but one sea around our shores, and that with one sea and one Empire, there should in reality be but one Navy. The outcome of deliberations such as we are engaged in now should be to place both ships and the disposition of the ships, and the distribution of the ships and the whole question of strategical work, entirely under the control of those at the pulse of the Empire—London; who are responsible in the time of war for the working out of any engagements that may take place for the purpose of common defence. In any help that New Zealand may be able to give towards the building up of a stronger position, that main principle should be recognised, and will be, certainly, by my Colony. We regard the custodians of the Navy, the Board of Admiralty, as those who, being at the seat or pulse of the Empire, are the authorities in times of war to govern the Navy. We also recognise that they are responsible for the defence of our commerce on the seas, either in our part of the world or elsewhere, which Lord Tweedmouth has referred to. How far we can help in a subsidy or supporting manner, which we will readily do, is a question to be decided upon in conjunction with the Home Government. The details will certainly be improved as the result of this Conference.

I am prepared to cordially co-operate with Mr. Deakin as the representative of the Commonwealth of Australia in helping him to attain whatever his country conceives to be desirable for the purpose of carrying on the great work of the defence of that portion of the Empire. I was very glad to hear Lord Tweedmouth say that different countries could be treated, and he was prepared to have them treated, in different ways. In some respects we may require totally different treatment, while in the main co-operating to effectuate a strong position generally. It is important, from the view which I take of our country, to briefly indicate what the position of New Zealand is, and its difference in some respects from the Commonwealth of Australia and the great Dominion of Canada and Great Britain itself, which is so important a part of this great organisation. Our country is comparatively young; under 70 years of age. We have before the people in New Zealand still the work of the interior development of a country which in the years to come will be capable of carrying 20,000,000 of people without any difficulty. We have under one million of population at the moment. We have all the ramifications of the development of great public works, so essential as a provision for the future to enable people to settle in the interior of our country. We have still before us the making of the railways throughout our country. Though we have between two and three thousand miles of railways open to-day, it is, comparatively speaking, but the fringe of what the future years will require to have established in the country in order to meet the requirements of its people. That is one aspect of the matter which any young country such as the one I represent, with its future all before it, has to very seriously consider. Whilst anxious to help the Old World and the other portions of the Empire in making a system of common defence upon both land and the seas, the all-importance of which we recognise to the fullest possible extent, we have still to keep before us, as a young country, the fact that in the future many millions of money will be required for the country itself to carry out great undertakings that in the Old World have been carried out, many of them, such for instance as your railways, by private enterprise. In our country those undertakings of great public utility are not carried out on the basis of private enterprise, but by the State. That work must devolve in the future very largely upon the State. It is because of the fact that we have these great undertakings that may take years to fulfil in the future before us that we should hesitate to impose upon ourselves the burden of the construction of ships of war, or of any great liabilities connected with the maintenance of ships of war, or any great financial responsibilities other than we actually commit ourselves to in a defined agreement. In the meantime we cannot see our way to undertake this possibly heavy financial responsibility side by side with the great development policy which is very important to New Zealand, as its success is to the Old World from the point of view of the aspects of trade, and from the potentiality of the settlement of British people within our borders—important also from any direction which one could name. It is for these reasons, in brief, that New Zealand hesitates to embark upon so great an undertaking, in favour of which there is a vast amount to be said, as establishing a local fleet for the purpose of local defence, with the attendant repairing and large dockage accommodation such as has been referred to by Lord Tweedmouth. We have, with a comparatively small population, to consider the position from a practical standpoint, and to see how far we can go in the direction of co-operating in a practical way with the larger scheme suggested in the observations made by Lord Tweedmouth.

I want to say that the statement made that the Admiralty is prepared to meet the colonies in a liberal and conciliatory manner, and if necessary not upon a money basis only, is a matter which is deserving of the fullest consideration at the hands of the country I represent. I desire also to make it quite clear that I do not say that in any future agreement we make for our country we should give a money contribution only to assist in the up-keep and maintenance of our portion of the Navy. I gathered from the observations of Lord Tweedmouth that the British Government is prepared to entertain a manning proposal. Whatever is the maximum amount we may elect and agree to contribute—and I may say at once we are prepared to give more than the £40,000 a year that we are now giving—if that is converted into a proposal for the manning of ships and the paying for the manning of those ships in our portion of the world, still leaving them at the full disposition of the British Admiralty even though we pay for the full manning of them, I am quite prepared to consider whether we should not undertake to relieve the central authority of difficulties which now arise in connection with the manning of our ships, such as having two rates of pay for the crews, and whether we should not

man them completely at one rate of colonial pay, outside, of course, the Imperial officers required to control them, which I presume would be necessary, under the direction of the Navy. I am quite prepared to consider for our Colony whether we should not change our contribution from a maximum amount into an amount to be expended on the manning of the ships which the Admiralty may think it desirable to keep in our waters.

With regard also to the suggestion made by Mr. Deakin of the necessity for further consideration after we have seen in print the important speech delivered by Lord Tweedmouth, I want to reserve final judgment upon the great issues involved until one has had that further time to consider it. But I think this is too important to allow it to pass in the first instance without saying a word or two upon certain aspects of it which struck me as Lord Tweedmouth placed them before us. The method of putting smaller ships out in our waters than those required at home and other places abroad is one I take no exception to whatever. One recognises the principle that in times of warfare the whole strategical work and the whole disposition of the ships is to be under the control of the Admiralty, and that they, with the various classes of ships in the different portions of the Empire, will use their greater ones wherever required, and also that they may either elect to keep for the purpose of local defence the smaller subsidiary vessels such as we have in our country, or to call them somewhere else to assist in times of stress. Upon this question, however, I want to say that if it were possible in any scheme which the Board of Admiralty and the British Government lay down to have some unification, even although we changed our contribution to one of paying for the actual manning of vessels, it would in my judgment be very much better from the standpoint of New Zealand to have that uniformity, whether Australia carries it out upon its own account or whether we remain attached to the British Navy entirely. That uniformity of system would, I think, add very materially to the swift and practical working of the Navy in times of trouble.

Lord Tweedmouth suggested that the Colonial Governments should equip and maintain docks for use by His Majesty's ships. Upon that heading I agree with the principle suggested, but of course there must be a limit to a proposal of that kind as far as New Zealand goes. Already we have co-operated with the Admiralty, and we have at least one of the docks in our country which is capable of taking. I think I am right in saying, any of the ships that are out in our waters—that is the splendid Calliope dock in Auckland. Within the next few years we shall have a very large dock finished at the port of Wellington, which will also be capable of accommodating any of the ships likely to be retained in our waters; and we have two other large docks in New Zealand already, one at Lyttelton and one at Port Chalmers, where there is also a second and larger one now being built. I foresee one possibility, and that is, if an Australian Squadron were to be kept out in our waters, and our existing docks, or the docks about to be constructed, were not of sufficient length to cover the ships out there, we should be placed in a very awkward position if the duty were cast upon us of equipping and maintaining those docks entirely, and for this reason: we have a different method of initiating and carrying out the construction of docks in New Zealand to what exists in the Old Country. We have what are known as Harbour Boards, and in one case a Dock Trust, elected by the people from different portions of the district, and upon which some Government nominees are appointed, for the purpose of looking after the general interests of the harbours and docks of New Zealand. There are two possibilities that may arise about this suggestion, and I make it in order that the point may be further considered as to whether the Admiralty should not define what is to be the dock of the future in our waters so far as capacity goes for the berthing of these ships. Take the case of Wellington. If they finish a dock 600 feet long in the course of 18 months, British ships may be sent out to our country 650 feet long. I am not giving 600 feet as the length of the Wellington dock, as it may, and I think is to be, much longer. I am giving an illustration only. It is a good thing to encourage in our country the providing of suitable docks for repairing and meeting the requirements of ships in view of any time of trouble, if we should ever have trouble out in our waters, though I very much doubt it. I think the settlement of the troubles of the Empire, whenever they arise, will be far distant from the colonies. If an opponent of the British Empire wanted to settle the question of who is to be supreme upon the seas, or who is to take, if they can, any portion of the British Empire, it is hardly conceivable that they would come out to our waters to settle questions of that kind, though New Zealand

itself is too valuable to neglect in any way local defence. I do not want to raise questions which might be looked upon as troublesome, but we do fear some of the eastern countries, whose teeming millions, so close to Australia and New Zealand as they are, under an educational process in the years to come may find the attractions of our country sufficient to induce them to give us some trouble. I think, in any arrangements we make with the Admiralty for our defence upon the seas in the common interests of the Empire as a whole, if we are to make that arrangement of a practical nature—and the people of our country are only too anxious to help—this all-important question of equipping, maintaining, and providing docks should be considered upon a practical basis, and the Admiralty itself might convey to us, for our information, what length of dock for ships in our waters may in their judgment in the future be required. I may say that, under the system of constructing harbour board docks in New Zealand, we would go a long way towards meeting the requirements of the Admiralty in the different parts of the Colony.

I wish to say one word about this question of coaling. The New Zealand Government has seen its responsibilities connected with coaling in our country for a number of years. I think at the moment, in round figures, we have either provided for or guaranteed the debentures to enable some of our west coast ports in New Zealand to be first-class coaling places for the purpose of the exportation of coal, and we have done so to the extent of over half a million of money. I listened to that portion of the observations of Lord Tweedmouth with special interest. In our country special facilities at Westport and Greymouth could be provided of a very satisfactory kind, and they certainly could be provided in Australia at the Port of Newcastle; a harbour for the largest ships in the world could be provided at a place called Point-Elizabeth near Greymouth, and the finest coal in the world could there be put aboard ships loading down to any ordinary draught. If we can arrive, as I hope may be the case, at some system of meeting the local sentiments of these self-governing countries as to how those ships, under the control and disposition of the Board of Admiralty always, should be equipped and manned, I think the coaling matter is of sufficient importance to enable us to probably arrive at a basis which in the course of a year or so we might be able to put into practical shape. I want to take this opportunity of saying to Lord Tweedmouth that the difficulty which has presented itself by having two rates of pay on board the ships in our waters is one that we cannot lose sight of in considering this matter with a view to having it placed upon a better basis. The rates of pay generally in the Colonies are higher than they are in the Old World. In order to meet the natural sentiment of the people there the Admiralty have, with very great consideration, in the past agreed to a dual system of pay on board those ships. Under that differentiation of pay there naturally must arise a certain amount of friction and dissatisfaction, especially on the part of a man who is working side by side with his fellow on board any of the ships who is receiving a much lower rate of pay than the Australian or New Zealander is. That statement seems to me to emphasise the great importance and desirability of these vessels being manned entirely, so far as the crews are concerned, from the Colony itself, and probably a rate of pay could be fixed by which they could be borne in sufficient numbers to meet the position now filled by a portion of the men being drawn from the old land, and a portion from the new land. In any case, if it cannot be arranged in the way I am endeavouring to suggest, New Zealand will be quite prepared to have what I know has been talked of and referred to in despatches, the system of deferred pay for our men put into operation, so that they may draw the same rate of pay as the British men on board those vessels until the time came for paying them off, when that deferred pay would be paid out to them. I need not, because it must be very familiar to Lord Tweedmouth and those associated with him, refer to the troubles which arise owing to the higher class of pay being paid to the men in these places now.

I want to make it clear upon the details of any scheme for the betterment of the Navy and for the more effective working of it, that I should be only too glad with my friend Mr. Deakin and any of the other gentlemen here to have an opportunity of conferring with those who are responsible and with Lord Tweedmouth, who has made such valuable suggestions to us to-day.

I will not take up the time of the Conference further at present upon this matter. I have a great deal of detailed information in my possession. I hope as the outcome of the Conference that we are having with the responsible representatives of the Board of Admiralty and the British Government here, that if each Colony

wishes separate treatment, as has been referred to by Lord Tweedmouth, we will get it. I am sure we will be able to arrive at it, while allowing the people of the respective countries through their Governments to carry out such a local system as they believe to be best suited to their individual circumstances. I look forward to the outcome of the discussions which we are having across this table as going in the direction of enabling us to join with the Board of Admiralty and the British Government in helping generally in making our Navy stronger and better than it is at present.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Mr. Brodeur will speak for Canada.

Mr. BRODEUR: Lord Elgin, and gentlemen, in view of the remarks made by Mr. Deakin and Sir Joseph Ward, it will not be necessary for me to-day to state the position which Canada intends to take in regard to this question of Naval Defence. Our situation is a different one to that of the other Colonies, and should be treated as such. I think, however, it would be only fair that I should state to-day that the position of Canada has not been properly represented as far as Naval Defence is concerned. I see by a document which has been laid before us that we are supposed not to have spent any money at all upon Naval Defence. That document shows what has been spent by the United Kingdom, by Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape, Natal, and when it comes to speak of Canada, it is simply stated there that the Naval expenditure is none. I may say at the outset that in view of the Treaty which was made in 1818 between the Imperial Government and the Government of the United States, it was formally stipulated that the Americans should have the right to come and fish on our shores, and that they should have the right also to come into our harbours when they are looking after their fishing. Outside of that, they have a right also, in virtue of that Treaty, to go to some parts of Canada to fish on the same footing as the Canadian British subjects. This particular situation, which was created in Canada by that Treaty, induced the British Admiralty to look after the defence, or after the protection, of Canada against the poaching of these American fishermen. That duty was performed, and that protection was given to our own people, during many years by the British Admiralty, but for some time, especially since 1885, absolutely nothing has been done by the British authorities. All expenditure in connection with that Fisheries Protection Service has been carried on, incurred, and made by the Canadian Government. I understand that in England the Fisheries Protection Service is also under the control of the Admiralty, and all money expended for that service is found by the Admiralty. I do not know whether, in the amount which is given in that paper as being the expenditure of the British Admiralty—£33,000,000—that particular service is included or not. I suppose it is.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: The Newfoundland one?

Mr. BRODEUR: No, I meant the Naval expenditure of the United Kingdom, £33,000,000, as the money expended for Naval purposes. I suppose that includes the Fisheries Protection Service too?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Yes, certainly.

Mr. BRODEUR: Of course, we would claim that the same thing should be done with Canada—that the expenditure that we make for the Fisheries Protection Service in our country should also be given as money for, and should be considered as, Naval expenditure.

I must also say that this obligation which we are carrying out to-day is to a certain extent not simply a local obligation, but an Imperial obligation, because that obligation was incurred in virtue of treaties, those treaties having been passed between Great Britain and the United States without, of course, the consent of Canada. We are very glad to-day, however, to take upon our shoulders the expenditure in connection with that service. I may say that since 1885—since the abrogation of the Washington Treaty—we have spent for that service 3,147,990 dollars, and last year, 1905-6, we spent 250,000 dollars. I may say this year the money to be spent will be very much larger, because we are going to construct a cruiser which will cost us about 500,000 dollars, or £100,000. As I say, we have been very glad to take over this service and to relieve the Admiralty of so much. The same thing has been done with regard to the great lakes, and in connection with the great lakes I might call the attention of the Conference to this point. It is not to be supposed, I think, that the Admiralty could do anything on the great lakes. It would not be a very easy thing to do. This service, then, should be taken over entirely by the Canadian Government. As a matter of fact, it was done by the British Government for some time. They had some boats there, but those boats went away, and

they were replaced by Canadian boats. We have to-day on the lakes a boat, which is an armed boat, which is looking specially after the protection of our fisheries against the American fishermen, not only for the carrying out of the local regulations, but mostly, and I may say almost exclusively, for preventing the Americans from coming and fishing in our waters. We have on the great lakes (large seas, properly speaking) American States bordering those great lakes, and they are having navies of their own now. I think that three States bordering on the three great lakes, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, are spending not less than 15,000,000 dollars themselves for keeping up a navy on these lakes, and are drilling their men on the shores of the lakes. Besides, they have some ships which are not armed—because it would be against the conditions of the treaty—but built in order to be prepared in case of emergency. As far as Canada is concerned, one of the first duties we shall have to look after is our protection in connection with the great lakes, I may say that the wars we have had since 1763, since Canada has become part of the British Empire, came from the United States. We had an invasion in 1775, we had an invasion in 1812, and we had the Fenian Raids in the Sixties. All those invasions came from the United States. So we have to look specially to protect ourselves in that direction, and I may say we have been doing it as far as the great lakes are concerned, not to a very large extent it is true, but to the extent of spending a sum of money which is quite important for a country of the size of ours.

Now with regard to our Naval Militia, which comes under my Department, we have been, as I said, spending some money for the Fisheries Protection Service, and carrying out in that way not only some local self-defence, but also Imperial obligations, and I am sure we have been very glad to do it, and are glad to continue to do it. We established a couple of years ago a cruiser for Canada which is manned entirely by Canadian seamen. Those men are now drilling every day. We have a certain number of young men on that boat drilling every day and taking exercises, and acquiring knowledge in connection with Naval matters.

I may say also in connection with that that we have been assuming some parts of the work which was done previously by the Admiralty not only in connection with the Fisheries Protection Service and Naval Militia, but also in regard to certain other matters. We have established wireless telegraphic stations. Several of them have been established on the Atlantic coasts, and we are now under contract to establish some others on the Pacific coast. We have been asked by the Admiralty authorities to consult with them with regard to the communications of those different stations. We have been very glad to do it, and since we received that communication from the British authorities we have not established any of these wireless telegraphic stations without consulting with the British Admiralty. Those services are costing also a great deal of money, and are not included in the amount of money which has been given as our part of our Naval expenditure, though I suppose that the expenditure made in connection with wireless telegraphy in England is also under the control of the British Admiralty, and is included in the amount which is given here.

We have taken over also the Hydrographic Survey, and we are to-day extending the Hydrographic Survey. We have engaged the services of a naval officer of the British Admiralty for the purpose of making our Hydrographic Survey. We are building a new boat on the Pacific coast for that purpose, also, and we have two boats now engaged on that service on the Atlantic coast. I know that the British Admiralty have some two boats, I think one in the Atlantic Ocean and the other in the Pacific Ocean, now making some hydrographical surveys. We are ready to take over this service at any time the British Admiralty would like us to do that work.

We have taken over, or are going to take over, the Halifax and Esquimalt Dockyards—in fact, we are in possession already, from the 1st January, of the Halifax Dockyards. I do not know exactly how much those dockyards were costing the British Admiralty—or the one at Halifax, but I may say we have assumed all the obligations in connection with those dockyards, and we have provided specially that the amount which the British Admiralty was to pay as an annual subscription to the graving dock at Halifax would be paid by us instead of by the British Admiralty. We have, as I have said, provided for the establishment of docks at Halifax and Esquimalt, so I think it would be only fair that in the statements published giving the monies spent for naval expenditure, the amount spent by the

Canadian Government in connection with those different Services I have just mentioned should be included in such Naval expenditure.

I do not think for a moment it will be necessary for me to discuss the question further, because I understand the discussion will be taken up on some other day.

Dr. JAMESON: I will ask Dr. Smartt to speak for Cape Colony.

Dr. SMARTT: Lord Elgin, and gentlemen,—I think that, as the result of the interview which Lord Tweedmouth was kind enough to grant to Mr. Moor and myself with regard to the naval defence of South Africa, he is thoroughly in possession of the views of the Cape; and I therefore listened with all the more pleasure to the clear statement made by him and to the express statement that the Admiralty would view, in the most sympathetic manner, any proposition coming from any self-governing portion of the Empire with a view to improving the naval resources.

Now I can thoroughly understand the position taken up by Canada's representative, which is, to a certain extent, moving in the direction laid down by Lord Tweedmouth as one of the express lines of policy desired by the Admiralty. Canada, it is stated, is doing a great deal in the direction of improving her harbours, which harbours would not only be of assistance to herself, but also to the Admiralty in time of trouble. But I think a great deal of the expenditure referred to in connection with what might be described as the policing of the seas with the view of protecting their Fisheries is similar to that made (perhaps in a much heavier way) by the Cape Colony and Natal in connection with the forces which, owing to the large native population, it is necessary to maintain and which is not the case in other Colonies. But, Lord Elgin—I do not think the people of Cape Colony would for one moment desire to raise that as an argument to prevent our meeting the legitimate obligation that rests upon us as a portion of the Empire in assisting Great Britain in her naval defence, and I think Mr. Moor will say the same of the people of Natal. Lord Tweedmouth has told us of the enormous work done by the Navy. I think that is recognised by every portion of the Empire; and while we are pleased to hear of the magnificent position in which Lord Tweedmouth and his responsible advisers consider the Navy to be, we in the outlying portions of the Empire, recognising, as was laid down by Mr. Haldane in his statement on Military Defence the other day, that the first line of defence is the Navy, and that, if that line of defence is broken through, the whole fabric of the Empire will crumble to pieces, are prepared to recognise that we should do everything, with the assistance of the Admiralty, to try and make that first line of defence, if possible, still stronger than it is at present.

On behalf of the Cape Colony, I at once acknowledge that the contribution that we give at the present moment is not adequate to our position, and is not adequate to the services that the Navy renders to us. We are now trying to do something to infuse a spirit of enthusiasm into our young men to come forward and enrol themselves in a corps of Naval Volunteers, and I trust that the Admiralty will meet that corps by allowing it to be established as a force not of Naval Volunteers, but of Royal Naval Volunteers. I am able to state that it is the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill into Parliament next Session whereby every member of that Naval Volunteer force will enrol not only for service in local waters, but for service in any part of the world that the British Admiralty might consider such service necessary should a period of danger unfortunately arise. We, to be able to keep up the necessary spirit of enthusiasm in a force of this sort, must have some means of giving them practical training; and I gather from what Lord Tweedmouth has said that the Admiralty will be prepared to treat sympathetically every portion of the Empire on a basis best suited to its individual requirements, and further will be prepared to do what would be very acceptable to the Cape—that is, allow us to take over a small ship, necessary for the training of these men, and, until other arrangements can be made, to devote to the up-keep of that ship a certain portion of the grant that the Cape and Natal now give towards the British Navy.

I also fully agree, and am perfectly certain that the people at the Cape will agree, in the necessity of assisting the Admiralty, that we outlying portions of the Empire should provide small craft, such as submarines and torpedo-boats, not alone for the defence of our shores, but to be joined on to any squadron sent from Great Britain in periods of great emergency, it being a great difficulty, or almost impossible, to send torpedo craft many thousands of miles to sea. As the Admiralty say they would welcome a departure of that sort, I think the people at the Cape, knowing that they were really fundamentally assisting in building up the Navy,

would, when times improve, be prepared to increase their contribution; and I also presume that that would be the position of Natal. I hope that we would be joined in that position—especially as the spirit of federation is now so strongly evident in South Africa—by the inland States, that is the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and perhaps Rhodesia. I think everybody recognises the burden upon the British taxpayer. I should think at the present moment, Lord Tweedmouth, that the Admiralty is taking out of the general taxation of Great Britain something over £20 out of every £100 for the up-keep of the Navy. You are paying roughly, I suppose, 15s. or 16s. per head of your population. Well, in comparison with that, look at the contribution of the Cape—(50,000 a year)—and the contributions of the other portions of the Empire towards the up-keep of the Navy. It is about a sovereign, perhaps, out of every £100 of the general revenue. We must recognise that, while it is of the first importance to Great Britain to protect her enormous over-sea trade, it is also of equal importance to South Africa, and to the other portions of the British Empire, to protect their trade over the seas—which is of as great importance to them as the trade of Great Britain is to her. If the Admiralty would work out a scheme and discuss it with us, we would be prepared to see how far we could work up in that direction, so that our contribution would be of the greatest possible assistance to the Admiralty; and the assistance in this direction would naturally appeal much more forcibly to the people and give them a stronger individual interest in the fleet than simply a monetary contribution would do.

With regard to docks: that is also a matter in which we could assist, but I would like to point out that as these docks would not alone be used for commercial purposes, but also for naval purposes in time of war, they would be practically useless if they were not adequately defended. Another matter on which we would like to have the advice and assistance of the Admiralty is as to the character of the defences in such an important strategical portion of the Empire as Cape Colony, because, if we find that it is necessary, as we think it is, to improve those defences, we would be quite prepared to discuss what our proportion of the contribution towards the improvement of those defences should be. Lord Tweedmouth has told us that the Admiralty are increasing their dock accommodation, and that there are already some thirteen docks that will take in ships of war even of the size of the "Dreadnought," and that one of those docks is, I believe, Simonstown. Now I presume that, from an Admiralty point of view, it is not alone the question of the size of the dock to accommodate a ship of a certain tonnage, but the question of a ship being able to get into that dock under all conditions of weather. I would like to be assured by the Admiralty on this point as to the docks at Simonstown. The advice I have is that, as the Simonstown Docks have been constructed, at the present moment in the prevailing wind at certain seasons of the year (that is during periods of howling south-easters) it might be very difficult for a ship to get into the Simonstown Docks. I would like to be assured that the necessary works to allow that to take place are under contemplation by the Admiralty, because to have a dock which you are not able to use in all weathers (especially in time of war) to my mind detracts enormously from the value of that dock; and I hope that this is a point that the Admiralty will fully consider before it is too late and the Simonstown Docks are fully completed.

Before we return, we hope that, with the advice and assistance of the Admiralty, we shall be able to devise some scheme whereby our Naval Volunteers will be established and strengthened in number, in conjunction with Natal; and also that the Admiralty will advise us as to what is the best manner in which we can move on the lines of the policy laid down by the Admiralty. I think the people of the Colony would welcome a departure of that sort, and I believe would recognise that, if further contributions in such a direction were necessary, they would be willingly met by the Colony.

Sir ROBERT BOND: Lord Elgin, and gentlemen,—For more than 400 years the Fisheries in Newfoundland have been a recruiting ground for the British Navy. It is so to-day. It may be so to a far greater extent in future than it is at present, for there are some 60,000 fishermen engaged in that Colony of a physique developed by their avocation which makes them most suitable for His Majesty's Navy.

In 1902 I entered into an agreement with the Admiralty, on behalf of my Colony, in the matter of the establishment of a Naval Reserve, which should be liable for service, if found to be necessary, beyond the limits of the Colony and in any part of the Empire. Up to the present time it has been a very marked success

indeed. On the roll there are now some 590 men who have distinguished themselves in His Majesty's Service, according to the reports of the Commodores upon that station. Any large contribution that the Colony may give in the future must be in the direction of the service of such men. This is necessarily so because while the Colony that I represent is not like that of my friend, Sir Joseph Ward, a new Colony, for, on the contrary, it is England's most ancient Colony, still the conditions that apply there at the present time are almost identical with those that have been portrayed by Sir Joseph Ward. The Colony for the most part is an undeveloped one. The expenditure necessary for its development must come from the resources of the Colony. We stand in an exceptional position amongst all other Colonies of the Empire, I think, in that we have not received any assistance from His Majesty's Government—money assistance, I mean—in the direction of promoting the industries or the development of the Colony. Yet at the present time the Government owns some 700 miles of railway, nearly 1,500 miles of telegraph, 300 miles of cable which connect the Colony with the neighbouring continent, and a dock which up to a very recent date was pronounced to be one of the finest in British North America. All these great undertakings have come out of the funds of the Colony itself. In the future, I take it, we shall have to look to our own resources, and such being the case, as I mentioned a moment ago, any large money consideration or contribution towards the Navy can hardly be expected from the colony of Newfoundland.

There is a matter that I am pleased my friend the Canadian Minister of Marine has touched upon, namely, the expenditure incident to the policing of the waters consequent upon treaties entered into many years ago by His Majesty's Government with certain foreign nations. While the liability of expenditure to which my friend the Canadian Minister referred only applies to the Americans in his case, we have a further obligation in the Colony of Newfoundland, inasmuch as by virtue of a treaty entered into with France many years ago, she occupies St. Pierre and Miquelon islands off our south coast, which are a continual menace to our revenue. What I mean is this, that a system of smuggling has been carried on from St. Pierre for a number of years. We have estimated the loss to our revenue at something like 150,000 to 160,000 dollars a year. We have to police—at very considerable expense to our revenue—the waters of the south coast in the neighbourhood of St. Pierre and Miquelon. We also have to police our waters right around the whole coast line of nearly 4,000 miles to protect our fisheries and protect our revenues from encroachment at the hands of the American fishermen. My friend, the Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries, has contended, I think, with very much force and very much justice to his Colony, that the expenditure incident to that protection service ought to appear really as a contribution from his Colony towards Naval Defence, because unless the Colony provided that protection service itself I take it it would be regarded by His Majesty's Government as a duty incumbent upon itself to supply such protection, inasmuch as the necessity is one that the Colony can hardly be held responsible for. The argument applies with greater force in the case of Newfoundland. The treaties are of old standing, namely, that of 1818 with the Americans, and the Treaty of Utrecht with France more than a hundred years older. They were made without the consent of the Colonies by the Imperial Government in the interests of the Empire. Therefore I respectfully submit that the expenditure that the Colony is called upon to make for fishery protection service by reason of those treaties might be properly regarded as a contribution towards naval expenditure.

Under the agreement that was entered into in 1902, to which I have made reference, the liability of the Colony is to the extent of £5 sterling per head for every man recruited in the island, His Majesty's Government assuming the whole of the balance of the expenditure in connection therewith. The arrangement that was made having worked out entirely satisfactorily to the Colony, and, I believe, entirely satisfactorily to His Majesty's Government, I assume there is no reason for any revision of the agreement that is existing.

I have only to add that I shall be pleased to recommend to my Government a further increase to the amount that is at present being contributed if it is deemed desirable by His Majesty's Government to increase the number of reservists in the Colony. I will go so far as to say that we would assume double our present liability upon the same basis as that set forth in the existing agreement.

With regard to the matter of dock provision. The Colony built a dock some

years ago, at a cost of some 650,000 dollars, and it is regarded as one of the largest docks, if not the best, in British North America.

With respect to coaling facilities for His Majesty's Navy, the Colony at the present time is expending a very considerable annual amount in developing the coal measures which not only exist on the south-west coast of Newfoundland, but also in the interior of the island, and it is hoped that these deposits will be such as to warrant us in going much further than we have gone up to the present time, and at no distant date offer facilities for naval supplies. The coal is of excellent quality.

We are also encouraging the development of the petroleum areas of the west coast. When I was in England in 1905 the Admiralty communicated with me in respect to the petroleum areas of the west coast, and showed very great interest indeed in the possibilities of that country. Mr. Pretyman, who was at that time Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, assured me that the matter was of special interest to his Department, and expressed a hope that the Government of the Colony would do what it could to aid in the development of those deposits. That we have done, and that we are still continuing, and I hope the efforts in this direction may yet result in being of material advantage to His Majesty's Navy.

I have nothing further to add at present.

Mr. F. R. Moor: Lord Elgin and gentlemen, I have to thank Lord Tweedmouth for the clear way in which he has laid big problems before us this morning, and I have also to thank him on behalf of Natal for the sympathetic way in which he seems to have met both the Cape Colony and the Colony I represent in the direction we have been indicating to him at a conference that Dr. Smartt has already referred to.

We feel that in South Africa individual Colonies, divided as they are at present, are not sufficiently strong to do all that they should be doing towards helping the British Navy, and as far as the Cape and Natal are concerned, having duly talked the matter over, we feel we might more adequately assist if we had some kind of union together with the advice and the assistance of the Imperial Government. Our idea is that, being more or less in union with each other, we shall have better results, and will be able to have more scope for the movement we are trying to promote in these Colonies. For some years in Natal, and I believe also in Cape Colony—in fact I know it is so—we have had a movement there started, so far as Natal is concerned, by the late Mr. Harry Escombe, who was one of the best public men we ever had in the Colony, to promote a spirit of assistance towards the Imperial Government in regard to harbour matters and the building up of the Naval Reserve. He, my Lord, was the father of the corps that we now have in Durban, known as the Naval Reserve Corps. This corps has done admirably, is very enthusiastic, has been in the field on several occasions, and took a most prominent part in the late outbreak that we had there—the rebellion. But this corps is more or less dying of inanition, because it feels that it is not having recognition as regards its value or its services in a direction that it is essentially organised for, that is, with regard to its naval training. We cannot give that naval training or promote any further that spirit of assistance unless we have the assistance of the Admiralty. And, as already indicated by Dr. Smartt, it did occur to us that if the Admiralty could help us with a ship we might be able to utilise the services of these men with the ship, as between different ports on our coast, and give these men that sea training which is so essential not only for their use, but in keeping alive the movement. It would bring the movement closely in evidence; it would bring it to the notice not only of these men, but to the notice of the Colony, and would raise a spirit of enthusiasm which we cannot hope for unless we do have something of that sort.

From the statement we have had this morning it seems that the Admiralty is realising there may now come about a new departure with regard to the defence of these outlying portions of the Empire, that is in the direction of the utilising of smaller craft. These scientific craft are highly technical, I take it, but they could be used in our waters very effectively not only in the event of war, but in the meanwhile for the training of our local people, and also as one of the best means for repelling any threatened attack by a cruiser or any ships an enemy might put round our coast, and deterring, perhaps, the attack from being delivered.

That being the case, I feel that I should put myself here entirely in the hands of the Admiralty and the Home Government as regards advice. We are here to learn, to exchange ideas with you, and where possible to give you every assistance in our power, and if our first crude idea is not one that commends itself as the most efficient to the Admiralty, by all means let us take advice, and I promise that we will

do our best to forward the movement that Lord Tweedmouth has indicated to us this morning.

I can only say this, that as regards our local defences we are trying to do our best. My little colony has just spent some £700,000 or £800,000 of money in quelling a rebellion among the natives. That is a danger we all of us in South Africa have to face, and I think we do fully realise that we have to face that in the future and we have to provide efficient men and means for being able to govern these people without looking to the Home Government. Putting it against the arguments that have been adduced by the representatives of Canada, and also the last speaker, Sir Robert Bond, I do humbly submit that it is a set off to the arguments that have been adduced as regards policing their waters. We have in Natal made and wrenched from the reluctant hands of nature one of the finest harbours in the southern hemisphere, and it has cost us millions of money to do it. That harbour to-day is at the disposal of the British Navy, with all its furniture and all its conveniences, and all we ask of you is to advise us how to turn those facilities, that we have carried out entirely at our own expense, to the greatest advantage for the common good. I do not say it with the idea of trespassing on the claims of my sister colonies in South Africa, but we have the finest coal that has yet been discovered in South Africa. That coal is available in any quantity that you may desire at our harbours, and we are providing these facilities for handling it and for getting it into depôts as may be desired in the interests of its use not only commercially, but for defensive purposes.

I feel that this contribution we are now giving in money would be perhaps more advantageously spent if it was more in the direction of men and material—a direction that would appeal to the people, so that they would have evidence that it was really a living organism which we had started and it would encourage them to go on with the good work. With regard to what Dr. Smartt has said as regards increasing the combination, when the time comes that we can afford it, and when we have, as I hope we shall have, the federation of our Colonies an accomplished fact, I do trust that we will be able to increase our contribution. But I do trust also that the Admiralty will meet us in getting that contribution made more in the direction which I have tried to indicate than by simply a cold lump sum, voted on our estimate, for which we have no actual evidence as directly concerning the people we represent.

I have nothing more to add, only I wish to emphasise that I do thank Lord Tweedmouth for the kind way in which he is trying to meet our views, and I hope that with the advice of the Admiralty some good will come out of the movement we are attempting to advance.

General BOTHA: Lord Elgin and Gentlemen, the Transvaal is in a unique position with regard to this question. We are inland and we have absolutely no harbour. I was nearly going to say our friends in the Mother Country always kept us well away from the sea.

I have gone through this statement, and the £177,000 that is our expenditure in the Transvaal only indicates the sum we spend on volunteers. But there is another force in the Transvaal on which we spend a big sum of money. This is a force that was brought into existence after the war, and which is there still. It is the South African Constabulary, and that body costs the Transvaal about a million pounds every year, so that our expenditure is really very much more than would appear from this statement.

On the item of expenditure on the Navy we figure as nil, but the question arises with me whether it would be practicable to give a sum of money. I think the best way in which we at present in the Transvaal can assist the British Empire in general is to get the Transvaal to unite with the rest of South Africa in a practical way on the question of defence. The position is to-day that although we are spending very much money we practically have no reliable defence in the Transvaal. And we notice especially with regard to the recent rebellion in Natal that we are not sufficiently prepared for all contingencies. In South Africa we have a situation which may become a very serious one and a menace to our position, and if we do not set to work very carefully there, we run the risk that one day possibly half of the white population may be mowed down without our being in the position to help them. Bearing this in mind, my opinion is that we should federate, at any rate with a view to defence, in order to remove the possibility of such a danger. I have not had the opportunity of discussing the question of a naval contribution or aiding the British Navy with my Government, and still less with the Parliament of the Transvaal, but

what I have in my mind's eye to propose is a system of defence for the whole of South Africa, and if the Parliament of the Mother Country thinks we can aid the Empire in that respect, we shall be prepared to spend a large sum of money for that object. I think that at present we are so constituted in the Transvaal that we shall find it difficult to make a contribution to the Navy by way of a money payment.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the First Lord of the Admiralty would like to say a few words in reply to the observations which have been made, but I think that he agrees that effect must be given to the request of Mr. Deakin, who has been called away by another engagement, that there should be another opportunity of resuming the discussion later; therefore I propose to ask Lord Tweedmouth to make his reply now, and I will make a suggestion with regard to the resumption of the debate when I mention the other arrangements at the conclusion of the meeting.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Lord Elgin, and gentlemen. I think that the general discussion and the expressions of opinion on the part of the Prime Ministers who have spoken is very satisfactory. I think they form a good basis for an eventual agreement on the lines which I have ventured to foreshadow. Of course it is impossible to settle details now and here. I hope that some of the Prime Ministers and their friends will come and talk over that question with me as to how the wants of each particular Colony may be met in the sort of way that I have roughly suggested.

There are just two or three points that I think I ought to allude to. The first is the question of manning, which is a very important one. The present view of the Admiralty undoubtedly is, after very careful consideration of the whole subject, that the conditions of modern war probably would lead rather to the loss of ships than of men; that the results of the Japanese War and other experience have shown that the loss is rather one of ships than of the men who are on board those ships; that there is always a considerable number of men saved even if a ship is lost, and that the loss of men in a naval battle is small in proportion to the loss of men on land. That must always be remembered. So that what we may naturally expect is that as a war goes on and we are subject to the casualties of war we shall find that we have a number of men at our disposal, whose ships perhaps have either been damaged or lost, to use on board other ships.

Another point that I should like to remind you of is the long time under modern conditions that it takes to train a man properly to do his work efficiently on one of these great modern battleships. I think I am not exaggerating in the least when I say that for the higher ratings on board ship certainly six years are taken to train a man to do his work properly. The higher ratings now in the Navy are really trained and skilful mechanics, and they only are able to take the duties of those ratings and to undertake the machinery, gunnery, torpedo, and other work of that sort. Untrained men are useless for that work, and therefore we are bound to have men who have gone through a long and careful training.

Then it is the same thing, to a still greater extent perhaps, as regards the officers. I do not consider that an officer really can start on his career now on less than eight years' training. Of course, we take them very young—at 13 now—and by the time they are 21 or 22 they become lieutenants, but even then I do not for a moment suggest that they are fully capable of discharging all the important work that has to be done by officers. This, however, I can say with the greatest confidence, that you may have the most magnificent ships, guns, armour, and everything else, but if the human element is not very properly trained, your guns, your armour, and your ships are absolutely useless. The whole history of our Navy shows that the self-sacrifice and endurance of British sailors has been beyond compare, and I believe at this moment they have reached a higher state of efficiency than has ever been known before in the history of our country. I make that remark, because I think it is only fair to warn the Conference that the admission of an unlimited number of men to the Naval Service is in practice impossible. I mean we should have nothing for them to do. We should not be able to employ them.

Then there is a point which has been alluded to more than once by speakers, and that is the question of the distribution of ships. At this moment no doubt we are under certain obligations with regard to Australia as to the ships that are to be on that particular station. If, in future, as I hope will be the case, there will be greater concentration of the ships, I want it to be very distinctly understood that I do not believe that our dominions beyond the seas would suffer in any way from such an arrangement. They would not even suffer in the show made by British ships in Colonial waters, because though it may be perfectly true that vessels may not be so frequently on the station, yet, as I believe, future developments will lead

to the Colonies not having the secondary or not quite the best of the ships, but they would see the big battleships and cruisers from time to time. This would really give a much greater show and give the Colonies a much better idea of what the British Navy is than the ships that they have now stationed permanently in their waters. That has been undoubtedly the case in the Northern Hemisphere since the concentration of the Fleet in Home waters. The visits made by squadrons to foreign powers and foreign cities have been much more impressive, much more frequent, and much more useful than they would be if only comparatively few ships were sent at a time to particular foreign ports.

Sir Joseph Ward referred to the question of pay. That is a very important one. It is quite true that we have had trouble from the fact of the Colonial men serving at a higher rate of pay than our own British sailors. I think it was inevitable, and of course we must try to make as good an arrangement as possible for mitigating the evils of the system. At the present moment in Australia the pay is not paid directly to the men on board ship, but is paid to them through the Post Office on land, the idea being that they would leave their money in the Post Office and would not spend it with their British comrades whilst they were on board ship. As a matter of fact I think that idea has proved false. I have the figures here, which are very curious. In Australia, out of £32,300 paid to the Savings Bank since the beginning of the agreement—that is up to the 30th June, 1906—only £2,800 has remained in the Savings Bank, showing that the men have drawn out the money at once, and have expended it whilst they were on service in British ships. Therefore, they were living and are living at a higher rate than their British comrades on board the ships, and they spend their money on various things, clothes, or food, or one thing and another. They do live on a different scale and in a different manner to the British sailors who are serving alongside them, which leads, no doubt, to difficulty. I think that is an unfortunate thing, and what I should suggest would be that in those cases we should adopt a system of deferred pay, so that the Colonial sailor should not be paid his extra pay till he has fulfilled his time of service. When his time of service expired, then he would receive the whole payment due to him for the whole service, and would have a considerable sum with which to go away from the ship, and he could use it on land for some really useful purpose rather than fritter it away in having a good time on board ship.

Sir WILLIAM LYNE: Is it not possible that that money was drawn out of the Savings Bank to support wives or parents on shore?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Of course that may be so.

Sir WILLIAM LYNE: I think that most likely accounts for a portion of it.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: I am afraid a good deal of it is spent by the men on board. I quite admit Sir William Lyne's point is a good one, and no doubt an arrangement ought to be made to enable them to transfer money to those belonging to them, and the people they have to support while they are on board ship.

I ought to say that we here make no sort of reflection on Canada, and we do not for a moment accept the criticism to which Mr. Brodeur referred. We hold that Canada is perfectly free to come to any resolution. We hope to have their help, but still they are quite right to look after their own interests, in the full security that so far as the British Government can be of use to them in their defence in time of need, they may depend in any circumstances on our giving that aid with the greatest joy and without any sort of drawback whatever.

Dr. Smartt made a great point that the Naval Volunteers should receive the title of "Royal." That depends, I think, chiefly on the local legislature passing a Bill registering the Naval Volunteers as a regular force. I think as soon as that Bill has passed through the Cape Legislature there will be no difficulty in their coming under the title of "Royal."

With regard to the point raised as to the dock at Simon's Bay, I will discuss it with the Hydrographer at the Admiralty and see what truth there may be in that allegation that the dock at Simon's Bay is not accessible in certain winds. I fancy there is some question of a breakwater to be added.

Dr. SMARTT: What I gather from seamen who know that coast is that in a howling south-easter, which very often blows for two or three days, the sweep of the wind playing on the entrance to the dock might make it unsafe for a battleship or cruiser to enter. I understand that that could be remedied by an expenditure of a not very large amount of money.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: I believe there has been some additional breakwater contemplated.

Dr. SMARTT : I believe so.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH : I do not know the details of it, but I must get it from the Hydrographer.

Dr. JAMESON : Practically the extra expenditure necessary would be £50,000 or £60,000.

Dr. SMARTT : Say £60,000 or £70,000 to make it complete.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH : Then Sir Robert Bond referred to the Newfoundland Naval Reserve men. Your Chairman and I saw a squadron of them in this very quadrangle last summer, and we were struck by the smartness of the men, and we had a most excellent report of the service they do. We are very pleased to have the help of these men who are trained to the sea and who must be, and are, most efficient fellows, and of course we shall be glad to consider Sir Robert Bond's suggestion that there might be a possibility of some addition to these reservists.

The same remark that I made to Dr. Smartt applies to what Mr. Moor said about the Natal Naval Corps. They have not been registered as naval volunteers. It would be necessary to have a Bill passed in the local legislature before that is done. At this moment I think from the reports I have received that the Natal Naval Corps is practically used as a sort of garrison artillery; that they do not at all train at sea; that they have some considerable guns under their charge—four 6-inch breech-loading guns, one 12-pounder quick-firing gun, two '45 Maxim guns, and two quick-firing Hotchkiss guns. In the last defence scheme, this body is to take charge of the guns in case of war or any attack as I understand. That I believe is the last arrangement under the Defence Committee.

I quite recognise that General Botha is in rather a different position from the other Prime Ministers, and, of course, the case of the Transvaal is quite different, in having no coast at all. Still, we shall welcome any help that General Botha may be able to give after consultation with his Government and his Parliament to the general Naval Defence of South Africa. I am sure anything of that sort would greatly help what, I hope, may very soon come about—the federation of all the different Colonies now existing in South Africa.

All I can say is that I shall be only too glad to confer with any members of the Conference who may wish to go into greater detail with regard to the arrangements that can be made under the suggestions that I have made to-day, and then I think if we had another talk at the Conference after that, we might, perhaps, come to some defined resolution on the subject.

CHAIRMAN : I think my best plan is to move the adjournment of this debate.

8TH MAY, 1907.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

CHAIRMAN : I understand that different members of the Conference have had interviews with the Admiralty, and the First Lord is now prepared to state to the Conference the result of those interviews and try to get your decision on the whole subject.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH : Lord Elgin and gentlemen, since we last met I have had the opportunity of having conversations with various of the Prime Ministers, and also with their colleagues, and they have had some conferences with some of my colleagues at the Admiralty also. I do not know that I have any very definite plan to propose to you. I can only repeat what I said before, that at the Admiralty we are most anxious to meet the wishes of the various Colonies. But, of course, the real difficulty is that the position varies in the different Colonies and they have very different wants.

The basis that I think we want to go upon is in the first place to acknowledge that it is perfectly impossible in modern warfare to improvise defence; we must have it ready. That is the case with the army, no doubt; but it is still more so in any naval operations, because you require to have the ships, and you require to have the men and officers, who have to undergo a long and severe training.

Now the situation, it seems to me, is this. I will take a colony separately, or I will take Australia and New Zealand together, because the agreement with New Zealand and with Australia is a tripartite one—New Zealand, Australia and ourselves. We all hang together in the existing agreement, and all are mutually bound. Australia now gives a sum to the Admiralty of £200,000 under certain conditions, and New Zealand gives £40,000. The Cape Colony gives £50,000, Natal £35,000, and Newfoundland £3,000.

As I understand, Australia puts forward a proposal that the agreement of 1902 should be ended, and that Australia should start something in the way of a local defence force. I do not know how far New Zealand concurs in that suggestion. Sir Joseph Ward asked for some information on the subject, and he had some talk at the Admiralty about it. He asked that some information might be given to him with regard to the cost of such a local defence, which in effect was to be founded on the establishment of a force of submarines. I do not know what is Sir Joseph's view, but I think it is rather important I should know the exact position he takes up if he adopts the idea of the possible establishment of a submarine service. I think, shortly, it may be stated that each submarine would probably cost about £50,000 capital expenditure for building, and probably each submarine might cost about £8,000 to keep going every year—I mean, to pay the men and keep it in repair, maintain the necessary appliances, and so forth. Then comes a question as to the manning of a submarine, because that is a very important matter. The submarine men must be very highly trained. I think there would be two ways of meeting that. One would be by sending the men over to this country and getting them trained here, and probably the training might be done in a year. I think it would certainly take a year before the men would be competent to do the duties required of them in a submarine. Or it might be done in another way. Provided the flotilla were large enough, we could send a crew, or more than a crew, out to the Colony which would be able to train men belonging to the particular Colony in the work they had to do.

Then comes the question of South Africa. There, again, I believe the idea of submarines is not altogether opposed to the opinion of the South African representatives, and I believe that the establishment of a flotilla of submarines by degrees would be favourably considered, at any rate in Cape Colony; I do not know what Mr. Moor would say with regard to Natal. As I understand, the South African Colonies as a whole would like to have some definite force of their own, either a submarine flotilla, or help with regard to their naval volunteers at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and in Natal. Again we should be very glad to give some help with regard to that.

I ought to have said first, that so far as concerns the flag under which the submarines would sail, probably they would fly the white ensign but with a special mark on the flag—say the Southern Cross for Australia.

Mr. DEAKIN : We have the Union Jack with the Southern Cross besides.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH : That is the sort of proposal to which we should be prepared to agree supposing that particular plan were adopted.

I do not think I need say anything with regard to Newfoundland. I understand that the Newfoundland view is that the present system should be maintained. The Government of Newfoundland would be very glad if a greater number of men were added to the Naval Reserve in Newfoundland, and they would be ready to give some further help in addition to the present £3,000 which is paid by Newfoundland.

Sir ROBERT BOND : Upon precisely the same basis—yes.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH : Yes, upon the same basis. With regard to Canada, I think I may say there has perhaps been some exaggeration in the idea that Canada does not do anything for the Empire in this matter. I think not sufficient account has been taken of the work they have done in taking up the protection of fisheries. They are very anxious to extend that work, and they have now taken over the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt, which I hope the Dominion will keep up and improve. I think that is really a very considerable contribution towards the general upkeep of our naval interests. There is at present no proposition from Canada to make any change at all, but I think it is proposed that matters shall go on very much as they have gone on, except that the Canadian representatives announce that they are anxious to do all that they can to expand the interest in the Navy throughout the Dominion, and in that way think that they will be really giving a great help to the Empire as a whole.

I think the important point we have to consider is the present situation in the various Colonies which already pay subsidies.

Then there is the question of manning. Of course Australia has already a considerable number of Naval Reserve men and men who are in the Navy. There are going to arrive here next week, on the 20th, 30 Australians and 10 New Zealanders, who are going to join British ships in this country for training. We shall welcome them very heartily, and I hope that they will gain great good by their visit and by the training they will receive.

Mr. DEAKIN: The training they are coming for is the higher training which could not be obtained on the squadron.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Yes. You have now in Australia, I think, nearly 1,000 men of one sort or another who have been connected with the Navy or who are in the Reserve and so forth. If Australia prefers to terminate the arrangement with regard to the subsidy, the burden of those men would naturally fall upon Australia. That would be one of the things that would have to be provided for if the subsidy were dropped.

Mr. DEAKIN: Yes.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: I think I ought to say with regard to this question of manning that the number of men necessary for the British Navy must necessarily be limited. We cannot take in an unlimited number. At this moment I should think we have at least six times as many applications from men to enter the Navy as we can take in. Therefore, whatever arrangement may be come to with regard to manning throughout the Empire, it would have to be understood that it must be limited, because beyond a certain limit we should not have any use for the men.

Dr. JAMESON: The rank and file—able-bodied seamen—six times as many as you want?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: I think I am putting it under the mark rather than over it in saying that.

Then I ought to say a word about the question of cadets. I think that in the Agreement of 1902 an arrangement was made by which there should be a certain number of cadets from each Colony. There were, I think, eight from Australia.

Mr. DEAKIN: You mean cadets coming into the Royal Navy to become officers.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Yes. There were eight for Australia; two for New Zealand, two for the Cape; one for Natal; and two for other Colonies; a total of 15. I think the arrangement with regard to that has not been altogether understood. It has been imagined that the cadets were to be taken in anyhow. Really it only comes to this, that there are nominations given to that number of cadets, and then some of them are examined in Australia. Some come to schools in England and are examined here. So far as the Colonial cadets are concerned, I think it is only right for me to say that those who have been examined out in Australia are found not to be up to the standard of education which is prevalent amongst the same boys in England, and a good many have been rejected. I think the idea is that this number is given without consideration of the qualities of the boys, whereas in fact a good many boys have been rejected on examination.

Mr. DEAKIN: All this is news to me.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Take 1903, for instance. In that year there were six Australian nominations—three passed and went in. In 1904 there were again six boys examined, and three passed into Osborne. In 1905 Australia sent eight, of whom two passed in. In 1906 five Australian cadets came up, of whom four passed in, and in this year I think four have come up, and one has passed in and one has not yet been examined. I do not think the system has been thoroughly understood. I think the idea has been that the nominations given were supposed to be absolute cadetships; whereas, they were only nominations to candidates in order to go through the examinations, and so enter in the same way as the cadets who enter here.

Mr. DEAKIN: No complaints have reached me.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: You have had nominations from New Zealand also.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Yes, from New Zealand in 1903, one entered and one passed; in 1904 two entered, of whom none passed; in 1905 two entered and none passed; in 1906 one entered and one passed; and this year one entered and one passed.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: I understand there is a limit to the number which you are allowed to nominate in any case?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Yes; two from New Zealand in a year, and they are examined. A special examiner is appointed to examine them out there; or else they come here, and they are examined in the ordinary way.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: How many do you allow from each of the other countries that are allowed to nominate in one year?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Eight for Australia, two for New Zealand, two for Cape Colony, and one for Natal; and the other Colonies two. Canada was not included in the original agreement, and those two were left for the Dominion and the other Colonies.

Dr. JAMESON: When does that wholesale ploughing take place—at the original entry or at any other time?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Before they go in at all.

Dr. JAMESON: Simply on general knowledge examination?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Yes.

Mr. F. R. MOOR: Are the examinations here, or in the Colonies?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: The examinations are held either in the Colony itself, or some boys come over here and go to school here, and then afterwards are examined. I ought to say that, as a rule, we have about three times as many candidates for these examinations as we can take; that is, about 200 come up, and 70 are taken. I think an idea has got about that the Colonial Cadets are entitled to come in. They are only entitled to come in provided they pass tests similar to those imposed on boys from this country.

Dr. JAMESON: I think it is always acknowledged it is merely a nomination, and they have to pass. Is the South African black list as bad as you have just read?

Sir JOSEPH WARD: That idea is not prevalent in New Zealand. There is no misconception as to the conditions.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: I am glad to hear that, and that is why I mentioned it to-day. From the Cape, one entered in 1903, and one passed; in 1904, there were two entered, and they were both unsuccessful; in 1905, two went in, and two passed; and in 1906, one entered, but he appeared before the Interview Committee here and was not rated sufficiently high to be taken.

Dr. JAMESON: That is physically?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: No. In 1907, one has entered but he has not yet been interviewed.

I do not know that I have very much more to add, except to say that we are anxious to meet you if we possibly can. If Australia makes up its mind to start something in the way of a local defence force, we are quite ready to give all the assistance we can to it. If New Zealand wishes to go on with the subsidy, again we are quite ready to arrange for that, or equally willing, if they prefer to go in for a submarine flotilla, to help in that. The same with regard to the Cape; we are quite ready to meet their wishes. If they in South Africa wish to try a submarine flotilla, we are quite ready to help. Also, in the meantime, I think we should be quite ready to try to arrange for a training ship for the naval volunteers, and so forth. But with regard to that, one particular point is that your volunteers are very desirous in South Africa to become a division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and thereby obtain the name of "Royal." That depends, in the first place, on your passing an Act in your local legislature.

I do not think I could make a definite promise with regard to leaving a ship continually there. That is a matter for future consideration. Indeed, if this is to become part of the charge made on the subsidy, then I think as time goes on the expenses for a ship ought to be borne by the Colony as well.

Dr. JAMESON: As time goes on they will do very well for us, because we all say we ought to give more. In the meantime it will help with what we do.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: We shall endeavour to carry on the arrangement with regard to a ship at present; but I would not like to pledge myself that for all time we should have a ship there. On the contrary, I think the proper thing would be that the training ship for your volunteers should be part of the Colonial force.

Dr. JAMESON: Out of the contribution?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Yes; I think that is all I can say. If any of the Prime Ministers would now say what they think, if I can meet them in any way, I shall be very glad.

Mr. DEAKIN: Lord Elgin and gentlemen, as Lord Tweedmouth mentioned Australia first, perhaps I may be permitted to say that the Commonwealth will recognise the extreme fairness, and generosity, with which he has met us. In conceding perfect freedom, notwithstanding the existence of an obligation which has yet several years to run, you have shown that in every possible manner you desire to keep in close accord with the feelings of the outer Dominions. In Australia, for reasons which have already been put on record in the despatch which I had the honour of addressing to the Admiralty about two years ago, the existing contribution has not proved generally popular. It was passed because it was felt that some distinct recognition of our responsibility for the defence of our own country and of the Empire of which it is a part, was necessary, and though it did not take the form which commended itself most to the very large minority, possibly even a majority, of the electors we accepted that mode of co-operation until some better presented itself. Further consideration has convinced the public that the present agreement is not satisfactory either to the Admiralty, the political or professional Lords of the Admiralty, or to the Parliament of the Commonwealth. In your case you find yourselves to a certain degree shackled even by the very general restriction as to the station of the fleet which is imposed by the present agreement. Originally, under the Agreement of 1887, the Australian fleet was limited to Australian waters. When that agreement expired, another agreement was entered into by which a fleet or squadron of increased strength was provided, and its sphere of action enlarged to the China and Indian seas. As a consequence, it appeared to many in Australia that the local protection which was its primary condition was so far departed from that it had practically ceased to exist. Nor could this new development of policy be challenged because all expert opinion agrees that the proper place for a defensive force is where it can deliver the best blows at any offensive force directed against it. It was quite probable that this would not be immediately on the coast of Australia, but rather in the Indian Ocean, or to the eastward towards the China seas. It is as much in the interest of the Commonwealth as of the Navy that whatever power it can bring to bear should be available wherever the enemy is to be found in force, but this meant the withdrawal from our coast of ships to which we have been accustomed to look for localised protection, and also for the world-wide operations of the British Navy. Their withdrawal brought more home to the public particularly of our great States on the seaboard the nature of the risks to which they must be exposed in the absence of the squadron. Practically every capital, with perhaps the single exception of Perth, is upon the sea; Sydney, Adelaide, and Hobart, are all easily approachable from the sea. In the case of Melbourne, Port Phillip Heads, and the forts there could, if effective, keep an attacking force at a distance. Yet, supposing the Heads to be passed, Melbourne, too, would lie directly open to any attacks. Brisbane runs a somewhat similar risk. The Committee of Imperial Defence, after giving this question full consideration, have decided that a regular attacking force is not to be anticipated in our Antipodean situation, under any circumstances that it is necessary to directly provide for in advance. They look forward to the possibilities of a raid, consisting in all likelihood of some four fast half-armoured or partly armoured cruisers, carrying forces of from 500 to, at the outside, 1,000 men. Even an expedition of those small dimensions, calling for a very considerable provision in the way of fuel and other arrangements, would make only a transitory dash for our ports and shipping rather than a series of prolonged attacks. But, whatever the nature of the assault is to be, its possibility leaves the large population of our seaboard States with a sense of insecurity, emphasised by the probability of the withdrawal of the squadron some thousands of miles away to deal with the expected enemy there. Consequently, the demand for some harbour and coast defence has been pressed upon the minds of the people in general, and has been lately several times considered by Parliament. It is thought that while it may be the best possible naval strategy to withdraw the squadron to remote portions of the seas surrounding Australia, the contingency of our being raided, even by a few cruisers, and of our commerce being driven into the harbours or destroyed, or enclosed in the harbours, is not one that a community ought to contemplate unmoved. Hence our desire for the local protection to which you have already alluded. Our proposal to replace the existing agreement by the establishment of a force in Australian waters is not due to motives of economy. On the contrary though it will involve a greater expenditure upon maritime defence than we have ever undertaken I believe that those proposals will be willingly accepted by Parliament. Of course we shall require to

proceed by degrees, but even then the expenditure proposed will exceed the payment now made to the Admiralty, plus the payments that have been made for several years past upon such naval defences as we have retained. At all events, the present temper of the electors encourages me to believe that in the course of a few years we shall see, in proportion to our population, a fairly effective harbour defence, which may be extended, if our means permit, to some approach towards coast patrol. I do not say coast defence, because that would imply a size and character of ship which our finances, I fear, will hardly be able to afford for a long time to come.

In regard to the very judicious remarks you have made with reference to the question of manning, for my own part, I quite realise the wisdom of associating any local force which we may develop in the closest possible manner with the Navy. Of the efficiency of the Navy and the quality of its officers and men we have, from personal experience, in times of peace it is true, but still from prolonged experience, the highest possible opinion. Every confidence is felt in Australia both in British ships and British sailors, and no doubt is entertained of their capacity to give the best possible account of themselves when the time of trial actually arrives. But we also recognise that the Navy as a fighting machine is only kept in its condition of efficiency by the constant maintenance, even in the lowest ranks of the Service, of the highest state of training. We appreciate the discipline and training which our men have received in the squadron, and anticipate in the future that, by similar means, by association with the Navy, we shall be assisted to keep our local vessels, whatever they may be, up to its high standard. We shall not be willing in any way to accept for ourselves any less degree of proficiency than that which His Majesty's Navy enjoys, and by which its reputation has been established. A force, small as ours must be, would enjoy few, if any, opportunities of advancement for officers and men if it were a completely isolated service. On the contrary, it has everything to gain by being kept in the closest possible touch with the Navy, and with all advances as they are being made in Naval tactics or training. If, therefore, our partner, New Zealand, is able to devise what would be to them a satisfactory scheme of local defence, or make some amended agreement with yourselves, I believe the Parliament of the Commonwealth would desire to terminate the present agreement, to set free the ships of the squadron from any obligations at present imposed, and to devote our funds to the provision of a local force. The agreement, as you properly observed, is tripartite, and requires the consent of New Zealand as well as that which you have given. I quite recognise that. I have made no appeal to my friend, Sir Joseph Ward, either in public or in private on this head, because I felt it was a matter which he required to consider independently. As he knows, I have made him no suggestion on this topic of any kind whatever. But I say it will be a source of gratification to us if his Parliament terminates this agreement in order to follow, so far as New Zealand is concerned, whatever course it may think best. For our part, Lord Tweedmouth, your overture will be made known in the Commonwealth. Your words of counsel and approval will be very highly esteemed. We recognise this as a further step in the exercise of our self-governing powers with which are properly attached the responsibilities which can never be dissociated from them. Those responsibilities we have no desire to avoid; on the contrary we shall assume them with confidence in ourselves and in our cause, providing, so far as our means and population permit, a defence of the harbours of Australia, which will be an Imperial defence; it will not be the shipping owned in Australia alone that will enjoy the protection of our ships and forts; it will not be commerce especially Australian that will be protected by this harbour defence; but of course the same protection will be secured by these means for all British shipping and cargoes. The necessary supplies, the necessary coal, either for the mercantile marine or for your vessels of war, will there be under safe shelter and always at hand. All the stores required to maintain the Naval force while it is in our waters would be safe in time of war. These, I take it, are no mean steps towards the protection of that portion of the Empire not merely for its own needs, but affording a Naval base for all operations which may need to be conducted in those seas. That ought not to be under-valued. Every development of Naval force in Australia is a development of the Naval forces of the Empire. It will be capable of being utilised for defence and also in connection at any time with your squadron in our waters for offence also. Of course, even if the agreement be terminated, the visits of the squadron to our seas will not cease. They will be paid in ordinary course. I also understand that as at present the Navy will, for its own sake and in recognition of our common interests, obtain the largest portion of its supplies

from Australia and New Zealand; that is to say, whatever supplies can be obtained on the spot; that we shall have the opportunity of seeing in our ports the ships of this powerful united fleet that will be composed of the three squadrons of Australia, India, and China. That is very necessary as maintaining a link of Empire of a very real character, which makes an extremely strong appeal to the patriotism of our people. The Navy is immensely popular. The British Army we do not see except in our own militia. The Imperial Navy represents the great guarantee of its existence as well as a guarantee of our liberties and constitutional privileges. The Navy is an extremely popular Service, and, realising that, we are sure the Admiralty will not fail to allow us the opportunity from time to time of seeing the splendidly manned and equipped vessels which have made the British flag paramount in all seas.

I could not pass by a speech so extremely gratifying to Australian sentiments as your own without this notice. I do not for one moment pretend to have adequately dealt with it.

Let me say in conclusion, that, of course, we look upon any vessels for local defence not only as Imperial in the sense of protecting Australia, but because they will be capable of co-operating with any squadron, or any part of your squadron, which you may think fit to send into our waters to meet any direct attack in proximity to our coasts. In that way, we ought to be able, with the type of vessel we shall have, when associated with your larger ships, to render extremely effective assistance. And so far from the termination of this agreement in any way concluding our close and intimate relationship with the Imperial Navy in Naval Defence, I hope it will be the means of enabling us to extend Naval development, in very efficient forms, in our own seas, making it of such a character as to be of material assistance if ever a foe to the flag should find his way into our waters.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Elgin and gentlemen, I would like to try and make the position, as far as New Zealand is concerned, quite clear in connection with this matter. The remarks I made on a former occasion—which I do not propose to refer to at any length again—I adhere to in every respect. That is, in brief, that in a developing country of the size of New Zealand, about the size of Great Britain and Ireland, and a comparatively young country, we cannot undertake the possible future obligations entailed in the making for the provision of anything in the shape of a local navy. We believe it is of great consequence to the future development of New Zealand with its enormous potentialities for the settlement of people, that the necessity of maintaining that development must, in view of the financial obligations involved in providing a local navy, take precedence with the Government of that country in the interests of the people of that country. I adhere absolutely to what I stated before in that respect. New Zealand has made no request of any kind for an alteration of the existing agreement, and I readily acquiesce in the suggestion made by the First Lord of the Admiralty that New Zealand in relation to the Mother Country will of necessity require to continue by direct subsidy or an increased subsidy which we are quite willing to give for a continued attachment to the Navy proper which we consider is so important to us.

I have had the opportunity, owing to the courtesy of the First Lord of the Admiralty of discussing matters with him since we last met, and I asked for some information to be furnished to me regarding submarines. This I received late last night, and only had an opportunity of looking at it since I arrived at the Conference this morning. I have read the statement this morning with considerable interest. It goes without saying that I am not prepared—in fact I mentioned it to Lord Tweedmouth when speaking to him—to commit the Colony of New Zealand to any departure in the way of a suggested submarine service without having had the opportunity of conferring with my colleagues and in turn, any great departure if we contemplated making it, we would require to submit to our Parliament and have the ratification of our Parliament upon before assent by me at this Conference could be by any means directly or indirectly implied. I should be only too glad, however, to have the aspect of it placed before me, and, when I have had an opportunity of discussing, placed before my colleagues, with a view to our considering whether the suggestion of a submarine service, pure and simple, without the attendant surroundings of a local navy, as an alternative to an increased subsidy, could then be taken up by New Zealand as a part of the great organisation of the defence of the Empire as a whole, and that portion of which is New Zealand especially.

I want to make the position clear so that the Admiralty, who are no doubt

better posted upon these matters than I am, may know. We have 14 towns on the sea coast. The majority of them are very important towns. There is not one of them that is more than 9 miles at the outside from the ocean or to the port unless it be the city of Dunedin, which to the ocean itself, irrespective of the means of ingress and egress that ships have to take, is only 5 or 6 miles away from the Pacific. Though Lord Tweedmouth has not to me personally, or at the Conference, given any lead or indication as to what the Admiralty favours—whether it is the organisation of a local submarine service, and the responsibility being taken upon the shoulders of Australia and New Zealand—I have had no indication personally whether that method of dealing with the Colonies is more acceptable to the Admiralty than the continuation from the New Zealand point of view of a subsidy. I wish to add that from my point of view it would be of considerable importance for us to know what the Admiralty itself favours. If the Admiralty were to say to New Zealand that they believed as a matter of defence of that portion of the Empire that the system we have been party to for so many years has, as the result of changes in the scientific development of these submarines, become to some extent obsolete, or not so valuable, and make the suggestion of a submarine force that would weigh considerably with the Government and the people in arriving at a decision as to the best course to follow in future, I think myself that the opinion of the Admiralty would be valuable. I recognise Lord Tweedmouth has taken a completely impartial stand, and allowed it to be at the voluntary action of the Colonies themselves to elect whether they go in for the subsidy or the submarine defence. In that respect, if I may be allowed to say so, it is particularly fair to the Colonies, and will be appreciated by New Zealand to be allowed from the standard of self-government to do as we think proper. We would like to have the opportunity of ascertaining what is the preference of the Admiralty in this suggested system of local defence for Australia as against the one for New Zealand for the continuation of a subsidy.

Mr. Deakin has already, for his country, said Lord Tweedmouth has acted with a generous consideration for the views put forth by Australia, having assented to their proposal by stating he was prepared to agree to whichever course they desired. That brings up the question of the position of New Zealand as one of the contributors to the agreement, whether we are going to hold Great Britain and Australia to that agreement, or set them free to do at an early date what they think is essential and proper for them. I can only say at once I am perfectly certain both my colleagues and the Parliament of my country, if the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is responsible for the general government of the sea defences of the Empire itself, is willing to meet Australia in that respect, we would not adopt a dog-in-the-manger policy, but I think would favourably consider the cancellation of the agreement, with a view to allowing Australia to have a free hand with the Admiralty, and New Zealand also, on its own line, to have a free hand to carry out what it considers is best for our particular circumstances, in order to make the position easy of settlement, as between the Admiralty and the Commonwealth of Australia, I shall be only too glad to recommend it to my colleagues, and to recommend it to my Parliament. In any case it would take some little time to give effect to the change that Australia wants from that point of view, and long before any inconvenience could arise no doubt the Parliament of our country would give expression to what I am now voicing here as its representative. New Zealand as a country has been desirous of giving upon the basis of the contribution of Australia its fair proportion. The six States of Australia gave an average of a little over £33,000 each, and originally as fixed the contribution of a colony like New Zealand was fairly proportionate to the individual contributions of the States of the great Commonwealth of Australia, and we paid our £40,000 a year. I am quite certain New Zealand, if required to, under altered proposals that may be suggested, with a view to cementing the defence of the Empire as a whole, would be willing to increase its contribution.

I thank Lord Tweedmouth for the information he has furnished to me. I am exceedingly obliged to the Admiralty. The whole matter will receive the fullest consideration of my colleagues and myself at the earliest possible date.

Dr. SMARTT: Lord Elgin, and gentlemen, I am extremely obliged to Lord Tweedmouth for the statement he has made (a statement which I think will be welcomed by the people in Cape Colony, and certainly by the Naval Volunteers) that he has kindly consented to agree to meet the request that on the passage of the Bill submitted to the Admiralty the title "Royal" should be attached to them.

I think, on the first meeting we had with the First Lord of the Admiralty, he

stated it was the intention of the Admiralty, as far as possible, to deal with each Colony on the lines of the particular circumstances appertaining to that Colony. I think the statement that he has made to-day shows the earnest intention of the Admiralty to try and move forward in that direction.

So far as the Cape is concerned, I take it Lord Tweedmouth's statement for the Admiralty is first, that on the passage of the Bill which has been submitted to the Admiralty, the Naval Volunteers will be able to style themselves Royal Naval Volunteers; secondly, the Admiralty will, pending further arrangements, place at the disposal of the Naval Volunteers a ship, most probably the "Odin," with her guns, on which our volunteers, as well as those of the sister Colony of Natal, can get as thorough a sea-going training as possible. In the meantime, the cost of the nucleus crew for that ship, whatever crew the Admiralty considers necessary to enable her to go to sea, would be defrayed out of the joint contribution now given by the Cape and Natal to the Admiralty. I presume I would be in order, after your statement, in allowing the volunteers in Cape Colony to know that on the passing of this Bill, this will come into effect?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Quite so.

DR. SMARTT: I can assure you that that will be most satisfactory and will give a great fillip to the Naval Volunteer movement in the Cape.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: We think in the end that the vessel ought to be a Colonial one.

DR. SMARTT: Yes. Further, I take it that the proposition the Admiralty make is that they would encourage the spirit of local defence and local assistance for naval purposes, and that the best direction in which that could take effect would be either in the direction of submarines, or I suppose the Admiralty would also be prepared to consider the question of destroyers.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Certainly.

DR. SMARTT: I should take it that the submarine is a ship that only employs a small number of the most highly trained experts?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: That is so.

DR. SMARTT: She is not a vessel that will go far out to sea, whereas, in the establishment of the destroyer class, you would at once imbue your people with the spirit of seamanship and the idea that they were rendering greater service, because they could go some little distance out to sea, and that would be a great incentive to developing a naval spirit amongst our people.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: I think the development of submarines is going to be such in the future as almost to supersede the destroyer; that it will have a much larger sea range, and it will be not merely a defensive vessel, but a very distinctly offensive one.

DR. SMARTT: But, in the meantime, the Admiralty would be quite prepared to consider, if the Cape desires to accept further obligations, whether it should take the shape of submarines or destroyers?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: Yes, either or both.

DR. SMARTT: Should that position be taken up, the grant which is now paid to the Navy, and any further amount that might be necessary, would be devoted to this purpose instead of being paid to the Admiralty as at the present moment. That is a point I want to be very clear upon. The Cape and Natal are giving £85,000. A small portion of that will be used to provide a nucleus crew to the "Odin," so as always to be able to go to sea for the purpose of training our Naval Volunteers along the coast. Then, if we establish submarines or destroyers, I understand that it is the intention of the Admiralty that the balance of the £85,000 should be devoted to that purpose, plus any extra amount of money that may be voted by the Colony in order to establish a service of that sort. I at once acknowledge that the contribution on behalf of the Cape is not at all adequate to the services which the Navy renders to our defences, and I have no doubt that when the federation General Botha spoke of the other day takes place, as the ports of Cape Colony and Natal will be equally the ports of the Transvaal, both the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony will also recognise their obligations to contribute towards a defence scheme of that sort. Therefore, I do not see any difficulty in the future, with the assistance of the Admiralty, in working up a considerable defence of this character. I presume then the Admiralty would place at our disposal before we return to the Cape—or if not before, as soon after as possible—the necessary information as to the cost of establishing a submarine or destroyer force, i.e., the cost of the ship, whether it be a submarine or destroyer, and the cost and number of the

crew necessary for upkeep, so that we could see in what direction we would have to work.

I do not wish to take up the time of the Conference, but I would like to ask Lord Tweedmouth whether he has inquired into a statement I made some few days ago with regard to the Naval docks at Simonstown, in which I stated I had been informed that as the docks are now being constructed under heavy south-east gales, it would be impossible or dangerous for a ship to enter those docks until the gale abated. You were good enough to say you would inquire whether that was correct or not, with a view, if my information is correct, of having something done to expend the necessary extra £60,000 or £70,000 to rectify it.

There were some other matters relating to shore defence, but I do not know whether they ought to be discussed here or privately with the Admiralty or with the War Office. There is the matter of the manning of our defences.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH: That is a War Office matter.

DR. SMARTT: It would be better discussed with the War Office or Admiralty privately, there being a mutual arrangement between the Cape and the War Office in connection therewith.

MR. F. R. MOOR: Lord Elgin and gentlemen, I follow on the lines of the Cape. Our proposal now—and I think the two Governments are in accord—is that we should work together as regards this training ship which shall be available for our common cause, and to give our men the necessary training at sea. The expense of this is to come out of our mutual contributions; and then the question of the submarines is to be taken up hereafter as to the cost and as to any increased expenditure in regard to maintaining these craft at our different harbours.

I am prepared to join with my colleague from the Cape in furthering the objects we mutually have in view, and I trust before we leave the Admiralty will be able to give us a definite answer to what we are placing before them, so that we shall be able to go back to South Africa and explain to our people what the terms of the provisional agreement are. We are going to meet our Parliaments in a month or two, and I think it would be very advantageous both to my Parliament and the Cape Parliament that we should have the proposals definitely settled before we leave England.

I have nothing more to say, and I trust the lines suggested will be beneficial to our Colony and the Navy generally.

MR. BRODEUR: Lord Elgin and gentlemen, I have nothing to say except to thank heartily Lord Tweedmouth for having been good enough to recognise what Canada has been doing in regard to its defence. As I mentioned the last time we discussed this question at the Conference, I think the situation of Canada has not been properly represented. I am very glad to see Lord Tweedmouth has actually acknowledged and recognised that we have been doing a great deal, and are still doing a great deal, by taking over the Naval Stations at Esquimaux and Halifax.

There was a discussion in previous years to the effect that we should contribute something directly to the British Navy. I may say with regard to that, there is only one mind in Canada on that question, and if it was necessary I should be able to quote the remarks made lately in an article published by Sir Charles Tupper, who is certainly one of the men best qualified to speak in Canada upon the question. I think, perhaps, I might mention what he said in regard to that. He said: "It is known that from the outset I have felt the interests of Canada and the true interests of the Empire to be opposed to the demand for Colonial contributions to the Imperial Navy," and "I maintain that Canada has discharged that duty in the manner most conducive to Imperial interests." So it shows that both sides of politics in Canada agree with the policy which has been going on for some years there. He adds, also, in that article, that "Canada protects her fisheries by her own cruisers, and when the Imperial Government expressed a wish to be relieved of the expense of maintaining the strategic points at the harbours of Halifax and Esquimaux the Canadian Government at once relieved them of that large expenditure, amounting to £185,000 per annum." Negotiations are now going on for taking over the Naval stations there. I do not know exactly what will be the amount by which the Admiralty will be relieved, but I think it is a somewhat large amount.

Since the matter has been brought before this Conference I may say that Parliament has voted a large sum of money for the purpose of purchasing another cruiser and putting that cruiser on the Pacific coast for the protection of our fisheries.

We are very glad to see that Lord Tweedmouth has recognised that in this matter it should be left almost entirely to the Colonies. I may say, in conclusion, that we will be very glad to work in co-operation with the Imperial authorities, and under the advice of an Imperial officer, so far as it is consistent with self-government.

Sir ROBERT BOND: I have nothing to add to what I have already said in the matter.

Sir WILLIAM LYNE: I would like to ask Lord Tweedmouth a question in connection with the Australian proposals. It is not intended, I presume, to remove the present squadron, or any large proportion of that squadron, until, if we can make a new arrangement, our coastal defence is fairly complete?

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: There is no intention of moving the squadron as it at present exists until a new arrangement is arrived at. I think the discussion that has taken place here to-day shows very clearly what was said by Mr. Moor, that it is impossible to come to any final decision with regard to these proposals we have been talking about, and on which, I think, we are very largely agreed, until reference is actually made to the Parliaments of the various Colonies, because they must decide in the first instance as to whether they will take the line of going on with the subsidy, or supplement the subsidy by certain local defence arrangements, or adopt a system of local defence instead of the subsidy altogether.

Sir Joseph Ward asked what is the opinion of the Admiralty with regard to the comparative merits of submarine local defence and subsidy. That, I think, is a question upon which we at the Admiralty cannot pretend to adjudicate. We say, if the Colonies decide on a system of local defence, we think submarines would be the most useful way of beginning it, and that Colonies would find that a submarine flotilla would be the best way from their point of view and from a strategical point of view of defending the coast, to begin with, at any rate. They might afterwards develop the destroyer, and so forth; but to begin with the submarine would be the best plan that could be adopted in everybody's interests.

We do not refuse the subsidy plan, and I do not think it would come well from us to say that we insist that the subsidies should be dropped. That, I think, is a matter for the Colonies themselves. So far as we are concerned, the subsidy is a very convenient way of receiving help from the Colonies; but we quite recognise that it is a question for the Colonies themselves as to how far it is to be subsidy and how far it is to be local defence. What we really desire is that we should have the cordial help of the Colonies, and that in the most effective way in the first place, and in the second place, in a way most acceptable to the Colonies.

Dr. SMARTT: So that if the Colonies were prepared to accept a scheme, which met with the approval of the Admiralty, to improve their local defence in such manner as not alone would it assist them but also the British Navy in time of emergency, they would have the approval of the Admiralty to devoting the subsidies that they now pay to the general fund to this purpose, and still more have the approval of the Admiralty if they increased the amount of money to be devoted to those services. So long as we feel assured that that is the desire of the Admiralty, I am extremely anxious, so far as South Africa is concerned, to move forward in that direction.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: We shall be willing to take in kind what has been paid in the past in hard cash.

Dr. SMARTT: And as times improve, we should be prepared to increase the amount devoted to these services. That is why I was anxious to know whether, so far as the Cape and Natal are concerned, the Admiralty would give us some suggestions as to the cost of building up either the submarines or destroyers—that is, the cost of the ship on the one hand, and the cost of the men on the other. We understand, in the case of a submarine, that we could not supplement her crew by the volunteers, because in that case you want really trained experts.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: I have here a statement which I had made out for Sir Joseph Ward with regard to the cost of a submarine. Will you take that copy and share it with Mr. Moor? I gave a copy to Mr. Deakin. That gives, I think, a very good and short summary of what the cost of a submarine would be. You also would like something on the same lines as to a destroyer?

Dr. SMARTT: Yes. I would like even further than that some small scheme prepared by the Admiralty to put before the Cape and say: This is a scheme you can work up to whenever you can find the money. I want it as an incentive to the

people to see what they are going to work up to, and to allow them to know what it will cost them.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: That we shall be glad to give. Dr. Smartt spoke about the Naval dock at Simonstown the other day, and the matter was referred to the Hydrographer. I have not got his report yet, but I will get it.

Dr. SMARTT: So long as I know you are really considering the matter I am satisfied, because it is a matter of considerable importance to the Cape, and to the Empire.

Lord TWEEDMOUTH: Yes, it has been referred to the Hydrographer for report already. I do not think I have anything else to add. I do not think we can pass a resolution now. We must have the answers from the various Parliaments before we can come to a definite conclusion.

CHAIRMAN: I find that at the last Conference there was no definite resolution on the subject, but only discussions on proposals put forward, which were taken for consideration, and that is our position now.

Dr. SMARTT: I should think perhaps, if you would not mind letting that wait over until the Conference is again up to its full strength, the Conference may be able to affirm the advisability of the various Dependencies of the Empire recognising their obligations and insisting on doing anything they can to assist the Navy. If we do not close it now it can be put in some form before the Conference. The Admiralty might draft a resolution of that character.

Mr. F. R. MOOR: Apart from what the Conference say to-day, Natal and the Cape will be quite satisfied to have that short Memorandum from the Admiralty, so that we can lay these views of the Admiralty before our Parliaments.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

9 MAY, 1907.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

Dr. SMARTT: Would I be in order in moving this Naval Resolution after the discussion yesterday? I do not think it will take any time because it is a resolution which requires no remarks to make it acceptable to the Conference: "That this Conference, recognising the vast importance of the services rendered by the Navy to the defence of the Empire and the protection of its trade, and the paramount importance of continuing to maintain the Navy in the highest possible state of efficiency, considers it to be the duty of the Dominions beyond the Seas to make such contribution towards the upkeep of the Navy as may be determined by their local legislatures—the contribution to take the form of a grant of money, the establishment of local Naval defence, or such other services, in such manner as may be decided upon after consultation with the Admiralty and as would best accord with their varying circumstances."

CHAIRMAN: I may say I communicated with the First Lord of the Admiralty what occurred, and he desires me to say he leaves himself entirely in the hands of the Conference with regard to any modification or omission of the words referring to the Admiralty. Otherwise he has no objection to it.

Dr. SMARTT: My reason for moving this resolution is the fact that I think we have all been impressed with the character of the discussion and the necessity of maintaining the Navy at the fullest possible strength, and I think we all recognise the manner in which the First Lord of the Admiralty has met us, especially in his desire to meet the views of the outlying portions of the Empire to see whether it is possible that they can assist in contributing to the strength of the Navy by organising local defences of a Naval character. I feel convinced that a policy of that sort will appeal very strongly to many portions of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas. I gather from the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty that the establishment of submarines, destroyers, Naval Reserve forces, local defences, and works of that character, will be of considerable advantage to the general strength of the Navy. I do not think anybody can take exception to the resolution, because it distinctly states that it is subject to the votes of the individual Legislatures, and that though the money will only be spent after consultation with the Admiralty, it does not in any way take away from the individual Colony its rights to be heard and practically to decide the best manner in which that money can be spent. But

I gather from the character of the discussion we have had in this Conference, and the nature of the reception we have received—those of us who have had the advantage of discussing the matter with the First Lord of the Admiralty and his advisers—that the Admiralty will deal with the Colonies in the most sympathetic manner in this direction, the result being a movement that I consider will be of great advantage to the defence of the Empire. I think we all recognise that the time is coming when it is utterly impossible for the Colonies to expect Great Britain to bear practically the whole of this great burden of defence. The commerce of the Empire is now becoming of such an enormous character that it is more and more evident to the self-governing Dominions beyond the Seas of what vital importance it is to them, as well as to the heart of the Empire, that this commerce should have the fullest and most adequate protection. Therefore, I feel strongly that it is the duty of the Conference to come to a general resolution of this sort before we part. At this late period I do not wish to go into the whole facts, figures, and statistics, which we have gone over before, and therefore will content myself by simply moving the resolution, which I hope will be acceptable to every member of the Conference.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I am sorry to say, so far as Canada is concerned, we cannot agree to the resolution. We took the ground many years ago that we had enough to do in our respect in that country before committing ourselves to a general claim. The Government of Canada has done a great deal in that respect. Our action was not understood, but I was glad to see that the First Lord of the Admiralty admitted we had done much more than he was aware of. It is impossible, in my humble opinion, to have a uniform policy on this matter: the disproportion is too great between the Mother Country and the Colonies. We have too much to do otherwise; in the Mother Country, you must remember, they have no expenses to incur with regard to public works; whereas, in most of the Colonies, certainly in Canada, we have to tax ourselves to the utmost of our resources in the development of our country, and we could not contribute, or undertake to do more than we are doing in that way. For my part, if the motion were pressed to a conclusion, I should have to vote against it.

Dr. SMARTT: But the public works to which you refer are of a reproductive character which are vital to the interests of your Dominion.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: Some of our railways have never paid a cent of interest or expenses.

Dr. SMARTT: Still it is developing and opening up the country to an enormous extent. All the colonies are building developing railways of a character which may not be revenue-producing for years. I thought the wording of this resolution would have specially met your views because you will find to make such a contribution towards the upkeep of the Navy it may take the form either of a grant of money, or the establishment of a local defence force or other services. I understand Canada suggested strongly the other day that some of their other services were in the nature of local defence.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I have said all I have to say on the subject.

CHAIRMAN: I think it is a pity to pass the resolution if it is not unanimous.

Dr. SMARTT: I should like very much to hear the opinions of the representatives of the other portions of the Empire.

Mr. DEAKIN: I have no hesitation in entering into the discussion if desired; but if we are not going to pass the resolution is it worth while?

Dr. SMARTT: I think it is a great pity we do not pass something. We have done so much in the way of pious affirmation, that I am anxious we should do something of a practical character.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: It can be passed if there is a majority. For my part, I must vote against it.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: To do any good we would require to be unanimous about it.

Dr. SMARTT: Yes, I suppose so.

Mr. WINSTON CHURCHILL: It is not much good to have a resolution at all if we cannot be unanimous.

CHAIRMAN: I think we had better not proceed any further just now.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: We of the different Dominions beyond the Seas have tried to be unanimous up to the present time. I am sorry to say this is a question upon which we could not be unanimous. Therefore, Dr. Smartt can move it if he chooses, or withdraw it. But if he presses it I should have to vote against it.

Dr. SMARTT: I am absolutely in the hands of the Conference. I do not want

to press a resolution that is not likely to meet with the general approval of practically everybody on the Conference, especially a resolution of this particular character. We might, perhaps, let it stand over until the next sitting. Between this and Tuesday I may be able to modify it in some way to meet Sir Wilfrid's view.

D.

APPENDICES LAID BEFORE THE CONFERENCE OF 1907.

III.*

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

Resolution of Commonwealth of Australia.

"That it is desirable that the Colonies should be represented on the Imperial Council of Defence.

"That the Colonies be authorised to refer to that Council for advice any local questions in regard to which expert assistance is deemed advisable."

MEMORANDUM AS TO THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

The Treasury Minute published as [Cd. 2200] explains the constitution of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the position and duties of its secretariat.

The objects of the Committee are:—

- (a) To facilitate common discussion and agreement as to matters of Imperial Defence which fall within the purview of more than one Department, and which otherwise might involve long and indecisive correspondence.
- (b) To advise in the case of any questions relating to local or general defence which may be referred to it by the Secretary of State at the request of the self-governing Colonies.
- (c) To bring naval and military experts into direct touch with Ministers, who are enabled to question them freely and fully, thus avoiding the misunderstandings which may arise from minutes and memoranda.

2. The Committee is purely a consultative body, having no executive powers or administrative functions. It is assisted in its deliberations by the Colonial Defence Committee, which is regarded as its sub-committee, and works on the lines described in the statement appended to this memorandum, dealing with all Colonies, self-governing and other.

3. Questions are referred to the Committee by the Prime Minister, or by the head of a Department of State.

4. When special information is required, the Prime Minister may summon any person who may be in possession of such information.

5. When a Colonial question is discussed, either the Secretary of State for the Colonies or another representative of the Colonial Office is present.

6. Up to the present time only two cases of important questions affecting the self-governing Colonies have come before the Committee:—

- (a) Certain points in connection with the defence of Canada were considered in 1903, when the Hon. Sir F. Borden, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia, sat as a member of the Committee.
- (b) In November 1905 the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, by telegram, asked the Committee to prepare a general scheme of defence for Australia, specifying the points which his Government desired to be

* The numbering of the Appendices is that of [Cd. 3524], May 1907.

included. Mr. Balfour replied in a telegram sent by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General:—

"Committee of Imperial Defence gladly consent to undertake the preparation of a general scheme of local Australian Defence for the consideration of the Government of the Commonwealth."

The scheme was prepared and was sent out by the Secretary of State in May, 1906.

7. The Prime Minister considers that it might with advantage be made clear to the representatives of the Colonies at the coming Conference that the Committee of Imperial Defence is intended to provide the means of discussing questions of a general or local character relating to defence. It should, therefore, be open to the Government of any self-governing Colony to submit these questions through the Colonial Office, and to obtain such advice as the Committee is able to give. If so desired, any representative of a Colony which may wish for advice would be summoned to attend as a member of the Committee during the discussion of the questions raised.

March, 1907.

Enclosure.

STATEMENT AS TO THE CONSTITUTION AND WORK OF THE COLONIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

1. The Colonial Defence Committee was established in 1885, when an incident on the Afghan frontier resulted in an alarm of war throughout the Empire. As the numerous communications from the Colonies with reference to their defence could not be dealt with by existing machinery with the rapidity required by the importance of the subject at a time of political tension, the Committee was appointed to consider representations as to their defence from Colonies for which the Royal Commission on Colonial Defence had made no provision.

From the first the War Office and Colonial Office found it convenient to obtain its views on questions relating to other Colonies, and when the immediate crisis of 1885 had passed, the Committee was retained to discuss and work out the details of such questions of Colonial Defence as might be referred to it; and, in particular, to examine the local Defence Schemes for the application in war of the Imperial and Colonial resources in each Colony.

On the establishment of the Committee of Imperial Defence it was decided that the Colonial Defence Committee should be regarded as a sub-committee of that Committee, and that with a view to mark the connection between the two Committees the Secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee should also be an Assistant Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, although appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and borne on the Colonial Office Estimates.

2. The constitution of the Committee is as follows:—

Chairman.

Colonial Office Representative ... { The Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Members.

Admiralty Representatives ... { The Director of Naval Intelligence.
The Naval Adviser to the Army Council.

War Office Representatives ... { The Director of Military Operations.
The Director of Artillery.
The Director of Fortifications and Works.

Treasury Representative ... { The Assistant Secretary to the Treasury.

India Office Representative ... The Military Secretary, India Office.

Secretary ... A Military Officer.

Governors of Colonies visiting this country, representatives of Departments not permanently represented (*e.g.*, the Foreign Office and Post Office), and other officers possessing special knowledge on subjects referred to the Committee, have from time to time been invited to take part in its deliberations.

The members of the Colonial Defence Committee are thus all professional officers, and are therefore better able to devote the time necessary to work out technical details of schemes of defence than the Cabinet Ministers who form the majority of those normally attending the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Military Operations, who, as a rule, attend the meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, are, in addition, members of the Colonial Defence Committee, and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies usually attends the meetings of the former Committee when questions affecting the Colonies are under consideration.

3. The proceedings of the Colonial Defence Committee are governed by Regulations which were approved by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in January, 1893.

In these Regulations the object for which the Committee is established are defined as follows:—

- (a) To discuss and work out details of questions relating to Colonial Defence, in which the Admiralty, War Office, Colonial Office, and Treasury are individually or collectively concerned, which have been referred to the Committee by any one or more of the Departments above named.
- (b) To advise the Secretary of State for the Colonies in relation to local forces or defences in Colonies where no Imperial Establishment is maintained.
- (c) To prevent the delays and misunderstandings which may arise from inter-departmental correspondence.
- (d) To insure, as far as possible, a uniform treatment of questions of Colonial Defence.

4. The Committee have in the past dealt with a wide range of subjects. The documents normally referred to the Committee for their remarks are:—

- (a) *Defence Schemes*.—The annual revision of the Defence Schemes of Colonies and dependencies, and of the Indian defended ports, are now sent to the Colonial Defence Committee for their remarks.
- (b) *Annual Reports on Colonial Forces*.—Advantage is taken of the various reports received from Colonial Governments to furnish more or less detailed advice on points of organisation, armament, and training.
- (c) *Colonial Acts and Ordinances relating to Defence*.—Most of the enactments now in operation under which local forces serve have been examined through the agency of the Committee, and amendments have been made on their recommendation.

In addition, memoranda have been prepared by the Committee dealing with a wide range of subjects. Those of general application include papers on the general principles of Colonial Defence as accepted by His Majesty's Government, instructions for drawing up Defence Schemes, reviews of the strategic conditions of each defended port, revisions of armaments and calculations for garrisons, taking into consideration local conditions and the manning requirements of the approved defences. Of new general subjects dealt with of late years, it is sufficient to mention Colonial troops for Imperial service in war, Colonial Naval Reserves, draft Orders in Council for the regulation of the civil population and utilisation of the civil population in war.

IV.

Subject No. 1 proposed for discussion by the Army Council.

THE STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS OF THE EMPIRE FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.

(PAPER PREPARED BY THE GENERAL STAFF.)

1. No review of the strategical conditions of the British Empire, even when such a review is limited to the purely military aspects of the question, can be undertaken without admitting as a first and fundamental principle that the maintenance

of the Empire rests primarily on supremacy at sea. The very essence of a military system in a great federation of territories is the power of combination for a common end, and when those territories are separated from each other by the sea, such combination is wholly dependent on the possession of maritime command. However carefully, therefore, its various component parts may elaborate and improve their military organisations, a complete dissolution of the whole Empire must inevitably follow upon a failure of the navy in war. Whilst thoroughly appreciating how absolutely vital to us is this command of the sea, we must not, however, lose sight of two all-important considerations. In the first place it must be clearly understood that naval supremacy is powerless, unaided, to bring a great war to a successful conclusion, a fact which has been proved by history in all ages; in the second place we must realise that the British Empire, with its vast land frontiers and continental responsibilities, is confronted by dangers against which naval force can offer it little, if any, protection.

2. The second great principle which must govern the military organization of the Empire is that each portion of it should, as far as possible, maintain sufficient troops for self-defence. That this principle cannot be carried out in all cases is obvious. The problem of the defence of India is one that must at all times concern the Empire as a whole, whilst many of the minor dependencies of the Crown require to be garrisoned as naval bases by regular troops from the United Kingdom. The principle, however, holds good generally as regards the great self-governing portions of the Empire overseas, and it must form the basis of their different military systems. In connection with this individual responsibility for local defence, it must be understood that, though the navy may be able to guarantee the different parts of the Empire against maritime attack on a serious scale, His Majesty's ships cannot absolutely assure British territory under all circumstances against raids from overseas. In the case of seaports easily accessible to hostile enterprise and affording sufficient inducement for an enemy to attack, raids must be provided against by local defences and local garrisons. In deciding on the nature of the fortifications and the number of troops required to meet possible dangers of this kind, it is essential, however, that each case shall be examined on its merits, with a due sense of proportion, and a regard for the probabilities of the situation; otherwise, as has so often happened in the past, there may be a waste of money and misapplication of force.

3. The third principle to be borne in mind in this consideration of the military requirements of the Empire is the great one of mutual support at a time of emergency. It is evident that under certain circumstances the land forces of the various territories of the Empire may be impelled by considerations both of safety and sentiment to act together in some great conflict which may imperil our national existence. Should such a situation arise it would be impossible to over-rate the advantage of having in every case a system of military organisation capable of being readily assimilated to that of the many other contingents which would compose the Imperial army.

To detail all the possible causes of conflict which might bring about a great combined effort of this nature, or to suggest future theatres of war, would be out of place in a memorandum which aims only at calling attention to general principles. It is quite sufficient to point out that the Empire has vast stretches of land frontier to be defended, that we must be prepared to take such military action as is necessary to fulfil any treaty obligations which have been entered into in the past, or which may be undertaken in the future, and that the ethnographical conditions of certain British possessions impose upon us the responsibility of preserving order amongst half-civilised native races.

4. Since the last Colonial Conference there has been a great conflict between two nations powerful on land and sea. That war has taught us lessons, tactical and strategical, ashore and afloat. It has thrown light on many questions which have been a source of controversy amongst experts, deciding some, leaving others obscure. But the one lesson of the Russo-Japanese war which stands out clear and well defined, admitting neither argument nor disclaimer, is that that nation of which the naval and military authorities are in a position to make their preparations for emergency on a definite plan, and with a full knowledge of the strength and organisation of the forces which they will be able to put in the field at the critical moment, starts with an incalculable advantage over an opponent who does not enjoy the same position. War is in the present day becoming more and more an exact science. The gallantry of the troops, the genius of a commander,

the purely fortuitous circumstances inseparable from operations in the field, all may to some extent help to sway the issue. But it is adequate preparation, leading up to a well worked out plan of campaign, which is the paramount factor in securing a decision, and a plan of campaign can no more be worked out without knowing what troops are available to carry it out than a building can be erected without first laying its foundations.

5. The General Staff are well aware that there are great difficulties in the way of self-governing colonies (and also Crown colonies and British protectorates) guaranteeing that contingents of any given strength and composition can be counted upon by the Empire at large at the vital point in case of need. The local statutes which bind the citizen to serve in defence of his country for the most part limit this obligation to the defence of that portion of the Empire to which the citizen belongs. This is thoroughly understood by the General Staff, who quite realise that though the feelings of loyalty and affection towards the Mother Country entertained by the colonies will quickly rally them to the Imperial flag in the hour of trial, yet that it is impossible (at any rate at present) to learn in advance the exact number of troops which might be placed in the field side by side with the home army. They feel, however, that it is their duty to point out that the lack of definite provision for common action between the various military forces of the Empire deprives those forces of much of the power which they might otherwise exert at a time of national danger.

6. There is a tendency in the present day in certain quarters to underrate the importance of adequate training for troops, and to suppose that mere levies of men properly armed and gifted with grit and courage can be pitted against the regular troops of a civilized nation in a great campaign. The growth of this delusion in the British Empire can largely be attributed to the South African war, where the Boers so long held at bay a numerically far superior army, consisting for the most part of trained professional soldiers. The history of irregulars, fighting in guerilla fashion and proving difficult antagonists for trained troops to deal with, is, however, as old as the history of war, and care must be taken not to apply the lessons of the South African conflict to any possible campaign of the future against a regular army. Though the guerilla is formidable enough in defence of his own country, he cannot conduct an offensive campaign, and he is practically powerless to bring any war to a successful conclusion. For any great emergency, therefore, the armies to take the field to sustain the honour of the flag and to maintain the security of His Majesty's dominions must consist of troops who, man for man, are as efficient and highly trained as those whom they are to meet in battle.

7. Effective training of the rank and file is, however, impossible unless the officers charged with the duty are versed in the arts of the military profession. Moreover, with the advance of science, military education becomes more and more enlarged in its scope, and demands more and more a thorough grounding in first principles before its technicalities and developments can be appreciated and its principles imparted. Cadet colleges like Woolwich and Sandhurst are costly, and they are only calculated to provide for the training of youths intending to make the Army their profession. Institutions, however, like Kingston are adapted for training students both for military and civil life, and colleges organised on these lines are perhaps better suited to growing nationalities, the public finances of which are constantly strained in developing the resources of the territory but recently colonised. But whatever form military schools of any portion of the Empire may take, such schools are essential not only to secure the fighting efficiency of the local forces, but also to supply a nucleus of experts in the art of war, capable of advising their Government, capable of appreciating the peculiar defence requirements of the land in which they live, and capable of meeting upon common ground the experienced professional officers of the regular army who deal with the strategical problems of the United Kingdom and the Empire generally.

The General Staff recently created by the Army Council is still in its infancy. It will, however, it is hoped, in time embrace officers from all parts of the Empire, and will form a bond of union in regard to military thought throughout its length and breadth. This bond of union will not, however, be confined to military officers. The General Staff use every endeavour to keep in close touch with naval opinion, and it is all-important that colonial officers shall similarly strive to ensure that co-operation between the naval and military forces in all quarters of the globe which alone can afford an adequate guarantee for the safety and preservation of the Empire.

8. The more the various military forces of the Empire can be brought together in the matter of training, of education, and of community of thought, the better able will those forces be to cope with the peculiar difficulties of the strategical problem presented by a federation of widely scattered nations, anxious to assist each other and to co-operate in time of danger for the common good.

Steps have already been taken to arrange a certain amount of interchange between officers of self-governing colonies, and also between such officers and officers of the regular army at home and in India. The Staff College at Camberley is, under certain necessary restrictions, open to all, and it is greatly to be hoped that colonial officers will, in increasing numbers, fit themselves as graduates for service upon the General Staff. Numbers of officers recruited from all parts of His Majesty's dominions overseas have joined the regular forces, with advantage both to themselves and to the Service, whilst, in the arrangements for the provision of an adequate reserve of officers which has recently engaged the special attention of the War Office, the possibility of the colonies being able to work upon similar lines has not been overlooked. Much, indeed, has been accomplished, but a great deal more remains to be done.

It is perhaps a matter for consideration whether whole battalions, squadrons, or batteries might not occasionally be interchanged between different portions of the Empire. The question has often been discussed, and there are many obvious difficulties in the way, but the advantages of such an arrangement, from both a strategical and training point of view, would be very great. Since the last Conference Canada has taken over full responsibility for the fortresses of Halifax and Esquimaux, previously garrisoned by units of the regular army from home and paid for out of army funds. To provide a portion of the requisite personnel the Dominion has gladly availed itself not only of officers, but of non-commissioned officers and rank and file, transferred from the regular army. The actual numbers so transferred have been small, but, small as they are, they establish an invaluable link between the military forces in Canada and those in the United Kingdom. Progress in such matters is necessarily slow, and obstacles, mainly due to difference of administration and to difficulties of law, have to be overcome; but every step taken in this direction is a step forward in the interests of Imperial defence.

9. This memorandum is designed to draw attention very briefly to some questions affecting the strategical condition of the Empire which appear to lend themselves to discussion between the military authorities of the self-governing colonies and the War Office. It must be understood to be a purely military paper, embodying the views of the General Staff upon certain aspects of Imperial defence. No fear whatever is entertained that any portion of the Empire will fail to respond to a call from the Mother Country, and it is realised to the full, as already stated, that there are at present almost insuperable obstacles—obstacles perhaps rather political than military—which prevent any sort of guarantee that contingents of any given strength and composition will be forthcoming for a great Imperial war. It will further be gladly acknowledged that in their recognition of the first duty of citizenship British nationalities overseas have taken a lead and are providing an example to the United Kingdom.

10. The progress in efficiency of both the regular and colonial military forces has been most marked of late years, but the satisfaction which may well be felt at what has already been achieved should prompt us to set up some higher ideal, which, even if it is unattainable for the moment, will indicate the direction in which we should all move. In the opinion of the General Staff that ideal can only rest upon a recognition of the three fundamental principles enumerated in the opening paragraphs of this memorandum—

- 1st. The obligation imposed on each self-governing community of providing as far as possible for its own local security.
- 2nd. The duty of arranging for mutual assistance upon some definite lines in case of need.
- 3rd. The necessity for the maintenance of that sea supremacy which alone can ensure any military co-operation at all.

In the Mother Country these fundamental principles are recognised and are being acted up to. The United Kingdom provides for its own security by maintaining troops, organised for the most part on a non-permanent basis, to repel raids from overseas; it provides a striking force ready to assist other threatened portions of the Empire, and it possesses a navy sufficient to secure maritime command and

to permit of land forces being moved by sea from place to place in case of war in furtherance of the military requirements of the Empire.

In conclusion, it seems hardly too much to say that in a thorough organisation of the great military resources of the Empire, and in the cordial co-operation of the ever-expanding colonies with the Mother Country, lies the best hope of relief from the heavy burden of armaments. The surest guarantee of peace for the Empire is the solidarity of all its component parts, and the fixed determination of each and all to stand firmly together in every crisis which may arise.

N. G. LYTTTELTON,
C.G.S.

March 14, 1907.

V.

Subject No. 2 proposed for discussion by Army Council.

POSSIBILITY OF ASSIMILATING WAR ORGANIZATION THROUGHOUT THE EMPIRE

(PAPER PREPARED BY THE GENERAL STAFF.)

1. The object of war organization is to facilitate and simplify the difficult task of a commander in the field, so that he may be able to devote as much of his attention as possible to the practical problem of defeating the enemy.

2. A properly organized army is a fighting machine designed in peace to carry out, with the minimum of friction and the maximum of efficiency, the work for which it is intended in war. The more thoroughly it has been prepared in peace, the less attention need be paid to its design in war and the more time will its commander have to devote to its utilization.

3. There are many subjects connected with organization from the burden of which no commander in the field can free himself, however good the organization of his army may be: such subjects, for instance, as the relative position from day to day of the larger subdivisions of his command, the formation of advanced and rear guards, the distribution of his forces for battle, and the retention of a portion of them in reserve.

4. The management of these and similar subjects, combined with the attempt to keep himself constantly acquainted with the plans and movements of the enemy, are sufficient to try a commander in the field, as well as his staff, to the utmost of their capacity. It is therefore essential, by careful and well-considered previous organization, to prevent his time being taken up by questions which might have been solved for him before the beginning of the campaign.

5. In order that the organization of an army may work smoothly, it must be understood by those who form part of it, and in order that it may be understood by all, it must be simple. Simplicity can only be achieved by a symmetrical subdivision of parts, and by each part being suited to the place it has to fill. Thus, if an army is divided, as in the case of the British organization, into divisions, each division should include the same number of infantry brigades, and be furnished with the same proportion of artillery and mounted men; each infantry brigade should consist of the same number of battalions, each field artillery brigade of the same number of batteries, and each battery of the same number of guns.

6. In order to achieve simplicity, it is, further, important that the nomenclature employed throughout the army should be uniform and logical; the number of terms employed should be as few as possible, and the same term should always be applied to the same definite portion of the organization. Thus it would be apt to lead to confusion if one brigade of infantry were to be composed of infantry "regiments" and another of infantry "battalions," or if one brigade included a proportion of artillery and administrative services while another was composed of infantry only.

7. Any sacrifice of uniformity in organization immediately adds to the difficulty of the calculations on which the successful conduct of a campaign depends; for instance, if certain units of a force were of a different composition from the others, special allowance would have to be made in working out the amount of room they would take up on the march and in battle. If the corresponding portions

of an army varied in size and composition, elasticity would be sacrificed, for it would no longer be possible to employ, with equal advantage, whichever happened to be most conveniently placed for a particular task. When more than one organization is employed, orders become more difficult both to write and to understand, owing to the greater variety of names that have to be used, while the officers responsible for issuing orders are obliged to keep an increased mass of detail constantly in their minds.

8. All departures from uniformity also lead to additional complications in the necessarily elaborate system of administration in the field; the quantities of ammunition and supplies vary with the numbers of men and animals for whom they have to be carried, and the composition of the various ammunition and supply columns has to be altered accordingly, while special arrangements have to be made at depôts on the lines of communication; this all means extra labour for the various administrative departments, which are, as a rule, already overworked. The difficulty is much intensified if any portion of the administrative services themselves have a different organization from the remainder, for then the officers of every department have to make themselves acquainted with and to deal with two different organizations at the same time; or else there have to be two separate sets of administrative departments in the field; either of these alternatives presents almost insurmountable difficulties. Considerable inconvenience was experienced in Natal because the transport of the troops sent from India was organized on a different system from that of the troops sent from England.

9. The basis of all war organization is the composition of the various units which form part of an army; this composition is given, in the case of the British army, in a number of tables which are published annually in a volume known as War Establishments. After the number of men and animals and the amount of material in the various units have been decided, the next step in organization is to group them into larger bodies. This process is repeated until the whole army is grouped into a small number of large formations, whose commanders are directly under the orders of the commander-in-chief in the field. During the process of deciding the composition and grouping of units, a large number of questions have to be dealt with, of which the following may be taken as examples:—

- (a) The proper proportion of cavalry and guns to infantry, and the most efficient size of a unit of each.
- (b) The best system for replenishing ammunition and for supplying food, forage, and other articles to the troops.
- (c) The most effective arrangements for dealing with the sick and wounded, and for moving them to hospitals in rear.
- (d) The minimum amount of transport which will carry the actual necessities of troops in the field without hampering their mobility.
- (e) The number of rounds per gun and rifle, and the number of days' rations per man and horse, to be carried by the various columns.

10. These are all questions, of the nature referred to at the end of paragraph 4, with which the commander in the field ought not to have to deal, and it will readily be understood that if he had to do so, much of his time would necessarily be devoted to that object.

It will be remembered that, when Lord Roberts landed in South Africa at the beginning of 1900, owing to the heterogeneous nature of the force placed under his command, he had to spend more than a month of valuable time in evolving a new transport organization for the army, before any further strategical measures could be undertaken.

To obviate this waste of valuable time and energy, it is essential that all troops placed under the command of a general in the field should be organized on a single system, and that that system should be one with which the commander is closely acquainted and on which the bulk at any rate of the army has been trained.

11. This principle has already been accepted in the case of the auxiliary forces in the United Kingdom; it has been decided to form them into a Territorial Force, which will have identically the same organization for war as the regular army. In the case of India, too, the subject has been taken up, and communications are now passing between the military authorities in the United Kingdom and in India as to the possibility of further assimilating the organization for war of the two countries. Some progress has already been made by substituting the division of

three brigades for the army corps, as the leading feature in the war organization of the United Kingdom.

12. In view of the probability that the colonies will take an ever-increasing part in future wars in which the welfare of the Empire is at stake, it has, for the same reasons, been thought advisable to submit, for the consideration of the Colonial Conference, the subject of the possibility of assimilating the war organization of the colonies more closely to that of the United Kingdom. Steps in that direction have already been taken in the case of some of the colonies; officers sent by them have, from time to time, studied the question, in consultation with officers of the General Staff in London, with a view to seeing how far it would be possible for them to adopt the war establishments already referred to.

13. Much, however, remains to be done before it can be said that the war organization is the same for the whole of the Empire; for instance, while in War Establishments the unit of Infantry is the battalion, in Canada it is the regiment. The mounted unit varies considerably both in name and strength, and the mounted branch is alternatively known as cavalry, mounted infantry, mounted rifles, light horse, and carbineers. In War Establishments the unit of field artillery is the brigade, which consists of three batteries and an ammunition column; in the case of some colonies the batteries are not grouped at all, while in others, where they are grouped, no arrangements exist for forming ammunition columns. The situation is similar as regards administrative units; in many cases no provision appears to have been made for them, while in cases where they do exist they vary in name and composition, e.g., the medical field unit in War Establishments is the field ambulance; in Australia there are still two units, the field hospital and the bearer company, while the same is the case in New Zealand.

14. The following is a copy of pages 21 and 22 of War Establishments, 1907-08, and shows the general lines of the organization of the field army to be maintained in the United Kingdom for service abroad:—

COMPOSITION OF BRIGADES, DIVISIONS AND ARMY TROOPS.

A.—Composition of a Cavalry Brigade.

Head-quarters.
3 cavalry regiments.

B.—Composition of a Cavalry Division.

Head-quarters.
4 cavalry brigades.

Cavalry divisional troops—

Cavalry divisional artillery—

Head-quarters.
2 horse artillery brigades.

Cavalry divisional engineers—

Head-quarters.
4 field troops.

1 cavalry divisional transport and supply column.
4 cavalry field ambulances.

C.—Composition of an Infantry Brigade.

Head-quarters.
4 infantry battalions.

D.—Composition of a Division.

Head-quarters.
3 infantry brigades.

Divisional troops—

Divisional cavalry—

2 Imperial Yeomanry squadrons.

Divisional artillery.

Head-quarters.

3 field artillery brigades.

1 field artillery (howitzer) brigade.

1 heavy battery and ammunition column.

1 divisional ammunition column.

Divisional engineers—

Head-quarters.

2 field companies.

1 divisional telegraph company.

1 divisional transport and supply column.

1 divisional transport and supply park.

3 field ambulances.

E.—Composition of a Mounted Brigade.

Head-quarters.

1 cavalry regiment.

1 horse artillery battery and a mounted brigade ammunition column.

2 mounted infantry battalions.

1 mounted brigade transport and supply column.

1 cavalry field ambulance.

F.—Composition of the Army Troops for a Force of a Cavalry Division and 6 Divisions.

Army head-quarters.

2 mounted brigades.

2 Imperial Yeomanry squadrons.

1 infantry battalion.

2 wireless telegraph companies.

2 cable telegraph companies.

2 air-line telegraph companies.

3 balloon companies.

2 bridging trains.

1 army troops transport and supply column.

2 field ambulances.

In order more thoroughly to understand the organization in question, a study of the remainder of the book is necessary.

15. Coming now to practical proposals, it is submitted for the consideration of the Conference that—

- (i) The same military terms should be adopted throughout the Empire, especially as regards the names applied to similar bodies of troops, *e.g.*, "cavalry regiment," "field company," "infantry battalion."
- (ii) Any unit which may be sent as part of a colonial contingent in war should be composed, as far as circumstances permit, of the numbers shown in War Establishments.
- (iii) When a number of units are sent they should be grouped in the same manner as shown in War Establishments.
 - (a) When mounted troops are sent they should, if possible, be organized as mounted brigades, but there would be no need to differentiate between cavalry and mounted infantry in the brigade, and all these units might with advantage be on the cavalry war establishment.
 - (b) When dismounted men are sent, they should be organized into divisions, if sufficient in number; if not, into infantry brigades, with a due proportion of divisional troops.
- (iv) Whatever the size of the contingent sent by a colony, it should be accompanied by the requisite number of administrative field units; these are necessary on the same scale as is provided for in War Establishments to meet its wants in the way of ammunition and supplies, and for attending to the sick and wounded. The administrative units held

ready in the United Kingdom are only sufficient to deal with the requirements of the forces despatched from thence; consequently, unless units of this nature were sent with the colonial contingents, the fighting troops of one or the other force would have to go short.

- (v) Administrative units on the lines of communication should be provided entirely by the United Kingdom.

16. It may perhaps be asked why the war organization of the United Kingdom shall be adopted as the universal war organization of the Empire. The reason is that for many years to come the army despatched from the United Kingdom is likely to form the larger portion of the whole force engaged in any Imperial campaign, and that it is therefore simpler for the forces sent from the various colonies to conform to its organization than for it, and the forces from the remaining colonies, to conform to that of any one colony. Further, the General Staff in London have facilities for the study of war organization which are not yet available in the case of any of the colonies. The war organization now being introduced has been worked out after the devotion of much attention to the question, and the careful study of the organization of the leading foreign armies. The work of the General Staff is proceeding continuously, and it is hoped that by this means constant improvement will be possible, and that the organization will advance concurrently with the progress of military science.

17. It may also be urged that, although the organization worked out by the General Staff may be that best suited for a great war, it may yet be unsuitable for the other duties for which the military forces of certain colonies are primarily intended. This is of course a question which must be weighed by the authorities of the colonies concerned, but the wisest principle to adopt in such cases is that any organization should be based on the most important requirements which it is likely to have to meet; moreover, it will generally be possible so to adapt the organization that it can be made to serve more than one set of circumstances.

18. It is hoped that the representatives of the different colonies will use their influence on their return home to impress on their Governments the great additional strength which would accrue to the Empire should uniformity of war organization be achieved. The great services rendered in the past by the colonies show the value of any assistance which they are prepared to give in time of emergency, even without the advantages of a similar organization. In the future the value of such assistance would be still further increased if it could be given in a form which enables it to be at once fitted into its place in the organization of the army in the field. Every colony which sent a contingent to fight alongside the forces of the United Kingdom, and of other colonies, would then have the satisfaction of knowing that it was applying its aid in the manner in which it would be most effective and at the point where it was most required.

N. G. LYTTTELTON,
C.G.S.

March 14, 1907.

VI.

Subject No. 3 proposed for discussion by Army Council.

PATTERNS AND PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT AND STORES FOR COLONIAL FORCES.

(PAPER PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL AND THE MASTER-GENERAL OF THE ORDNANCE.)

1. The question to be considered divides itself into two headings—
 - (a) The pattern of the arms and equipments which should be provided.
 - (b) The amount which should be maintained as a reserve.

(a) QUESTION OF PATTERN.

2. *Small arms.*—It is *essential* that the small arms supplied to any force which may have to act side by side with troops from the United Kingdom should fire the same ammunition as that supplied to the latter. On service, the supplies of ammunition would be drawn from the same source, and it would be impracticable

to arrange for an adequate supply of different kinds to suit arms of varying calibre or chamber.

3. It is also most desirable, although not essential, that the arms should be of the same pattern as those in the hands of the regular army, as this would facilitate the execution of repairs or allow of the exchange of unserviceable arms from the general stock, without giving a man a weapon he did not understand.

4. *Machine guns.*—The above remarks apply with equal force to machine guns.

5. *Clothing, accoutrements, harness and saddlery, camp equipment, &c.*—In the case of stores of the above classes, there is no necessity for a rigid adherence to the patterns in use in the regular army, provided the articles are of such materials and such a design as to be equally efficient.

6. It is most desirable that the area of supply of the warlike stores under reference should be as wide as possible, and, therefore, the Colonial Governments should be urged to arrange for local manufacture and provision, rather than to rely on the resources of the United Kingdom.

7. To assist them in carrying this out, certain broad principles should be laid down as to the requirements which the articles are required to fulfil, and sample patterns of the articles approved for the regular force should be supplied, when desired, as a guide to design.

8. It would also be well for samples of all patterns which Colonial Governments propose to adopt to be submitted to the War Office for record. Should any of the patterns have already received trial in this country, the result could at once be communicated to the Colonial Government concerned.

(b) QUESTION OF PROVISION OF RESERVES.

9. It is a mistake to suppose that equipment can be easily obtained or improvised on mobilization. Some few articles, such as blankets or boots, might, it is true, be got, but only at the cost of delay in the readiness of the force to take the field. It is, therefore, necessary that all articles required as the first outfit of any force should be in possession, or held in reserve ready for issue.

10. The provision of such reserve involves not only the capital outlay necessary for the purchase of the stores, but also that required for suitable storehouses in which to keep them, and, in addition, an annual charge for personnel necessary for their care and custody.

11. There is also the question of "turnover," by which is meant the utilization of the articles which have been in store longest to meet ordinary peace "wear and tear" requirements, replacing them in reserve by new articles. This is not an unimportant point, as, although equipment may not deteriorate in store to any appreciable extent if properly looked after, military requirements change in course of time, and articles for which there is no regular outlet grow out-of-date and useless.

12. We hold in reserve in this country, for an expeditionary force, stores and equipment—

(a) To complete the war outfit of every unit required for the force.

(b) To replace war wastage for a period of six months.

There are, of course, other classes of reserves held as well, but these need not be enumerated.

13. Colonial Governments should, it is thought, be urged to hold complete, for all forces which they contemplate being able to put into the field, reserves of class (a), and to make, during peace, definite arrangements for the supply of stores required under (b).

W. G. NICHOLSON,
Q.M.G.

C. F. HADDEN,
M.G.O.

March 21, 1907.

VII.

Subject No. 4 proposed for discussion by Army Council.

THE DESIRABILITY THAT THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD GIVE THEIR ORDERS FOR ORDNANCE STORES, PARTICULARLY ARMS AND AMMUNITION, THROUGH THE WAR OFFICE.

No. 1.

(PAPER PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MASTER-GENERAL OF THE ORDNANCE.)

1. The desirability of placing all colonial orders for warlike stores through the War Office, instead of direct from the trade, has been under discussion for many years, and has several times been brought to the notice of the Agents-General.

2. After discussion in 1903, a Colonial Defence Committee memorandum was drawn up (No. 327 M), and printed for the consideration of colonial governments. This memorandum was circulated to the colonial governments in August 1905.

3. As explained in the above memorandum, the stores required by colonial governments fall into three classes:—

(a) Stores which can be issued from army stock and do not require to be replaced.

(b) Stores which can be issued from army stock only by trenching on reserves from Imperial service, for which a definite scale and programme of supply has been laid down.

(c) Stores which are not in stock and must be specially ordered to meet the demand.

4. As regards (a), supply can be made immediately upon the receipt of the colonial requisitions, and therefore the colony could obtain quicker supply than by ordering direct from the trade, and in certain circumstances supply could be made at a reduced price. For instance, an Australian colony ordered in 1905 some pompoms direct from the trade, while at that time there were a number of these guns in army stock surplus to requirements. This order was given prior to the receipt in the Colony of the C.D.C. memorandum referred to above.

5. Provision has also been made recently for the local issue of stores on repayment on the indent of the officer administering the government of the colony, and arrangements have been made in the case of ammunition to issue from lots of most recent manufacture in local stock.

6. As regards (b), there was at one time some financial difficulty in making an immediate issue from army stock owing to the disturbance of army votes caused by the necessity for immediate replacement. By an arrangement, approved by His Majesty's Treasury, this financial difficulty has been removed, and in the absence of any administrative objection, stores falling in this category can now, as a rule, be issued direct from army stock without any delay.

7. As regards stores in the third class (c), which are usually stores of entirely new patterns, unavoidable delay may occasionally occur, but it is improbable that the delay in any instance would be greater than if the colony placed the order direct with the trade without the intervention of the War Office. By placing a direct order with the trade in these cases the colony has no security that the stores will really be of the latest pattern, and at the same time is prevented from sharing in the Ordnance Factory price, which is often considerably lower than the trade price. For instance, the Ordnance Factory prices for the new Q.F. Horse and Field Artillery vehicles (carriages, limbers, and waggons) are only slightly above half the prices paid to the trade.

8. The disadvantages arising from the placing of colonial orders direct with the trade are fully dealt with in a letter addressed to the Colonial Office, dated 16th January 1906, a copy of which is annexed as an appendix.

9. The contents of this letter were circulated to the colonial governments in August 1906.

C. F. HADDEN,
M.G.O.

March 20, 1907.

APPENDIX.

WAR OFFICE LETTER REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 8.

SIR,

January 16th, 1906.

1. IN connection with the subject dealt with in the Colonial Defence Committee memorandum No. 327 M of 22nd November 1904, which was forwarded to you in War Office letter, 57/20/8550, under date 6th June 1905, I am commanded by the Army Council to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for the Colonies that it has come to the notice of this department that several important orders for guns have been recently placed direct by colonies with firms in this country. The disadvantages of this procedure have been already emphasized in general terms in the above-quoted memorandum, but there arise also certain further drawbacks in matters of detail of which the Colonial authorities may be unaware, and which it is possible Lord Elgin may think fit to communicate to them—

- (i) In the first place this practice interferes with the system of dividing all orders (including those for the Royal Navy and for colonies, &c.), between the Ordnance factories and the trade in accordance with well established principles.
- (ii) It deprives the colonies of the advantage of sharing the benefit of the Ordnance factories' price, which is in almost every case less than the price charged by the trade, in some cases very considerably so.
- (iii) It deprives the colonies of the advantage of arrangements made by the Secretary of State for War under section 27 (2) of the Patents Act, as, unless the stores to which the patents apply are supplied through the agency of a home government department, terms for the use of the patents must be arranged separately by the colonies, who are thus unable to avail themselves of the privileges provided by that section of the Act.
- (iv) It prevents the colonies reaping the advantages of obtaining articles direct from store without delay, which they can occasionally do when there are surpluses in the Imperial Service; in which case they might in certain circumstances be supplied at a reduced rate.
- (v) It causes great difficulties as regards inspection. This is due in the first place to the fact that the orders are often loosely worded, and not in the detail customary with War Office contracts; and secondly, to the fact that they are placed so that delivery is taken from the firm's works. The result is that inspection and proof have to be carried out at those works, where it cannot be done with the proper degree of supervision, in sufficient detail, and with due regard to interchangeability.

The above applies when the colonies call on the War Office to carry on inspection for them. In cases where they appoint their own inspectors these have of necessity to apply to the War Office inspection staff for information, guidance, and assistance in proofs and tests.

2. No doubt those interested foster the belief that the colonies experience delay by obtaining stores through this department; but the Army Council would point out that the armament trade is in the hands of a small number of firms, and that to place the orders direct simply enables the contractors to play off one department or colony against another, and tends to defeat the object they all have in view. There is only too good reason to believe that the competition of foreign powers already leads to high prices, and to the postponement of orders placed by this department, in order to accommodate rival purchasers; and it is feared that this will be greatly aggravated if there should be additional competition on the part of colonial governments. It is to avoid any such competition that orders for warlike stores for the Royal Navy are given through the War Office to the trade.

3. It is to be remarked that a great deal of the delay complained of is due to this department insisting on interchangeability, which experience has shown to be absolutely essential for service. The necessity of this interchangeability, as well as the importance of standardization throughout the Empire, are matters upon which it is unnecessary to dilate; to ensure this it is considered most desirable that arrangements for the provision of warlike stores should, in all but the most exceptional cases, be made by this department. The Army Council are so convinced of the

necessity for this course, that they desire me to point out that, while most anxious to assist the colonies, and however deeply they would deplore such a step, they may have seriously to consider whether they will be able to afford the services of their inspection staff when it is not followed.

4. The Council would be glad if Lord Elgin could give this matter his earnest attention, and they suggest that it might be discussed at any future Colonial Conference, when the officers concerned could give evidence as to the unfortunate results which have arisen in the past, and which will certainly arise in the future, by the adoption of a course at variance with that which is advocated in this letter.

I am, &c.,

E. W. D. WARD.

The Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office, S.W.

No. 2.

THE GOVERNOR OF NEWFOUNDLAND to THE SECRETARY OF
STATE.

(Received October 3, 1906.)

Government House, St. John's,
September 20, 1906.

MY LORD,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 10th August last,* on the subject of ordering warlike stores through the proper authorities, which was forwarded to my Ministers for their information, I have the honour to enclose herewith the reply I have received from the Premier of this Colony.

I have, &c.,

W. MacGREGOR.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
St. John's, Newfoundland,
September 4, 1906.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, enclosing copy of despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, of date 10th ultimo in reference to the question of ordering warlike stores, and I notice that the matter is proposed as a fitting subject for discussion at the forthcoming Colonial Conference.

I have, &c.,

R. BOND,

Colonial Secretary.

His Excellency

Sir W. MacGregor, K.C.M.G., C.B., &c.,
Governor.

No. 3.

THE GOVERNOR OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE to THE SECRETARY OF
STATE.

(Received October 6, 1906.)

Government House, Cape Town,
September 18, 1906.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, with reference to your despatch of 10th August last,* a copy of a minute from Ministers, on the subject of the supply of Stores to Colonial Governments by the Army Ordnance Department.

I have, &c.,

WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.

* This despatch set forth the contents of Appendix to War Office Memorandum above.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Prime Minister's Office, Cape Town,
September 17, 1906.*Minute.*

With reference to His Excellency the Governor's minute dated the 4th instant, transmitting copy of a despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, relative to the supply of Stores to Colonial Governments by the Army Ordnance Department, Ministers have the honour to state that they acquiesce in the proposal contained in the last paragraph of the despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and consider that the matter is one which might usefully be discussed at the next Colonial Conference.

T. W. SMARTT.

No. 4.

THE GOVERNOR OF NEW ZEALAND to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
(Received November 22, 1906.)Government House, Wellington,
October 8, 1906.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your despatch of the 10th August last,* in which your Lordship informs me that it is considered most desirable that arrangements for the provision of warlike stores should, in all but the most exceptional cases, be made by the War Office.

2. I duly brought the contents of your despatch to the notice of my Ministers, who inform me that all orders from the New Zealand Government for defence material are placed with, or through, the War Office.

I have, &c.,
PLUNKET,
Governor.

No. 5.

THE GOVERNOR OF NATAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
(Received December 8, 1906.)Government House,
Pietermaritzburg, Natal,
November 12, 1906.

MY LORD,

WITH reference to your despatch of the 10th August,* I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a minute by the Commandant of Militia on the subject of the placing of orders with the War Office for ammunition and warlike stores.

2. Ministers note that the matter will be brought up for discussion at the Colonial Conference to be held in London next year.

I have, &c.,
HENRY McCALLUM.

Enclosure in No. 5.

COMMANDANT OF MILITIA to MINISTER OF DEFENCE, October 16, 1906.

Minute.

In dealing with the Circular Despatch from the Secretary of State herein, which refers particularly to this Colony, I may state at once that we have always been desirous of obtaining our ammunition from the War Department, and always have obtained it through this source except on two occasions, once when the War

* This despatch set forth the contents of Appendix to War Office Memorandum above.

Office was unwilling to supply the particular Mark we asked for, and on the second occasion when it was unable to supply it.

The second paragraph of the Secretary of State's despatch refers to the latter instance. An indent for 3,000,000 rounds of Mark V. ammunition (to be obtained from the War Office) and 2,000,000 rounds of axite ammunition with Mark V. bullet (to be obtained from Kynoch & Co.) was sent to the Agent-General in December of last year. With regard to the order for the 3,000,000 rounds Mark V. ammunition to be obtained from the War Office, the Agent-General informed this Government by letter, dated 22nd December, that the War Office had been induced to issue the Mark V. ammunition, and stated that he had to make certain promises as to its use, &c. On the 25th January the Agent-General cabled as follows:—"War Office have issued to me all the Mark V. ammunition they have in store, totalling 2,700,000 rounds. Please telegraph instructions regarding the balance." A reply to which was sent requesting that the balance should be made up of Mark VI.

In the notes accompanying the indent on the Agent-General for the axite ammunition, paragraph 2 reads as follows:—"The axite ammunition is only to be ordered on the understanding that this explosive is approved by the War Department. It is understood that it is being tested by the War Department at present." On the 16th February the Agent-General informed me by cable that the War Office trials were not yet completed, and there was a certain amount of risk in obtaining such a large quantity of ammunition which had not yet been approved by the War Office, although careful practical tests of it had been made in the Colony, which proved highly satisfactory. I requested the Agent-General by cable to obtain 1,000,000 each of axite and cordite ammunition with Mark V. bullets from Kynoch & Co.

In requesting the Agent-General to obtain the ammunition from Kynoch & Co., I did so with the knowledge that, as regards the axite, it could not be supplied by the War Office, and as regards the cordite with Mark V. bullet, that it also could not be supplied by War Office, seeing that our order for the 3,000,000 rounds had already exhausted their stock, and that only 2,700,000 rounds could be issued on the order. I was, however, very gratified to hear from the Agent-General, in his letter dated 20th April 1906, that the War Office had agreed to manufacture cordite Mark V. ammunition to our special order should we require any further supplies, and I have already taken advantage of this offer.

The foregoing explanation will, I hope, clearly show that this Government is not only willing but most anxious to fall in with the wishes of the Home Government as regards the purchase of warlike stores, more especially in ammunition, which we have long recognised to be more reliable than that obtained directly, or indirectly through the War Office, from the trade.

I need not dilate further on the despatch, but I cannot conclude without drawing attention to paragraph 3, in reference to prices. Our experience in this Colony does not coincide with this, but is rather to the contrary, the War Office price being 95s. per 1,000 rounds and the trade 85s. per 1,000.

H. T. BRU-DE-WOLD, Colonel,
Commandant of Militia.

October 16, 1906.

No. 6.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

Downing Street,
December 19, 1906.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Earl of Elgin to transmit to you, to be laid before the Army Council, a copy of a despatch* from the Governor of Natal forwarding a minute by the Commandant of Militia on the subject of the placing of orders for ammunition and other warlike stores with the War Office.

I am to state that Lord Elgin would be glad to be favoured with the Army Council's observations on Colonel Bru-de-Wold's minute, and especially on the remark in the last paragraph as to the relative prices charged by the War Office and by the trade.

I am, &c.,
C. P. LUCAS.

* No. 5.

No. 7.

WAR OFFICE to COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Received February 5, 1907.)

War Office, London, S.W.,
February 5, 1907.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter of the 19th December,* I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that Colonel Bru-de-Wold's minute (a copy of which accompanied your letter) is concurred in generally, the only statement calling for remark being the last paragraph relative to War Office and trade prices.

The War Office Vocabulary price for small arm ammunition, formerly 95s. per 1,000, but reduced by the publication of the 1906 Vocabulary to 93s., and now further reduced to 87s. 6d., includes cost of inspection and packing, whereas the rate of 85s. quoted by Colonel Bru-de-Wold as the trade rate is exclusive of these charges, which amount to 5½ per cent.

It is, of course, impracticable, owing to various considerations, to place the whole of the orders for the Army with the contractor who quotes the lowest price; and the quotations of those trade firms, from whom supplies are regularly obtained by this Department, range from 79s. to 90s.

The latest Ordnance Factory price is 83s. 8d. War Office Vocabulary prices are based on the average cost of Ordnance Factory and trade supplies.

All the prices quoted above are for Mark VI. Ammunition, the current pattern under manufacture; for Mark V. Ammunition (not now made for this Department) the trade price, and also the Ordnance Factory price, would be considerably higher.

From the above it will be apparent that supplies of small arm ammunition can be obtained through the War Office at a lower cost than if the order were placed direct with the trade at the price quoted in Colonel Bru-de-Wold's minute. Moreover, if supplies are obtained direct from the trade without inspection, there is grave risk, not only of the quality not being up to the standard, but of ammunition already rejected by the War Office being supplied.

I am, &c.,
E. W. WARD.

No. 8.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR OF NATAL.

SIR,

Downing Street, February 8, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 12th of November last,† forwarding a minute by the Commandant of Militia on the subject of the placing of orders for ammunition and warlike stores, and to transmit to you a copy of a letter‡ from the War Office replying to Colonel Bru-de-Wold's observations with regard to the prices of ammunition.

I have, &c.,
ELGIN.

No. 9.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF CANADA to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received March 11, 1907.)

[Copy sent to War Office, March 14, 1907.]

Government House, Ottawa,
February 26, 1907.

MY LORD,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 10th August 1906,§ advocating the expediency of orders for warlike supplies required by Colonial Governments being placed through the medium of the War Office instead of being given direct to firms in England, I have the honour to enclose copy of an approved Minute of the Privy Council expressing the general concurrence of my responsible

* No. 6.

† No. 5.

‡ No. 7.

§ See note to No. 2.

advisers in the course recommended by the Army Council and agreeing to your Lordship's suggestion that the matter should be discussed at the approaching Colonial Conference.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

Enclosure in No. 9.

EXTRACT from a REPORT of the COMMITTEE of the PRIVY COUNCIL, approved by the Governor-General on the 25th February 1907.

P.C. 1148 M.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 10th August 1906, on the subject of placing in England orders for warlike supplies required by Colonial Governments.

The Minister of Militia and Defence, to whom the said despatch was referred, observes that the object of this despatch (which has been sent at the instance of the War Office) is to draw attention to the disadvantages of the procedure at present followed by certain Colonies when placing orders for warlike supplies, as mentioned above, in that—

1. Orders are not infrequently given direct to private manufacturers without the knowledge or co-operation of the War Office. Where this is done, the Colony concerned loses the benefit of sharing ordnance factory prices (which are less than those charged by the trade), as well as the advantage of the provisions of the Patent Acts, while undesirable competition between the War Office and the Colony is apt to arise, resulting in the manufacturer being able to charge enhanced prices to both.

2. It is often found that articles of novel pattern have been ordered, or that War Office specifications for similar articles used by the Army have not been followed, with the result that inspection (which the War Office is usually asked to undertake) is made difficult, while interchangeability, a matter of the highest importance, has been overlooked.

The Minister, in regard to the points thus raised, states that, with the exception of one or two orders of minor importance, the system followed by the Government has been generally in accord with the spirit of the procedure advocated by the War Office.

Where warlike stores of the pattern maintained in stock by the War Office have been wanted, they have been ordered from the War Office.

Where, as in a recent case, an order for field artillery guns of the most modern type was given direct to the manufacturers, it was expressly laid down in the contract that they must be manufactured according to War Office specifications, and were to be paid for at War Office contract rates.

And where, as in another comparatively recent case, an order was given direct for certain guns not then adopted for His Majesty's Service, it was stipulated in the contract that they should be subject to War Office inspection and that the price charged should be certified by the War Office to be fair and reasonable.

The Minister therefore submits that while the procedure advocated by the War Office has not been followed out in its entirety, Your Excellency may safely express a general concurrence in the views enunciated by the Army Council, and at the same time accept the suggestion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the subject is one which might with advantage be discussed at the forthcoming Conference.

The Committee, concurring in the foregoing, advise that Your Excellency be pleased to forward a copy hereof to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

All which is respectfully submitted for Your Excellency's approval.

RODOLF LE BOUDREAU,
Acting Clerk of the Privy Council.

VIII.

DEFENCE (NAVAL).

(1) *Resolution of Commonwealth of Australia—*

"That the provisions of the Naval Defence Agreement, 1902, be reconsidered."

(2) *Resolution of New Zealand—*

"That the question of an increased contribution by the Australasian Colonies to the Australasian-New Zealand Squadron should be considered together with other matters respecting Colonial Defence."

No. 1.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE ON THE QUESTION OF A GENERAL SCHEME OF DEFENCE FOR AUSTRALIA.—
May 1906.

(Laid before Commonwealth Parliament.)

GENERAL SCHEME OF DEFENCE.

In the following Memorandum it is proposed—

- (i) To review briefly the broad strategic principles on which any measures for the local defence of Australia must of necessity be based;
- (ii) To examine the requirements of a detailed scheme for the "defence of the ports of the Commonwealth, framed in the light of present and future naval developments, as far as can be judged, and adapted to any attacking forces which may be reasonably expected";
- (iii) To consider "the general organisation of the military forces, and peace and war establishments"; and
- (iv) To discuss the question of "local naval defence for ports, harbours, and coastal trade," and its bearing on the "development of the maritime resources of the Commonwealth."

2. The general principle that war preparations should be governed by the reasonable probabilities of the next few years rather than by remoter possibilities is beyond question; but its application must be separately considered in regard to the provision of *matériel* and the organisation of *personnel*.

Experience has shown that there is no finality in the matter of war *matériel*, and that on an average little more than a decade elapses between successive re-armaments, whether of infantry, field artillery, or coast defences. It is therefore inadvisable that expenditure should exceed the requirements of the near future, especially in the case of such costly elements of defence as coast batteries. Should future naval developments tend to reduce the importance of the fixed defences, much wasted expenditure will thus be avoided. If, on the other hand, improvements in these defences should become desirable a few years hence, the money saved now by restricting expenditure to guns of moderate calibre will be available then for the purchase of new guns with the latest improvements. The mere size of the guns is no adequate criterion of efficiency in the defences of a port, and the provision of unnecessarily heavy artillery may retard necessary revisions in the future by increasing the cost of each re-armament. It is consequently neither necessary nor advisable to anticipate more than the requirements of the near future when considering the provision of war *matériel*, and especially of coast artillery armaments.

On the other hand, the national armies, on which must depend in the last resort the issue of wars for national existence, cannot be brought into being without long and careful preparation in peace, even though time for development after the outbreak of war may be guaranteed to them by the influence of sea power. The organisation of the active military forces maintained by the Commonwealth must consequently be designed not only to furnish the garrison troops which suffice under present conditions for local defence in Australia, but also to provide a certain

number of field troops, organised in units of all arms with the necessary departmental services, and grouped in brigade formations, which will serve as the training school and model for the field forces that may be required in the future. At the same time it is necessary to extend opportunities of elementary military instruction in various forms to as large a proportion as possible of the population with a view to rendering military training as universal as circumstances may for the time being permit.

I.—*Strategical Considerations.*

3. The primary condition of the security of all British territory and trade in war is the maintenance of superiority at sea over the naval forces of any combination of Powers likely to be formed against us. The traditional rôle of the Navy is to seek out all the ships of the enemy wherever they may be, and either bring them to action or mask them if they remain in port. This policy of active offence against the enemy's naval forces as opposed to one of local naval defence of our own coasts is still, as it has always been, the only possible way of giving effective protection to the shipping and maritime commerce in every sea on which the economic life of the widely dispersed members of the Empire depends.

4. The enormous advantages accruing to the belligerent who succeeds in establishing sea supremacy over his opponent are now well understood, and it is to be expected that any naval Power hoping to inflict serious injury upon us will, on the outbreak of war, attempt to neutralise our naval superiority and, if possible, to wrest from us the command of the sea. This object can only be attained as the result of great battles in which the main fleets of the contending Powers are concentrated for the decisive encounters. Arrangements for this concentration must be made in time of peace, and the normal distribution of our battle fleets must be governed by the dispositions of the foreign fleets which for the time being are regarded as their most formidable rivals.

With a view to impairing our measures of concentration in war, and inducing us to weaken our main fleets, the enemy may endeavour to create a widespread feeling of insecurity and alarm throughout the Empire by utilising such classes of vessels as are unfitted for taking part in the decisive actions in raiding our sea-borne trade and threatening distant portions of the Empire. Although in themselves such raiding operations will be only of secondary importance, as the ultimate issue of the war must depend on the result of the fleet actions, it will be necessary to take a vigorous offensive against all such outlying raiding vessels in order to prevent the disturbance of trade and demoralisation which might be caused by their depredations.

5. It is the constant policy of the Admiralty to keep our squadrons on distant stations sufficiently strong to protect our trade from attack by the foreign squadrons normally stationed in those seas. It is, of course, possible that in war time an enemy might send out additional cruisers to attack our Colonial trade, but in this case our superiority in vessels of this class and our greater facilities of ports would enable us to despatch a preponderating force in pursuit.

The distribution at any moment of foreign navies, and of all merchant vessels likely to be employed as armed auxiliaries, is known in time of peace. During the period of strained relations every effort will be made to keep the ships of the prospective enemy under observation. The great increase in the rapidity and certainty of transmission of intelligence consequent on the development of submarine cables and wireless telegraphy, have combined to add enormously to the difficulties of raiding operations depending for their success on tactics of evasion.

When the presence of a commerce raider in the Eastern seas is reported, it will be desirable to bring her to action without delay, and if possible before she can reach our own territorial waters. This points to the necessity of concerted action not only for direct pursuit, but also with a view to intercepting her at obligatory points of passage, and off hostile or even neutral ports at which she is likely to call. It is for this reason that under the Naval Agreement of 1903 the cruisers on the Australian Station are not necessarily confined in war to the waters of that station, while it is recognised that they will not be the only force used there should the necessity arise for a larger force. The object of making the naval Commander-in-Chief on the China Station responsible for the strategical distribution of the cruisers on the China, Australian, and East Indies Stations is simply to ensure that all the ships of the enemy in these seas may be dealt with at the earliest possible moment wherever they may be found. Closely concerted offensive

action by powerful sea-going ships will afford the only effective protection to Australian floating trade, whether on the high seas or in local waters.

6. Having regard to our present naval strength and dispositions, it follows from the above considerations that attacks on floating trade in distant seas will offer to an enemy but slight prospect of any but very transitory successes. Similar considerations impose even greater restrictions on the possible forms of attack on the Australian littoral.

In considering this subject it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between hasty raids, dependent for success on surprise and rapidity of execution rather than on the number of troops employed, and larger operations aiming at a prolonged or permanent occupation of Australian territory. The oversea conveyance from a distant base of operations of a military expedition strong enough for the latter purpose, and its continued supply with munitions of war when landed, would only be possible to a Power which was mistress of the seas and was able to destroy or mask all the hostile ships that might at any time be in a position to interrupt the communications of the expeditionary force. No such expedition has ever been carried to a successful conclusion unless this condition has been fulfilled, and some of the greatest military disasters recorded in history have resulted from failure to secure or retain the assured sea command which is essential for the prosecution of an oversea campaign. It is evident that so long as British naval strength is calculated and maintained on the basis of securing command of the sea as against all probable enemies, and protecting the maritime communications of the Empire against disturbance, the attacks upon the Australian littoral against which land defence is required will be limited to raids hastily carried out by single vessels or small squadrons which have temporarily evaded our naval forces.

Assuming it to be the object of the raiding vessels to avoid capture by our cruisers for as long a period as possible, while inflicting the maximum of injury on our commerce, their best course would be to remain in open waters, rather than to approach our coasts and commercial ports, where their presence would be quickly reported to our own ships, which, especially in Australian waters, will have a great advantage over them in respect of information. In the absence, however, of suitable measures of defence on land, commerce raiders might be induced to raid a port if the advantages to be gained thereby appeared to outweigh the risks involved in the disclosure of their position.

II.—Measures of Local Defence.

7. The defensive measures required on land to provide against attacks by raiding cruisers acting under these limitations come within certain clearly defined categories.

From the point of view of the protection of sea-borne commerce it is necessary to provide a certain number of fortified harbours of refuge, where merchant shipping can, in case of need, seek protection from capture or molestation, and remain in safety until commerce raiders reported in neighbouring waters have been dealt with by His Majesty's ships or compelled to withdraw from shortage of coal. In some few cases favourably situated harbours may have to be defended with this special strategical object in view, but in most cases it will be possible to utilise as harbours of refuge great commercial ports where fixed defences would in any case be provided for other reasons. Fixed defences are required at a commercial port if such resources as naval stores, graving docks, or extensive plants of coaling machinery, which are of essential value to our warships and mercantile marine, are collected within such a limited and exposed space that they might be seriously damaged by the gun-fire of raiding cruisers if no defences existed. The function of the fixed defences will be to keep the enemy's cruisers at a sufficient distance from the objects protected.

Raids on other commercial ports would gain for an enemy no advantage that he could not derive from attacking shipping on the high seas, and the inducements to bombard would be outweighed by the knowledge that attack would reveal the position of the raiding vessels, and by considerations of ammunition supply. A bombardment could inflict no substantial injury without an expenditure of ammunition which must be regarded as prohibitive when no object of strategic importance is involved. There is therefore no likelihood that an undefended town would be subjected to bombardment as an alternative to the payment of an indemnity even

were it not the case that any wanton damage inflicted on such a place would inevitably provoke reprisals which must fall heavily on the weaker maritime Power.

At cable landing places, a small infantry defence is required to prevent damage to the shore ends of the cables by boats' crews landing from a raiding vessel. The measure of protection required is evidently only that which will involve such risk of loss to the attackers as will deter them from an enterprise, which, even if successful, will cause only a temporary interruption to the particular cable attacked, while communication by other alternative cable routes, of which there are now several, would still remain open.

In the future, the security of wireless telegraphy stations will have to be considered, but in most cases it should be possible to erect the installations in such positions that the necessity for special measures of defence will be obviated.

8. The application of these principles to Australian ports points to the retention of fixed defences at Fremantle, Port Adelaide, Port Phillip (Melbourne), Sydney, Newcastle, Brisbane, Normanby Sound (Torres Strait), and Hobart.

No other fortified ports are required as strategic harbours of refuge for merchant shipping, nor do any other commercial ports in Australia at present possess concentrated resources, either ashore or afloat, to such an extent as to justify the provision of defensive works at the present time. It is impossible to provide against every conceivable attack, or to enter upon war with the certainty of incurring no losses, and it is wiser to confine expenditure on local defence to protecting objectives of real strategic value than to attempt to extend protection to an indefinite number of places where the shipping and resources, though of local importance, are not essential to the general maintenance of maritime trade.

The supersession of Albany by Fremantle calls for some explanation. When King George's Sound was selected in 1882 as a mercantile strategic harbour of refuge in the neighbourhood of the great trade route which rounds Cape Leeuwin, to be fortified and garrisoned at the joint expense of the Australian Colonies, it was the only harbour in the south-west of Australia. This is no longer the case. From the point of view of position, with reference to the trade route, there is little to choose between King George's Sound and Fremantle, and as only one harbour of refuge is required in these waters, the selection should be governed by such considerations as the course of trade in peace and the facilities for shipping in regard to coaling and other marine resources. In these respects the balance of advantage has completely turned in favour of Fremantle, which, owing to its greatly improved harbour facilities, has now become the port of call for the various lines of mail steamers. Albany is, therefore, no longer required as a strategic harbour of refuge, and it does not fulfil the other conditions necessitating fixed defences.

Normanby Sound (Torres Strait) is the harbour of refuge now usually referred to as Thursday Island, where the guns for its protection are mounted. The re-siting of the defences to meet modern requirements is discussed elsewhere.

9. In order to arrive at just conclusions in regard to the standards of defence to be adopted at Australian defended ports, it is necessary to form as clear an idea as possible of the character of the vessels which may reasonably be expected to engage in raiding attacks in Australian waters, and of the strength of the landing parties which might be disembarked.

As already stated, a powerful enemy is likely at the outset of war to use every endeavour to cripple our sea power, for which purpose all his armoured cruisers as well as his battleships will be required. Even when his battleships have been reduced to inactivity, there will still remain more urgent and suitable strategic tasks for those of his cruisers which are armoured than attacks on distant defended ports. The experience of the recent Russo-Japanese war confirms the evidence afforded by the Spanish-American war of 1898 as to the improbability of any such employment of this important type of warship, which costs almost, if not quite, as much as a battleship, and takes as long to build. Thus in 1898, when Admiral Cervera's squadron was despatched across the Atlantic, there was never the slightest intention on the part of the Spanish naval authorities to attack the coast towns of the United States. Again, the rôle of the powerful squadron of armoured cruisers which was based on Vladivostok throughout 1904 was to interrupt the lines of communication of the expeditionary armies, and their feverish movements and eventual fate illustrate the precarious situation of the cruisers of a Power inferior at sea, even when acting from a near and secure base. It is worthy of notice also that the attacks on the Japanese transports would have been more serious

if the Russian cruisers could have dispersed, but the strong probability of being destroyed singly if met by the Japanese cruiser squadron compelled them to keep together, and so to sacrifice the principle of ubiquity which has been considered the most formidable characteristic of cruiser raids. The recent changes in the distribution of the Royal Navy, which have aimed at disposing our forces in peace in the manner most likely to prove effective in war, have involved the formation of powerful squadrons of armoured cruisers. These changes, and the large number of modern vessels of this type of which this country is now possessed, have an important bearing on the question of the limitations attaching to the action of an enemy's armoured cruisers.

On the whole, it may now safely be assumed that the exigencies of modern naval warfare will, in all reasonable probability, compel an enemy to reserve his armoured cruisers for the more important strategical operations, such as working with his battle fleets, operating against our detached squadrons, protecting his own commerce, and, in short, operating against other warships, and not against land defences. The employment of armoured cruisers, as of battleships, in Australian waters is not a contingency which, in the light of present and future naval developments, as far as can now be judged, need reasonably be expected.

If raiding attacks on Australian ports are attempted the classes of vessels employed will, therefore, in all probability be those which are of small value for the major operations of naval warfare, such as unarmoured cruisers or armed merchant auxiliaries.

The number of vessels which may be expected to operate together must be small, since the main hope of success will lie in suddenness of execution and in ability to elude observation and avoid opposition by even an inferior naval force while the operations are in progress. The assumption on which Australian armaments have hitherto generally been based is that the number may be limited to a maximum of three or four, and nothing has occurred in recent naval warfare to give ground for supposing that this is other than a liberal estimate.

The number of men that three or four cruisers could disembark for a raid depends upon the following considerations. If only the normal complements are borne, it is estimated that the total number available would usually not exceed 500 men. It is not unlikely, however, that raiders despatched to so great a distance from their base as Australia would carry numbers surplus to the complement in order to replace casualties and wastage, and these would be available to reinforce the landing party. An enemy willing to incur the very serious danger of losing his ships entailed by operations in these distant seas might not hesitate to risk a few hundred additional men in the enterprise, and although it may reasonably be assumed that the raiders would not hamper themselves by the presence of unarmed transports, and that every vessel must form a fighting unit, the embarkation of a limited number of troops in the cruisers for the express purpose of raids on ports cannot be excluded from the range of possible contingencies. On the other hand, it is clear that the necessity for keeping the ships at all times ready to fight an action, and the great importance of carrying large supplies of coal and ammunition, would militate against overcrowding the decks of the three or four unarmoured vessels postulated.

For purposes of calculation, therefore, it may be assumed that the landing parties disembarked for a raid on an Australian port might reach a total of 1,000 men at the outside. The strength and disposition of the force required to meet this attack will vary at different ports, according to the topographical conditions.

10. In determining the standard of the gun defences required at Australian ports, it is necessary to bear in mind that a most powerful deterrent to attack in these remote waters will be the probability of sustaining injury affecting the fighting efficiency or seaworthiness of the ships at a distance from any place where repairs could be effected. The nearest foreign ports which at present possess the qualifications of naval bases are more than 4,000 miles distant from the chief Australian ports. At such a distance from bases of repair and refitting and depôts of ammunition and stores, the consequences of even partial disablement would be extremely serious, while considerations of ammunition supply will preclude an enemy from attempting to effect his object by a long-range bombardment. In considering this question of long-range fire it is necessary to avoid fallacious applications of the experience of recent naval actions. A ship at sea at a range of 10,000 yards or more constitutes a distinct target admitting of accuracy of aim and correction of sighting by observation of the effects of fire. The case is widely

different if the target is a dock, or a ship lying in a harbour, which may not be clearly distinguishable from seaward, or even exposed to view at all. Failing the means of careful observation of the effects of fire, no serious damage could be expected from firing the limited amount of ammunition available, and the attacking vessels would have to approach to a distance measured, not by the theoretical extreme range of their guns, but by the possibility of correcting their fire by observation. Here they would be exposed to great risk of disablement, especially if the enemy's targets were a long distance in rear of the coast defences.

It follows from these considerations, and from the nature of probable attack discussed in paragraph 9, that the type of gun selected for the defence of Australian ports should have great rapidity of fire and accuracy, with as large shell power as is obtainable without sacrifice of these essentials, but that it is unnecessary and inadvisable to seek after very long range and high power of penetrating armour protection. These latter qualities are not required, and could not be obtained without increasing calibre; and as calibre increases, handiness and speed of fire are lost, and the cost of guns, mountings, and emplacements rises rapidly. The chief defects of the armaments of Australian ports in the past have been want of homogeneity, and deficiencies in the accessories on which the value of modern guns is mainly dependent. By restricting the guns in future to a single and moderate calibre, and insuring the completeness of their equipment, the Commonwealth Government will secure economy, efficiency, and simplicity, both in armaments and in arrangements for ammunition supply. For the armaments of those of the Imperial defended ports, abroad as well as at home, where the attack to be provided against is of the same nature as that to which the ports of Australia are liable, the 6-inch gun of the latest pattern is accepted, with the approval of the Committee of Imperial Defence, as the weapon which best fulfils requirements. This gun has a rate of fire of six rounds per minute, and a range at 10 degrees elevation of 9,050 yards, as compared with a rate of fire of only three rounds a minute and a range at 10 degrees elevation of 11,700 yards for the 7.5-inch gun, the next higher calibre. It has not been considered that the increase of range and armour penetration compensates for the great loss of rapidity, and this calibre has not been introduced into the Imperial land service, in which there is now no gun intermediate between the 9.2-inch, which is mounted where the power to attack armour is considered essential, and the 6-inch, which is used where the most likely enemy will be unarmoured vessels.

It is not necessary to provide light armament against attacks by torpedo craft on merchant vessels lying in harbour. To sink such vessels without at least warning and examination would not be a legitimate operation of modern warfare, and the difficulty of distinguishing neutral ships would be a serious consideration. It may, moreover, be assumed that the mere destruction of a few merchantmen would not be considered a sufficient inducement for such an employment of torpedo craft, whose proper rôle is the attack of warships. His Majesty's ships are at all times prepared to defend themselves against attack by carried torpedo boats, and in Australian ports they are secure from attack by sea-going torpedo craft by reason of the distance of all possible hostile torpedo flotilla bases. Boom defences are not necessary or advisable for enclosing portions of Australian harbours, but the actual dock and lock gates, where they exist, should be protected by any suitable contrivance which will prevent injury by a Whitehead torpedo, or by the application of explosive charges in any other form.

Electric lights will be required at most ports to aid the gun defences.

Submarine mine-fields at present exist at some of the Australian ports, but this form of defence is being discontinued at all ports in Imperial charge as a result of the consideration by the Committee of Imperial Defence of the general policy of submarine mining in relation to coast defence. The adoption of the same course has recently been recommended to the Governments of Canada and New Zealand, and is now recommended in the case of Australian ports. The submarine mining service has always been a very technical one, and in the past it has been possible to draw on the experience of a numerous *personnel* employed at many defended ports for the highly qualified experimental and administrative staffs which have been indispensable for its direction. But even with the very complete system of instructional manuals and circulars issued from Army headquarters, it has been found difficult to secure uniform efficiency at outlying ports to which the central inspection and control did not fully extend. It is scarcely necessary to point out the disastrous effect on maritime trade that would be produced in time of war by

any untrustworthiness, or even suspicion of untrustworthiness, of the submarine mining defences of ports frequented by our shipping. Nothing but the highest degree of efficiency would suffice, and all experience goes to show that this could not be maintained at a small number of isolated ports, even with selected *personnel* of high individual capacity. It is therefore recommended that this form of defence should be discontinued in Australia.

11. Detailed projects for the revision of the gun defences and electric lights at each Australian defended port, and for the provision of necessary accessories, together with directions to guide the preparation of artillery and engineer manning tables for the works, and estimates of the infantry garrisons required for the defended ports and outlying cable landing places, have been printed in a separate secret Memorandum.*

III.—Organisation of the Military Forces.

12. The military forces of the Commonwealth are correctly divided into two categories, viz., field units brigaded in a field force organisation, and garrison troops allotted for the defence of particular localities.

Under the existing organisation the garrison troops are subdivided into two portions, called the "district reserves" and the "garrisons for forts." There appears to be no strategical justification for this arrangement, and it is recommended that, after provision has been made for the actual garrisons of the defended ports and for the detachments guarding outlying cable stations, all other units of militia and volunteers should be included in the field force organisation.

13. It is very desirable that the garrisons of defended ports, and those allotted to cable landing places, should, wherever practicable, be raised locally, in order that the coast artillery and engineers may be constantly trained at the guns and electric lights they will man in war, and that the mobile portion of the garrison may be thoroughly acquainted with the local topography.

It will not be possible to bring up troops from a distance in time to prevent a rapidly executed raiding attack, and the garrison allotted for the protection of each defended port must be capable of repelling the attack without external aid.

14. The principle governing the maintenance of field troops has already been discussed in paragraph 2. A field force organisation in Australia provides a school of training in field units and higher formations as distinguished from sedentary garrison service, and is a necessary factor in a complete system of national military training, especially in a country where no regular troops are maintained. In Australia it has been wisely decided to proceed from a basis of cadet training, through training according to arm in the military unit, to combined training when brigaded in the higher formation. This system will diffuse among an increasing proportion of the population the knowledge and discipline which distinguish an army from an armed mob. Each unit and brigade will serve not only as a training school, but also as a pattern to be multiplied indefinitely in case of necessity. The peace unit should be the nucleus round which the materials for war expansion would be formed under a system of territorialisation, which will enlist to the full local effort and interest. A sound foundation will thus be laid in time of peace for the development of the national resources to meet a national crisis. The influence of sea power may prolong the period available after the outbreak of a great war for the expansion and training of land forces, and may transfer the scene of the decisive land battles to foreign soil, but it cannot by itself decide the issue of a war for national existence, which must in the last resort depend on the action of fully developed citizen forces. The main object of a field force organisation of part of the militia in Australia is to supply the basis for expansion in case of grave national emergency.

15. The system of organising the field units into brigades of light horse and infantry appears to be well adapted to the circumstances of the Commonwealth. At present there are nine of these brigades, six of light horse and three of infantry. The proportion of mounted to dismounted riflemen has the advantage of giving scope for the special qualifications for mounted service which have been so conspicuously displayed by Australians. In the allotment of units to the brigades

* NOTE.—Paragraphs 2-11 of this paper were repeated in the Colonial Defence Committee Memorandum No. 366 M, on the Revision of the Fixed Defences of New Zealand, which was prepared at the instance of the New Zealand Government.

every effort has rightly been made to form a complete brigade from units belonging to a single military district. Six of the present brigades are thus formed, but the remaining three brigades are made up of units drawn from two or more military districts, and can only be regarded as formations on paper. Having regard to difficulties of inter-communication it seems unlikely that the brigadier would ever have an opportunity of training his brigade as such. Moreover, the organisation of units from two or more districts into one brigade might easily lead to a dual responsibility with its attendant drawbacks. It is true that this paper organisation of scattered units into brigades of the normal Australian pattern has the advantage of maintaining a uniform proportion between the different fighting arms and the very important but less popular departmental services, but there is no reason why this principle should be lost sight of so long as the brigades formed entirely in single districts remain as models of the fighting formations adopted by the Commonwealth. It is very desirable that the ultimate goal of organising and training all field units in normal brigades confined to their own districts should be kept in view. Until that object is attained, it is recommended that the field units surplus to the district brigade or brigades in the larger districts should be affiliated to one or other of the district brigades, and that the field units in each of the smaller districts should be grouped and trained together as a mixed force if they are insufficient to form a complete district brigade of normal composition.

16. As regards peace and war establishments, the arrangements at present in force have the grave defect that half of the war establishment of the light horse and infantry, and an even larger proportion of the artillery *personnel*, are to be introduced into the ranks for the first time on mobilisation. Such an arrangement is to be deprecated in any military force, and especially so where, as in the case of the Commonwealth Militia, the amount of military training is exceedingly limited. It is recognised, however, that the objections to such a course are, to some extent, diminished by the arrangement under which officers and non-commissioned officers are maintained in peace on practically a war establishment, and it is no doubt the case that in the country corps commanding officers might, owing to sparsity of population, find it exceedingly difficult to keep in touch with all portions of their units, if these were maintained in peace at a strength equal to war establishment.

Nevertheless, it should be possible to increase considerably the efficiency of units on mobilisation without introducing drastic changes into the existing organisation. Every opportunity should be taken of increasing the peace establishments of units already allotted to brigades, instead of creating new cadres, and the troops which now form the "district reserves," if not required to complete the garrisons recommended elsewhere for defended ports, should be absorbed into the brigade organisation. The men introduced on mobilisation to raise units from peace to war establishment, instead of being drawn entirely and indiscriminately from the rifle clubs, should be drawn from two classes, viz., (1) men who within three years previous to mobilisation have completed the third consecutive training in the active militia or volunteers, and (2) members of rifle clubs classified at the time as "marksmen." Lastly, it must be pointed out that the present annual period in camp, which alone offers any opportunity of a systematic training with the other arms, is very short, and should, if possible, be extended to at least ten days.

The field battery is the unit in which an increase of peace establishment is most required. Unless the gun detachments are thoroughly efficient at their drill, and the gunlayers and fuse setters absolutely trustworthy, it is impossible for the most expert commanding officer to obtain effective results. Efficiency can only be attained if the battery is regularly drilled with full detachments, and this fact points to the desirability of raising batteries in towns rather than in the country districts. It is recommended that batteries should throughout be limited to four guns; this is better fitted to the conditions of Australian militia than a six-gun organisation, and is well adapted to the Q.F. equipment now being introduced.

No force can keep the field without an ammunition column, but it appears that so far no arrangements have been made for supplying these essential units on mobilisation. Under Australian conditions, it is unnecessary to maintain the requisite *personnel* in peace, but the ammunition waggons with limbers and spare gun carriages should be provided in peace as "mobilisation equipment." The locally available equivalents of such vehicles as general service waggons and forage carts may, in the case of these as of all other field units, be left to be procured on mobilisation. Suitable arrangements must be worked out for providing the requisite officers, non-commissioned officers, men, and horses, for these columns on

mobilisation. The *personnel* of all ranks should, as far as possible, be composed of officers and men who have previously served in the artillery, and will thus be qualified to fill casualties in the ranks of the batteries. This requirement affords an additional reason for a considerable increase in the peace establishment of a field battery.

Under present arrangements a brigade of light horse contains one six-gun battery, and a brigade of infantry three four-gun batteries, two of which are armed with the 18-pr. Q.F. gun, while the third is to be armed in one case with guns of position, and in another with howitzers. In the case of the infantry brigade this gives a smaller proportion of guns to rifles than is normal in modern armies. In a British army corps the average is somewhat over 5 guns per 1,000 rifles, heavy guns being provided in the proportion of 1 and howitzers in the proportion of 1.5, to every 10 of the horse and field guns. It is, however, considered far more important that the existing Australian batteries should be given larger peace establishments than that any immediate effort should be made to increase the proportion of guns to rifles.

The shortage of peace as compared with war establishment can, in the case of the light horse, be remedied by adopting for war the establishment of the home Imperial Yeomanry. A regiment of Australian Light Horse on the present peace establishment of 296 all ranks would then be raised in war to 476 instead of to 583.

Two machine guns should form part of the equipment of each regiment of light horse and battalion of infantry.

17. With regard to rifle clubs, which form part of the military system of the Commonwealth, it is believed that much good would result from a system of affiliating each club to a neighbouring militia unit. These clubs are of value in affording facilities to acquire proficiency in the use of the rifle to men who for one reason or another cannot belong to a militia unit. It must, however, be remembered that the drill and discipline which can alone turn rifle shooting to good account on the battlefield cannot be acquired from membership in a rifle club, which can never be looked upon as an effective substitute for the military training afforded by service in the militia. If the rifle clubs are affiliated to militia units and administered under the supervision of the officers commanding these units, such a measure should tend to more economical and effective administration as regards rifle ranges, and to the simplification of arrangements on mobilisation, while promoting a spirit of comradeship and mutual interest between the two branches. If, as has been suggested above, a "reserve" is formed of ex-militiamen undertaking to join their units on mobilisation, should the occasion arise within two years of their completing their training in the active militia, one condition of service in the reserve should be membership during that period in the rifle club affiliated to their unit, so that their proficiency with the rifle may be maintained.

18. The recommendations made above respecting the organisation of the military forces may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) Garrisons to be recruited locally as far as possible.
- (2) The only organised brigades retained to be those which are, or can be, formed exclusively from units in a single military district. Other units either to be attached for administration and training to brigades in their own districts, or, in the less populous districts, to be administered and trained as mixed forces.
- (3) Units now classed as "district reserves" to be absorbed into the field units.
- (4) A militia reserve to be formed to provide, together with marksmen from the rifle clubs, the additional *personnel* required on mobilisation to raise units from peace to war establishment.
- (5) The peace establishment of units, especially in the case of artillery, to be gradually raised.
- (6) The annual training camp to be extended to ten days.
- (7) Provision to be made for ammunition columns.
- (8) The war establishment of a regiment of light horse to be reduced to 476 all ranks.
- (9) Each regiment of light horse and battalion of infantry to be equipped with two machine guns.
- (10) Rifle clubs to be affiliated to militia units.

IV.—Local Naval Defence.

19. The subject of the provision of local naval defence for ports, harbours, and coastal trade is discussed in a Memorandum (Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 66 of 1905) by Captain Creswell, Director of Naval Forces, which is forwarded for the information of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who are requested to consider these matters, as the sentiment in favour of the development of the maritime resources of Australia is one which, in the opinion of the Commonwealth Government, deserves and will repay encouragement.

Captain Creswell's proposals contemplate the provision of a separate navy for the Commonwealth, comprising:—

- 3 Cruiser destroyers,*
- 16 Torpedo boat destroyers,
- 15 Torpedo boats (1st and 2nd class),

the acquisition of this force to be extended over a period of seven years, at a cost which he estimates at £2,300,000 for construction and maintenance of vessels alone.

As regards *personnel*, he estimates that an addition of 456 will be needed to the permanent forces, and 466 to the naval militia.

The rôle of this navy is described as follows:—

"This will provide a defence not designed as a force for action against hostile fleets or squadrons, which is the province of the Imperial fleet, but as a line necessary to us within the defence line of the Imperial fleet—a purely defensive line, that will give security to our naval bases, populous centres, principal ports, and commerce."

These proposals appear to be based upon an imperfect conception of the requirements of naval strategy at the present day, and of the proper application of naval force.

The services which, it is claimed, will be rendered by the proposed destroyers are to contribute to the security of defended ports and to the protection of floating trade.

Having regard to the nature of the attack to which Australian ports are liable (considered in paragraphs 6 to 10), the benefits to be rendered to the coast defence by destroyers appear altogether incommensurate with the expenditure that would be entailed by their maintenance. The Australian ports have already been provided with works and armaments, and the comparatively inexpensive revision now recommended will bring them up to modern requirements. The deterrent effect exercised by these defences, manned by vigilant local forces, may confidently be expected to exclude raiding cruisers from the harbours of the Commonwealth by night as well as by day, while the defence against the landings possible from such cruisers can, with equal safety and economy of force, be intrusted to small infantry garrisons.

The protection of Australian floating trade, whether on the high seas or in local waters, demands for its effective accomplishment, as explained in paragraphs 3 to 5, the closely concerted action of powerful sea-going ships. Localised vessels of the destroyer type could play no effective part in securing this object.

There is, therefore, no strategical justification from either point of view for the creation at great expense of a local force of destroyers—a type of vessel designed for totally different uses. If in the future strategical conditions should ever so far alter as to necessitate the provision of warships of this type in Australian waters, it would devolve upon the Admiralty to provide them as part of their general responsibility for the strategical distribution of the naval forces of the Empire. Should this necessity arise, it will no doubt be advantageous that these vessels should be manned by Australians trained in sea-going fleets under the Naval Agreement. At present, however, no such strategical necessity exists or threatens.

It may be added that the employment of a naval force as "a purely defensive line" is a misapplication of maritime power opposed to every sound principle of naval strategy. To act deliberately on the defensive, and to organise naval forces with this object in view, is to adopt voluntarily the policy which is of necessity forced upon the weaker naval Power. Australia need not be reduced to assuming such a rôle so long as she is a member of an Empire which is the strongest naval Power in the world, and which extends naval protection not only to the home-land and to the

* It is not clear what type of vessel is indicated by this designation. It is presumed that it represents a new class of warship of the destroyer type with increased tonnage and coal endurance.

most distant of the King's dominions beyond the seas, but also to all commerce sailing under the British flag.

The policy of devoting the entire naval forces of the Empire to seeking out and destroying the ships of the enemy wherever they may be is that which will best insure not only the safety of floating trade, but also the immunity from attack of coast towns and harbours, and, if this policy is to be properly and efficiently carried out, the Royal Navy must be one and undivided. Unity of training and unity of command can alone insure that thorough co-operation which is essential. A separate Australian navy could not find in any effective organisation of the naval forces of the Empire a rôle commensurate with the cost of its creation and maintenance or worthy of the aptitude for sea service of the inhabitants of the island-continent. The existing Australian floating defences, consisting entirely of obsolete vessels, were originally provided mainly with a view to co-operation in local defence, and, although their value for this purpose was never great, the Colonial Defence Committee have hitherto hesitated to recommend the extinction of the local naval forces, which afforded the only means of satisfying the inclination of Australians for service afloat, and of giving some effect to the desire in Australia to make some contribution in men as well as money to the naval strength of the Empire. The natural and legitimate aspiration in Australia to furnish a distinctively Australian element to the sea power of the Empire will find a satisfactory realisation in increasing degree when the scheme, still in its infancy, initiated by the Naval Agreement of 1903, has had time to take full effect. The preamble of the Agreement recognises, on the one hand, the necessity of a single navy, and, on the other, the advantages which will be derived from developing the sea power of Australia. Article 5 provides for the manning by Australians of a certain number of ships; Article 6 secures that in the future there will be a steady supply of officers of Australian birth, who will be able to rise to the highest posts in the Royal Navy; and Article 7 establishes a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve in Australia. In the future it may be expected that an increasing number of ships specially manned and officered by Australians will be included in the fleets and squadrons of the Royal Navy. This will, in time of peace, insure wide opportunities of training, and, by the healthy spirit of emulation induced, will enhance the fighting value of the units to a degree unattainable in a small navy; while, in the event of war, these ships will represent Australia, and enable her to take a more worthy share in the operations than if her naval activity were confined to guarding against problematical attacks on her coasts.

No. 2.

1906.

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF NAVAL OFFICERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH ASSEMBLED AT MELBOURNE, VICTORIA, TO CONSIDER THE MEMORANDUM OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE, AND REPORT AS REGARDS THE NAVAL DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA.

Presented by Command; ordered by the House to be printed,
27th September 1906.

COMMITTEE.

President:

Captain William Rooke Creswell, C.M.G., Director of the Naval Forces.

MEMBERS:

Captain Chapman James Clare, C.M.G., Naval Commandant, C.N.F., South Australia.

Captain Frederick Tickell, C.M.G., Naval Commandant, C.N.F., Queensland.

Commander William Jarvie Colquhoun, D.S.O., Commonwealth Naval Forces, Victoria.

Commander Frederick Hugh Cust Brownlow, Officer Commanding Commonwealth Naval Forces of New South Wales.

Engineer Commander William Clarkson, Commonwealth Naval Forces, Victoria.

SECRETARY:

Mr. G. L. MacAndie.

Commonwealth of Australia,
Department of Defence, Melbourne,
12th September 1906.

The Honourable the Minister of State for Defence, Melbourne.

IN accordance with your directions, we have considered the General Scheme of Defence for Australia, and the Memorandum on Revision of Coast Defences (approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence on 25th May 1906), so far as regards those portions affecting Naval Defence, and have the honour to report as follows:—

2. We think it unfortunate that the Report of the Naval Director for 1905, printed in February 1906, was not submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

It is also a matter for regret that the Naval Director, when in England, was not asked to appear before the Committee, and give evidence. As a member of the Commonwealth Council of Defence, it is thought that his local knowledge would have been of service.

3. We are fully appreciative of the immensity of the responsibility and the absorbing gravity of the daily outlook, even in times of peace, that fall on the central Imperial authority. It cannot be otherwise, when compared with the naval security of the heart of the Empire involving the organisation, war preparations, and movements of immense fleets of battleships and cruisers, than that such a small matter as the possible attack on the Australian coast by four cruisers should have but a "secondary importance" (para. 4).

It is surely permissible, however, for those at the furthest extreme of the Empire's dominions, without losing in any degree their full responsibility and participation in the Empire's wars, to propose measures for defence against dangers that come immediately home to them—measures that in no way detract from, but aid, the Imperial plans of naval strategy.

4. After full discussion of the Memoranda, we have unanimously agreed upon the following resolutions:—

I. We agree with the statement of the Committee of Imperial Defence as to the most probable nature of attack, but consider that the defence recommended (Military forces and harbours of refuge) is inadequate and inappropriate.

II. We submit that the grounds upon which the Commonwealth Naval Forces are disapproved of are insufficient.

III. The Committee of Imperial Defence recommend measures of land defence, involving the heaviest expenditure, to meet dangers which they regard as remote and improbable, but reject proposals to meet attacks which they state are probable. We are unable to reconcile these recommendations.

IV. In the absence of the Royal Navy, a trade worth 170,000,000*l.* per annum is open to attack. We cannot agree that this trade should cease, and seek security in harbours of refuge.

Having in view our defence conditions and obligations to the Empire, a destroyer and torpedo defence supplementary to the Royal Navy will best ensure coast defence and continuance of trade.

V. In view of Australia's geographical situation and our distance from the Empire's base, and having regard to our conditions, general, strategic, and other, we are of opinion that a naval force raised and trained in Australia, and provision for the manufacture of all war *matériel*, are of first importance to our present security, and vital to our future.

VI. We consider that the present condition of the Naval Forces calls for immediate decision, either to abolish them, and accept *in toto* the recommendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence, or to initiate a policy of advance.

I. We agree with the statement of the Imperial Defence Committee as to the most probable nature of attack, but consider that the defence recommended (Military forces and harbours of refuge) is inadequate and inappropriate.

5. The Committee of Imperial Defence estimate that, in time of war, Australia will be liable to attack from not more than four unarmoured cruisers. This is undoubtedly based on the best information of relative fleet strengths, and their probable war dispositions.

The landing strength possible from such a squadron has been estimated at 1,000 men, and this is probably a generous estimate.

The Defence arrangements recommended are—

- i. The Imperial squadron in these seas.
- ii. Fortress defences of 6-inch guns as laid down by the Committee. Garrisons of 1,000 men (3,000 Sydney).
- iii. The Field Force, which under a peace establishment numbers 13,831 and under a war establishment will be raised to 27,753.

6. Under the exigencies of war, the removal of the Imperial squadron from these seas is an accepted condition (para. 5). The Committee of Imperial Defence consider that probability of attack exists under such circumstances; the defence, therefore, must be based on this probability.

In such an event there will be no defence whatever beyond the range of fortress artillery. The whole coastal and oversea commerce, arriving or departing, will be open to capture.

To rely on "harbours of refuge" (para. 7) for safety of coastal shipping involves total cessation of all sea trade and the resulting industrial paralysis.

These losses would continue for an indefinite period, until the arrival of a pursuing squadron of "preponderating force" (para. 5), or the enemy's "withdrawal for shortage of coal" (para. 7). Shortage of coal as a reason for withdrawal is extremely improbable, as it is reasonable to suppose that any expedition of this nature launched against Australia would make provision for coal supply in accompanying colliers, possibly, as in the late war, under a neutral flag, which would serve as a reserve supply.

7. The lack of any means of obtaining accurate information would dislocate traffic at any point within the possible position of the enemy. A cruiser not seen or heard of for five days might be anywhere within a five days' steaming radius, and affect traffic for 1,200 or 1,500 miles on either side of her last known position.

There is no provision made in the Memorandum of the Committee of Imperial Defence to meet this want of information of the enemy's whereabouts.

The presence of a cruiser outside our ports would close them to traffic. Outside artillery range the cruiser would command all sea communications.

The fortress artillery may defend the port entrances during daylight, and the garrisons prevent a landing, but the whole of the remaining defences recommended are inoperative, and are not in accord with the principles laid down by the Memorandum in para. 2 that "war preparations should be governed by the reasonable probabilities of the next few years."

8. The 6-inch guns are adequate for the defence of ports against unarmoured cruisers, if they are supplemented by effective torpedo craft defence; but fortress and military defences alone are inadequate for the protection of commerce afloat. If this is pent up and idle in harbour it ceases to be commerce.

The field armies "organised in units of all arms with the necessary departmental services and grouped in brigade formations" (para. 2) cannot be used against raiding unarmoured cruisers, and are *inappropriate* for defence against the only form of attack declared to be reasonably probable.

II. We submit that the grounds upon which the Commonwealth Naval Forces are disapproved of are insufficient.

9. The objections raised to the Commonwealth naval proposals appear to be of a varied order. The dominating objection seems to be—

"If, in the future, strategical conditions should ever so far alter as to necessitate the provision of warships of this type in Australian waters, it would devolve upon the Admiralty to provide them as part of their general responsibility for the strategical distribution of the naval forces of the Empire." (para. 19.)

This implies that the Commonwealth should rely on the Admiralty for all naval protection, and, as it is clearly a question for the decision of the Commonwealth Government, is outside the scope of this Committee to determine.

10. Again, in paragraph 19—

"These proposals appear to be based upon an imperfect conception of naval strategy at the present day, and of the proper application of naval force."

This criticism cannot be better met than by quoting from Mr. Balfour's statement to the House of Commons, made in May 1905, with the authority of the Committee of

Imperial Defence, when considering the defence of England against a surprise invasion in the absence of the organised fleets. Mr. Balfour said—

"We should have at home besides, irrespective of the organized fleets of which I speak, the twelve cruisers which cruise in home waters; there would be 24 destroyers in commission, and there would be in reserve with nucleus crews, ready for very rapid action, no less than 95 more torpedo craft, some of them destroyers, some of them torpedo-boats proper."

"That would be the position if our organized fleets were away."

These forces (reserve ships with destroyer and torpedo-boat flotillas) are essentially a "purely defensive line." It cannot be said that, although deliberately organised for this service, these forces in the English Channel are a "misapplication of maritime power opposed to every sound principle of naval strategy" (para. 19). This reserve torpedo force is designed to meet attack, Mr. Balfour informs us, in the absence of the organised fleets.

The torpedo force proposed for the Commonwealth was designed to meet attack in the absence of the organised fleet (*i.e.*, the Royal Naval Squadron). The position is identical.

The specialities and advantages of using torpedo craft are also given by Mr. Balfour (Appendix K).

It is difficult to understand why, in the absence of the organised fleets, naval force used in the English Channel as a purely defensive line should fulfil all the principles of naval strategy and a naval force used on the Australian coast in identical circumstances should be a "misapplication of naval force opposed to every sound principle of naval strategy." Circumstances certainly differ, but not in a way to affect the principle, such difference in fact favouring the Australian proposals.

That the whole naval strength of a powerful sea people should be satisfied with a purely defensive line is, of course, deserving the criticism applied to it. That a section of this naval strength should be allotted to this duty is in strict accord with the best strategy. A high authority (Captain Mahan) has assumed that there would always be such a purely defensive line in Australia (Appendix I.).

11. Again, in para. 19—

"The policy of devoting the entire naval forces of the Empire to seeking out and destroying the ships of the enemy wherever they may be . . ."

is not, as will be seen from Mr. Balfour's statement, to be accepted literally and without reservation.

The measures proposed in Australia are to ensure that, in the absence of the "organised fleet," the cruiser raiders deemed probable should not have a clear field for their operations. Under the Memorandum of the Committee for Imperial Defence, the only choice for floating trade would be between the risk of capture and remaining in port till the fleet sent in pursuit cleared the seas of the raider. It is not easy to understand the disapproval of a scheme that would go far to give security to trade and obviate, perhaps, the need of sending a pursuing force, possibly at the sacrifice of services of a more important nature.

Just as in the home naval organisation described by Mr. Balfour, the home defence is an aid to concentration, and precludes the need to recall fleet strength to meet attack on the English coast, so the Australian Naval Force would obviate the recall or despatch of ships to meet raids on our coasts, to deal with which would be within our own capacity.

It is from all points of view difficult to reconcile the objections to the Commonwealth proposals with the plain requirements in war of great interests otherwise left open to the attacks regarded by the Imperial Committee as "reasonably probable." Particularly is this the case when these proposals make no additional demands on the sea forces of the Empire, but sensibly lessen them, and in no way lessen the Imperial sea forces, but add to them.

12. Again, it is urged in para. 19—

"Having regard to the nature of the attack to which Australian ports are liable (considered in paras. 6 to 10), the benefits to be rendered to the coast defence by destroyers appear altogether incommensurate with the expenditure that would be entailed by their maintenance."

Paras. 3 to 5 of the Memorandum are careful to state the limitations of sea defence of our fleets against cruiser raids. The benefits to be derived from destroyer services are as follows:—

Briefly, Torpedo Defence offers—

- i. The most powerful auxiliary to the fleet stationed in Australia.
- ii. An effective substitute when the fleet is absent.
- iii. It prevents blockade.
- iv. It compels attack on ports to be by daylight, when the land defence can most effectively reply.
- v. It compels hostile cruisers to retreat beyond striking distance of destroyers.
- vi. It keeps touch with an enemy, communicates intelligence, and so prevents unnecessary cessation of traffic.
- vii. It is the greatest deterrent to any landing operation near our ports.
- viii. It keeps cruisers off coastal tracks.
- ix. It enforces continual night watchfulness on any enemy to a degree that could not be endured for any length of time.

The value of our trade is 170,000,000*l.* annually (Appendix G); it is without defence in the absence of the Royal Navy.

The cost of the torpedo craft service, which would save considerable loss, is (taking annual capital expenditure at 225,000*l.* and maintenance at 170,000*l.*) 22 per cent. of the above amount, a small rate of insurance amounting to less than $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., and this would include the renewal of the fleet every ten years.

13. Again, in paragraph 19—

"The protection of Australian floating trade, whether on the high seas or in local waters, demands for its effective accomplishment, as explained in paras. 3 to 5, the closely concerted action of powerful sea-going ships. Localized vessels of the destroyer type could play no effective part in securing this object."

Paras. 3 to 5 of the Memorandum lay down strong reasons for defensive action against raiders. It is easy to see from these paragraphs how well-timed would be co-operative action of the kind suggested in Australia.

The word "localized" used in a deprecatory sense of destroyers for service on the Australian coast shows that Australian conditions, particularly the extent and great distances round our coasts, and not fully realized. The map (Appendix N) will aid in making this clear, contrasting the extent of the Australian coast with that of England.

Destroyers will never be "localized" in the sense of their being tied to ports. Australian service involves work to the limit of their very considerable steaming radius. Vessels covering distances such as that from Plymouth to Malta, which fairly represents the distance of, say, Melbourne from Perth, are not "localized" vessels.

14. Further, in para. 19, "unity of training and unity of command" are disqualifications in no way caused by Commonwealth action. Unity of command has been specifically laid down in all Australian naval proposals. Unity of training would be of the greatest benefit to the Commonwealth Naval Forces, and easily obtainable with the help of the Admiralty.

15. It is laid down in the Memorandum that danger of damage to raiders far from a base (para. 10), and particularly of their presence being disclosed (para. 6, latter part), would act as a deterrent to raiding.

The fact that a proper destroyer service would have the power to accomplish both the above, putting it beyond the raider's power of discretion, whether or not his presence would be known, has not received any attention in the Memorandum.

III. The Committee of Imperial Defence recommend measures of land defence, involving the heaviest expenditure, to meet dangers which they regard as remote and improbable, but reject proposals to meet attacks which they state are probable. We are unable to reconcile these recommendations.

16. It is laid down in para. 2 of the Memorandum that "the general principle that 'war preparations should be governed by the reasonable probabilities of the next few years, rather than by remoter possibilities is beyond question. . . . In the matter of war matériel . . . it is inadvisable that expenditure should exceed the requirements of the near future.'" "On the other hand, the national armies . . . cannot be brought into being without long and careful preparation in peace . . ."

In addition to "the garrison troops which suffice under present conditions for local defence in Australia," the Memorandum recommends "field troops, organized in units of all arms, with the necessary departmental services, and grouped in brigade formations, which will serve as the training school and model for the field forces that may be required in the future."

The Memorandum is officially entitled a "General Scheme for the Defence of Australia," and the only inference deducible would be that organised attack on Australia of such strength as to require a field army is so probable as to warrant a heavy annual expenditure, and is of such serious menace as to require as a defence the training of "as large a proportion as possible of the population." This can only be to resist an invasion of Australia, a contingency the same Memorandum says is most improbable (para. 6).

In direct opposition to the above it is laid down with emphasis in para. 19 that a "purely defensive line" of naval force is unnecessary as long as Australia is "a member of the Empire which is the strongest naval Power in the world, and which extends 'naval protection, not only to the home land and to the most distant of the King's dominions beyond the seas . . .'" These statements are mutually destructive.

They cannot be reconciled unless it is assumed that the command of the sea is of such uncertain tenure as to call for the active measures of preparation set forth in para. 2 of the Memorandum (Field armies—as large a proportion of the population as possible under arms, &c.).

The view of the transitory or evanescent nature of sea command cannot be found in any of the official statements upon Home or Imperial Defence policy. It would seem to be reserved for Australia.

17. Mr. Balfour, in his statement to the House of Commons on the authority of the Committee of Imperial Defence, makes no demand whatever on the land forces, even though the organized fleets are away from England. The obvious advantage of a sea frontier is availed of.

18. Mr. Haldane, on 11th July 1906, in his speech enunciating the Army policy of the Government said—

"The first question was . . . what was the purpose for which the British Army exists; and the answer was a very simple one. It was for war over seas."

19. The late Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station considered that, in the absence of the British flag in requisite force from the Pacific, an expeditionary force, lightly equipped, and without transports, of from 30,000 to 40,000 men, acting from a floating base of store-ships, could carry with ease any of the Australian capitals, and that the only possible defence would be a service of torpedo boats and destroyers. It is a defence of this character which we recommend.

20. In each and every case, the commanding advantage of a sea frontier is availed of. By Mr. Balfour, though handicapped by the absence of the "organized fleets," the sea frontier is still availed of as the factor of decisive defence value. Mr. Haldane, appreciating the value of the sea frontier, is able, unhampered by any question of land defence, to organize the British Army for oversea service. The late Commander-in-Chief could see an effective defence against invasion by a strong expeditionary force only in such an intelligent use of our sea frontier.

21. In other British possessions not so fortunately situated, field armies are a prime necessity for the defence of immense land frontiers, or the control of subject races. One or other of these causes determines the organizing of field armies in Canada, India, and South Africa. In Australia, field armies are without a *raison d'être*.

22. There remains yet another comparison of conditions which accentuates the lack of determining cause for field armies in Australia. Our sea frontier is of far greater importance as a factor in our defence than is the case with England (a land less than 4 per cent. or one-twenty-fifth of Australia in area), upon which is concentrated a population ten times the Australian, and which, covered with a close network of railways and roads, could easily (it would be supposed) mass troops to meet any invasion. Yet there the advantage and safety attained by using the sea frontier with a floating defence is judged worthy of absolute reliance.

This is specially noteworthy when the close proximity of possible sources of attack on the Continent of Europe is remembered.

Compare these conditions with the Australian. Here there are immense distances, a small and sparse population, imperfect communication, and the difficulties of massing the defence troops at any threatened point (see Appendix M), and the long line of sea

communications to Australia would be many times that from the Continent of Europe to England in the event of an attack on the English coast.

The plain and obvious conclusions are that, if the advantage of a sea frontier and a floating defence is considered the effective method of dealing with invasion in force on England, where land forces could be readily massed to deal with it, to a far greater degree must reliance for defence be placed on our sea frontier and a floating force in Australia, where land forces cannot be readily massed to meet the danger.

23. The desirability of military training is not questioned. Political changes in Europe or the East, possibly within the next decade or two, may require of us every effort that makes for national defence efficiency. But our condition of immense distances and a small and scattered population make imperative a defence organized to reap to the fullest the advantage of our natural conditions, and the controlling condition of all is a continuous sea frontier. To restrict ourselves to the raising and training of field armies is clearly to surrender this commanding advantage gratuitously. To avail of it requires the training of sea forces, and if "national armies cannot be brought into being without long and careful preparation in time of peace" (para. 2) (a statement that is not without notable historical exceptions), the same principle applies tenfold to national navies, and that they require long and careful preparation in peace is without any historical exception whatever.

24. Finally, it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory resultant of the opposing principles laid down in paras. 2 and 19 of the Memorandum.

Para. 2 recommends field armies, involving heavy expenditure, which, if para. 19 is accepted, can never come into operation in Australia.

Para. 19, on the other hand, rejects summarily proposals for the defence of floating trade, which, in the absence of the Royal Naval Squadron, will be without protection outside gun range of the forts, and which is within reasonable probability of attack.

IV. In the absence of the Royal Navy, a trade worth £170,000,000 per annum is open to attack. We cannot agree that this trade should cease and seek security in harbours of refuge.

Having in view our defence conditions and obligations to the Empire, a destroyer and torpedo defence supplementary to the Royal Navy will best ensure coast defence and continuance of trade.

25. The freedom of action of the Royal Naval Squadron on the Australian Station is necessary to the general naval scheme of the Empire, and an important condition of the Naval Agreement. War operations may at any time require the service of this squadron at a distance from Australia. We should be closely concerned in its success, possibly the first affected by any failure through inadequate force. Such an arrangement under the present defence scheme as proposed in the Memorandum leaves, in the absence of the fleet, our trade (oversea and inter-State, valued at £170,000,000 per annum) open to attack. It would offer a clear and rich field to the commerce raider, with small risk of interference. The conditions of a scattered population, mostly on the coast, are such that the business life of the Commonwealth is mainly dependent on the safe and uninterrupted continuance of our floating trade. A reference to Appendix J shows the nature and worth of a trade certain to attract commerce raiders.

26. The extent to which interruption of sea traffic must dislocate trade and daily business can be estimated from one item of output alone—coal (Appendix F). Upon water-borne coal are dependent some of the principal industries of the States. The sea-routes are the only means of communication with Western Australia and Tasmania. Queensland depends on the Barrier route for communication with its own northern districts, and has a coastal trade within the State of about £18,000,000 per annum.

An idea of the extent of this sea traffic may be estimated from the returns of arrivals and departures, showing for Melbourne an average of 198 arrivals a month, and for Sydney 160 of foreign-going and inter-State vessels, not including ships of war and vessels trading coastwise (see Appendix H). Under the scheme proposed by the Committee of Imperial Defence, shipping is without defence outside fortress artillery range, while to remain within "harbour of refuge," as practically imprisoned shipping, is no defence of trade, but cessation of trade.

27. Under an effective scheme of trade defence, all that should be required from port defences is the defence of shipping in port while loading and unloading cargo in the ordinary course of traffic work.

Defence measures are certainly necessary to ensure the continuance of traffic in war in spite of the presence of four unarmoured cruisers in Australian seas. A destroyer and torpedo craft service would, under the conditions of the present Agreement, best meet

our requirements. Acting as a supplementary force, it would be a powerful auxiliary to the Royal Naval Squadron when this force is in Australian seas, and in its absence would furnish intelligence, menace any cruiser with possible destruction, and render any landing impossible. In such a case, interruption to any appreciable extent to our commerce would become so hazardous to raiders as in all probability to deter them from attempting it.

V. In view of Australia's geographical situation and our distance from the Empire's base, and having regard to our conditions, general, strategic, and other, we are of opinion that a naval force raised and trained in Australia, and provision for the manufacture of all war matériel, are of first importance to our present security, and vital to our future.

28. Australia's geographical situation is that of an island continent, and of all British dominions she is the furthest from the main war base in the United Kingdom.

The island condition of a continuous sea frontier is, if availed of, one of strength. The other—immense base distance—is a weakness, both to Australia and the United Kingdom.

To avail of our insular position demands that we shall have sea forces.

To make up for the weakness of a base distance extending half round the world demands self-dependence in everything that makes for defence, and should be the guiding principle in all our defence schemes. The weakness of a line of communication 12,000 miles long is evident. Ordinary foresight would provide against interruption. In India this has been the principle followed to the fullest possible extent. Arsenals, gun, ammunition, and cordite factories have been established with this end in view. This will render India immune from the crippling effect on war operations on her frontier which would otherwise be certain to follow interruption of war stores from England. The same principle applies to Australia. It is just as imperatively necessary that the means of repelling attack on our sea frontier should be produced in Australia.

29. Destroyers (it is the opinion of the Committee of Imperial Defence), if strategical conditions should alter, would be placed here by the Admiralty (para. 19). In war, when strategical conditions usually alter most, it might be impossible to do so, and would in any case require some time to bring vessels of this class from England.

30. Australian defence, if attacked by raiding cruisers, will be met, under the scheme proposed by the Committee of Imperial Defence, by a preponderating force sent in pursuit (first part of paras. 5 and 7). Without considering all that such raiders might effect during the time on our coast between their arrival and the arrival of the preponderating force, would it not be worth while to deal with such raiders at once, directly their presence was disclosed, saving the many thousands of tons of coal, and thousands of pounds sterling, and the many weeks at sea during which the force sent to Australia in pursuit would be out of touch and quite inoperative for other war service? There would seem to be some compensating advantage for departure from the orthodox line and the principle of naval strategy which directs that action shall be taken by a force sent in pursuit rather than by one on the spot.

31. From the Imperial point of view, surely the sea efficiency of the Empire could only be aided by a policy making for Australian advance in naval defence. It is not conceivable that Australia should grow in wealth, commerce, and population, and in all that goes to make a strong and prosperous State, and yet in the matter of defence remain a helpless and inert country (dependent for safety from the most insignificant of enemies by sea upon the mother country's help sent half round the globe), an element of weakness to the rest of the Empire. It would also seem that an Empire depending on sea supremacy for existence should welcome with alacrity and every kind of encouragement every effort made to increase the naval strength of the Empire in its most distant parts.

From the Australian point of view it is clear that safety lies only in sea defence, and will depend on our ability to meet attack without awaiting the arrival of forces that it is conceivable might not too easily be spared.

VI. We consider that the present condition of the Naval Forces calls for immediate decision, either to abolish them, and accept *in toto* the recommendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence, or to initiate a policy of advance.

32. The condition of the Commonwealth Naval Forces was made the subject of special remarks in the Naval Director's Report for 1905. It was there stated that the vessels were old and obsolete, and the officers' list so attenuated as to be on the verge of collapse.

This state of affairs remains, and is being accentuated by increasing difficulty in getting ammunition that has gone out of manufacture owing to the out-of-date armament. The defence value of the Commonwealth Naval Forces, through no fault of their own making, is approaching the vanishing point.

The condition of the Commonwealth Naval Service is one that calls for early attention. Unless it is intended to initiate at an early date a policy of development and advance, it will be better to abolish the Service altogether. To continue as at present gives no adequate return for the cost of maintenance.

PART II. OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE MEMORANDUM.—
REVISION OF COAST DEFENCES.

33. We have not considered the detailed proposals of the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum with regard to the Military Defences and Forts, and have only dealt with those military defences designed primarily to meet a naval attack.

The leading points in Coast Defence recommendations are—

- i. The restriction of port defences to 6-inch guns and searchlights.
- ii. Abolition of Mine-fields.
- iii. Albany and Townsville to be undefended.

i. 6-inch Gun Defence.

34. We agree with the arguments of the Colonial Defence Committee that the calibre of gun selected is suitable against unarmoured cruisers, that is, provided there is an efficient floating Defence.

ii. Abolition of Mine-fields.

35. The abolition of mine-fields leaves the whole responsibility for defence on fortress artillery (6-inch). The mine-fields have been abolished at home ports only since the advent of submarines—a condition which cannot obtain in Australia, where we consider their abolition would be premature.

Townsville.

36. Although Townsville is a town of considerable trade importance, and would break the distance (1,200 miles), Brisbane-Thursday Island, between which there is no defended port, it is not to be continued as a defended port (para. 2).

The radical ineffectiveness of the sites previously selected has been pointed out in the Report of the Queensland Naval Commandant, of September 1903 (considered by Colonial Defence Committee in Memorandum No. 321 M). Previous failure to select proper sites should not disqualify Townsville. The need for defence remains, and this can be effectively carried out by a battery on Nobby Head, Magnetic Island, which would command the deep-water anchorage, and is such an advanced position as to keep a raider from taking up any position whence damage could be inflicted on town, harbour, or shipping.

Wollongong.

37. While Wollongong is too close to Sydney to be required as a port of refuge (para. 2), still it is important as a coaling port, which in the absence of any defence might be taken advantage of by a hostile cruiser. This accentuates the value of a mobile defence. Wollongong and the southern coal ports would be safe from hostile cruisers if there were a strong torpedo flotilla at Sydney. The Imperial Committee appear to have overlooked the strategical importance of coal at the southern coal ports (see Appendix F).

Albany.

38. The geographical and strategical importance of Albany has not been affected by the development of Fremantle. Albany is on the track of the greatest volume of trade arriving in or leaving Australia. The grounds upon which it is to be abandoned seem quite inadequate considering its strategical importance, its natural facilities for defence and good harbour accommodation. Expense of maintenance is the reason adduced in the Colonial Defence Committee's Memoranda quoted (para. 2).

With a population of 3,000, there can surely be no difficulty in finding men for the small battery, and we have no doubt that with such a population the military authorities could make satisfactory arrangements for manning the small fortifications required. Its

importance from the naval point of view is considerable, and its abandonment to be deprecated.

Fremantle.

39. We agree that Fremantle should be a defended port, but consider that the military defence should be supplemented by a torpedo flotilla.

Port Adelaide.

40. Port Adelaide cannot be defended by 6-inch guns. Neither shipping nor outer harbour can be defended by Fort Largs. The presence of sea-going torpedo craft in these waters furnishes an effective means of defence.

Other Ports.

41. We agree that Melbourne, Sydney, Newcastle, Brisbane, Normanby Sound, and Hobart should all be defended ports, but such ports do not of themselves form an effective defence of floating trade, which requires for its protection a floating defence of sea-going torpedo craft.

Cable Landing Places.

42. We do not agree with the recommendations for defence of cable landing places (para. 70). We are of opinion that no attempt would be made on the landing places when the cables themselves can be easily picked up out of range.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA SUBMITTED BY THE
COMMITTEE OF NAVAL OFFICERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

43. We consider that the measures to be taken for the defence of Australia against raiding attacks of four unarmoured cruisers may be divided into five heads (see diagram, Appendix A), viz. :—

- (1) Defence of trade routes.
- (2) Defence of principal ports.
- (3) Defence of minor ports.
- (4) Defence against landing parties.
- (5) Defence of cables and communications.

(1) Defence of Trade Routes.

44. The Memorandum of the Committee of Imperial Defence indicates very clearly the policy of the Admiralty, and the action which will be taken by the Imperial cruiser squadron in the protection of floating trade.

The Memorandum states that concerted action will be taken for direct pursuit of commerce raiders (paras. 4 and 5). The squadron will endeavour to "intercept them at obligatory points of passage and off hostile or even neutral ports at which they are likely to call" (para. 5), but the possibility of raiders evading the cruiser squadron is admitted (para. 6), and we consider that it is necessary, in order to protect the floating trade of the Commonwealth in time of war, to institute an efficient patrol of the south-west, south, and east coasts of the continent.

We are strongly of opinion that, in order to be efficient, this patrol duty demands the employment of vessels capable of keeping the sea at all times and in all weathers, and consider that, to meet these conditions, there are required—

- Three ocean-going destroyers—displacement, 1,300 tons; speed, 33 knots; and
One ocean-going destroyer—displacement, 800 tons; speed, 30 knots.

These vessels should be fitted with wireless apparatus to enable them at all times to communicate with stations established on shore, and also with each other. This will aid rapid concentration.

(2) Defence of Principal Ports.

45. The Committee of Imperial Defence make recommendations for the defence of these ports, and we consider that, so far as fixed defences are concerned, these recommendations are sufficient to meet the attack already accepted. We, however, are strongly of

opinion that fixed defences only are of small value for the defence of ports at night, and that this is especially the case at Port Phillip Heads and Sydney.

At these places, the efforts of the garrisons will be limited to a period of 17 minutes—that being the time that a vessel of fair speed will remain within the radius of the searchlights provided. This estimate presupposes that the garrison will always be ready to open fire the instant a hostile cruiser appears within the beam of the searchlight, and without waiting for the formalities demanded by regulations governing the Examination service. It also takes no account of the total extinction of the electric searchlights by the enemy's fire.

We consider that, under these circumstances, a raiding cruiser could run past the fixed defences and take up a position of absolute command of these large and important cities.

This condition renders necessary a mobile torpedo defence, and the following are recommended:—

- 16 coastal destroyers—550 tons displacement; 26 knots.
- 4 1st-class torpedo boats.

46. We consider that the provision of these vessels, with their suitable disposition, would also efficiently meet—

- (3) Defence of minor ports;
- (4) Defence against landing parties;
- (5) Defence of cables and communications;

and their rapid concentration and mutual support is easily attainable.

DISTRIBUTION OF VESSELS IN TIME OF PEACE.

47. It is proposed that one ocean-going destroyer, 1st-class, and one ocean-going destroyer, 2nd-class, shall, in time of peace, be kept in commission with a full permanently employed crew.

These destroyers to visit in turn the various States, when the vessels in reserve in these States would be mobilized for training purposes.

The remaining destroyers, 1st-class, would be kept in ports having docking facilities, with very reduced crews.

Fremantle	One coastal destroyer will remain in full commission; one of the same class in reserve.
Port Adelaide	One coastal destroyer in commission and three in reserve.
Melbourne	One coastal destroyer in commission and three in reserve.
Sydney...	One coastal destroyer in commission and three in reserve.
Brisbane	One coastal destroyer in commission; one coastal destroyer and four 1st-class torpedo boats in reserve.

Every opportunity will be taken to mobilize and exercise these vessels in organized units.

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE.

48. The provision of these vessels will entail an expenditure of 2,250,000*l.*, which we recommend should be spread over a period of five years (Appendices B and D).

ORDER OF PURCHASE.

49. We recommend that, during the first two years, the following should be built in England at a cost of 930,000*l.*:—

- One ocean-going destroyer, 1st-class.
- One ocean-going destroyer, 2nd-class.
- Six coastal destroyers.
- Two 1st-class torpedo boats.

50. The remainder should be built in Australia.

We estimate that a period of two years will be required by the shipbuilders in

Australia to raise capital, organize their shipyards, import plant, and instruct their workmen.

The instruction of the workmen can best be accomplished by sending them to England actually to work on the vessels ordered. It should, therefore, be a condition of contract that the English contractors shall receive a number of Australian mechanics into their shipyards for this purpose.

We are of opinion that, in order to induce the shipbuilders in Australia to make preparations for building vessels of the class proposed, a definite scheme should be agreed to, *i.e.*, it should be decided that a fixed sum is to be expended on shipbuilding within a fixed period.

In the estimates for the years after the first two, the English prices have been given, as it is considered that any increase in cost due to these vessels being built within the Commonwealth should not be a charge against defences, but should be regarded as a subsidy or bonus given for the initiation of an important industry, that of shipbuilding, calculated to be of immense benefit to the trade of the Commonwealth.

ANNUAL COST OF MAINTENANCE WHEN FLOTILLA COMPLETE.

51. The annual cost of maintenance, manning, stores, &c. of vessels proposed is estimated at 167,970*l.* (Appendix C).

This sum, it is calculated, will suffice for a *personnel* of 882 Permanent Force and 1,128 Militia. A margin of 15 per cent. Naval Militia over those actually required for manning the vessels has been allowed.

52. Tables showing details of cost and *personnel*, together with proposals for the number of vessels to be built each year, are attached (Appendices B to E).

53. We would point out that, without a Naval Defence Force, the presence of a raiding squadron on our coasts would lead to the mobilization of all military forces, the cessation of all shipping trade, and the consequent industrial paralysis, which would cost the country at the lowest estimate 1,000,000*l.* a week, or, in a month of war conditions, a sum greater than the proposed capital cost of an adequate naval defence and its maintenance for five years.

54. We consider that, at the end of five years, the vessels in use at present will be of no value either for defence or training purposes, and recommend that they be then sold out of the Service.

SUITABILITY OF VESSELS FOR AUSTRALIA WHICH HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM IMPERIAL SERVICE.

55. The vessels of the "Katoomba" class, if sound and in good order, would be suitable for training reserves and cadets, but they are old and likely to be costly for repairs, and their acquisition by Australia is not desirable. The proposals herein put forward for the creation of a sea-going flotilla of the destroyer class will provide within two years the fullest and most modern facilities for the training of reserves and cadets.

CONCLUSION.

56. In the above Report, we have confined ourselves to measures in our opinion necessary to meet Australian requirements. These, we believe, will make for our welfare, and afford the largest degree of self-dependence as an outlying portion of the Empire. We sincerely hope that the results of our work will be of assistance to the Government in considering the vital question of Australian Defence.

W. R. CRESWELL, Captain, Director of the Naval Forces,	}	President.
C. J. CLARE, Captain, Naval Commandant, C.N.F., South Australia,		
F. TICKELL, Captain, Naval Commandant, C.N.F., Queensland,		
WM. J. COLQUHOUN, Commander, C.N.F., Victoria,	}	Members.
F. H. C. BROWNLOW, Commander, O.C. C.N.F., New South Wales,		
W. CLARKSON, Engineer Commander, C.N.F., Victoria,		

APPENDIX A.

DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA.

WHAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN, AND HOW.

The accepted Form of Attack — — 4 Unarmoured Cruisers.

TRADE ROUTES.	DEFENCES AT PRINCIPAL PORTS.	DEFENCES AT MINOR PORTS.	DEFENCES AGAINST LANDING PARTIES.	DEFENCE OF CABLES.
Imperial cruiser squadron—to intercept the enemy at obligatory points of passage off hostile and neutral ports, also in pursuit of enemy.				
3 Ocean-going destroyers, 1st Class 1 " " 2nd Class	<p>To patrol trade routes from Fremantle eastward to Thursday Island.</p> <p>To keep in touch with enemy and engage it; to keep up communication with shore by means of wireless telegraphy.</p> <p>Fixed defences.</p> <p>Coastal destroyers. 1st-Class torpedo boats.</p> <p>Coastal destroyers. 1st-Class torpedo boats.</p>	Coastal destroyers. 1st-Class torpedo boats.	Coastal destroyers. 1st-Class torpedo boats.	Imperial cruiser squadron. Ocean destroyers.

APPENDIX B.

Commonwealth of Australia.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

ESTABLISHMENT AT THE END OF FIVE YEARS.

[illegible]

Commonwealth of Australia.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

ESTABLISHMENT AT THE END OF FIVE YEARS.

Peace Distribution.

Station.	Personnel.		Cost— Maintenance, Manning, Stores.
	Permanent.	Militia.	
Fremantle—			£
1 coastal destroyer, in commission	70	100	13,400
1 coastal destroyer, in reserve			
Adelaide—			
1 coastal destroyer, in commission	98	160	19,060
3 coastal destroyers, in reserve			
Melbourne and Tasmania—			
1 ocean-going destroyer, 1st-class, in commission. Cost charged to "Other" expenditure.	198	Nil	34,000
1 ocean-going destroyer, 1st-class, in reserve	143	322	29,500
1 coastal destroyer, in commission			
3 coastal destroyers, in reserve			
Sydney—			
1 ocean-going destroyer, 1st-class, in reserve	143	332	29,640
1 coastal destroyer, in commission			
3 coastal destroyers, in reserve			
Brisbane—			
1 ocean-going destroyer, 2nd-class, in commission. Cost charged to "Other" expenditure.	132	Nil	22,500
1 coastal destroyer, in commission	98	214	19,870
1 coastal destroyer, in reserve			
4 1st-class torpedo boats, in reserve			
	882	1,128	167,970
Total personnel and annual cost	2,010		167,970

NOTE.—Coastal destroyers all of "Teviot" class.

APPENDIX D.

Commonwealth of Australia.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

First Year.

Proportion of cost of <i>one</i> ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyer, 1st-class	100,000
Proportion of cost of <i>one</i> ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyer, 2nd-class	80,000
Proportion of cost of <i>six</i> coastal torpedo-boat destroyers	240,000
Total cost of two 1st-class torpedo boats	60,000
Capital expenditure	480,000
Maintenance and manning of existing defences, and training increased <i>personnel</i> , and cost of bringing out to Australia <i>two</i> 1st-class boats	78,000
Total expenditure, first year...	558,000

Second Year.

£

Completion of <i>one</i> ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyer, 1st-class (ordered first year) ...	130,000
Completion of <i>one</i> ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyer, 2nd-class (ordered first year) ...	80,000
Completion of <i>six</i> coastal torpedo-boat destroyers (ordered first year) ...	240,000
Capital expenditure ...	450,000

Manning and maintenance of existing defences, and training increased personnel, also cost of bringing out—

1 ocean-going destroyer, 1st class ...	120,000
1 ocean-going destroyer, 2nd class ...	
6 coastal destroyers ...	

Total expenditure, second year ... 570,000

Third Year.

Total cost of <i>two</i> 1st-class torpedo boats (if possible, built in Australia) ...	60,000
Proportion of cost of <i>two</i> ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyers (to be built in Australia) ...	200,000
Proportion of cost of <i>four</i> coastal destroyers (to be built in Australia) ...	160,000
Capital expenditure ...	420,000

Manning and maintenance of existing defences and training increased personnel ... 125,000

Total expenditure, third year ... 545,000

Fourth Year.

Completion of <i>two</i> ocean-going torpedo-boat destroyers (ordered third year) ...	260,000
Completion of <i>four</i> coastal destroyers (ordered third year) ...	160,000
Capital expenditure ...	420,000

Manning and maintenance of existing defences and training increased personnel ... 130,000

Total expenditure, fourth year ... 550,000

Fifth Year.

Total cost of <i>six</i> coastal destroyers (to be built in Australia) ...	480,000
Capital expenditure ...	480,000

Manning and maintenance of defences provided ... 140,000

Total expenditure, fifth year ... 620,000

Sixth Year.

Manning and maintenance of defences provided ...	167,970
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APPENDIX E.

COMPLEMENT.

OCEAN-GOING DESTROYERS.

1ST CLASS.			2ND CLASS.		
	Full.	Reduced in Reserve.		Full.	Reduced in Reserve.
Commander ...	1	—	Commander ...	1	—
Lieutenants ...	2	1	Lieutenant ...	1	1
Sub-Lieutenants ...	2	—	Sub-Lieutenants ...	2	—
Warrant Officers ...	2	1	Warrant Officer ...	1	1
Chief Petty Officers ...	3	1	1st-Class Petty Officers ...	4	2
1st-Class Petty Officers ...	4	—	Leading Seamen ...	4	2
Leading Seamen ...	6	2	A.B.s ...	25	6
A.B.s ...	40	8	Ordinary Seamen ...	5	2
Ordinary Seamen ...	8	4	Boys ...	2	2
Boys ...	4	2	Signalmen ...	4	2
Signalmen ...	6	2	Engineer Lieutenant ...	1	1
Engineer Commander ...	1	—	Engineer Warrant Officer ...	1	1
Engineer Lieutenant ...	1	1	Engine-room Artificers ...	3	2
Engineer Warrant Officers ...	2	1	Chief Stoker ...	1	1
Engine-room Artificers ...	3	2	Leading Stokers ...	6	—
Chief Stoker ...	1	1	Stokers ...	60	10
Leading Stokers ...	9	—	Chief Carpenter's Mate ...	1	1
Stokers ...	90	15	Armourer ...	1	1
Chief Carpenter's Mate ...	1	—	Surgeon ...	1	—
Carpenter's Crew ...	1	1	Sick Bay Steward ...	1	—
Armourer ...	1	—	Assistant Paymaster ...	1	—
Surgeon ...	1	—	Ship's Steward ...	1	—
Sick Bay Steward ...	1	—	Ship's Cooks ...	2	1
Assistant Paymaster ...	1	—	Domestics ...	4	2
Ship's Steward and Writer ...	1	—			
Ship's Cooks ...	2	1			
Domestics ...	4	2			
Total ...	198	45	Total ...	133	38

COASTAL DESTROYERS.

1ST-CLASS TORPEDO BOATS.

	Full.	Reduced in Reserve.		Full.	Reduced in Reserve.
Lieutenant ...	1	—	Lieutenant ...	1	—
Sub-Lieutenant ...	1	—	Sub-Lieutenant ...	1	—
Chief Gunner ...	1	1	Warrant Officer ...	1	—
1st-Class Petty Officers ...	3	1	1st-Class Petty Officer ...	1	—
A.B.s and Signalmen ...	12	5	Leading Seamen ...	2	—
Boys ...	2	1	A.B.s ...	6	—
Engineer Lieutenant ...	1	—	Signalmen ...	2	—
Artificer Engineer ...	1	—	Boys ...	2	—
Engine-room Artificers ...	3	1	Artificer Engineer ...	1	—
Chief Stoker ...	1	—	Artificer ...	1	—
Leading Stokers ...	3	1	Leading Stokers ...	2	—
Stokers ...	24	4	Stokers ...	6	—
Cook ...	1	—	Cook ...	1	—
Domestics ...	2	—			
Total ...	56	14	Total ...	27	7

APPENDIX F.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

COAL PRODUCED, 1904.

State.	Tons.	State.	Tons.
New South Wales	6,019,809	Western Australia	138,550
Queensland	512,015	Tasmania	61,109
Victoria	121,741		
South Australia	—	Total	6,853,224

OVERSEA AND INTER-STATE SHIPMENTS OF COAL FROM THE PORT OF WOLLONGONG AND JETTIES, 1905.

Destination.	Quantity.	Destination.	Quantity.
	Tons.		Tons.
Sydney	424,995	New Zealand	—
Victoria	100,994	Chili	1,323
South Australia	52,056	China	13,660
Western Australia	78,422	South Africa	800
Queensland	658		
Tasmania	3,204	Total	676,122

COAL EXPORT.

NEWCASTLE, NEW SOUTH WALES.—RETURN SHOWING QUANTITY OF COAL EXPORTED DURING THE YEAR 1905.

Countries to which exported.	Quantity.	Countries to which exported.	Quantity.
	Tons.		Tons.
Victoria	817,717	Mexico	46,132
Queensland	40,382	Great Britain	9,219
South Australia	470,207	New Guinea	2,610
Western Australia	148,946	Cape Colony	12,505
Tasmania	100,455	China	19,776
New Zealand	288,077	Natal	700
Hong Kong	93,044	Ceylon	1,450
United States	99,105	Canada	12,762
Java	47,350	Gilbert Islands	8,948
New Caledonia	13,378	Marshall Islands	1,150
India	66,545	Japan	15,179
Philippine Islands	283,087	Portuguese East Africa	720
Fiji	49,796	Argentine Republic	700
Mauritius	11,847	New Hebrides	3,246
Peru	90,679	Germany	478
Chili	475,991	Solomon Islands	763
Straits Settlements	82,716	Guatemala	2,460
Sandwich Islands	118,525		
Ecuador	14,257	Grand Total	3,461,438
Panama	10,536		

APPENDIX G.

TRADE OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

(Extracts from Commonwealth Budget Papers, 1906-7, Tables R. and Y.)

Oversea imports	£38,346,731
Inter-State imports	37,613,750
Total imports	75,960,481 £75,960,481
Oversea exports	56,841,035
Inter-State exports	37,613,750
Total exports	94,454,785 94,454,785
Total trade	£170,415,266

APPENDIX H.

SHIPPING STATISTICS.

(From "Year Book of Australia," 1906.)

Commonwealth of Australia.

1904.

Vessels Inwards—Tonnage, 14,541,248. Vessels Outwards—Tonnage, 14,609,714.

Arrivals of Vessels.

Port.	Average Monthly, 1905.	Port.	Average Monthly, 1905.
Sydney	161	Port Adelaide	72
Melbourne	198	Perth	29
Brisbane	47	Hobart	—

APPENDIX J.

VALUE OF EXPORTS OF AUSTRALIAN PRODUCE AND OTHER PRODUCE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH, 1905.

(Extract from Commonwealth Budget Papers, 1906-7, Table T.)

Article.	Value.
	£
Wool	19,822,216
Gold specie and bullion	9,515,372
Butter	2,331,595
Wheat	4,174,128
Flour	1,160,813
Meats of all kinds, preserved by cold process (exclusive of rabbits and hares).	1,628,727
Rabbits and hares	389,738
Silver ore and bullion and silver lead	1,824,224
Copper bullion and ore	2,113,101
Tin ore and ingots	967,729
Coal	861,692
Tallow	784,718
Hides and skins	2,112,415
Pearl shell	252,895
All other articles	6,198,393
Value of exports of Australian produce	54,127,758
Value of exports of other produce	2,713,277
Total value of exports	£56,841,035

* The total value of coal produced for 1905 was £2,352,198.

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

NAVAL AGREEMENT WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

(Correspondence between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth—dated August 28, 1905, to June 8, 1906.)

Presented by Command; ordered by the Senate to be printed,
10th October, 1906.

MY LORD,

Melbourne, August 28, 1905.

As your Excellency is aware, under an agreement with His Majesty's Government, the Commonwealth contributes five-twelfths of the annual cost of the Naval force on this station, whose base is in Australasian Ports, but whose sphere of operations includes the China and East Indies Stations. The protection of Australasia and its commerce, and of great Imperial interests in China and India upon the high seas, are its principal duties in this very extensive area.

The Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir A. Fanshawe, has recently criticised this agreement on several public occasions, in order to support his contention that our contribution, as there fixed, is altogether insufficient. Since as yet only three payments have been made according to an agreement arrived at in 1902, which is to have effect for ten years from 1903, this appeal for an alteration of its terms might be deemed premature. But as it may indicate a dissatisfaction with the agreement shared by the Lords of the Admiralty, as well as by their official representatives, and as a similar dissatisfaction, though upon other grounds, exist here, it may be advantageous to commence its reconsideration without delay.

The paramount importance of the Navy to the British Empire and to Australia may be taken to be freely admitted. Nothing in this despatch is intended to question it. Indeed, our obligations to share in the general defence of the Empire have been already recognised in practice and in principle. Beyond this, the defence of Australia and of its coasts is accepted as a duty and as a necessity of our national self-respect. Yet even under these circumstances, the present Naval Agreement is not, and never has been, popular in the Commonwealth. It has been approved only in default of a better means of indicating our acceptance of Imperial responsibilities. Whatever may be the assumed basis upon which our contribution is there determined, it is regarded as merely an arbitrary proportion of an existing expenditure. Whatever the intention may have been, this attempt at joint naval action has failed to enlist a fraction of the support that was spontaneously accorded in all the States to the dispatch of military contingents to South Africa.

On this account, the question why the Naval Agreement is coldly regarded here appears serious enough to merit careful scrutiny. There is much truth in the customary interpretation that its want of popularity is due to the fact that, except to the small extent permitted by Articles V., VI., and VII., none of our grant is applied to any distinctively Australian purpose. When the squadron is pointed to as a justification for our subsidy, it must be remembered that a similar squadron, more localised than the present, was maintained prior to our first agreement with the Admiralty in 1887, and would be maintained now if there were no subsidy. What has been obtained by us in return for an annual appropriation has been simply an increase of its strength, coupled with an extension of its sphere of operation.

The British man-of-war and the British seaman awaken enthusiasm whenever they visit our ports because, being English, they are inseparably associated with our race and history; but the particular squadron supposed to be paid for in part by us is not specially Australian any more than it is Anglo-Indian or representative of the Straits Settlements, to which it may be called at any time. What is really required is that any defences, if they are to be appreciated as Australian, must be distinctively of that character. At present we are without any visible evidence of our participation in the Naval force towards which we contribute. Our 200,000*l.* a year would seem in part repaid if we were enabled to take a direct and active part in the protection of our shores and shipping. But as we have no identification with the squadron, except in the articles already alluded to, there is so far nothing naval that can be termed Australian, or even Australasian. No Commonwealth patriotism is aroused while we merely supply funds that disappear in the general expenditure of the Admiralty. The Imperial sentiment languishes too, since

the squadron is rarely seen in most of our ports, and then only by a small proportion of the population.

Having regard to the obvious lack of public interest upon the part of the people of this country in our present naval defence, several means have been suggested that would assist to awaken and render it deeper and more permanent. An acceptable expedient ought not to be hard to find. The Admiralty probably desires naval and coaling stations in Australia other than those already or likely to be hereafter established at such of our seaports as may be defended by local works, or it may need other accommodation established here that would earmark the moneys expended. There would then be something to show for our contribution, which at the same time would be a real assistance to His Majesty's Navy. Although object lessons of this kind would have a healthy influence, they are not the only, nor, when our remote situation is remembered, are they the wisest, means of popularising our grants. They might possibly be criticised as devices for the spending of money upon our own shores, or for local benefit only.

Imperial purposes can be served to which no such objection could be taken, but which would be at the same time of conspicuous value both to the Admiralty and the Commonwealth. Nowhere are maritime communications more important than to Australia, seeing that our dependence upon sea carriage is certain to increase rather than diminish as population and production advance. Our mails, passengers, cargoes, and perishable goods call for cheap and speedy transit outward, which we have not obtained, though that is at least as essential to our expansion as to that of any part of His Majesty's Dominions. Our present oceanic services inward are obviously capable of much improvement, especially those which are in British hands, seeing that in recent years the subsidized vessels of foreign Powers have made great inroads upon our trade and traffic.

There is generally understood to be a close connection between the mercantile marine and naval power of every nation, and it has often been suggested that the one might be greatly benefited by closer alliance with the other. What more natural than that this generally recognised relationship should be made use of in our own case? Our need is plain, the opportunity is obvious, and precedents already exist for satisfying our desires, while uniting us with the mother country in the necessary preparations for national defence.

For instance, the agreement between the Admiralty, Board of Trade, Postmaster-General, and the Cunard Company, dated 30th June 1903, and having a currency of 20 years, might be pointed to as justifying a similar arrangement in which we should be partners, providing for the construction of swift steamers, built upon plans approved by the Admiralty, ordinarily plying to and from Australia, but always available for use as transports in times of need. Both the naval power and mercantile shipping of the Empire would be materially reinforced if the sum at present paid by us towards the local squadron were applied in securing up-to-date ships usefully engaged in commerce during times of peace, but capable of being employed economically and at the shortest notice in the event of war. The French and German Governments are understood to have important agreements of this nature now in force.

The establishment of a rapid and regular service of first-class steamers between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth would confer a great boon upon our producers, upon British merchants, and upon all travellers to and from Australia. It should largely assist to develop trade between the mother country and ourselves. We are now paying a sum of 120,000*l.* a year to the Orient Company for a fortnightly mail service that will in all probability be terminated on 31st January 1908. Taking its character into account, this is an expensive bargain. It is in no sense a substitute for the efficient weekly service between Great Britain and Australia that our mutual interests demand. This we might acquire by combination with the Admiralty, and a diversion of our subsidy to that end.

If any contract to which we are parties were made upon the Cunard pattern, providing for constant steam communication between Great Britain and Australia, conditions could be inserted providing for the selection and partial training of the crews engaged upon them as members of the Royal Naval Reserve. There can be no doubt but that an agreement of this character would be immensely more popular than that which forms the Schedule to the Act of 1903. The ships would be always in evidence, their value would be felt, and their purpose a matter of pride. The Naval forces of the Empire would be at least as much strengthened as by the existing arrangement, quite apart from all the commercial and other advantages of the present proposal.

There are perhaps other schemes for naval co-operation preferred by His Majesty's Government, to which attention ought to be given, but the foregoing is also worthy of careful examination from another point of view.

Australia has admittedly done more than most of her sister dominions in accepting a temporary scheme of naval defence, though confessedly as it stands it is unsatisfactory to us, and, if we may rely upon Admiral Sir Arthur Fanshawe's publicly expressed opinions, to the Lords of the Admiralty too. It is, however, not improbable that other parts of the Empire which at present accept no share in naval defence would reconsider their attitude in the event of the adoption of a new scheme of this character. If attractive to us, some form of it could probably be made attractive to them.

No attempt is made at this stage to do more than indicate a general project in outline. Should this preliminary overture be favourably received by His Majesty's Government, it would be a great advantage if a conditional approval of the proposal, or of its further consideration, were expressed by confidential cable at the earliest date possible. The project could then be put in form as a whole, criticised, supplemented, and submitted to examination in all its details.

The resources of the Empire, whether upon sea or land, may be made to minister to its efficiency by direct developments, and by their indirect and reciprocal action. The promotion and enlargement of national co-operation by these means, while conferring greater potencies upon our people, would foster in them a stronger sense of mutual support. Especially should this be the consequence when scattered dominions were drawn closer together in times of peace, sharing a prosperity increased as well as sheltered by a far-seeing policy providing for their defence.

Where, as in our case, a world-wide Empire depends for very life upon the efficiency of its Navy, an increase of maritime strength would seem to be one of the safest methods of its equipment for the grave emergencies of international rivalry. At all events, it is in the hope that the present proposition will be interpreted in the light of these ambitions that it is now respectfully submitted.

His Excellency the Governor-General.

I have, &c.,
ALFRED DEAKIN.

Governor-General's Office, Melbourne,
June 8, 1906.

Memorandum.

The subjoined cablegram (in cypher), dated London, 7th June 1906, 1.10 p.m., received this day by the Governor-General from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, is transmitted to the Prime Minister.

The Honourable the Prime Minister.

NORTHCOTE,
Governor-General.

"Your despatches of 29th August, 9th September, Naval Agreement. Reply now received from Admiralty to the effect their views on the whole question will be found in Scheme of Defence for Australia approved by the Committee Imperial Defence, and forwarded by last mail. They desire, however, to dissociate themselves absolutely from any expression of dissatisfaction with the terms of the Agreement, and to add that the experience of subsidised mail steamers as the means of supplementing war strength of a fleet has proved that method is of extremely limited efficacy and also costly. Suggestion, therefore, does not commend itself to Admiralty. Despatch follows by mail."

MY LORD,

Downing Street,
June 8, 1906.

In confirmation of my telegram of the 7th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you, to be laid before your Ministers, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Admiralty, in regard to the suggested reconsideration of the terms of the Naval Agreement with Australia and New Zealand.

2. Copies of the Scheme of Defence* for Australia, which has been approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence, were forwarded to you in my secret despatch of the 1st instant.

Governor-General his Excellency the Right Hon.
Lord Northcote, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.

I have, &c.,
ELGIN.

Admiralty,
May 23, 1906.

SIR,

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have had before them your letter of the 16th November 1905 (No. 37565), forwarding copies of two despatches from the Governor-General of Australia, in which are enclosed letters from his Prime Minister, suggesting a reconsideration of the terms of the Naval Agreement with Australia and New Zealand.

2. In reply, I am to request you will state to the Earl of Elgin that My Lords are glad to find from Mr. Deakin's despatch that the paramount importance of the Navy to the whole British Empire and to Australia is not questioned, and that the moral obligation of the Commonwealth to share in the general defence of the Empire is recognised.

3. On the part of their Lordships, I am to state that they desire absolutely to dissociate themselves from any expression of dissatisfaction with the terms of the Agreement, and they would have been prepared to have discussed in this letter the alternative proposals put forward by Mr. Deakin, had it not been for the receipt recently of the application from the Commonwealth Government that the Imperial Defence Committee would consider and frame a scheme of defence for Australia.

It appears to My Lords that such a scheme, when prepared, will be the best mode of conveying their views on the whole question to the Commonwealth Government.

4. The one detail in Mr. Deakin's scheme on which My Lords would desire to touch is that referring to the suggested provision of a service of subsidised mail steamers, to be available in war as cruisers or transports, and I am to state at once, that experience of this method of supplementing the war strength of a fleet has proved that it is not only of extremely limited efficacy, but costly in its operation, and the suggestion does not commend itself to their Lordships.

I am, &c.,
C. I. THOMAS.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office, S.W.

IX. BRITISH EMPIRE.

MILITARY AND NAVAL EXPENDITURE, 1905-6.

Year.	—	Population.	Military Expenditure.	Military Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval Expenditure.	Naval Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval and Military Expenditure.	Naval and Military Expenditure per head of Population.
1905-6	UNITED KINGDOM ...	43,217,687	£ 29,813,000	s. 13 d. 9½	£ 33,389,500	s. 15 d. 5½	£ 63,202,500	£ 1 s. 3
1905-6	CANADA ...	5,900,000	1,333,067	4 6½	Nil	—	1,333,067	0 4 6½
1905-6	NEWFOUNDLAND ...	222,643	Nil	—	3,000	0 3½	3,000	0 0 3½
1905-6	COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ...	4,052,475	76,430	3 9½	255,651	1 3½	1,018,031	0 5 0½
1905-6	NEW ZEALAND ...	938,309†	202,054	4 3½	40,592	0 10½	242,646	0 5 2½
1905-6	CAPE OF GOOD HOPE ...	2,409,804*	555,058	4 7½	50,000	0 5	605,058	0 5 0½
1905-6	NATAL ...	1,141,406‡	133,944	2 4	35,000	0 7½	168,944	0 2 11½
1905-6	TRANSVAAL ...	1,269,951§	177,913	2 0½	Nil	—	177,913	0 2 0½
	TOTAL COLONIES	15,934,588	3,164,466	3 11½	384,243	0 6	3,548,709	0 4 5½

NOTE.—In the case of the Colonies the figures of expenditure are extracted from the Annual Returns of Military and Naval Resources.

* Of these 579,711 are European, and 1,830,093 are non-European.
† Of these 94,731 are European, and 1,046,675 are non-European.
‡ Including 47,731 Maoris.
§ Of these 297,277 are European, and 972,674 are non-European.

E.

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN Mr. DEAKIN (PREMIER OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH) AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMIRALTY.

24th April, 1907.

Present:

Mr. DEAKIN.

Captain OTTLEY, Director of Naval Intelligence.

Captain TUDOR, Assistant Director of Naval Ordnance.

Captain JONES, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. GRAHAM GREENE, Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.

Mr. Deakin explained that, for the following reasons (*inter alia*), the Commonwealth Government desired to modify the present Naval Agreement.

1. While fully recognising the paramount importance of "unity of control" for all the general Naval forces of the Empire, the people of Australia regarded the present contribution of 200,000*l.* to the cost of the Imperial Navy as being somewhat in the nature of a tribute, and it is therefore desirable if possible to find some means by which Australia can co-operate with the Admiralty in the Naval defence of the Empire without offence to the constitutional doctrine that the Government which levies taxation should be responsible for the expenditure and management.

2. To meet this difficulty Mr. Deakin stated that a local defence force was proposed by Australia under the political control of the Commonwealth Government as to finance and allocation to different ports, but under Naval discipline and inviting inspection by the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

3. The personnel of this local defence force should be Imperial in character, and, whether British or Australian, in order to preserve its efficiency should only serve for limited periods in the local flotillas after previous training in the Navy, to which they might return on the expiration of their term of local service.

4. The objections to a dual system of control were, he thought, not so great as was supposed. The control which Australians desired was constitutional. The Commonwealth Government should have control over the movements and stationing of the vessels, but would preserve the character and discipline of the force. In war the functions of the flotillas being local could not be directly controlled by the Commander-in-Chief of the seagoing fleet, who might be thousands of miles away, but the sphere of their action and such matters as recognition signals, &c., &c., would in time of war be arranged in association with that officer in order that harmonious co-operation of the seagoing and local forces might be assured.

5. Mr. Deakin said it was desired to always keep an open door between the local force and the Imperial Navy for any Australians wishing to permanently join the latter. It was conceivable that Australians serving in the local flotillas who formed a liking for a naval life, would be ready to relinquish the Colonial rates of pay in order to enter the Navy and serve for a pension.

6. Mr. Deakin thought that Colonial rates of pay should be given to all men, whether British or Australians, serving in the local forces. Australians serving in the Imperial ships whether for training or as part complement to be paid British rates of pay only, their Colonial allowances being deferred while so serving.

7. The Commonwealth to pay for the entire upkeep of the local forces and the deferred pay for all Australians under training in the Navy for those forces.

8. All other Colonial payments to the Imperial exchequer to cease.

No. 1.

DR. SMARTT to ADMIRALTY.

Hotel Cecil, London, W.C.,

23rd April 1907.

DEAR MR. GRAHAM GREENE,

As promised on Sunday, I enclose a copy of the Bill in connection with Naval Volunteers, which it is the intention of the Government to introduce into the House of Assembly as the basis upon which the Naval Volunteers are to be established.

On this consideration, I take it that what was agreed to by Lord Tweedmouth on Sunday was—

- (1) The authorisation of the prefix "Royal";
- (2) The sanction by the Admiralty of the uniform being worn by the corps previous to the passage of the Bill;
- (3) An arrangement whereby the "Odin" will be lent by the Admiralty for the training of the Cape and Natal Naval Volunteers—the expenditure necessary for the upkeep of the ship and such crew as may be necessary to allow of her being taken to sea with safety being paid by the Cape and Natal out of their joint contribution of 85,000*l.* a year to Naval purposes—such amount to be subtracted from the total amount which, under existing conditions, is paid over to the Admiralty without any conditions whatever.

As I am anxious to communicate, by cable, with the Cape on the subject, I should be much obliged if you would be good enough to have this confirmed with as little delay as possible.

Yours faithfully,

T. A. SMARTT.

W. Graham Greene, Esq., C.B.,

Assistant Secretary to the Admiralty.

Enclosure in No. 1.

BILL TO ENABLE THE GOVERNOR TO ENROL A FORCE OF NAVAL VOLUNTEERS.

Be it enacted by the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and House of Assembly thereof, as follows:—

1. It shall be lawful for the Governor to enrol within the Colony British subjects over the age of _____ years and under the age of _____ years to constitute a force to be styled the Cape Colonial Division Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and to serve in His Majesty's Royal Navy, within and beyond the territorial limits of the Colony, and either ashore or afloat, under and subject to such regulations and conditions (including liability when on actual (active) service, or when being temporarily borne on the books of any of His Majesty's ships and vessels for instruction, training or exercise afloat or ashore to all and several the provisions of the Imperial Statutes relating to Naval discipline for the time being in force) as may from time to time be made and imposed by the Lord High Admiral or the Commissioners for exercising the office of Lord High Admiral acting under the authority of the Imperial Legislature, or made and imposed by the Governor under powers assigned to him by His Majesty in Council under the like authority in respect of the matters following, viz.:—(a) the constitution, establishment and organization of the force and its general administration; (b) enrolment, disbandment, resignation, and retirement of its members; (c) precedence, command, uniform, and decorations; (d) discipline, offences, and punishments (in so far as they are not provided for by the Naval Discipline Acts); (e) calling out for actual (active) service; (f) property, finance, pay, and the appropriation of fines.

2.—(1) If any volunteer dies from any injury or illness received or contracted by reason of his being on active service, or his being trained or exercised with any of His Majesty's regular forces, ashore or afloat, or with any of the permanent Cape Colonial Forces, or his being called out, by proclamation of the Governor, in aid of the civil power in the protection of life or property, or his being assembled in a camp of training or instruction, his widow or dependents, being an ascendent or descendent, shall be entitled to an adequate pension (to be paid out of moneys to be provided by Parliament for the purpose) having regard to social position and means of livelihood, to be determined by the Governor, and such pension shall be paid till disallowed, decreased, or increased, as the case may be, by Parliament. Provided that in the case of descendents, an annual allowance for a reasonable number of years shall be awarded, and not a pension for life.

(2) If any volunteer receives or contracts a serious injury or illness in such circumstances, but does not die therefrom, the Governor may by way of compensation award such gratuity, annual allowance, or pension as may appear to be equitable, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and more especially to the nature of the injury or illness, the amount of suffering, its permanency, and its effect on his capacity to carry on his usual vocation or earn a livelihood; and any such pension or allowance shall be payable till disallowed or altered by Parliament, provided that no gratuity shall be wholly paid till approved of by Parliament.

3. All and several the provisions of sections ninety-seven et seq. of the Colonial Forces Act, 1892, shall apply to the Cape Naval Volunteers, their persons, property, and equipments, and to the public in respect of them respectively.

4. This Act may be cited as the Naval Volunteers Act, 1907.

No. 2.

ADMIRALTY to DR. SMARTT.

DEAR DR. SMARTT,

Admiralty, S.W.,

26th April 1907.

I HAVE shown your letter of the 23rd inst.* to Lord Tweedmouth, and he desires me to say in reply that there will be no difficulty with regard to the authorisation of the prefix "Royal" nor to the approval of the uniform, so soon as the necessary legislation has been passed.

It is presumed that there will be no objection to the addition of some slight mark of difference to the uniform, so as to show that the wearer of the uniform belongs to the Cape or South African Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

With regard to the lending of the "Odin" for the use of the Naval Volunteers, Lord Tweedmouth desires me to say that he is not in a position to go beyond the assurance which he has already given, viz.: that the Admiralty will give the question their careful consideration. The matter is one, as you will admit, which should not be dealt with outside, and independently of, the general questions now under the consideration of the Conference.

I may add that the draft of the proposed Bill, which you enclosed, is being considered with the Law Officers of the Admiralty.

The Hon. Dr. Smartt.

Believe me, &c.,

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

No. 3.

ADMIRALTY to SIR J. WARD.

DEAR SIR JOSEPH,

Admiralty, S.W.,

7th May 1907.

By Lord Tweedmouth's request I send you a statement showing approximately the cost of four submarine torpedo boats (together with their crew and the appliances immediately connected with them) of a class considered suitable for employment in the defence of New Zealand harbours. The pay of officers and men only is given, victualling and clothing being omitted.

It is difficult to give anything more than a general statement of the cost involved, as New Zealand is not in the position of this country, which possesses numerous Naval establishments which are capable of carrying out without difficulty all the repairs that might be necessary.

I may explain, briefly, that the statement has been prepared on the assumption that as the submarine crews cannot live in their vessels, and their work is of a very exhausting nature, it is necessary to have spare crews for relief purposes. The number of these spare crews would vary according to the total number of submarine boats kept in one port, and it has been assumed that the boats will be kept at separate ports.

A small vessel is required to provide living quarters and to attend the submarine when under weigh, and for towage, if the submarine proceeds for any distance. Probably a large tug would meet the case.

The spare crew could be used partly to man this vessel, certain additional ratings being allowed for care and up-keep of the tug and submarine.

Some arrangement would also be necessary for docking, hauling up, supply of electricity, supply and care of petrol on shore and means of easily supplying the same to the submarine, and probably a small shore dépôt will be found necessary with a care and maintenance party.

As regards training the first crews, it may be anticipated that including time from and to New Zealand about a year would be required, assuming that the crews were

* No. 1.

seamen at the start. It would probably be advisable that the boats which may ultimately be located in New Zealand waters should be available for the training of the men in this country.

Lord Tweedmouth hopes that this information will be sufficient for your immediate purpose. Should more precise data be required, he considers that there will be no difficulty in supplying the facts, provided that a decision is arrived at with regard to the actual requirements.

Believe me, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

The Honourable

Sir Joseph G. Ward, K.C.M.G.

(Note.—Copy of above given to Mr. Deakin and Dr. Smartt.)

Enclosure in No. 3.

SCHEME FOR FOUR SUBMARINES.

Personnel required.

Ports.	1.	2.	3.	4.
Shore base	4 (a)	4	4	4 ratings.
One submarine (two crews)	32 (b)	32	32	32 "
One small vessel	10 (c)	10	10	10 "
	46	46	46	46

Add 10 per cent. for sick, on leave, &c. = 20.

Grand total for 4 boats - - - 204.

(a) Shore Bases.	(b) Two Crews.	(c) Tug.
1 Electrician.	2 Lieutenants.	1 Lieutenant.
1 E.R.A.	2 Sub-Lieutenants.	4 A.B.'s.
2 A.B.'s (S.T.).	2 Petty Officers (Cox.).	1 E.R.A.
	4 Leading Seamen.	2 Stoker Petty Officers.
	10 A.B.'s.	2 Stokers.
	2 E.R.A.'s.	
	2 Mechanics.	
	2 Stoker P.O.'s.	
	6 Stokers.	
4	32	10

Initial cost of submarine torpedo boat, 50,000l.

Total cost of 4 boats, 200,000l.

On the basis of Naval rates of pay, the cost of pay and allowances, including submarine pay under Naval Regulations and Colonial allowance to ratings at 3s. a day, but excluding victualling, clothing, &c. and pensions, is estimated at 30,000l. per annum, approximately, as follows:—

	£
570l. for each shore base	= 2,280
5,650l. for each submarine	= 22,600
1,280l. for each small vessel	= 5,120
For 1 = 7,500l.	For 4 = £30,000

No. 4.

DR. SMARTT to ADMIRALTY.

DEAR MR. GRAHAM GREENE,

Hotel Cecil, London, W.C.,
8th May 1907.

I ENCLOSE the last draft of the proposed Naval Volunteer Bill, which I have received from Colonel Crewe, the Cape Minister of Defence. The Bill is practically the same as the copy already in your possession, save that it contains a clause—and I think a very desirable one—making the Naval Volunteers liable for service on land in case of emergency.

Before communicating with the Defence Department at Cape Town, I am anxious to be assured that my interpretation of the remarks of the First Lord of the Admiralty, to-day, is correct—so that there may be no possible misunderstanding, which I desire in every way to avoid, as the Admiralty has shown a desire to meet us in every possible manner.

I understood Lord Tweedmouth to state that (a) when the Bill receives the approval of the Cape Parliament, the Naval Volunteers will be entitled to use the prefix "Royal"; (b) that the "Odin" (or some other suitable ship) will be placed at their disposal for training purposes, most probably in conjunction with Natal; the necessary expenditure in connection with the up-keep of this ship being defrayed out of the 50,000*l.* Cape and 35,000*l.* Natal subsidies which are now paid direct to the Navy, on the understanding that, when a suitable opportunity arises, the expenditure in connection with this ship will be met from other Cape and Natal sources; (c) that the Admiralty is favourable to an arrangement whereby the subsidy now paid by the Cape and Natal should be devoted to local Naval purposes—previously approved of by the Admiralty—such as the establishment and maintenance of submarines and destroyers in South African waters; the Admiralty kindly supplying all the necessary information and details in connection with these matters, especially considering that the total amount devoted to this purpose would exceed the contributions now given to the Navy.

I trust that, on the understanding that the Government will introduce the Naval Volunteer Bill during the ensuing Session, the Admiralty will be prepared at once to sanction the wearing of the uniform by the Cape Naval Volunteers prior to the actual passage of the measure, since I am personally aware that the withholding of this sanction—the reasons not, perhaps, being properly understood—has had a tendency to dampen the ardour of the men.

W. Graham Greene, Esq., C.B.,
Assistant Secretary to the Admiralty.

Yours faithfully,
T. A. SMARTT.

No. 5.

ADMIRALTY to DR. SMARTT.

DEAR DR. SMARTT,

Admiralty,
16th May 1907.

In reply to your letter of the 8th instant,* Lord Tweedmouth desires me to say that his statement at the Conference at the Colonial Office on that date may be taken to convey an assurance to the following effect:—

(a) So soon as the Cape Parliament has passed a Bill placing the Cape Naval Volunteers in the same position as regards service and discipline as the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve established in the United Kingdom, the Admiralty will take steps at once to authorise the Cape Government to treat the Naval Volunteers as a branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, with the right to wear a similar uniform, it being understood that this arrangement must be provisional until an Act of the Imperial Parliament has been passed authorising the application of the Colonial Act beyond the Colony or Colonies and the territorial waters of the same.

(b) So soon as the necessary legislation has been passed the Admiralty will endeavour to arrange to place a vessel at the disposal of the Colonial Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve for the purposes of training the Naval Volunteers, but without any pledge as to providing a crew for

* No. 4.

the same, and also to give all possible assistance towards the training of the Volunteers, it being understood that the necessary expenditure in connection with the upkeep of the ship is defrayed by the Colonies and be reserved in the meantime out of the present Cape and Natal subsidies if the Colonial Parliaments so decide.

The late Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Station is expected to arrive next week, when an opportunity will be given to consider the question of training more fully than has been possible hitherto.

(c) As stated by the First Lord at the Conference, the Admiralty do not take up a positive attitude towards the continuance or not of the present agreement. They accept gladly the contribution to the expense of the Navy now made by the Governments of the Cape and Natal, but should the Legislatures of these Colonies decide to substitute for these direct payments another form of assistance towards the defence forces of the Empire, the Admiralty are ready to consider any arrangement which the Colonies may deem more suitable to their requirements.

With regard to the form of the Bill to be submitted to the Colonial Legislature, Lord Tweedmouth has had the draft Bill reviewed by the legal advisers of the Admiralty, and with the small alterations shown therein it is considered that it will meet the requirements of the case. It will be noticed that the Admiralty have not adopted the last "tentative" paragraph of Clause I. of the draft enclosed in your letter of the 8th instant, seeing that it is considered preferable that the duration of service, &c. should be laid down in the regulations, the legal maximum duration of service in the event of mobilisation being three years under the Royal Naval Reserve Volunteer Act of 1859 which governs the case. It may be remarked that it would be very undesirable that the Colonial Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve should have conditions of service in time of war differing in an important essential from those of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve at home.

On the subject of the dock at Simonstown, Lord Tweedmouth desires me to say that he has ascertained that it has been designed with a full knowledge of the fact that at certain seasons a strong south-east wind may be anticipated, and the advisers of the Admiralty are of opinion that the design provides for all reasonable contingencies and that no difficulty will be felt in docking or undocking. The question of the breakwater under construction is somewhat different, and it is premature to say whether or not the arrangement being carried out will possess the disadvantages suggested, but it would only be occasionally in very stormy weather that any possible difficulty would be experienced by ships on entering the harbour.

The Hon. Dr. Thomas Smartt,
&c., &c., &c.

Believe me,
Yours truly,
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 5.

BILL TO ENABLE THE GOVERNOR TO ENROL A FORCE OF NAVAL VOLUNTEERS.

Be it enacted by the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and House of Assembly thereof, as follows:—

1. It shall be lawful for the Governor to enrol within the Colony British subjects over the age of — years and under the age of — years to constitute a force to be styled the "Cape Colonial Division Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve," form a division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, established under the Imperial Statute 3 Edward 7 Chapter 6 and to serve in His Majesty's Royal Navy, within and beyond the territorial limits of the Colony, and either ashore or afloat, and to be liable under and subject to such Regulations and conditions, in addition to liability when on actual (active) service, or when being temporarily borne on the books of any of His Majesty's ships and vessels for instruction, training or exercise afloat or ashore, to all and several the provisions of the any Imperial Statutes relating to naval discipline for the time being in force, and to be subject to such regulations and conditions as may from time to time be made and imposed by the Lord High Admiral, or the Commissioners for exercising the office of Lord High Admiral, acting under the authority of the Imperial Legislature, or by the Governor under powers

assigned to him by His Majesty in Council under the like authority, in respect of the matters following, viz.:—(a) The *title*, constitution, establishment, and organisation of the force, and its general administration; (b) enrolment, *duration of service*, disbandment, resignation, and retirement of its members; (c) ~~precedence, command, command~~, *precedence*, uniform, and decorations; (d) discipline, offences, and punishments in so far as they are not provided for by the ~~Naval Discipline Acts~~, *any Imperial Statute relating to naval discipline*; (e) calling out for actual (active) service; (f) *pay*, property, finance, ~~pay~~, and the appropriation of fines: Provided that in the event of any volunteer being sentenced under the Naval Discipline Act or any regulation made under this Act to a term of penal servitude, or of imprisonment exceeding six months, to be served in any of His Majesty's gaols outside the territorial limits of the South African Colonies, he shall, if he so desires, be transferred, as soon as a proper opportunity offers, to one of the gaols or convict stations, as the case may be, in this Colony, and ~~provided further that no volunteer shall be liable to serve on active (actual) service for any period exceeding (?) two years.~~

2.—(i.) If any volunteer dies *under this Act* from any injury or illness received or contracted by reason of his being on actual service, or by reason of his being temporarily borne on the books of any of His Majesty's ships and vessels for instruction, training, or exercise, ashore or afloat, or by reason of his being called out, by proclamation of the Governor, in aid of the civil power in the protection of life or property, as hereinafter provided, his widow or dependents, being ascendants or descendants, shall be entitled to an adequate pension (to be paid out of moneys to be provided by this Parliament for the purpose, having regard to her or their social position and means of livelihood, to be determined by the Governor; and such pension shall be paid till disallowed, decreased, or increased, as the case may be, by this Parliament: Provided that in the case of descendants, an annual allowance for a reasonable number of years shall be awarded, and not a pension for life.

(ii.) If any *such* volunteer receives or contracts a serious injury or illness in such circumstances but does not die therefrom, the Governor may by way of compensation award such gratuity, or annual allowance, or pension as may appear to be equitable, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and more especially to the nature of the injury or illness, the amount of suffering, its permanency, and its effect on his capacity to carry on his usual vocation or earn a livelihood; and any such pension or allowance shall be payable till disallowed or altered by this Parliament, provided that no gratuity shall be wholly paid till approved of by Parliament.

3. All and several the provisions of sections ninety-seven et seq. of the Colonial Forces Act, 1892, shall apply to the ~~Cape Naval Volunteers~~ volunteers *under this Act*, their person, property, and equipments, and to the public in respect of them respectively.

4. It shall be lawful for the Governor at any time by proclamation to call out on active service against an enemy or in aid of the civil power in the protection of life and property volunteers enrolled under this Act, and thereupon and for such period as may be agreed upon by the Governor and the Admiral Commander-in-Chief all volunteers so called out shall be subject to all the duties and liabilities of volunteers enrolled under the Colonial Forces Act aforesaid, and, as regards the public, shall be deemed to have been enrolled thereunder.

5. This Act may be cited as the Naval Volunteers Act, 1906, 1907.

No. 6.

ADMIRALTY to MR. DEAKIN.

DEAR MR. DEAKIN,

Admiralty, 18th May 1907.

I HAVE been desired by Lord Tweedmouth, who has now left London, to send you an estimate of the first cost and maintenance of four destroyers of the River class and four coastal destroyers. This number has been taken as affording a convenient comparison with the cost and maintenance of four submarine boats. Should the provision of a larger number be in question, it would be necessary carefully to consider the organisation of the flotilla, and in that case some fresh item of expense would probably present itself.

The figures given are those for River class destroyers fitted with reciprocating engines and burning good Welsh coal, and for coastal destroyers fitted with turbine machinery and burning oil fuel only.

It is suggested that it would be advisable to fit the River destroyers with turbine machinery, and the boilers to burn oil-fuel only. This would reduce the number of stokers to be carried, and they would also not require so much training in working the boilers.

Oil-fuel does not cause the same dirt in the boilers as coal does, and they require less cleaning—another saving of labour. If coal is used it will have to be good Welsh coal, or else the boats will not obtain their full speeds. If at any time local Australian coal is used in these boats, experience shows that it will burn away casings, fronts of boilers, and firebars, and will necessitate larger and more expensive repairs than if Welsh coal is burnt.

The ordnance requirements have not been considered, as it is impossible to foreshadow the practices which would be carried out by the flotilla.

Believe me, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

P.S.—I add a note as to the estimated cost of maintaining a submarine, viz., repairs, sea stores, and petrol, which has been worked out since the date of Lord Tweedmouth's letter to Sir Joseph Ward.

	£
Repairs	1,150
Sea Stores	350
Petrol	1,500
	£3,000.—W. G. G.

(Note.—Copy of above sent to Sir J. Ward, Dr. Smartt, and Mr. Moor.)

Enclosure in No. 6.

SCHEME FOR DESTROYER FLOTILLA.

Original Outlay.

	£
(a) Four River Class destroyers at 75,000l.	300,000
(b) Four 1st-Class torpedo-boats (coastal destroyers) at 42,000l.	168,000
(c) Purchase and fitting out of parent ship (stationary)	11,300
Total	£479,300

Upkeep per Annum.

	£
Coal for (a) 100 days' steaming	32,400
Oil fuel for (b) 100 days' steaming	20,000
Stores (naval) for (a)	1,200
Stores (naval) for (b)	900
Repairs for (a)*	8,000
Repairs for (b)	6,000
Maintenance of parent ship and incidentals (c)	1,600
Total	£70,100

	£
Depreciation (life 15 years) for (a)	20,000
Depreciation (life 15 years) for (b)	11,200
Total	£31,200

* Average over a number of years.

Complement, &c.

	Officers and Men.	
	Numbers.	Pay, &c.
(a) Four River Class destroyers each	70	£ 8,000
(b) Four 1st-Class torpedo boats (coastal destroyers)	33	4,500
Total four { (a)	280	32,000
(b)	132	18,000
Total eight	412	50,000

The cost of pay and allowances has been estimated on the basis of naval rates, including colonial allowances at 3s. a day, but excluding victualling, clothing, and pensions.

A complement for the parent ship has not been drawn up. The number of men would depend upon the manner in which the destroyers are located.

Complement of River Class.

- 1 Lieutenant.
- 1 Sub-Lieutenant.
- 1 Chief Gunner or Gunner.
- 2 1st-Class Petty Officers.
- 2 2nd-Class Petty Officers.
- 13 Able-Bodied or Ordinary Seamen.
- 1 Leading Signalman.
- 1 Qualified Signalman.

Included in the foregoing.

- 1 Sightsetter for 13-pr.
- 7 S.G.
- 1 Torpedo Instructor.
- 1 Torpedo Coxswain.
- 1 Leading Torpedo Man.
- 3 S.T.
- 1 Engineer Lieutenant of less than 8 years' seniority or Engineer Sub-Lieutenant.
- 1 Chief Engine-Room Artificer.
- 3 Engine-Room Artificers.
- 3 Chief Stokers.
- 3 Leading Stokers, 1st Class.
- 3 Leading Stokers, 2nd Class.
- 31 Stokers.
- 1 Second Ship's Cook.
- 2 Domestics, 2nd Class (Wardroom).
- 70 Total complement.

Complement of Coastal Destroyers.

- 1 Lieutenant.
- 1 Sub-Lieutenant.
- 1 Chief Gunner or Gunner.
- 2 1st-Class Petty Officers.
- 2 2nd-Class Petty Officers.
- 10 Able-Bodied or Ordinary Seamen.
- 1 Qualified Signalman.

Included in the foregoing.

- 2 Sightsetters for 12-prs.
- 2 S.G.
- 1 Torpedo Instructor.
- 1 Torpedo Coxswain.
- 2 Leading Torpedo Men.
- 4 S.T.
- 1 Chief Artificer Engineer or Artificer Engineer.
- 1 Chief Engine-Room Artificer.
- 1 Engine-Room Artificer.
- 2 Chief Stokers.
- 2 Leading Stokers, 1st Class.
- 6 Stokers.
- 2 Domestics, 2nd Class (Wardroom).
- 33 Total complement.

F.

RESOLUTION OF COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC.

That in view of the probable completion of the Panama Canal it is desirable that all possible means of strengthening British interests in the Pacific should be adopted.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE EXTENSION OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC IN CONNECTION WITH THE OPENING OF THE PANAMA CANAL.

The question of the effect which the opening of an Isthmian Canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans would have on British interests in the latter has ever since the matter came within the domain of practical politics engaged the serious attention of His Majesty's Government.

When the question arose in 1898 of the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and its supersession by a fresh Agreement with the United States for the construction and neutralization of the Canal, an early opportunity was taken of consulting the technical advisers of His Majesty's Government on the strategic and commercial questions which were raised in that connection, and the views of the Director of Military Intelligence and of the President of the Board of Trade and of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty were accordingly obtained. It was then pointed out that, though in the event of hostilities with the United States the advantage would certainly lie with them, should they hold the Canal, yet in times of peace the opening of such a Canal would, if its dues were moderate, attract a large custom, and confer a great and continuous benefit upon our merchant ships, and ordinarily be a material convenience to our ships of war.

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which was signed between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government on the 18th November 1901, agreed to the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention and to the construction of an interoceanic canal under the auspices of the United States and provided for its neutralization; while, two years later, on the 18th November 1903, a Treaty between the United States and Panamá determined that the Canal should follow the Panamá route.

Since the latter date, when this route was decided on in preference to that *via* Nicaragua, the attention of His Majesty's Government has naturally been specially directed to the consequences involved in that decision, and the Governments of Australia and New Zealand have not failed to press upon them the desirability of acquiring, if possible, a coaling station on one of the islands lying between Panamá and the Australian Colonies. It appears unnecessary for the purposes of the present Memorandum to enter at length into the commercial and strategic results of the opening of the Canal, but it may be convenient to summarize the communications which have passed and the suggestions which have been made with respect to the possible sites for naval or trading stations—viz., Tahiti, the Leeward Islands, and the Gambier Islands.

As regards Tahiti, in August 1906 Captain E. F. A. Gaunt, of His Majesty's ship "Cambrian," sent home a Report, a copy of which was supplied to the Governor-General of Australia, on the changes of administration then proceeding there. The French, having removed all their troops and reduced the number of their *fonctionnaires*, were, he stated, preparing to give up the whole of the islands if they could be sold or exchanged for a consideration. The reason assigned was that the cost of administration was very high, and the islands were not paying their way. The natives of Tahiti would, he thought, welcome the British as their rulers more than any other nation.

On the 28th September the Governor-General of Australia telegraphed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the complete removal of the French troops from, and the reduction of the Administration in, Tahiti were causing the Australian public much apprehension of the possible cession of the group, and the Commonwealth Ministers requested to be furnished with either public or confidential information on the subject. His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris addressed inquiries to the French Government thereupon, but was assured that the withdrawal of troops and the administrative reductions were solely due to motives of economy, and that there was no question whatever of any cession of the islands. Lord Northcote was accordingly informed of these assurances.

In the meanwhile the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in forwarding Captain Gaunt's Report on Tahiti to the Foreign Office, stated that the Society Islands, though possessing some excellent harbours, were not on the direct route between any two very important places. Tahiti, it was pointed out, might form a useful base to an enemy to disturb the trade between Panama, Australia, and New Zealand, being only 500 to 600 miles off that trade route, but would not be likely to be of any other use strategically, while any possible enemy would require great power at sea to make it really useful. There appeared, moreover, to be no reason to suppose that France intended to give up Tahiti, as the French squadron there was, it was understood, to be kept up to its usual strength during 1907.

In expressing the satisfaction of the Commonwealth Government at the information that the French had no intention of ceding Tahiti, the Governor-General of Australia called the attention of His Majesty's Government to disquieting rumours which were being continually received in Australia to the effect that Germany was gradually increasing her influence in the group. The Australian Government understood that the German Banking Company which had a branch at Papeete were endeavouring to secure possession of a large number of estates in the islands by advancing money on mortgage. The feeling in the group that France intended at an early date to relieve herself of the cost of administration by cession to another Power was strong and widespread, and should the French Government ever show an inclination to reconsider their determination to retain possession, it would, the Australian Government felt, be greatly to the disadvantage of British interests in that hemisphere to permit the islands to become the property of any other Power. It was pointed out that, on the opening of the additional highway between Europe and Australasia of the Panama Canal, a large part of the trade between New Zealand, Fiji, and the Eastern parts of Australia on the one side, and Great Britain on the other, would be diverted to the new route. Owing to the distance to be covered, it would be necessary for steamers to have coaling stations, and as the Society Islands, which are about half-way between Sydney and Panama, are the last group of islands possessed of good harbours before the wide stretch of ocean between the South Sea Islands and the American continent is reached, it would be desirable that the chief of such coaling stations should be located at Papeete or Port Phaeton. An assurance had already been sent to Lord Northcote by His Majesty's Government before the receipt of his Lordship's despatch, that the matter was receiving the earnest consideration of the Imperial Government.

Rumours of the intention of the French to cede Tahiti were current at the end of 1906 in New Zealand as well as in Australia. On the 12th September the "Auckland Star" published an article to the effect that negotiations were in progress for the sale of the islands to Great Britain. In December the Prime Minister presented a Memorandum to the Governor advocating the acquisition by the British Government of Raiatea and the other islands of the group known as the Leeward Islands, by arrangement with the French Government by purchase or otherwise. These Islands have been occupied by France since 1888, when the French military posts in the New Hebrides were withdrawn, on which occasion, as agreed in the Convention with France of the 16th November 1887, the Anglo-French Declaration of 1847, recognizing the independence of the Leeward Islands, was abrogated. Raiatea, with its twin Island Tahaa, is inclosed by an extensive barrier reef in which there is a fine deep harbour, which, the Government of New Zealand pointed out in their Memorandum, would be of great value to Great Britain and New Zealand as a naval and trading station, particularly in view of the completion of the Panama Canal. The New Zealand Government at the same time stated their readiness, should any negotiations with France be successful, to accept the responsibility of administering not only these islands but also Tahiti in the same manner as they now administer the Cook and other islands.

His Majesty's Government, in their reply of the 5th March 1907, thanked the New Zealand Government for their offer to accept the responsibility of administering the islands should they be acquired, but stated that it was not anticipated that there would be any opportunity of considering the matter further. The reply of the French Government to the inquiry made of them in the previous October had made it clear that there was no question whatever of their intention to cede the group to any Power, and, so far as His Majesty's Government were aware, this assurance applied equally to Raiatea and the adjacent islands which were formally annexed by France on the 16th March 1888. The wishes of the New Zealand Government would, however, it was added, be borne in mind.

In January 1907 the Secretary of State for the Colonies called Sir E. Grey's attention

to the fact that one of the resolutions to be submitted to the forthcoming Colonial Conference by the Commonwealth Government referred to the rumoured intention of the French Government to cede Tahiti, and reminded him, in view of the improbability of any such cession at present, of an opinion expressed by the Admiralty that the acquisition of the Gambia Islands would be of more importance to British interests in connection with the change in the Pacific situation resulting from the completion of the Panama Canal than that of Tahiti. This opinion had been brought to the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne in July 1905, when the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty stated that, having had under consideration the question of acquiring a coaling station between New Zealand and Panama, their attention had been drawn to the advantages presented in this connection by the Manga Reva or Gambier Islands. These islands, belonging to France, lie almost midway between Panama and Auckland, practically on the direct route, and the completion of the Panama Canal would render the possession of a coaling station thereabouts of the highest importance. The Lords Commissioners therefore suggested that the existing amicable relations with France might make it a favourable moment for approaching the French Government on the matter. Lord Lansdowne, however, replied to this proposal on the 9th August 1905, that, though the opinion of the Lords Commissioners as to the value of the islands to Great Britain would be borne in mind, in case proposals from the French Government on other subjects should offer an opportunity for bringing the matter forward, it was not then at all an opportune moment for proposing a transfer to the French Government, who, even if they were willing to entertain it, might not improbably bring forward counter proposals of a very embarrassing character. The inhabitants of the Gambier Islands, at whose request the islands had in 1844 been placed under the protection of France, being subsequently annexed by her in 1881, would, moreover, probably be opposed to a transfer of allegiance.

In October 1906 the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty again called attention to the importance of the Gambia Islands, as being on the direct route from Panama to New Zealand or Australia, and therefore very valuable to Great Britain.

His Majesty's Consul at Tahiti has, however, recently reported that, though admirably adapted geographically as a half-way station between Panama and Australia, Manga Reva (Gambier Islands) is subject to cyclonic disturbances in January and March, and to hurricanes or gales in September. Its population numbers only about 400 persons, and provisions, fruits, and vegetables are scarce. On the east side of the island water is unobtainable, but on the north-west side there is a small river. At Rikitea, the seat of government, there is a small harbour, difficult of access and available only for small vessels, while opposite it is an expanse of water suitable for the anchorage of large vessels, but unfurnished with any adequate entrance. Other anchorages on the north-west side of the island are badly interspersed with rocks and shoals, and their approaches are practically prohibitive.

Papeete Harbour, in Tahiti, he adds, need not be approached by way of any of the dangerous islands of the Paumotu Archipelago. If vessels going from Panama to New Zealand or Australia make Fatu-Hiva Island, in the Marquesas group, and thence proceed direct to Papeete, the distance of the Tahiti route is approximately the same as that of the Manga Reva route (7,700 miles). From a commercial point of view also, the advantages of Papeete as a coaling station are many. Its geographical situation entitles it to consideration as a possible store-house for coal from New Zealand and Australia, and for oil-fuel from the Californian oil-fields and elsewhere. Its harbour is large and commodious, accessible either by day or night. Its beach is adapted by nature for the erection of wharves capable of providing accommodation for several large ships at a time, while the water supply is good and plentiful, and provisions of all sorts are abundant. A well-protected coral shore in its immediate vicinity, which is approachable in deep water, is suitable for the construction of a dry dock adapted to the requirements of present day shipping, and in this respect Tahiti appears to be the only island in the South-East Pacific where such accommodation could be made available.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, however, do not indorse the views of His Majesty's Consul.

They point out that Tahiti is just as much subject to cyclonic disturbances as Manga Reva, and that its harbour, which is only 300 feet wide, cannot be regarded—according to the naval idea of such a harbour—as a "commodious harbour, accessible either by day or night."

As regards Manga Reva, the Lords Commissioners point out that it was never contemplated to make Port Rikitea the coaling place.

Further examination will be necessary before the exact spot can be determined, but

there appears to be, the Lords Commissioners point out, a large area close to the Islands of Aukena and Aka Maru, the best water being at Aukena.

If Manga Reva should prove unsuitable, they add, a far better harbour than Papeete exists in the Island of Bora Bora, west of Tahiti.

When recently the Commonwealth of Australia proposed, among various Resolutions for submission to the Colonial Conference, one to the effect, "That, in view of the probable completion of the Panama Canal, it is desirable that all possible means of strengthening British interests in the Pacific should be adopted," some doubt was felt as to the intended scope of this Resolution.

An enquiry addressed to Lord Northcote, however, elicited the information that the terms of the Resolution had special reference to the question of Great Britain's acquiring a coaling station on the new Panamá route, as suggested in his despatch already referred to. It was intended to urge that the whole route from the Panama Canal to Australia should be the subject of constant solicitude and of any action possible in the interests of British ships.

In answer to this appeal, His Majesty's Government desire to take this opportunity to place on record the deep interest they feel in this question, their determination to watch closely the effects of the opening of the Canal on the interests of the Empire, and their desire to meet, as far as may be practicable, the wishes of the Commonwealth Government and those of the Government of New Zealand in this important matter.

*Foreign Office,
March 21, 1907.*

CO 886/2/6

Printed for the use of the Imperial Conference.

Dominions

No. 13.

CONFIDENTIAL.

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

SUMMONING OF A

CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE SELF-GOVERNING DOMINIONS

ON THE

NAVAL AND MILITARY DEFENCE
OF THE EMPIRE.

COLONIAL OFFICE,
July, 1909.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
1	The Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. Mar. 22.)	States that Government of New Zealand offer one battleship, and, if necessary, two battleships, of the latest type.	1
2	To the Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	March 22	Requests that Prime Minister may be assured that the generous and spontaneous offer of battleships made on behalf of New Zealand has been received by the Secretary of State with the highest appreciation, and will at once be laid before His Majesty's Government.	1
3	Ditto ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	March 24	Expresses the feelings of appreciation and gratitude with which His Majesty's Government have received the offer of a battleship; states that provision for the coming financial year is adequate, but that His Majesty's Government most gratefully accept the offer for following years, and at an early date will confer with the New Zealand Government as to the time when it may become appropriate to give effect to their proposal.	2
4	Ditto ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	March 24	States that the King has commanded that his gratitude and high appreciation for fine patriotism and generosity shown in the magnificent offer should be conveyed to New Zealand.	2
5	The Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. Mar. 28.)	States that he is desired by the Prime Minister to convey to the King New Zealand's deep sense of gratitude for his gracious message and generous recognition of offer of battleship to the mother country.	2
6	Ditto ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. Mar. 28.)	States that Government and people of New Zealand are much gratified by the acceptance of their offer, and will await the explanatory despatch of His Majesty's Government as to the kind of contribution that will best promote the end which the Dominion has in view.	3
7	Canadian House of Commons.	—	March 29	Extracts from debates on defence of the sea coast.	3
8	The Acting-Governor.	New South Wales, Telegram.	(Rec. Apr. 4.)	States that if the Commonwealth Parliament resolves to make the offer of a Dreadnought, the Governments of New South Wales and Victoria have agreed to contribute proportionately to the cost, but that if the Commonwealth does not adopt this course, New South Wales and Victoria will share the cost of a Dreadnought on a <i>per capita</i> basis.	15

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
			1909.		
9	To the Governors ...	Victoria, New South Wales, Telegram.	April 7	States that His Majesty's Government warmly appreciate the desire of New South Wales and Victoria to contribute their share of the cost of a Dreadnought, and desire that their very cordial thanks may be conveyed to the two Governments for this signal proof of regard for the mother country.	15
10	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. April 15)	Submits proposals of Ministers for the maintenance and control of the Commonwealth Naval Force.	15
11	To the Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	April 16	Requests that the Prime Minister may be assured that no time will be lost in submitting his important proposals to the Admiralty and His Majesty's Government.	17
12	To the Governor-General and Governors.	Australia, New Zealand, Cape of Good Hope, Newfoundland, Telegram.	April 30	Conveys a message from the Prime Minister suggesting that a Conference of representatives of the self-governing Dominions should be held in London early in July next to discuss the question of the defence of the Empire.	17
13	To the Governors...	Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Natal, Telegram.	30 April	Communicates message in No. 12	19
14	To the Governor-General.	Canada, Telegram.	30 April	Conveys message in No. 12 and trusts that Ministers will see their way to accept the proposal.	19
15	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram, Confidential.	May 1 (Rec. May 1.)	States that the Commonwealth Government suggest desirableness of convening a conference of self-governing Dominions at earliest possible date to consider a definite line of co-operation for the naval defence of the Empire.	20
16	Ditto ...	Canada, Telegram.	(Rec. May 5.)	States that the views of the Canadian House of Commons on the question of Naval Defence have already been expressed by resolution, and that two Ministers will shortly discuss with Admiralty in London best method of carrying out that resolution; the Canadian Government have not sufficient information as to the necessity for such a formal Conference as that suggested, but will postpone visit of Ministers till July to suit the convenience of Imperial Government.	20
17	Ditto ...	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. May 5.)	States that Commonwealth Government will send a delegation to the proposed Conference in London.	20

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
18	The Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. May 7.)	Conveys message from Ministers that New Zealand can only be represented by the Prime Minister, who would attend on the plainly expressed desire of His Majesty's Government; it would be necessary to adjourn Parliament after a short session for supplies and the Prime Minister could not arrive before the last week in July.	21
19	Ditto ...	Transvaal Telegram.	May 10 (Rec. May 10.)	Reports that Transvaal Government is anxious to accept the Prime Minister's invitation to attend the Defence Conference in London, and will make arrangements for its representation by members of the Government who are on the South Africa Union Conference.	21
20	To the Governors-General.	Canada, Australia, Telegram, Confidential.	May 10	Informs them that the New Zealand representative cannot attend before end of July, and trusts that it will be possible to arrange for the Canadian and Australian delegates to attend at that time.	22
21	To the Governors-General and Governor.	Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Telegram.	May 12	Expresses the gratification of the Prime Minister and of His Majesty's Government at the readiness shown to take part in the Defence Conference, and the hope that it will be possible shortly to fix the date of meeting.	22
22	The Governor ...	Cape of Good Hope, Telegram.	May 12 (Rec. May 12.)	Communicates Minute from Ministers stating that Delegates from Cape Colony visiting London in connection with South Africa Act will be authorized to attend the Defence Conference.	23
23	The Governor-General.	Canada, Telegram, Confidential.	(Rec. May 12.)	States that the end of July will be equally convenient for Mr. Brodeur and Sir F. Borden.	23
24	The Governor ...	Orange River Colony, Telegram.	May 13 (Rec. May 13.)	Conveys Prime Minister's acknowledgment of the invitation in No. 13, and states that he hopes that the Orange River Colony delegate to London in connection with the South African Union will be able to arrange to attend the Defence Conference.	23
25	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. May 14.)	States that date of Conference is acceptable, and that representatives will be named in a few days.	24
26	The Governor ...	New-land, Telegram.	(Rec. May 14.)	States that the Prime Minister expresses a desire to attend Conference if possible and enquires date on which it will be opened.	24
27	Ditto ...	Natal, Telegram.	May 14 (Rec. May 15.)	Reports that Natal accepts the invitation to be represented at the Conference, and concurs in the proposal that the Delegates to visit London in connection with the passage of the South Africa Act should attend the sittings of the Defence Conference.	24

Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
28	To the Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	May 17	States that Canada and Australia have accepted invitations and that South African delegates will also attend, and expresses earnest hope that Sir J. Ward will be able to attend Conference, which it is proposed to hold at end of July.	24
29	Ditto ...	New-land, Telegram.	May 19	States that Conference is expected to be opened last week in July and that the presence of the Prime Minister will be cordially welcomed.	25
30	The Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. May 20.)	States that the importance of the Conference is fully recognised, and that efforts are being made to meet the request made in No. 28.	25
31	To the Governors ...	Transvaal, Cape of Good Hope, Orange River Colony, Natal, Telegram, 1.	May 21	Expresses satisfaction of His Majesty's Government on learning that the Colony will be represented at the Conference.	25
32	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram, Confidential.	(Rec. June 4.)	States that the Government of the Commonwealth will shortly submit to Parliament proposals for defence of Commonwealth and its coasts, and now offer an Australian Dreadnought, or such addition to the naval strength of the Empire as may be determined after consultation at the Defence Conference; the offer will be communicated to Parliament as soon as it reassembles.	25
33	The Governor ...	Cape of Good Hope, Confidential.	May 11 (Rec. June 5.)	Transmits copy of Ministers' Minute, on which No. 22 was sent.	26
34	Ditto ...	Orange River Colony, 72.	May 17 (Rec. June 5.)	Transmits copy of Ministers' minute, on which No. 24 was sent.	27
35	To the Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram, Confidential.	June 7	Conveys cordial thanks of His Majesty's Government for the offer contained in No. 32; they welcome the opportunity for consultation which will be offered at the forthcoming Conference.	28
36	The Governor-General.	Australia, Telegram.	(Rec. June 15.)	States that the Commonwealth will be represented at the Conference by Colonel Foxton, Honorary Minister.	28
37	To the Governor ...	New Zealand, Telegram.	June 16	Enquires on what date the Prime Minister expects to arrive in England.	28
38	The Acting Governor.	New Zealand, Telegram.	(Rec. June 18, 1909.)	Reports that Prime Minister expects to arrive in London 24th July, and he suggests that conference should meet a few days later.	28

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

SUMMONING OF A

CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SELF-GOVERNING DOMINIONS

ON THE

NAVAL AND MILITARY DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE.

10042

No. 1.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9.50 a.m., 22 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by Nos. 2, 3, and 4.]

With feelings of pride and satisfaction I transmit to your Lordship following message :—

"Government of New Zealand offer to bear cost of immediate building and arming by the British Government of one first-class battleship of the latest type. If subsequent events show it to be necessary will also bear cost of second warship of the same type.—WARD, Prime Minister."

—PLUNKET.

10042

No. 2.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 1.40 p.m., 22nd March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Please hasten to assure your Prime Minister that his message has been received by me with the highest appreciation of the generous and spontaneous offer made on behalf of New Zealand. It will be at once laid before His Majesty's Government.

—CREWE.

10042

No. 3.
NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 3.53 p.m., 24th March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 6.]

In further reply to your telegram March 22nd,* I desire you to express to Sir J. Ward and to your Government in the warmest terms the feelings of appreciation and gratitude with which His Majesty's Government have received the offer so generously and patriotically made. So far as the coming financial year is concerned, the provision and powers for which sanction is being asked in the Naval Estimates now before Parliament afford ample security. In view of the uncertainty that exists as to the character and extent of the demands which may be made on the national resources in the following years, the offer of the New Zealand Government to bear within that period the cost of providing one first-class battleship of the latest type and of a second of the same type should subsequent events show it to be necessary is most gratefully accepted by His Majesty's Government. Your Government will doubtless understand that it is impossible to enter into detail by telegraph, but you will receive at an early date full communications by despatch, as His Majesty's Government desire to consult with the New Zealand Government as to the time when it may become appropriate to give effect to their public-spirited proposal.—CREWE.

10042

No. 4.
NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 5.10 p.m., 24 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 5.]

I am commanded by the King to inform you that His Majesty is deeply gratified by the patriotic feeling displayed by New Zealand towards Mother Country in their splendid offer, and to convey at once his gratitude and high appreciation for fine patriotism and generosity shown in the magnificent offer made so promptly and spontaneously.—CREWE.

10879

No. 5.
NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10.20 a.m., 28 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram of March 24th.† Am desired by Prime Minister to convey to His Majesty the King Government of New Zealand's deep sense of gratitude for gracious message and for His Majesty's generous recognition of New Zealand offer of battleship to the Mother Country. People of New Zealand pleased to evince in a tangible way their loyalty to His Majesty the King and to help to maintain strength of Empire.—PLUNKET.

* No. 1.

† No. 4.

10874

No. 6.
NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10.40 a.m., 28 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram of March 24th.* Am desired by Prime Minister inform you that Government and people of New Zealand much gratified acceptance of their offer; their sole desire is to assist Empire, as far as New Zealand resources permit, in maintaining naval supremacy; they feel that Imperial Government can best determine what shape and kind of contribution will promote that end, and, therefore, as desired by Imperial Government, Government of New Zealand will await explanatory despatch.—PLUNKET.

No. 7.

CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS.

EXTRACTS FROM DEBATES, 29 March, 1909.

DEFENCE FOR OUR SEA COAST.

HON. GEO. E. FOSTER (North Toronto) moved:

That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, or her geographical position and national environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports.

Rt. Hon. Sir WILFRID LAURIER (Prime Minister). Mr. Speaker, to the eloquent and able observations with which the House has just been favoured by my hon. friend from North Toronto (Mr. Foster) very little exception, if any, can be taken by anyone and certainly not by myself. If my hon. friend will permit me, and if he will accept it from me, I will offer him, in all sincerity, my hearty congratulation, for the temperate and moderate manner in which he has approached a difficult and very important subject. Let me say at once to my hon. friend that the only exception which I have to take to the observations that he has offered to the House and to the policy that he has, to some extent, outlined for us, is simply that his conclusions have been too indefinite and that they should have been presented in a more concrete form. I was anxious to hear from my hon. friend what would be the argument which he intended to apply in support of the resolution which he has placed in your hands, Mr. Speaker, and which has been upon the Order Paper for the last two months. I am sure I will not offend my hon. friend when I tell him that in my estimation his resolution was not perhaps as clear as the crystal water of the mountain brook. My hon. friend did not define what was the policy that he would like us to adopt as explicitly as I would have desired. The gist of his proposition is to be found in these words:

Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports.

The only interpretation I could give these words was that in the opinion of my hon. friend (Mr. Foster) Canada had been remiss in the duty she owes to herself of providing for her own defence. This seemed to me somewhat surprising in view of the fact that Canada has no quarrel with any one, that she does not desire any territorial aggrandizement, that she occupies geographically an isolated position, and that she has only one neighbour, with whom she has been at peace for nearly 100 years. But, now that we have had the pleasure and the advantage of listening to my hon. friend, we have learned that his opinion is not that Canada has been remiss in the duty she owes to herself, but that in his estimation Canada has been remiss in the duty which she owes to the empire. Well, let me say to my hon. friend, and I say it in all sincerity, because I hope that if we differ in details we shall be able to agree on the main issue, let me say that in my estimation, if Canada has been remiss to the duty she owes to the empire we are not conscious of it. Sir, we will not for a moment admit that impeachment. We are British subjects; Canada is one of the daughter nations of the empire and we realize to the full the rights and obligations which are involved in that proud title. It has been, it is, it shall be our unalterable determination to meet and

* No. 3.

to carry out every duty which is implied by the title of "British subject." Nay, more—not only will Canada fulfil every obligation which is implied by that title, but I think I make bold to say that we will rise to every sacrifice that may be needed in order to maintain unimpaired the rank and status which is occupied by Canada in the British empire and the rank and status which is occupied by the British empire throughout the world. But, Sir, I may say—and I do not say it in reference to the speech which we have just listened to—I may say that we are not to be carried away, we are not to be stampeded from what has been the settled policy and deliberate course which we have laid down, by any hasty, feverish action, however spectacular such action may be. It behoves us as freemen to look at our position calmly and deliberately, to review the situation as it is, to ascertain where we are, and to determine whether we should alter or whether we should persist in the course we have adopted long ago. My hon. friend (Mr. Foster) has told us, and I agree with him, that this question should be approached not only from the point of view of Canada, but from the point of view of the British empire at large. I agree with everything my hon. friend has said, and eloquently said, with regard to the admiration and devotion which every British subject, every Canadian, should have in his heart for the British empire. I agree with my hon. friend that the greatest phenomenon recorded in the pages of history is the existence of the British empire as it is at this moment. In its origin perhaps it may not have differed widely from the origin of other empires, but in its continuance and permanency is the phenomenon. The empire of Rome, the empire of Alexander, the empire of Charlemagne, the empire of Napoleon, were all built up and maintained by force and the moment force gave way these empires crumbled. The empire of Britain has been founded less on war than on discovery and colonization, and wherever founded in any part of the world, whether by war or colonization or discovery, it has been maintained only by the free will and consent of the peoples who now acknowledge British supremacy. To-day the British empire is composed of a galaxy of young nations proud of their allegiance to the British Crown and proud also of their own local independence. And though they may have a common aim, each has reserved to itself the duty and the right to develop its own resources and to attain its aim according to its own views, and by its own methods as may be best suited to the peculiar circumstances of each.

Now, it may be said that defence, which is the duty of all nations, is a matter as to which there should be a common aspiration. Yes, I agree in that, but at the same time the young daughter nations of England have insisted that even in the matter of defence they should preserve in its entirety local autonomy, and that each should approach this subject according to its own lights. Let us not disguise the fact from ourselves that at present there is a passing wave in which we can trace anger, enthusiasm and fear, and which directed and pushed us to depart from our policy and to contribute at once to the British navy. Well, Sir, let us view this question as it is, let us not blink at it, let us realize that it is not the way in which in the past we have understood our duty. This question is not new; we are familiar with it, it is not of to-day or of yesterday. I will not say it is as old as the hills, but it is as old as confederation itself and it comes to the front periodically. It presented itself in a concrete form in the Imperial Conference of 1902 to those who were there assembled from all parts of the British empire conferring with the Government of the mother country. The proposition was placed before us that all the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire should contribute to the army and to the navy. The Canadian ministers who were present attending that conference did not view that project with any favour. They received it with respect but they declined to accept it and they presented their views in a State Paper wherein they stated what they were prepared to do so far as Canada is concerned. Their views thus stated have often been quoted in this House, but I think it is opportune that I should quote them again. This is the statement:—

At present Canadian expenditures for defence services are confined to the military side. The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well. On the sea coasts of Canada there is a large number of men admirably qualified to form a naval reserve, and it is hoped that at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men and to the making of their services available for defence in time of need.

In conclusion, the Ministers repeat that, while the Canadian Government are obliged to dissent from the measures proposed, they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make expenditures for the purpose of defence in proportion to the increasing population and wealth of the country. They are willing that these expenditures shall be so directed as to relieve the taxpayer of the mother country from some of the burdens which he now bears; and they have the strongest desire to carry out their defence schemes in co-operation with the imperial authorities, and under the advice of experienced imperial officers, so far as this is consistent with the principle of local self-government, which has proved so great a factor in the promotion of imperial unity.

Now, Sir, this paper has been sometimes criticised, but it has never been seriously challenged so far as I know. At all events it has never yet been challenged on the floor of this House, and if I understood the observations of my hon. friend (Mr. Foster) aright, he does not now dissent from the proposition which is therein made.

Nay, more, the policy which we there laid down has been adopted by some of the Dominions which had not accepted it before. The Commonwealth of Australia had for many years made a contribution of \$1,000,000 a year out of its treasury to the imperial exchequer for the purposes of the navy. This policy has been reversed by the Australian Government, and Mr. Deakin, the late Premier of Australia, one of the ablest men of the British empire, a man of lofty ideals, has himself introduced a resolution on the line of the Canadian policy, if I may so call it, providing for the local defence of Australia. Under the old arrangement Australia contributed £200,000 to the British squadron. Under the new arrangement, that of a flotilla, there will be no money contribution. Instead, it is proposed to build and equip six destroyers,

nine submarines, and two depot or parent ships, which the Admiralty estimates will cost £1,277,500. In making his proposition, Mr. Deakin spoke as follows:

The real question is one of control. The problem before us is the association of our small naval strength with the great organization of fleets of the mother country, so as to secure the highest efficiency and unity without sacrificing our right to the constitutional control of our own funds, and of any flotilla built and maintained at our own cost.

Yet there is more than this. If there is a man in the British empire who has given his thought, his heart, and his soul to the great problem of the defence of the British empire, a man who has made it the study of his life, I think I am justified in saying that that man is Lord Milner. He was in this country a few months ago, and discussed this question at various places, and everywhere he took the position we are now taking. At Toronto, where he discussed the question perhaps more fully than anywhere else, he spoke thus:

I have never been a great advocate of contributions from the self-governing States to the army of the United Kingdom. I am sure that the form which imperial co-operation in this field will ultimately take, and ought to take, the form at once most consistent with the dignity of the individual States and most conducive to their collective strength and organic union, is the development of their several defensive resources in material and manhood.

Therefore, I think I am justified in saying that our policy is the one which commends itself to all the thinkers who have given any attention to this subject. I might also quote the opinion of a veteran Canadian statesman, Sir Charles Tupper, who, in a famous article which I am sure no one has forgotten, wrote these very pregnant words:

The policy of levying a large tax was a policy unheard of, mistaken, and fraught with danger.

Well, Sir, this is the position we have taken; this is the position we maintain to-day, and, as I understood my hon. friend from North Toronto, while he was not very emphatic for it, he was not against it either. If I understood him aright, he insisted that something should be done; but in what particular form it should be done, whether by a contribution to the imperial treasury or by the development of our own naval resources, he left an open question. Well, to us it is an open question, and we see no reason in anything that has taken place recently to depart from the policy that we laid down in 1902.

It may be said—and my hon. friend approached this subject, I must say, in a very moderate and fair way—that though this was our policy, we have not lived up to it. I deny the impeachment. We have done a great deal for defence, though not perhaps as much as we might have done. At the conference in London in 1902 we stated that we undertook to develop our own defences by land and by sea. With respect to our defences by land, we have done more than our duty; we have done what I think we have reason to be proud of. In 1902 we spent in round numbers two and a half millions on our militia, and last year we spent more than six and a half millions. So that in five or six years we have just trebled our expenditure on the militia. What have we done for that increased expenditure? We have taken over the garrisons of Esquimalt and Halifax; we have relieved the British treasury to that extent. We have organized a small permanent force. We have established instruction camps. We have provided arms and ammunition, and have drilled more than 50,000 men; and Sir, those who were at Quebec at the time of the Tercentenary celebration and saw the review of the Canadian forces to the number of some 12,000 men by the Prince of Wales, could not but feel a sense of pride in their hearts at the appearance of those men, looking as they did like veterans, and receiving the praise of that veteran of many battlefields, Lord Roberts. In the development of naval defences, I admit we are altogether behind the times. Engaged as we have been in works of peace, we have delayed and put off the development of our navy. But, Sir, I agree with my hon. friend that we shall undertake this work also, and undertake it immediately; but upon what lines should we do it? Upon the lines, I repeat, of our own action—of undertaking to do with respect to a navy what we have done with respect to the militia. I think we should commence to establish the nucleus of a navy. But I call the attention of my hon. friend to this, and I am sure he will agree with me. Is he sure where we should begin and end in naval matters? In this age of invention naval construction has varied almost from year to year. Is it not a fact that the armaments of to-morrow may be so improved as to render the armaments of to-day obsolete? When we were in London in 1902, what we had in our minds was training ships; they were of great importance. When we were again in London at the conference of 1907, training ships were altogether forgotten; then it was the defence of our seaports that was the important question before us. Lord Tweedmouth, of the Admiralty, speaking on the question of what should be done by the self-governing Dominions, ignored the question of training ships altogether, and insisted that we should at once make provision for the defence of our sea harbours. This is the language he made use of on that occasion:

I understand that, in Australia particularly, and in South Africa, it is desired to start some naval service of your own. Perhaps I might suggest that if the provision of the smaller craft which are necessarily incident to the work of a great fleet of modern battleships could be made locally, it would be a very great help to the general work of the navy. You cannot take the small craft such as torpedo boats and submarines across the ocean, and for warships to arrive in South Africa or in Australia or in New Zealand or in Canada, and find ready to their hand well-trained men in good vessels of this kind, would be an enormous advantage to them. It would be an enormous advantage to find ready to their hand men well trained, ready to take a part in the work of the fleet. There is, I think, the further advantage in these small flotillas,

that they will be an admirable means of coast defence; that you will be able by the use of them to avoid practically all danger from any sudden raid which might be made by a cruising squadron. What I should like to point out is that, above all things in this work, the submarine is probably the most important and the most effective weapon. It is the weapon with which you can meet a fleet attacking during the day, or individual ships attacking by day. I am assured by my advisers at the Admiralty that it is a most important weapon, that it has already reached very considerable development, and it is one on which we may rely with great confidence.

In another part of his observations he spoke as follows:

Then I should like to say a single word on the further point of the provision of docks and coaling facilities in the colonies. The enormous development of the modern warship entails important consequences. These great modern warships require large docks to contain them. I think we are getting on well with the provision of docks. At this moment in our own country and abroad we have, I think, 13 Government docks which will take in our largest ship, the "Dreadnought." I think in the course of the next two years we shall have four more, which will make about 17 altogether. But it is very desirable that we should have in all parts of the world docks which could take such great ships, supposing they were to meet with an accident or were to receive damage in war.

This was only two years ago, and the chief Lord of the Admiralty then accepted in the fullest sense the policy of the Canadian Government that we should ourselves maintain our own navy and not contribute to the Imperial Exchequer. He accepted to the fullest extent the proposition that we should invest in and build submarine torpedo boats and tugs. Two years have elapsed and to-day, if we were to listen to a certain press and give attention to the wave which is passing, we would not send a Dreadnought to Great Britain. But all these spasmodic efforts would not, to my mind, furnish a proper defence of the British empire. How should that be done? We should proceed as we have done with our militia. We should consult with the naval authorities of the British Government, as my hon. colleague the Minister of Militia (Sir Frederick Borden) has done with the council of defence in London; and after having organized a plan, we should carry it out in Canada with our own resources and out of our own money. That is the policy which commends itself to the Government.

My hon. friend concluded his remarks by saying that if it were decided to offer a Dreadnought to Great Britain, that decision would be acceptable to the opposition. This brings us to something which is in the air at present and which no British subject can ignore. For a hundred years and more the naval supremacy of Great Britain has been unquestioned—nay more, British supremacy on the seas has been so absolute that no one supposed it could ever be disputed. But this is an age when events happen very fast. We have learned lately that the foremost military power of the world at present is contemplating perhaps to cope with Great Britain on the high seas. We have, perhaps, reason to believe, as we have just been told, that Germany is building more ships than Great Britain and building them more rapidly. Possibly there is a conclusion to be drawn from this, and the only conclusion is that Germany intends sometime to do with Great Britain on the high seas what she has done with France on land. Everybody knows it is a matter of history that Prussia had for years been silently preparing to cope with France which, up to that time, had been the greatest military nation in the world, that Prussia waited its opportunity, and when that opportunity came, delivered a mortal blow. If it be true then that Germany is organizing on the seas, no British subject can afford to be indifferent to the prospect. For my part I do not think that the danger is imminent. Germany is a great nation, she has made greater progress in peace and war during the last 60 years than any other nation; she has increased her population from 40,000,000 to 62,000,000; she has developed her industries and commerce in a marvellous manner; she has increased her wealth prodigiously. But to bring the German navy up to the standard of the British, to accomplish in a few years what has been the result of centuries, may be a task which is even beyond the ability of Germany, with all her great ability and resources. At all events, we know that the British nation is not unduly alarmed. We have the testimony of the great organs of English public opinion that Britain can cope with Germany alone, without the assistance of the British colonies. We know that the British government has, in response to the generous offer made by New Zealand of a Dreadnought, postponed its acceptance. There is something else not to be lost sight of. I appeal to every student of history whether it be not the case that although England has been of all nations of Europe the one which has given more attention to trade than to war, she has generally come out victoriously in all the wars in which she has been engaged. This, she owes, in the first place, to the courage, the endurance, and dogged pertinacity of her sailors and soldiers, but surely in no smaller degree also to the fact that while other nations were wasting their energies in war she was attending to the arts of peace and amassing wealth, and consequently had an abundance at her hand to make use of when other nations were deficient in that greatest essential to success. But although I do not believe that the danger is imminent, I have no hesitation in saying it would be folly to sleep in a sense of the fullest security. Vigilance, and eternal vigilance, must be the watchword of to-day, not only in England but in Canada and every other part of the British empire. On more than one occasion I have said that I would deprecate Canada being drawn into the vortex of militarism existing in Europe. The situation of Europe to-day is one which cannot be characterized as other than madness. Europe is an armed camp. Every nation there is living in a condition of armed peace almost as intolerable as war itself. England is the one nation which has not lost her head, which has resisted militarism as much as she could, which has refused to adopt the conscription and sacrifice her children on the altar of this insatiable moloch. I hope the day shall never come when we will be drawn into the conflicts of Europe. But I have no hesitation in saying that the supremacy of the British empire is absolutely essential not only to the maintenance

of that empire, but to the civilization of the world. I have no hesitation in saying that the supremacy of the British empire on the seas must be maintained in the highest degree of efficiency it has occupied the last hundred years. I have no hesitation in saying also that if the day should come when the supremacy of Britain on the high seas will be challenged, it will be the duty of all the daughters of the nation to close around the old mother land and make a rampart about her to ward off any attack. I hope that day will never come, but should it come, I would deem it my duty to devote what might be left of my life and energy to stump the country and endeavour to impress upon my fellow-countrymen, especially my compatriots in the province of Quebec, the conviction that the salvation of England is the salvation of our own country, that therein lies the guaranty of our civil and religious freedom and everything we value in this life. These are the sentiments which animate the Government on this occasion. As I said a moment ago to my hon. friend, the resolution he has offered is not sufficiently explicit in my estimation, and if he will permit, I will substitute for it—and hope with his concurrence—the following resolution:

This House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence.

The House reaffirms the opinion, repeatedly expressed by representatives of Canada, that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the self-governing Dominions the payment of any stated contribution to the imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be a satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

The House has observed with satisfaction the relief afforded in recent years to the taxpayers of the United Kingdom through the assumption by the Canadian people of considerable military expenditure formerly charged upon the imperial treasury.

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Great Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire, and the peace of the world.

The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and the honour of the empire.

Mr. R. L. BORDEN (Halifax). Mr. Speaker, I am sure that the House listened with a great deal of pleasure to the very eloquent speech of the Prime Minister, and I was glad to learn that he did not take any exception to the remarks of my hon. friend from North Toronto (Mr. Foster) except perhaps in one unimportant particular; I was pleased also to observe that he did not find any fault with the resolution proposed by my hon. friend except that it was not sufficiently definite. I was rather led to believe from that remark that the resolution which the Prime Minister himself would propose would be of a definite character, but I am bound to say that I found his resolution even less definite than that which was proposed by my hon. friend. Now the right hon. gentleman has spoken of the relations of Canada to the empire, and I for one am prepared to go as far as he, as far as any hon. gentleman in this House, in absolutely maintaining in this country of ours the full control of our own affairs, which we have enjoyed for many years in the past. I do not think there is any difference of opinion between the two political parties in Canada in that respect. It might be wise to refer for a moment to the circumstance that Great Britain, by giving to Canada and the other great dependencies of the empire, absolutely full control of their own affairs, an absolute autonomy in respect of self-government, has, I believe, increased and strengthened the ties which bind these great dependencies to the empire as a whole, in a measure which would not have been practicable by any other policy. I believe also that the ties which bind Canada to the empire to-day are firmer and surer and more enduring than they have been at any time in the past.

It might be well to refer for a moment to the curious evolution by which this has been brought about, and to point out to the House that it has been accomplished by exactly the same means as the system of parliamentary government, both in Great Britain and in Canada, has been evolved. It has been accomplished by the circumstance that the constitutional law of Great Britain is to-day for the most part an unwritten law, and that which determines the relations between the great dependencies of the empire and the empire as a whole is to a great extent a matter of unwritten law. I am not unmindful that we have a written constitution, I am not unmindful of the fact that there is, both in Great Britain and Canada, a great body of written law setting forth constitutional provisions; but the British system of parliamentary government chiefly depends upon that which a great French writer, M. E. Boutmy, in his work upon the constitutions of Great Britain, the United States, and France, has called the customary law of the constitution; and the development of this customary law has had more influence in bringing about the evolution of parliamentary government, both in Great Britain and in Canada, than any other means of which I am aware. It seems to me that the relations between Great Britain and her dependencies are being moulded and developed to-day, as they have been during the past 50 years, by the same influence of unwritten law and custom;

and that makes it all the more important to us to-day to understand clearly what we propose to do, to see clearly the path on which we are entering, and to understand thoroughly what the consequences will be to Canada and to the empire as a whole of the action which we propose in this regard. I understand that we have a written constitution in Canada, a constitution which is a statute of the imperial parliament. I understand also that in Great Britain the King has, as a matter of formal law, of strict legal, but not of constitutional, right, the power to impose his veto upon any statute enacted by the parliament of the United Kingdom. But I also understand that by reason of that which Mr. Lowell, the new president of Harvard, has called custom superimposed upon law, and which Mr. Anson, another great constitutional writer, has called law overgrown by custom, the parliament of Great Britain to-day, although it has the legal power, has not the constitutional right to alter the British North America Act without the consent of the people of Canada. So we understand that we have in this country full powers of self-government, and that those powers of self-government depend not only upon the written, but upon the unwritten, law, which has so largely moulded British institutions and the relations of the great dependencies to the empire in the past.

Coming now to the consideration of the matter which is immediately at our hand, it has been said, we are all in the habit of saying it, my right hon. friend has uttered the boast, if it be a boast, some eight or ten years ago, that Canada to-day is a nation, and we are all proud to recognize and to hail Canada as one of the great nations in the greatest empire that the earth beholds. But Mr. Speaker, let us not forget also that a national status implies national responsibility. It is of no use for us in Canada to speak of this country as a nation, and to shrink in any manner from the discharge of our national responsibilities. What are those responsibilities? Acknowledged in every civilized community, recognized among all the great nations of the earth, a primal responsibility is the defence of their territories and the protection of their commerce. I do not gather, Mr. Speaker, that my right hon. friend dissents in any way whatever from the enunciation of that principle which was laid down this afternoon in such eloquent terms by my hon. friend the member for North Toronto.

Now I am prepared to recognize also, as the Prime Minister has very properly observed, that the people of this country, so far as military defence is concerned, have done a great deal, and have done a great deal more in recent years than they ever did before. As a matter of fact, if we look at the expenditure for military and naval defence of the whole empire and of the great Dominions of the empire, we find that in 1905-6 Great Britain and her colonies paid respectively the following sums per head of the population:

	£	s.	d.	f.
United Kingdom	1	9	3	...
Canada	4	6	1	...
Newfoundland	3	1
Australia	5	...	2	...
New Zealand	5	2	1	...
Cape of Good Hope	5	1
Natal	2	11	2	...
Transvaal	2	...	1	...

So that if you look at the amount expended on both military and naval defence, you find Canada pretty well up to the standard of all the great self-governing dominions of the Empire. But, I would venture to submit that our expenditure has, to some extent, been appropriated to the wrong purpose. What is the object of our military expenditure? I know that my hon. friend the Minister of Militia and Defence (Sir Frederick Borden) has stated in the House that the military expenditure of this country is not larger than is necessary for the aid of the civil power. I would hardly think that an expenditure of \$6,000,000 annually would be necessary for that purpose, and, while I am not prepared at the present moment to lay down any figure which would be a proper amount for the people of Canada to set apart for the purpose of defence, I do most unhesitatingly say that of the portion which the people of Canada should set aside for that purpose out of their public revenues a very substantial portion, and, in my opinion, not less than one half, of the amount appropriated for defence should be devoted for naval instead of to military defence. I would like to point out to the country and to the House some considerations which lead me to that conclusion. Where is the great market of the people of Canada to-day? We know that it is across the Atlantic ocean, and we believe that in years to come it will also be across the Pacific ocean. The great market of Canada to-day is not the market which would be especially safeguarded and preserved to us by the expenditure of a large amount of money for military purposes, but it is a market which may be preserved to us by expenditure for naval purposes. Let me point that out to you, Mr. Speaker, and the hon. gentlemen of this House by this illustration. Take the total agricultural exports in the last year for which we have any statistics, and you will find the following:

	Value of exports.
Cereals	\$62,548,153
Live animals	10,897,232
Dead meats	11,494,665
Dairy products	22,995,860
Total	\$107,935,910

You will also find, and this I desire to emphasize, that the ocean-borne exports amount to no less a sum than \$104,740,000 and land-borne exports to \$2,998,000. Therefore, as far as our commerce is concerned, I venture to submit to you, Mr. Speaker, and to the members of

this House, that the expenditure in defence of our seaports, in defence of our coasts, and in defence of the waters of the ocean which are immediately adjacent to our coasts, is of immensely greater advantage and of immensely greater importance than the expenditure which, year after year, we are disbursing in connection with the military forces of this country. Against whom could the military forces of this country protect us? Under the law of the land they cannot be taken out the Dominion of Canada without the consent of Parliament. I do not desire in the least to minimize the importance of some expenditure for military purposes, and I am prepared to acknowledge the very great advance that this country has made in that regard in many respects. I am aware that my hon. friend the Minister of Militia and Defence has been invited to a seat upon the Imperial Defence Committee. I am aware that there has been some movement made within the past three or four weeks for the co-ordination of the General Staff of Canada with the imperial staff of Britain. I am not prepared to minimize these things. I do not desire to minimize them, but I do desire to emphasize, as far as may be in my power, the importance to Canada of some attempt at naval defence, of the defence of our seaports and the protection of our commerce.

Let us look at the question from another aspect. How many cities and towns are there in Canada which would be open to the raids of a second or third-class cruiser, as pointed out by my hon. friend from North Toronto? I suppose there are not less than forty or fifty cities and towns in Canada of 2,000 population or upwards which would be open to the raid of an enemy coming against our coast. Let us not forget that the danger pointed out to the Commonwealth of Australia by the Admiralty itself was the imminence of a movement of that kind in Australian waters and against the Australian coasts in case the empire should unfortunately become involved in any great naval war. We are all aware to-day that the policy of the British Admiralty is a policy of concentration, and we are all aware that the Australian naval programme which has recently been entered into with the full approval and consent of the mother country is altogether designed to guard the coasts of Australia against a danger of that kind.

In so far as my right hon. friend the Prime Minister to-day outlined the lines of naval defence of this country I am entirely at one with him. I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian naval force of our own. I entirely believe in that. The other experiment has been tried as between Australia and the mother country and it has not worked satisfactorily in any respect. In Great Britain the contribution has perhaps been regarded as rather unsatisfactory. In Australia it failed, in the end, to meet with the approval of the people, for the reason that Great Britain felt constrained to ask Australia that the field of operations of that squadron should be extended to the China and Indian seas; and when the operation of that squadron was so extended, the Australians felt that the contribution which they had been making for some years past was not really being used to give that protection to Australia which her interests demanded. So that the policy of Australia at the present time is to build up a flotilla of submarines and torpedo boats which, in case of war, would co-operate with the armed cruisers and battleships of the British navy. It was pointed out in discussing this question that Australia, in providing a force of that kind, would provide a force which it would be very difficult if not impossible for Great Britain to send across the seas, and that in thus protecting themselves they were providing the best possible force for the protection of the empire. So, I am at one with the Prime Minister as far as this is concerned. I am at one with him in this respect also that I think that an expenditure of money designed for that purpose ought, in the main at least, to be under the control of our own Parliament, and that by making an appropriation of that kind and attending to the defence of our own coasts, by co-operation and co-ordination with the imperial naval forces we would be rendering a real service in the defence of the empire and we would be doing our duty not only to Canada but to the empire as a whole.

My right hon. friend has spoken in very eloquent terms of the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the empire. We are all at one with him there, and there are just one or two observations that I desire to make in that regard. The first is that the loss of the control of the seas by the British fleet means the dismemberment of this great empire. Great Britain having once lost control of the seas it is impossible to conceive that this empire would longer survive. A world-wide empire such as ours, an empire which reaches out on every continent and spreads over every ocean can only be maintained by absolute naval supremacy. The moment a naval power arises which can effectively challenge the supremacy of Britain's navy, that moment may the British empire be dismembered and that moment Canada may cease to be among the nations of that great empire. I am not one of those who look to see the integrity of the British empire menaced by the future independence of Canada. Like Sir John Macdonald, I was born a British subject, I shall remain a British subject, I hope to die a British subject. I trust the day will never come when the British flag will cease to float over this Canada of ours. But as has been eloquently said, Britain staggers under the too vast orb of her fate, and so it behoves us her children to decide how we can best assist the motherland to maintain control of the seas. It is not for us to-night to lay down the details of a scheme by which we can best co-operate towards that end, and I agree with the Prime Minister that we should act in conjunction with, and by the advice of, the British Admiralty. They have experts at their command, they have the experience of the past to direct them, and these we have not. While I venture to think that a system of torpedo boats and submarines such as has been adopted by the Commonwealth of Australia would be perhaps the most effective way in which we could assist Great Britain in a stated policy of naval defence, yet I agree that the Canadian Government ought to have the advice of the British Admiralty and I lend itself to such co-operation and co-ordination as will be best for the whole empire. We are either of the British empire or not of it; we are either in the empire for weal or woe or we are out of it. The unanimous voice of the people of Canada demands that we shall be in the empire and of the empire, and being in the empire and of the empire we must take our fair share of the burden of the naval defence of that empire and particularly of our sea coasts.

I come now to a consideration of the resolution which has been moved by the right hon. the Prime Minister, and I will say that with many portions of it I am in entire sympathy. But I would like to make one or two suggestions to the right hon. gentleman, and I do not make them in any party spirit or in any carping spirit, because if there is one thing more than another that I would desire it is that the policy of Canada on this great question, and the resolution announcing it should meet with the absolute and unanimous approval of this Parliament and of the country. What suggestions I have to make, I make with the sincere desire that we may shape a resolution of which we can all approve and which shall go forth to the world as a ringing declaration that if the mother of nations has to fight the battle of her life, the people of Canada without distinction of party or of creed will stand by her side in that fight. This is too great a question for the introduction of party strategy; it is a question in respect to which we should all rise superior to all party motives, and so I purpose making to my right hon. friend one or two suggestions which I know he will receive in the spirit in which I make them. I do not find any fault at all with the first paragraph which reads:

That this House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada as they increase in numbers and wealth to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence.

The next paragraph of the resolution reads:

The House re-affirms the opinion repeatedly expressed by representatives of Canada that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the self-governing Dominions the payment of any stated contributions to the imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be a satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

I would respectfully and very sincerely suggest to my right hon. friend that perhaps that paragraph had better be omitted, and I will tell him why. In the first place because it tells Great Britain and the world what we are not prepared to do when it seems to me that this is an occasion when we should declare to all men what we are prepared to do. My right hon. friend will not misunderstand me; I am as strong as he is in the assertion of the rights of self-government which Canada enjoys. I believe that we enjoy our privileges not by grace but of right, and we enjoy them in the carrying out of the wisest statesmanship on the part of the mother country. But, it does not seem to me that there is any need of asserting now a mere negative proposition such as is embodied in this paragraph. Again, it seems to me that this is a little inconsistent with the last paragraph of the resolution. The day might come—I do not know that it will come—the day might come; it might come to-morrow, it might come next week, it might come next month, when the only thing we could do in the absence of preparation in this country would be to make some kind of contribution. I do not know and the right hon. the Prime Minister does not know what events may point to. Probably he knows more than I do, and I am not asking him to disclose anything to this House which ought not to be disclosed, but would it not be wise to omit that paragraph altogether? I tell him that I and every man on this side of the House stand firmly for the principle that the rights of self-government which we now hold shall not in any way be detracted from in the slightest degree. But is there any need of inserting this somewhat negative proposition in a resolution which ought to go forth as a message not only to the people of the empire but to the people of the world?

There is another paragraph in the resolution which—and I say it with all deference to my right hon. friend and to any hon. gentlemen whose opinion may not coincide with mine—there is another paragraph in the resolution which does not comment itself to my judgment. It is this:

The House has observed with satisfaction the relief afforded in recent years to the tax-payers of the United Kingdom through the assumption by the Canadian people of considerable military expenditure formerly charged upon the imperial treasury.

It does seem to me that the occasion is not very opportune for impressing that fact upon the mind of the British tax-payer. It no doubt seems a considerable sum to the people of Canada; I am not disposed to minimize it in any way; but after all, when you compare it with the enormous contributions which have been made for the defence of the whole empire by the British tax-payers for many years past, is it desirable at the present moment that we should put it forward in a resolution of this kind, designed to go out not only to the people of the British empire, but to the people of the whole world? It seems to me, if I may use the word, as I do without offence, to be too trivial a matter to introduce into a resolution of this kind. Therefore I would most earnestly suggest to the right hon. gentleman that it would be better, in the interest of this country, and undoubtedly in the interest of the empire, that it should be omitted. To omit it would be to emulate something of that generous spirit, that remarkably generous spirit, which is to be found in the utterance of a British naval authority—the First Lord of the Admiralty, I think it was—in 1907. I do not suppose that a more magnanimous utterance ever fell from the mouth of an imperial statesman. He said: "We are prepared to defend this empire through its entire length, and we do not ask you to contribute one dollar to it; but we shall be glad, so far as your good will and your loyalty will impel you to do it, that you should come to our aid if it pleases you to do so." But mark, he said: "We do not even ask it; we will do it ourselves whether you do it or not; but if it pleases you to come to our aid, then the British nation will recognize with appreciation and with gratitude your action in that regard." Well, Sir, when we are face to face with utterances of imperial statesmanship of that greatness and magnanimity, is it worth while, in a resolution framed for so great a purpose, to refer to that expenditure by Canada, which after all, in comparison with the enormous expenditures of the mother country, must seem

extremely trivial, and is indeed trivial compared with what the resources even of this country might accomplish?

Just one word as to a further amendment which I would like to suggest to my right hon. friend. In paragraph 4, he proceeds:

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Great Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire, and the peace of the world.

I would be glad if my right hon. friend could accept the suggestion of inserting in that paragraph some word which would indicate an intention to act promptly. If my right hon. friend would insert before the word "organization" some such word as "immediate" or even "early," I think it would greatly improve the paragraph, it would meet with my approval, and I do not think it would be disapproved of by any hon. member of this House.

Now, I understand what the right hon. gentlemen contemplated in 1902. At that time he looked to the establishment of a Canadian naval force. At page 18 of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1902 the First Lord of the Admiralty announced this:

Sir Wilfrid Laurier informed me that His Majesty's Government of the Dominion of Canada are contemplating the establishment of a local naval force in the waters of Canada, but that they were not able to make any offer of assistance analogous to those enumerated above.

Then, further on, in a written statement from which the right hon. gentleman has quoted, the following statement of policy is to be found:

At present Canadian expenditures for defence services are confined to the military side. The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well. On the sea coasts of Canada there is a large number of men admirably qualified to form a naval reserve, and it is hoped that at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men and to the making of their services available for defence in time of need.

That was the statement, but up to the present time, as my right hon. friend is well aware, that has not materialized in anything of value. I know that my hon. friend the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, in a speech at the Colonial Conference, dwelt somewhat on the expenditure of this country on the fisheries protection service; but after all it does not seem to me that that should be taken greatly into account. If you leave that out of the account, you find the record of naval expenditure for 1905-6 to be as follows:

	£
United Kingdom	£33,389,500
Canada	Nil.
Newfoundland	3,000
Commonwealth of Australia	255,651
New Zealand	40,592
Cape of Good Hope	50,000
Natal	35,000
Transvaal	Nil.

I do not think that I am making any statement in breach of confidence when I say that am thoroughly aware that the late Raymond Prefontaine thoroughly intended to establish a Canadian naval militia or naval force of some kind. He told me so about a year before his death. Mr. Prefontaine was a man of large views and of great courage, and it may be—I am not intending to cast any reflection upon my hon. friend the present Minister of Marine and Fisheries—that a policy which would have been carried out otherwise has not been carried out owing to the present head of that department finding it necessary to devote his attention to other matters. I suggest to my right hon. friend that we should put something in this resolution which would point to prompt action. In 1902 we told the imperial Government that we intended to do something; but up to the present time, seven years afterwards, we have done nothing. If the resolution of my right hon. friend were so amended, I think it would commend itself to the unanimous approval of the members of this House.

I do not desire to say anything more on this subject. I believe that the defence of our own shores and the protection of our own commerce is due to the self-respect which should fill the heart of every man in this country. You say that we may rest contented to depend for our naval defence on Great Britain. Well, if we have assumed the status of a nation in one respect, shall we adhere to the status of a Crown colony in other and still more important respects?

You speak of a Monroe doctrine, but that doctrine would not defend our coasts, our cities, and our commerce from the attacks of any foe; and it is idle to suggest that we could, in the case of a great naval war, obtain any measure of comfort from the Monroe doctrine. But if we should depend on the Monroe doctrine, would it not, as the hon. member for North Toronto (Mr. Foster) well said this afternoon, reduce us to a position of vassalage as regards the great republic. That is not a condition or a policy in harmony with our self respect or with our ideals and status as a nation. We desire that this resolution should go out as the unanimous resolution of the Parliament of Canada to the whole world, and I believe it may go out as a message which will do much to keep the peace of the world in these days of uncertainty. It should go in such terms as would entitle the Canadian people to the gratitude of the empire and do much to restore to the people of this country that self respect in which,

it seems to me, we have been somewhat lacking in these days when others have done so much, and we so little, for naval defence so absolutely essential to the integrity and the maintenance of our great empire.

Hon. L. P. BRODEUR (Minister of Marine and Fisheries). Before this debate closes it is perhaps my duty to say a few words. I congratulate hon. gentlemen who have spoken upon the patriotic tone which has characterized their remarks, and on the dignity which has characterized the debate. The loyalty of Canada to Britain is beyond all question, and it is also undeniable that under the British flag Canada has prospered beyond compare. The question which we are discussing to-day is an important one, in that it concerns the relations which this great Dominion bears to the empire; it is a question which in the past has attracted and is well worthy the consideration of a patriotic people. In view of the high position which Canada has taken in recent years amongst the nations of the world and her great development in population and wealth it is to be expected that, with the dawn of this new era, Canadians should more and more devote themselves to the study of a subject so momentous to the national weal. There is no doubt that our new status brings with it new responsibilities, which, if we are to judge from the discussion to-day, Canada is ready to assume. The times have changed and conditions have changed with them. It is not so many years ago in the life of this country when even commercial treaties involving the interests of Canada were conducted by the Home Government without conference with the Canadian Government and concluded without their consent. But to-day no commercial treaty affecting the interests of Canada can be made without Canada being represented at the negotiations. In some instances the negotiators for His Majesty were exclusively Canadians, and in the past year we have seen that even what might be called political treaties, which were of concern to Canada, were submitted for approval and assent to this Government before they were signed by the representative of His Majesty. One of the responsibilities which the new era has brought upon us is that we must provide for our country adequate naval protection. Certain remarks which I made at the Imperial Conference in 1907 have been quoted during the debate, and one of the hon. gentlemen who did me that honour seems to have misconstrued my statements on that occasion. When we met in the Imperial Conference the document which has been read by the leader of the opposition was submitted, and in that document the assertion was made that Canada had done nothing in the way of naval expenditure. It was pointed out that the naval expenditure of the United Kingdom amounted to £33,389,500, that of Newfoundland to £3,000, that of Australia £255,651, that of New Zealand to £40,592, that of the Cape of Good Hope to £50,000, that of Natal to £35,000, and the document then asserted that the Transvaal and Canada had not contributed anything for this purpose. I thought it my duty to state at this juncture the exact position of Canada in that respect. Not only did this document contain the statement referred to but important publications both in Great Britain and Canada had made the same assertion. I pointed out that this allegation was erroneous and that Canada had relieved England of certain naval expenditures which England formerly bore. By the treaty of 1818 it was stipulated that the Americans would have the right to take fish within the three-mile limit in Newfoundland and the Canadian Labrador. This was a treaty which had been made by the mother country without the consent of Canada, because in those days the consent of Canada was not asked to such a treaty. From 1818 to 1873, except during the years the reciprocity treaty was in force, the duty of the protection of our fisheries and the enforcement of the regulations was assumed entirely by the British fleet. That was a duty which would have entailed on the British treasury the expenditure of a large sum of money. At one time not simply one vessel but several were assigned to the protection of our fisheries. In 1870 we established a marine police as an auxiliary to the British vessels engaged in that service. But after the denunciation of the Treaty of Washington, from 1886 until to-day, Canada has assumed alone all the responsibility of protecting her fisheries, not only on the Atlantic coast, but also on the Pacific coast; and since that time we have spent for the protection of our fisheries, on our hydrographic survey, which also was formerly carried on entirely by the British fleet, and for our wireless telegraphy service, which of course did not exist before, no less a sum than \$5,186,701.16.

Mr. R. L. BORDEN: May I ask the hon. gentleman, for information, whether expenditures of this character, if there be such expenditures in Great Britain, are included in the sum mentioned as the total naval expenditure of Great Britain?

Mr. BRODEUR: Yes. I may say that when this question was being discussed before the Imperial Conference, I asked Lord Tweedmouth whether the £33,000,000 mentioned as the naval expenditure of Great Britain included the cost of the hydrographic surveys, the fisheries protection service, and the wireless telegraphic service, and he told me that the cost of the fisheries protection service was included.

Mr. COWAN: Is it not a fact that since then these items have been excluded from the naval expenditure?

Mr. BRODEUR: I could not say whether these items have been excluded or not from the naval expenditure of Great Britain. I am speaking of what happened at the Imperial Conference. It was stated that Canada was not expending anything on the fisheries protection service, and I thought it my duty to call the attention of the members of the Conference to the fact that that statement did not represent the situation exactly as it was. I do not know whether any change has been made since, but I am convinced that the naval expenditure of Great Britain to-day includes not only the construction of ships, but also the fisheries protection service, the hydrographic survey, and the establishment of wireless telegraphic stations.

There are some other services which have been taken over by Canada. Reference has been made to the stations of Esquimalt and Halifax. It is true that the transfer of Esquimalt has not yet been completed; but I expect to be able to report in a very few days that the matter has been entirely closed up, and that the expenditure on that port will in future be carried on by the Canadian Government. The Halifax station has been handed over to us

temporarily for a special purpose. The understanding or contract between the Imperial Government and the Canadian Government with reference to that station has not yet been signed, as it will require legislation by the Imperial Parliament; but I understand that this legislation will probably be passed at the present session of that Parliament. Lord Tweedmouth stated on the 30th of July, 1907, that the cost of the establishment at Halifax had been £31,600 and that at Esquimalt £27,300, or a total of £58,900, or about \$300,000. Provided the Canadians kept up those two docks and harbours in proper condition, he said, they would be doing a very great service to the empire at large.

Mr. SPROULE: Was that the ground on which we were to take them over—simply that we were to keep the docks and shipyards in an efficient condition?

Mr. BRODEUR: No, we shall be obliged to maintain those stations in the same state of efficiency that they are in to-day in order that they may be used as coaling stations and for other purposes. At the present moment we are using the Halifax dockyard, with its magnificent equipment, for our buoy service. All our buoys and ships are being repaired at that station.

Since I am on this question of Canada's contribution to the navy, I might quote some remarks made in the same discussion by the First Lord of the Admiralty upon the contributions of the other self-governing Dominions. My hon. friend from North Toronto quoted to-day the contributions which had been made by Australia, New Zealand, the Cape, and Natal. We must not forget for one moment that those contributions are made under certain conditions. Take the case of Australia, which has handed over £200,000 to the British treasury without anything in return. There are some obligations stipulated in the contract between the Australian and the Imperial Governments which render that contribution of £200,000 and even the contributions made by the other colonies somewhat onerous on the British treasury. The amounts subscribed by the different colonies are as follows:

Newfoundland	£3,000
Australia	255,000
New Zealand	40,000
Cape of Good Hope	50,000
Natal	35,000
Total	£383,000

Taking simply the case of Australia and New Zealand, I find that the total sum of £383,000 is more than offset by the burden which the contract between Great Britain and the Governments of Australia and New Zealand imposes on the Imperial treasury. I find, by a speech made by Lord Tweedmouth on the 30th of July, 1907, in the House of Lords, that the obligations imposed by this contract have cost Great Britain £581,954, or £200,000 more than the amount subscribed by those different self-governing Dominions. Here is the statement of Lord Tweedmouth, which I will take the liberty of reading, taken from the "Times" of the 31st of July, 1907:

Having reference to the way in which the colonial contribution was initiated, I mention that under the outstanding agreement with Australia that colony was obliged to give £200,000 a year to this country, and New Zealand was similarly pledged to give £40,000 a year, on condition that a certain squadron should be kept in Australian waters. That agreement was still in effect, and could not be broken without the vote of the Australian and New Zealand Parliaments as well as of our own. The annual cost of that squadron was £581,954.

So that this contribution given by those self-governing Dominions instead of being a monetary benefit to the British Treasury, has entailed upon that Treasury an expenditure of £200,000 more than the whole amount contributed.

Mr. BARNARD: As a matter of fact, had not the Government of New Zealand, since the date of that quotation, increased its subscription to £100,000, and made it unconditional?

Mr. BRODEUR: I understood that the contract made in 1902 was made by the Imperial Government with the Australian and the New Zealand Governments and that, as stated by Lord Tweedmouth, it cannot be cancelled except with the consent of the three interested parties. At present I think there is an offer on the part of New Zealand to make her contribution £100,000. I do not know whether that offer is conditional or not, but I simply take the facts as I find them.

Mr. BARNARD: If my hon. friend will look at the Imperial Blue-book of a much later date, he will find that in December, 1907, New Zealand increased her subsidy from £40,000 to £100,000 and, in reply to a question from the Imperial Government, made it unconditional.

Mr. BRODEUR: There may have been such an offer, and I am not questioning my hon. friend's statement, but suppose there was, that would still leave a difference of £140,000 against the British Government. I am not disparaging, in any shape or form, what the different self-governing Dominions have done, but I say that the conditions imposed by some of them are such that the British treasury is out a sum of £200,000 or at least of £140,000. And Canada, which is represented as not doing anything, has been undertaking the defence of her own coast, as far as fishery protection service is concerned. Canada has been spending her own coast, as far as fishery protection service is concerned. Canada has been spending \$5,100,000 on this service since 1886, and we are spending also a very large sum for the aid of navigation, if not of a navy proper. My hon. friend thinks that our fishery protection service is not what is desired. Possibly it is not absolutely perfect, but it must be borne in mind that new vessels are coming out every day which were not in use some years ago, and we are taking steps to build cruisers to cope with new conditions and protect our fisheries more effectively. I was alluding to the fact that we in Canada have made other expenditures which show that we are improving our navigation. Take the expenditure of last year in connection with lighthouses, ship channels, and wireless stations. We have spent in this

connection \$3,048,386. That expenditure, I admit, does not turn absolutely to the benefit of naval defence, but at the same time it shows that Canada is doing something for the development of our means of transportation. And if we consider the situation of Australia and other self-governing Dominions we do not see that they are obliged to make such expenditures as those regarding the maintenance of lights and the development of the improvements of means of transportation. On this question of defence there are two means of contributing. The one is what I might call the national defence; the other one is a contribution which might be made directly in the shape of a sum of money or it might be made indirectly by the construction of some big ships. The Imperial authorities did not ask us at the Imperial Conference to contribute any sum of money. No, what they were most anxious for was that we should do something for the protection of our sea coast and, as was well illustrated in a discussion I had on this matter with a naval authority when I was in England, the construction of torpedo boats and destroyers and small craft of that kind will render perhaps more service to the British navy than the construction of great warships. Suppose a war should be declared, suppose the coast of Canada should be attacked and that we have only one or two warships, what would these warships be able to do? Nothing, or almost nothing. On the other hand, if we had some of these small boats in order to protect our coasts, it is to be presumed that in a short time large warships could come to our rescue and in the meantime our coasts could be defended by these destroyers and torpedo boats. It has been stated in the debate to-day that there is only one opinion in Canada on the question of local defence. I was very glad to hear my hon. friend from North Toronto (Mr. Foster) express that view which has been concurred in to a very large extent by the leader of the Opposition (Mr. R. L. Borden). I shall quote an authority showing that in Canada there is only one view, irrespective of party, upon the question of local defence. I beg to quote from an article by Sir Charles Tupper, published in the "Nineteenth Century," of April, 1907. Sir Charles said:

It is known that from the outset I have felt the interests of Canada and the true interests of the empire to be opposed to the demand for colonial contributions to the Imperial navy. Those loudest in that demand admit that a voice in administration by the colony contributing is essential, and all the naval experts concur in the opinion that any diversion of authority would be fatal. But this is not for one moment to say that each colony should not contribute to the extent of its ability to the defence of the empire. I hold strongly that it should, and I maintain that Canada has discharged that duty in the manner most conducive to Imperial interests. Canada projects her fisheries by her own cruisers, and when the Imperial Government expressed a wish to be relieved of the expense of maintaining the strategic points at the harbours at Halifax and Esquimalt, the Canadian Government at once relieved them of that large expense. The empire can be best defended by strengthening its weakest part.

At this late hour I need not dwell on the question of contribution to the British navy with such an opinion as has been expressed by Sir Charles Tupper. There is no doubt that the supremacy of Great Britain on the sea is absolutely essential for the protection of our commerce, for the advancement of civilization and in the interests of the world. I maintain that as long as this supremacy exists we in Canada may safely continue to develop our natural resources, to extend our commerce, and to make this country a great and powerful nation which, in case of need, will be there ready with vast resources and vast wealth to co-operate with the empire in order to maintain for ever the supremacy of Great Britain at sea.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER. The suggestions which have been made by my hon. friend the leader of the Opposition are such as can be accepted by this side of the House and I have no objection to adding the words, so that the resolution will read as follows:

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service.

With regard to the paragraph stating what we have already done in alleviating the burden of the British taxpayer, there is no objection at all to striking that out. I therefore move the amendment in the following form:

That all the words after "that" be struck out and the following substituted thereto:

This House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence.

The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the self-governing Dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire, and the peace of the world.

The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the empire.

Amendment agreed to, and motion as amended agreed to.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 12.35 p.m., 4th April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 9.]

With reference to offer of Dreadnought, Minister asks me to send you following message* :—

"Governments of New South Wales and Victoria are of opinion that, defence Australia should speak with one voice, it is most desirable that Governments of New South Wales and Victoria should not take action till the opportunity has been afforded the Commonwealth Parliament, when it meets, to make a proposal to Imperial Government on behalf of all the States. Therefore, if the Commonwealth Parliament resolves to make the offer of a Dreadnought to the Imperial Government, Governments of New South Wales and Victoria have agreed to contribute proportionately to the cost of the same. Despatch has been addressed to Prime Minister of Commonwealth of Australia embodying above views. If, however, Commonwealth Parliament does not adopt this course, Governments of New South Wales and Victoria have agreed immediately to take the necessary steps to obtain the authority of their respective Parliaments to share costs of a Dreadnought on a *per capita* basis."

—G. B. SIMPSON.

VICTORIA: NEW SOUTH WALES.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS.

(Sent 2.50 p.m., 7th April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

His Majesty's Government warmly appreciate desire† of New South Wales and Victoria to contribute their share of the cost of a Dreadnought, and would gratefully welcome such an addition to the naval strength of the Empire. Please convey to your Ministers the very cordial thanks of His Majesty's Government for this signal proof of regard for the Mother Country. We fully understand the constitutional position of the State Governments in this matter, and, subject to the negotiations referred to in your telegram, His Majesty's Government will be happy to exchange more detailed communications as to the most appropriate method of giving effect to the patriotic proposals of your Government.—CREWE.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 4.40 p.m., 15 April, 1909.)

[Answered by No. 11.]

TELEGRAM.

Prime Minister of the Commonwealth has asked me to submit to your Lordship, for consideration of His Majesty's Government, the following memorandum on the question of Naval Defence:—

"Whereas all the Dominions of the British Empire ought to share in

* NOTE.—This message was also received by telegram from the Governor of Victoria. † See No. 8.

the most effective way in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the Empire:

"And whereas this Government is of opinion that, so far as Australia is concerned, this object would be best attained by encouragement of naval development in this country so that people of Commonwealth will become a people efficient at sea and thereby better able to assist United Kingdom with men as well as ships to act in concert with the other sea forces of the Empire:

"The views of the present Government, as a basis of co-operation and mutual understanding, are herewith submitted:—

- "(1) The Naval Agreement Act to continue for the term provided for;
- "(2) The Commonwealth Government to continue to provide, equip, and maintain the defences of naval base for the use of the ships of the Royal Navy;
- "(3) In order to place Australia in a position to undertake the responsibility of local naval defence, the Commonwealth Government to establish a Naval Force;
- "(4) The Commonwealth Government to provide ships constituting the torpedo flotilla and maintain them in a state of efficiency, wages, pay, provision, and maintenance of officers and men;
- "(5) The sphere of action of the Naval Force of the Commonwealth to be primarily about the coast of Commonwealth and its territories;
- "(6) The administrative control of the Naval Force of the Commonwealth to rest with the Commonwealth Government. The officer commanding to take his orders from the Commonwealth Government direct, proper sequence of command by officers appointed by the Commonwealth being maintained. The forces to be under naval discipline administered in same way as in the Royal Navy;
- "(7) Whilst employed about the coast of Commonwealth or its territories, whether within territorial limits or not, the vessels forming the Naval Force of the Commonwealth to be under the sole control of Commonwealth. Should the vessels go to other places, the said vessels to come under the command of the naval officer representing the British Government, if such officer be senior in rank to the Commonwealth officer. Provided that, if it be necessary to send these vessels or any of them on training cruises outside the waters referred to, arrangements shall be made with the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty through Naval Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station;
- "(8) In time of war or emergency or upon a declaration by the Senior Naval Officer representing British Government, that a condition of emergency exists, all the vessels of the Naval Force of the Commonwealth shall be placed by the Commonwealth Government under the orders of Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. The method by which the vessels shall come under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer would be by furnishing each Commander of an Australian vessel with sealed orders and instructions (to) the effect that upon the declaration to him by the Senior Naval Officer representing British Government that a state of war or emergency exists, such sealed orders shall thereupon be opened and, in pursuance of their provisions, he shall thereupon immediately place himself under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer representing British Government;
- "(9) It is, however, to be understood that if the services of any of the Coast Defence vessels be desired in seas remote from Australia, the approval of the Commonwealth Government shall first be obtained to their removal;
- "(10) To ensure the highest efficiency, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to be asked to agree to the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station making, at request of the Commonwealth Government, periodical inspection of the vessels

of the Naval Force of the Commonwealth, Naval School of Instruction, and Naval Establishment;

- "(11) Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to be asked also to approve of the service on the flotilla of such officers of the Royal Navy as may be mutually agreed to for service as Instructors and Specialist officers and to receive officers of the local flotilla for instruction at the torpedo, gunnery, and other schools in the United Kingdom;

- "(12) Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to be asked to give opportunities from time to time for officers and men specially selected by the Commonwealth being attached to battle fleets or torpedo flotillas in European waters for special instruction, the expense to be borne by Commonwealth; and

- "(13) For special facilities to be given, by arrangement with the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station, for the vessels of the flotilla being exercised in conjunction the ships of the Royal Navy on the Australian Station, subject to the command of such combined exercises being held by the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy on the Australian Station."

In concluding his memorandum, Prime Minister assures me that Commonwealth Government would highly appreciate the receipt, at earliest possible moment, of the views of His Majesty's Government on the foregoing proposals.—DUDLEY.

12859

No. 11.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 1.45 p.m., 16th April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram 15th April.* Please assure Prime Minister that I will lose no time in submitting his important proposals for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and for an early expression of the views of His Majesty's Government.—CREWE.

14728

No. 12.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND GOVERNORS.†

(Sent 6 p.m., 30th April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by Nos. 16, 17, 18, 22, 26, and 33.]

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as President of the Imperial Conference, has desired me to ask you to convey the following message to the Prime Minister of [the Commonwealth of Australia] [the Dominion of [New Zealand] [Cape Colony] [Newfoundland].]

"It will, no doubt, be within your knowledge that on the 29th March the Canadian House of Commons passed a Resolution to the following effect:—

"Resolution begins: That this House fully recognises the duty of the people of Canada as they increase in numbers and wealth to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of National Defence.

* No. 10.

† Australia, New Zealand, Cape of Good Hope, and Newfoundland.

14240r

c

"The House is of opinion that, under the present constitutional relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury for naval and military purposes, would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

"The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service in co-operation with, and in close relation to, the Imperial Navy along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the Naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, and the peace of the world. The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the Empire. *Resolution ends.*

*I understand that the Dominion Government proposes that its Defence Ministers should come here at an early date to confer with the Imperial Naval and Military Authorities upon technical matters arising upon that Resolution.

"His Majesty's Government have also before them recent patriotic proposals made by Australia and New Zealand, proposals most highly appreciated by the Mother Country, and demanding very cordial and careful consideration both as to principle and detail.

"I desire, therefore, to commend to you the following important suggestion, namely, that a Conference of representatives of the self-governing Dominions convened under the terms of Resolution I. of the Conference of 1907, which provides for such subsidiary conferences, should be held in London early in July next. The object of the Conference would be to discuss the general question of Naval and Military Defence of the Empire with special reference to the Canadian Resolution, and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia to which I have referred.

"I assume that as the consultation would be generally upon technical or quasi-technical naval and military matters the other Governments of the self-governing Dominions would elect to be represented as in the case of Canada by their Ministers of Defence, or failing them by some other member of the Government assisted by expert advice, but it is

entirely for the Government of

the Commonwealth
New Zealand
Cape Colony
Newfoundland

 to decide the precise form of its representation.

"The Conference would, of course, be of a purely consultative character, it would be held in private and its deliberations would be assisted by the presence of members of the Committee of Imperial Defence, or of other expert advisers of His Majesty's Government. I am addressing a similar message to the other members of the Imperial Conference."

I am strongly of opinion that an early confidential exchange of views between His Majesty's Government and the Governments of His Majesty's self-governing Dominions beyond the seas will be of the greatest mutual advantage, and I therefore trust that your Prime Minister and his colleagues will see their way to adopt the proposal.

[To Newfoundland only: At present juncture I presume your Prime Minister will suspend definite answer until the elections are over.]

[To Cape only: I recognise that at the present time the Government of Cape Colony in common with the other South African Governments which are contemplating the probability of early union may not be in a position to take an active part in such a Conference, but the absence of any representatives of the South African Dominions from its deliberations would be a serious detriment to the completeness of the Conference.

Please repeat this telegram to the Governors of Transvaal, Orange River Colony and Natal.

I have informed them that I have communicated message to you for Prime Minister of Cape Colony which is also for communication to other Prime Ministers in identic terms.]

14728

No. 13.

TRANSVAAL, ORANGE RIVER COLONY, NATAL.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNORS.

(Sent 6 p.m., 30th April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by Nos. 19, 24, 27, and 34.]

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as President of the Imperial Conference, has desired me to ask you to convey a message to the Prime Minister of [the Transvaal], [the Orange River Colony], [Natal], which he has also addressed to the Prime Ministers of the other South African Colonies in identic terms.

I have communicated the text in a telegram to the Governor of the Cape Colony,* and I have asked him to repeat my telegram to you.—CREWE.

14728

No. 14.

CANADA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 6 p.m., 30th April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 16.]

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as President of the Imperial Conference, has desired me to ask you to convey the following message to the Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada:—

"His Majesty's Government have noted with much satisfaction the resolution passed by the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada on March 29th on subject of national defence, recording its approval of the speedy organisation of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with, and in close relation to, the Imperial navy, and I understand that the Dominion Government proposes that its Defence Ministers should come here at an early date to confer with the Imperial Naval and Military Authorities upon technical matters arising upon that resolution.

"His Majesty's Government have also before them recent patriotic proposals made by Australia and New Zealand, demanding very cordial and careful consideration both as to principle and detail.

"I desire, therefore, to commend to you the following important suggestion, namely, that a conference of Representatives of the self-governing Dominions, convened under the terms of Resolution I. of the Conference of 1907, which provides for such subsidiary Conferences should be held in London early in July next. The object of the Conference would be to discuss the general question of naval and military defence of the Empire, with special reference to the Canadian Resolution and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia, to which I have referred.

"The Conference would, of course, be of a purely consultative character: it would be held in private, and its deliberations would be assisted by the presence of members of the Committee of Imperial Defence or of other expert advisers of His Majesty's Government.

* No. 12,

"I am addressing a similar message to the other Members of the Imperial Conference. I am intimating to the other Prime Ministers that I assume that as the consultation would be generally upon technical or quasi-technical naval and military matters, the other Dominions would elect to be represented, as in case of Canada, by their Ministers of Defence, or, failing them, by some other Member of the Government assisted by expert advice."

I am strongly of opinion that an early confidential exchange of views between His Majesty's Government and the Governments of His Majesty's self-governing Dominions beyond the seas will be of the greatest mutual advantage, and I therefore trust that your Prime Minister and his colleagues will see their way to adopt the proposal.—CREWE.

14787

No. 15.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.30 a.m., 1st May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

(Paraphrase.)

1st May. Confidential. The Government of Commonwealth suggests to His Majesty's Government the desirableness of convening a conference of the self-governing Dominions at the earliest possible suitable date, to consider a definite line of co-operation for the naval defence of the Empire.—DUDLEY.

15156

No. 16.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.30 a.m., 5th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 21.]

Your telegram of 30th April.* Ministers wish to point out that views of Canadian House of Commons† on the question of naval defence have already been expressed, and, in pursuance of resolution of that body, two Ministers, as already announced, will shortly go to London to discuss with Admiralty best method of carrying out that resolution. My Ministers have not sufficient information to warrant them in advising as to necessity for such a formal Conference as that suggested, but there would be no objection to postpone visit till July so as to suit convenience of Imperial Government.—GREY.

15157

No. 17.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9.20 a.m., 5th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 21.]

Your telegram of 30th April‡ Government of Commonwealth of Australia concurs in views of His Majesty's Government and will send delegation representing

* No. 14.

† See No. 7.

‡ No. 12.

Commonwealth Government at proposed Conference on Military and Naval defence.—DUDLEY.

15447

No. 18.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.56 a.m., 7th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 21.]

(Paraphrase.)

Naval Defence. Your telegram of 30th April.* The following is the substance of confidential communication from my Ministers:—

- (1) My Government unanimously consider no representation, except by the Prime Minister, who is also Minister of Defence, would be satisfactory to New Zealand, and that failing this, New Zealand could not be represented.
- (2) To enable the Prime Minister to attend the Conference, an early session of the Dominion Parliament must be convened in order to obtain supplies, followed by adjournment of Parliament, which is absolutely necessary, this being the first session of a new Parliament.
- (3) Such a step could only be taken for very substantial reasons. Chief among these would be the plainly expressed desire of the British Government for the attendance of my Prime Minister at the Conference.
- (4) It is desirable that the date of the Conference should be fixed not earlier than the last week (in) July as it would be impossible for Sir J. Ward to arrive in England before then.
- (5) If His Majesty's Government concur and will send a suitable invitation, which may be read to Parliament, it is hoped that Sir J. Ward can attend. On receipt of your reply Parliament can be called for the 10th June for the purpose of considering matter, that being earliest possible date under existing prorogation.
- (6) My Government believe the course proposed by His Majesty's Government is in best interests of the Empire, but they consider it would be a matter for much regret if New Zealand, which is anxious to give assistance to the British Government in a material direction, could not be represented for want of being able to postpone the meeting of the new Parliament.—PLUNKET.

15862

No. 19.

TRANSVAAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.5 p.m., 10th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 31.]

May 10th. Defence Conference. With reference to Prime Minister's invitation† to representatives of South Africa Governments, General Botha writes that along with colleagues he deeply appreciates courtesy of invitation, and is anxious to accept it on behalf of Transvaal Government. He points out that, as you anticipate, in view of impending changes here it will not be possible for any of South African Premiers to take very active part in Conference or to adhere to any policy by which

* No. 12.

† No. 13.

future Union Government might seem to be bound. At the same time it is agreed by General Botha and his colleagues that the presence of South African representatives at Conference will make it more complete, and may help future Union Government in formulating some general scheme of South African defence as far as possible in harmony with systems in other parts of the Empire. They suggest that delegates from Conference who have to go to London in connection with South Africa Bill should leave South Africa end of June, and arrive in London middle of July. Arrangements would then be made by members of the Government who are on the delegation for the proper representation of the Transvaal at sittings of the Defence Conference.

I should add that I have not yet received from President of Convention a formal reply to my letter expressing hope that delegation will arrive in London not later than July 17, but I believe your invitation for that date will be accepted—SELBORNE.

15447

No. 20.

CANADA. AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL.

TELEGRAM.

(Sent 6.15 p.m., 10 May, 1909.)

[Answered by Nos. 23 and 25.]

(Paraphrase.)

10 May. Confidential. [To Canada only. Commonwealth Government concur in views of His Majesty's Government and will send delegation.]

Government of New Zealand earnestly desire to attend Conference, but point out that their Minister cannot attend until the new Parliament has been convened and has voted supplies, and that consequently the date of Conference in London should be fixed not earlier than the last week of July. New Zealand Government believe course proposed by His Majesty's Government is in best interests of Empire and express the opinion, which His Majesty's Government share, that it would be a matter for much regret if New Zealand could not be represented through not being able to postpone the meeting of the new Parliament.

His Majesty's Government trust, therefore, that it will be possible to arrange for the delegation from [Canada] [Australia] to attend at end of July.—CREWE.

15447

No. 21.

CANADA: AUSTRALIA: NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL AND GOVERNOR.

(Sent 2 p.m., 12th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram [5th May], [7th May].* I desire, in name of Prime Minister and of His Majesty's Government to express their gratification at readiness of [Dominion], [Commonwealth] Government to take part in Conference.

I hope that, as result of communications now proceeding, it will be possible shortly to fix, definitely, date for its meeting convenient to all Governments.—CREWE.

* Nos. 16, 17, and 18.

15977

No. 22.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.3 p.m., 12th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 1.]

12th May. Your telegram of 30th April,* Defence Conference, Minute from Ministers expressing appreciation of your courtesy, and saying that His Majesty's Government readily understands that Cape Colony cannot take any part involving responsibility which it would fall on others to discharge. Ministers are, however, entirely in agreement with you in thinking that presence of delegates from South Africa would add to completeness of Conference, and help future Union Government in formulating some general scheme of South African defence. Delegates from Cape Colony deputed to visit London in connection with South Africa Act will be authorised to attend Defence Conference. Delegates should reach London in the middle of July, and will probably consist of Prime Minister and one or two other delegates.

Minute leaves by next mail.

Repeated to High Commissioner for South Africa.—HELY-HUTCHINSON.

16113

No. 23.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 7.5 p.m., 12th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

(Paraphrase.)

Confidential. With reference to your telegram of 10th May,† my Prime Minister says that the end of July will be equally convenient for Mr. Brodeur and Sir F. Borden.—GREY.

16125

No. 24.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.40 a.m., 13 May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 31.]

13th May. Prime Minister desires me to acknowledge receipt of courteous invitation Prime Minister of United Kingdom contemplated in your telegram of 30th April‡ sent through Governor Cape Colony. Prime Minister hopes that delegates from this Colony who go to London end of June in connection with South African Union may be able to make arrangements to attend Defence Conference. Despatch§ follows by mail with full minute of Prime Minister.—GOOLD-ADAMS.

* No. 12.

† No. 20.

‡ No. 13.

§ See No. 34.

16203

No. 25.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.15 a.m., 14 May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Date of Conference end of July acceptable to Commonwealth Government. Names representatives few days.—DUDLEY.

16368

No. 26.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9.25 p.m., 14 May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to War Office and to Admiralty, 22 May, 1909. L.F.]

[Answered by No. 29.]

Your telegram of 30th April.* Understand that Prime Minister expresses a desire to attend proposed Conference if Session of Parliament can be completed in time. Please inform me date proposed Conference will be opened.—MACGREGOR.

16330

No. 27.

NATAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9 a.m., 15th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 31.]

14th May. Natal accepts invitation of His Majesty's Government contained in your telegram of 1st May† to be represented at Conference on Naval and Military Defences of Empire, and my Ministers concur in proposal of Transvaal Government that members of South African Governments who go to London in connection with passage of South Africa Act should attend sittings of Defence Conference.—NATHAN.

16203

No. 28.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 1.28 p.m., 17 May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 30.]

Please inform your Ministers that Governments of Commonwealth and Canada have accepted invitation to Defence Conference proposed in my telegram of 30 April,* and that Governments of South African Colonies will authorise delegates sent home in connection with Union Bill to attend Conference. In these circumstances

* No. 12.

† No. 13.

I earnestly hope that the Dominion of New Zealand will be represented, and that it may be possible for Sir J. Ward, as Minister of Defence and Prime Minister, to be spared from his important duties to attend the Conference.

It is now proposed to hold Conference at end of July, as that date will be convenient for the other delegates, and will, I hope, be also convenient to your Prime Minister.—CREWE.

16368

No. 29.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4.55 p.m., 19 May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to War Office and Admiralty, 22 May, 1909. L.F.]

Your telegram 14 May.* Exact date opening Conference not fixed, but expected to be last week July. I shall cordially welcome presence of your Premier.—CREWE

17106

No. 30.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.30 a.m., 20th May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram of 17th May.† My Government fully recognise importance of Conference; efforts being made to meet His Majesty's Government's request; sending reply by telegram as soon as possible.—PLUNKET.

16330

No. 31.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNORS.

(Sent 12.22 p.m., 21 May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

- (1. Transvaal.)
- (2. The Cape of Good Hope.)
- (3. Orange River Colony.)
- (4. Natal.)

21 May, No. 1. Your telegram [1. 10 May [2. 12 May] [3. 13 May] [4. 14 May]‡ Please express to your Ministers satisfaction with which His Majesty's Government learn that Colony will be represented at Defence Conference.—CREWE.

18749

No. 32.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.29 p.m., June 4, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 35.]

Confidential. Government of Commonwealth of Australia take earliest opportunity after assuming office to inform Prime Minister, as President of Imperial

* No. 26.

† No. 28.

‡ Nos. 19, 22, 24, and 27

Conference, that will shortly submit to Parliament their proposals for defence of Commonwealth and its coasts. They now beg to offer to the Empire an Australian Dreadnought, or such addition to its naval strength as may be determined after consultation with Naval and Military Conference in London, at which it will be represented. This offer will be communicated to Parliament immediately it re-assembles.—DUDLEY.

18857

No. 33.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5 June, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office and Admiralty, 15 June, 1909. L.F.]

(Confidential.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Cape Town, 11th May, 1909.

I COMMUNICATED to the Prime Minister your Lordship's telegram of 30th April, 1909,* on the subject of the proposed Defence Conference.

2. The Prime Minister was at Bloemfontein, attending the South African National Convention, and informed me that he would consult the other Prime Ministers present at the Convention on the subject of Mr. Asquith's proposals. The Convention has, as your Lordship is aware, come to an agreement. The amended draft of the South Africa Act has been unanimously signed and the prospect of its passing the South African Parliaments seems favourable.

3. I received to-day from the Prime Minister the minute of which a copy is enclosed, from which your Lordship will see that the delegates from the Cape Colony who may be deputed to visit London in connection with the South Africa Act will be authorised to attend the sittings of the Defence Conference; and that the Delegation, which is expected to reach London in the middle of July, will probably consist of the Prime Minister and of one or two others.

4. I have informed your Lordship by telegram† of the substance of the minute.

5. I am communicating a copy of this despatch to the High Commissioner.

I have, &c.,

WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.

Enclosure in No. 33.

PRIME MINISTER TO GOVERNOR.

(No. 1/187.)

South African National Convention, Bloemfontein, 11th May, 1909.

Ministers have to acknowledge the message, dated 1st May, forwarding the telegraphic message from the Secretary of State with reference to the proposed Conference on the subject of the naval and military defences of the Empire.

Ministers desire to express their appreciation of the courtesy of the Secretary of State in extending to them the invitation to attend this Conference. Owing to the impending political changes in South Africa, His Majesty's Government will readily understand that it will be quite impossible for this Colony to take any part involving responsibilities which would fall on others to discharge. They are, however, entirely at one with the Secretary of State in thinking that the presence of delegates will add to completeness of the Conference and will help the future Union Government in formulating some general scheme of South African Defence and in bringing that scheme into harmony with those which may be adopted in other portions of the Empire. The delegates from the Colony who may be deputed to visit London in connection with the South Africa Act will be authorised to attend the sittings of the Conference on Defence.

It is hoped that the Delegation will reach London in the middle of July.

It will probably consist of the Prime Minister and one or two other delegates.

JOHN X. MERRIMAN.

* No. 12.

† No. 22.

18893

No. 34.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5 June, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office and Admiralty, 15 June, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 72.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, 17 May, 1909.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 30th ultimo,* I have the honour to inform you that I received through the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope the message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom relative to the Imperial Defence Conference.

2. I at once transmitted Mr. Asquith's message to my Prime Minister, and, in confirmation of my telegram to your Lordship of the 13th instant,† I now enclose a copy of the minute received by me from Mr. Fischer setting forth the attitude to be adopted by this Colony in reference to the Conference.

I have, &c.,

HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 34.

(Minute No. 1981.)

Prime Minister's Office,

Bloemfontein, Orange River Colony, 11 May, 1909.

Ministers have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency the Governor's minute, No. 572, of the 3rd instant, forwarding copy of a telegram from His Excellency the Governor of the Cape Colony, dated the 3rd instant, and to state that they have discussed with the Prime Ministers of the other South African Colonies the Secretary of State's invitation therein contained to representatives from the South African Governments to the Conference on the Naval and Military Defences of the Empire.

Ministers appreciate deeply the courtesy of His Majesty's Government in extending this invitation to this Government, and need not assure His Majesty's Government how anxious they are to accept it. It will, of course, be understood, as, indeed, the Secretary of State clearly anticipates, that it will not be possible for any of the self-governing South African Colonies, in view of the great political change now pending in South Africa, to take a very active part in such a Conference or to adhere to any policy which might seem to bind the Union Government which will so soon replace the present Colonial Governments.

Ministers, however, at the same time agree that the presence of South African representatives at the Conference will not only give it greater completeness but may help the future Union Government towards formulating some general scheme of South African defence which may as far as possible be in harmony with the systems prevailing in other parts of the Empire.

With reference to the question as to when delegates from this Colony could attend the Conference, Ministers have to state that it was the view of the Prime Ministers that the delegates from the South African Governments who have to go to London in connection with the passage of the South Africa Act through the British Parliament should leave South Africa at the end of June and so arrive in London in the middle of July. The members of the Governments who are on this Delegation could then make the necessary arrangements to attend also, as far as possible, the sittings of the Defence Conference.

A. FISCHER.

* No. 13.

† No. 24.

18749

No. 35.

AUSTRALIA.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(Sent 12.15 p.m., June 7, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

(Confidential.)

June 7. Please convey to your Ministers the warm and very cordial thanks of His Majesty's Government for offer contained in your telegram of June 4.* They welcome the opportunity for consultation which will be afforded by the forthcoming conference on the defence of the Empire.—CREWE.

19948

No. 36.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.35 a.m., 15 June, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Commonwealth of Australia will be represented Naval and Military Conference by Colonel Honourable J. Foxton, C.M.G., Honorary Minister.—DUDLEY.

19948

No. 37.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4.10 p.m., 16 June, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 38.]

Your telegram, 20 May.† I see from press telegram that your Prime Minister will leave this week for England to represent Dominion at Naval Conference. Should be glad to know for certain date when he expects to arrive England.—CREWE.

20430

No. 38.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10.1 a.m., 18th June, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram of 16th June.‡ Prime Minister leaves New Zealand to-day to attend Defence Conference; proceeds from Adelaide by steamer "China," and from Port Said by P. & O. express steamer to Brindisi, thence to London, expecting to arrive 24th July. He suggests that if convenient Conference should meet few days later.—JAMES PRENDERGAST.

* No. 32.

† No. 30.

‡ No. 37.

10 886/2/7

Printed for the use of the Imperial Conference.

Dominions

No. 14.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

PROPOSED FORMATION OF AN IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

(In continuation of [Cd. 4475] February, 1909.)

COLONIAL OFFICE,

July, 1909.

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Serial No.	From or to whom.	Despatch No., &c.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1909.					
11	The Governor ...	Orange River Colony, Telegram.	May 24 (Rec. May 24.)	States that Ministers presume that the question will be discussed at the Imperial Defence Conference, and do not propose to submit any observations for the present.	11
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13	The Acting Governor-General.	Canada, 288.	June 5 (Rec. June 21.)	Forwards copy of a Minute of the Privy Council explaining the measures proposed to be taken to extend the functions of the Royal Military College of Canada.	12
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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

PROPOSED FORMATION

OF AN

IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

7363

No. 1.

CANADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1 March, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office, 15 March, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 66.)

MY LORD,

Montreal, P.Q., 15 February, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 12th instant,* giving a summary of the observations of my responsible advisers upon your Lordship's despatch, No. 30, of the 15th ultimo,† on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole, I have the honour to enclose copy of an approved Minute of the Privy Council, upon which my telegram was based.

I have, &c.,
GREY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

CERTIFIED COPY OF A REPORT of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor-General on the 10th February, 1909.

(P.C. 70 N.)

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a despatch dated 15th January, 1909, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, forwarding a letter from the War Office, dated 15th December, 1908, enclosing and commending to the attention of Your Excellency's Government a Memorandum prepared by the General Staff on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole.

The Minister of Militia and Defence, to whom the said despatch and enclosures were referred, submits a report thereon (hereunto attached) in which he expresses the opinion that Your Excellency's Government may safely assent to the general principles proposed for adoption in the Memorandum by the General Staff, and recommends that, as requested in the above-quoted Colonial Office letter, a cable message conveying that assent be addressed to the Colonial Office.

* No. 4 in [Cd. 4475], February, 1909.

† No. 1 in [Cd. 4475].

The Committee, concurring in the said Report of the Minister of Militia and Defence, submit the following as the text of the cable message to be sent by Your Excellency to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

"Your despatch, Canada, 30, of January 15th. My Ministers fully accept the principles set forth in Memorandum by General Staff. Despatch will follow explaining precise position of Dominion Government."

The Committee further advise that Your Excellency may be pleased to transmit a copy of this Minute and of the annexed Report to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

DEPARTMENT OF MILITIA AND DEFENCE.

70 N.

To His Excellency

Ottawa, 9th February, 1909.

The Governor-General in Council,

1. The undersigned has the honour to report, for the information of Your Excellency in Council, that he has had under his consideration Colonial Office letter (Canada, No. 30), dated 15th January, 1909, in which the Secretary of State for the Colonies forwards a letter from the War Office, dated December 15th, 1908, enclosing and commending to the attention of Your Excellency's Government a Memorandum prepared by the General Staff, on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole.

2. The undersigned, after full and careful consideration of the important question referred to him, is of the opinion that Your Excellency's Government may safely assent to the general principles proposed for adoption in the Memorandum by the General Staff, and recommends that, as requested in the above-quoted Colonial Office letter, a cable message conveying that assent be addressed to the Colonial Office.

3. At the same time, he is of opinion that it is advisable that, simultaneously with a general acceptance of the principles laid down in the Memorandum referred to, the position of Your Excellency's Government upon certain points therein which especially appear to require attention should be precisely defined, and he, therefore, recommends that the cable message in question should further state that a despatch explaining this position will follow by the first mail. He submits the following as the text of the message:—

"Your despatch, Canada, 30, of January 15th, my Ministers fully accept the principles set forth in Memorandum by General Staff. Despatch will follow explaining precise position of Dominion Government."

4. With regard to the despatch itself, the Minister of Militia recommends that it should state that Your Excellency's Government is prepared to give full assent to the general principles laid down, both in the letter of the War Office and in the Memorandum prepared by the General Staff, and they do it all the more cordially in that they observe that, in the body of the Memorandum itself, the great principle of complete local control by the responsible Minister concerned of the officers of the local section of the Imperial General Staff is fully safeguarded.

5. It will probably be within Your Excellency's recollection that, in the "Memorandum by the Canadian Ministers concerning Defence," which was drawn up at the Colonial Conference of 1902, the reasons given for dissenting from certain of the proposals laid before that Conference by the War Office and the Admiralty were stated to be that "the acceptance of the proposals would entail an important departure from the principle of Colonial self-government." This important question appears to be adequately provided for in the latter portion of the penultimate paragraph of page 8 of the present Memorandum, in which it is stated that "the full control of the chief of the local section of the General Staff by his own Government must be accepted from the outset." It is further clearly laid down that, while chiefs of the local sections of the General Staff are to "keep in close communication with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, they cannot receive orders from him." "He will keep them informed as to what are considered, from an Imperial point of view, the correct general principles, and they will advise their Governments as to the best method of applying these principles to local conditions, and as to the risk

of departing from them. When their advice is not accepted, it will be their duty to carry out whatever their respective Governments may order."

6. In regard to that portion of the paragraph quoted which states that "the chiefs of the local sections of the General Staff will keep in close communication with the chief of the Imperial General Staff," the undersigned is cordially in agreement with the proposal, but he is of opinion that, in order to avoid possible misunderstanding by the chief of the Canadian section of the views or intentions of the Dominion Government, and consequent misrepresentation of those views to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, it would be advisable to lay down definitely that all communications passing between the Chief of the Canadian Section and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, other than those on purely routine or ephemeral questions, must be submitted to the Minister of Militia for his concurrence before being despatched.

7. The Minister of Militia further feels it desirable that a definite assent should be given to the axiom (first paragraph of Part III., p. 9) that "in order to qualify themselves for employment on the General Staff, officers must have been educated previously up to a certain common standard of military knowledge, and have become imbued with the requisite uniformity of thought and practice.

This uniformity in training and thought can only be obtained by passing officers intended for General Staff work through a Staff College."

8. The Memorandum appears to contemplate the possibility of the Staff College at Camberley (England) which must, for some years to come, be the central school of higher military education for the whole Empire, becoming congested, should large numbers of officers from overseas be collected together there, and suggests, as a possible remedy, decentralisation by the establishment of similar colleges in the overseas Dominions.

9. The Minister of Militia holds the opinion that, in view of the improbability of any large increase of the Canadian Permanent Forces for some years to come, it is unlikely that the Dominion would, for a considerable period, be able to spare more than four officers of that force at any one time for a Staff College training. If this be so, then it would not be worth while for the Dominion to establish a Staff College of its own, and it would be preferable, subject to War Office concurrence, to continue to send these officers to the Staff College, Camberley, following the existing arrangements. Should this course entail on the War Office any addition, either to the accommodation at the College or to the number of the instructors, the Dominion Government would, of course, be prepared to bear its share of the expense, calculated upon any equitable basis.

10. Closely allied with this part of the subject is the question, also considered in the Memorandum, of the preliminary military education of regimental officers, in order to ensure that officers entering the Staff Colleges should have attained as uniform a standard of military knowledge as possible, so that they may profit to the utmost by the instruction given at those colleges. This question in Canada may present minor difficulties to some extent adumbrated in the Memorandum. In the opinion of the Minister, these may best be met by an extension of the functions of the Royal Military College, Kingston, and by including among its instructing staff specially selected officers from the educational branch of the Imperial General Staff.

11. Finally, the Memorandum lays stress upon the advantages to be gained by the free interchange of officers between the various branches of the Imperial General Staff in the different parts of the Empire, and especially upon the great benefit which would result from periodical conferences of the Imperial General Staff, attended by representatives from all parts of the Empire, and held under the Presidency of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London. The advantages indeed are obvious.

The acceptance of these proposals and those others already referred to would doubtless involve expenditure, but the resultant benefits are, in the Minister's opinion, so great as to outweigh enormously the comparatively small expense involved.

12. The following extract from the "Memorandum by the Canadian Ministers concerning Defence" of August, 1902, already referred to, states fully the policy which then commended itself, not only to the Government of Canada, but to the Dominion at large:—"In conclusion, the Ministers repeat that, while the Canadian Government are obliged to dissent from the measures proposed (in 1902) they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make expenditures for the purposes

of defence in proportion to the increasing population and wealth of the country. They are willing that these expenditures should be so directed as to relieve the taxpayer of the Mother Country of some of the burdens which he now bears; and they have the strongest desire to carry out their defence schemes in co-operation with the Imperial Authorities and under the advice of experienced Imperial officers, so far as this is consistent with the principle of local self-government which has proved so great a factor in the promotion of Imperial unity."

This extract from a Memorandum written six years ago would appear to represent correctly the attitude of Your Excellency's Government at the present time.

F. W. BORDEN,
Minister of Militia and Defence

7698

No. 2.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.15 a.m., 3 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Commonwealth of Australia concur in general principles Imperial General Staff set out in Memorandum of 7 December, 1908,* but desire to emphasize fact that full local control retained.

Despatch follows by mail.—DUDLEY.

8227

No. 3.

NATAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.25 p.m., 6 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to War Office, 10 March, 1909. L.F.]

6 March. No. 1. Your military despatch, No. 5, 8 January,† and telegram, No. 1, 10 February.‡ In Minute of to-day, Ministers, though not opposed in any way (to) establishment of Imperial General Staff to be selected from forces of Empire as a whole, are of opinion that in view of defence being subject which would concern Central Government in the event of adoption of draft Act of Union now before South African Colonies it is undesirable at the present time to commit Natal to principle of memorandum.—NATHAN.

8580

No. 4.

TRANSVAAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.33 p.m., 9 March, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to War Office, 11 March, 1909. L.F.]

9 March. No. 1. Your despatch of 8 January, No. 10,† and your telegram of 10 February, No. 1.‡ Ministers state that they are in hearty sympathy with fundamental objects of memorandum framed by War Office to assimilate various

* In [Cd. 4475].

† No. 2 in [Cd. 4475].

‡ 46433: not printed.

Colonial military systems with system obtaining in England, and they desire to point out that, as a matter of fact, they have, in the organisation of Transvaal volunteer forces, followed as closely as possible organisation of British army. Ministers, however, point out that matters in South Africa are at present in a state of transition, and, in the circumstances, they prefer not to make any declaration which may have effect of not leaving to future Union Government a free hand to deal with this important matter.—SELBORNE.

8983

No. 5.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 13 March, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office, 26 March, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 30.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Bloemfontein, 22 February, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, No 4, of the 8th ultimo,* enclosing copy of a letter from the War Office with reference to the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire, together with the memorandum prepared thereon by the General Staff.

2. I now forward herewith a copy of a Minute from my Ministers dealing with the subject, which will confirm the contents of a telegram sent by me to your Lordship to-day,† in accordance with the wish expressed in paragraph 3 of the despatch in question.

I have, &c.,

HAMILTON GOOLD-ADAMS,

Governor

Enclosure in No. 5.

MINISTERS to GOVERNOR.

(Minute. No. 1779.)

Prime Minister's Office, Bloemfontein, Orange River Colony,

19 February, 1909.

MINISTERS have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Minute, No. 527, of the 11th instant, from His Excellency the Governor, enclosing a copy of a despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies forwarding a memorandum which has been prepared by the General Staff on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole.

Ministers desire to state that the principles and procedure explained in the memorandum will receive their full consideration, but as there are as yet no local military forces in this Colony, and they have, consequently, no military advisers whom they can consult as to our local requirements, they will probably not be able to submit their views at an early date.

A. FISCHER.

9874

No. 6.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 20 March, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office, 1 April, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 35.)

MY LORD,

Government House, Cape Town, 2 March, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, with reference to your

* No. 2 in [Cd. 4475].

† 6568 : not printed.

telegram, No. 1, of 10 February,* and to my reply, No. 1, of 25 February, 1909,† a copy of a Minute from Ministers, dated 24th February, 1909, on the subject of the proposal that an Imperial General Staff should be created for the service of the Empire as a whole.

I have, &c.,

WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.

Enclosure in No. 6.

MINISTERS to GOVERNOR.

(Minute. No. 1/53.)

Prime Minister's Office, Cape Town, 24th February, 1909.

Ministers have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency the Governor's Minute, No. 51, of the 27th January, 1909, transmitting copy of a despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the proposal that an Imperial General Staff should be created for the service of the Empire as a whole.

Ministers desire to inform His Excellency that they have given their best attention to the War Office Memorandum forming the enclosure to Lord Crewe's communication, which places the objects of this proposal clearly before them, and which Ministers are aware arises from a resolution adopted by the Colonial Conference of 1907.

In regard to the subject matter of this Memorandum, Ministers beg to point out that grave political changes are impending in South Africa, and they feel that it would be improper for them to enter into any engagements or to express an opinion upon a matter involving serious issues of policy upon which Parliament has not been consulted.

In submitting an answer to His Excellency's Minute in the above terms, Ministers wish to add an assurance that they acknowledge the responsibility devolving upon the Cape of Good Hope in respect of internal defence, and that they are alive to the importance of all questions bearing on the defence of this part of His Majesty's Dominions.

JOHN X. MERRIMAN

11436

No. 7.

TRANSVAAL.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3 April, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office, 23 April, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 75.)

MY LORD,

Governor's Office, Johannesburg, 13 March, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 8th January, No. 10, and to my telegram of the 9th March, No. 1,‡ I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a minute from Ministers on the subject of an Imperial General Staff.

I have, &c.,

SELBORNE,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 7.

(Minute 100.)

Prime Minister's Office, Pretoria, 8 March, 1909.

With reference to His Excellency the Deputy Governor's Minute, No. 82/6/09, of the 28th January, 1909, forwarding, for the consideration of Ministers, a copy of a despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies,

* 46433 : not printed.

† 6821 : not printed.

‡ No. 2 in [Cd. 4475] and No. 4 in this book.

together with an enclosure on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff, Ministers desire to inform His Excellency the Governor that they are in hearty sympathy with the fundamental object of the Memorandum framed by the War Office to assimilate the various Colonial military systems with the system obtaining in England, and they desire to point out that as a matter of fact they have in the organisation of the Transvaal Volunteer Forces followed as closely as possible the organisation of the British Army.

Ministers desire, however, to point out that matters in South Africa are at present in a state of transition, and under the circumstances they would prefer not to make any declaration which might have the effect of not leaving to the future Government of Unified South Africa a free hand to deal with this important matter.

LOUIS BOTHA.

11698

No. 8.

NEW ZEALAND.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 4.40 a.m., 5 April, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

Your despatch 24th December,* Imperial General Staff. My Ministers accept principles of Memorandum.—PLUNKET.

11698

No. 9.

NEW ZEALAND.

COLONIAL OFFICE to WAR OFFICE.

SIR, Downing Street, 7 April, 1909.
WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 1st of April,† I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to transmit to you, to be laid before the Army Council, the accompanying copy of a telegram‡ from the Governor of New Zealand, reporting that his Ministers accept the principles of the Memorandum on the Imperial General Staff.

I am, &c.,
H. W. JUST.

16324

No. 10.

AUSTRALIA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received May 15, 1909.)

(No. 78.)

MY LORD, Governor-General's Office, Melbourne, April 8, 1909.
REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch, No. 2, dated 1st January, 1909,§ on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole, I have the honour to confirm my cablegram|| to your Lordship of the 4th ultimo, intimating that the Commonwealth Government concurs with the third resolution of the Imperial Conference held in London in April, 1907, affirming the need for a General Staff selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, and defining the duties of such a staff in time of peace.

* No. 1 in [Cd. 4475]. † L.F. ‡ No. 8. § 46433: not printed. || No. 2.

2. The general principles relating to (a) the organization, (b) selection and training in the future, and (c) the suggestions for utilizing existing means for the creation of an Imperial General Staff laid down in the memorandum prepared by the General Staff, meet with the approval of the Government, but questions of detail are reserved for future discussion.

3. The Commonwealth Government desires to state specifically that its assent to the general principles mentioned above is not to be considered as binding it to raise or equip any force or designate any existing troops for employment outside the Commonwealth or territories under the control of the Commonwealth, nor as committing it as to the strength of the forces to be maintained in the Commonwealth.

4. While the Government regards with much satisfaction the recognition of full local control contained in the third paragraph on page 8,† dealing with the relationship between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the chiefs of the local sections, it desires to make it clear that it understands this principle involves:—

- (1) That no officer of the military forces of the Commonwealth shall be appointed to the Imperial General Staff without the consent of the Commonwealth Government, and the appointment of any officer to the Australian section must be subject to the approval of the Commonwealth Government.
- (2) That the Commonwealth Government shall have power to terminate the appointment on the Imperial General Staff of any Australian officer.
- (3) That communications, except on matters of routine, between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the local section must be made through the Commonwealth Minister of Defence.

I have, &c.,
DUDLEY,
Governor-General.

17566

No. 11.

ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.5 p.m., 24 May, 1909.)

TELEGRAM.

[Copy to War Office, 28 May, 1909. L.F.]

24th May. My telegram of 22nd February.* My Ministers now presume that question of creation of an Imperial General Staff will be discussed at the approaching Imperial Defence Conference at which they will be represented. Do not propose to submit any views on this subject for the present.—GOULD-ADAMS.

18834

No. 12.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received June 5, 1909.)

[Copy to War Office, June 10, 1909. L.F.]

(No. 96.)

MY LORD, Government House, Cape Town, May 18, 1909.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, in reply to your despatch, No. 106, of 31st March, 1909,† a copy of a Minute from Ministers, dated May 11, 1909, on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff.

I have, &c.,
WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.

* 6568: not printed.

† 7698: not printed.

‡ See page 9 of [Cd. 4475].

Enclosure in No. 12.

MINISTERS to GOVERNOR.

(Minute, No. 1/178.)

Prime Minister's Office, Cape Town, May 11, 1909.

With reference to His Excellency's Minute, No. 272, of the 20th ultimo, transmitting a copy of despatch No. 106, dated the 31st March, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies regarding the creation of an Imperial General Staff, Ministers have the honour to state that, whilst they are in sympathy with the proposed movement, in conformity with the views expressed in their Minute, No. 1/53, of the 24th February last, in reply to His Excellency the Governor's Minute, No. 51, dated the 27th January, they feel that, having regard to the present state of political uncertainty in South Africa, it is inopportune at this stage to enter into any detailed discussion on the subject.

N. F. DE WAAL.

20669

No. 13.

CANADA.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 21 June, 1909.)

(No. 288.)

MY LORD,

Ottawa, 5th June, 1909.

In continuation of Lord Grey's despatch, No. 66 of the 15th February last,* on the subject of the organisation of a Canadian section of the Imperial General Staff, I have the honour to forward copy of an approved Minute of the Privy Council, explaining the measures which the Minister of Militia and Defence proposes to take in extending the functions and increasing the instructing staff of the Royal Military College of Canada, in order to ensure the efficiency of Canadian officers to be appointed to the General Staff.

I have, &c.,

C. FITZPATRICK,

Administrator.

Enclosure in No. 13.

CERTIFIED Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor-General on the 28th May, 1909.

(P.C. 1120.)

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a report, dated 19th May, 1909, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, submitting as follows:—

1. With a view to the organization, in Canada, of a local section of the Imperial General Staff, the principles enunciated in the Memorandum which accompanied War Office Letter, 33/Gen. No. 306 (S.D. 1) dated 15th December, 1908, have been accepted; and to quote from a Minute of Council dated 10th February, 1909, these principles can best be applied "by an extension of the functions of the Royal Military College, Kingston, and by including among its instructing staff specially selected officers from the educational branch of the Imperial General Staff."

2. It is realized that, at the outset, the evolution of the Canadian Section of the Imperial General Staff must necessarily be slow, and that efforts must be directed, first of all, towards raising the standard of professional proficiency and promoting uniformity of thought among the officers of the Dominion Forces who, in due course, will compose it.

3. It is realized that such officers ought to graduate at the Imperial Staff College, and that they should possess qualifications which will enable them not merely to pass the entrance examination, but to derive the fullest benefit from the course. It is therefore proposed to send Canadian candidates for the Staff College to the Royal Military College for special instruction for at least six months before

* No. 1.

the date of the Staff College entrance examination, at which, however, they will not be allowed to compete unless they are fully recommended by the Commandant.

4. But this will saddle the Commandant with increased responsibility, and would impose on him and on the present staff of military professors more work than could be undertaken by them without detriment to the interests of the Gentlemen Cadets.

5. The present Commandant, whose appointment will expire in October, 1909, is a General Staff Officer of the 2nd Grade. The Minister recommends that his successor should be a specially selected General Staff Officer of the 1st Grade. This will entail a corresponding increase in his emoluments.

6. The present Commandant draws \$3,200.00 pay per annum, with free quarters, fuel, light and medical attendance, and the Minister recommends that the Imperial Government be notified that his successor will be offered, with effect from the 1st April, 1910, an increase of \$400 per annum, making a total of \$3,600.00 pay per annum, with allowances as before; and it is hoped that the emoluments proposed will be sufficiently attractive to secure the services of an officer of Colonel's rank who has already had experience on the instructional staff of the Imperial Staff College.

7. The Minister further recommends that two General Staff Officers of the 2nd Grade should be added to the College Staff (from the 1st April, 1910), with consolidated pay and allowances at the rate of \$3,200.00 per annum, and that in due course the Army Council be invited to forward the names of officers recommended for appointment.

8. It will be their special, but not exclusive, duty to attend to the preparation of Staff College candidates. When not so engaged they could help in the education of the Gentlemen Cadets, but they will be employed more particularly in connection with the periodical courses of instruction for Militia officers which for some time past have been held at Kingston. They will attend the staff rides, regimental tours, and war games, and their services will be utilized as lecturers at such Universities as McGill where military instruction is provided. At times they will be ordered to serve on the General Staff at the annual camps and to take part in the training of the Permanent Force at the central camp at Petewawa. They will also prepare schemes, set papers, and act as examiners in military subjects. The need of assistance in all these duties has already been much felt.

9. It is believed that the foregoing proposals when carried into effect will pave the way for a considerable advance in the efficiency of the Militia Force.

The Committee, concurring in the foregoing, submit the same for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,

Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

20671

No. 14.

CANADA.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 21 June, 1909.)

[Answered, 29 June, 1909. No. 429. L.F.]

(No. 290.)

MY LORD,

Ottawa, Canada, 5th June, 1909.

With reference to my despatch, No. 288, of even date,* on the subject of the proposed Imperial General Staff, I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter from the Department of Militia and Defence, covering a statement indicating the lines upon which it is proposed to carry out the organization of the Canadian section of the Staff.

I have, &c.,

C. FITZPATRICK,

Administrator.

* No. 13.

Enclosure in No. 14.

MILITIA DEPARTMENT to GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S SECRETARY.

SIR,

Ottawa, May 28th, 1909.

In connection with the establishment in Canada of a local section of the Imperial General Staff, and with reference to a Report, dated 19th May, 1909, from the Minister of Militia and Defence to His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, I have the honour to submit the following remarks:—

1. It is intended to proceed with the organization of a Canadian General Staff on the lines indicated in the accompanying draft, in which, however, before taking further action, the Minister would be glad to know whether any improvement can be suggested by the Chief of the General Staff at Army Headquarters.

2. It is also intended to evolve, gradually, from the Canadian General Staff a Canadian Section of the Imperial General Staff. It is proposed, however, to include in that section, for the present, at any rate, four officers only, namely, the Chief of the Canadian General Staff, his two Directors, and the Commandant of the Royal Military College, Kingston, in which proposal the concurrence of the Army Council is invited.

I have, &c.,

E. F. JARVIS,

Acting Deputy Minister.

DRAFT.

Organization of the Canadian General Staff.

1. The Canadian General Staff has been organised under the authority of the Minister in Militia Council with the following objects:—

- (1) To provide the Militia Council with such materials as it may require to enable it to formulate a general policy in military matters, especially as regards the military training and war organization of the Militia Force, and the preparation of plans for the defence of Canada.
- (2) To secure uniformity and continuity in the execution of that policy.
- (3) To advance the formation of an Imperial General Staff, in accordance with the resolution passed on the 23rd April, 1907, at the Imperial Conference, namely,

"That this Conference welcomes and approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognises and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and, without in the least interfering with questions connected with command and administration shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organisation of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire."

2. The Canadian General Staff falls into three principal divisions:—

- (1) The General Staff at Militia Headquarters.
- (2) The General Staff in commands and districts.
- (3) General Staff officers at the Royal Military College.

3. At Militia Headquarters, the Chief of the General Staff deals with the following duties, assigned to him by Order in Council, dated 7th December, 1904 (Appendix A, King's Regulations and Orders):—

- (1) Advice on questions of general military policy.
- (2) The organisation of the military forces for active service.
- (3) The military defence of the Dominion.
- (4) The collection of intelligence.

- (5) The training of the military forces and their employment on active service.
- (6) Education of officers.
- (7) Telegraphs and signalling.
- (8) Selection and administration of the General Staff in the field.
- (9) Preparation, jointly with the finance member, of estimates for the above services.

4. In commands and districts, officers of the General Staff are required to perform similar duties under the orders of the officers on whose staffs they are serving, and thereby to assist them in carrying out the policy prescribed by the Militia Council.

Being thus the local representatives of the chief of the General Staff, they will work out for the officers on whose staffs they are serving, all questions which, within the several commands and districts, affect the training and military instructions of the troops, the education of officers, the preparation and execution of schemes for concentration, manœuvres and field operations, war organisations, staff rides, intelligence, and the preparation of defence schemes.

5. At the Royal Military College, General Staff duties embrace the military instruction and education of staff and regimental officers.

6. For the present, the undermentioned will be officers of the Canadian General Staff:—

- (1) At Militia Headquarters, in the branch of the Chief of the General Staff:—

Directors and Assistant-Directors of Operations, staff duties training, intelligence, and surveys.

- (2) In commands and districts—

(a) Chief Staff Officers.

(b) Such other officers as may from time to time be appointed.

- (3) At the Royal Military College—

(a) The Commandant.

(b) Such of the military professors as, on the recommendation of the Commandant, the Militia Council may select.

7. With a view to future appointments to the Canadian General Staff, it is not intended, at present, to lay down any definite standard of qualification; but no officer will be selected to represent it on the Imperial General Staff unless he has passed the final examination at the Staff College, or unless he has served, with credit, on the staff of a force in the field.

C0/866/2/8

CO 886/2/8

Printed for the use of the Imperial Conference.

Dominions

No. 15.

Secret.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE

DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE, 1909.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS.

*[The Notes of Conferences of Sub-Committees at the Admiralty are printed
separately as Dominions No. 17.]*

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT,
October, 1909.

SECRET.

NAVAL AND MILITARY DEFENCE.

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

ON

NAVAL AND MILITARY DEFENCE

AT THE

FOREIGN OFFICE, WHITEHALL.

FIRST DAY.

Wednesday, 28th July 1909.

PRESENT :

The Right Hon. H. H. ASQUITH, M.P., Prime Minister (*President*).

The Right Hon. The EARL OF CREWE, K.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. R. B. HALDANE, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. R. K. MCKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Canada :

The Hon. Sir F. W. BORDEN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia and Defence.

The Hon. L. P. BRODEUR, K.C., LL.D., Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

Australia :

Colonel the Hon. J. F. G. FOXTON, C.M.G., Minister without portfolio.

New Zealand :

The Right Hon. Sir J. G. WARD, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Cape Colony :

The Right Hon. J. X. MERRIMAN, Prime Minister.

Newfoundland :

The Hon. Sir E. P. MORRIS, Prime Minister.

Natal :

The Right Hon. F. R. MOOR, Prime Minister.

Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. E. M. GREENE, Minister for Railways and Harbours.

Transvaal :

The Hon. J. C. SMUTS, Colonial Secretary.

Orange River Colony :

The Hon. A. FISCHER, Prime Minister.

General the Hon. J. B. M. HERTZOG, Attorney-General.

Colonel J. E. B. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

LORD LUCAS, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.

Sir FRANCIS HOPWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., R.N., Director of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.

General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, G.C.B., Chief of the General Staff.

Major-General J. S. EWART, C.B., Director of Military Operations.

Colonel W. ADYE, C.B., representing the Director of Staff Duties.

Canada:

Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Australia:

Colonel W. T. BRIDGES, C.M.G.
Captain W. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

New Zealand:

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

South Africa:

Brigadier-General G. G. ASTON, C.B.
Colonel P. S. BEVES.

Mr. H. W. JUST, C.B., C.M.G., *Secretary*.

Mr. W. A. ROBINSON,

Mr. H. E. DALE,

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O. } *Assistant Secretaries.*

THE PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, my first duty, and it is a most agreeable one, is, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to tender you a very hearty welcome and to acknowledge with gratitude both the fulness and promptness of the response which the self-governing Dominions have made to their invitation. I need not perhaps say, although it is a matter which we shall all bear in mind, that a Conference of this kind, dealing, as it has to deal, with matters which are vital to the safety of the Empire, is in the peculiar and special circumstances a confidential gathering, and I think we shall all of us—it will not be a self-denying ordinance, I am sure—adopt the rule which we shall only be too glad to observe, that, unless by some special resolution of the Conference *ad hoc*, the course of our proceedings should remain our own property, and should not pass into the knowledge of the outside world.

I need not waste your time in going back upon facts with which you are all familiar, namely, the previous history of what I may call the problem of Imperial Defence. So far as the Navy is concerned and the relations between the Imperial Navy and the naval contributions of the various other members of the Empire, it was left, and has been left now for some years, in the situation which resulted from the Conference in 1902. I will just briefly recapitulate, though the facts I am sure are familiar to most if not all of you, what the state of things as left by the arrangement concluded by that Conference is in substance at the present day.

First, as regards the Commonwealth of Australia, the previous contribution of 106,000*l.* was increased to 200,000*l.* a year towards the cost of an improved Australasian squadron, and the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. I will not go into the details of the arrangement, but the agreement made was to last for 10 years. In New Zealand the contribution was increased from 20,000*l.* to 40,000*l.* a year towards the cost of an improved Australasian squadron, and the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. In both those cases, therefore, the contribution was ear-marked from the beginning. In the case of Cape Colony the previous contribution of 30,000*l.* was raised to 50,000*l.* a year towards the general maintenance of the navy without any specific allocation. In Natal, in the same way, they agreed to contribute 35,000*l.* a year towards the general maintenance of the navy without condition, and Newfoundland 3,000*l.* a year, with a capital sum of 1,800*l.* towards the maintenance of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. In the case of Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier stated that, as the Dominion Government were contemplating establishing a local naval force on the waters of Canada, they were not able to make any offer of assistance analogous to those I have just enumerated.

That was the state of things, Gentlemen, which resulted from the Conference, and the subsequent more or less informal deliberations in 1902-3. The matter was raised again, as you are aware, at the Conference held two years ago, in 1907, and no one, I think, even at that time, felt satisfied that the arrangements then existing were adequate or in all respects up to date, but anything like a general consensus not being attainable, no resolution in regard to naval defence was adopted by that Conference.

As regards the army and the relations between the Imperial forces and those which are raised in the self-governing Dominions, the past history admits of even simpler statement. The resolution, and the only resolution, I think, which is on record is that which was come to by the Conference of 1907. I need not read its

terms, which are familiar to you, but the substance of it was that the Conference recognised and affirmed the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, and with certain duties which were then more particularly indicated. I think substantial progress has been made since the time that that resolution was come to in arranging, by Conference and mutual agreement, the form which the General Staff is to take, the sources from which it is to be recruited, and the functions which it is to discharge.

That, Gentlemen, is how we stand so far as written documents or statements are concerned at the present moment, or rather how we did stand at the commencement of the present year. Events move very rapidly, and particularly in this domain of armaments, and since the Conference of 1907 broke up, the situation, so far as this country and this Empire is concerned, has visibly and materially changed. I am glad to say that it is not necessary to suggest that there has been any deterioration in our friendly relations with the other great Powers of the world; we are on good terms with all, and, so far as we know, and so far as we can foresee, there is no immediate and no imminent cause for quarrel, but there is a very vital change, if not in the diplomatic sphere, in the sphere of preparation for war, and particularly of naval preparation. During the last eighteen months or two years, to put it as far back as one can, there has been, particularly in Germany, not only an acceleration of her statutory shipbuilding programme, but a development entirely without precedent in her resources, both for the actual building of ships and still more for the fabrication of gun-mountings, guns, and armaments generally, the rapidity and ease in the construction of which, or the turning out of which, is perhaps more vital in these modern days to rapid increase of naval strength even than improvements in the facilities for shipbuilding itself. This development, as I have said, is recent, but it is rapid, and largely owing to the introduction of a new type, or new types, of battleships, what is called the "Dreadnought" type of battleship, and its sister cruiser type which we call the "Invincible"—this new or mammoth type of battleship, which as it increases in number will tend every year to render less and less effective battleships and cruisers of an earlier period—largely owing, as I say, to the introduction of that new type, not only our friends in Germany, but other European nations, are starting a shipbuilding competition in vessels of that class. The information which the Admiralty now have at their disposal shows that Austria is providing herself with means for turning out in the course of a very comparatively short time certainly two and probably four vessels of the "Dreadnought" class. Italy, not to be undone, although she is ostensibly and diplomatically an ally of Austria, is replying to that proposal by starting "Dreadnoughts" of her own. In France, again—it is a matter of notoriety, and, as we know, has led to the downfall of the Government—the backward condition of the navy has led to general alarm and disquietude, and we must look, and reasonably look, for a considerable increase in the shipbuilding programme there. So that wherever we turn we find ourselves confronted, I will not say with new dangers, because I do not wish for a moment to use the language of alarm, but with new contingencies, new possibilities which, as prudent trustees and stewards of the interests of the Empire as a whole, all of us who are seated round this table are bound to keep in view.

Gentlemen, under those conditions, as you know, the Imperial Government proposed this year a large actual and a large contingent addition to their shipbuilding programme. The contingent addition has now become an actual one, with the result that we are committed during the present financial year and the beginning of the next to the construction of no less than eight new vessels of the "Dreadnought" or "Invincible" type. We believe, and public opinion, however much it may differ as to the adequacy of our preparations, is practically unanimous in saying, that at least so much is needed, and we believe we could not have done less, and we also believe that that provision will be amply sufficient for the needs which we have at present to take into view. When the declaration of the intention of His Majesty's Government in that respect was made to the House of Commons by my right honourable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, and by myself in the month of March last, and the facts which I have been summarising in outline here were made public property, there was from all parts of the Empire a response which deeply touched the hearts and feelings of the people of this country, and for which, I need hardly assure you, His Majesty's Government are most grateful.

On the 22nd March, the Government of New Zealand telegraphed an offer to bear the cost of the immediate construction of a battleship of the latest type and of a second of the same type, if necessary, which offer was gratefully accepted by His

Majesty's Government. On the 29th March, the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution recognising the duty of Canada, as the country increased in numbers and wealth, to assume in a larger measure the responsibilities of national defence, and approving of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organisation of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy. On the 15th April, Mr. Fisher, then Prime Minister of the Australian Government, telegraphed that, whereas all the British Dominions ought to share in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the Empire, so far as Australia was concerned this object would be best attained by the encouragement of naval development in that country. On Mr. Deakin succeeding Mr. Fisher as Prime Minister, a little later, on the 4th of June, a further telegram was sent offering the Empire an Australian "Dreadnought," or such addition to its naval strength as might be determined after consultation in London. It was in view of those communications, absolutely uniform in spirit, though naturally differing in their precise terms, that His Majesty's Government decided to convoke this Conference and to endeavour by the free interchange of opinions in these rooms to proceed to a further, and, as we think, a most necessary stage in the development and co-ordination, not only of our Imperial resources for the purposes of defence, but of the methods by which they are to be organised and in which they are eventually to be employed.

Gentlemen, you will forgive me if I quote a few figures illustrating the existing position which show how the naval and military expenditure of the Empire is at the present moment met. I have here a table, which will be laid before you, or rather a series of tables, the first of which shows the actual figures of the naval and military expenditure of the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions and India. I will give just the totals for the moment, so as not to weary you with unnecessary detail. The total naval and military expenditure of the United Kingdom, for the current year 1909-10, is 62½ millions, in round figures, which works out at an expenditure per head of the population of 11. 8s. 1d. The total naval and military expenditure of the self-governing Dominions—again I use rough figures, and they do not all belong to the same year, some are 1907-8 and some 1908—is 4 millions, which works out at an expenditure per head of the population of practically 6s.—6s. 0½d. being the precise figure. To that, of course, you have to add, which does not concern us for the moment, the naval and military expenditure in India of 20½ millions, which for that enormous population works out at 1s. 5d. That, I think, is a striking table. Now let us look at the matter for a moment in order to realise what the exact facts are from another point of view, and take the figures not in terms of population but in terms of trade. The total trade, by which I mean exports and imports, of the United Kingdom for the year 1907-8, which is the last for which we have the accurate figures, was 1,170 millions; for the self-governing Dominions the corresponding figure is 370 millions, and for India 250 millions. Now, taking those figures, you may from them work out the proportion between the foreign trade, the overseas trade perhaps is the better expression, although in the case of Canada the figures include some overland trade to the United States, but in the case of all the others it is overseas trade, and naval expenditure is as follows:—The naval expenditure in the United Kingdom may be taken at 35 millions, and that shows the naval expenditure for each 100l. of foreign trade is 3l. I have the other corresponding figures for each of the self-governing Dominions, and the highest is New Zealand, which works out at 5s. 4d. naval expenditure for each 100l. of foreign trade, and in the case of Canada, I think, it is not more than 1s. 6d. Although I quote those figures it is not for the purpose of suggesting invidious comparisons, or with any desire of disputing or in any way qualifying the proposition that the main burden of naval expenditure must fall in the future, as it always has done in the past, on the shoulders of the people of the United Kingdom. I simply quote them for the purpose of making it clear what are the actual facts of the situation in which we stand, and the inferences which ought to be drawn from them might well be reserved until after your deliberations are well on foot.

In those circumstances, to sum up what I have been saying, we have an existing state of arrangements which, however well adapted it may have been to the past, is after all more or less, and recognised by all parties to be more or less, of a makeshift and a provisional arrangement. We have next new contingencies to contemplate necessitating a very substantial increase certainly in our naval expenditure, and an increase in naval expenditure in which every part of the Empire, whatever part of the globe it may be situated in, is interested directly or indirectly just as is the

United Kingdom. We have, lastly, and perhaps most important of all, the spontaneous expression of opinion, not in any way invited or challenged by the Imperial Government, on the part of the whole self-governing Dominions of the Crown, of their desire to re-adjust existing arrangements and to become parties to a co-ordinated system of Imperial defence in which all who share the benefit should, each in their respective degrees and according to their local circumstances and requirements, contribute, or share, also in the burden.

Now, Gentlemen, I am not going to-day in these very brief opening remarks to indicate to you the lines upon which we would even suggest these problems ought to be settled. That is peculiarly a matter for free discussion and conference amongst yourselves. As regards the army, the military problem, although I do not say it is easy to work out in detail, yet its general nature is relatively simple, and I think may be stated almost in a sentence. The problem, so far as it is a military problem, which you have to consider, is whether the arrangements for organising, training and mobilising the troops of the dominions of the Crown primarily directed to local defence, can include the possibility and, if so, on what conditions, of employment at any rate of a proportion of those troops in case of Imperial necessity in a wider sphere. I only want to indicate the problem in the most general language in order to foreshadow the line which the course of the discussion will probably take.

As regards the navy, the problem is one, no doubt, of greater complexity, and it may be well that I should very briefly indicate what are the views, not in detail, but the general views of the Admiralty and His Majesty's Government on that point. If the problem of Imperial naval defence were considered merely as a problem of strategy—a strategical, and not a composite strategical and political problem—if it were merely considered as a problem of naval strategy, it is the opinion, I think, of all competent judges, that the maximum output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity of command. The responsibility of providing a navy adequate to the defence of the whole Empire in every part of the world primarily rests with the Imperial Government, who recognise and will not shrink from the duty so long as they are equal to it. In furtherance, then, of the simple strategical ideal in the development of the naval forces of the Crown, the maximum of power would be obtained if all parts of the Empire contributed, according to their needs and resources, to the maintenance of the British Navy. That is dealing with the matter merely from the point of view of strategy, but it has long been recognised that in defining the conditions under which the naval forces of the Empire should be developed, wider considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account, in particular the varying circumstances—I might call them the infinitely varying circumstances—of the overseas Dominions have to be borne in mind. They are at present in different stages, both in economic and political growth, though I am glad to say they have now all attained to political manhood. Their geographical position has subjected them to internal and external strains, varying in kind and intensity. Their history and physical environment have given rise to individual national sentiment, for the expression of which room must be found. A simple contribution of money or matériel may be to one Dominion the most acceptable form in which to assist in Imperial defence. Another, while ready to provide local naval forces, and to place them at the disposal of the Crown in the event of war, may wish to lay the foundations upon which a future navy of its own could be raised. A third may consider that the form its contribution should take would be to maintain a military force capable not only of dealing with local emergencies, but also of co-operating with the Imperial army in the military operations inseparable from the defence of the Empire in all its parts. While a fourth may think that the best manner in which it can assist in promoting the interests of the Empire is in undertaking certain local services not directly of a naval or military character, but which may relieve the Imperial Government from expenses which would otherwise fall on the British Exchequer. Those are all different situations in which it may be one or another of the Colonies may find themselves placed, and it is therefore extremely desirable, so far as possible, that we should avoid anything in the nature of a system of cast iron and rigid uniformity, and whatever arrangements are made should be flexible and elastic, adaptable and adapted to the conditions of the different parts of the Empire.

Gentlemen, when you come to deal with the naval aspect of the problem the Admiralty, of course, will be only too glad to hear any specific proposals brought forward by you either respectively or collectively, and they on their part will be

prepared to submit for your consideration suggestions which, while allowing full width and latitude for local conditions will, as they believe, enable us to combine the requirements of local defence, and, I will add, of local sentiment, with the supreme strategical necessities of the Imperial Navy in the event of war.

Those are the general considerations which I venture to submit to you at the opening of your deliberations. We, all of us, sitting round this table are united in believing that in the event of war the Empire for the purposes of defence is one and indivisible. The people of the United Kingdom, as far as I know anything of their temper and their opinion, are not in the least degree disposed to shift off from their own shoulders any part of the burden which they have borne, and which inevitably they must bear in that class of defence, but we recognise, and recognise with gratitude which it is not easy adequately to express, not merely the desire, but the determination of the self-governing Dominions of the Empire to take their share in the task in which they feel they are as interested as we are, and we must never forget that a war in which the British Empire had arrayed against it one, or a combination, of the other great Powers of the world would be a war which would not merely menace the integrity of this United Kingdom, but which would be directed against all the outlying parts of the Empire, and in particular along our trade routes would aim at the destruction of that vast network of oversea commerce which is the life-blood of our people here, and on which in so large a degree the prosperity of the various communities which you represent depends.

Gentlemen, I am certain it is in that spirit—the spirit that we have a common duty in the performance of a common task—that your deliberations should be conducted, and I can only conclude as I began by offering you on the part of His Majesty's Government a most hearty welcome, and praying that all possible success may attend upon your Conference.

Lord Crewe will say a word about the procedure of the Conference.

EARL OF CREWE: Gentlemen, I have nothing to add on the general topics to what has been said by the Prime Minister, except, if I may venture to do so, on behalf of the Colonial Office to extend to you the welcome which the Prime Minister expressed. I merely wish to indicate what appears to us may be the best course of business to pursue. Probably, I think, in conformity with the wishes of the Delegates, we should proceed promptly and regularly with the business of this Conference, and we propose, therefore, to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock, if that will prove to be convenient. About Friday, I am not able to speak with certainty. On Saturday I assume that at any rate a great many of those present will be visiting the Fleet, and that we shall not, therefore, think of sitting on that day. In the next week we should, I hope, be able to sit pretty regularly. It is suggested, therefore, that we should meet not here, because these rooms are required in connection with a reception, but at the War Office, to-morrow at 11 o'clock. It is proposed that to-morrow's meeting should be exclusively confined to the army side of the question. I understand that a memorandum proceeding from the Army Council has been circulated to the Delegates, and we should propose, therefore, to have a full meeting to consider that memorandum; but, when it comes to matters of purely military detail, it might perhaps be advisable to form ourselves into one or more sub-committees for the purpose of considering them. That is a matter which we might talk over at the meeting to-morrow, but I feel, both on the military and the naval side, that when it comes to a purely technical question it might be better to have it considered by a somewhat smaller body than that now sitting round this table, and one more of an exclusively expert character.

I think that is all I have to say as to the probable course of business; but of course if any representative wishes to make any suggestion of a different character we should like to hear it, in case it may be desirable in any way to modify the plan of proceeding.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Mr. President and Gentlemen, it has been suggested to me by my colleagues on my left, representing Canada, that I should say a word or two in recognition of the sentiments so fully and so explicitly expressed by the Prime Minister of His Majesty's Government. I desire—and I feel I am voicing the sentiments of all who are here—to acknowledge the warmth of the welcome which has been extended to us as representing the oversea Dominions.

I do not know what course it is intended to take to-day, but I want for myself at least to say that that outline which has been given expression to by Mr. Asquith very largely falls in with the views that I hold regarding the Dominion which it is my

pleasure and honour to represent here. Recognising, as I do, the varied requirements of such a vast Empire as we possess, we must, of necessity, have flexibility in whatever is finally determined upon to meet local conditions, and there must be a clear recognition of the fact that some of the over-sea Dominions will not require what others of the countries consider that they should have, and that is especially so as far as New Zealand is concerned. However, I want to say, Sir, that in approaching this important Conference I recognise—and I am speaking specially for New Zealand—the fact that we must to a large extent be guided by the expressions of opinion of the Admiralty so far as naval defence is concerned. As a matter of policy we think it is in the best interests of the Empire that we should remain attached to the British Navy, and that, apart from our own individual Dominion, full consideration must be given to the requirements of the United Kingdom itself, which is contributing so largely to the support of the navy. For my own country I am prepared to say that we are ready, as far as it is possible for us, to fall into line with the course that is considered best to meet the requirements of all the over-sea Dominions. For our part we are prepared to give considerably more than we are giving at the moment, recognising as we do the outcome of recent developments, which has created a position which we believe, though satisfactory to a certain extent, should not be continued.

I do not propose to discuss those very interesting figures which have been put before us as regards the proportion of cost to which we, to some extent, in New Zealand, and the British taxpayer contribute to the support of the navy, either on the basis of trade or upon the actual amount of contribution per capita. As I say, I do not want to discuss them, except to say that the figures bring out in very marked contrast the amount of contribution we are respectively giving. I should like to say that New Zealand feels it is not doing as much as it ought to do, and we desire in some further way to help the Empire along lines of progress. I do express the hope that before we finish—and I hope it may not be thought presumptuous on my part to say so—that we will be able to have some definite system, which, though flexible, can from time to time be altered, contracted, or expanded without having to come to a Conference for the purpose of doing it—a system which can be established to meet the general requirements of the home-land and the oversea Dominions. I am anxious to help men of very much greater experience than myself to bring about a better system than we possess to-day. I fully recognise that from time to time if we put our oar in with regard to Imperial matters, it may in certain quarters be misunderstood, and perhaps wrong impressions may be formed by some people in the old land itself. We take the view that in Imperial matters we who are so far away from the heart of the Empire may be looked upon to some extent as interfering. We do try to draw the line between internal and external affairs so far as Great Britain or the United Kingdom is concerned. I want to say that impartially and impersonally in every respect I am anxious to do whatever I can to help to bring about a better condition of affairs in the condition of the Imperial Navy, though I do not wish for a moment to suggest that affairs have not hitherto been conducted as well under the circumstances as they could be.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: If I may add a word I would like to endorse what Sir Joseph Ward has said as to his appreciation of the kindness with which we have been welcomed here by the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary. I would like also to say first that I regret—a regret which, I think, all of us who have had the opportunity of meeting Sir Wilfred Laurier will share—that we are not to have the advantage of his presence here at this Conference.

Our duties, that is of Mr. Brodeur and myself, have been rendered easier by the fact that the Canadian House of Commons has passed a resolution, from which the Prime Minister has read an extract to-day, which indicates very clearly, I think, the lines upon which Canada will expect its representatives to proceed to advise the Conference so far as opportunity occurs. The unity of the Empire and the autonomy of the different parts of that Empire is a phrase which Sir Wilfred Laurier has coined, and is one to which everybody will subscribe, and I think it is quite evident from the remarks of the Prime Minister that he accepts that view. I do not propose to detain the Conference at all with details, but I want to say at once that Canada has shown by the resolution, in the words quoted by the Prime Minister to-day, that she recognises fully her responsibility in matters of defence. I may say that she has proved this by the fact that within 10 years the amount of money she has expended upon land defences has

quadrupled. Whereas 10 years ago we expended perhaps altogether too small an amount, at any rate to-day we are spending more than four times the amount which was expended then. In 1902 the Canadian delegates to the Conference of that year indicated very clearly in a memorandum their desire to take their full part, not only in defence on the land, but on the sea as well.

In considering the statistics, the interesting statistics, which have been placed before us to-day by the Prime Minister, so far as they refer to Canada, and in which I admit Canada makes a very small showing, I think it is only fair to remember, and only a fair and proper thing to say—that, while that is true, Canada has nevertheless been doing its share in the way of developing the power and strength of this Empire by expending, not millions, not tens of millions, but hundreds of millions of dollars in developing the public works of that country. I do not know, Sir, any way in which the upbuilding of this Empire could be contributed to better than by the work which we have been doing in that way during the last 20 years. That has been done, but it is not finished. We are stronger as the result of that work, and the Empire is stronger. We are richer, and we are better able to do, and we are prepared to the fullest extent possible or necessary to do, our share on the lines which have been laid down in the resolution passed by the House of Commons at their last sitting.

Colonel FOXTON: May I be permitted to say a few words, Sir, in endorsement of what has fallen from Sir Joseph Ward and Sir Frederick Borden. I have listened with very great interest to your remarks in opening this Conference, and I feel that there are very few present who will not fully appreciate the very clear and concise way in which the facts which have led up to the calling of this Conference have been placed before us. I have to regret myself that Mr. Deakin, the Prime Minister, my colleague, has been prevented from being present at this Conference; but we are in the midst of a strenuous and somewhat bitter session, and it was found quite impossible for him to be here. We, in Australia, fully recognise the fact that up to the present time, although we have done what we can, and have spent (as Sir Frederick Borden has put it), in Australia, hundreds of millions in developing our resources, we have contributed—and continue to contribute—something to the maintenance of the British Navy, but we have aspirations somewhat beyond that. We desire to have something to which we can point as being, so to speak, our own portion of the naval armament of the Empire, and we also desire that it should be maintained upon a standard, which is, if possible, in no wise inferior to that which obtains in the British fleet, which, as we all know, is the highest standard to be found in the world. I think it will be admitted that this is a natural aspiration, and it can be, I think, also admitted, that however we may be able to add to our strength in that respect, it will be adding for all time to the strength of the Empire as a whole. We believe the only way in which that could be done would be not to have a mere isolated small naval squadron of our own, but one which by interchangeability of officers and men, and possibly of units in the shape of vessels, should be able to obtain that wider field of instruction which is so necessary for the maintenance of the high standard of efficiency to which I have referred. If that were not found to be practicable I am afraid that with a small squadron such as that we contemplate in the first instance, we should, so to speak, become fossilised, which is a thing we do desire may not happen. As regards the military aspect of the defence question, we recognise that it is necessary also that there should be uniformity of organisation, equipment, and so forth, and we are quite prepared to do what we possibly can in that direction. I sincerely hope that our deliberations will have that effect, and I have to join in thanking you, Sir, for the clear and concise way in which you have placed before us the business which we are about to undertake.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I wish to join with the other speakers in thanking Mr. Asquith for the way in which he has introduced the business. I should like to say a few words with regard to the position of the members of this Conference who came from South Africa. We are, of course, at the present moment in a transition stage, and it is impossible for us to take any resolution, or to bind ourselves in any way, until we have formed a Union Parliament. That, of course, will be understood, and therefore anything we can say, and such poor remarks as we may make, will be simply by way of discussing the very great problem in which we are all deeply interested. I was glad Mr. Asquith alluded to these statistics, because I do not think in any one of them South Africa shows up badly. We pay 16s. 7d. towards our naval and military defences, and Great Britain, with all its enormous wealth, and all its obligations, pays

11. 8s. per head of the white population, and it must be always recollected that we have wide liabilities cast upon us, which we discharge cheerfully, but which no other self-governing Colony has, and that is in providing for the government of 5,000,000 of black people, who are, of course, in the position of a subject race, and have given on past occasions a great deal of trouble to the British Government until responsible government was granted to us. Neither do we show up very badly as regards our naval expenditure, if you turn to the trade statistics. I do not like to make any invidious comparisons, but the value of our trade per head of our European population is about three times what it is in Canada and about double what it is in Australia. I would like to ask, if I might, that the statistics of the other Colonies should be added to the table—not only those of the self-governing Colonies—because the naval defence of Great Britain is responsible for all the other Colonies, of which the trade is enormous. The trade, for instance, of the Straits Settlements is surprising, and also of the Colonies on the west and east of Africa, and also of the West Indies, all of which have to be provided for out of the Naval Vote. Therefore, in discussing the question of the whole British Empire, I think those statistics should be included. India is included, but the East Indian possessions, of which the trade is enormous, are not included. Ceylon is not included; nor Nigeria and West Africa. I have the figures here, but they are only for 1906, and they are surprisingly large; but in dealing with the defence of the Empire, I think those figures should be included. I think also we should be provided with a return, which would be useful, showing the life of these costly modern ships—what is their life and when they will become obsolete, which is a matter of very great importance in dealing with the question in the only way in which, I think, it can be dealt with, and that is, from an insurance point of view—the insurance of trade.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a very difficult question to answer.

Mr. MERRIMAN: There is, I understand, a return prepared.

THE PRESIDENT: Twenty years is usually taken as the life of a battleship, but it is a difficult question, because the changes in naval construction render a thing which is comparatively new to-day obsolete to-morrow.

Mr. MERRIMAN: But a return* could be prepared showing the expenditure upon the building of new ships and how many are now in commission which are judged fit for service, and how many have been scrapped lately.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

Mr. MERRIMAN: That is a very important thing when dealing with this question from the point of view of insurance. I was very much struck by reading some remarks made by Mr. Deakin in the last Conference which really touch the crux of the whole of this question, and that is regarding the difficulty of avoiding the feeling that the contributions to the navy are tributes paid. That is a prejudice which ought to be got over, and I think it can only be got over by looking at it from an insurance point of view. However, that is only a detail.

Mr. MOOR: I can only say that I repeat what my colleague from South Africa has stated to the Conference, that we South Africans are more in the position of listeners, as we are in a transition condition and could not give our assent to any definite policy at this critical stage. We shall take the deepest interest in all that is said, and in any conclusion at which the Conference may arrive, and I feel satisfied that whatever is the conclusion which is arrived at by this important Conference, it will have due consideration on the part of our Home Government.

Mr. SMUTS: I might just add this to what has fallen from Mr. Merriman and Mr. Moor with regard to the invitation which your Government has sent to us, that you must not expect us to take a very active part at this stage in our political evolution in the deliberations of this Conference. The Transvaal Government thought it most desirable to be represented here, because certainly the discussions which will take place and the suggestions which will be made, may prove most fruitful to the

* The following Returns, containing the information desired by Mr. Merriman, were circulated to the Conference, viz., H.C. 74 of 1905, Parts I. and II.; H.C. 77 of 1905, H.C. 337 of 1905, H.L. 190 of 1905, H.L. 204 of 1908.

Union Government in the future when it comes to handle the question of military organisation or naval defence. I therefore do not propose to take any very active part in these deliberations; but we are here more in the spirit of listeners, as Mr. Moor has said, and to see at what result we can arrive in South Africa in the future from the deliberations which take place at this Conference. We have a good deal to learn. We have passed through great troubles in South Africa and we have also some experience to give to a body of this kind, and I hope that our presence here, so far as the Transvaal is concerned, will not be without some good to the Empire as a whole and thus justify our being here.

Mr. FISCHER: The only excuse for my speaking is this,—that it is the first opportunity our little colony has had of being represented at these conferences, and it probably is the last chance it will have of being so represented. However, I do wish to say that we are glad of the opportunity of being present here, and I desire to add my views to those of my colleagues from South Africa, that this is a matter which we all recognise the importance of, but we feel it would be premature of us to take an active part now, or promise to take an active part, although we are ready to learn from the experience of others, and, as has been said, perhaps can add a little from the practical experience we have had. That history of the past that you all have in traditions of loyalty to the Empire we have yet to learn, but I think our little history has shown in the past the value of our word of honour, and that when it has been pledged to the Empire we shall not be wanting in our duty when we are called upon to do anything, whatever it may be. We are prepared to learn and prepared to take advice, and prepared to go to our new Union and put in our word in view of what we have heard and of what we think will be our duty; but at present, as I say, we could not possibly be expected to speak, as we have no authority to speak, for South Africa as a whole. I think the sentiments expressed by the several parts fairly represent what may be taken to be the sentiments of South Africa as a whole.

Sir E. MORRIS: I should like, on behalf of Newfoundland, to thank you, Sir, and the Colonial Secretary, for your very kind welcome here to-day. I should also like to say that in the main I am entirely in accord with the statement which has been made. Of course I represent a very small place—Newfoundland; but I can say, without any qualification, that we are prepared to do everything in our power, and to contribute our share, according to our means, to any scheme or programme which may be agreed upon. But in a small way we have been doing something for the last 10 years in providing a Naval Reserve, and at present we have quite a number of men ready to go on board His Majesty's ships. That work will be continued, and I think the sentiment of the colony is now that they are prepared to go somewhat further in order to be able to maintain the supremacy of the Empire.

THE PRESIDENT: I am very much obliged to you, Gentlemen, for your kind expressions. We are all aware of, and realise fully, the peculiar position at present in which South Africa stands in regard to this matter, because she is, as its representatives have said, in a state of evolution or transition, and naturally her representatives here can only consider the proposals put forward with a view to any future action to be taken by the new Union Parliament.

[Adjourned to to-morrow at 11 o'clock.]

AT THE
WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL.

SECOND DAY.

Thursday, 29th July 1909.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The EARL OF CREWE, K.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies
(in the Chair).

The Right Hon. R. B. HALDANE, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

Canada:

The Hon. Sir F. W. BORDEN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia and Defence.

The Hon. L.P. BRODEUR, K.C., LL.D., Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

Australia:

Colonel the Hon. J. F. G. FOXTON, C.M.G., Minister without portfolio.

New Zealand:

The Right Hon. Sir J. G. WARD, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Cape Colony:

The Right Hon. J. X. MERRIMAN, Prime Minister.

Newfoundland:

The Hon. Sir E. P. MORRIS, K.C., LL.D., Prime Minister.

Natal:

Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. E. M. GREENE, K.C., Minister for Railways and Harbours.

Transvaal:

The Hon. J. C. SMUTS, Colonel Secretary.

Orange River Colony:

The Hon. A. FISCHER, Prime Minister.

General the Hon. J. B. M. HERTZOG, Attorney-General.

Colonel J. E. B. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

LORD LUCAS, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.

Mr. F. D. ACLAND, M.P., Financial Secretary, War Office.

Sir FRANCIS HOPWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, G.C.B., Chief of the General Staff.

General Sir I. S. M. HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., Adjutant-General.

Major-General J. S. EWART, C.B., Director of Military Operations.

Colonel W. ADYE, C.B., representing the Director of Staff Duties.

Brigadier-General G. F. ELLISON, C.B., Director of Organisation.

Canada:

Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Australia:

Colonel W. T. BRIDGES, C.M.G.

Captain W. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

New Zealand:

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

South Africa:

Brigadier-General G. G. ASTON, C.B.

Colonel P. S. BEVES.

Mr. H. W. JUST, C.B., C.M.G., Secretary.

Mr. H. E. DALE.

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O. } Assistant Secretaries.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have met here this morning appropriately in the precincts of the War Office to discuss the military side of these questions, particularly in connection with this paper which has been prepared and circulated by the War Office, and which my right honourable friend on my right will commend to you with some words of explanation. I do not wish to make any preliminary remarks myself further than just to say this, that we all recognise as a general principle that the self-governing Dominions do not want, and do not mean to have, standing armies for foreign service. They claim, and we entirely admit, their right to join in or abstain from any military operations which may be undertaken by the Imperial Government. We also most fully admit the necessity of maintaining the complete elasticity of organisation and suitability to the particular circumstances of each case. But at the same time we feel, on our side, and the War Office strongly feels, that if and when occasion should arise, if and when, as we should assume in 999 cases out of a thousand, the self-governing Dominions, or some of them especially concerned, desire to take their part in Imperial defence, they should be placed, or rather place themselves, in a position where they could do so with effect. For that purpose it is desirable that, so far as possible, their systems of organisation should be such as can be worked in with a general military scheme prepared by the military authorities of the old country. I think it is important to bear one thing in mind, that it always is the case with every nation that its ideas of warfare are too largely affected by the recollection of the last war in which it has been engaged. Now we know very well that in the war in South Africa the self-governing dominions rendered splendid help, and it happened that the particular circumstances of that war were specially suited for the assistance which at that time they were able to give, but it must not be forgotten that some day the Empire might be engaged in a war of an entirely different kind—a war in which the most appropriate assistance, and indeed I would almost venture to say the only assistance of real value, which could be rendered would be assistance of a more closely organised and more formal kind than it was possible to render at that time. I think that is an aspect of the case which ought to be borne in mind, and I have ventured to mention it now because it perhaps comes less ungracefully from the Secretary for the Colonies than from the Secretary of State for War. This is a matter, I think, which we must always bear in mind in considering the possibility of joint organisation as laid down in these observations of the War Office.

That is all I have to say at this moment, and I will ask Mr. Haldane to start by some observations upon the paper which has been issued and circulated.

Mr. HALDANE: Lord Crewe, and Gentlemen, it is more than two years since the last Conference took place on Imperial Defence. At that time, when the Prime Ministers of the overseas dominions were here we were able to come to a very substantial agreement upon the mode of organisation of the military forces of the Empire. It was agreed then as common ground that it would be out of place, and a misunderstanding of the independent character of the constitutions of the various parts of the Empire if we were to try to lay down any rigid plan or scheme under which the various Governments of the Empire should endeavour to bind their people in advance. What we recognised was that, given the proper machinery and a common purpose for which the machine was present and could be used, the purpose was the most effective power, and, accordingly, with a view to making the common purpose clear and providing the organisation for giving it effect, we agreed on the principle of an Imperial General Staff. Before I come to the stage we have now reached it is probably appropriate that I should say a few sentences as to what has been accomplished in the meantime. To begin with, the Imperial General Staff which was then considered in principle has been further elaborated; despatches containing details were forwarded after consultation with various experts from different parts of the Empire in December last, and the broad principle of these despatches has received a very general assent. These despatches contained details for translating the principle of the Imperial General Staff into reality, and while a good deal of work has been done there still remains work to be done in connection with the working out of that Imperial general staff. Its conception as we know is this; that given the common purpose of the Empire to remain one and indivisible for the purpose of Imperial defence you should have a trained mind—a mind to which every part of the Empire contributes its share, organised for the working out of these great common strategical problems, and that while each Government at home and overseas retained complete control it should have the advantage of having at its elbow representatives of that Imperial General

Staff from whom it ought to get the best counsel as to the steps to be taken in war and the best advice as to preparation for the time of war in peace. So much for the Imperial General Staff.

Since that time we have done a good deal at home. As you know, accepting the principle that command of the sea carried with it the necessity of an overseas force for striking at long range, we have been bending our energies here in London on the development of the expeditionary force raised on a profession basis for long-range operations overseas. By long range I mean this: In Germany and France the great and splendidly organised armies are armies raised on the militia basis for short service, and the terms under which the citizens serve, and the duration of service, are such that you could not maintain those forces mobilised for any prolonged period without going far to ruin the nation to which they belong. We have organised in Great Britain a professional army, which has always been our principle, raised on a voluntary basis, but the terms of service of which are pretty long, and the man who enters it makes it his profession for the best part of his life, and therefore we are in a position to send abroad a far greater force for long-range work—that is to say, for work for a long time as well as at a great distance—than any other Power or combination of Powers in the world. We felt that, having regard to the increase of the responsibilities of the Empire, our force was not in a satisfactory condition, either as regards size or organisation, and the first thing we set ourselves to do was to free certain elements in it from the obligation of home defence, and to make it as completely as possible an expeditionary and overseas force. To that end we created the Territorial Force. Until now its establishment has been 313,000 men, but as those of you who have looked at the newspapers this morning will have seen we yesterday issued new orders, under which a reserve of another 100,000 will be put behind it as a back; and the Territorial Force, we hope, will attain such capacity before long as to give greater freedom to the regular forces of the Crown in this country.

Turning to the regular forces of the Crown the position is this: We have got nearly 80,000 in the British army in India, and we have got about 40,000 overseas in other parts of the Empire, and that 120,000 men constitute what I may call the overseas garrison. It is organised into nine divisions in India, where a certain amount of native troops are included to make up the nine divisions which Lord Kitchener has organised. In addition to that we have recently added a division to which we attach a good deal of importance, which extends from South Africa, where a large section of it is and will remain for a good while to come, to the Mediterranean. Certainly I see no limit to the time of its remaining there at this moment. The rest of it is in Egypt and in Malta. That constitutes a 7th division in addition to six, to which I am coming presently, which we can use for purposes over-sea. Added to Lord Kitchener's nine, that makes ten divisions I have already described of the regular forces.

Then at home we have organised our scattered and disorganised forces into six great divisions of three brigades each. That was done in principle when the Premiers were over here in 1907, but it has now been completed, and the organisation of the Territorial Forces has enabled us, as we foresaw it would, to add largely to the effectiveness of these six divisions, which constitute the expeditionary force for work. The organisation of the Territorial Forces has given us the means of home defence, which takes the form of 14 divisions, and has enabled us to turn the old militia to a better and more useful account. The old militia we have converted into the new special reserve, which on mobilisation is just as much liable to go over-sea for long service as any other part of the army of the British Empire. The result of that is that in three years we have been enabled to increase the expeditionary force at home by no less a figure, all reductions taken into account and the piecing-in duly considered, than 110,000 officers and men. There is a paper which I would commend to your attention which some of you have seen, I think, but not all, which is the memorandum* which was circulated a short time ago to the Army Council of the existing army system, and the present state of the military forces in the United Kingdom. If you will look at that you will find that whereas the total number of men already liable to serve abroad, on the 1st January 1906, was only 222,638, to-day it is 329,592. That is got largely by the conversion of the Militia on mobilisation into a part of the Regular Forces. That is another addition of over 107,000, and if you add the officers we have got by the same process, it brings out

* [Cd. 4611].

a total figure of 110,000 added in the last three years to the Expeditionary Force for service over seas.

But that was only part of the problem. Gentlemen, I have always regarded with great respect the soldier of that mighty military power Germany, but I am not afraid of the German soldier; I am more afraid of the German staff. The German staff has been the product of the application of the highest intellectual effort of the organisation of the military forces of Germany for some 50 years past, and that organisation was the product of the brains of several men, and notably of a great genius as a military organiser, the late Count Moltke. We have tried—we are only in the early stages of it—to organise our forces with a staff which is in accordance with modern requirements. It is only for a very short time that we have had a general staff over here, and it is only by degrees that it is attaining to the full measure of its reality; it is rapidly developing just now, and as it develops it will permeate right through the Army, as I hope the Imperial side of it will permeate right through the staffs of the Empire, with its conceptions, ideas, and organisations. But already we have been able to make great progress with mobilisation. Mobilisation used to be the great defect of the British forces wherever they were. We had never thought out the proportions in which the various kinds of troops were wanted; we had never thought out the elements required, and we had never thought out the mode of handling those big organisations in war. I think that Sir Frederick Borden and some other members of the Conference managed to snatch a few hours yesterday afternoon to get down to Aldershot to witness a great experiment which is going on in the handling of the largest mass of regulars which has ever been mobilised in this country before. I mean a complete division at war strength. Those of you who saw that know what an enormous problem the handling of these masses of troops is. That is what we are working up to, and what we have made much progress with since you last were here.

Another thing that has been done is what I daresay you have not noticed, but I think it would be a good thing if everyone who is interested in military forces here took away with him the two volumes which are at your disposal, the new field service regulations. These contain a complete code of what ought to be done in war in organisation of the staff, the mode of transport and supply, the assistance which the General Commanding-in-Chief has at his elbow so that he may be freed from every detail, and in short a plan under which the mobilisation may be followed by smoothness and rapidity in all operations in the field, every duty having its special officers assigned to that duty, who are responsible for its discharge, and the Commander-in-Chief being set free for the great purpose of defeating the enemy wherever he can find him. Gentlemen, these field service regulations have cost a great deal of work; they have been the result of many elaborate experiments and staff rides and so on, and they are now at last embodied in two volumes, which I hope will receive the attention of those who are interested in those things in the Conference.

Now I come, having reviewed the state of progress here, to the problem of to-day. We know, as Lord Crewe has said, that it is impossible for you to bind your people in advance. The difficulty is a peculiar one in the case of South Africa, which is just bringing her Constitution to the birth; we have no Ministers of the new Government here who can say anything, and I think all we can do is to put before you plans we have fashioned out for carrying on the work already done in the constitution of the Imperial General Staff in principle, and in what I have described to you, a stage further, and asking you, if these plans meet your approval, to take them away with you and commend them to those whom you have to counsel. There is a second stage of that work. I think I probably express, not only my own feeling, but the feeling of others here, if I say that you must feel yourselves anxious to take away something practical, not merely general principles, but detailed plans which can be adopted and made use of. Now, I would suggest, when I have come to the end of what I am going to say, that if we can find ourselves in a mood of general agreement about the desirability of adopting the broad principles which are laid down in the papers which have been already circulated, the next stage of the work might be taken up by the experts, of whom I am not one. I should propose to vacate the chair for a series of expert conferences, to be presided over by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who might well make his debut on this occasion—Sir William Nicholson—who would consult the military representatives over here and anybody else from over-seas who is good enough to attend these Conferences on the working out of the application of these principles. In that way you will be able to talk over that with the material already placed at your disposal, and possibly to get some assistance on various minor

problems which are troubling yourselves at the present time. All we can do is to define our common purpose. If we can define our common purpose so as to make it a worthy purpose, then I have faith that it will be adopted by its own weight, if it is a well worked out purpose, and that involves that we should be able to define it and take it in detail as well as in its broad outline.

Gentlemen, I now come to the substance of these three papers, and I can take you over them, I think, pretty rapidly. These papers are three in number. The first deals with the general principles on which the military defence of the Empire must be based; the second with what received so much stress at the last Conference, the desirability of as far as possible having a common pattern as regards formations, style of weapons, and so on; we do not want identity, but we want as much resemblance as the circumstances admit of; you may raise your troops, for instance, in some parts of the Empire by compulsion, and in others by voluntary service, and it all works in; it does not follow that there should be identity, but there should be similar formation in broad features, that is essential if there is to be anything like rapid mobilisation; and the third paper deals with the development of detail of the Imperial General Staff.

Now I need only say this. Passing by Part III. and touching for a moment on Part II. before I come to Part I., I may say the essence of success in the military defence of the Empire is rapidity of mobilisation, and the power of mobilising rapidly is that you should have your war establishments as much as possible on the same footing, and that you should know all the details that are requisite in the way of transport, supply, medical service, and so on, to enable the forces to be rapidly put in the field. On page 11 you see some of the details which we find are required for that purpose, and which we have worked out in the six divisions of our expeditionary force. It must, of course, be a long time before we get anything like complete organisation all over the Empire, but it is essential that these principles should be applied if we are to get rapidity of mobilisation and cohesion of the force when it is mobilised.

That brings me to the broad object we are aiming at, and which has already been defined in its broad features by Lord Crewe. Gentlemen, what we have to have in view is a great emergency; we hope it will never arise; we believe that the possession of such an organisation as we contemplate will be the surest guarantee against its coming. Once the foreign general staffs realised that there were enormous reserves behind what I may call the first line of defence, then they would cease to be interested in the problem. We know that the business of a foreign general staff, even of the most peaceful Government, if it does its duty, is to study all our weak points, and I have not the smallest doubt that the Governments of Europe know our weak points just as well as we do, and perhaps better. I am sure their attention is concentrated on these things, and I do not blame them for it. If I were in their position I would feel it to be my duty, if I were War Minister, to do the same thing. But one notices the great advantage of a perfect organisation. Nobody contemplates marching to Berlin nowadays, simply because it is out of the question. Well, I believe we can organise the Empire in such a way that nobody will contemplate attacking any part of it, because it would be out of the question with the hope of ultimate success. But for that purpose we must remember that in working everything out you have to deal not only with what seems for the moment likely, but what seems for the moment unlikely; you cannot tell what sweeping changes may come over the political firmament. The theatre of war might be, it is conceivable, in Australia, in Canada, in South Africa, in India, in Egypt, or in this country. You do not know where you may be called upon, or at what point you may find that you have got the vital and crucial point of the defence of the Empire. The battle might have to be fought in some unlikely part. That being so, what would be our greatest source of strength would be this—if behind the expeditionary and professional force which I have described we were so organised from the military point of view that, possessing the command of the sea, we should, if the Empire so desired it and if the sense of common danger required it, put into force these vast reserves which the strength of the Empire promises us even now, and will promise us still more as time goes on and you increase in population and riches. At this moment the military forces of the Empire, that is to say the number of trained men in the Empire more or less organised, consist of about 1,200,000 men. I believe there are far more within reach. There is magnificent military material in South Africa, magnificent because it

has been trained in the broadest of all senses. Then there is material also which has been trained in war in Canada, in Australia, in New Zealand, and there are great possibilities. What we suggest to you is this, that you should work out your own home defence for yourselves on the best possible footing. If you organise on such a footing that the formations are the same formations which you would use in the event of your deciding to come to the assistance of the Empire in some great crisis, there is no inconsistency between the two. On the contrary, we have found it best from the military point of view to organise our Territorial Forces—which is as much in its inception and general characteristic a purely home defence force as any of the forces in the Dominions over-sea—on exactly and precisely the same pattern and in the same formations as are possessed by the six divisions of the expeditionary force of Lord Kitchener's divisions in India. Identity of pattern and organisation for home defence, as well as for defence over-sea, puts you in a position to concentrate should concentration be required, and, as I have said before, it makes the necessity of concentration less likely, because it would soon become apparent to foreign general staffs that a great change has taken place in the organisation of the forces of the Empire, and that for defence—it never can be for aggression after the enormous difficulties we have of getting all that together—in some over-mastering impulse for the saving of the life of the Empire, these forces would pour forth.

Gentlemen, that of course is based on command of the sea. It is based upon this, that the first line, the rapid work of defending distant parts of the Empire, must come in the first instance as the professional force. That we have, and as you see we have considerably increased it. But it is based also upon this, that when we were hard pressed, when the Empire was threatened—and it can be threatened—nowadays wherever it was attacked (because we conceive the Empire to be one in its cohesion, and to depend on the loyalty of its component elements standing together), the necessity of bringing up this great reserve might well arise. If you agree with this, in fashioning your forces so that should your peoples decree, in the last emergency, they might throw themselves into the common struggle, then it is eminently desirable—it is a peace operation, but it is a peace operation which every competent general staff must undertake—that we should work out the details and plans of all this. It is no use having a pious aspiration in connection with military forces; it is no use laying down a good academic principle and doing nothing to carry it into effect; you must begin by working out everything in detail that it demands, and see what it means, and see whether you can compass it; and therefore, I hope that the work of the Imperial general staff would be to fashion out something like an order of battle for the Empire—an order of battle in which the troops that were most ready to take the field would be prepared to take it. I am only talking of the case of this great emergency, when a decision had been taken to come to the rescue, and the others would be able progressively to come forward to relieve places where there was a highly-trained garrison which would be put into the theatre of war, and then when their own troops had got a war training, which troops of a citizen nature in time of peace cannot get adequately, they should be able to proceed to the theatre of war also. In that way we should be constantly surveying the military condition of the Empire, we should know how progress was being made, and each part of each dominion would feel itself a member in an organic whole, and working out a common purpose.

Gentlemen, the broad principles on which we propose to do that are set out in the three parts of the Paper which you have all had, and with which I think you are all more or less familiar. I may say that at the end of Parts II. and III. we have put certain questions on which we do not ask you to bind yourselves. Africa cannot bind itself, and the other Dominions probably would be loth to do so, but they form points on which we can get a general indication of the individual opinion of the gentlemen here present.

Turning to page 12, the first question is, "Is each part of the Empire willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it to take its share in the general defence of the Empire?" I need not say more about that than I have said already.

The second question is, "Shall Imperial war establishments be fixed, based on requirements for the most probable campaign of a serious character in which an Imperial army is likely to be engaged?" As we have pointed out, these war establishments, which have been worked out here pretty completely, and the materials of which are at your disposal, are, in the view of the general staff, the best war

establishments for any Home defence force; they are based on filling a double purpose.

The third question is, "Will the Dominions endeavour to organise their existing forces so as to be capable of mobilising in accordance with the above establishments for a common Imperial object?" That is the same question in another form.

CHAIRMAN: If I may interrupt you for a moment, as regards Question 2, speaking as a civilian, I take that question to mean merely the laying down of certain establishments as possible requirements. The wording of the paragraph might conceivably, I think, be taken to mean something of a mandatory nature to the oversea Dominions, and I wish to make it clear that there is nothing of the kind intended.

Mr. HALDANE: I see the ambiguity. Nothing of that sort was meant. All we meant to say was: Will the staffs of the various Dominions work out with the staff at Home the proper and most effective establishment for this purpose? Whether they are adopted or not, or whatever is done, depends on the government of the particular Dominion. It only concerns the advice which the staff would give as to the formation of the Home defence force.

CHAIRMAN: It is the word "fixed" which possibly leads to that ambiguity. Perhaps some other word might be substituted for it.

Mr. HALDANE: Would "calculated" do?

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think so.

Mr. HALDANE: I think it is most important to have that question quite unambiguous, and we will substitute the word "calculated" for "fixed."

Then the fourth question is: "Will the Dominions adopt the field service regulations and training manuals issued to the Home regular army as the basis of the organisation, administration, and training of their troops?" That really means: Will the representatives here recommend to their Dominions the field service regulations and training manuals issued to the Home regular army? That is a matter which we should like to discuss, but it is a highly technical matter, which your experts would probably wish to work out with our experts.

The fifth question is: "Are the Dominions prepared to adopt, as far as possible, Imperial patterns of arms, equipment and stores?" That does not mean if you have something of your own which you think very good that we wish to interfere with you; but it means that in broad features we should be armed in the same fashion and with the same weapons.

Then I come to the question with regard to the Imperial General Staff, and on page 16 of the Paper which is before you the first question is: "In what manner is it proposed to arrange for the preliminary and higher education of officers of the local forces? (2) Are the services of any qualified general staff officers of the Home regular army required by any of the Dominions? If so, what number of officers would be required, when, what would be their duties, and what emoluments would be offered? What should be their grading? (3) Do the views advanced on the subject of the interchange of general staff officers meet with general concurrence? (4) Is the principle of direct communication to the limited extent indicated in paragraph 6 generally acceptable?" The Imperial General Staff, of course, cannot give any orders, but subject to that, and subject to the full control of the local chief of the Imperial General Staff by his own Government, there are matters of routine, matters of a technical kind, in which it is desired that there should be constant direct communication between the general staff at home and the general staff overseas; otherwise you do not get that continuity of mind and that freedom from what is called red tape which is necessary in order to develop a common military organisation.

What I suggest, in conclusion, is this:—Several of these last questions are of a highly technical nature, and can, I think, only really profitably be discussed between the technical experts as soon as the principle is conceded. But if what I have said about the general features of these three Papers commends itself to you, and if you are willing to say: "We approve of this individually, and think that whatever view our Governments take of them—whether those Governments are in existence yet or not—they would be all the better for having the full materials which can only be given by these propositions being worked out in detail by the experts," then I

would suggest to you that after this Conference, and on the hypothesis that we have come to a happy agreement on these particular principles, we should instruct our experts to work out these details for us at a subsidiary Conference which would take place here. The whole of the materials of this office are, as I need not say, at the disposal of the Conference—our documents and our experts—and we should be only too glad if the result of this sub-Conference puts you in possession of a fairly complete body of material on which hereafter to work out the solution of the problem with your own Governments.

CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I may add one word to what Mr. Haldane has said with regard to the procedure to be adopted. It seems to me that all the questions asked on page 16, at the end of Part III., are of a purely expert character, and that to attempt any discussion of them at a general meeting like this would be useless. The same, I think, applies to Questions 4 and 5 on page 13 at the end of Part II. Those are matters for expert advisers. On the other hand, Questions 1, 2, and 3, at the bottom of page 12, are of a more general character, and although, as Mr. Haldane said, we certainly should not expect any gentlemen who are here to answer for their Governments in so many words that they would adopt Questions 1, 2, and 3, yet some form of agreement with regard to Questions 1, 2, and 3 seems to be necessary in order to make it worth while to proceed with the more expert discussion of which Mr. Haldane has spoken. If Questions 1, 2, and 3 were all answered in a blank negative the further examination by experts would clearly be useless. Therefore, I think that what we can do now, sitting as a Conference, is to come at any rate to some provisional conclusion, without attempting a final conclusion, on Nos. 1, 2, and 3, which are given at the bottom of page 12, after which we could consider in what form it would be well to proceed by means of a sub-Committee to the examination of the more technical parts of the subject with which many of us are not competent to deal. In 1907 the only resolution adopted by the Colonial Conference with regard to military defence was: "That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognises and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a general staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organisation of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire." It is quite true, as Mr. Haldane said, that these Questions 1, 2, and 3, although they mark undoubtedly a certain advance from that position, do not mark any change of principle from what was adopted by the Conference of 1907.

Mr. HALDANE: Sir William Nicholson mentions to me that Question No. 2, translated into layman's language, relates simply, under the head "War Establishment," to the strength and size of battalions, the formation of brigades, and pure military matters of organisation.

Colonel FOXTON: Does it relate to the total number?

Mr. HALDANE: It does not refer to the total number, but only to the formation; it might be of quite a small number.

Sir F. BORDEN: Lord Crewe, Mr. Haldane, and Gentlemen, I am very glad to notice that a very fundamental idea in the consideration of this question, namely, the autonomy of the different Dominions is recognised as the basic principle. That, I think, is vital to any progress, or any success, in any organisation that may be undertaken. Imperial unity, as I said yesterday, and local autonomy must go hand in hand. We recognise the first and—I am not using the word in any offensive way—we insist upon the second. Now I need not elaborate that point further, because I am glad to observe that it is recognised everywhere. I have been carefully reading all the interesting speeches which have been delivered lately in connection with the visit of the Press Conference here, and the same note I have observed existed in all the speeches of all the statemen, regardless of party, recognising the absolute importance, as the first consideration, of local autonomy.

Then it seems to me we might ask ourselves the question: Is there community of interest between the different autonomous Governments? Is there community of interest, for instance, between my own country, Canada, and the Mother Country? It is only necessary, I think, to ask the question in order to answer it in the affirmative. It is true of Canada, and it is true of every part of the Empire. If the Empire falls, we fall as the result. Then is defence of any kind necessary? It is again only necessary to ask that question to answer it in the affirmative. Local defence has been undertaken, I think, in most of the dominions, and has been developed quite extensively on land in Canada—and I speak chiefly for Canada, of course. We have thought it our duty, and we so stated in 1902 at the Conference, to develop our local defences in such a way that we should relieve the Mother Country as far as possible from the expense of defending our immense territories. I need not say what we have done. We have proceeded upon those lines in co-operation with and with the advice and assistance of the War Office. We believe that local defence and Imperial defence are very largely one and the same thing, and we have arranged our military organisation in such a way that we can co-operate with Imperial forces, and in such a way that we would have a first line of defence in the event of any attack being made against Canada or upon Canadian soil. Just here I might perhaps illustrate my view of the relationship of local and Imperial defence. Suppose, for instance, a war took place, and an enemy landed its forces in Canada, we would be prepared to meet that enemy at first, but eventually we would require the power and assistance of the centre of the Empire. Here at once you have an illustration of how inseparable local and Imperial defence are. A raid, such as we had some years ago, on Canadian territory in the form of the Fenian raid, or a riot, or anything of that kind, which is purely local, we are able to take care of ourselves; but the moment attack is made upon Canadian territory by any other nation, then at once Canada becomes the scene, the theatre of a war in which immediately the Empire is interested, and Imperial troops would be necessary. So that it seems to me it is only common sense which would lead us to so organise our local defences that they could co-operate with an Imperial army and be really and genuinely a part of that army.

In 1902 a proposal was made to the Conference of that date by the then Secretary of State for War, that a certain force should be set apart by each one of the dominions and earmarked, so to speak, for foreign service. I am sure that proposal was made with the best intentions, but it became my duty, as representing the Dominion of Canada, at the request of the Prime Minister, to speak for Canada, and I did not hesitate to say that such a proposal could not possibly be carried out. I thought it would be detrimental to the best interests of the military forces of Canada in the first place, and we could not think of setting apart any set of men under any particular circumstances. I take it the present proposal is entirely different from that. If it were not, I should not agree to it. As I understand it, the present proposal is the logical sequence of the establishment of an Imperial general staff. Lord Crewe read the resolution of the last Conference, which unanimously adopted the principle of the establishment of an Imperial general staff. Since that time, as Mr. Haldane has stated, the idea has been elaborated, and, so far as Canada is concerned, has been practically adopted *verbatim et literatim*, as forwarded to us in the dispatch that came to us through the Colonial Office some months ago. I think the proposals which have been made to-day are throughout largely the logical result of the step which we took at that time.

With regard to the question on page 12, perhaps I should say that I understand my colleague and myself are not in a position to bind the country which we represent, absolutely. We were really sent here more particularly to take part in the discussion of some proposed naval organisation for Canada, but we were very glad to come and take part in the wider discussions which were decided upon afterwards. I have looked over these questions somewhat carefully, and it seems to me that there is nothing in them to alarm any self-governing country or to which any one could take exception. That is my own personal view, and that view I shall be prepared to press upon the Prime Minister and upon my colleagues at home when I return: "Is each part of the Empire ready to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it to take its share in the general defence of the Empire?" Why not? If a defensive force, as I ventured to try to say a moment ago, is to be of any use, it must be in a position to co-operate with the great Imperial army, and it seems to me it is only common sense to answer that question in the affirmative. It takes away nothing from our local autonomy. May I say that there is nothing in any of these recommendations which suggests in any way any change in our method

of raising our troops. It is not suggested that it shall be anything but voluntary service. It is not suggested that there should be any compulsion. That is to say, we are left absolutely to ourselves. Under the militia law of Canada the Governor-General in Council has power to mobilise the whole of our forces, and if a war is imminent and Parliament is not in session, Parliament may be called within 15 days, and Parliament will then decide, and Parliament can alone decide whether we will take any part in that war, whatever it may be. But in the meantime the Governor-General in Council has power to mobilise the whole of our forces, and Parliament would be called and Parliament would decide what was to be done. There is nothing inconsistent with that authority in this question so far as I can see. If the question be answered in the affirmative, and acted upon, and we maintain forces which are organised on a common principle and in co-operation and in co-ordination with those of Great Britain, then we are ready, if we see fit, to take part in any war in which the Empire is interested. That is the whole point, that we shall be ready if we wish to take part; but we are not bound to take part if we do not wish to do so. We shall be able to do so if we desire it. If we do not desire it we are absolutely free to abstain or refrain from doing it. It seems to me that is the whole thing.

As to the second question I am not quite so clear, and possibly that question might be modified somewhat. I do not like the idea of shaking in the faces of our neighbours our war establishment if there is any way of avoiding it. We are alongside very friendly neighbours, and I suppose any organisation which would be contemplated could not leave out of consideration the possibility of a war on the North American continent; but it would seem to me better if these war establishments could be kept secret and not published to the world. I throw that out as a suggestion.

As to the third question, I think I have practically answered that in what I have said with regard to the first question.

With regard to Questions 4 and 5, I agree with Lord Crewe that those are more or less technical, and seem to me to follow absolutely as the natural sequence to an affirmative answer of the first and third questions.

As to the fifth question. I might say that I consider it is desirable that Imperial patterns of arms, equipments, and stores should be identical. I suppose Mr. Haldane had in mind the fact that we have a different rifle in Canada. With regard to that, I want to say that I did my best to induce some of the English manufacturers of the Lee-Enfield rifle—the Service rifle of Great Britain—to come to Canada and establish factories, but they would not do so, and so we had to do the next best thing we could; but we took good care to secure a rifle which uses the same ammunition as the Service rifle of the Imperial army. Therefore, so far as that goes, I think there is no difficulty. I may say that I am trying now to induce, and I believe I have succeeded in inducing, one of the largest manufacturers of artillery to come to Canada and establish a factory there. Of course, if that is done the guns that will be manufactured will be manufactured from the pattern of the War Office.

I do not know that I should detain the Conference any longer. I have said to you all I have to say. I have not entered into the question of the command of the sea, which probably is the first and most important thing requisite, but that question, I assume, will be considered at another meeting.

Mr. HALDANE: I may explain with regard to Question 2 that we publish a document called "War Establishments," which simply gives the details of a battalion and an artillery battery, and a brigade, and so on. They are not secret documents, because they go all over the army. They give the standards. It is considered of importance that we should aim at having a common system with regard to these war establishments.

Sir F. BORDEN: An explanation of that can be put in.

Mr. HALDANE: Sir William Nicholson will work out the words.

Sir W. NICHOLSON: I will alter the wording. The whole meaning of it is that in the home army and throughout the dominion armies, when a force is mobilised, a battalion should consist of the same number of companies and the companies of the same number of men, and that a battery of artillery should consist of the same number of guns, and that sort of thing. It only means that we have certain war establishments. Are you prepared to adopt those war establishments as the basis of mobilisation? Then everybody would know the value of a battalion as a fighting unit

and the value of a battery as a fighting unit, if its composition is approximately uniform. That is the whole meaning of the question, but we will try and word it differently.

Mr. HALDANE: Other armies publish their war establishments, and so do we.

Sir F. BORDEN: I am not at all sensitive on that point.

Colonel FOXTON: Lord Crewe, and Gentlemen, I shall not occupy your time long, because I think I can safely say that, taking it as a whole, the Australian Government will fall in with the general principles you lay down. Sir Frederick Borden has referred to the fact of the possibility of Canada, or, for the matter of that, any one of the oversea Dominions, not desiring to take any part in any operations in which the Mother country was involved. But it is difficult to conceive any circumstances under which the oversea Dominions would not feel called upon to throw in their lot entirely with the Mother Country if the operations were of such a character as to menace the integrity of the Empire as a whole. It might possibly be that a war would be unpopular in a given Dominion for a short period, but let the Empire, or any portion of the Empire, be seriously threatened, and I am sure the revulsion of feeling would be very great indeed. That seems to me to go almost without saying. I was very glad to find that in Question No. 2, on page 12, we are not invited in any way to set forth or give any conditional or provisional undertaking as to the number of troops which would be available for service. That is a matter which must depend very largely upon financial conditions, and is dealt with practically from year to year by the various Governments—at least, that is so in our case. I have no hesitation in answering this question by saying that our reply from Australia to the first question on page 12 is an unequivocal affirmative.

As to the second question, I understand there is some difficulty in regard to detail, but, as first mentioned by Sir William Nicholson, it asks for our views with regard to the organisation by brigades or divisions, and as to batteries being either four guns or six guns. Now all our batteries are four-gun batteries in Australia, but, of course, we should recognise, I take it, that it would be desirable, whatever local views might be entertained, that on this question of four or six-gun batteries, or any similar matter of comparatively minor detail, we should fall in line with the Imperial establishments.

Mr. HALDANE: We have both kinds of batteries. We have four-gun batteries in the Territorial Force, and six-gun batteries in the regular force. We do not consider it at all inconsistent in that way.

[At this point Sir William Nicholson suggested the following alteration in the question: "Shall the war establishments of units of the Dominion forces be assimilated as far as possible to the approved war establishments of units of the regular forces?"]

Colonel FOXTON: That being so, I think our answer would be equally unequivocally in the affirmative on that question.

As to the third question, I should certainly recommend that we also answer that in the affirmative. The same applies to the fourth question, which I think it is most desirable should be answered in the affirmative. It seems to me almost to go without saying. It is true, as Lord Crewe has said, that it is a highly technical matter, but I should say that the field service regulations and training manuals ought to be adopted if the principles proposed to be laid down are to work out satisfactorily.

As to the fifth question, the pattern of the arms, equipment, and stores being uniform is undoubtedly very essential. We have seen in the past that it is not desirable to have differences in patterns in the arms, equipment, and stores. We already have the 303 pattern in our small arms, and our field and other artillery are entirely on the Imperial pattern.

Now I will turn to the questions on page 16.

CHAIRMAN: I think perhaps the questions on page 16 had better stand over for the present, because they deal with a very technical matter which I do not think it desirable to discuss now, unless there is any particular point you desire to raise.

Colonel FOXTON: Perhaps it is not necessary to answer Question No. 3, because we have what we want with regard to that.

Mr. HALDANE: That can be dealt with by the experts.

Colonel FOXTON: Otherwise, without detaining you any further, I may say that, generally speaking, Australia will fall in entirely and completely with the suggestions contained in those questions with which I have dealt.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Sir, I would just like to say that (subject to that very important principle which was alluded to by yourself and also by Mr. Haldane in the matter of Home defence, that our local governments have an undoubted right to do whatever they consider proper within their own territory and without interference from the British Government or any of the men on the General Staff who for the time being may be in our own country without the express consent or authority of the Government of the Dominion concerned), generally speaking, I feel that the full necessity for co-ordination, for co-operation, and for uniformity, is absolutely imperative, and for my part I have no hesitation whatever in saying that any representative who subscribed to Question I. on page 12 must of necessity subscribe to Question II. Sir Frederick Borden will see it is quite clear that it has nothing to do with the total number of men; it is simply aiming at similarity so far as the character of the battalions or brigades is concerned, and so on, and in that respect I think it is thoroughly satisfactory.

I am very glad to be able to say that in New Zealand we are already co-operating with the War Office so far as rifles and ammunition are concerned, and if we take part in expeditionary forces, as is suggested, we must have uniformity in every respect. I attach a great deal of importance to the proposals for extension of that principle, and so much so that I want to suggest here for my own country (I do not make the suggestion for the consideration of any other representative regarding his country) that one way in which we could have practical results in New Zealand would be by the war authorities agreeing to exchange a unit from India fully equipped at their expense, and let us send a unit from our country of 550 men to India at our expense, not merely for a passing show from either side, but for the purpose of remaining in the respective countries for a year or two. If from time to time we did something of that sort the visiting unit would give us a good object lesson, and our men who went to India would have the benefit of practical training and education, and it would have the additional effect of creating a bond of unity between the people, who would feel that they had really in military matters the actual evidence of a great organisation in their presence. In a distant country such as New Zealand, which is anxious in its small way to assist the Home authorities, we know next door to nothing from the standpoint of the people having actually seen trained regiments or units, and consequently know very little of what military organisation means. I do not say that we have not had wars; we have had a long war in days gone by, but people in various parts of the country knew next door to nothing about it, and if you want to get the public behind the Government or Parliament of the country it is somewhat important in matters of this kind that the public should have some knowledge of what they are being asked to support. The public want to realise that we are not experimentalising without some knowledge of the detail from time to time placed before them. In older countries you have trained regiments more or less before the people, and you can impress them with the value of the military organisation, and they see what is carried out in the most modern way. Apart altogether from the detail of the proposals contained here, I for one cordially endorse the proposal that they should be remitted to the experts in order that we may get something concrete from the expert side after their examination of the details in reference to these further questions on page 16. For instance, it does not concern the Conference directly, but it affects the country I represent, and I should like for our own guidance to know how many trained men under ordinary conditions the experts believe we should have in hand in New Zealand for its own inland defence—is it to be 40,000 or 100,000 or 150,000 or 250,000? I would like to know what, in the opinion of the experts, our numbers should be, not necessarily to adopt it, but so as to have the benefit of their experience.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: That will be one of the questions for the General Staff.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: I want to have some idea, because I am a believer in the effect of practical result, and when I return to New Zealand I would like to be able to say to the Parliament of the country that the opinion of the experts at this Conference is that we should make provision for so many hundreds of thousands of pounds, and what it is for. I want them to realise that after all the opinions of a Conference such as this is, with representative men from different portions of the

Empire, if we are to have uniformity of effort and intention at all and are to have good results in the end, we ought to be able to go back and carry with us from the practical side of a Conference of this kind what the military experts' belief is as to what we are required to provide on a peace basis and on a war basis in a country such as ours is. It is a very easy thing of course for anyone to say that according to the population you ought to do so and so. I have not very much faith in an argument of that kind. I think it would be far better for the military experts to say that, so far as the different countries are concerned on a peace basis under an efficient inland defence system, they believe it would be desirable to have a certain number of trained men—not to tell us we should do it, but allow us to exercise our own judgment as to how far we can carry it out.

I do not want to introduce the question of naval defence into this stage of our business upon this occasion, but as far as New Zealand is concerned, I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that if anything were to occur to the Navy to make it necessary, we would fight to the very last, as any other British country would, for the purpose of protecting our country. If the Navy went down by any unfortunate accident, the total number of men you could get in our country for the purpose of holding on to it would be comparatively small, possibly 200,000 people—there might be more—and every person who is there would, I am quite confident, take his share. I have, however, no doubt that the suggestion which has emanated here in its application to Canada (on which I think Sir Frederick Borden has dwelt absolutely from their point of view) has, when dealing with our portion of the British Dominions, no force whatever. The possibility of the transport of a sufficiency of British troops to help us in New Zealand in the event of such a contingency as I have referred to arising, would be practically asking us to shut the door after the horses were out. In our case we want to realise that we are prepared to help the Old Country under certain emergencies, and necessarily the consent of our Government first being given, with an expeditionary force to go wherever it is required, and the Government of the day would go to the fullest extent it could in the matter of helping to maintain other portions of the Empire wherever they may be, whether in South Africa, in Canada, in Australia, or elsewhere. We would do our share in that respect. We want, from our point of view, to have as good an organisation in New Zealand for military purposes as it is possible to have, without having anything in the shape of a standing army. Our people are strongly averse to anything in the shape of a standing army or a permanent militia. We do expect to be able to organise, and personally, I think, we could establish a good organisation, in peace time of possibly 100,000 men. We want to feel that, while we are doing our duty there, we should from time to time have an interchange of the Imperial staff, as we are doing now, and have a more active exchange of units, and thus have the advantages of the education which having a trained military regiment with us would afford. I would, for this reason, like to see an exchange with India, because I think it would be the place where it would be very valuable for our men to go in the first instance, and if they went there for a year or two, they would get more practical results and more efficiency probably than in any other way we could locally go to work.

I do not wish to take up the time of this important Conference by talking for any length of time—any more than I feel to be necessary—but I want to say that I listened with very great attention to Mr. Haldane's review of the position in connection with the Territorial Army here, and the alteration for the better which has taken place since we last had the pleasure of hearing him, and perhaps I might be allowed, with due deference, to congratulate him very heartily on what he has so far achieved. If I may be allowed to say so, the results, as indicated, show that the effort has been in the right direction.

If we can remove a great portion of what I may call the natural red tape which of necessity comes in in connection with the administration of a great organisation such as the British Army, and if it is realised that the smaller countries are sincerely in earnest in their anxiety to co-operate, and if the stumbling blocks in the way of practical administration are removed, I would look forward to the interchange both of the Imperial General Staff and the units of the organisation as in all probability working to a good end, and not spasmodically, as at the present moment, with its attendant unsatisfactory results. In other words, when the oiling of the new machinery has been sufficiently done, I should look forward myself to seeing a great organisation existing over the British world available in time of war for its own defence, and a proportion of men available to be called upon by the central authority, and the obtaining of such an organisation with unanimity in every respect both as to system

and equipment. I attach the greatest importance to an effort being made to establish this upon full and complete lines. I think the central authority here should have the supreme and absolute direction and control from the very moment when we say, "Yes, we are prepared to give you 10,000, 15,000, or 20,000 men as an expeditionary force"; from that moment we should give up, directly and indirectly, entire control, so far as those men are concerned.

If after the representatives of the different countries have concluded their general consideration of this matter—because of necessity we cannot possibly hope to go into the details now—it were possible for the experts of the different countries who are here to get together with your experts and consider the questions, and with the very valuable papers before us, I think we ought to be able, following the important suggestion made by Sir William Nicholson a few moments ago, to get all these matters concreted, so that we can say, not that we are going to agree to them, but that we are prepared to agree to recommend our respective Governments to ask their Parliaments to confirm the recommendations that we can agree to, and to have them carried out upon permanent lines. If we can go back from this Conference unanimously agreed on the recommendations to our Governments and Parliaments, speaking for New Zealand, I am quite confident in saying that they would confirm them, if not unanimously, practically so, with the ultimate object of trying, over the scattered Dominions we possess, to have what is so difficult, viz., cohesion in times of trouble, and at least uniformity and co-operation in times of peace. If we can achieve this I should expect the most successful results by-and-by. Speaking in general terms, I subscribe quite willingly to the proposals made here; and I am anxious to say, as the representative of my country, that we will do anything we can to try and put them into practical shape at the earliest possible moment.

Sir EDWARD MORRIS: I would merely like to say in a general way that I subscribe to what has been said.

CHAIRMAN: I do not know whether any of the gentlemen from South Africa would like to say anything. We know from what they have told us that they are here more to watch than to make statements. I do not know whether Mr. Merriman would like to say anything.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I do not like to leave a gap in the uniformity of procedure, but I should like to say that I have been in Parliament now for about 40 years, and there is the very greatest difficulty in getting a vote through for defence. You must recollect that you have got to deal with democracies. We come over here and we are sometimes carried away, but when we get up in Parliament there are always oppositions, and there is nothing so much opposed as anything like military combination in any shape or form. I am speaking only of the Cape now; there is nothing we have so much difficulty in getting through as this military vote, and with regard to the question which Sir Joseph Ward referred to, that the Colonies should be allowed to go and send an expeditionary force to any part of the Empire, I must say I should not like to pledge any Government I had anything to do with to that, because the question always arises then, "What is the war about?" I say that a great question arises always when you are asked to send an expeditionary force. What is the war about—what has led you to go into that war? Supposing you had a war in the Balkans, I feel absolutely certain the colonists would be very reluctant indeed to send a force to engage in that. Supposing that by any misfortune or mischance your alliance with Japan was to bring you into collision or conflict with the United States, if any such calamity was possible, do you suppose that any colonist would for a single moment send an expeditionary force to help an Eastern Power? Never! It is no use speaking smooth things; that is the fact. Of course with regard to all the technical parts of the matter, I am not in a position to say anything about them. There always seems to me to be a great danger, I must say, in getting an organised army, which is unsuited to a free government, because when you get a thoroughly highly trained and organised army with a clever man in command of it, there is always the danger of having a Napoleon and his scorn of government.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Turn him out.

Mr. MERRIMAN: That is all very well, but supposing he will not go.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: That is what we do.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Upon all these subjects there are a great many things which are necessary and desirable, and I only wish to add this, that South Africa is quite prepared, I am perfectly certain, to do one thing, and that is to defend itself, and we spend more on military organisation than any country, certainly any self-governing power, and I think we would compare very favourably with Sir Frederick Borden's country, which is of course more populous, seeing that we spend about 16s. a head, and we have quite recently incurred a debt on a poor little miserable —

Mr. BRODEUR: Does that include all your population?

Mr. MERRIMAN: It includes the whole—the whole of the European population.

Mr. BRODEUR: Yes, but what about the others?

Mr. MERRIMAN: As to the others, I am sorry to say that we have to keep a force to control them.

Mr. BRODEUR: We have included everybody else as far as we are concerned.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Yes, because you are all a homogeneous white population,

Mr. BRODEUR: We have some Red Indians.

Mr. MERRIMAN: How many? You bottle them up and keep them for show.

CHAIRMAN: I think we are rather getting away from the Questions 1, 2, and 3.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I am only giving my opinion upon these questions, and I say I do not pledge myself at all. Of course, I am not asked to do so, but I say that you will have some difficulty when you go back to your Parliaments if you assent to Nos. 1, 2, and 3 with the idea that you are to send an expeditionary force wherever there is a war. That I am sure of, and there is no use trying to say smooth things, and to say that it is all right.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Crewe, might I be allowed just to say this? In some respects I agree with Mr. Merriman. I do not know whether he assumes that in our country we are prepared to do foolish things, even although we subscribe to a general principle proposed before this Conference, because of course that is not so. In our country we are just as strong about the maintaining of it for a white race as any portion of the British Empire, and we have been all along. If the suggestion were made by the responsible authorities, and we were asked to send an expeditionary force to assist in helping the Eastern races, you might just as well ask us to separate ourselves from the British Empire. It would meet with a refusal point blank. In our country we are certainly a democratic community, and I have no hesitation whatever in saying that were our people to experience times of stress and trouble they would quite expect the British taxpayer to assist them by an expeditionary force in the shape of a ship of war, or ships of war, or in other respects to give us support; and we are prepared, and, indeed, it is to my mind our clear duty, to give a *quid pro quo* and to do the same thing under proper conditions subject to the reservations I made at the start, which is, that the power of the Home Government, in New Zealand I mean, is not to be taken away by any proposal given effect to here. In the ordinary course of things we must protect our own country in conformity with the views of the majority of the people, and in that respect I am quite in accord with Mr. Merriman, and I should be very sorry as the representative of our country here to be supposed to say that we were going to carry out anything and everything we were asked to do—to fight in support of the Eastern races because of the troubles in the Old World, but if we ever found that the Old World was likely to go down under a trouble of that sort we would come in and fight for the Empire. That is the point. If we find it necessary to come in we would come in and do our best for the maintenance of British supremacy against the world.

CHAIRMAN: I think there is no difference of opinion at all between us, Gentlemen. We began by almost ostentatiously stating that all the self-governing Dominions were, as we fully admitted, absolutely free to engage or not to engage in any kind of military operations which the Imperial Government might undertake. Equally, I suppose, in theory it would be the privilege of the Mother Country if some self-governing Dominion were to do something which embroiled the Mother Country with a European Power—a thing which is not altogether inconceivable—to take its own line; but these are questions of theory.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Very practical.

CHAIRMAN: We hope that neither consideration will arise. Therefore I only repeat once more that all that is suggested here is if it is desired by any part of the self-governing Dominions to take part in Imperial defence, whether they are prepared to organise themselves in such a manner as to make their co-operation effective. We cannot go further than that.

Colonel GREENE: I would like to say on behalf of Natal that it is rightly understood after what Mr. Merriman has said that I cannot pretend to speak on behalf of South Africa, but I do claim the right to speak on behalf of what is still the Colony of Natal, which will shortly become a province in the Union of South Africa, and although I speak entirely on behalf of Natal I believe that the views held by the people of Natal are shared by a large section of the people in South Africa, and I think I am entitled, in fact I know I am, to voice the opinions at this meeting of the people in that portion of the coming Union of South Africa. We hold in the very strongest way that when we are a portion of the Empire, and are entitled to all the privileges of being a member of that great Empire, we are bound to accept the responsibilities also which attach to that position. As far as Natal is concerned, on the return placed before you you will see the position there is entirely different apparently to the position in Cape Colony; we have no difficulty whatever in our Parliament in getting a vote for defence. According to the figures on the returns which have been placed before us, Natal contributes—I think the figures given are incorrect, I shall not say in what particular, but they will do for the purposes of my argument—2*l.* per head of its European population more than any other portion of the British Empire, including the United Kingdom, for defence. We have never any trouble in securing the money which we consider necessary for the defence of our own country. We have adopted the principle that if we are citizens of an Empire we have got to perform the first duty of the citizen of an Empire, and that is to defend ourselves and to assist in defence of the Empire. I do not think it will be amiss my saying that we have adopted a principle there which I think might with advantage be followed by those who look upon us as a very small community, as we unquestionably are, namely, we have adopted the system of training cadets. I think we started it, at any rate upon the large scale which has been adopted, and we have recognised in the schools of the Colony, which are all subsidized from the public exchequer, that the schools of the country are established to educate the children of the country, and that they are not simply to be educated with a view, when they attain to manhood, to making money. The primary idea, I suppose, of education is to teach the youth of the country to become good citizens, and we desire to instil into the youthful mind that their first duty as good citizens of the Empire is to defend the country. Therefore we have started in every public Government-aided school throughout the country a cadet corps. There is nothing in the shape of compulsion; it is simply to instil into the youthful mind what his duties are to his country, and if he desires to perform that duty he is trained from his youth up, and when he is drafted subsequently into the militia force he has already acquired the first principles of his duties as a soldier, and he soon becomes an exceedingly useful militia man.

Holding these views as far as Natal is concerned, we want to recognise to the fullest extent our obligation, and we appreciate the proposals that are put before us which do not compel us to adopt any particular line of action. The whole proposal, as I understand it, is this—that if you recognise the absolute need of defence within your own country, you have to get your forces organised—they should be organised upon one given principle of uniformity with the forces in the United Kingdom and throughout the Empire. That is not asking us very much; it is an absolute necessity, as everyone who has had any practical experience must recognise, that if in times of stress Natal in a small way is desirous of contributing a force towards the assistance of any Imperial force in any portion of the world, what an enormous advantage it is that that force should be trained and organised on exactly the same basis as the rest of the troops whom they meet wherever the field of action may be. I cannot conceive that we are being asked to give up anything. Surely we should recognise that the experience of those at home, which is vastly greater than any of our own, and the lines they have laid down must be in a general way superior to any scheme we ourselves could formulate; but be that as it may, we all to my mind ought to have that one object in view: that in times of stress we have got to perform our duty; let us be as prepared

as we possibly can for the performance of that duty. We can do it; we are not committed to anything at all; if a time of stress arises, the question as to whether or not we should contribute a portion of our forces is entirely in our own hands, and as I understand it, the Imperial Government, recognising the Imperial spirit that is prevalent throughout the whole of the Empire, are quite content to leave it at that, knowing that the Colonies will stand to a man as well as any persons within the United Kingdom in fighting for the defence of the Empire, if it is ever attacked. I am confident in my own mind that when the Union is established in South Africa, South Africa will not be found to be behind any other portion of the Empire in its determination to accept the responsibilities which attach to it as a portion of that Empire, and come to the aid of the Mother country if it is ever required.

I am not afraid of there being a proposal, and I do not think it is proposed that we should have an organised army in South Africa; we could not do such a thing, and I understand it is not intended to have such a thing—there is to be no military domination in South Africa or anything else by our adoption of the proposals put before us by the Imperial Government, and I regret exceedingly that there should be a suggestion in that direction, because I think it is a mistaken idea or else I have misread the whole of the papers that have been submitted to me.

I was glad to hear Mr. Haldane say that there is no proposal to interfere or to suggest any interference with the method in which these forces in the Colonies are organised. Our present laws which are in force in Natal cannot remain on the Statute book very long. The rest of the Union unquestionably, if I read public opinion aright, would never agree to apply to the whole of the Union the laws which we enforce in the Colony of Natal. We have compulsory service throughout the whole of the country.

Mr. MERRIMAN: So have we.

Colonel GREENE: Not to the same extent that we have. However, fortunately, although we have been through some troubles lately, and I do not think it is realised, we have never had to use compulsion. We can, if we desire, force the unmarried men between the ages of 18 and 30 out into the first militia, but owing to the—I do not like to use the word, because it appears to be objectionable—military spirit which is infused into the minds of these boys through the cadet system —

Mr. MERRIMAN: Call it patriotism.

Colonel GREENE: I think that is a far better word—I am much obliged to you—owing to the patriotism instilled into the minds of these boys when they leave the cadet corps, our difficulty has been to keep them out of the militia on the score of expense; we have had so many offering that we have had to prevent them recruiting. Therefore, although we have got a law which enforces compulsory service in our country, it has never been put into force even during the late rebellion when we were pretty hard pushed, and our organisation is now, to my mind, complete; but I think it is altogether incomplete from the Imperial point of view. As we all know, when we had to mobilise for the last rebellion, we mobilised our troops in a very short time, but we had to realise this, that however perfect we may have thought ourselves in the past, and however admirable for the purpose of our own local affairs, when our whole system is in conflict with the proposals put before us, in asking us to alter our system you are not asking us to do anything that we should object to. So far as I am concerned, speaking on behalf of Natal, I am perfectly ready, if Natal was to remain as it is to-day, a colony, to subscribe to every word suggested and to answer every one of the questions in the affirmative.

Mr. SMUTS: I hope, Sir, you will excuse me from making any set speech, as I have not prepared one, and will allow me only to make some remarks on some of the points which have been raised by you and Mr. Haldane and some of the speakers here to-day. The differences which have already disclosed themselves between these two eminent South Africans who have spoken before me make me all the more cautious in expressing even a personal opinion on this great matter of Imperial defence. One feels, Sir, that the matter is a very serious one, and words lightly spoken here to-day in an ordinary sense and in all good faith may, under extraordinary circumstances, assume an extraordinary importance, and therefore one does not like to go very much beyond the facts of the case.

I was very glad to hear from Lord Crewe that there was not the slightest idea of this Conference going beyond the basis which was laid down at the last Imperial

Conference two years ago. At that Conference the resolution was passed after prolonged consideration, which laid down the basis of future co-operation between the various parts of the British Empire in time of war. That resolution which you have read, Sir, recognises the political independence and judgment, if I may say so, of the various Colonial Governments, the autonomy to which Sir Frederick has referred. It also recognises that the command of Colonial forces will rest with the Colonial Governments. But assuming these two principles as basis the resolution went on to lay down a common system for collection and dissemination of military information and intelligence, the preparation of schemes of defence, and so on. That, I understand, is the great principle which was laid down two years ago, and that is the principle which is the basis of our discussion to-day at this Conference. So I understand also the questions which have been raised here in these very important papers which have been submitted to us; they are intended rather to work out details than to touch the principle which has been laid down. I, Sir, could not for a moment interfere with that principle; it was agreed to by the Prime Minister of the Transvaal two years ago, and of course I am not at liberty to proceed a step beyond what was then laid down.

These questions which have been raised in these papers, as I say, are of the greatest importance, and I shall proceed very briefly to refer—not to launch into a general discussion, but to refer to these questions on page 12. The first question is this: "Is each part of the Empire willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it to take its share in the general defence of the Empire?" Of course, here it is simply a question of emphasis—what particular word is emphasised in this question. I can conceive that in furtherance of any affirmative answer to this question the South African Government, the Union Government, might lay down a scheme which the people of South Africa would not accept for a moment. It all depends upon what is meant by "the general defence of the Empire."

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: May I interrupt. It has been suggested that after the word "share" the words should be inserted "if it so desires."

Mr. SMUTS: That does not really alter the position. Of course, one likes to state for the information of the British Government exactly what the position is, so that nobody is misled, and we know exactly where we are, and I am trying to state my point of view as to how far it would be possible for South Africa to meet the British Government in contingencies which may arise in future. Well, now, I am not only stating my individual opinion, but certainly I think I am stating what is common South African opinion, when I say that South Africa would be prepared to undertake its own defence. Mr. Merriman said that Colonel Greene said that too, and I believe that would be practically common cause in South Africa, that any Union Government that comes in after union is established will have to take the necessary steps for organising the defence of South Africa on a proper basis. I think that is common cause, and I doubt, Sir, whether we should be pressed at this stage to go further. Our position in South Africa is a most peculiar one. As Mr. Merriman has pointed out, we have a problem which is unique in self-governing colonies; there are little more than a million or a million and a quarter of whites in South Africa, and for every white individual you have five natives. The natives are not really part and parcel of the South African family, and any defence scheme which is established by the white people of South Africa has to keep largely in view the fact that our primary difficulties may arise with the native population. You, in Canada, or in Australia, or in any other part of the British Empire, are not face to face with a problem like that. Our defence scheme would have to bear in mind the contingency that perhaps in the near future we may have to fight as we have fought for generations now in South Africa, for our lives against these barbarous nations that live on our continent. Therefore, when we may say that we should be prepared to undertake our own defence we are saying a good deal more, I think, than the other self-governing Colonies say under the same circumstances, because we have at our door and in our midst a possible enemy which you are happily rid of. Of course I am not one of those alarmists who think a native war is very probable, and we have always to be on the watch against that sort of thing. I think that is very much over done. But there is no doubt that, not only in view of what has happened in the past, but in view of the developments and the social movements which are going on in South Africa, which look almost like an upheaval of the very structure of society in South Africa, we must keep before our eyes this contingency of a conflict,

an elemental conflict, between the two alien forces, the white people and the native people, in South Africa. That is a peculiar item in our case.

We have another peculiar feature in our military problem, and that is that for thousands of miles the boundary of South Africa is coterminous with the greatest military Power in the world. Again I do not wish to say anything which is alarmist in its character, but of course we have to bear in mind that when the Union is established it will have for almost thousands of miles along its frontiers a Power which is the greatest military power to-day in the world, and when we say we are prepared to defend South Africa, that is to defend our country, we say it with a full appreciation of the fact that we may have to contend, not only with natives, but may in the last resort have to contend with the greatest military Power in the world. So that I do not think when we say to-day that we should not go much further than the mere South African point of view, you will come to the conclusion that we are taking a narrow view of the matter, because I think in taking the South African point of view we are taking an enormous burden on our shoulders.

CHAIRMAN: When you and Mr. Merriman say you are prepared to undertake the defence of South Africa, that is, of course, assuming the command of the sea is maintained.

Mr. MERRIMAN: That is a different question.

Mr. SMUTS: We have not yet come to the naval question.

CHAIRMAN: No, but I think it must be taken as a postulate.

Mr. SMUTS: No, I would not take that, because you must remember that in the last war, when the forces arrayed against you had no command of the sea at all, but were perfectly cut off from the sea, they could keep the war going on an enormous and almost unprecedented scale under such circumstances for three years. If a great European Power were to know that they had to face merely on land a United South Africa—not merely the Transvaal and the Orange Free State—which could put into the field 100,000 men in the highest state of training, I think that Power would think twice, even if it had complete command of the sea, before it tackled that problem. So that I think the question is entirely independent of the mere command of the sea. Our military defence should be on such an efficient basis that a European Power that had command of the sea would know that it took an enormous burden on its shoulders if it attacked united South Africa on land. I think our scheme should be so efficient as to ensure the chances of peace by inducing that fear in our opponents.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Presupposing that Great Britain would keep the command of the sea.

CHAIRMAN: I am talking of the case of the British Fleet being wiped out, and this country defeated here.

Mr. SMUTS: But even then, I assume our defence scheme should be so independent in itself, that what happened seven or ten years ago in South Africa could happen on a larger scale again, and that South Africa should be able to maintain itself even against the greatest country in the world. I say this without any aggressive intention at all. I do not think we are likely to have such a war, and I do not think it ought to be assumed that to-morrow we are going to invade German West Africa or any other part of Africa belonging to a different Power; but I am only speaking from the point of view of the defence of United South Africa.

Of course, we have some other features in our situation. I was very glad to hear from Mr. Haldane that he has no immediate intention of removing from our shores the very small body of regulars that are now in South Africa. I think it is a very good thing to keep them there, because, as long as they are there, there is a certain standard of comparison between our local organisation and that more perfect organisation which belongs to the British Army. You have high officers, men of great training, who would be in command of the regulars in South Africa from time to time, and they would be a most useful element in South Africa, and would help us very much in regard to the organisation of our own forces. I hope those forces will remain in South Africa for some time yet.

Mr. HALDANE: It is your view, I take it, that it would be desirable, these British troops being there, that the alteration of organisation of your own troops should be considered.

Mr. SMUTS: I am going to deal with that point. I was simply saying that in my personal opinion we should be quite willing to undertake the defence of South Africa, and, as far as regards the general defence of the Empire, I think we are taking such an enormous responsibility upon ourselves of seeing that we are prepared to defend South Africa, that we ought not to be asked to go further. I think Canada, Australia, and New Zealand could go much further, because they have no internal enemy, nor an enemy next door; but we are so peculiarly situated that we have quite enough responsibility when we say that we are prepared to defend ourselves.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: We have the Eastern races closer to us than they are to you.

Mr. SMUTS: They are allies just now.

Now I come to Question No. 2. I am glad to hear from Sir William Nicholson that the form of the second question will be changed so that it will refer simply to the composition of the various units.

Sir W. NICHOLSON: Yes, there is a full explanation of it on the paper.

Mr. SMUTS: I quite follow that. I thought that there might be quite innocently some catch in the second question because it referred to the most probable campaign.

Sir W. NICHOLSON: War establishments are simply tables.

Mr. SMUTS: The question says: "Shall Imperial war establishments be fixed, based on requirements for the most probable campaign of a serious character?" We do not know what the most probable campaign of a serious character will be in which the Imperial army will be engaged. The fact is that we, in South Africa, have for a long time, to bear in mind that our probable enemy is the native. There is no other probability. We have always to bear in mind the features of native war when we organise our defence forces. In the form in which General Nicholson has now put this question I think there is no objection to it. All that I would say is that in South Africa, from the experience that we have had in the past, the tendency always has been, and very probably in the future will be, in favour of mounted riflemen. A mounted brigade is, I believe, one of the units of military organisation in the English system, and a mounted brigade of riflemen would be the system more favoured in South Africa than infantry. The people are accustomed to that form of fighting. It is a country of enormous distances. Huge distances have to be covered in any operation, and of course a man prefers going on horseback to going on foot. A mounted brigade is very much like the Boer commando in the late war. Our system then was simply this: we had our commandos, and a commandant had under him 500 or 600 men, which corresponds very much to your battalion or regiment of mounted men, and two or three regiments, I understand, are brought together under a brigadier-general. That was very much the system we had in South Africa, and I think that is probably the system which will commend itself most to South Africans.

As regards the other subsidiary services mentioned on page 11 of the paper which is before us, that I think is more a question for detailed consideration. I could go into that question, but I do not think it is worth while doing so now. The third question is: "Will the Dominions endeavour to organise their existing forces so as to be capable of mobilising in accordance with the above establishments for a common Imperial object?" I understand this question to mean whether by legislation provision will be made, not merely for a paper organisation, but for an organisation which, when the occasion arises, can be mobilised and utilised. Certainly I think it is reasonable that that should be done. We do not want to have a paper force, but a force which, when the occasion requires, can be mobilised, and mobilised with the greatest expedition.

Mr. MERRIMAN: The gist of that question is in the tail.

Mr. SMUTS: I do not think that I understand the second question in that form, but it seems to me the third simply follows as a corollary from the second, that if you organise according to the second question on a more or less common pattern, then you should also make provision for mobilisation of that organisation at the proper time.

Mr. HALDANE: That interpretation of it is quite plain from the preliminary memorandum.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Certainly I read it so. While the Dominions endeavour to organise their forces, who is to mobilise them? I presume the General Staff.

Mr. HALDANE: No; look at the beginning of the paper.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I am saying only what I thought it meant—"for a common Imperial object." The common Imperial object might be a war with the United States.

Mr. SMUTS: I have made it clear what I understood by the common Imperial object.

Mr. HALDANE: And so have I in my preliminary statement.

Mr. SMUTS: Coming to the fourth question, that refers to the adoption of the field service regulations and training manuals issued to the home regular army as the basis of the organisation, administration, and training of the Colonial troops. That, as Lord Crewe has pointed out, touches on a matter of detail, and can be more usefully discussed by experts, but I think it is useful to make some observations upon that question. What we want, just as what you want in England, is simplicity and efficiency. I am afraid in a huge organisation, with long traditions behind it, such as you have in the Imperial army, it is a system which is very complicated, and which probably is very rigid, and has sometimes been described as of a more or less red-tape kind. That is not my criticism at all. I say where it is an old service, and an enormously big service such as you have, the tendency is for it to become rigid, and for it to be inflexible and inefficient. It is too complicated for colonial conditions. What our experience has taught us to be the best system for us is one of great simplicity. Our population is of a peculiar kind. Our common soldier you cannot handle roughly, because he is the equal of our officer, and the sort of thing which a common English soldier would submit to you could not get our soldier to submit to.

Mr. HALDANE: May I say that these regulations are drawn on the most modern lines, and they are quite new, but we are well aware of what you say, and when we have applied them to our Territorial Forces we have modified them to suit the necessities. Of course they could be modified to meet your own local necessities in the same way. They are merely a broad scheme.

Mr. SMUTS: I understand that, and I am simply entering some caveat. If I assent to Question 4, I want to do so in a cautious form, so as not to mislead anybody. I know something of these field service regulations and training manuals, and if they can be applied under certain circumstances in a very modified form, the object of which would be simplicity and efficiency, I hope in that form it would be possible to adopt them in South Africa. You have, for instance, in Cape Colony regulations which have been adopted for what is called the Cape Mounted Riflemen, and those regulations are unlike the cavalry regulations on the one hand or mounted infantry regulations on the other hand. That is what we have to bear in view. Our conditions are somewhat unique, and in arranging for training or field service, we have to bear in mind the peculiar South African conditions. Our whole transport service of course would be much simpler, and on a different basis from the Imperial transport service.

On the fifth question I do not think there is any difference of opinion whatever in this Conference, certainly not in regard to South Africa. South Africa would certainly be prepared to adopt the Imperial patterns of arms, equipment, and stores. We have found enormous inconvenience in South Africa on account of having different patterns. We started the late war with the Mauser rifle, which was in some respects a better rifle than the Lee-Metford, but our ammunition got exhausted after the first eight months, and for the last two years of the war we had simply to live on the arms and ammunition which we could capture from the enemy. Naturally one can understand how difficult it must be to carry on a war under those conditions. I think the primary requisite in Imperial defence must be a common pattern of arms, equipment, and stores.

Then there are some further questions on page 16 of the memorandum.

CHAIRMAN: It has been suggested that we leave those at present to stand over until they have been considered by the sub-committee of experts.

Mr. SMUTS: I do not think that in what I have said to you you will think I am approaching this question in any niggardly spirit, but we know the magnitude of this problem of South African defence. A great deal of the work will have to be done in the immediate future by our Union, and I think if our Union undertakes simply to reorganise its military defence on a proper and efficient basis, that should be the furthest we should go. No doubt the future will probably afford openings in other directions, but that, I think, is the furthest we should go to-day, not because we are not willing to go further, but because we do not think we have the capacity to go further in view of the task before us.

CHAIRMAN: Do you wish to say anything, General Hertzog?

General HERTZOG: No, thank you. I think our case has been very well stated.

CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I had better read the questions, not putting them to you exactly in the form of resolutions, because these are in a sense provisional, but assuming that they are generally agreed upon—

(1) Is each part of the Empire willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it to take its share, should it so desire, in the general defence of the Empire?

(2) Shall the war establishments of units of the Dominion forces be assimilated as far as possible to the approved war establishments of units of the regular forces?

(3) Will the Dominions endeavour to organise their existing forces so as to be capable of mobilising in accordance with the above establishments for a common Imperial object?

(4) Will the Dominions adopt—and here I suggest we should put in the words “as far as practicable”—the field service regulations and training manuals issued to the home regular army as the basis of the organisation, administration, and training of their troops?

(5) Are the Dominions prepared to adopt, as far as possible, Imperial patterns of arms, equipment, and stores.

I may assume that on the general lines of those questions you are generally speaking agreed.

Now the question comes as to what our further proceedings should be. I do not think that there will be any advantage in holding a meeting of the full Conference to discuss the questions arising out of Part III., as to the proposals for the development of the Imperial general staff. I think it will be best that a sub-committee of experts should be formed as soon as possible, and that it should proceed to deal with the various questions both with regard to Part II. and Part III., and until a committee of that kind is prepared to make at any rate an interim report to the full Conference I do not think it would be worth while for the Conference to meet again on this military side.

We are not able to meet to-morrow because there is a meeting of the Cabinet in the morning, and I am afraid Mr. Haldane and I will have to attend. On Saturday is the naval review. Monday is a bank holiday, and Mr. McKenna has to be down at the Isle of Wight with the King, and therefore I suggest that we should meet next on Tuesday, at the Foreign Office, at 11 o'clock, for the purpose of dealing with the naval side of the question. By that time, either on Saturday evening or on Monday, the Admiralty will be able to present a paper which Mr. McKenna desires himself to explain and develop to the members of the Conference, and that will be the subject of discussion on Tuesday next.

The only point remaining is as to the composition of the sub-committee which is to consider the details of this army organisation. Of course it will be open to any member of the Conference, if it pleases him to do so, to sit on that Committee, and we shall place no embargo on any member sitting. It is suggested that General Nicholson should preside.

[Adjourned to Tuesday next at 11 o'clock.]

AT THE

FOREIGN OFFICE.

THIRD DAY.

Tuesday, 3rd August 1909.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The EARL OF CREWE, K.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies
(*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. R. B. HALDANE, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. R. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Canada:

The Hon. Sir F. W. BORDEN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia and Defence.

The Hon. L. P. BRODEUR, K.C., LL.D., Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

Australia:

Colonel the Hon J. F. G. FOXTON, C.M.G., Minister without portfolio.

New Zealand:

The Right Hon. Sir J. G. WARD, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Cape Colony:

The Right Hon. J. X. MERRIMAN, Prime Minister.

Newfoundland:

The Hon. Sir E. P. MORRIS, K.C., LL.D., Prime Minister.

Natal:

Colonel the Hon. E. M. GREENE, K.C., Minister for Railways and Harbours.

Transvaal:

The Hon. J. C. SMUTS, Colonial Secretary.

Orange River Colony:

The Hon. A. FISCHER, Prime Minister.

General the Hon. J. B. M. HERTZOG, Attorney-General.

Colonel J. E. B. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Lord LUCAS, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.

Sir FRANCIS HOPWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.

Major-General J. S. EWART, C.B., Director of Military Operations.

Brigadier-General G. F. ELLISON, C.B., Director of Organisation.

Canada:

Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Australia:

Colonel W. T. BRIDGES, C.M.G.

Captain W. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

New Zealand:

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

South Africa:

Brigadier-General G. G. ASTON, C.B.

Colonel P. S. BEVES.

Mr. H. W. JUST, C.B., C.M.G., *Secretary.*

Mr. H. E. DALE,

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O. } *Assistant Secretaries.*

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I am sorry you have had to wait so long, but the First Lord's train was unavoidably late. What we propose this morning is that the First Lord shall give some explanation of this Admiralty memorandum which has been circulated, and, without any preliminary observations on my part, I will ask him to do that; but I understand that it will be the wish of the delegates, when they have heard the First Lord's statement, to adjourn in order to consider any observations which they may wish to make upon it, and, of course, if that is so, we shall fall in with that proposal. I will ask Mr. McKenna, without further preliminaries, to proceed.

Mr. McKENNA: Gentlemen, Lord Crewe has explained to you why I am late, and I beg to offer you my apologies for having kept you.

We started upon this matter in a certain amount of difficulty, inasmuch as we could not exactly tell what each of the Dominions would wish for itself to do with regard to the Navy, and, therefore, any suggestions which we have to make are only put forward in the most tentative manner in order to meet, so far as we can see, the circumstances of each Dominion. I have set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the memorandum the conditions as we understand them. Taking paragraph 2, first of all, we state, what of course everybody would admit to be a truism, that a certain force to which all contribute gives you the greatest power at the smallest expense; but in paragraph 3 I venture to refer to the various circumstances of the Oversea Dominions which have to be borne in mind. Nobody recognises more fully than we do at the Admiralty that you have to take other things into account besides strategy, and the representatives of some of the Dominions may naturally—I may be wrong, but it seems to me so—wish to have some regard to a future, which may be more or less remote, when they would have a navy of their own, not a navy separate from the British Navy, but a navy which could be united with and form part of the British Navy, but which, in time of peace, would be developed by themselves, manned by themselves, and controlled by themselves. Accordingly, in paragraph 3, we indicate the possibility that individual Dominions may wish at once to lay the foundations of a Dominion Navy. Well, if that is to be done, and if you are each to have a navy, it is perfectly clear that the first thing you have to consider is personnel. Your navy must be of a kind to offer a career for officers and men. I venture to put it to you that it is no use starting with half-a-dozen destroyers or half-a-dozen submarines, or any individual type of vessel which, in the long run, cannot give you all grades of officers and men. If you are going to enlist men into the Navy you must offer them a future, and you will never get men to enlist if they know that when they are over 30 years of age perhaps, the possibility of rising in the service is gone. We, therefore, have to start upon the basis of the smallest fleet unit which will offer both to officers and men a career in life. After considerable thought, the Admiralty suggest that such a fleet unit would consist of one large vessel—(we suggest an armoured cruiser)—three smaller unarmed cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines. If any individual Dominion were to have a fleet unit of that kind, it would have an organisation which would offer prospects of advancement to the officers, and would be sufficiently large to enable schools of training to be established. Of course, it is perfectly clear that such a fleet unit could not be instituted in any Dominion at the present moment. We put this forward rather in the nature of an ideal, the beginnings of which may be attempted now, but which cannot be realised until some years hence. The advantage of a unit of this kind is not only that it offers the groundwork upon which the personnel can be formed, but also that it is capable of rapid combination with other similar fleet units. We have now, as you know, in the Far East, the Eastern Fleet; there are three divisions—the Australian Division, the

China Division, and the East Indies Division. It would be quite proper if we had three such units, as we have here described, to combine them together at any time in order to make what we might in the future call the Australasian Fleet. The base of one would be, as now, in Australian waters, of another in China waters, and of a third in East Indian waters. The greater part of the provision of this combined fleet, of which I have spoken, would, in any event, fall to the duty of Great Britain, but it is conceivable that steps might immediately be taken that one of these divisions should be put upon a Dominion basis. I am making no mention here either of Canada or of South Africa. To take an illustration, you might in Australia start, according to the extent of the burden which you are willing to bear, by providing a part of this unit. I do not now suggest that the Commonwealth Government could provide the whole of this unit, but if the "Dreadnought," which has been so generously offered to the United Kingdom, were to take the form of an armoured cruiser of the "Indomitable" type, that might be supplemented, so far as the Commonwealth Government were willing to go, by the other units. They would be manned, in the view which the Admiralty have in mind at the present moment, so far as there are Australian seamen and officers at the present time in the navy, by Australians, and, so far as the number was insufficient, we should be prepared to lend both officers and men to make up the necessary complements. That would be for immediate purposes, but, if the Commonwealth Government desired to have in future a Navy of its own, it would have to begin to take thought now for the training of its own men, and it would gradually supply more and more Australians, who would take the place of the officers and men lent by us. At the present time I do not think the Commonwealth has the means of building ships of this type; but here again, I think, steps might be taken to start works, at any rate for hulls and machinery. I do not know what the feeling is—of course you, gentlemen, can inform us upon that point—but I can imagine that the electors of the Commonwealth would be far more willing to contribute to the cost of the Navy, if the money was spent in the Commonwealth, and was not spent over here. There must always be, and it is unavoidable in a money contribution, something of the feeling, at any rate in some persons' minds, that it is in the nature of a tribute; but if the money is mainly spent at home that feeling cannot exist.

As regards the cost of a unit of this kind it is difficult for me to say what it would be in the terms of Australian prices. The figures I have given here show that for us the annual cost of maintenance of the "Indomitable" would amount to 52,000*l.* a year; each of the "Bristols," 16,500*l.*; each of the destroyers, 10,000*l.*; and each of the submarines, 2,000*l.*; but that does not cover the cost of the personnel. I have also given the figures of the personnel, which I have stated in the memorandum as 2,000; but, as a matter of fact, they would come to a little over 2,000, and would probably come to 2,300, including officers and men. The personnel figures at our price and our rates of pay would amount to 156,000*l.* a year. It will be seen that the maintenance and personnel combined would be just over 300,000*l.* a year. Then you would have to reckon the annual charge for the sinking fund and interest on the original cost of the ships, and you would further have to reckon an additional charge which would come into being for training, for hospital services, and for other subsidiary services, which, if you had a division or fleet of your own, become unavoidable. Although the total I have here given shows only something over 300,000*l.* a year, if you add interest and sinking fund and the other charges of which I have spoken, I do not think you would find in experience that the cost of such a fleet unit as this would amount to less than between 500,000*l.* and 600,000*l.* a year.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: 700,000*l.* I make it at least. I have, upon the information supplied, worked it out.

Mr. McKENNA: Of course you know your rates of pay and your charges so much better than I do. I reckoned it at rather under 600,000*l.* a year, but I daresay that with you it would cost that.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Yes, I think so. I am sorry to have interrupted you.

Mr. McKENNA: I am much obliged. If you take it at 600,000*l.* a year, it is obvious that it is a very very great advance upon any burden that has heretofore been undertaken. Now we do not suggest that this should be an immediate burden undertaken in any case. In the early days, while a fleet unit of this

sort was being built up, we should be prepared to lend any portion of the unit and any portion of the personnel which a Dominion Government did not find itself equal to bearing, that is to say, we could proportion the cost of this fleet unit to the actual means of the Dominion Government concerned. Of course, I must make one reservation upon that point. Inasmuch as it is proposed that the control of the unit should come under the Dominion Government, it would, as I think it will be generally agreed, be necessary that the major part of the unit should belong to the particular Dominion. I do not think it would really work—in fact, I know it would not work—if we were simply to hand over a unit of ours. As regards the relationship of such a fleet unit to the Home Government Fleet, whenever it was joined up with any part of the British Fleet the senior officer would take command of the whole, and so far it would be an integral part of the Home Government Fleet; but again, taking an Australian Division as an example, if that was in Australian waters it would be under the command of the senior Commonwealth officer, and would be under the orders of the Commonwealth Government. There are certain difficulties which must be apparent to everybody as to the relationship between the Home Government and the Dominion Government in its control of the combined Fleet, but when each unit was separate no trouble, of course, could arise.

Now, gentlemen, the details of such a scheme as this, if it were acceptable, would have to be worked out with very great care. In what I have said so far I have spoken more particularly with reference to the Commonwealth Government. When Mr. Deakin was in office before, I had considerable correspondence with him, and I was consequently more or less aware of what the desires of his Government were at that time.

With regard to the New Zealand Government, I do not know whether such a suggestion as I have made could be regarded as practicable at all at the present time. I think New Zealand has shown the most extraordinary generosity in its willingness to help the Home Government, but to have thrown upon it the maintenance of such a unit, or even the maintenance of the greater part of such a unit, would be such a burden that I do not know that it could be expected to entertain it at the present time. To us, as I said in opening, the preferable policy is one of simple contribution, and if New Zealand prefers for the time being to continue its present system of contribution, we should propose that, as in the case of the Commonwealth "Dreadnought," the New Zealand "Dreadnought," or as we suggest in each case "Invincible," if that were the type given, should remain in Far Eastern waters, and would form the nucleus of one of the other units which the British Government would undertake to maintain. It would offer the advantage that this ship, which has been so generously offered, would be seen in New Zealand waters, and it would at the same time be a most material relief to the Home Government, as was intended when the offer was made, inasmuch as it would give us a far more powerful ship than we have at present on our Eastern station.

The scheme is thus, as I put it before you, obviously capable of great elasticity. Provided that a fleet unit is contemplated, that fleet unit may be obtained either by the sole energy of an individual Government, or by the combination of the British Government with a Dominion Government, or in the main by the contribution of the British Government. As I have said, in the case of the Far Eastern station the scheme would work, I think, well in enabling both the Commonwealth and the New Zealand Governments to co-operate with the British Government in the maintenance of our Far Eastern Fleet as a whole.

Now this scheme is really adaptable to the case of other Governments, although perhaps not quite so immediately appropriate. We may look forward to the time when all the great self-governing Dominions will each have its own fleet unit and will each be responsible within its own waters for the defence of Imperial interests. The British Government will remain necessarily responsible for the protection of the Empire in all parts of the globe. In the case of South Africa, their interests, as I understand them, are very great in the protection of the trade route. I do not know that we should expect at the present time that South Africa could contemplate the beginnings of any fleet of its own, and therefore, while we might look forward to a future in which this was possible, for the present the Admiralty have not ventured to put forward of their own motion any suggestions for a scheme which would be particularly applicable to the conditions of the new South African Government. Their circumstances are such at the present time, that, subject to what the representatives from South Africa may say, we should regard it as probable that a continuance of the present system would be most acceptable to them. However,

we are, of course, most anxious to assist in any way we can if other views would be more acceptable to you.

In the case of Canada also we think that the fleet unit, such as we have outlined, might in the future form an acceptable system, particularly with regard to the Pacific. If we had another fleet unit of this kind on the Pacific coast of Canada we should have, under circumstances under which they could be easily united, no less than four of these divisions, and they would together constitute a very powerful fleet. I do not know what the cost would be to Canada, but I should imagine it would not be less—Sir Joseph Ward has worked out the figures—than in the case of New Zealand, and I imagine, therefore, you would find that it would cost between 600,000*l.* and 700,000*l.* a year. If that is so, I do not know whether the present time would be suitable for making a beginning, but, at any rate, we put it before you that, should you desire, here are the lines upon which a combined Imperial scheme could be worked. As I have said in opening, I speak under the difficulty that I am not quite certain what particular ideas would be most agreeable to each Government, with the exception perhaps of the Commonwealth of Australia, as to which Mr. Deakin has written to me from time to time, but with regard to the others I only put this forward as a possible solution. I assure you at the same time that we shall be most anxious, should other ideas seem to you to be more adapted to your individual circumstances, of which, after all, you must be the best judges, to offer every assistance in our power in order that the naval development of each Dominion may proceed upon the lines which are most acceptable to the Dominion Government itself. I am sure there is no other way upon which permanent naval forces can be built up.

That is all I have to say.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I do not know what course you would like to pursue in the matter of procedure. As I said, it was indicated to me that the delegates might prefer to adjourn for consideration of this paper after having heard Mr. McKenna's statement, but I should like to take your opinion with a view to our further procedure upon paragraph 15. The proposal in this paper differs somewhat from that which has been adopted with regard to the Army. In the case of the Army, as you know, a Sub-Conference was formed to consider the general questions of detail which were brought up in the Army memorandum. The proposition here is a somewhat different one. It is that the representatives of each Dominion should confer with the representatives of the Admiralty on the points of detail mentioned, (a), (b), and (c), and others which might occur to them. I should like to know what the opinion of the delegates is upon that, because it involves a somewhat different course of procedure from that which was suggested with regard to the Army.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: My Lord, I was very glad to hear your Lordship's suggestion at the opening of the proceedings to-day that there might be an adjournment to give time to consider this very important paper and the accompanying remarks which we have listened to with very much interest from the First Lord of the Admiralty. In order to enable us better to do that, if that view is adopted of adjournment, I would venture to suggest the desirability of having the First Lord's statement printed and distributed at the earliest possible moment. I did not receive this memorandum, or did not have an opportunity of reading it, until after 10 o'clock last night; I saw my colleague, Mr. Brodeur, as early as possible this morning, and we agreed that it was very desirable that we should have more time; so that if that view is accepted, we personally would be very glad indeed to adjourn for a few days if possible.

Mr. BRODEUR: I approve of the suggestion made by Sir Frederick. I notice Mr. McKenna in his statement has spoken of the advisability of having a unit on the Pacific coast, but he did not mention anything with regard to the Atlantic coast. Would he have anything to suggest with regard to the Atlantic coast?

Mr. McKENNA: I am anxious not to be in the position of suggesting to you, except in response to your own request. It is so undesirable, I think you will agree with me, that we should attempt, or appear to attempt, to prescribe to you the lines upon which you should act. I would much rather that the position was inverted, and that you should tell us the lines upon which you would like to proceed, and then ask us whether we can offer any suggestions upon that. We do not want to appear to be pressing you. I only referred to the Pacific Squadron in its relation to the

other squadrons we should have on the further side of the Pacific Ocean and the possible combination of them all into one fleet. With regard to the Atlantic side, it is so very much nearer to our own home waters, and we are so much freer consequently to send vessels of our own, that I do not think there is quite the same urgency on the Atlantic side as on the Pacific side. While both oceans alike are open to you, the Atlantic coast is very much nearer to our own scene of operations.

Colonel FOXTON: I should like to say I entirely concur in the views expressed by Sir Frederick Borden as to the desirability of seeing the First Lord of the Admiralty's remarks in print. They are exceedingly important, and have dealt in detail in such a way that the printed matter we have before us, which is very general, of course, in its application, scarcely gives us as much detail as we should wish.

As to the method proposed in paragraph 15, it seems to me that is a very excellent way of meeting the situation, because there are, I believe, divergent views as to the best method of contributing to the naval strength of the Empire, and probably it would be better that it should be done in the way which has been suggested. If we could adjourn for two days it would be so much the better.

CHAIRMAN: I am told the statement the First Lord has just made can be circulated in good time to-morrow. Perhaps, therefore, we might meet on Thursday morning.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I venture to express the hope that we should meet as soon as possible. I thought the object of this Conference was to get some sort of uniform action for the whole British Dominions with regard to the support of the Navy. If we are going to go off on divergent lines, each one with his own plan without its being discussed together, I think it will be confusion worse confounded. We have heard the address of the First Lord, and I think if we adjourned till to-morrow it would be quite time enough to consider and confer.

CHAIRMAN: If you would not mind making it Thursday, there is a meeting of the Cabinet to-morrow.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Of course another day would suit me, but I see that there is going to be a good deal of difficulty if we are going to get into divergent lines, and the address of the First Lord, if I may be allowed to say so, seemed to contemplate only one thing, and that was, the starting a little inefficient Navy by some separate Dominions. I wish to say that is not the most practical course.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: I would just like to say that I agree with Mr. Merriman on one important point. My opinion is that before we can expect to have anything in the shape of a practical result from an investigation such as is suggested in paragraph 15, we ought here, first of all, to discuss from the different standpoints the possibility, recognising the flexible conditions necessary to meet the requirements of the different Dominions, of arriving at a common base upon which the whole naval structure can be erected by all the countries; and it seems to me that if we get into the position of a Sub-Committee, investigating as to how various things can be done before they know the minds of the delegates here, it really would be anticipating to some extent and it would create difficulty afterwards. I fully recognise—I want to say frankly from the first—the different position in which both Australia and Canada are to what New Zealand is, and I take it that South Africa to some extent is in a different position to that which is suggested for those countries too. Personally I see no reason whatever why we should not, for what it is worth, give the gentlemen who represent those two Dominions the benefit of our opinion, even in the matter of what is required for their local necessities, and at the same time providing a flexible condition to meet our special requirements irrespective of these two great Dominions.

I do not want to go into detail to-day at all, in fact I am rather anxious to have the opportunity of considering the proposals, which are very valuable indeed as submitted by the Admiralty, and also to have the benefit of seeing in print the very important speech delivered by Mr. McKenna, and I think an adjournment is essential. I would not be prepared myself to go on with the question hurriedly until I have had an opportunity of considering it in its many aspects as it has been presented both orally and in this memorandum.

CHAIRMAN: I think it is quite clear that we shall be meeting the general desire of the delegates by postponing the consideration of the subjects to which Clause 15 refers for the moment until after a general discussion which may last either one day or more. We shall see how we get on with it, but for the moment we had better consider that the adjournment until Thursday will be for the purpose of the general discussion on this paper and on the First Lord's statement.

[Adjourned to Thursday next at 11 o'clock.]

AT THE

FOREIGN OFFICE.

FOURTH DAY.

Thursday, 5th August 1909.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The EARL OF CREWE, K.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies
(*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. R. B. HALDANE, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. R. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Canada:

The Hon. Sir F. W. BORDEN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia and Defence.

The Hon. L. P. BRODEUR, K.C., LL.D., Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

Australia:

Colonel the Hon. J. F. G. FOXTON, C.M.G., Minister without portfolio.

New Zealand:

The Right Hon. Sir J. G. WARD, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Cape Colony:

The Right Hon. J. X. MERRIMAN, Prime Minister.

Newfoundland:

The Hon. Sir E. P. MORRIS, K.C., LL.D., Prime Minister.

Natal:

Colonel the Hon. E. M. GREENE, K.C., Minister for Railways and Harbours.

Transvaal:

The Hon. J. C. SMUTS, Colonial Secretary.

Orange River Colony:

The Hon. A. FISCHER, Prime Minister.

General the Hon. J. B. M. HERTZOG, Attorney-General.

Dr. T. J. MACNAMARA, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty.

Colonel J. E. B. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Lord LUCAS, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.

Sir FRANCIS HOPWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.

Major-General J. S. EWART, C.B., Director of Military Operations.

Brigadier-General G. F. ELLISON, C.B., Director of Organisation.

Brigadier-General A. J. MURRAY, C.B., Director of Military Training.

Canada:

Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Australia:

Captain W. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

New Zealand:

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

South Africa:

Brigadier-General G. G. ASTON, C.B.
Colonel P. S. BEVES.

Mr. H. W. JUST, C.B., C.M.G., *Secretary.*

Mr. H. E. DALE, } *Assistant*
Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O. } *Secretaries.*

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, you will remember that at our last meeting the First Lord of the Admiralty gave an explanation of this Admiralty Memorandum* which has since been printed and circulated to the delegates. That Memorandum and the First Lord's commentary upon it are the subject of discussion for this morning, and I think we had better proceed to raise the various questions connected with it.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Necessarily what I say, and properly I suppose, will have to be from the Canadian point of view. Some observations were made the other day as to the desirability of reaching general conclusions, and I suppose that is extremely desirable, but it would seem to me that a frank presentation of the points of view of the different Dominions would be necessary in order to reach any general conclusions such as are possible and which would be of any use.

In the first place I wish to say, what I hinted at I think at the first meeting of the Conference, that the instructions given to the Canadian delegates were very specific in the form of a Resolution unanimously adopted by the Canadian Parliament, and while reference has been made to that Resolution, and one or two sentences quoted from it, there are other parts of the Resolution which I think have a special bearing upon the matter now in hand. I will read the Resolution if I may: "This House fully recognises the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence. The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury for Naval and Military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence. The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organisation of a Canadian Naval Service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference," (this is a point I wish to call the attention of the First Lord and the Conference to) "and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, and the peace of the world. The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises, the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the Empire."

From this it would appear that there are three points or principles laid down. The first is the principle that Canada desires to do whatever she has to do herself, and to retain local control thereof, but at the same time she wishes to do it in direct connection with and under the guidance and supervision of the Imperial authorities. Secondly, she specifically, and Parliament specifically, indicates that what they wish to do is along the lines laid down by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the Conference of 1907. So that it would seem to me that those instructions are specific, and that so far as Mr. Brodeur and I are concerned, we have no mandate whatever to go beyond that. Lastly, I take it that the last clause means that in the event of an emergency of any kind Canada will not necessarily limit herself to expenditure of her own money herself, but will be prepared

* See page 29 of *Dominions*, No. 16.

to go to any extent possible to assist the Mother Country to meet that emergency or crisis such as it may be. Therefore, as I have already said, our duties are somewhat clear and our responsibility is to that extent limited.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Prime Minister, and I think other prominent speakers, elaborated their views and quoted from the views of the First Lord of the Admiralty, as presented by him in 1907, and perhaps I might quote very briefly from the Prime Minister's speech. The Prime Minister said, "Lord Tweedmouth, of the Admiralty, speaking on the question of what should be done by the Self-Governing Dominions, ignored the question of training ships altogether" (this is in 1907) "and insisted that we should at once make provision for the defence of our harbours. This is the language he made use of on that occasion, 'I understand that, in Australia particularly, and in South Africa, it is desired to start some Naval Service of your own. Perhaps I might suggest that if the provision of the smaller craft, which are necessarily incident to the work of a great fleet of modern battleships could be made locally, it would be a very great help to the general work of the Navy. You cannot take the small craft such as torpedo boats and submarines across the ocean, and for warships to arrive in South Africa or in Australia or in New Zealand or in Canada, and find ready to their hand well-trained men in good vessels of this kind, would be an enormous advantage to them. It would be an enormous advantage to find ready to their hand men well trained, ready to take a part in the work of the Fleet. There is, I think, the further advantage in these small flotillas, that they will be an admirable means of coast defence; that you will be able by the use of them to avoid practically all danger from any sudden raid which might be made by a cruising squadron. What I should like to point out, is that, above all things in this work, the submarine is probably the most important and the most effective weapon. It is the weapon with which you can meet a Fleet attacking during the day, or individual ships attacking by day. I am assured by my advisers at the Admiralty that it is a most important weapon, that it has already reached very considerable development, and it is one on which we may rely with great confidence.' In another part of his observations he spoke as follows:—'Then I should like to say a single word on the further point of the provision of docks and coaling facilities in the Colonies. The enormous development of the modern warship entails important consequences. These great modern warships require large docks to contain them. I think we are getting on well with the provision of docks. At this moment in our own country and abroad we have, I think, 13 Government Docks which will take in our largest ship, the "Dreadnought." I think in the course of the next two years we shall have four more, which will make about 17 altogether. But it is very desirable that we should have in all parts of the world docks which could take such great ships, supposing they were to meet with an accident or were to receive damage in war.'"

Then the Prime Minister said himself further—I will only read a word or two:—But all these spasmodic efforts would not, to my mind, furnish a proper defence of the British Empire. How should that be done? We should proceed as we have done with our Militia. We should consult with the Naval authorities of the British Government, as my honourable colleague the Minister of Militia (Sir Frederick Borden) has done with the Council of Defence in London; and after having organised a plan, we should carry it out in Canada with our own resources and out of our own money. This is the policy which commends itself to the Government."

So that we are limited, I think, so far as this discussion is concerned, to the terms of the Resolution. Now, I am not prepared to criticise and I am not capable of criticising this Memorandum which has been laid before the Conference, and which has been so fully explained by the First Lord. I would, however, desire to say one or two things. I think that we are bound to consider local conditions in the different Dominions, at any rate we must do it in Canada. We have two coasts; we have the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts, separated by 4,000 miles of territory, and I take it that it would not be at all in accordance with, and it would not satisfy in any regard the ambitions of the Canadian people to place a Naval unit on one ocean and rely entirely upon the protection to be derived from the great Navy on the other ocean. On the Atlantic Ocean we have seven-eighths of the whole of the population interested in such matters. It is country which has been much longer settled than the West, and full of people who are taking a very keen interest in all these matters, and if there is anything at all in the idea, as I believe there is, of

allowing the people to see for themselves what they are doing in these matters of defence, it would not satisfy in any way the ambitions, as I have said, of the people on the Atlantic border to have a Navy exclusively limited to Pacific waters. I make this observation because it was suggested, I think, in the speech of the First Lord, that possibly Canada might wish to contribute assistance in that direction.

Mr. McKENNA: May I interrupt to say—to start with that?

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: To start with that, certainly, but I am inclined to think that we should start on both coasts at once, that that would be the only thing that would satisfy our people thoroughly. There is a great anxiety to begin at once the work of laying the foundation of the establishment of a Navy or Navies in Canada to co-operate with the British Navy. I am not going to detain the Conference by going into the details of this matter, but we were sent here, Mr. Brodeur and myself, by the Prime Minister for the purpose in the first place of consulting with the Admiralty with reference to the best way in which we could begin the foundation of a Navy and at the same time to co-operate in doing it with the Admiralty and with the British Navy.

My colleague, Mr. Brodeur, will be able to state whether he has any proposals to make, and I would like to leave that part of the discussion to him; but I would say before concluding my remarks that it seems to me we should at once—again I offer this suggestion—appoint a Sub-Committee under Clause 15 of your Memorandum to begin the work under the different headings (a), (b), and (c). I cannot see why this should not be done immediately. (a) is “The means of reconciling the local control of the Dominion Government over its Naval Forces with the principle of unity of command in time of War.” It does not make any difference what peculiar or special line any one of the different Dominions is to take. That is an important principle which must be settled. (b) is “The best means of arranging for the close connection as regards ships and personnel between the local and Imperial Naval Forces which is essential to enable these Forces to attain the same standard of efficiency.” The same observation applies to that. And (c) is “The arrangements to be made during the transitional period pending the establishment of a complete Fleet unit.” Therefore, I would hope that the work suggested by this clause might be taken up at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. BRODEUR: Lord Crewe, I may say as a complement to what has been said by my colleague, Sir Frederick Borden, that immediately after the Canadian Parliament adopted the Resolution which he has read, it was decided by the Government, and I think you, my Lord, were so informed, to send the Minister of Militia and the Minister of Marine to England to confer with the Admiralty and with the Imperial authorities as to the best way of carrying out this Resolution. Some time after that decision was arrived at by the Government we got an invitation to come to this Conference. We accepted the invitation in order to have the opportunity by attending this Conference of having the benefit of the views of the Imperial authorities as to the best method to be pursued in the establishment of our local forces.

I may say that I have read with very much interest the Memorandum which has been prepared by the Admiralty. I am very glad to find out in that Memorandum—and I am sure the people of Canada will appreciate the fact—that the Imperial authorities are willing to recognise that on this question of Naval Defence local autonomy should be preserved. There had been in former years, I think in 1902, a proposal that a contribution should be made. I think, if I remember right, that at the Conference of 1902 a formal proposal to that effect was made by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The Canadian Government, by its Prime Minister, was obliged then to declare that such a settlement of the question of defence would not be acceptable to the Canadian people, and we have seen, Lord Crewe, by the Resolution which has just been read by my colleague, that Sir Wilfrid was certainly then voicing the sentiments of the country, because the Canadian Parliament unanimously decided that under the present constitutional relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions the payment of a contribution to the Imperial Treasury for naval purposes or military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence. But I was very glad to see that at the Conference of 1907 the idea of a contribution was, if not entirely abandoned, largely abandoned by the Imperial authorities, and the suggestion was made then that Canada and the self-governing Colonies should start a

system of home defence by which new sources of strength could be established for the defence of the Empire.

I must say that even before 1907, and as a consequence of the statements which were made at the Conference of 1902, we started immediately the nucleus of a Navy. We bought a cruiser which we put on the Atlantic coast, which was not a very large one it is true, but which was a beginning tending to show our desire and our wish to carry out the idea which had been announced at the Conference of 1902. I might perhaps say at the outset in connection with that, that we are obliged to maintain in Canada on the two coasts, the Atlantic and the Pacific, a Fisheries Protection Service. Formerly that service was carried on by the Imperial authorities, but we took it over some years ago and we have to maintain there a certain Fleet. The Fleet that we have now there is not sufficient for the purpose which we have in view. We would require certainly on the Pacific coast at least one if not two cruisers for the purpose of protecting our fisheries not against our own people, but against Americans, who are coming into our waters under the Treaty of 1818, and who are poaching. On the Atlantic coast our protection is fairly good and probably sufficient. On the Pacific coast it is not sufficient and would require to be increased. This service would require to be increased, as I have just stated, and in connection with it we are anxious to establish a local Naval force which would probably be useful in case of war. We have got a large population of seamen, of fishermen, who could be trained, and whose services later on in case of war could be called upon. I am sure that they would be willing to tender their services for the general defence of the Empire, and the training which they would receive in that way would be, I think, very advantageous, and they would probably form the nucleus of a reserve of great usefulness.

In 1907, as my colleague has just stated, it was declared by the First Lord of the Admiralty that some local force could be established in the different Dominions that could be of use for the defence of the Empire. I need not repeat what has been said; my colleague has just read the most important parts of the statement which was then made by Lord Tweedmouth. Lord Tweedmouth was suggesting the construction of docks, the establishment of flotillas composed of submarines and torpedo boats, and some other local services of the same nature. We would be willing to go even further than that, and to establish some cruisers, not, perhaps, cruisers of the same importance as the one which has been suggested, but we would be willing to improve and extend that service on the proposition which was then made. I do not know whether the Admiralty are still of opinion that submarines and torpedo boats would be of great service. We would be very glad if we could have some conference with the Admiralty as to that. At all events, we are willing to extend and to improve the existing service, and to increase it, in order that it should be not only a local service, but that it should be also a local force. Perhaps there may have been some misunderstanding as to the nature of the Resolution which we passed, because we used the words “Local Naval Service”; but I may say that the intention of Parliament there was not only to undertake some service like the construction of docks, signal service, hydrographic survey, taking over some dockyards, and establishing naval militia, or some similar organisation, but we had also in our minds the creation of local forces which might, in case of war, if Parliament so decided, or the Government so decided, be joined to the British Navy for the general defence of the Empire.

Now I should be very glad if the Admiralty would take into consideration the Resolution that we have passed in the light of the facts which I have just mentioned, and tell us in what respect we could carry out satisfactorily the opinions of the Canadian Parliament, and at the same time carry out the project which would be acceptable to them and which they would consider advantageous to Canada and the British Empire. That would be my suggestion. Perhaps it is not necessary that we should discuss those proposals at the General Conference, because it will not be a matter of great interest to the Representatives of the other Colonies; but if you, Lord Crewe, thought that my suggestion could be acceded to, of a conference at the Admiralty, we would be willing to confer with them in order to carry out the Resolution we have passed, and in order also to obtain from them their advice as to the best way of carrying out our idea and the idea of the Imperial Government.

A suggestion has been made—and perhaps I might refer to it in passing—which, perhaps, also the Admiralty could examine when we come to discuss with them the details of our Resolution. It is not absolutely in conformity with our Resolution, but I think it would be acceptable to the Canadian people, and so in that view

the Admiralty might perhaps consider the matter. It has been suggested that we might have cruisers which in time of peace could be used on the trade routes as merchant vessels, but which should be built under the supervision or under the instructions of the British Admiralty, and should be armed or provided with guns which might be put on board if war happens. Those ships would be, during peace—as I have just stated—used to carry the traffic between Canada and Great Britain and would be subsidised by the Government. I am under the impression that if such cruisers were acceptable, and were considered as a good means of defence, it would be, perhaps as far as we are concerned, a very good way of contributing our share to the defence of the Empire. Those vessels, as I have just stated, would be used as trade carrying vessels during time of peace, and would be manned by persons who had had very good naval training—naval officers of repute—and manned also by a crew which, in case of war, could be utilised for the purpose I have just mentioned. I do not know about the merits of that suggestion from a strategical point of view, but as far as I am concerned, I would like very much to get the opinion of the Admiralty on such a proposition. We are in Canada—and I am glad this fact has been recognised by the statements which have been made to us and by the Admiralty memorandum—in very exceptional circumstances. We have got two coasts to defend, the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts. We have been trying, in later years especially, to divert the trade of Canada towards Great Britain. Almost all our trade was previously going through the United States—even the trade with Great Britain. We have been obliged, in order to divert the trade towards Canadian channels, and towards Great Britain, to make a very large and extensive expenditure. We are now building two other trans-continents in order to carry out our aim. We have built canals which have cost the country very large sums of money, and which we have been obliged to make in order to make the grain from the West pass through the Canadian route. We have been obliged also to improve our lighting system at a very large cost without charging anything to the shipping which frequent our ports, and that shipping, I might say, would be 95 per cent. of British vessels. All those improvements, all those works which have been done have been done for the purpose of increasing our trade with Great Britain, and thus cementing more and more the relations existing between our Colony and the United Kingdom. I think we have been somewhat successful in the efforts we have made in that direction. We are willing, I repeat, to cement more and more the relations which exist between the United Kingdom and Canada, not only in a commercial way, but also in such a way as will show that we are willing to take a larger share in the defence of Canada, and consequently in the defence of the Empire, and relieve the British taxpayer of so much of his burden.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have heard the two delegates from Canada who have stated their case, I am sure you will agree, very clearly and fully, and I will now ask Colonel Foxton to say a word in regard to Australia.

Colonel FOXTON: My Lord Chairman and Gentlemen, the proposals made by the Admiralty, and as amplified and gone into more in detail by the First Lord, appear to me in their general tenour to give expression to the ideals which Australia has before it in regard not only to its own local defence, but also in regard to that share of the defence of the Empire which we are desirous of engaging in. I am glad to say that it has been recognised, and I think the principle can be laid down with perfect safety from the Imperial point of view, that such vessels as may be provided and manned by Australians in the future shall be in peace time under the administration and financial control of the Commonwealth Government. It has been suggested in some quarters that upon the outbreak of war the control of an Australian Squadron such as I have indicated ought to pass automatically to the Admiralty, and locally speaking to the Admiral on the Australian or Eastern Station. I think myself that if that is seriously contemplated it would be regarded with some degree of objection in Australia. I may possibly be fighting a mere shadow in this matter, because it has been conceded, I think, at the first meeting of the Conference, that it would be always at the option of any Dominion to take any share, or a prominent share, in any warlike operations of any kind. So that it would meet our national sentiment, so to speak, that the control should not pass automatically, but that it should be clearly by a voluntary act on the part of the Commonwealth Government and Parliament.

CHAIRMAN: I think it rather depends upon the meaning you attach to the word "automatically." The Admiralty's suggestion was that, assuming the Commonwealth joined in a war, then the control should pass.

Colonel FOXTON: That is exactly the point of view.

Mr. McKENNA: May I add that what would really happen would be that the senior officer present would take command of all; it might be an Australian officer.

Colonel FOXTON: It might, of course.

Mr. McKENNA: But, of course, that pre-supposes that the Commonwealth Government did in fact accept the situation of joint action.

Colonel FOXTON: Quite so. In working, the two processes would come to exactly the same thing. Of that I am convinced. So much for the question of control.

The whole question, from our point of view, resolves itself into two heads; that is, the local or Australian defence measures and those which are of an Imperial character. They are, of course, so closely linked that it is almost impossible to separate them, but for the purposes of discussion here, and on similar occasions, it is desirable to regard them from the two different standpoints. Taking the Imperial view of it first, we desire, of course, to take our share in the maintenance of the supremacy of the Empire at sea all over the world, to maintain the trade routes which are of such vital importance both to the Motherland and to the outlying Dominions. The offer which was made recently from the Commonwealth to the Imperial Government was not in the nature of, in any way, dictation, because that is too strong a word, or a suggestion that any particular kind of vessel should be provided by Australia, but it was rather to be taken, I think, as an expression, in a concrete form, of Australia's desire to do something more than she has hitherto done in the maintenance of the Imperial supremacy at sea.

Passing to our local defence, if I may so call it, it must be borne in mind that we have a very large coast-line, approximating to something like 8,000 miles, and that Australia's physical conditions are of a peculiar character. Very much the greater part of its population is scattered around the southern and eastern seaboard, and it may be said, roughly speaking, that the whole of the inter-State trade is sea-borne, that is to say, with the exception of mere passenger traffic there is practically no inter-State trade or intercourse overland; mails and passengers are practically all that pass from one State to another. So that our coastal trade, more especially on the southern and eastern coasts, is of vital importance to us.

It is when we come to consider details in regard to the Admiralty proposals that one begins to have doubt as to whether in an endeavour to blend, as it were, the two views of which I have spoken—that is, the Imperial view and the Australian view—if the proposal were carried out some loss of defensive power might not result; that is to say, whether proposals such as we have here of one armoured cruiser, three unarmoured cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, would be sufficient for all our purposes in regard to the defence of our very large coastal trade and our widely scattered ports along our coasts. The general impression, so far as I have been able to gather it—I do not mean the impression of Australia, but the impression gathered from experts—has been that our immediately local needs would perhaps be better met, irrespective of the Imperial question, by a larger number of vessels of a smaller type. That is a matter of detail in which it is possible there might be some modification.

Mr. McKENNA: Certainly.

Colonel FOXTON: Of course, I quite understand that the proposal for a Fleet unit is a very desirable one from the Imperial point of view, especially when it is borne in mind that the Australian Fleet unit, when complete as a purely Australian unit and provided entirely by Australians, would always act in co-operation with two smaller units, which together would form an Eastern Fleet, and so give great strength to the Imperial Navy in eastern waters. But I notice that it is suggested that we could not at once, and I think that goes without saying, provide such a unit; it would take us some years to do so, certainly a period which would run considerably over the period of our existing agreement with the Admiralty for the subsidy. Just a word in regard to that. I am not aware that the matter, as there are still four of those 10 years

to run, has been very widely considered as to what, in the event of such proposals as these being adopted, ought to be the attitude of Australia in regard to that agreement at the end of the 10 years. That agreement is generally regarded from the point of view of the public as being an agreement for 10 years only, and that there is a necessity for some other provision to be made if it is to continue beyond that period. If I remember rightly, that is not so. I think there is 12 months' notice to be given in any case for its determination, and if no such notice as that is given it goes on automatically and indefinitely as to time, but in speaking of the agreement one naturally falls into the attitude which is generally adopted by the Press and public of regarding it as an agreement for 10 years only. We should hope that by the time those 10 years have expired matters would have so developed under the proposals which are now being made, and which under certain modifications may be adopted, and that circumstances would have so altered as to render the question of the continuation of that agreement, which has its obligations on both sides, perhaps not necessary, and that it would be practically superseded by the very much increased provision which Australia would then have made for not only its own coastal defence, but for taking part in Imperial operations. I just wanted to say that by way of parenthesis.

Our immediate needs appear to be that we have, speaking from the Australian point of view purely, to protect the commerce which is local commerce, which is valued at 170,000,000*l.* or thereabouts annually, and which, as I have pointed out, is of vital importance to Australia. It is also, let me remark, of considerable importance to the Motherland, because, I think, with perhaps two or three exceptions, the whole of the steamship companies which are engaged in that commerce are owned, and I think principally directed from the Mother Country. If, with the very best expert advice, it is considered that the Fleet unit which is proposed is the best which could be devised with the means at our disposal for the defence of that coastal trade, I should say there would be very little hesitation in accepting the proposition. I notice it was suggested by the First Lord, to use his own words:—"To take an illustration, you might in Australia start according to the extent of the burden which you are willing to bear by providing a part of this unit. I do not now suggest that the Commonwealth Government could provide the whole of this unit, but if the Dreadnought which has been so generously offered to the United Kingdom were to take the form of an armoured cruiser of the 'Indomitable' type, that might be supplemented so far as the Commonwealth Government were willing to go by the other units." I quite realise that that contemplates that the Australian Government should in the meantime not be asked to provide the whole of this unit. But I do not quite gather from that suggestion as to which portion of it should be so provided by the Commonwealth Government and which by the Imperial Government as a mere tentative measure until we can rise to the full extent of our obligation, assuming it to be adopted.

Mr. McKENNA: Perhaps I may interrupt you here to say that if you look at paragraph 15, sub-paragraph C, of the Admiralty Paper, it says: "The arrangements to be made during the transitional period pending the establishment of a complete 'Fleet unit' should be the subject of discussion by a Sub-Committee, that will be one of the points.

Colonel FOXTON: Then I understand no actual suggestion as to that has yet been made?

Mr. McKENNA: No.

Colonel FOXTON: Then that leaves matters of detail for discussion.

I wish just to remind the Conference that there is always present with us in Australia—and the same remark applies with equal force to New Zealand—the fact that we are in close proximity to the teeming millions of two great Asiatic powers. The awakening of the East has very great significance for Australia and New Zealand, and although at present everything is as one could wish from the Australian and New Zealand point of view, we have to look far into the future, and there might be possibilities in that connection which it is necessary for us to make provision for. So that while we are anxious and desirous to assist in the Imperial view of the naval question, we are also deeply concerned with the matter so far as it affects ourselves and our immediate neighbourhood.

I do not know that I have anything more to add at present, except to say that generally speaking, the scheme, subject to the modifications I have indicated, would, I think, be very acceptable to Australians and adaptable to Australian circumstances.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Crewe and gentlemen. I would like in the first place to try and make the position of New Zealand clear from the standpoint of the British Empire. I do not for one moment believe that it is possible in future naval battles that may arise for New Zealand to be brought into active engagement until an arbitrament between the enemy and the Old Land itself has been settled many thousands of miles away from us. The spirit which prompted the offer of the New Zealand Government on behalf of its people recently to the British Government was prompted by the conviction that the true interests of the Empire were best served by seeing that the heart of the Empire itself was made impregnable. I want to make it quite clear that we were not animated by any desire to see or encourage combat anywhere. The primary object we had was to help the Old Land to ensure peace by making it plain to all outside Powers that the overseas Dominions were prepared to help in a material way in case of need, and it was with the object of attaining what I may term peace conditions by being prepared on a war basis that we were prompted in making that offer.

Now, Sir, I want to say that the second proposal in the Memorandum of the Admiralty states very much more forcibly and eloquently than I can profess to do what I believe to be the right system in the interests of the British Empire.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Paragraph 2.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Paragraph 2—yes. "If the problem of Imperial Naval Defence were considered merely as a problem of naval strategy it would be found that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity of command." Now, Sir, with all respect to my friends the representatives of the two great and powerful overseas Dominions, Canada and Australia, who have spoken previously to me, I want, at least from my point of view, to say what I think and to have the benefit of the views of the members of this Conference upon the best means of providing a world-wide British Navy and one that beyond all question would provide for the future protection of Great Britain and Ireland and of her overseas Dominions, and necessarily, among those, New Zealand. For local purposes such as the preservation of fisheries or other local interests local Navies are no doubt valuable, but, in my opinion, unless an expenditure of at least 50 millions is incurred, before many years such navies would in times of war be next door to useless, with all respect to the gentlemen who have preceded me. I mean, of course, from the standpoint of maintaining in all parts the scattered British Territories and so ensuring the safety of the British Empire as a whole. I do not wish for a moment to obtrude my views upon the well-considered opinions which they have so well expressed on behalf of their countries, but I am talking of it from the standpoint of Empire in relation to the important considerations that we have in a distant country such as New Zealand, and what affects that country more or less affects the others. I think it would be a mistake on the part of any of us here to idly compliment the previous speakers on the views they have expressed on behalf of their countries, because I am firmly of the opinion that we should arrive at some basis giving flexible conditions that would give the supreme command of a world-wide Navy greatly strengthened not only in the eyes of the British people, but in the eyes of outside countries, to the Admiralty to control in times of war. I recognise as fully as every other gentleman who has spoken the undeniable right of the Colonies—their indisputable right in times of peace—to do whatever they think proper in any local Navy they may have, or indeed in any local matter that is not interfering with the prerogatives of the Crown in the Old Country. I will take Australia as a case in point. Sir, I think it is desirable that here we should have the views of one who does not belong to Australia and has nothing to do with the representation of it. Take Australia as a case in point, and here I want to say with all due deference that I am rather sorry that the Admiralty has recommended that a unit should be formed for Australia. Assuming Australia with a unit or a portion of a unit such as is talked of, if one of your swiftest steamers were starting at the Port of Sydney to steam round the Continent of Australia it would take it over a month to get back to the point it

started from, and Australia, which is 1,200 miles from New Zealand, is proposing a system which in my judgment in times of trouble would be useless to them as well as to us and would be rather a weakening instead of a strengthening of the British Navy. If this unit or portion of a unit is established in Australia what, in the event of trouble by influx of the Eastern races, is it going to do? As a matter of fact it would at once hand the whole concern over to the Admiralty. If there was a testing point anywhere distant from Australia, then while the local unit was travelling, the British Navy itself would be settling the troubles of Australia in all probability without the assistance of that unit. It is quite true it will be at home in Australian waters, but it must surely be admitted, that unless it could be actively used, it could not be of any practical service. Although we are a smaller country, yet if we were to go on the same lines, New Zealand would be in the same position. At the best, when you have the Australian unit established, the Port of Melbourne or the Port of Sydney, or the Port of Adelaide, may be taken as the points they would be chiefly at. No one supposes for a moment that the Eastern races are to come to the settled places in order to get to the interior of Australia, and if you are to transfer the whole organisation you are establishing there for defence purposes to preserve Australia to some place far distant on the coast to guard against an inroad of an Eastern nation, as far as my judgment goes one unit would be quite inadequate to meet the purpose required. I know the Representative from Australia is voicing the sentiments of his people, and I feel perfectly certain he cannot alter it without the authority of the Australian people,—but looking at the whole fabric of Empire, for the defence of which we are met here to try to establish a satisfactory scheme and one which will show the outside nations to-day that they have not only to reckon with the Old Land in the matter of its Navy, but that the younger portions of the Empire are prepared to come to its assistance in a practical way and so preserve peace during the years to come—if we want to do something of that sort then I think we should go in a different direction to that which has been suggested. I regard it to a very large extent as a weakening of the British Navy, this suggestion of portions of units which are talked of for the oversea Dominions. Take this important question of the control of the sea between New Zealand and England or between Australia and England. I do not profess for a moment to have that practical knowledge that men connected with the Admiralty possess, but, to my mind, as a matter of ordinary common sense, to suppose that a number of cruisers or battleships from other countries are to go and traverse oceans many thousands of miles away from where you have to feed your people in England, is to suppose that they have not got common sense themselves. Where the principal protection of the oversea routes will take place will not be off the coast of New Zealand or Australia, although doubtless some protection may be necessary there, but it will chiefly be at some point where a concentration of the enemy can make use of whatever ships they can spare during the time of war so as to prevent your people obtaining the food supplies you want. In other words, I take it that part of their policy will be to endeavour to starve England. In my opinion our course from the Empire standpoint is to let the outside world see that we are prepared to give material assistance to the Navy itself, allowing the supreme control to be in the hands of the Admiralty; so that what we recognise to be absolutely beyond all question is that in time of stress upon our own coasts, should it arise, their protection should pass to not a unit from the East, not a portion of a unit from Australia, not to a unit in Canada, but that it is to the whole Fleet itself wherever that Fleet may be upon which we can look for our protection, and without the right of call we would have the support we have always had from the Old Land, from its Navy, if instead of one or two ships we recognised that the whole British Fleet in all parts of the world is what we are looking upon for our defence and assistance and for the keeping clear of the sea routes between the oversea Dominions and these Islands. Then I say that the oversea Dominions would be much safer than by attempting to provide local fleets admittedly inadequate for sustained resistance.

Sir, I will not attempt for a moment to go into the higher domain of what I would call the strategical side from the British point of view as against other countries. My own belief is, and I express it with a very great deal of diffidence, that if we had the moral courage to-day as a community, that is the Empire community, to say to the Old Country: "We are prepared to give you either in money or ships," and the whole of the oversea Dominions were to do it, Germany, which is labouring at present under such stress from its internal financial condition, or any other nation would realise the uselessness of attempting a building programme

in competition with Great Britain; if they had Great Britain and the oversea Dominions to count upon as one you would quickly have a common understanding that building was no longer necessary. If we are going on with this piece-meal disintegrating system of trying to create a local Navy for the purpose of conceding to the demand made by local people of having ships built locally or having expenditure made locally, I say with all diffidence to the gentlemen who represent the different countries here, that we are not going to do in the eyes of the world what I think this Conference could do if it were to arrive at a decision as to providing a United Navy and developing the land proposals for local defence which must come into consideration. If it went out from this Conference on behalf of the British Government and the Governments of the oversea Dominions that we could keep well ahead of any other nation—then we would do something to prevent this terrible system which is going on of the over-building of navies, drawing the life blood out of the taxpayers in these older countries. In that way you would do more to cure it and more to maintain the supremacy of the British Navy, and consequently the British Empire, and in turn the preservation of the peace of the world, than anything else we can suggest.

Now, Sir, I have made these remarks in consequence of what I have heard to-day, and I am thoroughly cognisant of the difficulties from the fact that local sentiment to a very large extent must be considered. Australia has offered a Dreadnought. Might I be perhaps so unwise as to suggest that you should accept and ask them to build it? New Zealand has offered a Dreadnought—one or two—and we will not recede from it as far as we are concerned—but I want to make it clear that it has not been suggested with any idea of trying to show that one country is doing something different to another. It has been suggested that that course should be followed irrespective of what Canada or Australia may do in the matter of local defence. I suggested it with the idea of showing that there is unity and all the possibilities of concreting that unity in the future—that there is unity at present on behalf of at least two of the self-governing countries to help the Old Country to make the British Navy stronger under the supreme control of the Admiralty, both in times of peace and war.

Now, Sir, Colonel Foxton has referred to the agreement, and I want to say a word about that. We are contributing 100,000*l.* a year. The money value of that in my opinion is like a drop of water in the ocean. I look upon it from the money standpoint, though important, as not by any means so valuable as if we joined in a definite line of doing something towards actively providing a ship or ships for the Imperial navy. From the sentimental side of showing that we are doing something in the matter of helping the British navy, we talk about the money contribution from that standpoint, and say that we are doing something, and there I think it practically ends.

Now, I believe, Lord Crewe and gentlemen, New Zealand as a country would be better off to have no agreement at all; it would be better for us to build two Dreadnoughts—incomparably better for us to allow the British Navy to have two Dreadnoughts, which amount on the basis of 3½ per cent. interest on the cost of the two of them if they were to cost 4,000,000*l.*, and with a 4 per cent. sinking fund, which I propose to ask Parliament to provide, so as to eliminate the payment within our lifetime, at the outside 20 years—the cost of the two, including the provision for the repayment of them, would come to 300,000*l.* a year. I do not care personally how anyone may view the action of the country which I represent, and may say it would be preferable to have given so many hundreds of thousands of pounds a year, as against the offer of a Dreadnought. From my standpoint it is of no consequence if we pay 300,000*l.* a year for interest, and for an extinction fund, whether we pay it direct to the Admiralty or whether we pay it in the nature of interest and sinking fund for two ships of war of the value of 4,000,000*l.* sterling; but there is this material difference—and it is so important that it is why I suggest to you that you should accept the offer both of Australia and of New Zealand of a Dreadnought. It is not only the effect that it has on the people in our own country, and the people in other countries too, that we have something in the Navy itself which we are able to point to, even though that is placed in the East as part of a unit, as has been suggested by the First Lord of the Admiralty (which I think is a very good idea indeed), but it is the moral effect it has, not upon the people of to-day alone, but upon our children who are to follow us who will be able to point to the fact that we are a part and parcel of the British Navy itself, and that it is to the whole Navy that we must look for assistance and for the defence of all parts of the

British Empire. As a matter of common sense I know—and I do not believe there is one gentleman sitting round this table who will take exception to the statement, that it is the preservation of the shores of England that the Navy will have to look after. If by any mischance any foreign Power did destroy the Navy and get hold of England, I know just as well as I am sitting at this table that our trouble in the overseas Dominions would then in reality commence. Though our land forces, small though they may be, would fight to the last, and if necessary die at their posts, as I believe every one of them would, yet if our Navy was beaten on the seas, let it be in the North Sea or close to the old land, our numbers in the British Dominions would infallibly go up, and for that reason, instead of talking of preserving New Zealand from the influx of Eastern races, I want to be perfectly sure that there is no chance of a foreign foe from across the Channel being able to get its foot upon English territory, because the day he does that he has got the Dominions in his power and the territory of Canada, the territory of Australia, the territory of New Zealand, and the territory of South Africa, although every one of us would, as I say, fight to the last point. Each country would be nearer to the flying of some other flag over its territory; that would be the case if England fought a naval battle and lost, and no naval units in such a case at any of the overseas Dominions would then be of much value. So the whole matter comes back to the point: Are we preparing to-day at this Conference to suggest a system which will ensure a certain victory should a contest of strength upon the sea take place? We are doing nothing of the kind, in my opinion. We should get ready as a combination of the great Old Country with the overseas Dominions to show the outside world that it is no use trying to get up alongside the British Navy in the matter of a shipbuilding programme, because if we keep them far behind on a shipbuilding programme, it goes without saying that so long will we keep away the possibility of a contest in the North Sea, or wherever it may be, and by so doing make it impossible for England itself to succumb. It seems to me to be infinitely safer and wiser to have ships of a great British Navy at the different points in the overseas Dominions, each country helping by contribution or by ships as it thinks proper. My opinion is that the Empire would be far safer, and that the overseas Dominions would lose nothing locally by helping to make a great Imperial Navy. The position would be a stronger one all round, while the great moral effect in the matter of building programmes in other countries would, to my mind, be incalculable.

I want further to say that what Canada has suggested in another respect, I think is a wise course. Mr. Brodeur suggests that it would be a good thing if they could have the opinion of the Admiralty on the matter of cruisers, for the guidance of their people whom they represent here and to whom, in the ordinary course, they require to submit the matter through their Parliament. If the British Admiralty accepted the Australian Dreadnought, and in the words of Mr. Deakin which were cabled home some time ago, "or in any other form that the Admiralty desired," I regard it as of ten thousand times more importance to Australia—and the same applies to New Zealand and all the other portions of the Dominions too—that not only the British people and our own people should know that an "Invincible" was in their Fleet either away in the East or somewhere else. What it means in reality is that the Fleet, wherever it may be, is one, and that its great protecting force is over each country, and for its people to realise that they own a part of the Fleet, and the way to let them realise they own is that they should pay for it. Moreover, the protection that is being given is worth paying for. If local defensive purposes were carried out on the lines suggested by the Admiralty, with local cruisers if you like, and submarines, if you want them, and torpedo destroyers, if you desire to have them, at various points on the Australian coast as supplemental to the main proposal of strengthening the British Navy, by all means do it. But we should realise that our future is dependent upon the successful defence of England itself in the first instance, and that it is our duty to help in making that defence stronger, so as thereby to keep open the overseas routes. If we do this it will be best for us in the days to come (which I believe will come) when the Eastern races are a trouble to Australia and to my own country, and when a great Power in the East, now happily attached to England, so far as peaceful conditions are concerned, may be detached from it. I say that a new situation and one of great portent to the British Empire will then arise. A day will arrive in the history of the British Empire when in the interests of the widely scattered portions of it, England will have to consider whether it is advisable to maintain an alliance with a country—against which I am not saying a word—which for the moment is a friendly ally. For one moment, let us think of the position. In the Pacific we have, apart altogether from the Eastern races, a great

country practically overshadowing Australia and New Zealand. It is a cosmopolitan country it is true; but the United States of America to-day is building its Navy up in a wonderful way, and has already decided to have a Pacific Fleet. We should have no doubt as to who are to be the controllers of the Pacific in the years to come. It should from every standpoint be the British Empire. In my humble opinion we cannot ignore the conditions of the attachment of Japan to Britain at present, or of the marked developments that are going on in that other great country to which I have alluded. Those islands in the Pacific, which are to some extent ignored, must be of vital consequence to the future of this country. Some of those islands will become the object of jealousy on the part of some other countries in the future as certain as we are sitting here. Who is going not only to police, but to protect all the growing and extensive British interests in the Pacific? If New Zealand were to take up the line of saying that we would not give a Dreadnought but would prefer to have part of a unit, what, under such circumstances would be the use of New Zealand talking about policing the Pacific during times of peace? As a matter of fact, when peace prevails, anybody, so to speak, can police the Pacific. But in times of trouble of what use would be a portion of a unit, if we had it in New Zealand or Australia, to help to maintain the freedom of our people and to protect the great and increasing British interests in the Pacific? From a strategical point of view in the future many of the islands in the Pacific will be invaluable to the Empire itself. What use are these scattered Fleet units going to be in times of trouble compared to the whole power of the British Navy, even though it may not be on the spot? When it is not on the spot it will be in the position, by reason of its great strength, of indicating, so to speak, to other countries "hands off!" and surely a recognition of the undesirability of putting hands on is much safer and cheaper, and from every point of view better for us than having weak units that could be overpowered, and which could not maintain a position they were created for. In my judgment, it would be a great mistake for us to embark upon a system at this Conference which would lead us into a false position on the assumption during times of peace that we had something that was going to be of use to us in war. What we want to do is to see, if the time should arrive for war, that the great central authority, the controlling authority, had a Fleet representing all portions of the Empire of such a calibre that it would make any two nations at least study and consider a very great deal indeed before they decided to embark on an undertaking against it at all. If we should go away from this Conference with a Resolution affirming unanimously to our respective countries, even though some of them may not be able to carry it out, that while conceding the undoubted right to each of them to establish their own system of local external defence and recognising that we must establish our own system of internal defence (which is being inquired into by a Committee under Mr. Haldane, with the view of advising us as to the safest and most efficient course for us to adopt)—if we should go away from this Conference with a Resolution affirming to every portion of the self-governing Dominions their undoubted right to establish any system of local defence which they may think proper at their own cost (and rightly so from that standpoint), but recommending in addition to that that it is desirable for the purposes of the general protection of the Empire itself that there should be a system of contribution either in ships or money (whatever the countries may think proper) to the general Navy, then I think such a recommendation coming from this Conference to our respective countries would have a salutary and inspiring effect, certainly in my own country (and I am speaking from the standpoint of my own country, which has already agreed to the Government's proposal made to the British Government) even though we cannot arrive at a unanimity of action and system on account of local conditions. Then in the matter of Empire Defence we would in the future have a much easier road to go. The public men in the different countries would be reminded by their people who, I feel sure, are determined to see that they took their part in the building up to a greater extent than now of a British Navy at a greater cost to the overseas Dominions than any of them are providing for now. The beginning of continuity of system is a great desideratum for us to achieve at a Conference such as this.

I listened with very great pleasure to the suggestion made by Mr. Brodeur on behalf of the country he represents. It is a suggestion I want to endorse and to commend to the consideration of the Admiralty, and, indeed, of the British Government. Apart altogether from what we are doing in a material way, either in providing money or ships, at the present moment, I believe if you want to bring in an active coadjutor, if I may use the expression, to the Navy, and

to do something which is of real value to the oversea Dominions, and which is to be available in times of war, let us co-operate and have some assistance of trade ships as an auxiliary to a Fleet, trading across the Atlantic or the Pacific to Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. Let us co-operate and have something of that nature, if it can be shown to be of practical use in times of war. In any case we have to provide something of the kind quite independent of the Admiralty, and when we are doing it for mail and passenger purposes, if we could have those ships built under the eye of the Admiralty, not by any of the Governments of the countries, but let private people embark upon it and comply with the conditions required to make those ships useful in time of trouble, I think we should be doing something of considerable value, speaking from the point of view of New Zealand, and in time of peace it would be of great commercial value to England, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. Unless it could be made use of in times of war, it ought not to be considered, but I want to endorse the suggestion made by Mr. Brodeur that that matter should be considered by the Admiralty, with a view to advising upon that point, which, personally, I regard as of some consequence. The Admiralty, possibly, has already considered it.

I am not going to further take up the time of the Conference. I have simply tried to express from the standpoint of New Zealand, and from the standpoint of the Empire, as regarded by me as the representative of New Zealand, what appears to be the strongest course for us as an Empire to take.

I want to say that I most cheerfully fall in with the proposal made by the First Lord that the Dreadnought, if one only is taken from New Zealand, be regarded as a portion of a unit of the Eastern Fleet, which I understand periodically would visit our country and so give an opportunity to the people there really to see in practical form what we have never had up to the present in our waters, a first-class British battleship—we want something more than fifth-rate ships, or whatever they may be, which we know while they fly the flag of the Old Country would really in times of stress not be very much use in doing what was actually necessary for the protection of the great interests they represent.

I do not suppose that at one meeting of this Conference we can in the time focus the ideas of the different representatives and arrive at anything like unanimity of action, but I feel that after we have heard the opinions of the representatives of all the countries here we may then be able to evolve at this Conference some enveloping or practical system which, while bringing about the adhesion of the oversea Dominions to the parent land, will be of great service in showing the world at large that while talking of unity and co-operation and co-ordination, we are doing something practical which can be given out by the British Government in their own way to the world of the results achieved at this important Conference.

Sir EDWARD MORRIS: Lord Crewe and gentlemen, I only desire to make a few observations. In the first place, owing to the size, from the point of view of population, of the Colony I represent, we would not for a considerable time have any special interest in the acquiring or building of any Navy, and perhaps for that reason it might be considered presumptuous on my part to offer opinions in relation to a policy involving a large expenditure. Merely then, as a member of this Conference, and with that understanding, I should like to say first, that if this Conference endorses the principle of separate local navies, then, as far as I am capable of judging, the memorandum issued by the Admiralty, as well as the statement by the First Lord, seems to me to carry out that principle in the amplest and in the most satisfactory way. At the same time I venture, but with considerable hesitation, to suggest that the view expressed by the last speaker, Sir Joseph Ward, might well be considered with very great seriousness, first, as to whether local navies will effect what it is hoped they may, or whether it would not be better to have a strengthening of the Imperial Navy.

Now it was stated at one of the sessions of this Conference that, owing to the great differences in point of geographical situation of the various oversea Dominions, there are considerable conflicts of interest, and that it might possibly happen that England might be at war with some Power in which one of the oversea Dominions—take the case of South Africa, which was, I think, mentioned—might not be in a position to take part, would not care to take part, and might not be able to take part, and if they have a local Navy it might have the effect of endangering the unity of the Empire if that were so. As I say, it is a very important matter and is well worthy of consideration, but I mention it with considerable

hesitation because I feel, of course, that I am not able to bring to the consideration of the subject that technical and scientific acquaintance with the subject that others at this Board have.

There was one matter that Mr. Brodeur referred to, and which has been amplified and supported by Sir Joseph Ward, in which I think there is a great deal, and that is in times of peace the utilisation in the interests of the Empire by the oversea Dominions as well as Great Britain, of those cruisers towards trade development between the oversea Dominions and Great Britain. I cannot understand why that could not be done—if cruisers are to be built why they could not be utilised in times of peace by all the oversea Dominions contributing subsidies—annual subsidies if you will. That is a matter I think well worthy of consideration.

As regards Newfoundland, as I said at the opening, of course, we are not in a position to build any Navy, even if that principle were carried out, but recognising the value to the country of being a part of the Empire we have for the last ten years established in Newfoundland a branch of the Naval Reserve and it is the intention of the Government further to extend that in the future.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I would like to ask one question, if I may at this stage. I did not understand that this Conference was to decide the question as to whether a certain policy should be adopted as to local navies or contributions. It seems to me that it would be a very undesirable thing if a vote were taken at this Conference with any intention of deciding any such principle as that.

CHAIRMAN: I do not think in one sense this Conference is empowered to decide that, or indeed any proposition of a purely general character. We have laid it down all through as our opinion that each Dominion must form its own ideas as to the manner in which, if it chooses to contribute to Naval Defence, it thinks it can best do so, and of course it is obvious that no Dominion Government can be bound in any way by any Resolution or expression of opinion passed at this Conference. Those expressions of opinion, of course, have their distinct value, but it is perfectly clear that no Dominion Government would consider itself bound by any expression of that kind.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: But, my Lord, passing such a Resolution here might create difficulties which I think it is quite unnecessary should be created.

CHAIRMAN: I think it is a matter for consideration whether it would be wise for this Conference formally to pass any definite Resolution at all. That is a matter I should like to let stand over, if the Conference would allow it.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I would like to begin by apologising for speaking at all, because, of course, we in South Africa are not in a position to give any promises or to make any pledges whatever, because we are not an entity that can do it. I would say also that, even if we were, it is extremely difficult for a Colonial Minister to come over to London and without a clear mandate from his Parliament to pledge it to any course of action. By doing so he at once hands over a most dangerous weapon to the opposition which exists there, and it will be recollected, of course, that a Prime Minister did come over here and very generously offer the British Government a battleship. As soon as he got back he was eliminated, because the people had not given him any sort of sanction to make a promise like that, and therefore it is a little difficult to discourse here, sitting in London, about what is the best thing to be done 6,000 miles away. We are not all as happy as Sir Joseph Ward, because he has his people in his pocket; he says they all think with him, I wish I could think that at all events. But I think I may say that in South Africa, speaking for myself, and I think I may say for my colleagues here—there is only one opinion amongst us—that is, of people who have thought over the matter at all, and that is that it is our duty as we grow up to manhood to take our fair share in the burdens which keep the whole Commonwealth together. That opinion, I think, we are all at one upon, and how to give effect to it is, of course, what we should very much like to consider, and I venture to express the hope that this Conference will have some practical result towards that end. I would submit that in order to attain a practical result which would be of any value it would be rather an advantage if His Majesty's Government

would give us what is called a friendly lead, that they would express, after this Conference perhaps, and formulate the different plans which have been suggested, and indicate what in their opinion, not by forcing it upon the people at all, would be the best and most practical thing.

I may say here again that there is not the slightest doubt that in this question of Naval Defence, South Africa is, perhaps, the most important place in the whole world, not from itself, but as a station for Naval Defence, because in the event of any unfortunate disturbance taking place, all the trade of the world, all the trade of the Eastern world at any rate, which is extremely valuable, will have to come round South Africa. We have got a Power with a magnificent port, in fact two ports—the French and Germans have both got magnificent ports on that line of trade which will have to be watched; and from South Africa go every week steamers that take about three-quarters of a million of treasure. The hunt after the treasure ships of Spain across the Atlantic will be nothing to what the race will be to capture the treasure ships from the Cape in the event of a war. I do not at all agree with Sir Joseph Ward. My reading of history is not that wars begin in that way; wars begin always by the State which has the power trying to grab its neighbour's commerce, and to say that merely because you have lost the command of the sea that is going to stop is the greatest mistake in the whole world, because the French ships inflicted tremendous injury upon English commerce long after they had lost the command of the seas, and one or two cruisers getting down South with a friendly port to shelter them might inflict untold damage upon Great Britain, and certainly upon South Africa. I just mention that by the way.

There have been several proposals put forward, and I would like to say at once that sitting here, of course, as an impartial person in this matter I cannot see what argument there is to be used in favour of these small Navies. They will only be a source of the utmost weakness in time of war. They will be inefficient in time of peace because you cannot arrange for the training of the men. I am sure that anybody who went down to that Review the other day, if they were struck with nothing else, must have been struck with one thing. It is not the ships; you can buy the ships if you can borrow enough money. I believe one of the best battleships in the world belongs to Brazil, but what is the value of it? The thing is, you must get the men, and you can only get the men by having a large Navy that is prepared to do as we do, to go dashing about with their destroyers with their lights out sinking one or two every now and then. In that way you breed up a class of men that you cannot breed up in a small Navy. You will get a lot of stocky fellows; you have not the money to send them to sea to keep them going, and you build up a lot of stocky fellows who would be no use, and when they are handed on to the British Fleet they will be only a source of weakness to it. I implore anybody who is in favour of a small Navy to read a book that gives an account of the Russian Fleet travelling round to the East, Rojdestvensky's Fleet, called "Rasplata." You will see there all the points of inefficiency which spring from a small Navy of disjointed squadrons not under the same control: and that very thing which has been brought forward, I think, by Mr. Brodeur about an idea of having ships used for trade purposes was tried by the Russians. They had their volunteer fleet, and if you read that "Rasplata," you will see that some of the most inefficient units in the whole Fleet were these merchant vessels that had been brought into it, which had been this volunteer fleet; they were most inefficient, and the whole thing is an object lesson to anybody who wants to start a Navy in a disjointed fashion. I should be extremely sorry to see my sister Colonies starting upon that line, because I believe they will only be wasting money and will do no good whatever to the Nation—to the whole British Commonwealth. They will do no good whatever by separate Fleets even if they could manage to get and pay for them. They will be far more expensive than if you join in the maintenance of the British Fleet, and either in peace or war I do not think they would be exactly what one would wish to see. Then, of course, the idea has been started—I think Sir Joseph Ward is rather responsible for that—of what I might call the spasmodic gift. They are very grand and very nice all these gifts—to borrow money and impose a tax upon your people—borrow money and then present something to the British Government. Naturally, every Colony tries to compete with the other, and says: "So-and-so has given a silver watch, I am to give a gold one." That is really the principle of that, but there is nothing regular; you do not build up any real safety for the Empire in those spasmodic gifts. I admire them very much indeed, but I do not think that is any real strength. What we want, in my humble opinion, is to get some regular contribution to the Navy, so that we could

feel that it was our Navy, that it was the Navy of the British Commonwealth, not only of England; and that can only be done by giving some sort of contribution. Now the objection, of course, to that is that the minute you suggest that, there are in every Colony a large number of people opposed to it, and invariably the opposition will at once say: "You are proposing to give a tribute." Well, it is difficult, of course, to get over that, and all those people—and there is a large majority in every Colony, I think, who would prefer to do nothing at all—always will seize upon that argument; but still I think the attempt would be worth trying if it could be put upon some line so as to minimise that tribute idea. It has suggested itself to me that there may be a logical basis found for it, because you have the Trade Returns of the British Empire here. Now, there is no doubt that if the British Navy is anything it is a police. It is a policy of insurance for our trade, and if it was not for that every Colony would, of course, have to pay more in every possible way; if it was not for the British Navy, and if every one of the British Possessions were to pay only a percentage on that trade, you would get a very large sum indeed. It is surprising if you see the Trade Returns: Australia 114 millions—I leave out the hundreds of pounds, and I am only able to take 1906, because the returns are not added up for the others yet—Canada 108 millions, South Africa 76 millions it is now 70 millions—New Zealand 33 millions, and so on, West Africa 13 millions, and they do not contribute a halfpenny, the Straits Settlements, and Eastern Possessions 115 millions, and they contribute nothing towards the Navy, the West Indies 19 millions, and they also contribute nothing—Cyprus a million. Every place ought to contribute something to the Navy, and if they did it on the basis of the insurance I think to a certain extent you would get over the tribute idea. You could certainly recommend it to a Parliament as being a logical thing. If you have some logical basis for it it is not a matter of sentiment then, and you can then say that every place is contributing on the same basis. If you could get it down to that and get rid of the separate Navy idea you would really be doing something and then you would have a share in the Navy. The amount that would be contributed on a very small percentage would be sufficient to pay for four or five units which might protect our commerce, because I must confess—apart from what Sir Joseph Ward has said. I have seen it all in the newspapers about striking a blow at the heart of the Empire and concentrating your Fleets here—the great advantage always was that Great Britain had her ships all over the world and that wherever there was a row there was a Naval Lieutenant and a gunboat turned up. That strengthened the Empire enormously, although this exhibition here of the Great Fleet no doubt was a fine warning to the Powers of Europe, and an incentive to them, still it has not the effect in a distant part of the Empire that having ships stationed there would have, and you would have them always handy. Certainly, as regards South Africa, we are in a peculiar position. We have the Germans close by us being brought there, and we have also got the Portuguese on the other side in one of the most valuable ports which, in time of war, if it was seized by a Foreign Power, would be a most uncomfortable thing for us, and, therefore, you ought to have sufficient ships there to bottle those two places at once as soon as ever anything occurs. Therefore, I must say I should like to see something which gave us a call upon having a certain number of ships there. Of course, if war broke out you do not suggest that the Germans would be asleep; they would have some ship out there that would probably manage to snap up a couple of mail steamers with two millions of treasure on board. All those things ought to be provided for, and, of course, if we are to ask you people to provide for them we ought to give a share, I think.

I would just like to say that there are different points I wanted to make. One was that South Africa is an all-important station for the British Navy, and you cannot say too much about the importance of having that strongly held by the British Fleet. The second is that local fleets in my mind are out of the question if you want any efficiency, that they are the most unsuitable, and the least efficient mode of providing for anything like united action: that direct contribution is preferable, but that there is a great deal of difficulty in getting over the idea of tribute, which is very distasteful, and which, of course, is used by everybody who wishes really to make no contribution at all.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Crewe, I did not want to interrupt Mr. Merriman, but I would not like it to be supposed that I entertain the ideas upon two matters which apparently he says I do. First of all, I have never suggested at any time

that the centralisation of all the ships of the British Navy should be round the British coast. I do not entertain any such opinion.

Mr. MERRIMAN : Then I misunderstood you ; I beg your pardon.

Sir JOSEPH WARD : I think the system of having ships at the different portions of the Dominions similar to what the Admiralty has now is itself not only a very valuable one indeed, but a necessary one, and in any case I have long contended that the whole Navy should be under the administration of the Admiralty, who can be depended upon to have their ships placed where they consider them to be necessary and also with efficiency at the spots where they place them. I would not like it to be supposed that I was not familiar with what had transpired with regard to the taking of merchantmen in times past. What I was trying to convey, and I think Mr. Merriman will agree with me, is that if under the system of units this preservation of the trade routes is expected to be carried out by them in different portions, Australia, for instance, is over 12,000 miles away from here, and in my opinion they would be next door to useless for the protection of Australia if they had to follow the oversea routes to ensure the safety of the numerous merchantmen *en route* to England, where food supplies are required, and what I wanted to convey was that it would probably be in nearer waters and not over the scattered thousands of miles of ocean where an enemy would do the real practical damage to England. I want to reaffirm that, because I believe the protection of these trade routes of necessity would require to be looked after very much closer home if they were endeavouring to starve England, although I do not for one moment suggest they would not be attacked on the broad oceans in distant parts, as in all probability they would.

Colonel FOXTON : I was referring to our coastal trade, which is inter-State trade. We have 170 millions a year, the dislocation of which would be a most serious matter for us even for a temporary thing.

Colonel GREENE : Lord Crewe, I do not think it is necessary to make any apology for speaking. We have been asked to attend this Conference, and from the remarks you yourself have made just now we are not expected to bind our several Colonies, but we in South Africa are just as much interested in the discussion, and I think the primary object is to enable us when we return and desire to place any proposal before our people to know that we have had the benefit of discussing the matter before at this Conference table, and are, therefore, in a better position to lay the whole question before them, and to get an intelligent decision upon it.

After listening to the remarks that have been made I must say, with Sir Joseph Ward and Mr. Merriman, that I would on behalf of South Africa, if I was discussing the question with a view to binding South Africa to any particular course of action, strongly deprecate this idea of local units. To my mind it is absolutely contrary to the whole principles upon which the British Navy has operated in the past. These local units could only be used for one purpose, and apparently it is only intended that they should be used for one purpose, and that is for defence. Now, as I understand it, our Navy is used for offence, and we do not want the Navy to be used purely for the purpose of defence. Then when we come to analyse it, supposing these units are established, and we are requested to establish one of these units in South Africa, would it be sufficient to protect us in the time of trouble? To my mind it would be totally inadequate for that purpose. There is another very serious objection to it that if we are to have the sole control of these local units in each part of the Dominion, then it is absolutely incumbent upon us to pay the total cost of these units. I can hardly see how it is consonant with our dignity for us to say that we are to have absolute control in times of peace and practically in times of war of the units in our own particular waters when the British taxpayer is possibly contributing the greater portion of the cost of the unit. Lord Crewe, it appears to me—and I believe it is an axiom that everybody in this room will endorse—that if we desire to benefit, as we must, from the establishment of the British Navy we are all bound in duty to contribute our share towards the establishment of that Navy. I think when we really sit down to consider the whole question and have the views of the Admiralty placed before us we will all be irresistibly forced to the conclusion that our greatest safety lies not in the establishment of these units of the Navy in different parts of the Empire but in having one strong Navy

to command the whole of the seas. If we had these units, even if we could afford to bear the expense of these units and to establish them, say in South Africa, they would be utterly useless for the purpose of protecting our trade and they would have to remain in South African home waters to look after our ports there, dockyards, &c. They would be of no assistance for our trade. Therefore, what would we have to look to? We would have to look to the British Navy as in the past. Then is it not far better to look to the British Navy for the whole of the services and to make, so far as we are able to make, I will not say an adequate return for the services rendered, because we cannot hope to do so for many years to come, but make some return commensurate with our wealth for the services so rendered.

Now, I do not think, we in the little Colony of Natal are any different to any other section of the British Empire. We have recognised, as I believe every other portion of the Empire has recognised, the obligation we are under to the British taxpayer to make some return for the services which have been rendered to us. Whenever the question has been brought before Parliament, although we have had opposition, and perhaps too many oppositions, I have never heard a soul yet oppose it on the ground that it has been a tribute. In fact it has never been opposed at all, and I am perfectly positive in any of our Parliaments when we come to consider this question both Government and Opposition will look upon it as a simple duty that we owe to the British Empire to make some return for the assistance which we receive from the Navy. We have made a return, and it may be totally inadequate, but if it is based upon the population basis it is an adequate return for the service, because we have contributed, according to the amended return now before us, I think, 7s. 6d. per head of our European population towards the Navy. I look upon it as an unsatisfactory way of making the return, and personally, although Mr. Merriman does not agree with it, I admire, and I am sure everyone must, the action of New Zealand, and I think it is a pity to throw cold water on such a proposal. The contribution of a Dreadnought to the Navy, I think, creates a magnificent spirit throughout the whole of the Empire. We have to consider sentiment just as much as we have to consider business in a matter of this description; and I agree with Sir Joseph Ward that it is a magnificent thing for the people, not only in New Zealand, but in the rest of the Empire, to realise that they have got a portion of that Navy which they themselves have contributed. It may be that in 20 years it is obsolete, and in 25 years, according to Sir Joseph Ward's scheme they will have redeemed the original cost, but be that as it may, it creates a precedent, and I should only hope the day will not be far distant when South Africa will be able to do the same sort of thing.

But really, to come to business, I think, so far as South Africa is concerned, we cannot hope to contribute in the same way as the other portions of the Dominions can. We have not got a maritime population there. We cannot hope to contribute the men that Canada, and possibly Australia and New Zealand can. But we ought to make our contribution in some other way. In the first place I think we ought to recognise the responsibility in South Africa for such of our own coast defences as the Imperial Government through the Admiralty or the War Office should consider necessary—apart altogether from our contribution to the Navy. Cape Town and Simon's Bay are to-day fairly well protected; I understand fresh guns are shortly to be put in position there at the cost of Cape Colony. In Durban, which is to my mind an exceedingly important position, I suppose we have got, at any rate so far as Africa is concerned, perhaps the best coal or better than we can get elsewhere, and it would become exceedingly valuable in time of war. Means ought to be taken to protect that port. I think we in South Africa ought to take that burden upon our own shoulders, and recognise it is a duty. I believe there has been a report by Sir Matthew Nathan who is looked upon as an authority upon this question, upon the subject of the defence of that particular port. The burden would not be an overwhelming one, and I think we ought to undertake it; but in addition to the whole of that give something—I do not mind whether you put it in the shape of a direct contribution to the utmost of our means to the Imperial Navy, or whether to get over the difficulties that some may have (Mr. Merriman apparently has) on the question of it being a tribute we pay it in the shape of an insurance. I do not mind in what shape we pay it so long as we—I am perfectly sure the people of South Africa when it is placed before them will agree to it—make some adequate return to the Imperial Navy for the services rendered to us. As I said before, I do not think it is consonant with our own self-respect for us to accept services at the cost of the British Admiralty, when we are well able to make some contribution towards lessening the contributions from people in the motherland. If it is to be in the shape of an insurance, I see no objection to it,

provided as I stated just now, we will agree to make an adequate return. In South Africa we have to realise—and the people do realise—that if our trade is stopped by any hostile cruisers outside our ports, or on the way to England, we could not hold out very long. We are absolutely dependent upon the British Navy, and I think that our whole aim and object, not only in South Africa, but through every part of the Dominions, should be to strengthen that Navy by every means in our power, and to let any hostile Power, or any Power that may become hostile, realise that if need arises, the question is not going to be decided between that Power and the United Kingdom, but between that Power and the United Kingdom and its Dominions over the seas, and that they are willing to the utmost of their power, even in times of peace to contribute in proportion to their means towards the maintenance of a Navy which will retain the command of the seas.

Mr. SMUTS: This question of Naval Defence of course opens up very large issues—questions of public policy and of naval strategy, and so on, which have been partly referred to here to-day, but which I do not feel myself fit to discuss at all. Indeed, at the last Imperial Conference two years ago, when this subject was fairly fully discussed, you will remember that the Conference found itself unable to come to any conclusion, and failed to agree on any suggestions that were made. I doubt whether even on this occasion it would be possible to come to any resolution which would find general acceptance. I think we must consider the circumstances of the various Oversea Dominions, and see how far it is possible to shape a policy which might apply to them in their varying circumstances. In South Africa, of course, we have this position, which has been stated by my colleagues, that we cannot bind any Government. We are only expressing personal opinions, which perhaps are not of much value, either, under the circumstances. We also feel that our principal question is that of military defence. For reasons which we have already discussed on a previous occasion the question of military defence is pressing and urgent in South Africa; but at present the case as to naval defence is different, because as Mr. Merriman stated, we are situated on one of the naval highways of the World. We feel even if we are somewhat remiss in our duties, there is the British Fleet to help us, and to see us through, because we are, fortunately for us in this case, situated on this highway and the British Navy will have to see us through. Therefore, I think, naturally, we would take more interest in that side of the question, namely, military defence, which would fall as a burden upon us, and feel inclined to postpone the consideration of naval defence which will lie largely with the Imperial authorities. There has been some criticism here to-day of the attitude of the Imperial Government in suggesting this Fleet unit which is embodied in this, if I may say so, very able Memorandum of the Admiralty. I do not think that criticism is at all justified, because, as I read this Memorandum, it is perfectly clear what the policy of the Admiralty is. That policy is laid down in the second section of this document that from a Naval point of view, from the point of view of Naval strategy, the Admiralty is perfectly clear that one big navy is the proper fighting unit for the British Empire. It is accurately stated here in the most unequivocal language, but the document goes on to consider other very important matters, namely, the opinions that are held and sometimes very strongly held, in other parts of the Empire—circumstances which, no doubt, must influence the British Government in shaping a Naval policy for the whole British Empire. That is why, as I understand, as a concession to local opinion, and in view of local circumstances, this suggestion is made of a Fleet unit for those parts of the Empire which do not find themselves able to contribute in any other way to the Imperial Fleet. I think that is why this suggestion is made here. It is made for the benefit of those who want to avail themselves of this suggestion. Well, it is necessary too, because we have heard very strong opinions expressed here to-day, and on a former occasion they were put very strongly two years ago, when Sir Wilfrid Laurier stated most categorically that Canada would not contribute any money towards the maintenance of the British Fleet. I find that the same thing is laid down in the resolution of the Canadian Parliament; and I find that the contribution which has so far been made by Australia is leading to serious difficulty in that country. Therefore I think the British Government is perfectly justified in putting forward an alternative which is second best, which they do not approve of very thoroughly probably, but which they put forward for the sake of those Colonies who wish so to contribute.

The Fleet unit has been argued here very fully already. My colleagues from South Africa have expressed a strong opinion against it. Sir Joseph Ward also has

expressed a very strong opinion against this Fleet unit, and I believe the details of the scheme do not find very much approval, either from Canada or even from Australia. We in South Africa have this feeling—I think that would be our common feeling—that as we are situated on a Naval highway, a merely local force would be no good. We do require a big Navy to defend our shores in case of war, and it would be, I think, from that point of view, a wrong policy for us to start a little Navy of our own which, in any case, would be a portion of the British Navy whenever the occasion for action arose. I do not think this idea of a Fleet unit, however strongly it may be applicable in other cases, would apply to South Africa at all for the reasons I have stated.

Then, of course, I can also quite well see that this local Fleet, for any Oversea Dominion, may possibly lead to difficult questions in future in regard to command. I have listened to what has fallen from several speakers here to-day, and it seems to me that already there is a good deal of divergence of opinion on this point. Mr. Brodeur thought the local Fleet of Canada ought to come under the British command in case of war, if the local Government or Parliament so decided.

Colonel FOXTON: We quite agree with that in Australia.

Mr. SMUTS: But that is a point of view which the British Admiralty would not willingly accede to.

Colonel FOXTON: But they do.

Mr. SMUTS: Then I do not understand the discussion which took place at the Imperial Conference two years ago in that way. It is assumed here that in case of war the local Fleet automatically passes under the command of the Imperial authorities.

Colonel FOXTON: I put that clearly and I understand from the First Lord that that was not so.

CHAIRMAN: I will explain once more what I take it the position is. The theoretical right (I call it theoretical) and also in a sense the practical right, of any Dominion to refuse to join in an Imperial War, is safeguarded. I do not think the position is very likely to arise, and I confess I do not quite know what the position of the Dominion would be if it did arise. But that theoretical right is safeguarded.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I may mention that the question was raised first of all by myself. I then referred to a proposal that was made to pledge ourselves to send an expeditionary force. I know perfectly well in the event of a war it is no use saying we will not join in, because the first thing they will come and do is to seize all our goods; but sending an expeditionary force was an entirely different matter.

CHAIRMAN: That was quite a different matter, and I think it is clear that the difficulty of not taking an active part in a campaign would be infinitely greater in the case of a Fleet than in the case of an expeditionary force. I think we should all agree that that is so. But it has been the desire of the Dominions that that right should be safeguarded, and therefore the proposal has taken this particular form.

Mr. SMUTS: I was touching on the point because it seemed to me there was some divergence of opinion on this question. It is a question which would have to be settled in case these local Navies came into existence, so that no friction would arise on the occasion when friction would do most harm; that is, at the last moment. That was the first suggestion as to the local Fleet unit for any Colony.

Then there is this other suggestion, that some Colonies may feel so disposed towards the British Fleet as to make a contribution towards the British Fleet. I can feel that there is a considerable difficulty against that system too. Mr. McKenna expressed some of those difficulties in the speech he made to us, and I notice from the discussions that took place two years ago also that there was a good deal of feeling about that. In some Colonies they refuse to contribute because they think it against the principle of autonomy which has been frequently referred to, and I can understand that there may be some difficulty in the way of making these contributions—difficulties which in the

future are likely to increase because there will always be trouble about the amount that has to be contributed. It will be difficult to find any principle on which it is possible to assess the amount, and there will always be the feeling that it is really a tribute paid to the Empire. Therefore I do not think that that is a very good solution, but it is a solution which in South Africa has been accepted by a large part of the people so far, and, in default of something better, probably will go on on that basis for some time longer until time has been found to consider the whole question more carefully. Personally, I feel that the third suggestion which is made by the Admiralty in their Memorandum is the one which applies more directly to South Africa, that is, to render a certain local service, not directly of a naval character, which will relieve the Imperial Government from expenses which would otherwise fall on the British Exchequer. I think that is the form of assistance the British Fleet and British Navy which would on the whole and in the long run commend itself most to the judgment of the people of South Africa. There are important works to be done in South Africa of a subsidiary nature, and if South Africa is to be, as it is very likely to be, a very important station for the British Navy in future, then one can understand that on the coast a great deal of expenditure would have to be made in order to prepare it for contingencies. Colonel Greene has referred to the fortifications of the Port of Durban, which is a matter, no doubt, of great importance, and which will cost a lot of money. There are other points, too, on the coast which probably will have to be fortified, and which to-day are unfortified. There is this naval base in Simon's Bay on which a great deal of money has already been spent by the British Government. A dock has been built there which can accommodate, I believe, even a Dreadnought, and a great deal of money is being spent by the British Government in connection with that dock. I understand from figures which have been supplied to me by the Admiralty, that an amount of money is annually spent on that dock alone equal to the contribution which is now made by Natal and Cape Colony. These are all services I think which in the long run the South African Government might take over, and in that way they may help very materially towards the support of the British Navy in South Africa. The money that they would spend would not be spent abroad, and would not go to England or to any other part of the world, but would be spent in South Africa, and the people therefore would far more easily reconcile themselves to that mode of contributing than to any other. I think in the long run probably it will be found that that form of assistance is the one which will commend itself most to the people of South Africa. But of course what I say is purely personal opinion, and I do not think any action could be taken, but in the meantime until any definite consideration of the question can take place South Africa will go on with those contributions which are at present in force. If anything is to be done by the future South African Government in connection with Naval Defence we shall have to be advised by the Admiralty, and we shall have to go very carefully into all particulars with the Admiralty in connection with any proposed works that might be established.

Mr. FISCHER: I only wish to say that of course we, as an inland colony, have no direct advice to offer. We have come on invitation, and certainly, as is our duty, to show that we are interested, as a small part of the Empire, in listening to the greater matters that affect the Empire, especially the command of the sea. We have come to listen, and we have come to learn.

I wish only to add this, that I think South Africa will do its share. How that share is to be arrived at is still a matter for the future, because we have immediately before us the prospect of expenditure, in the matter of Military Defence, and so on, which has been touched upon, and which will, no doubt, require all our energy and attention in the immediate future. The question seems to be this: How can each one give the most? And the point naturally pressed on all sides is that we are not to forget the local part of the question. I think, probably, those who have had the question before them for many many years will best be able to form a judgment and give advice to the different Dominions how the Empire can be best served without forgetting the local part, and perhaps teach the local part, by hearing the views expressed round this table, not to emphasise too much the local considerations, but how best the interests of Empire can be served as well as the local interests by having one large central authority to look after all. As to the means to be devoted to it that will require the attention of South Africa, which has so much call upon its finances for the near future and for some years to come; but probably it may be one of the many points we have to think about, whether the preferences which are now given with the best intention of helping the

Empire, and which go only in the direction of helping persons and not the Empire, could not possibly be so diverted as to be a more direct aid to the greater cause all round than simply assisting in individual cases or individual parts of commerce—whether the protection of commerce as a whole could not best be got by taking away a certain amount of income of the Colonies now devoted in the way of preferential rates in a certain direction, and saying that that should be devoted to the Empire's cause by contributing to one large unit, and thus protecting the whole Empire.

CHAIRMAN: Have you anything to say, General Hertzog?

General HERTZOG: No, thank you.

Colonel GREENE: I think it is generally understood that on the Union coming into effect the contributions, certainly by Natal and the Cape, are obligations taken over by the Union, and the question of an increased contribution will be a matter of consideration by the Union Parliament when it is established; but the present contributions are taken over as liabilities of the Colonies.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think we must all agree that this is one of the most interesting and informing discussions in which any of us have ever taken part. Long experience on Committees of all kinds makes me say that. Personally, I have never taken part in or rather listened to, a discussion in which I have felt a greater interest. As time is getting on I think it will be best,—and the First Lord agrees with me,—that he should postpone making any observations in reply to, or in comment upon, the various views that have been expressed. I hear it was intended to hold a meeting of the Military Sub-Conference to-morrow, but I think it would be advisable to continue this discussion to-morrow morning if everybody agrees, and I hope we might be able to complete this branch of the question at one more meeting. I propose, therefore, that we should meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow.

Colonel Seely wanted to raise one point, I understand.

Colonel SEELY: The Military Sub-Committee wished me to put before you the question of the printing of their Proceedings, and asked me to tell you that they thought it would be best if the prints which are given to all of them were destroyed, after they had been read and noted, at the conclusion of the sittings of the Military Sub-Conference, and merely a précis of their Proceedings stated, giving what were the results arrived at and the conclusions and recommendations which they make to this Conference. They asked me to tell you that as their view.

I ask if you, as President of the Conference, agree to it?

CHAIRMAN: Subject to anything that anybody may say, it seems to me the best course. I think it tends to the very desirable system of frank discussion which is necessary and which, if everything is taken down and permanently preserved, people are apt to depart from. So I may take it that is agreed.

Mr. McKENNA: Would that apply to the discussion here?

CHAIRMAN: No, not to these discussions, only to the Sub-Committee's. These discussions are of a larger and more important nature. I think it is necessary to keep these discussions, of course in the strictest confidence.

Mr. McKENNA: A permanent record will be kept of these?

CHAIRMAN: Yes, a permanent record.

Mr. McKENNA: Will any opportunity be given for making corrections in the proofs.

CHAIRMAN: They will be sent to you.

[Adjourned to to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.]

AT THE
FOREIGN OFFICE.
FIFTH DAY.

Friday, 6th August 1909.

PRESENT :

The Right Hon. The EARL OF CREWE, K.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies
(in the Chair).

The Right Hon. R. K. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Canada :

The Hon. Sir F. W. BORDEN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia and Defence.

The Hon. L. P. BRODEUR, K.C., LL.D., Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

Australia :

Colonel the Hon. J. F. G. FOXTON, C.M.G., Minister without portfolio.

New Zealand :

The Right Hon. Sir J. G. WARD, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Cape Colony :

The Right Hon. J. X. MERRIMAN, Prime Minister.

Newfoundland :

The Hon. Sir E. P. MORRIS, K.C., LL.D., Prime Minister.

Natal :

Colonel the Hon. E. M. GREENE, K.C., Minister for Railways and Harbours.

Transvaal :

The Hon. J. C. SMUTS, Colonial Secretary.

Orange River Colony :

The Hon. A. FISCHER, Prime Minister.

Dr. T. J. MACNAMARA, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty.

Colonel J. E. B. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Lord LUCAS, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.

Sir FRANCIS HOPWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.

Major-General J. S. EWART, C.B., Director of Military Operations.

Brigadier-General G. F. ELLISON, O.B., Director of Organisation.

Brigadier-General A. J. MURRAY, C.B., Director of Military Training.

Canada :

Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Australia :

Colonel W. T. BRIDGES, C.M.G.

Captain W. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

New Zealand :

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

South Africa :

Brigadier-General G. G. ASTON, C.B.

Colonel P. S. BEVES.

Mr. H. W. JUST, C.B., C.M.G., Secretary.

Mr. W. A. ROBINSON,

Mr. H. E. DALE,

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O.

} Assistant
Secretaries.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the point we have reached is that the First Lord of the Admiralty will now make some observations on the different views expressed by the Delegates on the Admiralty Paper and on his exposition of that paper.

Mr. McKENNA: Lord Crewe and gentlemen, the speeches that were delivered yesterday were of extraordinary interest to me. They disclosed the different points of view of the various Dominions in their approach to the single problem of Imperial Naval Defence. The conclusion that I gathered from those speeches was that it did not seem probable that any Resolution could be arrived at laying down precise lines upon which all the Dominions could act. I had, indeed, in the Admiralty Memorandum anticipated that conclusion in paragraph 3. It did appear to me, nevertheless, that a general Resolution might be attained covering alternative methods by which the Dominions could at one and the same time protect their own interests and add a substantial force to the total of Imperial power.

Lord Crewe, if I may, I would rather not reply—make observations—upon the speeches in the order in which they were delivered, but proceed on lines which will enable me, in answer to the individual Representatives, to build up my own argument.

The first speech to which I should wish to refer was that of Sir Joseph Ward. He expressed a view in terms which I cannot hope to rival, which I strongly support. The Admiralty have no doubt at all in their minds that if you consider mere strategical advantage the method of contribution offers the best solution. I cannot add anything to what fell from Sir Joseph Ward in that regard, but I would like to make one observation only. He spoke of the great moral effect which contribution would have upon the outside world. I agree contribution does have a great moral effect, but I am not sure that an equal or, at any rate, almost equal moral effect would not be obtained by the other alternative method suggested by some of the delegates of forming local navies. We have to remember that a possible enemy, in viewing the whole of British force would always bear in mind that the British fleet must be largely dispersed over the world, and in reckoning what we could place in Home waters the enemy would remember that many of our ships of fine quality would have to be, in order to preserve our peace interests, so far away from the Home centre that we must be necessarily weakened. Now, if it became manifest that many of our more distant responsibilities were taken off our hands and that the great Dominions were themselves undertaking Imperial defence in distant seas, I cannot help thinking that the moral effect upon Europe would be very considerable. I think the method suggested by Sir Joseph Ward while admirable if possible—the most admirable if possible—opens up difficulties which were stated, as I think, very moderately and not in the least exaggerated by others of the speakers. Sir Frederick Borden, Mr. Brodeur, and Colonel Foxton, in referring to the particular circumstances of Canada and Australia, indicated to us what the difficulties of simple contribution might be. It was in order to meet those difficulties that the Admiralty had put forward a suggestion—I will not call it a proposal—which would reconcile the home difficulties of the Dominions with the desire, with the need for building up an Imperial force.

Now, gentlemen, I am not sure that the Admiralty Memorandum has been quite understood, and so far I take blame to myself. It is generally the fault of the authors of a memorandum if those for whom it is intended do not fully appreciate its terms. What we wished to lay before the Conference was this fundamental fact: if any Dominion desires to build up a navy of its own, that navy must be of a certain size. That was the cardinal point which we wished to bring home to the gentlemen here. It is quite true that you could render assistance by the provision of destroyers and submarines, which would form a necessary part of a British Fleet when the other adjuncts of the Fleet were united to the destroyers and

submarines; but if you attempt to found a navy upon destroyers and submarines you will be starting upon a road which ends in a *cul-de-sac*. You would have to enlist men who would serve admirably well in the destroyers and submarines for 5, 10, or perhaps 15 years, but at the end of that period your navy would offer no future to the personnel, and you would find that your difficulties of administration would become so great that I am afraid you would be tempted to give up the task in despair. If any Dominion desires to have a navy of its own that navy must be founded on a permanent basis, and the only permanent basis upon which you can found it is one in which you offer a life-career to the men who enter your service.

Facing the problem, then, of creating a Dominion Navy, the Admiralty considered what was the smallest fleet which would satisfy the condition of enabling officers and men to have a permanent profession in it, and they came to the conclusion that a fleet which employed something like 2,000 men would satisfy that fundamental condition. We start, therefore, upon the basis that if you desire to lay the foundations of a fleet you must be prepared for a fleet with a minimum of 2,000 men. In laying down that proposition so far, it will be observed that the Admiralty are only considering the question from the point of view of the Dominion—what is possible and what is feasible; but we had a second matter to bear in mind. We wished to take advantage of your generous desire to assist us, and we therefore gave attention to the next question—what form should a navy employing, roughly speaking, 2,000 men take if that navy is at once to serve local purposes and form a really useful unit for Imperial purposes? It was from that point of view, having given a navy of a certain size, that the Admiralty suggested that if you had a navy of that size the navy should take the form of a fleet unit such as is suggested in this paper.

Now let me carry the argument a little further and show how this fleet unit combined with other similar fleet units, would operate as a real force in Imperial defence. We have suggested here—in this Paper, supplemented by the observations which I addressed to you on the opening day—that three units of this kind might be furnished for service in the Pacific. I even went so far as to foreshadow the possible ultimate creation of a fourth similar unit, but for immediate purposes we had in view three of these units, one to be supplied by the British Government entirely on the East Indian station; the second to be supplied by the Commonwealth Government, on the Australian station—this unit probably, in the first instance, supplemented by assistance from the Home Government, but the ultimate ideal being that this unit would be a purely Australian unit; and the third unit on the China Station, to be made up largely by the generous contribution of New Zealand taken over by the Home Government, and supplemented by the Home Government. These three units, when combined, would form our Far-Eastern Fleet, and they would relieve the Home Government, *pro tanto*, of the charge which it has to bear in protecting the Pacific waters. As I said, we foreshadowed a fourth similar unit, although we had not got it in immediate prospect, to be formed by Canada on the Pacific, and we should then have in those waters a fleet capable, when combined, not of meeting the whole force of any possible enemy, but of so restraining the operations of any possible enemy that we should have, in the event of war, ample time to reinforce our Pacific Fleet by our Mediterranean Fleet, and, if necessary, by our Atlantic Fleet. That was the idea which we had in view. It was by those means that the Dominions would be able to co-operate most materially in solving the whole problem of Far Eastern defence.

Now we have reckoned that the cost of a unit of this kind would be, roughly speaking, about 600,000*l.* a year, and in that we include interest and sinking fund on the original cost of the large armoured cruiser. The ships proposed are all of the latest type and they are all, you will observe, of a peculiarly fast type. The armoured cruiser and the protected cruisers are all 25-knot vessels and offer, therefore, the power of very rapid concentration. The burden, as we anticipate, of 600,000*l.* a year—and possibly more in the case of the Dominions because, as was indicated, I think, by Sir Joseph Ward earlier, your prices are higher than ours and you have to pay more than we have—would be borne ultimately as regards one unit by Australia, ultimately as regards another unit we foreshadow in the remote future by Canada; as to the third unit in large part by New Zealand, and as to the fourth by ourselves, assisted, as we may be, by the East Indian Government. We have now on the China Station a considerable fleet consisting of four armoured cruisers. Those cruisers are not of as fine a type as the cruisers here proposed—as the “Indomitables.” We have a considerable fleet at the present moment in Australasian waters which costs us alto-

gether—I think the figure is—900,000*l.* a year. We have a fleet in East Indian waters to which the East Indian Government contributes directly, I think, 100,000*l.* a year, but which costs us a very large sum in excess of that. I have not got the precise figures for the cost of the China Fleet, but it would certainly be much less to us than it is now under the proposed Scheme inasmuch as we should reduce the total number of our vessels. It would be a direct saving in cost to us, but it would have a much greater advantage than that; it would be a far more powerful Fleet than we at present have in Far Eastern Waters. We have to look forward to a day when it is conceivable—and it is even more than conceivable, it is anticipated—that we should in the ordinary course of events have to strengthen our Fleet in the East, but it would not be for a long while that we should, so far as can at present be foreseen, consider it necessary to strengthen it beyond the point of a combination of four units such as are here outlined. We should then obtain both a saving in money and should get a superior force to what we have in Eastern Waters at the present time. So that to us the advantage is a double one.

Colonel Foxton asked whether such a squadron as the proposed Australian Squadron would be adequate for the protection of Australian interests, particularly having regard to the coasting trade. Here we have got to consider the possibility of an attack upon Australia, whence it could come, and how long it must take before it could reach Australian shores. There is no conceivable attack which could be made upon Australia before the three units which I have mentioned, the China unit, the Australian unit, and the East Indian unit could combine, and there is no conceivable attack upon Australia which could not be so delayed by these combined units as to enable a reinforcing British Battle Fleet to arrive before the enemy could do any serious damage. What ships could attack Australian commerce if there was an Australian unit of one “Invincible” steaming 25 knots and three “Bristols” also steaming 25 knots immediately available in home waters? What ships are to get through—where are they to come from? There are no individual cruisers which could stand for a moment against an “Invincible.”

Colonel FOXTON: If caught.

Mr. McKENNA: If caught; and when you think how far the supposed foreigner attacking Australia will have had to come, his difficulties in coaling, the state of his ships when he arrives the complete absence of reinforcements and the certainty that he cannot hold the water for any length of time, I think on reflection and consideration of all these questions you will come to the conclusion that there could be no serious attack made upon Australia if you had such a protecting force as this unless you assume that Great Britain has lost command of the sea.

Sir Frederick Borden and Mr. Brodeur recalled the conclusions of 1907 and the resolution of their own Parliament which has formed their instructions in coming here. I do not think that anything I have said or outlined is in the least inconsistent with the terms of those instructions. Mr. Brodeur stated that in Canada they desired a local force as well as a local service, and I understand the distinction which he draws there to mean this, that in Canada they desire that their navy shall not only perform purely local services, such as fishery protection, but shall, as well, be available as a fighting force in the event of war to be united with the British Fleet. That is how I understood the distinction which he drew. I think it would be more a matter for a Sub-Committee composed of representatives of the Admiralty and Sir Frederick Borden and Mr. Brodeur to discuss the immediate nature that the local force should take as distinguished from the local service, rather than a matter for the Conference now. From the speeches I gather that we shall have no difficulty at all in suggesting, in co-operation with you gentlemen, the lines upon which you can lay the foundations of a Canadian Navy which shall immediately answer your local purposes and form the foundation of what I will call an Imperial unit. As I have said, I have never anticipated that a unit of the kind here suggested would be immediately applicable to Canadian circumstances. I have never thought that, and it is not necessary, and, so far as I am concerned, I think I see my way to proceed upon lines which will give Imperial advantage and at the same time satisfy the Canadian need for a local service.

So far as Australia is concerned, I gather from Colonel Foxton that on general lines he approved of the suggestion here made, provided that on subsequent discussion he is satisfied that it would be applicable to the circumstances of Australia in coastal defence.

Colonel FOXTON: Yes.

Mr. McKENNA: I think, therefore, in a Sub-Committee, we shall probably be able to satisfy Colonel Foxton.

As regards the South African case, which, if I may say so, was so forcibly and admirably presented by the representatives from South Africa, I entirely agree with their main proposition that the case of South Africa is essentially a British interest as distinguished from a Dominion interest. The naval problem in South Africa is a pure problem of trade protection. It is right on one of the great main trade routes of the world, and I am not sure that in the present circumstances the South African view, which, as I understand it, is that we should continue on the same basis as at present, that is to say, one of contribution pure and simple without any regard to the special application of the money, would not be the best means of furthering Imperial interests. The South African problem is one which will offer in the future considerable difficulties. Figures were quoted by Mr. Merriman to show the enormous value of the trade which weekly passes from South Africa to our coasts; and we shall have, not only in South African interest, but in our own interests, absolutely to secure the freedom of that trade route. We shall of course welcome—and gladly welcome—all assistance which South Africa can afford us, and I have no doubt that as the new South African Government grows in strength and wealth, they will come forward most generously to our assistance; but in the meantime we do not ask, and we have never asked, anything more from them than they voluntarily give us, and I have nothing to suggest in their case by way of alteration of the present procedure upon which we act.

One last question was raised—and I must apologise for detaining you at this length—both on behalf of Canada and Australia, and that was the question of subsidised merchant ships. That is a matter which involves not only the Admiralty but the Board of Trade; and I do not know what Lord Crewe will think as to whether it is a matter which we can here discuss.

Colonel FOXTON: It was not raised on behalf of Australia.

Mr. BRODEUR: It was raised by Canada and supported by Sir Joseph Ward.

Mr. McKENNA: I am sorry. I thought it was Australia. It was raised by Canada and New Zealand, and Sir Edward Morris also mentioned it. I do not know whether Lord Crewe would think that that is a matter which comes directly within the consideration of this Conference.

CHAIRMAN: I understand that the suggestion is that those ships should be armed, or capable of being armed, and in that case it certainly would come, I take it, under your purview.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: The Cunard boats are in that position now, are they not?

CHAIRMAN: Yes, they are.

Mr. BRODEUR: They are built under the supervision of the Admiralty.

Mr. McKENNA: They are built under supervision.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: And receive a subsidy.

Mr. McKENNA: I would like to speak—and here I am only expressing my own personal opinion—with the greatest frankness on the subject. I do not know that the Cunard experiment is one which I should personally be anxious to see repeated. What occurs to me as possible to be done without any interference with the great shipping interests of this country would be that we should agree to pay any mercantile lines any additional cost to which they were put by strengthening their decks, in order to enable them to carry guns, or that we should pay any additional cost which they might incur in respect of any similar matter; but it opens up a question of

enormous difficulty if you propose to subsidise a mercantile ship for a war service, such, for instance, as that of speed, which would be of use to the particular ship at the same time as a commerce carrier. You immediately open up the grave question as to whether it is reasonable or fair to pay public money to particular lines of steamers to the detriment of other lines which are their competitors. It could be of no advantage to any particular line of ships in competition with others to have their decks strengthened, or to carry guns in their holds, or to make provision in other respects for having guns placed on board; and we might consider the desirability of bearing all such charges. But that is a different question from that of a general subsidy, which opens up very complicated matters, with which Sir Francis Hopwood is very well acquainted, with regard to the objections taken by those shipowners whose vessels are not subsidised. If a subsidy upon such a limited basis as I have suggested here would meet the views expressed by Sir Joseph Ward, Sir Frederick Borden, and Sir Edward Morris, the Admiralty would be very glad to consider the possibility of doing something of that kind, but beyond that I do not think it would be within my province to put forward before the Conference any views on the question of a general subsidy.

That, gentlemen, I think, covers the ground of the various questions that were raised, and I shall be only too glad to give any amplified reply upon any matters I have left untouched; but I think for the moment I have nothing further to add.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Might I ask upon that question of the cost of the Australian Squadron of 900,000*l.* a year to the Imperial Government referred to earlier by you, is that after deducting the contribution from Australia?

Mr. McKENNA: No, that is the total cost.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I want first to express my unconditional satisfaction with the observations which have just fallen from the First Lord, so far as they were general and so far as they referred to Canada.

I was very careful in what I said yesterday not to say that the Admiralty Memorandum was in any way inconsistent with the position of Canada, except to point out that the resolution passed unanimously by the Canadian Government referred to a certain specific statement made by the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1907, from which it might, and I think does, appear, that it might be possible—at any rate it led us to believe it would be possible—to begin the establishment of a navy in a smaller way than that indicated in the Memorandum. That was all I wished to point out. That is to say, I inferred, from the First Lord's statement in 1907, that we could begin with smaller ships and build the larger ones later on. But the ideal of Canada is the construction of a navy as complete as possible, first for local defence, and secondly to co-operate with the Imperial Navy.

There is one point with reference to the expense involved in the unit proposed, which is stated by the First Lord to be 600,000*l.*, although he said that that would very likely be greater in the case of the Dominions. I have made a somewhat careful calculation, and it seems to me that if you include the auxiliaries which are referred to in this memorandum, the annual cost, including also interest and sinking fund, could not be less than 800,000*l.* to Canada. But I am not quarrelling even with that amount; I only wanted to state our view with regard to that.

I would like, if I may, just to say two or three words with reference to the discussion which took place yesterday. I think it is only right that I should do so. I do not wish to precipitate controversy, which is the last thing I want to do; but, inasmuch as some criticisms, more or less severe, were made upon the scheme of building indigenous navies—I have heard the word applied to navies—in the different Dominions, and a suggestion was made that they would not only be useless but absolutely harmful, I think I would like to say a word or two with regard to it. Now I have no quarrel with the idea of the payment of local contributions. I think it was stated by Sir Joseph Ward, in 1907, that his country was engaged in the construction of railways by the Government, and large public works; that they were a small community with a small population, and that it was from financial considerations absolutely impossible for New Zealand to undertake the construction of a navy. I understood that to be the principal reason; it was the principal reason stated by him in 1907. I can quite understand that Newfoundland could not think of any such thing; it is

financially impossible—absolutely impossible. I understand that in South Africa, even at the present moment, it would be impossible. But in the case of Australia and Canada the conditions are entirely different. In the case of Canada, at any rate, we have a country with seven millions of people, rapidly increasing yearly to the extent of from half a million to a million people probably, and a country that in five years more, probably at the time of the next census, two years hence, may show a population of eight millions of people, with a very large and rapidly increasing revenue. We are a young nation, and we take pleasure—and it pleases our people in their national pride and aspirations—in calling ourselves a young nation. Well, it seems to me one of the first duties of a young nation is to defend itself. My country, at any rate, do not feel that we are going to pay anybody or hire anybody to do that which we ought to do ourselves, so long as we are able to do it. That, I think, fairly expresses the aspirations of the Canadian people.

There is a question which I think is superior to any question of strategy. We are told here that strategy is against the idea of local navies. I have no doubt it is, and I would add that convenience is against it. But it is the business of statesmen, and the business of admirals and generals, to overcome difficulties of this kind, and strategy must take a second place to Constitutional Government. Those are the lines upon which I have presented this view, and I thought it was only fair to my country that it should be understood why it is that we take the view we do. I do not believe there is any insuperable difficulty. You might say the same thing with reference to our land forces; why should not we employ the British Government, the War Office, to do all our work of defence? Why have any local militia or local forces? We have local militia and local forces, and we have developed them until to-day the War Office has evolved a scheme by which we are on the threshold, at any rate, of the establishment of an Imperial Army—a method by which the forces of the armies of the different Dominions can absolutely co-operate and form a whole.

Take this country itself. In deference to public opinion we have a certain system upon which the Army of Great Britain is organised. It is probably, from a strategical point of view, not the best system. The German method is infinitely better, but you cannot adopt the German method in England because the English people will not put up with it. Therefore you have to do the best thing you can. And we have turned our attention to evolving a plan which I believe is bound to be satisfactory. My Lord Chairman, the British people some years ago took charge of the Government of this country and the control of the Army, and, as a matter of fact, as I suppose every one here knows, the Army exists only by virtue of an annual Act of Parliament. It is a formality, but it is a fact that the Army would come to an end if it were not for an annual Act of Parliament passed to continue it. So the people have asserted their control. You are a democratic people, and we are just as democratic, and perhaps more democratic than you are here. I think myself that there is no very great difficulty. It is a matter for the soldiers and the statesmen to solve; but it seems to me that, on the lines we propose in regard to the construction of a navy, there should be no difficulty whatever in allotting to the Navy of Canada its proper share of the work of upholding the Empire, and on such terms and conditions and by such arrangements so that, if a war unfortunately occurred, our navy would be utilised and would become a part at once of the British Navy. One objection put forward was that if a serious war came, forsooth, some particular navy, Australian or Canadian, might refuse to act. Surely it is only necessary to present that view to see how absolutely necessary it is that there should be individual navies. In the same way a particular Dominion which contributes 200,000*l.* a year, or 40,000*l.*, as the case may be, might refuse to give that 200,000*l.* or 40,000*l.* There is no point in that and no argument in that. I will not detain the Conference further, but I thought it only proper to present this point of view.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Crewe and Gentlemen, I do not propose to take up the time of the Conference for long, but I am perfectly certain that when reviewing my remarks you will find, as I hope Sir Frederick Borden later on will also do, that they are not capable of construction as in any way reflecting upon the right of Canada to do whatever Canada considers proper. No one more fully recognises than I do, nor indeed is a stronger supporter of the principle that each oversea Dominion must exercise undoubted control in all local matters, including that of local defence either on land or on sea. We are here, however, for the purpose of seeing what is the best to be done for the general protection of all British interests wherever they may be, and how such can best be achieved. I was dealing with the matter rather

from the general situation of those great self-governing British countries which are what one might call bounded by the Pacific Ocean. I admire the courage, and recognise the ability, of the representatives of Canada and of Australia in putting forth what the sentiment of their own countries is dictating to them as being the better policy for naval protection; but when I speak at this Conference I speak with a recognition of the fact that we are a secret Conference; that we are here for the purpose of expressing our views freely with the idea of educating, and of being educated by others from the standpoint they believe to be right, with the view of arriving at the best conclusions in the general interests of the Empire.

Now it will be remembered by those who were at the Imperial Conference, that on behalf of New Zealand I readily expressed the willingness of that country to cancel or agree to any alteration of the agreement under which we jointly were contributing to the British Government with a view to their carrying out the policy which they considered to be necessary to meet the local conditions. I recognise, as far as Canada is concerned, that they have undeniably the same right, but I should be exceedingly sorry to go away from this Conference without expressing my personal opinion upon the all-important question of this Imperial Defence, that it would be incomparably better for the whole of us if we could stand together in the support of one great Imperial Navy, portions of that navy being allotted to Canada and Australia, and doing that which both Canada and Australia are urging on behalf of their respective countries should be done by a local fleet. In stating that I believe these small local navies would prove to be of very little use, and indeed a weakness in the time of a great war, I am expressing my own strong, conscientious opinion. In the event of a local navy being established, a unit or a portion of a unit, in Australia or in Canada, its destruction is possible, and in that case Sir Frederick Borden will recognise what would be involved in the matter of local taxation for the rebuilding, re-equipping, and re-establishing of a fleet which in years to come will probably require to be increased far beyond what is contemplated at the moment. There is a limit to populations, even although Canada is growing at the rate of 500,000 a year, and the burden that would be imposed upon them in a case of that kind would have a shattering effect, in my opinion, on the development and advancement of a country even such as that. I do not want to put my opinion against the matured judgment of the Parliament or Government of Canada, or the well-expressed views of Sir Frederick Borden and his colleague, Mr. Brodeur, at this Conference to-day. What I feel is that a small local navy, though conforming to local sentiment, would not, in a time of stress, achieve what is intended, and that nothing short of a powerful British navy could be expected to compete successfully with the opposing powerful fleets—powerful to day, and becoming more so daily—of other countries.

The point that I desire to make is that where the younger countries cannot afford to go to the necessary expense of having a powerful navy for themselves, is it not wiser to give our assistance to the British navy—admittedly the most powerful in the world to-day—so as to build it up to an extent that would make it so superior to any other, that our protection upon the seas by that great navy would be much stronger and greater than any of us could expect to have by a local fleet, which even the most sane advocate of it must admit—judging by the experience of other countries—would take many, many years to attain any great strength; and I question whether the people in the meantime could bear the necessary burden of creating and maintaining such a local fleet, even though the populations are growing. I have a feeling in the case of New Zealand, growing as it is steadily, too, that our real strength lies in being attached to the British Navy, and having the whole force available wherever it may be directed by the Admiralty in time of trouble, if it should arise. I believe our position is now, and will be in the future, better and stronger under those conditions than by supporting proposals for local units, however admirable they may be, from the standpoint of Canada and Australia. I have tried to express my opinion to the best of my ability as strongly as I can in that direction, and that, I take it, is what I am here for.

I want to say one word more, and I will not detain the Conference further. In suggesting that we should at this Conference pass some resolution, I used a perhaps unsuitable term when I said that we ought to have an enveloping resolution, my idea being that in some form we should have a resolution passed here to enable exactly what these Representatives from Canada and Australia are urging to be provided for to give effect to the local sentiments, the local ambitions, and local desires. At the same time, it seemed to me, from the point of view of the general Imperial interests, scattered as they are, that if we could have, in addition to that, some overriding

resolution giving some strong support, even if it be an implied one, to the navy as a whole, it would have a healthy effect, not only on the people of our own countries, but upon people in other countries whose desire to get up alongside of Great Britain is recognisable. I have no desire, nor indeed would I be presumptuous enough, to press anything of the kind unless we could unanimously agree to a proposal adapted to meet that view, and flexible enough to meet the necessities of our respective countries. I think it would be a very great mistake to have any recording of dissent from the representatives of any country at this Conference.

So far as my observations at the Imperial Conference relative to the development of the internal policy of New Zealand are concerned, which were dwelt upon by Sir Frederick Borden, I want to say that necessarily we must take matters of that sort into consideration. We are a young country, and we require many millions yet for the internal development of New Zealand. I am only too proud to see that Canada in the early years of its growth can not only carry on its great internal development policy, but can also, with a courage I admire though I cannot agree with—and I say so sincerely—embark upon the undertaking of a local navy with the enormous liability, present and future, that it must impose upon them. That is their own business entirely, as I fully recognise, and I would not for a moment presume to interfere in any way either with the sentiment or the action of Canada. But I am here for the purpose of helping the representatives of the Conference to build a Naval Defence system for the protection of the widespread interests of the Empire. If the Navy went down in the first instance in the defence of England, it would change the whole condition as far as the defence of each of the self-governing Dominions is concerned, and in such a case nothing but a navy as powerful as that of the attacking country could avail each of these Dominions. Such a local navy is not to be hoped for. In my judgment it is by the combination of all parts of the Empire that we can best build up a navy so powerful that any other nation would hesitate to attack us. Hence I do not believe in the local navy system, and favour one great British Navy supported by all parts of the Empire.

Colonel FOXTON: I would like to supplement what has fallen from Sir Frederick Borden in reference to the remarks which have been passed in the way of criticism of what have been called, I think, absurd and futile small navies.

I do not propose in any way in what I have to say later to criticise anything which any of the Colonies in South Africa or elsewhere propose to do. Each of us and each community which we represent must deal with the matter from its own particular and special standpoint, and having regard to the circumstances which surround its situation geographically and otherwise, I would like to point out that, whatever naval strength there may be at the present day in any nation, that has necessarily had a beginning, and I question very strongly the statement that all small navies have been either futile, absurd, or in any way unsuccessful. Take the Navy of the United States. It is only of quite recent years that it has grown to be of any very considerable dimensions, and yet those who had the direction of naval affairs in this country very many years ago were, I think, compelled to admit that it was by no means ineffective although very small.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Were these iron ships?

Colonel FOXTON: I do not know that that makes any difference. I have heard it contended, even from South Africa, that it is not the gun, but the man behind the gun that tells. Again, let us take not only the case of a race similar to our own, but let us take the case of Japan; it is only of quite recent years that their navy was anything but a small navy, and yet undoubtedly it would have been, even in its early days, able to have given a very good account of itself had it been called upon.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: The population of America is 80 millions, and of Japan 40 millions.

Colonel FOXTON: I am speaking of the time when the population of America was scarcely larger than our own. We desire to lay a foundation while we are yet young, so that when the time comes for us to make, from the British standpoint, a decidedly respectable array of naval force, it shall be of such a character as will

render it something to be reckoned with in the maintenance of supremacy of the Empire upon the seas.

That is all I want to say about small navies. It is our policy, and I am glad to see that Canada is in the same mood with us, and that nothing that may be said will tend to alter that policy; in fact, if I might venture a suggestion, it is that we, Canada and Australia, are just a little in advance of some of the other Colonies and Dominions, and that the time will come when they will follow the lead which is being given to them by these two Dominions. I can scarcely conceive it possible, in the gradual growth of a Dominion still remaining a part of the British Empire that there will not be a desire such as we entertain at the present time sooner or later to do their share in the same way. We prefer, in fact, to put it shortly, to be doing instead of paying. There is work to be done at our own doors peculiarly suitable for a great portion of our maritime population, and we desire to take a hand in that rather than to contribute something to somebody else to do that work for us. That is sufficient on the general question of small navies from my point of view.

I was much interested in what the First Lord said in regard to the strength of a fleet unit in its relation to the extent to which it would afford a life career to those entering upon the naval profession. I listened to that with great deference, and it does seem to me that even with a strength of 2,000 men we should scarcely be able to offer such a life career as would be really desirable in securing the very best men for such a service unless we also had some further scope to offer them in the shape of a perpetual interchangeability with the Royal Navy. We desire, of course, to start with a standard equal to that of the Royal Navy, we should certainly have to borrow for a very considerable time both officers and men to a very large extent if we launch out into that unit within any reasonably short period. That would necessarily be so; so that we should have every reason to hope that the standard would be as high as it is possible to attain from the jump. That being so, we should also desire to have continuous interchangeability so that that standard might be maintained, because I do think that there is a possibility of that standard being lowered unless there is that wider scope for both officers and men which would be found in interchangeability with the British Navy. The extent to which that can be carried, and how far service in one shall count as service in the other; also, the question of the differential pay are matters of detail which I think it perhaps as well not to go into here, seeing that it is quite apparent that each Dominion will have to be dealt with by the Admiralty separately as regards its own immediate circumstances, it is, perhaps, quite out of the necessary course at all events to burden this Conference as a whole with details of that sort.

One point I should like to refer to is that no indication is given of the class of destroyers which the Admiralty proposes should form the portion of the unit. I believe that is rather a material point.

Mr. McKENNA: It is the River class—80,000*l.* a piece. The price really indicates the class.

Colonel FOXTON: I must ask pardon for having missed that; I looked just at where it is summarised, where it is mentioned, "Bristol" class and so on.

What I certainly should like to have found as the result of the deliberations of this Conference would be that New Zealand could have seen its way to join with Australia in providing at an earlier period than will otherwise be the case, probably a fleet unit such as is proposed, so that we could take complete charge of the policing of the Southern and South-Western Pacific. That, apparently, is not quite practicable, seeing that New Zealand, through Sir Joseph Ward, who so ably represents it, has its views, and still clings, I hope for the time being, only to the idea of a subsidy to the Imperial Navy. But I would like to call attention to the fact, in connection with the question raised by me as to the adequacy of the composition of the proposed unit as to whether it would be sufficient to protect our coastal trade routes and our ports, that we have been told—I want to point this out—we need fear, in Australia, nothing greater than a raid of 1,000 or 2,000 men with a couple of cruisers. That is all. We feel that, so far as an invasion is concerned, we may rely upon that view, and that we have nothing to fear beyond that; but it is the temporary dislocation of our coastal trade which might be brought about by the presence in our waters of two or three, or, perhaps, more converted merchantmen of a hostile Power which is the most serious consideration, and there are two European Powers

who have possible bases now already existing within almost striking distance of our shores. We know with what facility, especially under the Declaration of London, these merchant vessels can be converted into war vessels at a day's notice apparently, and again become merchant vessels afterwards. It is these I think that we have to fear and the possibility of their evading any force which is not composed very largely of destroyers. I do recognize that with an armoured cruiser and three smaller cruisers we should perhaps be able to do some very excellent work on the offensive side in dealing if necessary with the foreign bases in the Pacific to which I have referred: that is perhaps the best protection we could give; but the possibility is presented to my mind of these three units, just at the time they are wanted in Australia, being concentrated in the China sea. That is a difficulty which appears to present itself to me. However, these are matters which are perhaps rather trenching upon the functions of the Sub-Conference to deal with Australian conditions more particularly, and I will content myself by saying no more on the subject at present.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I thought we had come here to discuss matters, and to try to form some common union. We are going to separate, each body going on a different road, which I think, so far from bringing us together, is going to set us apart.

Colonel FOXTON: Come in with us.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I quite agree with Colonel Foxton about Australia and Canada being in advance of South Africa. I am sure they think so, and that is the great point.

Colonel FOXTON: We are in advance; we have federated.

Mr. MERRIMAN: You set sentiment first; we try to set efficiency; that is just the difference between us.

Colonel FOXTON: I do not agree to that.

Mr. MERRIMAN: You are going to have the sentiment of having a little navy of your own, a nice little thing you are to build up with, I suppose, one or two ships.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: And pay for.

Mr. MERRIMAN: How are you to get a Naval Lieutenant to run them?

Colonel FOXTON: Why do you say one or two? We are building three already, and we hope to build a dozen more before the next two or three years are over.

Mr. MERRIMAN: How are you to get the people to run them, and to keep them going with a small navy? You will never do it, and you will have an inefficient thing.

Colonel FOXTON: We will show you.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Yes, you will show us, but you will get into a mess, and I want to keep you out of it if I can.

Colonel FOXTON: We are not troubling about your mess.

Mr. MERRIMAN: But we are not in one at present. Now, to show you the wrong idea upon which you are starting, you talk about the United States Navy of 1812, then they had wooden ships, and you could take any men on board and fight those ships very well indeed. You cannot do that nowadays. You have only to go down and see these destroyers and submarines to see that it is a thing you cannot do unless it is done on a large scale, to do it efficiently. No nation in the world can do it at the present moment except Great Britain. What a mess the French are getting into with their ships because they cannot keep them at sea and run them about as we do! It seems to me to be a hopeless thing. Then, as to what Sir Frederick Borden said, I like all that about sentiment, and we have a good deal ourselves, only it does

not take the same line, but when he said that you must have sentiment in the first place and that strategy must take the second place —

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: No, I did not say sentiment; I said the constitutional problem was the first and the strategical problem the second.

Mr. MERRIMAN: You will find when war takes place that strategy takes the first place.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Yes, but not in peace.

Mr. MERRIMAN: It will be a very awkward thing if your constitutional principles have led you into the wrong course. It will not help you a little bit.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: That is one of the penalties of responsible government, and government by the people.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Surely there is such a thing as leaders trying to lead them into the right way. Are they always going to run about after platform speeches? I am very sorry indeed we cannot get the opinion of a naval officer upon all this—upon what the real value of all these different little navies is. There has been a lot of experience in the world. Now at the present time several nations have these little twopenny-halfpenny navies. The question is whether they are really efficient, and what will become of them in time of war? It is a serious thing to spend 800,000*l.* a year in the wrong direction. At the present moment it will be seen that in South Africa, although there is a little difference of opinion between me and my friend Mr. Smuts, we are all of us quite sure that a little local navy will be no use at all; it will be worse than useless, and one of those merchant ships that you are going to put guns on board of, picking up fellows to work them wherever you can, will be the worst of all. Of course, Mr. Smuts hinted yesterday that our contribution should eventually take the form of taking over a dockyard. Well, either the dockyard will have to be managed by South Africa or managed by the British Government. If it was managed by the British Government, which is the only efficient way of managing it—because I cannot imagine a locally managed dockyard, and I am afraid it would not be of much assistance—I think it would be safer and better to hand the contribution at once over to the Navy and let them spend it in their own way, but particularly in keeping a local unit there. That is undoubtedly a matter of opinion, but I entirely agree with him that contemplating a local navy would be simply no use at all, and I am very sorry indeed to see that the other Dominions, who are in advance of us, are advancing along that line, because I think it will be a line from which they will have to go back some day or other, and probably with pain and grief.

I do not think we can pass any resolutions, because really they would be a little ludicrous, if I might venture to say so to Sir Joseph Ward. It would be very much like the sort of sentiment that people have before the collecting plate goes round in church. Unless it leads to practical results it will do no good. We are here to put the plate round and at present I do not think there is very much going into it.

Colonel GREENE: I do not think we from South Africa need concern ourselves with what the other Dominions do. If the general principle is recognised that every portion of the Oversea Dominions is going to contribute its quota towards the Imperial Navy in its own way and to the satisfaction of the Imperial authorities, I do not think it has really very much to do with us, and I hope that Sir Frederick Borden did not take in an unkind spirit any criticisms we offered yesterday, however crudely they were put forward. I tried, so far as I was concerned, to view the matter from a South African standpoint, and from the standpoint of the suggestion to have a local Naval unit in South Africa. We are strongly opposed to it, and I am glad to say every one of us is; but that does not mean, so far as I am concerned, that we should hesitate to make our contribution on different lines simply because other Dominions cannot see eye to eye with us on the subject. I would like to say, Lord Crewe, that at one time it struck me, and I was rather afraid, that this Conference was going to be somewhat barren of results. I am certainly not of that opinion now, although my

friend, Mr. Merriman, does not concur with me. It appears to me that much good is likely to result from this Conference, and from the speeches that have been delivered to-day I can see the possibility of an agreement being come to with every Dominion, perhaps not all upon one line, but upon lines which will be satisfactory to the Imperial Government, and which, I hope, will tend towards the strengthening of the Imperial Navy, which we all desire.

Mr. SMUTS: I have nothing to add, Sir.

Mr. BRODEUR: I see that our good friend, Mr. Merriman, claims that our proposition of a local navy is based purely and simply on sentiment, and that such a local force would be inefficient. I am not at all of his view with regard to that. We have not been guided purely by sentiment in coming to the decision at which we have arrived, but it is our mature and well-considered judgment. This question was brought up at the Conference of 1902. We took then absolutely the same stand that we are taking to-day. But I go further and I say that a declaration on the part of the Self-governing Dominions that they would establish a local navy might have and would have more effect upon the world generally than a money contribution. Supposing it to be announced to the world to-day that Great Britain would not only have one navy, but would have behind her four or five nations with their own navies, I am under the impression that if such an announcement could be made, it would tend a great deal to strengthen the British Empire. I see we are growing and growing fast, and we are not discussing this question to-day with the object of what might come in the near future, but we are laying the foundations for the future. I am under the impression that if to-day we decided to make a contribution perhaps in 10, or 15, or 20 years that question of contribution would come up before Parliament when the men who are there to-day might have disappeared, the feeling which has brought about the decision as to the contribution might have disappeared, some little friction might have come up between the Mother Land and some of the Dominions, and you might have a Parliament perhaps refusing to continue the contribution. What then would be the effect upon the public mind of the world, and upon the public mind over here? It would have a bad effect. That is one of the fears I have with regard to the contribution. It is not many years ago since this question was brought up for the first time, that several thought that the only way was a contribution. I notice some changes of opinion on this question, and it is found to-day that perhaps the best way of strengthening the British Navy would be by establishing some local navies and thus show to the world that we are all doing our share for the defence of the Empire.

Now some fears have been expressed—not here, I am very glad to say—that perhaps it will not be advisable to give to the Dominions the right of having local autonomy as far as naval service is concerned. Well, the same fears were expressed in 1845, when the question of giving responsible Government to the Colonies was discussed. You might open the debates at that time and find that some fears were entertained that if political autonomy was given to Canada it might perhaps result in separation. Well, we have been having responsible government since that time, and I may say that to-day there is stronger sentiment in favour of the connection with Great Britain in Canada than there was at the time when responsible government was given. It is the same result with regard to commercial autonomy. Some fears were also entertained when commercial autonomy was granted to the Self-governing Colonies, and some people said it might be a danger. Far from that, if you take the case of Canada as an example—I am always guided by the history of my country—we have had absolute freedom for many years as far as commerce is concerned, as far as the right of imposing duties and levying taxes is concerned, and what has been the result? The result has been that one day we decided by ourselves to grant to the Mother Country a preference on the goods which were imported into our country. We did that without asking for anything in return, and even to-day we are not asking anything in that respect, leaving absolutely to Great Britain the right to do what they like with regard to it. The same thing also happened with regard to military autonomy. There were some fears also entertained. It does not matter, however, when you consider the history of the country. When, some years ago, there was a war raging in some part of the Empire, Canada, like most of the other Dominions, sent contingents,

though they were absolutely free, according to their law, to reserve to their own country purely and simply the use of the militia which was formed in that country. Now, we are simply asking the same thing with regard to naval affairs—the same autonomy, and I am sure that in giving us that local naval autonomy you will obtain the same results as in the case of our political, fiscal, and military autonomy.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, in closing the discussion for to-day I think we may congratulate ourselves in the well-known phrase, that we have not differed except in opinion, and that the discussion, although it has exhibited some very marked divergencies of opinion, has yet been of a thoroughly amicable character.

With regard to the merits of the different propositions which have been set forward, the Admiralty have never disguised their view that as an ideal a single great navy, contributed to in varying degrees, by all the different parts of the Empire, represents what they would prefer to see carried out, and I think it is also safe to say that if that could be done the insurance basis suggested by Mr. Merriman is the soundest on which it would be possible to build. If no other considerations existed, I have no doubt that a great Imperial Navy could be built up to the best advantage on those lines. But we know, and it has become abundantly evident in the course of this discussion, that that system is not one which universally commends itself all over the Empire. It is quite true that though questions of strategy in a sense ought to take the first place in composing an organisation intended for war, yet there are occasions in which questions of strategy in composing that organisation have to take second place. We cannot impose any system upon the Dominions. We do not desire to, and we could not if we would. We do not speak of them now as Colonies; we speak of them as Dominions, and very largely as allied nations. Well, allied nations have to bear the disabilities which depend on their respective forces not being under identical control. Take the two great central Powers in Europe—Germany and Austria-Hungary. It is very difficult to conceive a war in which those two nations would not be side by side under present circumstances. I have no doubt it would be a great military advantage to them if their forces could be entirely under one control, similarly trained and similarly armed, and under one commander; but the national spirit of the two countries in their independence makes that impossible. Of course the great Dominions are not independent, and, so far, the analogy is not complete, but so far as they are to be regarded not as Colonies but as allied nations, for this purpose the analogy to some extent holds good. We and the Admiralty here have to face the fact that Australia and Canada both explicitly state that they will not adopt this method. That being so, we have to look to what they are prepared to do, and I am quite sure my right honourable friend will agree with me in regarding with gratitude and a sense of obligation the fact that they are willing to take their part in their own way in Imperial Defence.

Now, with regard to the question of a small navy, there seems to me to be one very real and positive advantage in a small navy system, which, though I quite agree it may not in theory outweigh the advantage attaching to the contributory system, is yet a genuine one, and that is this. That on the seaboard, both of Canada and Australia, there is a great deal of excellent material for manning the navy, and if your navy is in no sense local, I very much doubt if it is possible to utilise that material to any great extent; whereas it is undoubtedly hoped in the case of both those great Dominions and of Newfoundland that that material will be utilised and trained for the purpose not only of the local, but also of the Imperial, Navy. But at the same time, I think we cannot disguise from ourselves that in undertaking the building up of local navies the Dominions who select that form of contribution to the defence of the Empire are undertaking a very grave and a very difficult responsibility indeed. Mr. Brodeur mentioned just now the analogy of military defence, and said it had been feared that military efficiency might not be attained if the Dominions were left to defend themselves. There is this difference in the two cases: although of course it is desirable to attain the highest possible degree of military efficiency, yet partially trained troops have a very real value, and in the course of a campaign troops who were very imperfectly trained at the beginning may become first-rate towards the end. But that is not the case with a man-of-war. If you send an ill-found or an imperfectly trained crew on a man-of-war into action, well, that man-of-war will probably be at the bottom of the sea, or captured, at a very early date in the campaign. That is to say, the standard required is extremely high; and though I do not express any doubts as to the possibility of attaining that standard under the system of which

the details have been set forward by the First Lord of the Admiralty, yet I am sure those representing Canada and Australia will agree that they are entering upon a task of very real difficulty. If the criticisms on a small navy which have been mainly set out by Mr. Merriman are not to be justified, the Dominions must undertake, in the opinion of the Admiralty, to expend, at any rate, a formidable sum of money, 600,000*l.* or 700,000*l.* or, as it has been stated, 800,000*l.* a year, in order to secure a unit of the composition stated in the Admiralty Memorandum, because it is the known view of the Admiralty that with a smaller unit it is impossible to reach that degree of efficiency which is necessary, for the reasons which the First Lord of the Admiralty has stated. Then comes the question of interchangeability. Again, interchangeability is something to be aimed at, and, if carried out, it would undoubtedly be of great assistance to a Dominion Navy; but interchangeability presupposes something like equality of efficiency, because I think it may be laid down as an axiom that the British Admiralty never would and never could agree to imperil the standard of efficiency on His Majesty's ships of the British Navy by taking on board men of an inferior standard.

Gentlemen, I do not doubt that it will be possible—and I believe that is the view of the Admiralty—for these local navies to attain that standard—I do not say it can be done all in a moment—and it will demand not merely expenditure of money, which is, in a way, a simple thing, but a very large degree of national devotion and of intense application on the part of those in Australia and Canada. If not, the system will break down. I do not believe myself that it will break down, but I have ventured—and I am sure I shall not be misunderstood by either the representatives of Canada or the representatives of Australia in doing so—to paint in perhaps what they may think rather lurid terms the very grave difficulties which, I know, in the opinion of the Admiralty, and in my own opinion, so far as I am entitled to have one, do surround this particular side of the subject. There is the one other point as to what was said about the effect upon foreign nations of the creation of these smaller navies as compared with the contributions. Granting the possibility of those navies being equally efficient, and maintaining the same standard as that of the British Navy, I am inclined to agree that that would be so; but there again we come back to the necessity for uniformity of standard, and, if that can be maintained, I am inclined to think that there would be something distinctly impressive to the world at large in the existence of these forces bearing the names of the Dominion and the Commonwealth.

I should venture to suggest that we could not attempt to-day to pass any resolution of any kind. Whether it be possible to pass a resolution in general terms before we finally disperse I think might stand over for further consideration. I think that the First Lord will be glad after to-day to proceed with the consideration of the circumstances of the different Dominions through some Sub-Committee. Do you suggest Sub-Committees for each, Mr. McKenna?

Mr. McKENNA: For each. I think it will be the best if they be taken separately. If the representatives of each of the Dominions would come to the Admiralty, we would have the Naval Advisers, Sir John Fisher and the Director of Naval Intelligence, there, who would advise with us as to the particular form.

CHAIRMAN: When that is done we might perhaps have another meeting to clear up the results of the Sub-Committees, and we could then see if there was any resolution, which I think would have to be at any rate of a quite general character, which we might be able to pass.

Mr. BRODEUR: I suppose we could have our Naval Advisers there also?

Mr. McKENNA: Yes, certainly; they would come, and we would meet you and them with our Naval Advisers.

Adjourned.

AT THE
FOREIGN OFFICE.

SIXTH DAY.

Thursday, 19th August 1909.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The EARL OF CREWE, K.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies
(*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. R. B. HALDANE, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. R. K. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

Canada:

The Hon. Sir F. W. BORDEN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia and Defence.
The Hon. L. P. BRODEUR, K.C., LL.D., Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

Australia:

Colonel the Hon. J. F. G. FOXTON, C.M.G., Minister without portfolio.

New Zealand:

The Right Hon. Sir J. G. WARD, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Cape Colony:

The Right Hon. J. X. MERRIMAN, Prime Minister.

Newfoundland:

The Hon. Sir E. P. MORRIS, K.C., LL.D., Prime Minister.

Natal:

The Right Hon. F. R. MOOR, Prime Minister.
Colonel the Hon. E. M. GREENE, K.C., Minister for Railways and Harbours.

Transvaal:

The Hon. J. C. SMUTS, Colonial Secretary.

Orange River Colony:

The Hon. A. FISCHER, Prime Minister.

Dr. T. J. MACNAMARA, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty.
Colonel J. E. B. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Lord LUCAS, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.
Sir FRANCIS HOPWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.
Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.
Mr. W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.
Major-General J. S. EWART, C.B., Director of Military Operations.
Brevet-Colonel W. P. BRAITHWAITE, Assistant Director of Staff Duties.

Canada:

Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C., M.G., C.B.
Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Australia:

Colonel W. T. BRIDGES, C.M.G.
Captain W. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

New Zealand:

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

South Africa:

Brigadier-General G. G. ASTON, C.B.

Colonel P. S. BEVES.

Mr. H. W. JUST, C.B., C.M.G., *Secretary.*

Mr. H. E. DALE,

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O. } *Assistant Secretaries.*

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I propose first to ask the Secretary of State for War to say a word upon the result of the Sub-Conference on Military Defence, a Paper as to which has been circulated to the Delegates.

Mr. HALDANE: This Paper, which is dated 10th August, embodies the result of the series of Conferences which followed upon the general discussion which took place here and afterwards at the War Office. The conclusions come to, as far as I am competent to judge, carry out faithfully what we agreed on, that is to say, they fall within the limits of what was agreed on as practicable. They have been very closely worked out, and in substance they do two things. They perfect the machinery for the creation of the General Staff of the Empire. That General Staff will, for the future, if this is approved, be a single General Staff, the Imperial General Staff, with its own local sections here and in the Dominions over the seas; and the working out of interchanges is shown in this Paper. The other part is the outcome of discussion as to War Establishments. We have recognised in the results of these Conferences the necessity of elasticity, having regard to local conditions, and the agreement of the experts as to broad lines. These settle the various component units in an Army. Although these units will be completely under local control they can yet be used for a combined purpose of defence in case of necessity, and are framed on general principles which give uniformity of pattern.

I do not know that I can really say more. It is a very clear Paper, and a very short Paper, and I think all the members of the Conference have seen it, and if it commends itself I hope we may adopt it, because I feel sure it marks a great step on towards the laying of the foundations on which we can gradually evolve something substantial.

CHAIRMAN: I do not know whether any of the Delegates wish to make any observations on this Paper.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I have watched the proceedings of the Sub-Conference very carefully, and I agree entirely with the observations that have fallen from the Secretary of State for War. I think there is nothing objectionable in the recommendation, and all that has been done is in the right direction. I think it is very desirable that we should adopt it.

Colonel FOXTON: I also am very pleased with the result of the Sub-Conference on Military Defence, and very largely I think in Australia we have already adopted many of the recommendations which are here set forth. Speaking generally I consider it very satisfactory, and I look for very excellent results from it from an Imperial point of view.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Crewe, I would like to express my appreciation of what the Sub-Conference has done, and say that I think they have carried out, on the lines indicated by the Conference, the detailed suggestions here in a very practical way. I want, however, to make this reservation, as far as I am concerned, in order to avoid any misapprehension that might occur later on. Personally I agree in the main with the whole of those recommendations, but I want to have them confirmed by the Parliament of the country of which I am the representative, and, where necessary, to be embodied in an Act of Parliament. Apart altogether from the transitory passage of the Governments of the day, we should have put on record to ensure a system of uniformity and continuity by an Act enacting what is necessary in the general interests of the scattered Imperial organisations. I want also to take the opportunity of saying that, while in our country—I am speaking for New Zealand alone—we have followed the Old Land in one important branch of military organisation, we may require to alter it on account of the cumbrous nature of it and the

difficulty of having concentration. We have adopted the system of a Council of Defence in New Zealand. We have given it a fair trial, and my belief is that it is unwieldy and unsatisfactory, and I want to say, for the information of the gentlemen on this Conference who take an interest in the future defence of the Empire, that in New Zealand we are considering the reverting to the system of having a Commandant of the Forces. The great importance of uniformity and of co-operation, which is embodied in these proposals, to my mind makes it worth the while of the country I represent, at any rate, doing all in its power to put it into practical shape, and not in an uncertain way, but by Act of Parliament. Beyond that I wish to say nothing further at present.

Sir E. P. MORRIS: I entirely endorse that.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Lord Crewe, this puts me in rather an awkward position, because my position is not the same as that of those who have spoken. I would say that the position we take up is that we can do nothing whatever. We cannot agree to anything, and therefore we hold ourselves at perfect liberty to criticise these proposals when they come, as to be effective they must come, before our Parliament. I may say I was surprised when I saw the resolution that had been arrived at by the Sub-Conference, which certainly went a good way because it had never been discussed by our Parliament at all—never. Of course, without Parliament you can do nothing. Personally I do not understand—no doubt I shall get light as one goes along—what relation a General Staff is going to hold to the Colonial Minister of the Colonial Parliament which finds the money, and which criticises most closely anything connected with military affairs. Personally I do not think in our country we could ever subscribe to this proposal about the General Staff, either in Intelligence or in Transport—those are two things which we know have broken down most hopelessly in South Africa. To go to a South African Parliament and ask them to put that in the hands of anything like a General Staff would at once be foredoomed to failure.

Mr. HALDANE: There was no General Staff at the time of the war?

Mr. MERRIMAN: There was a staff.

Mr. HALDANE: Not a General Staff?

Mr. MERRIMAN: At the present moment they are worrying about intelligence and causing the greatest trouble to the Civil Government. I do not want to go into that at any length, because it would be out of place. I have no right to do so because I am only speaking my own personal opinion. I am only saying that when these things come before Parliament you must prepare yourselves for a great deal of criticism in South Africa. By-and-bye, I believe, you are going to pass a resolution, but the feelings that I have for myself are these: That the representatives from South Africa wish to place on record the fact that from their position they are precluded from giving their adherence to any resolution or findings of the Imperial Conference on Military Defence. For the same reason they hold themselves at liberty to take these proposals into more detailed consideration when more definite action is possible. That is really the position we take up.

CHAIRMAN: If I may say so, that seems to me a very reasonable course, because we have understood all through that the gentlemen who represent South Africa, although they do represent it at the moment, cannot speak for South Africa, and feel themselves debarred from expressing a definite opinion. Therefore we quite accept that position.

Mr. MERRIMAN: May I point out one more thing? I see there is great talk of "uniformity." How difficult, and how impossible, it is to have uniformity between men who are paid 1s. a day (which, I believe, is their wage), and men who are paid 5s. a day, and organised on a 5s. a day basis. We are like "The New Model," in fact.

Mr. HALDANE: Who are they?

Mr. MERRIMAN: They are our Force in South Africa. They are paid 5s. and 6s. a day. More efficient men it would be impossible to find: but then they are on the basis of "The New Model"; they are that class of people. You want to make them uniform with people paid 1s. a day.

Mr. HALDANE: We do not want to touch pay or any of those things.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Then it shows, I think, a want of understanding on my part.

Colonel GREENE: I regret exceedingly that I cannot concur in the observations made by Mr. Merriman. I claim to speak on behalf of a considerable portion of the people in South Africa, and I have not any hesitation whatever in saying that the proposals as submitted by the Committee would meet with the approval of a very large section of that community. I think they are reasonable in the extreme. They commit us to nothing. They do not commit us to any contribution in case of a war, and we incur no obligation to send troops unless we so desire at the time. As I understand it the whole thing is that if we do send a contingent (as I have no doubt whatever South Africa will do if occasion ever requires it), they should be as efficient as possible and organised and drilled on exactly the same lines as the forces throughout the whole of the Empire. If we adopt such a course, I cannot see how it can prejudice us in any way whatever in South Africa. It must tend, I think, to the improvement of our own local forces. Personally, I cannot agree that we are in such a position that we cannot speak for South Africa. Most of us represent the four Governments; in fact, we are representatives of the four Governments of the four existing Colonies in South Africa. We would not hesitate to speak on behalf of our several Colonies if the union had not taken place, and I think we are just as able to speak for South Africa together as we would be to speak for our own individual Colonies. I concur thoroughly in the observations made by Mr. Haldane, and I shall regret exceedingly, and I am quite sure the people in Natal and a good many in the other Colonies too, will regret exceedingly, if South Africa at this important gathering differs from or cannot assent to the very general proposition submitted for our concurrence.

CHAIRMAN: I understand that the position is not that South Africa differs, but that South Africa expresses no opinion.

Colonel GREENE: I think, Lord Crewe, a very large section of South Africa wants to say something, and as far as the General Staff is concerned, I think Mr. Merriman is very unfortunate in his observations about it, because there was no General Staff in the late war; but supposing there had been, surely as intelligent men, if they did fail, they would have gained information from the operations of that war, and turned it to good account. Because they may have failed in any particular, I do not say they did—it is no argument against the establishment of a General Staff for the whole of the Empire, and if such a General Staff is established we have the opportunity in all the oversea dominions of making our representations, which will be listened to by the General Staff, and I hope if they are reasonable ones they will be given effect to.

Mr. MERRIMAN: May I venture to point out that the finest General Staff in the world has just been conducting a war in another part of the country, and has made one of the greatest messes it is possible to make? That is the German General Staff.

Colonel GREENE: All right; then we must try to avoid the mistakes which they have made in establishing a General Staff for the Empire.

General SMUTS: I do not think it is necessary for me to enter into these controversial matters. They are really not germane to these proceedings. Nor do I think in view of what has fallen from the Chairman it is necessary for me to enter into any great detail on these recommendations. I understand that you do not expect the Delegates from South Africa, in view of their very peculiar position, to commit either themselves or their Governments definitely to these propositions. I have gone through them fairly carefully and personally I agree with most of what is contained in these resolutions. Only I would say this, that I am in doubt myself on this question of the single Imperial General Staff, whether, so far as South Africa at any rate is concerned, that is not too great a step in advance. What I personally would

have preferred would have been an Imperial Staff here at headquarters in England, and general staffs in the self-governing Dominions, working in close association and with exchange of officers from time to time with the staffs in other parts of the British Empire. I think a proposition like that probably would have carried more easily the assent of South Africa. Of course we cannot quite forget that we are not so far from the past after all and there is the possibility that a proposal of this kind may make people in South Africa, who do not understand what really a staff means, think that this is a creation of one Army for the British Empire, and that their local Defence Forces will under the scheme of a single general staff become really part of the military system of the British Empire. Once that idea is formed in the minds of people, perhaps from insufficient knowledge and ignorance in South Africa, it would be very difficult for us to work out a proper system of defence, because people would think that by adhering to any general scheme of defence in South Africa they were going in for a general military policy with which of course they would not like to associate themselves. I therefore personally doubt whether this would not be going rather far from our point of view. Perhaps I am wrong, but I think we could more easily carry South Africa with us if we had our general Staff there working in co-operation with the central Imperial Staff in London and with an exchange of officers, and exchange of ideas and so on, from time to time. That is the principal point on which I think I would venture to offer any personal criticism on these proposals; but as you do not call upon me to commit myself definitely to any of them, I will not go beyond these few observations.

Mr. FISCHER: I have not anything to add. I think Lord Crewe has put the position for South Africa very fairly and clearly. We have no power to speak, and therefore we should not attempt it. I will say for myself that we have no military organisation at all, properly so-called, and therefore I have had no opportunity of getting anything in the shape even of advice to guide me in this matter. All I said at the beginning I would say again. We are here to listen and to learn in order to show our sympathy with the general idea involved in this Conference, and, for the rest, to leave a United South Africa to take this matter to which others have agreed into consideration and see how far they can meet these views, and, where they cannot meet them, to express their reasons for not doing so—perhaps owing, as General Smuts has pointed out, to local considerations, and to the fact that we are more backward and cannot grasp the ideas that others more advanced in military knowledge have already been able to obtain. Therefore, I think, the position we ought to take up is to leave it a completely open question with sympathy for the general principle involved.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, in dealing with this branch of the subject, I think we see clearly how we stand. The principles of this paper are generally accepted, except in the case of South Africa, where there has been some expressed difference of opinion among gentlemen who are here representing the existing Colonies; but so far as South Africa is concerned, I think my Right Honourable friend will agree that the whole matter must stand over until the Union Parliament is in a position to express its view.

Mr. HALDANE: I would quite agree to that, and I would only add that the very breath of this paper is local autonomy, and in the working out of details every consideration to which General Smuts properly called attention will be open. You may find, when you come to settle it, that there is more autonomy under this and less friction than under any alternative machinery; at least we think so, and hope so, but that is for you when you are able to go into it.

CHAIRMAN: I will now ask the First Lord of the Admiralty to make a statement as to the result of the various Sub-Conferences which have taken place with regard to Naval matters.

Mr. McKENNA: As was evident from the first, there was no expectation that a uniform system could be applied to the development of the Navies in the different Dominions. We have had meetings of various Sub-Committees and as a result of those meetings arrangements have been come to between the Admiralty and the Representatives of the different Dominion Governments, which I hope will work out as the basis of a settlement of the question of Imperial Naval Defence. I do not know

whether it would be desirable now to state what the conclusions are that we have come to with each Government, or whether they had better be circulated as papers. At the present moment they take the form with regard to Canada, of an agreed paper between ourselves and the Canadian representatives, with regard to Australia, of a paper handed to me by Colonel Foxton, and accepted by us; and with regard to New Zealand the form has been a letter written to me by Sir Joseph Ward, to which I have written an answer accepting the proposals which he makes.

Roughly speaking, to summarise the terms with regard to Canada, the arrangement is made with that while keeping in view the scheme outlined by the Admiralty for the provision of a complete Fleet unit, which is to be regarded as an ideal, the Canadian representatives do not feel themselves able to concur in the immediate acceptance of such a suggestion. They asked us for an outline of the kind of Navy which could be provided by them on two alternative schemes of cost. I do not know that it will be desirable now to enter into the details, but we have prepared for the Canadian Government the two alternative schemes, and we shall learn later which of the two it is anticipated that the Canadian Government will accept.

With regard to Australia there is only one outstanding difficulty. Generally speaking, the scheme suggested in the Admiralty paper has been accepted. We propose to agree that the British Government shall make good to the Australian Government the difference in cost between the estimated charge for the scheme and a sum of half a million sterling.

Colonel FOXTON: Per annum.

Mr. McKENNA: Per annum. We estimate, consequently, that the charge falling upon the respective governments will be, 500,000*l.* a year upon the Australian Government, and 250,000*l.* a year upon the British Government. Should the cost be in excess of 750,000*l.*, the difference will be borne by the Australian Government. But the figures which we have prepared lead to the conclusion that 750,000*l.* a year will cover the cost of the unit. The only outstanding question is whether there should be established a system of constant interchange and exchange with the officers and men of the Royal Navy. That is a matter which I still have to discuss with Colonel Foxton. But with the exception of that point, all the other terms have been satisfactorily settled.

With regard to the New Zealand agreement, Sir Joseph Ward has written me a letter accepting the proposals originally suggested by the Admiralty for the maintenance of a unit on the China Station, the large armoured ship of which would be provided by New Zealand, and the other units would be contributed to by the New Zealand Government to the extent of 100,000*l.* a year. We propose—and this, I think, is acceptable to the New Zealand Government—to make the New Zealand waters the headquarters for two of the Bristols, three of the Destroyers, and two of the Submarines; they will be interchangeable with the rest of the China unit. The officers and men will be, as and when opportunity arises, of New Zealand birth, but in the meanwhile any numbers that are required will be provided, of course, by the British Government. The rates of pay, both in the case of Australia and New Zealand, will of course be the local rates; the additional pay taking the form, in order not to clash with the actual rates of pay received by our own sailors, of deferred pay.

The scheme as a whole—so far as the Pacific is concerned—will result as follows:—We shall maintain three fleet units—when I say “we,” I mean the Home Government in union with the Australian and New Zealand Governments—one in Australian waters, consisting of a large armoured ship; three second class cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines. Those will be entirely controlled by the Australian Government, and the cost of the maintenance of the unit will be borne by Australian Government, except that the British Government will contribute a sum of 250,000*l.* a year; the Australian Government taking over the Sydney Dock, and undertaking all the necessary work in regard to the unit. The second unit will be on the China and New Zealand Stations. In China we shall probably keep more ships than would be the balance of the unit after we have taken away two second class cruisers, three destroyers and two submarines for New Zealand waters. We shall certainly maintain the large armoured cruiser and some number of other cruisers, gunboats and other smaller vessels on the China Station. The third unit, which we intend to be of the same type as the Australian unit, will be stationed at Colombo. The ideal which we have in view is that in any danger of war these units, which are all ships of the newest and best type, extremely fast, of large coal-carrying capacity

and consequent large radius of action, would be able to unite, and would offer a resistance to any possible enemy of such a kind as would enable the Admiralty to have the necessary time for reinforcing the Fleet by ships from home or from the Mediterranean Station.

The result of the scheme we think, in fact we know, will be greatly to strengthen our force in the Pacific, ensuring safety in any conceivable state of affairs, and at the same time affording some relief to the Home Government, while offering a basis upon which Dominion navies may be built up in the future.

With regard to Canada, the particular arrangement to which we have come, we agree with the Canadian Government in thinking, will be most appropriate for the immediate requirements of Canada, and while they and we have in view the ultimate realisation of the ideal of a further Fleet unit being provided by Canada, we do not ask, as we have not done from the first, that such an ideal should be accepted now, and we have no doubt that the provision which Canada is making will amply provide for Canada's present and immediate needs.

I do not know that I have anything further to add. I have not referred to the case of South Africa because it was understood before that, with regard to the Navy, South Africa will stand exactly where it stands now. The same applies to the case of Newfoundland.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I have nothing to say except that from the Canadian point of view I think the results of this Conference, both as regards the land forces and the Navy, are eminently satisfactory. I have already expressed my view of what has been done in the matter of the land forces, and my colleague, Mr. Brodeur, will be better able to express our view as to the result of the Naval Conference.

Mr. BRODEUR: I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I had the good fortune of attending some meetings of the Sub-Committee, and discussing the different questions which were in our minds. I must immediately express my thanks to the Admiralty, especially to Mr. McKenna, for the way in which he has received the different suggestions which have been made by us, and for the work which the Admiralty has done in order to carry out as much as possible the wishes of the Canadian Government and Canadian Parliament. Unfortunately we were not in a position to state exactly what amount of money could be expended. We had no mandate as to that. Mr. McKenna has been very willing, however, to have two statements prepared embodying the different amounts of expenditure. I am sure one or other of those amounts will be accepted by Parliament, and we expect to carry out this idea in the next Session.

Colonel FOXTON: Lord Crewe, and Gentlemen, I have very little to say upon this subject, and I am very pleased to think that for Australia, so far as one is authorised to say so at a Conference, which is purely consultative, and whose conclusions can only be a mere recommendation to the various Governments, we have been able to fall in almost entirely with the suggestions which were originally made to the Conference by Mr. McKenna. I am very pleased to think that the proposals which I had the pleasure of submitting to Mr. McKenna yesterday after our final interview, and which were made, of course, provisionally, have been received with satisfaction, and, so far as one can say so, have been accepted with the exception, as mentioned by Mr. McKenna, of the proposition which I put forward for the complete and full interchange of officers and seamen. Now it is very desirable that a Fleet unit, or any naval force which is established under the control of any Dominion, should be always maintained at such a complete degree of efficiency, and at the same standard of efficiency as obtains in the Royal Navy, and we are very strongly of opinion that with so small a force as we are able to contemplate at the present time there would not be sufficient scope for that force itself to maintain that standard of efficiency unless there was some very complete system of interchange with the Royal Navy, so that constantly there might be, as it were, a comparison drawn—that the standard of efficiency of one should be the standard of efficiency in the other. I sincerely hope that notwithstanding the difficulties in regard to pay, which I do not think are insuperable, there may be devised some scheme by which we shall be able in that way to maintain the efficiency that we so desire. Of course it goes without saying that I have no mandate, either from my colleagues or from the Commonwealth Parliament, to agree to anything, and these suggestions can only be put forward as recommendations for adoption; but so far as I have been able

to communicate with my colleagues, I feel very little doubt whatever that the scheme as now put forward will be found to be acceptable to the Australian Government as a whole and the Parliament, and to the great body of Australians generally. I feel that in making this new departure we are entering upon what may be regarded, I think, as a new era in the matter of Empire Naval Defence. I am extremely anxious—as we all are, no doubt—that it shall be completely successful. I perhaps may be pardoned for saying here—and perhaps Sir Joseph Ward will pardon me for saying it—that our great desire was that having regard to the close proximity of New Zealand to Australia, New Zealand might be able to see its way to come in with us in the formation, organisation and control—joint control if necessary—of a purely Australian unit. That, however, apparently is not practicable at the present time, but possibly later on in the dim future something of that sort may be attained to. I think, if we are able to show that we can maintain the standard of efficiency of the Royal Navy, perhaps there will be less disinclination on the part of New Zealand to co-operate directly with Australia in the maintenance of a Fleet unit in the Southern Pacific.

I do not know that I have anything more to say except to thank all with whom I have come in contact in connection with this Conference for their extreme courtesy and readiness to meet one's views.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Crewe and Gentlemen, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Mr. McKenna for the consideration he and the other Lords of the Admiralty gave to the suggestions made by me on behalf of New Zealand. I am sure the people in my country will appreciate it as fully as I do. I would like, in view of a later explanation which I will make to the people in New Zealand, to say to the Conference that I do not swerve one iota from the opinion I hold and have already expressed strongly, that the right thing to do in the interests of the British Empire is to have one great Imperial Fleet to serve all parts of it. However, I recognise to the fullest possible extent how difficult it is for the representatives of some of the countries to do other than what they have done which they believe to be right in the interests of their countries, and I hope in the future it will prove to be right both for them and also turn out satisfactory in the general interests of the Empire. They have an undoubted right to do that which they think best. I take no exception to it whatever, but I feel it necessary to make some remarks because I do want to allude presently to the position which I think New Zealand now and in the future in all probability will take up. I for one have no knowledge whatever of what the representatives of any of the other countries have proposed to Mr. McKenna, the First Lord of the Admiralty, nor did I in any way inquire as to what they were proposing to do. So far as New Zealand is concerned, what I have suggested has been from the New Zealand standpoint in connection with the Empire as a whole, and from that standpoint only. I want to say that I attach far more importance from the New Zealand standpoint to the acceptance of a "Dreadnought" and to its being included as a portion of the unit upon the China Station, as a part of the Pacific Fleet, than I do to any other portion of the proposals that have been agreed to. I do so for the reason that in New Zealand we feel that it is the whole of the British Fleet that we are depending upon, not from the standpoint of protecting New Zealand, but from the overriding standpoint of protecting any portion of the Empire that might in the future be attacked, and, if defeated, would bring down New Zealand as a portion of the Empire. I believe our people will regard the inclusion of a "Dreadnought" in the British Navy, wherever that "Dreadnought" may be, as affirming a deeper and closer attachment to the Imperial Navy—it will make them feel that they have a direct interest in it, and it will impress upon the children who are growing up in our country that they have a continuous duty devolving upon them in connection with the British Navy. The subsidiary portion of the arrangement, which has been alluded to by Mr. McKenna, although very important from our standpoint, is to my mind of much less consequence than our aiding the Navy as a whole, because I believe, as New Zealand grows, and assuredly it must grow, and becomes a thickly populated country, the right thing to do is to give more Dreadnoughts if necessary to form a part of a great Imperial British Navy. In view of the fact that an alteration of very material consequence was being made by the changed policy of Australia—to which I take no exception, and which involves the creation of a unit under Australian control and the severance of the British control from it except in time of war, the joint agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and the British Government will cease. As the outcome of that New Zealand is consequently placed in a position that

requires consideration. I would have liked very much indeed to have been able to conform to the request made by Colonel Foxton on behalf of his Government that we should join in an Australasian squadron had I believed it to be the right thing for New Zealand to do. New Zealand is very friendly to Australia, and that friendship is reciprocated by them (Colonel FOXTON: Hear, hear). I am confident if I had assented to any proposal of the kind, the New Zealanders would have dissented from it, not from any hostility to Australia or the Australians, but from the deep-seated feeling that they have that it is the protection of all the widespread British interests that they want a great Imperial Navy maintained, and it would not be a direct maintenance of it if they were to have a separate attachment of a local Navy even associated with the great Australian Commonwealth. For those reasons, though Colonel Foxton very ably put the matter before me, I felt that the duty of New Zealand—and if I may say so without presumption, my duty—believing as I do in one great British Navy for the empire as a whole, that it was not possible for us to assent to anything in the shape of a proposal of that kind. Indeed, I go further, and say that if I had not believed it was better for us to maintain one great British Navy although we are small in population at present, and although our resources are not so great as our neighbours' across the water, we would have infinitely preferred to go a good deal further, and would have asked to have an independent and complete unit established on the coast of New Zealand, controlled entirely by the Admiralty, and would have given more money for it—we would have preferred to do that rather than to have an intermediary Australian unit of the kind referred to.

I want to say, Lord Crewe, as briefly as I can, that it is because of the alteration that has taken place necessarily, as we realise here, that I feel that in the New Zealand waters the absence of a section of the British Fleet would as a matter of general British policy be a huge mistake, and for that reason I suggested New Zealand should have two second-class cruisers of the Bristol type—new vessels they are to be—three destroyers, and two submarines placed in New Zealand waters attached to the China unit and under the flag of the Admiral of the China unit. The result of that will be that Australia on the one hand will have an Australian squadron of their own with the important attachment which I hope may continue of the British Government giving 250,000*l.* out of the sum of between 500,000*l.* and 750,000*l.*, which will keep a distinct connection between England and Australia; while we will have for New Zealand a Pacific squadron, part on the China station and part consisting of ships on our own coast, so that apart from the many matters in the Pacific requiring to be attended to from time to time, we will all the time maintain a direct connection with the British Navy under the supreme control of the Admiralty, which I consider to be of very great importance indeed.

I have not communicated a single word of anything we have been doing to the Press or even to my colleagues in New Zealand. I recognise that as Prime Minister I am in a different position to the representatives from the other countries. I have no hesitation whatever in saying New Zealand will accept what has been proposed. Our Parliament I am sure will ratify it; it has already agreed to the main proposal, what has been done will give a very great deal of satisfaction. We will, in addition to providing a Dreadnought, continue to contribute 100,000*l.* per annum to pay the difference in the rates of pay of those New Zealanders who join those ships, and in that way I hope we will be able to give you a sufficient number of men to draft New Zealanders to other portions of the world. I am certain that this Conference is laying the foundations—not in the direction I would like (we all have to accept things we do not like in this world)—but we are laying the foundations of a very much stronger Navy for the Pacific, and I very cordially co-operate with my friends at this table in the forward movement that has been made. I believe that those following us in the next 10 years or so will go a great deal further than we are doing to-day. I therefore very heartily congratulate you, my Lord Crewe, Mr. Haldane, Mr. McKenna and gentlemen, on the very important step that we have made in a matter which is so complex and difficult considering the local sentiment and interests of the widely scattered portions of the British Dominions.

CHAIRMAN: I understand that both Newfoundland and South Africa maintain their present provision for the Navy.

Gentlemen, in concluding this part of the subject I merely desire to express my pleasure as Colonial Secretary at the manner in which the discussion has been carried through and so far as possible concluded. My Right Honourable friend, the Secretary of State for War, was in one respect in a more fortunate position than my other Right

Honourable friend on my right (Mr. McKenna). All he had to do was to lay down certain propositions both generally and in detail, and although they were open to criticism yet he had not to encounter one stumbling block which must, I think, have placed Mr. McKenna in a rather delicate if not—it is hardly too much to say—an invidious position, arising from the necessary divergence in the views expressed by the delegates representing the different Dominions. Had the views of Sir Joseph Ward, for instance, been accepted, and it had been merely a question of contributing certain sums to the British Navy, the sums to be settled by the Dominions themselves, my Right Honourable friend would have nothing to do but to consider how he could best spend that money for the common purpose; but, as we all know, and we entirely respect the reasons which actuate both Canada and Australia, that particular form of support to the Imperial Navy is not universally adopted. Well, that threw upon Mr. McKenna the burden of making suggestions which were almost bound to take the form of naming specific sums of money. I think it right to repeat once more that His Majesty's Government here never have asked for any direct contribution from the Dominions. But my Right Honourable friend was under the necessity of showing from the technical point of view what kind of fleet would be required if such a fleet unit was to become a component part of Imperial defence. That, as I say, threw upon him the burden of naming certain sums of money, which might seem to wear the appearance of a request from the British Government for such contributions from the different Dominions, but nothing in the world was further from our thoughts. All that the First Lord of the Admiralty intended to do and all that His Majesty's Government would desire to do was to lay down certain principles on which fleet units might be founded if they were to be of Imperial service, and that necessarily involved describing the cost of such units. I have dwelt upon this because it is from our point of view a matter of real importance that we should not be supposed in any form to have suggested to any one of the Dominions any amount which they might or ought to contribute.

I think that is all I have to say so far as the naval side is concerned. It will come up again in a moment when we have to discuss the question of what publication and at what time, should be given to our proceedings. But before that I desire to say a word on the question of a resolution. The Delegates will remember that at both our last meeting and at a previous meeting something was said about the desirability of passing a resolution in general terms which might convey to the Empire at large a sense of the general agreement at which we had arrived. I thought it right therefore to circulate to the delegates a draft resolution, not indeed as a suggestion but simply laid upon the table for purposes of discussion. It is so little of a suggestion of mine that I certainly do not propose that it should be moved by any member of His Majesty's Government. If it is moved I hope it will be moved and seconded by representatives of the different Dominions, and its terms of course are open to complete discussion. I merely circulated it, there having been a strong expression of opinion that it would be desirable that some general resolution should be put forward, and if possible carried. This draft resolution^a is now the subject for discussion.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: My Lord, there is some question, perhaps, whether a resolution is necessary. I think the results of the meeting of this Conference have been eminently satisfactory. I think there is no doubt that the Conferences which have taken place—certainly the Conferences in 1902 and 1907 and this one—have accomplished a great deal towards bringing about a better understanding as to the question of defence, and elucidating plans by which common action and co-operation would take place in the event of any attack being made of a formidable character upon the Empire at its centre, or upon any important member of the British Empire. Possibly to give to the Empire the results of what has taken place at this Conference would be a better practical illustration and proof of the work which has been accomplished than any general resolution. However, I am not personally or individually opposed to this resolution, although if it is to be adopted

^a NOTE.—The draft resolution was in the following terms:—

"This Conference, whilst recognising that the provision made for defence in His Majesty's self-governing Dominions beyond the seas is primarily designed for local purposes, and is subject to the conditions imposed by the Legislature of each Dominion, desires to declare its full acceptance of the principle that the whole of the military and naval forces in the British Dominions should be so organised as to render each several force capable of performing the most efficient service in any emergency which might threaten the integrity of the Empire."

I should like to see it changed in some respects. As I understand the resolution, it simply means that we concur in the view—accept the principle, in other words—that the military and naval forces in the British Dominions should be organised on such lines as would enable co-operation between these different forces to take place. We have adopted that principle so far as the Army is concerned; we adopted in 1907, when we agreed to the single Imperial General Staff. I think there is no question as to that view being adopted with regard to the Navy at all, and I understand that all the negotiations that have taken place in the different sub-committees have been carried on with that understanding. Now the question is whether we should put that into the concrete form of a resolution. I think perhaps there are some others at this table who take a different view from what I do, but I think it is very undesirable that there should be any difference of opinion, and that the resolution should be voted upon, and that anyone should dissent. Therefore I would reserve the right, my Lord, if I may, after making these general observations, to say a word or two later on in reference to the view which I would take.

Colonel FOXTON: My Lord Chairman, I think it is very desirable that some such resolution as this should be passed. It deals purely with generalities and is non-committal; it is merely an expression of opinion as to the desirability of carrying out what I understand this Conference was called for—the co-ordination of the various forces, both military and naval, of the British Dominions in such a way, and to such an extent, as to enable them to co-operate with the forces of the Mother-land or the forces of each of the Dominions, as the case may be, and the occasion arises for the maintenance of the supremacy of the Empire.

It has been suggested in connection with the discussion that there is some dread that the operations of the Imperial General Staff would be regarded in some quarters as being, so to speak, an interference with the local control of the military forces of the Dominions. That, I think, is quite a misconception, because after all the operations of the Imperial General Staff as applied to those Dominions will be purely advisory as I take it; there will be no attempt at control whatever of any of the military forces of the outlying portions of the Empire unless and until those forces are voluntarily placed at the disposal of the Imperial authorities in the case of need.

CHAIRMAN: I might remind you, Colonel Foxton, of the actual words of the resolution.

Colonel FOXTON: Quite so; I was only endeavouring to meet the objection which has been raised to that. I think perhaps it would remove the difficulties of some of the members of the Conference if the words "as far as possible" were interposed after the word "render," and that it should read: "that the whole of the military and naval forces in the British Dominions should be so organised as to render as far as possible each several force capable of performing," or perhaps it would come in better in this way: "that the whole of the military and naval forces should as far as possible be so organised." That is perhaps where it should come in. To my mind there can be very little objection to the wording of this, especially if those words are introduced, on the part of anyone who desires to see the maintenance of the military and naval supremacy and the support of the Empire at large in which we are as Dominions so very deeply interested.

If it is not presuming too much, I would myself like to move the resolution if I may; if it is desired that it should come from a representative of one of the Dominions, I would have no hesitation whatever in moving it, with the suggestion that in order to meet possible difficulties on the part of some of the members of the Conference the words I have mentioned should be introduced.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Crewe and Gentlemen, I very cordially support that. Some may say that a resolution which does not in the actual wording convey much may be regarded as a mere desire to express something for the mere sake of doing it. I regard a resolution passed at the first meeting of a Conference of this kind as of some importance, especially after there has been an agreement arrived at between the representatives of the different self-governing Dominions and the British Government. There is nothing in this resolution suggesting the taking away of the power of any of the self-governing Dominions: there is no suggestion coming from the British Government that they want to interfere, and there is the undoubted right in everything we have done at this Conference, both on the military and the naval side, for

every one of the different countries to do whatever their Governments think proper. There is no question about that at all.

What the outside world, who will judge of the work of a Conference such as this, will look for is something in the shape of unanimity. The value of a Conference, when the material points of the individual countries have been settled, is in showing that upon the great principle of Empire defence it is one in desire. I recognise that you cannot at present get anything more expressive or definite than is conveyed in the resolution. If it were possible to do so I would heartily welcome it, but it is a very difficult thing to do; it however implies more than the actual wording of the resolution, so far as the future is concerned. Some time or other there will be a further Conference—when I do not know—but after all our efforts, recognising the necessity for flexibility to meet the conditions of the various self-governing countries, we should come to some decision in the general interests of the British Empire. If we are to go away from the Conference and are not able to agree to one resolution, even although it is not a very definite one, and are not able to agree to a resolution of a character such as this, which does not convey a great deal, it does not augur very well for future Conferences in the matter of arriving at decisions which may be still more important. We are trying to start on the right road upon this occasion, but surely we can agree to this proposal.

I will not detain the Conference further except to say that I have thought all along that we should affirm something at the end of the Conference, Lord Crewe, and I have previously suggested we should have a resolution, and in the absence of anything better I most cheerfully support this resolution, and accept it as an indication of a desire on our part to work together in support of the Imperial interests of the different portions of the British Empire.

Sir EDWARD MORRIS: I support the resolution.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Lord Crewe, I have already read the resolution which I should feel bound to append to this. Either this resolution means nothing and is a vague thing which, from what I gather, is rather Sir Frederick Borden's view, or it means something. If it means something, speaking for South Africa the question has never been discussed by Parliament and we are not sent here with any mandate to agree to anything at all; we are here merely to discuss things and it would be absolutely improper in view of our Parliament to agree to any resolution at all if it means anything. What will be read into it is what was stated at the first, and that is that we are prepared in the event of any serious row to send expeditionary forces. That will be read into it. That of course we are in no sort of position to agree to and I should have been glad if no resolution had been put forward. Of course the view I take is that every self-governing Colony, when it begins talking about its national feeling and so on is bound to be responsible for its own defence, and it is also a very mean thing if it depends on the British taxpayer to keep the policing of the seas going when it ought to contribute to the Navy. That is my own personal opinion, but I have no mandate from my Parliament, and to agree to a resolution would be simply nugatory.

Colonel GREENE: Lord Crewe, I should prefer not to say anything at all; I think it is very objectionable to have apparently to differ on every conceivable subject from my colleagues from South Africa. I do not know that any of the Dominions are authorised by their Parliaments to approve of a resolution of this description. What does it mean? Supposing we take Mr. Merriman's as the views expressed by the self-governing South African Colonies, they recognise that it is their first duty to protect their own country, and they have stated so in very definite terms at the first meeting we had, and how can we read more into it than this? It says that we recognise the principle "that the whole of the military and naval forces in the British Dominions should be so organised as to render each several force capable of performing the most efficient service in any emergency which might threaten the integrity of the Empire." All right. Supposing South Africa would only agree to provide such a force as would be able to protect its own shores against an attack—all right—we recognise the principle that it must be so organised as to render the most efficient service in performing the functions for which it is organised. I cannot see where we are committing ourselves to anything in this resolution, and really to take exception to it surprises me. Mr. Merriman says that you can read into it an obligation to supply forces for Overseas service.

Mr. MERRIMAN: I did not say that; I said it would be read into it.

Colonel GREENE: It would be read into it. Why should they read such a thing into it? They might also read into it that we have accepted an obligation to establish a naval unit. There is nothing of the sort. It is so general in its terms that I was rather surprised when I first received it. I am very much disappointed that the action of South Africa should possibly prevent some such general resolution being passed at this Conference, and I would suggest that if there is such a possibility we should stand aside and not vote,—that we should not take any part in the proceedings, because, I am sure that the people of all the Dominions would be very much disappointed if no resolution is come to at all as the result of all our deliberations.

Mr. SMUTS: I think not, Lord Crewe, if I may express my personal opinion, that it would be advisable not to press this resolution. In the first place I do not think it is necessary. Our whole work here for weeks now has been based on the idea that the military and naval system all over the British Empire should be assimilated and that there should be the organisation which would be the most efficient in case any common crisis were to arise. I think that has been the presupposition, and all the work is really based upon that idea. Here a number of resolutions have been framed and details worked out by the Military Sub-Committee which presupposes this common organisation and I understand that the same work has been done with regard to Naval Defence. I doubt, therefore, whether it is necessary to put this condition precedent so to say of our working into explicit terms, and I think also that it may be misunderstood. I think it is possible that this resolution might be understood to mean that the self-governing Dominion recognise the principle, that is, they bind themselves in any common crises to co-operate. That is, of course, a very large question which would depend upon many circumstances, and one does not like putting these things in plain words. It is far better for us to co-operate on a practical basis without affirming large abstract principles which seem to travel beyond the necessities of the case. I therefore think it would be better really for us not to pass any resolution; I do not think it necessary. I think the work that we have done presupposes the necessity of a common organisation, and I do not think we should go further and affirm a large abstract principle. At the same time I may say that I do not like to go against a proposal of this kind, it seems churlish to do so, and yet it does seem capable of a construction which is very far-reaching.

CHAIRMAN: Have you anything to add, Mr. Fischer?

Mr. FISCHER: No, Sir. I only take up the same position as I have from the start—the simple one that no matter whether the proposition is correct or not, have we any power to come here and affirm or reject any proposition? We have not got that power, and I think it is very desirable to keep the question open so far as South Africa is concerned. I think the man who puts up a target expects some one to shoot at it, and if we lay down a principle, it seems to invite someone to attack it: whatever possible Government adopts that and lays it down, there will be an opposition to attack it, whereas if we report to the new Union Parliament that these things have been considered advisable by others and that no opinion has been expressed by those who have no power to express opinions, it will come as a new subject, not something put forward for criticism but something open for debate, and possibly more desirable results may be got at by our not affirming something that we have no right to affirm even in the abstract.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have a proposition to make and it is this, that before we attempt to arrive at any definite conclusion on this question of the resolution we should suspend discussion on it for a moment and pass on to the next item on the Agenda, the question of the extent of publication and time of publication which is to be given to our proceedings. I do so for this reason, that I think it would be generally agreed that if a fairly free and general publication is given to the various conclusions which have been arrived at, what General Smuts has observed has considerable force, namely, that the sense of the Resolution would be conveyed by the Report of what we have done. There seems to me, as I say, to be much force in that argument. On the other hand, if it is decided not to publish the results of the various conversations which have taken place, and fairly soon, some disappointment might be felt both here, and I think also overseas, if we seemed to have reached no conclusions whatever, and under those circumstances perhaps the Delegates might be disposed to pass some quite general Resolution of this kind. I should like us therefore to consider, before we decide on this question of the Resolution, what the desire of the different

Dominions is with regard to early publication of our proceedings and to what extent it is thought desirable that they should be published.

Perhaps, if I might say a word upon this, I understand from what Sir Joseph Ward has been good enough to tell us privately that he would desire to convey himself to his own Parliament the conclusions, at any rate so far as the Navy is concerned, before they become public property. Is not that so, Sir Joseph?

Sir JOSEPH WARD: That is so, if it is possible to do it, but I do not for a moment want to stand in the way of what the other representatives desire.

CHAIRMAN: Considering that Sir Joseph Ward has further to go than anyone else, the publication of the results of his conversations with the Admiralty would be governed by the time at which he is able himself to make a statement of that kind. It might, perhaps, be possible to divide the publication into two, that is to say, to make a fairly early publication of the military results so far as they have been achieved, and then to publish the naval results about the same time both here and in the different Dominions, but I should like to hear the opinion of the Delegates upon this point. I suppose, to some extent, it depends upon the sitting of the various Parliaments, and I might also add, without being able to prophesy definitely as to when the House of Commons will rise, that the House of Commons will, I think, expect to have something told it as to what we have been doing before it disperses. As we know, certain communications have appeared in the newspapers which have been rather more full than I confess I myself had expected, but I imagine that each Government would desire to make its own statement in its own way at home, and that, of course, would be our desire here. Perhaps, Sir Frederick Borden, you would tell us what your view is about publication in Canada.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: I do not know how far the "Times" may be considered to be the organ of the Government.

CHAIRMAN: Not at all.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: But it contained a very definite statement this morning that nothing would be given out until Sir Joseph Ward had returned home.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: I may say I have given nothing whatever out up to the present.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Quite so, but the "Times" has had that idea. I think the suggestion made by Lord Crewe is a very good one; I think there is a good deal of force in keeping back the publication, that is to say, in the desirability of agreeing to Sir Joseph Ward's wish or co-operating with it, that the naval proposals should not be given out until he returns home, but I cannot see any reason why the military agreements reached should not be published, and, as far as I am concerned, I think it would be very desirable that that should be done. The Canadian Parliament, I suppose, will not meet until some time in November, and Sir Joseph Ward will have reached home before then, I presume.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: After Colonel Foxton has spoken I would like to say a word.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: That is all I have to say; I agree with your Lordship's suggestion.

Mr. BRODEUR: As to that, I may perhaps be permitted to make a suggestion. As to our memorandum, which has been prepared by the Admiralty as far as Canada is concerned, I think there would be no objection on the part of the Canadian Government that this memorandum should be published at any time that would be suitable to the Imperial Government and to us. We would like very much, when Parliament opens, that this memorandum should be published.

CHAIRMAN: Do you mean the Admiralty memorandum or your memorandum?

Mr. BRODEUR: The record of the proceedings of the interviews between the Admiralty and ourselves. I would like if that could be published at least at the opening of the Canadian Parliament, and it could be done without referring at all to the general discussion which has taken place here or even to the general memorandum

which has been prepared by the Admiralty and the statement made by the First Lord; but outside of that I may say that as far as I am concerned I would have no objection at all that the whole of the proceedings should be published. They are proceedings of very great importance, they will have to be published some day, and I do not see any serious objection to their being published just now—by just now I mean in a few months, when it will suit the Imperial Parliament, and when it will suit the other parties, but as far as we are concerned, I do not think there is any objection to the proceedings being published immediately.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: None at all.

Mr. BRODEUR: Perhaps it would dispense with the passing of the Resolution which is a little different to the one with regard to the Canadian Parliament and we would like to stand by the Resolution by our Parliament and not to pass one here.

Colonel FOXTON: My Lord Chairman, I am in a somewhat less fortunate position than the Canadian representatives, inasmuch as our Parliament is now sitting and is, I have not the slightest doubt, anxiously awaiting information with regard to what has been done at this Conference; in fact it will be necessary for the Government to make known the arrangements so far as the naval position is concerned which have been arrived at tentatively or provisionally, because, as can easily be seen, it affects the financial proposals which the Government will have to lay before the House.

CHAIRMAN: When will that have to be, Colonel Foxton? What would be the latest date?

Colonel FOXTON: As early as possible. I could not say, because I have no definite information except what one gathers from day to day in the Press.

CHAIRMAN: Do you propose that there should be a Parliamentary statement in Australia before you return yourself?

Colonel FOXTON: I am afraid that will be a necessity. It is rather unfortunate it should be so, but I think it would be quite sufficient if that statement had relation only to the arrangements which have been provisionally made with regard to Australia itself, without reference to the arrangements which have been made by any other Dominion. Always assuming that there is no objection on the part of the Imperial Government to such a disclosure, I think from our point of view the sooner it is made the better.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: Lord Crewe and Gentlemen, in suggesting so far as my own country is concerned that the opportunity should be afforded to me of placing before Parliament the particulars of what has been done here, such as can be given out of course, I was prompted by a knowledge of the fact that what I might term information in dribblets is going out and is being published in the Press, conveying rightly or wrongly suggestions of what we are doing here. With a journey before me after leaving London on Saturday of some 38 days I do not want to be placed in the position of all sorts of unconfirmed statements being made as to what has been done at this Conference so far as New Zealand is concerned. What I mean is that I want to avoid anything in the shape of inaccuracy or indefiniteness and to speak personally as to what has been done so far as it affects New Zealand. I am not in that respect concerned with what course is taken by any other country. Up to now I have conveyed nothing whatever either to the Press or my colleagues or anyone else concerning the doings of this Conference. I have regarded it as a secret Conference and as I have already said to-day, I have not conveyed even to my colleagues what has been going on, but I fully realise that there are other representatives who must communicate with their Governments, they could not carry on the work of this Conference without so doing. I take it that is the case, and rightly so, but I want to say, Lord Crewe, that I hope the matter will not be considered so far as my personal convenience is concerned, and whatever the other Delegates desire I shall fall in with at once. My belief is, looking at it from the standpoint of the closer countries, Canada for instance, that it is not desirable to hold the information back for so long a time as was suggested in the discussion with me, because naturally the people there want to know what is going on and it would be unreasonable to have

the information held back on account of the distance of a country such as mine until after my arrival there.

Mr. BRODEUR: It does not make a great difference, a month or two months.

Sir JOSEPH WARD: I also recognise, if I may be allowed to say so, that there would be persistent requests to the British Government in the House and in the Press as to what has been done at this Conference, and my belief is that in the interests of everybody the sooner an official statement is made as to what has been done the better. If that is understood, I would like to convey in my own way what I desire to be published in New Zealand concurrently with what you do here. I do not for a moment want to be specially considered: I will fall into line with whatever is considered best. I am inclined to think that you cannot postpone publication of the proceedings of the Conference. I think, Colonel Foxton, in view of opposition to the resolution, that it better be withdrawn; when you get an expression of dissenting opinion from two or three Delegates, the fact of their differing on such a resolution as this makes it worthless, because unless it were unanimous it would be a great deal worse than proposing no resolution at all, if you have dissent, even from the gentlemen from South Africa before the Union Parliament has been formed. So far as I am concerned personally, I would prefer to see the resolution withdrawn and to see the official publicity given to the proceedings which may be considered necessary and desirable.

Colonel FOXTON: I would have liked to see the resolution passed, but I think it would be decidedly undesirable to put it to the vote; I think it would do more harm than good, and, therefore, with your permission, Sir, at the suggestion of Sir Joseph Ward, who seconded it, I beg to withdraw the resolution.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Will all the things be published?

CHAIRMAN: You mean the entire proceedings?

Mr. MERRIMAN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN: It had not been contemplated that the whole of the proceedings would be published.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Because I shall have to enter into a full description of the attitude I have taken up, otherwise I shall have a very awkward ordeal to face. That is why I want to make it perfectly clear that I should not commit myself to any resolution.

CHAIRMAN: I have here what the Prime Minister said on the first day: "I need not perhaps say, although it is a matter which we will all bear in mind, that a Conference of this kind, dealing, as it has to deal, with matters which are vital to the safety of the Empire, is in the peculiar and special circumstances a confidential gathering, and I think we shall all of us—it will not be a self-denying ordinance, I am sure—adopt the rule which we shall only be too glad to observe, that, unless by some special resolution of the Conference *ad hoc*, the course of the proceedings should remain our own property, and should not pass into the knowledge of the outside world." I confess we had not here contemplated the publication of the entire proceedings. I think the proceedings sometimes would have been less animated than they were if it had been supposed that everything that was said would be reported verbatim to the public. If I may intervene at this moment, it appears to me that the general sense of the Conference is that on the whole the best course would be for a general statement of the results to be made here and in the House of Commons—(hear, hear)—and that as regards the publication of the different papers, we should arrange with each Dominion how far it wishes the actual papers to be published.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: That would be very appropriate because it would follow almost as a matter of course that it should be stated as regards the South African Delegates that they were unable to pledge a Parliament which was only being fashioned.

Mr. MERRIMAN: Yes, that would be perfectly right; that would safeguard my position at any rate.

CHAIRMAN: The Prime Minister is waiting for us at Whitehall, so, perhaps, I may close the Conference without any further remarks.

Sir FREDERICK BORDEN: Before the Conference closes I would like to move a resolution which I am sure will be unanimously adopted: "That the members of this Conference representing the self-governing Dominions desire before they separate to convey to Lord Crewe their warm and sincere appreciation of the manner in which he has presided over their deliberations as well as of the courtesies which they have received from him. They desire also to place on record the deep sense of gratitude which they feel for the generous hospitality which has been extended to them by the Government and people of the United Kingdom." (Hear, hear.) May I put this motion, my Lord? You have heard the motion, Gentlemen. All in favour will please say "Aye." That is carried.

CHAIRMAN: I must just assure you, Gentlemen, how much I personally value and how we all value this kind expression of your good will. It has been a great pleasure to me to have undertaken the very easy task of presiding in this chair, and I am glad to think that our Conferences will have been fruitful of, as I hope, some really permanent results.

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DEFENCE CONFERENCE, 1909.

CONFIDENTIAL PAPERS

LAID BEFORE THE

IMPERIAL DEFENCE CONFERENCE,
1909.

*Imperial Conference Secretariat,
Colonial Office,*

September 1909.

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NOTE.

In addition to the papers printed in this volume, the following Parliamentary and other papers were laid before the Conference:—

1. [Cd. 4325.] "Correspondence relating to the Naval Defence of Australia and New Zealand."
2. [Cd. 4475.] "Correspondence relating to the proposed Formation of an Imperial General Staff."
3. [Cd. 4611.] "Memorandum by the Army Council on the existing Army System and on the present State of the Military Forces in the United Kingdom."
4. H. C., 74, of 1905, Parts I and II.
"Return of the Vessels struck off the List of Effective Ships of War, showing the Name, Date of Completion, Cost of Hull, Machinery, and Armament, Cost of Repairs during the last ten years, Date and Cost of the last Substantial Repair with a view to Commission, and the Aggregate Complement of Officers and Men."
5. H. C., 77, of 1905.
"Return of Protected and Unprotected Cruisers included in the Return presented to Parliament in 1904 (No. 136), which have not been struck off the List of Effective Ships, showing Date of Completion, Cost, and Aggregate Complement of Officers and Men."
6. H. C., 337, of 1905.
"Return of Ships of 5,000 tons and upwards built for the Admiralty since the 1st day of January, 1893."
7. H. L., 190, of 1908.
"Return showing the Comparative Strength in First-class Battleships less than 25 years old, Armoured Cruisers less than 20 years old, and Destroyers built and building, of Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Germany, and Japan, on the 1st April, 1908."
8. H. L., 204, of 1908.
"Return of the Amount of Money spent during the last two years on the Repairs of Battleships and Cruisers launched since 1st January, 1898, together with the Period of the Repairs in each case."
9. Colonial Office Confidential Paper, Dominions No. 12.
"Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences relating to Defence."
10. Colonial Office Confidential Paper, Dominions No. 13.
"Correspondence relating to the summoning of a Conference with Representatives of the Self-governing Dominions on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire." (Incorporated in Papers to be presented to Parliament.)
11. Colonial Office Confidential Paper, Dominions No. 14.
"Further Correspondence relating to the proposed formation of an Imperial General Staff."

I.

Précis of Important Events connected with the Question of Colonial Naval Contributions.

SINCE the year 1862, the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the arrangements for the defence of self-governing Colonies has been based upon a resolution of the House of Commons which was unanimously agreed to on the 4th March of that year, to the effect:—

Resolution of House of Commons, 1862.

"That this House (while fully recognizing the claims of all portions of the British Empire to Imperial aid in their protection against perils arising from the consequences of Imperial policy) is of opinion that Colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defence."

1865.

2. The Colonial Naval Defence Act was passed in 1865. Its object was to enable the Colonies to provide for naval defence. The Act empowers Colonial Governments to provide and man vessels of war, and also to raise volunteer forces to form part of the Royal Naval Reserve established under the Act of Parliament of 1859. The members of such reserves will be available for general service in the Royal Navy in time of emergency, when an offer is made by the Government of a Colony to place them at the disposal of the Imperial Government.

Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865.

1881.

3. At an Inter-Colonial Conference held at Sydney in January, 1881, the Premiers of the States of Australia unanimously agreed to the following resolution in regard to the naval defence of Australia:—

Resolution of Australian Premiers.

"That, in the opinion of this Conference, considering the large Imperial interests involved, the Naval defence of these Colonies should continue to be the exclusive charge of the Imperial Government, and that the strength of the Australian squadron should continue to be the exclusive charge of the Imperial Government, and that the strength of the Australian squadron should be increased. That the members of the Conference pledge themselves to use all legitimate endeavours to procure the efficient fortifications and land defence of the several ports of the Australian Colonies, at the cost of the several Colonies interested."

The representatives of South Australia wished it to be understood that, although not voting against the motion, they were of opinion that, in order more effectually to secure the employment of an Australian squadron for the exclusive defence of Australian ports, the Colonies ought to contribute to the cost of maintaining such squadron.

4. In a despatch dated the 11th May, 1881, addressed to the Governor of Victoria, Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, observed with reference to this resolution that—

"Her Majesty's Government have noticed with much satisfaction that part of the resolution which pledges the members of the Conference to use all legitimate endeavours to procure the efficient fortification and land defence of the Australian ports at the cost of the Colonies interested. They are, however, unable to express similar satisfaction at the suggestion that the outlay for the naval defence of the Australian Colonies should be increased, and at the same time that it should continue to be exclusively a charge upon the Imperial Treasury.

"On this point I am glad to see that the representatives of South Australia placed on record their opinion that the Colonies ought to contribute to the cost of maintaining the Australian squadron."

1882.

5. In the Report of the Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad, the question of the Naval Defence of the Australian Colonies and New Zealand was dealt with under two heads:—

- (a) The protection of the Australian ports by naval means, whether alone or in combination with land works.
- (b) The naval defence of Australia generally as an integral portion of the British Empire, and of Australian commerce on the high seas.

The Commissioners expressed the opinion that (a) should be undertaken by the Colonies themselves. They asked the Admiralty to advise as to the best system to be adopted by the different Colonial Governments for the protection of their harbours, and the following paragraphs are extracted from the Admiralty letter of the 30th December, 1881, in reply to the Commissioners' enquiry:—

"My Lords will now endeavour to give such a general reply to the questions put to them as they can, bearing in mind that the circumstances of war are so varied, and the progress of naval science so rapid, that the lapse of a very few years may render some change necessary in any defensive measures which may be organized now, and even in the principles upon which they are based."

"In their Lordships' opinion then, there should be provided at every fortified port a system of submarine mines, to be placed when required in the positions selected for them beforehand. It is essential that these mines and the stations from which they would be worked, should be defended by batteries or by gunboats armed with machine guns in addition to other ordnance."

"For this and other defensive purposes my Lords recommend that the more important ports should maintain a small force consisting of gunboats, torpedo boats, and fast steam launches fitted for using torpedoes. The more particular description of these vessels and of their armament may, my Lords think, with advantage be left for future discussion."

6. At that time Victoria was the only Colony that had availed itself of the powers given by the Colonial Naval Defence Act, and was, until the presentation of the "Wolverene" to New South Wales in the year 1881, the only Colony in which the means existed for properly organizing and exercising a naval force. The Commissioners stated that they attached very great importance to the existence of bodies of men so trained, and suggested that "when any of the Colonies shall have made application for a training vessel, the Imperial Government shall assist the Colony as far as possible, either by transferring a suitable vessel, if there be one available, or by contributing towards the purchase."

They further expressed the opinion that those Colonies which had a naval force should form an efficient naval reserve.

7. With regard to the second and larger question, (b), the naval defence of Australia generally as an integral portion of the British Empire, and of Australian commerce on the high seas, the Commissioners expressed the opinion that the time

had arrived when the Colonies might reasonably be expected to take upon themselves some share of that defence—a burden hitherto exclusively borne by the mother-country.

Looking to the fact that only one Colony [Victoria] had availed itself of the powers given by the Colonial Naval Defence Act, and that the vessel (the "Cerberus") acquired by Victoria as a sea-going ship had practically been converted into a vessel for harbour defence, they did not suggest that these Colonies should maintain sea-going ships of their own for action beyond their territorial waters. To such a plan they considered that there were many objections; and even if the Colonies were willing to undertake the heavy expenditure of purchasing such ships, it was doubtful whether, considering the rapid changes in the construction and armament of sea-going vessels of war, they would long continue to be efficient. They suggested, however, that there was no reason why the Australian Colonies should not make a moderate contribution in money towards the cost of that squadron which is maintained by the mother-country for the protection of interests common to the Colonies and herself.

The Commissioners considered that it would be undesirable that any contribution from the Australian Colonies should be coupled with restrictions upon the free movement of the squadron. That contribution should be given and accepted only on the understanding that the primary duty of the squadron is the protection of Australian commerce and interests; and to hamper the free movement of the squadron by a condition that it should not leave Australian waters would defeat the object which both this country and Australia have in view.

1885.

8. In a circular despatch, dated the 19th June, 1885, the Earl of Derby, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, communicated to the Governors of the Australian Colonies a scheme for Naval Defence which had been prepared by Admiral Sir Cooper Key, at that time the Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty.

This scheme, however, was not proceeded with, as the Board of Admiralty which had shortly afterwards succeeded that of the former Administration desired some modification of the scheme prepared by their predecessors.

A revised scheme prepared in September of 1885 was communicated by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to the Admiral on the station, Rear-Admiral G. Tryon, C.B., who was instructed to negotiate direct with the Governors and Colonial Governments upon the subject of it; and the Governor of Victoria was informed that Her Majesty's Government considered it advisable that the Governors should endeavour to arrange a meeting of the Premiers of the Colonies, and of such Governors as might be able to attend to discuss the matter with the Admiral.

9. The object of the Admiralty's proposal, made through the Admiral, was to encourage an extension of the Imperial Navy rather than separate Colonial Navies. Its main features may be shortly stated as follows:—

- (a.) That the purely local Naval Defence Force, which had already been created in several Colonies, should remain substantially on the footing on which it was already established.
- (b.) That any sea-going vessels that might be provided, equipped and maintained at the cost of the Colonies, should be manned by the Admiralty, and be placed in every respect on the same footing as were Her Majesty's vessels then belonging to the station, including a periodical change of officers and men.
- (c.) That the vessels provided at the cost of the Colonies, should be retained within the limits of the Australasian seas.
- (d.) That no reduction of the forces then on the station should take place consequent on the addition of any force made at the cost of the Colonies.
- (e.) That the entire cost of any additional vessels should be borne by the Colonies.
- (f.) That an increased number of naval cadetships should be given to the Colonies.
- (g.) That during time of peace these vessels should be employed in the same way as other vessels of war on the station.
- (h.) That any arrangement made should be for a period of ten years.

- (i.) That the several Colonies should still continue to arrange for local defence, and that any sea-going vessels of war added to the squadron on the station should not be subject to any divided responsibility as to their movements within Australasian waters, but should form part of the squadron and be entirely under the control of the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief.
- (j.) That the additional ships to be provided should be five cruisers, of the "Archer" class, and two fast sea-going torpedo vessels.

1886.

Result of local consideration of Admiralty proposals.

10. Negotiations were accordingly initiated by the Governor of Victoria with a view to arranging for a Conference of the Premiers for the discussion of the Admiralty proposals.

The result of the negotiations may briefly be stated as follows:—

- (a.) None of the Colonies were prepared to accept the Admiralty scheme, which was based on the assumption that the original cost of the vessels and the gross annual liability for maintaining such vessels would be paid for out of Colonial funds, and that the vessels should remain the property of the Colonies at the end of ten years, and if the agreement was continued with new vessels that the Colonies should pay the original cost as at first.
- (b.) The Colonies of New South Wales, Queensland, and Tasmania agreed that the Colonies should bear the whole cost of maintenance, and should pay 5 per cent. on the first and prime cost of the vessels which are to remain the property of the Admiralty. The agreement to last for ten years, terminable at three years' notice, to be given at the end of the seventh or subsequent year. The Colonies of West and South Australia inclined to these views.
- (c.) The Colony of Victoria proposed that the Colonies should bear the charge for annual maintenance only.
- (d.) The New Zealand Government considered that owing to the geographical circumstances of that Colony the question of its naval defence must be regarded as distinct from that of the defence of the Australian continent, and they contended that one or more vessels of war should be kept stationed in New Zealand waters. They proposed that the Imperial Government should provide an armed cruiser for the special defence of New Zealand, and offered to pay interest at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the original cost and two-thirds of the cost of maintenance.

1887.

First Naval Agreement with Australia and New Zealand.

11. At the Colonial Conference of 1887, the proposed scheme for the increase of the Imperial Squadron in Australian waters was further discussed.

As the result of this discussion, an agreement was arrived at between the Imperial Government and the Governments of the Australian Colonies and New Zealand, by the terms of which the Admiralty agreed to provide a squadron of "five fast cruisers and two torpedo-gunboats" for "the protection of floating trade in Australian waters" in return for an annual contribution from the Colonies of 126,000*l.*, to which New Zealand contributed 20,000*l.* Of the seven vessels provided by the Admiralty, three cruisers and one gunboat were to be always in commission and the remainder in reserve in Australasian ports. The Agreement was for a period of ten years. In time of peace two ships, either of the normal Imperial Squadron or of these vessels, were to have their headquarters in New Zealand waters. The vessels provided by this Agreement were independent of the purely local naval forces of the several Colonies.

1897.

Colonial Conference, 1897.

12. At the Colonial Conference of 1897, there was a general discussion on the question of Colonial naval contributions, which was mainly confined to the Premiers of the Australasian Colonies. The only Resolution adopted in regard to naval defence was one by the Premiers of the Australasian colonies in favour of the continuance of the Australian Squadron under the terms of the existing Agreement.

1898.

13. The Legislature of the Cape of Good Hope passed an Act in 1898, under which the Colony contributes 30,000*l.* a-year towards the cost of maintaining the Imperial Navy, without conditions.

Naval contribution of Cape of Good Hope.

1902.

14. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, laid a Memorandum before the Colonial Conference of 1902 in which he explained the general naval policy of the Empire, and set forth the views of the Government regarding Colonial naval contributions in the following terms:—

Statement by First Lord of the Admiralty at the Colonial Conference of 1902.

- "The British Empire owes its existence to the sea, and it can only continue to exist if all parts of it regard the sea as their material source of existence and strength. It is therefore desirable that our fellow subjects in the Dominions beyond the seas should appreciate the importance of naval questions. If they will undertake a larger share of the naval burden, well and good. But I regard it as of even more importance that they should cultivate the maritime spirit; that their populations should become maritime as ours are, and that they should become convinced of the truth of the proposition that there is no possibility of the localization of naval force, and that the problem of the British Empire is in no sense one of local defence.
- "The sea is all one, and the British Navy therefore must be all one; and its solitary task in war must be to seek out the ships of the enemy, wherever they are to be found, and destroy them. At whatever spot, in whatever sea, these ships are found and destroyed, there the whole Empire will be simultaneously defended in its territory, its trade, and its interests. If, on the contrary, the idea should unfortunately prevail that the problem is one of local defence, and that each part of the Empire can be content to have its allotment of ships for the purpose of the separate protection of an individual spot, the only possible result would be that an enemy who had discarded this heresy, and combined his fleets, will attack in detail and destroy those separated British squadrons which, united, could have defied defeat. . . .
- "Whatever local distribution of forces may be advisable and feasible in time of peace, in time of naval war there must be only one authority with full power and responsibility to the Empire to move the ships, to concentrate them where they can deal the most effective blow against the forces of the enemy, and that any separation of responsibility, any diminution of the power of that central authority, any risk of hesitation or delay in making a conjunction of the squadrons where they can deal the most effective blow might have disastrous consequences."

15. A Resolution was moved by the New Zealand Government:—

Resolution proposed by New Zealand Government

"That the Australian squadron be strengthened (a) by increasing the number of cruisers; (b) by withdrawing some of the inferior gun-boats and replacing them with modern and better class cruisers; and (c) by adding torpedo catchers or destroyers if deemed necessary. The extra cost of maintenance entailed to be defrayed in the same proportion as provided under existing agreements and on the population basis."

16. The Commonwealth Government laid a Memorandum before the Conference which contained proposals for the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth on the following basis:—

Proposals of Commonwealth Government.

- (a.) That the existing agreement with the Imperial Government be readjusted and extended for ten years (unless cancelled sooner by mutual consent). The number and class of ships to be stationed in Australian waters, the annual contribution, and all other matters to be definitely dealt with in such revised agreement.
- (b.) That the existing Naval Militia Forces be made effective for supplementing the manning of seagoing ships in time of war, and that two ships commanded

by officers of the Royal Navy be allotted by the Admiralty for their naval instruction, and with that object to visit the various ports throughout the year. The militia naval forces to be available for the protection of the Commonwealth on land as well as on sea.

- (c.) That expert opinion be obtained as to the extent to which the "Cerberus," "Protector," gun-boats, torpedo boats, and existing armaments can be profitably utilized.
- (d.) That the permanent naval defence forces now existing in Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland be reduced in strength, and only a staff sufficient for the instruction of the Naval Militia on shore be retained.

Naval
Agreements
resulting
from
Colonial
Conference
of 1902.

17. From the general tenor of the discussion which took place at the Conference, it was clear that the conditions and circumstances of the several Colonies were so different that further discussion with a view to framing a general resolution would not be likely to lead to any practical result. It was accordingly arranged that the representatives of the Colonies should have separate private meetings with the First Lord of the Admiralty in order to settle with him what should be the form and extent in which they might severally best contribute to the naval defence of the Empire, and that the results arrived at should be reported to the Conference and recorded in the proceedings.

The results of the informal discussions which took place were as follows:—

- (a.) *Commonwealth of Australia*.—Contribution increased from 106,000*l.* to 200,000*l.* a-year towards the cost of an improved Australasian squadron and the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. The main provisions of this Agreement, which is printed in full as an Appendix to this precis, were that the naval force on the Australian station was to consist of not less than 1 first-class armoured cruiser, 2 second-class cruisers, 4 third-class cruisers, 4 sloops, and a Royal Naval Reserve of 25 officers and 700 seamen and stokers. The base of the force was to be in Australian and New Zealand ports and the vessels could operate, if necessary, in the waters of the Australia, China, and East Indies Stations. Of the above ships, one was to be in reserve, and three were to be only partly manned and used as drill ships for training the Royal Naval Reserve, the remainder being in commission. The three drill ships and one other vessel were to be manned as far as possible by Australians and New Zealanders, and ten nominations for cadetships in the Royal Navy were to be given annually to Australia (8) and New Zealand (2).

A later Agreement fixed the force at one armoured cruiser (first class), three second-class cruisers, and five third-class cruisers ("Pelorus" class) of which two are to be in commission, and three are to be partly manned as drilled ships in place of three "Milduras."

The Agreement is for ten years, but even then does not terminate unless notice has been given two years previously.

- (b.) *New Zealand*.—Contribution increased from 20,000*l.* to 40,000*l.* a-year towards the cost of an improved Australasian Squadron, and the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve (See Appendix).
- (c.) *Cape Colony*.—Contribution increased from 30,000*l.* to 50,000*l.* per annum towards the general maintenance of the Navy, without conditions.
- (d.) *Natal*.—Contribution of 35,000*l.* per annum towards the general maintenance of the Navy, without conditions.
- (e.) *Newfoundland*.—Contribution of 3,000*l.* per annum (and a capital sum of 1,800*l.* for fitting up and preparing a drill ship) towards the maintenance of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve of not less than 600 men.
- (f.) *Canada*.—Sir Wilfrid Laurier stated that the Dominion Government were contemplating the establishment of a local naval force in the waters of Canada, but that they were not able to make any offer of assistance analogous to those enumerated above.

1905.

18. In a despatch dated the 28th August, 1905, Mr. Deakin, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, suggested that the Naval Agreement of 1903 should be modified. He explained that "the paramount importance of the Navy to the British Empire and to Australia may be taken to be freely admitted. Nothing in this despatch is intended to question it. Indeed, our obligations to share in the general defence of the Empire have been already recognized in practice and in principle. Beyond this, the defence of Australia and of its coasts is accepted as a duty and as a necessity of our national self-respect. Yet even under these circumstances, the present Naval Agreement is not, and never has been, popular in the Commonwealth. It has been approved only in default of a better means of indicating our acceptance of Imperial responsibilities. Whatever may be the assumed basis upon which our contribution is there determined, it is regarded as merely an arbitrary proportion of an existing expenditure. Whatever the intention may have been, this attempt at joint naval action has failed to enlist a fraction of the support that was spontaneously accorded in all the States to the dispatch of military contingents to South Africa."

"On this account, the question why the Naval Agreement is coldly regarded here appears serious enough to merit careful scrutiny. There is much truth in the customary interpretation that its want of popularity is due to the fact that, except to the small extent permitted by Articles V, VI, and VII, none of our grant is applied to any distinctively Australian purpose. When the squadron is pointed to us as a justification for our subsidy, it must be remembered that a similar squadron, more localized than the present, was maintained prior to our first Agreement with the Admiralty in 1887, and would be maintained now if there were no subsidy. What has been obtained by us in return for an annual appropriation has been simply an increase of its strength, coupled with an extension of its sphere of operation. . . ."

"The establishment of a rapid and regular service of first-class steamers between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth would confer a great boon upon our producers, upon British merchants, and upon all travellers to and from Australia. It should largely assist to develop trade between the mother country and ourselves. We are now paying a sum of 120,000*l.* a-year to the Orient Company for a fortnightly mail service that will in all probability be terminated on the 31st January, 1908. Taking its character into account, this is an expensive bargain. It is in no sense a substitute for the efficient weekly service between Great Britain and Australia that our mutual interests demand. This we might acquire by combination with the Admiralty, and a diversion of our subsidy to that end."

"If any contract to which we are parties were made upon the Cunard pattern, providing for constant steam communication between Great Britain and Australia, conditions could be inserted providing for the selection and partial training of the crews engaged upon them as members of the Royal Naval Reserve. There can be no doubt but that an agreement of this character would be immensely more popular than that which forms the Schedule to the Act of 1903. The ships would be always in evidence, their value would be felt, and their purpose a matter of pride. The naval forces of the Empire would be at least as much strengthened as by the existing arrangement, quite apart from all the commercial and other advantages of the present proposal. . . ."

19. The proposal for the provision of a service of subsidized mail steamers, to be available in war as cruisers or transports, did not commend itself to the Admiralty, who stated that experience of this method of supplementing the war strength of a fleet has proved that it is not only of extremely limited efficacy, but costly in its operation.

20. In November of the same year the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth telegraphed to the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence to the effect that the Government of Australia desired to submit to Parliament a general scheme for the defence of the ports of the Commonwealth.

He stated that if the Committee of Imperial Defence considered that the framing of such a scheme is consistent with their responsibilities and would consent to prepare it, they would place the Commonwealth under very great obligation.

A Memorandum (Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 66 of 1905) by Captain Creswell, Director of Naval Forces, on the subject of the provision of local naval defence for ports, harbours, and coastal trade was also forwarded for the infor-

Proposal of
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Agreement
of 1903.

Admiralty
opinion on
proposal of
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Govern-
ment.

Request to
Committee
of Imperial
Defence to
prepare
Defence
Scheme for
Australia.

mation of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who were requested to consider these matters, as the sentiment in favour of the development of the maritime resources of Australia was one which, in the opinion of the Commonwealth Government, deserved and would repay encouragement.

Captain Creswell's proposals contemplated the provision of a separate navy for the Commonwealth, comprising:—

- 3 Cruiser destroyers,
- 16 Torpedo-boat destroyers,
- 15 Torpedo boats (1st and 2nd class),

the acquisition of this force to be extended over a period of seven years, at a cost which he estimated at 2,300,000*l.* for construction and maintenance of vessels alone.

As regards personnel, he estimated that an addition of 456 will be needed to the permanent forces, and 466 to the naval militia.

The rôle of this navy was described as follows:—

"This will provide a defence not designed as a force for action against hostile fleets or squadrons, which is the province of the Imperial fleet, but as a line necessary to us within the defence line of the Imperial fleet—a purely defensive line, that will give security to our naval bases, populous centres, principal ports, and commerce."

21. The Committee of Imperial Defence accordingly drew up a scheme, which was communicated to the Commonwealth Government.

As regards the proposal for the establishment of a local naval force for purely defensive purposes, it was pointed out "that the employment of a naval force as a purely defensive line" is a misapplication of maritime power opposed to every sound principle of naval strategy. To act deliberately on the defensive, and to organize naval forces with this object in view, is to adopt voluntarily the policy which is of necessity forced upon the weaker naval Power. Australia need not be reduced to assuming such a rôle so long as she is a member of an Empire which is the strongest naval Power in the world, and which extends naval protection not only to the homeland and to the most distant of the King's dominions beyond the seas, but also to all commerce sailing under the British flag. It was explained that the policy of devoting the entire naval forces of the Empire to seeking out and destroying the ships of the enemy wherever they may be is that which will best ensure not only the safety of floating trade, but also the immunity from attack of coast towns and harbours, and, if this policy is to be properly and efficiently carried out, the Royal Navy must be one and undivided. Unity of training and unity of command can alone ensure that thorough co-operation which is essential. A separate Australian navy could not find in any effective organization of the naval forces of the Empire a rôle commensurate with the cost of its creation and maintenance or worthy of the aptitude for sea service of the inhabitants of the island-continent. . . . "The natural and legitimate aspiration in Australia to furnish a distinctively Australian element to the sea power of the Empire will find a satisfactory realization in increasing degree when the scheme, still in its infancy, initiated by the Naval Agreement of 1903, has had time to take full effect."

In view, however, of the strong sentiment in favour of the establishment of a local naval force, these views were not generally acceptable in Australia.

1907.

22. At the Colonial Conference of 1907, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth, made a statement on the naval defence of the Empire, which disclosed a more sympathetic attitude on the part of the Admiralty towards the establishment of Colonial naval forces. He stated—

"We ask you to take some leading part in making more complete than it is at present the naval defence of the Empire. I wish to recognize all that our cousins over the sea have done in consequence of decisions of former Conferences. I know that you gave to the Government and to the Admiralty, with a free and unstinting hand, the help you thought you could manage to give. Gentlemen, I have only one reservation to make, and in making it I ask that, as we have proved ourselves successful in the past, you should put your trust in us now. The only reservation that the

Admiralty desire to make is, that they claim to have the charge of the strategical questions which are necessarily involved in naval defence, to hold the command of the naval forces of the country, and to arrange the distribution of ships in the best possible manner to resist attacks and to defend the Empire at large, whether it be our own islands or the dominions beyond the seas. We thoroughly recognize that we are responsible for that defence. We want you to help us in that defence. We want you to give us all the assistance you can, but we do not come to you as beggars; we gladly take all you can give us, but at the same time, if you are not inclined to give us the help that we hope to have from you, we acknowledge our absolute obligation to defend the King's dominions across the seas to the best of our ability.

"Now, there is, after all, only one sea that laps around all our shores. The sea is the link that joins us together. It was the reason of your up-springing. It is our first defence. It is the origin of our great commerce. It is the outlet and inlet of our exports and our imports, and it is to us in these islands the channel through which we get the food and raw material which are so necessary to our vast population. There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there is one navy, and I want to claim in the first place your help, and in the second place authority for the Admiralty to manage this great service without restraint."

Referring to the subsidies given by the various Colonies towards the cost of the Navy, he stated:—

"We do not wish to insist that the contributions from the Colonies should necessarily be in the form only of money. We are quite ready to enter into any arrangements with the Colonies that may seem most suitable to them, and which may seem to bring advantage to the Navy and advantage to the Colonies themselves. . . . His Majesty's Government recognize the natural desire of the self-governing Colonies to have a more particular share in providing the naval defence force of the Empire, and so long as the condition of unity of command and direction of the fleet is maintained, they are ready to consider a modification of the existing arrangements to meet the views of the various Colonies. In the opinion of the Government, while the distribution of the fleet must be determined by strategical requirements of which the Admiralty are the judge, it would be of great assistance if the Colonial Governments would undertake to provide for local service in the Imperial squadrons the smaller vessels that are useful for defence against possible raids or for co-operation with a squadron, and also to equip and maintain docks and fitting establishments which can be used by His Majesty's ships. It will further be of much assistance if coaling facilities are provided, and arrangements can be made for a supply of coal and naval stores, which otherwise would have to be sent out specially or purchased locally."

23. The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia proposed a Resolution to the effect that the Naval Defence Agreement of 1903 should be reconsidered.

The Government of New Zealand at the same time proposed that the question of an increased contribution by the Australasian Colonies to the Australian-New Zealand Squadron should be considered, together with other matters respecting Colonial defence.

Proposed modification of Australian Naval Agreement of 1903.

24. Mr. Deakin explained that the Commonwealth Government desired to modify the present Naval Agreement for the following reasons:—

While fully recognizing the paramount importance of "unity of control" for all the naval forces of the Empire, the people of Australia regarded the present contribution of 200,000*l.* to the cost of the Imperial Navy as being somewhat in the nature of a tribute, and it is therefore desirable, if possible, to find some means by which Australia can assist the Admiralty in the naval defence of the Empire without offence to the constitutional doctrine that the Government which levies taxation should be responsible for the expenditure and management.

To meet this difficulty a local naval defence force was proposed by Australia

under the political control of the Commonwealth Government as to the finance and allocation to different ports, but under naval discipline and subject to inspection by the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

It was proposed that the personnel of this local defence force should be Imperial in character, and, whether British or Australian, should only serve for limited periods in the local flotillas after previous training in the Navy, to which they should return on the expiration of their term of local service.

The defects of small local forces were very clearly recognized by the Australian Government, who desired to replace the present naval forces of the Commonwealth by a force which would be more Imperial in character and an integral part of the Imperial Navy.

The objections to a dual system of control were, he thought, not so great as was supposed. The control which Australians desired was purely political, i.e., the Commonwealth Government should have control over the movements and stationing of the vessels, but would not interfere with internal economy and discipline of the force. In war, the functions of the flotillas, being local, could not be directly controlled by the Commander-in-Chief of the sea-going fleet, who might be thousands of miles away, but their sphere of action and such matters as recognition, signals, &c., should be controlled by, and subordinated to, that officer, in order that harmonious co-operation of the sea-going and local forces might be assured.

Attitude of Admiralty in regard to the Agreement of 1903.]

25. The position taken up by the Admiralty was that while they did not themselves propose to cancel the agreement with Australia and New Zealand, yet, if the Colonial Governments desired that it should be terminated, they would be prepared to co-operate with them in carrying out that policy. It was admitted that, so long as the agreement was not cancelled, the Admiralty were precluded from making such a disposition of His Majesty's ships in the Far East as strategical considerations alone would dictate, and, therefore, the first condition of any new arrangement must be the cancellation of the agreement. The Admiralty desired that it should be clearly understood that under any arrangement substituted for the existing Naval Agreement they would not be bound to maintain particular ships permanently in Australian waters.

Proposed Resolution regarding duty of Dominions to contribute towards the naval defence of the Empire.

26. At the conclusion of the discussion, Dr. Smartt (Cape Colony), proposed that, with a view to showing their recognition of the necessity of maintaining the supremacy of the navy, the Conference should adopt the following Resolution:—

"That this Conference, recognizing the vast importance of the services rendered by the navy to the defence of the Empire and the protection of its trade, and the paramount importance of continuing to maintain the navy in the highest possible state of efficiency, considers it to be the duty of the Dominions beyond the seas to make such contribution towards the upkeep of the navy as may be determined by their local Legislatures—the contribution to take the form of a grant of money, the establishment of local naval defence, or such other services, in such manner as may be decided upon after consultation with the Admiralty, and as would best accord with their varying circumstances."

The motion was opposed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who said:—

"I am sorry to say, so far as Canada is concerned, we cannot agree to the Resolution. We took the ground many years ago that we had enough to do in our respect in that country before committing ourselves to a general claim. The Government of Canada has done a great deal in that respect. Our action was not understood, but I was glad to see that the First Lord of the Admiralty admitted we had done much more than he was aware of. It is impossible, in my humble opinion, to have a uniform policy on this matter; the disproportion is too great between the Mother Country and the Colonies. We have too much to do otherwise; in the Mother Country, you must remember, they have no expenses to incur with regard to public works; whereas, in most of the Colonies, certainly in Canada, we have to tax ourselves to the utmost of our resources in the development of our country, and we could not contribute or undertake to do more than we are doing in that way. For my part, if the motion were pressed to a conclusion, should have to vote against it."

As Dr. Smartt's proposal met with no support from the other members of the Conference, it was decided not to proceed further with it; and, finally, no general Resolution in regard to naval defence was adopted by the Conference.

27. In a despatch dated the 16th October, 1907, Mr. Deakin, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, again raised the question of the modification of the Naval Agreement of 1903. He proposed a scheme, the main features of which were that the contribution at present payable by the Commonwealth Government under the Naval Agreement of 1903 should cease to be credited to the Imperial Exchequer, and should in lieu be appropriated partly to the maintenance of a force of 1,000 seamen, Australians if possible, for service in the Royal Navy on the Australian Station, and partly to the construction, equipment, and maintenance of destroyers and submersibles or similar local defences. The Imperial Government for their part were to maintain in Australian waters in peace and war two cruisers of a certain standard to be manned by 400 of the 1,000 Australian seamen mentioned above, and were also to lend two cruisers of a certain standard, to be maintained at the cost of the Commonwealth Government, for the training of the local naval militia.

Proposal of Commonwealth Government to modify Australian Naval Agreement of 1903.

28. The Admiralty were unable to accept these proposals as a basis of a new Agreement in substitution for Naval Agreement of 1903. They adhered to the position taken up at the Conference that, while they did not themselves propose to cancel the existing Agreement, they were prepared to co-operate with the Colonial Governments if an alteration was desired by them. It was admitted that so long as the existing Agreement was not cancelled, the Admiralty were precluded from making such disposition of naval forces in the Far East as strategical considerations alone would dictate, and, therefore, the first condition of any new arrangement must be the cancellation of the Agreement.

Views of Admiralty in regard to proposals.

The Admiralty stated that they were not in a position then to express an opinion on the details of the scheme, which had not been yet put forward in sufficient detail to form the basis of a new arrangement, but they were prepared to advise and assist in carrying out a scheme for local defence, provided that such a scheme did not involve a definite pledge by the Admiralty to maintain particular vessels permanently in Australian waters. They desired it to be understood that no increase of Imperial expenditure beyond that involved in the existing Agreement could be entertained. They also regarded it as essential that complete control in time of war over local forces should be secured to Commander-in-Chief.

The Admiralty further pointed out that before any definite conclusion could be arrived at, it would be necessary to ascertain the views of the New Zealand Government as to any proposed alterations.

1908.

29. The correspondence with the Commonwealth Government was continued throughout the year 1908. The main point at issue between the Admiralty and the Commonwealth Government being the question of the control of the local naval forces in time of war. The Admiralty hold the view that it is indispensable, on account of probable international difficulties as well as for strategic reasons generally, that the vessels should come under the general command of the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the station, and be subject to his orders and directions. Mr. Deakin, on the other hand, while admitting that in almost every conceivable circumstance the local Australian flotilla would be placed under the command of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, maintained that for constitutional reasons the ultimate control, even in time of war, must remain with the Commonwealth Government.

Control of local naval forces in war.

30. The view of the Admiralty on this point is given in a letter dated 10th February, 1908, addressed to the Colonial Office, of which the following is an extract:—

"With regard to the subject of the control of the Local Naval Force in time of war, my Lords consider it of great importance that there should be no misunderstanding, and they had hoped that the discussion which took place at the interview between Mr. Deakin and the Representatives of the Admiralty on the 24th April last made the position sufficiently clear.

"In time of peace the different self-governing dominions comprised in the British Empire have power to maintain and employ for harbour defence and

for police purposes armed ships and vessels in their own waters; they have also a limited power to maintain and employ ships of war for wider duties, provided that an Order of His Majesty in Council is obtained as provided for in the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 (28 and 29, Vict. cap. 14). In time of war the circumstances are entirely changed, and as under international law there is only one executive authority in the British Empire capable of being recognized by foreign States, Colonial ships of war cannot operate independently of the Royal Navy except to the limited extent referred to above.

"The executive power of the Crown as the central authority of the British Empire must be applied as regards foreigners in the same manner and under the same conditions wherever a military or naval force is in existence, and the same responsibility for any action taken by Colonial or home ships of war will rest upon this central authority. It is essential, therefore, that officers commissioned by His Majesty should have full power and responsibility in accordance with their rank, wherever they may happen to be serving. Accordingly it follows that not only must the local force when associated with the Royal Navy recognize orders given by the Admiralty or Naval Commander-in-Chief, but also that their officers must submit to the command of any senior naval officer during the time they are in company with him.

"While, therefore, my Lords recognize the force of the contention as a general principle that the Government of a self-governing Colony should have power to control in its own waters the movements of the local force it maintains, and that this force should not be moved away from Colonial waters without the concurrence of the responsible Government, yet in the conduct of operations of a warlike nature it would be of vital importance that the vessels should come under the general command of the Commander-in-Chief on the station and be subject to his orders and directions.

"It would be obviously impracticable for any defensive operations to be carried out satisfactorily without that close co-operation which unity of direction secures, and my Lords are glad to notice that Mr. Deakin in his speech before referred to expressed the opinion that in the event of operations in Australian waters the Commonwealth vessels would in almost every imaginable circumstance be placed wholly under the control of the Commander-in-Chief for the time being."

Increase of
naval
contribution
by New
Zealand
Government.

31. In March, 1908, the New Zealand Government decided to increase its contribution to the cost of the naval defence of the Empire from 40,000*l.* to 100,000*l.* per annum.

Recognizing how important it is for the protection of the Empire that the Navy should be at the absolute disposal of the Admiralty, the New Zealand Government did not suggest any conditions as to the location of the ships.

Establish-
ment of
Royal
Naval
Volunteer
Reserve in
Cape of
Good Hope.

32. In August, 1908, the Government of the Cape of Good Hope passed an Act to enable the Governor to establish in the Colony a Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve for service in the Royal Navy. Steps are now being taken to organize such a force the cost of which, about 4,000*l.* per annum, it is proposed to defray from the sum of 50,000*l.* now contributed by the Colony towards the cost of the Navy.

1909.

33. The important statements made in the House of Commons on the 16th March by the Prime Minister and First Lord of the Admiralty at the introduction of the Naval Estimates for 1909-10 greatly stimulated the interest of the self-governing Dominions in the question of the naval defence of the Empire, and a notable change in the attitude adopted at the Colonial Conference of 1907 in regard to this question has recently become manifest.

Offer of
New
Zealand
Government
to bear cost
of first-class
battleship.

34. On the 22nd March, 1909, a telegram was received from the Government of New Zealand containing an offer to bear the cost of the immediate building and arming by the British Government of one first-class battleship of the latest type. The New Zealand Government further offered, if further events show it to be necessary, to bear the cost of a second warship of the same type.

35. On the 29th March, 1909, the Canadian Parliament unanimously agreed to the following Resolution:—

Resolution
of Canadian
Parliament.

"This House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measures the responsibilities of national defence.

"The House is of opinion that under the present Constitutional relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

"The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, and the peace of the world.

"The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the Empire."

36. On the 15th April a telegram was received from Mr. Fisher, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, as follows:—

Proposal of
Common-
wealth
Government
for establish-
ment of
local naval
force.

"Whereas all the dominions of the British Empire ought to share in the most effective way in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the Empire:

"And whereas this Government is of opinion that, so far as Australia is concerned, this object would be best attained by encouragement of naval development in this country, so that people of Commonwealth will become a people efficient at sea, and thereby better able to assist United Kingdom with men as well as ships to act in concert with the other sea forces of the Empire;

"The views of the present Government, as a basis of co-operation and mutual understanding, are herewith submitted:—

"(1.) The Naval Agreement Act to continue for the term provided for;

"(2.) The Commonwealth Government to continue to provide, equip, and maintain the defences of naval base for the use of the ships of the Royal Navy;

"(3.) In order to place Australia in a position to undertake the responsibility of local naval defence, the Commonwealth Government to establish a Naval Force;

"(4.) The Commonwealth Government to provide ships constituting the torpedo flotilla, and maintain them in a state of efficiency, wages, pay, provision, and maintenance of officers and men;

"(5.) The sphere of action of the Naval Force of the Commonwealth to be primarily about the coast of Commonwealth and its territories;

"(6.) The administrative control of the Naval Force of the Commonwealth to rest with the Commonwealth Government. The officer commanding to take his orders from the Commonwealth Government direct, proper sequence of command by officers appointed by the Commonwealth being maintained. The forces to be under naval discipline administered in same way as in the Royal Navy;

"(7.) Whilst employed about the coast of Commonwealth or its territories, whether within territorial limits or not, the vessels forming the Naval Force of the Commonwealth to be under the sole control of Commonwealth. Should the vessels go to other places, the said vessels to come under the command of the naval officer representing the British Government, if such officer be senior in rank to the Commonwealth officer. Provided that, if it be necessary to send these vessels or any of them on training cruises outside the waters referred to, arrangements shall be made with the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty through Naval Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station;

- "(8.) In time of war or emergency, or upon a declaration by the Senior Naval Officer representing British Government, that a condition of emergency exists, all the vessels of the Naval Force of the Commonwealth shall be placed by the Commonwealth Government under the orders of Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. The method by which the vessels shall come under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer would be by furnishing each Commander of an Australian vessel with sealed orders and instructions (to) the effect that upon the declaration to him by the Senior Naval Officer representing British Government that a state of war or emergency exists, such sealed orders shall thereupon be opened and, in pursuance of their provisions, he shall thereupon immediately place himself under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer representing British Government;
- "(9) It is, however, to be understood that if the services of any of the Coast Defence vessels be desired in seas remote from Australia, the approval of the Commonwealth Government shall first be obtained to their removal;
- "(10) To ensure the highest efficiency, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to be asked to agree to the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station making, at request of Commonwealth Government, periodical inspection of the vessels of the Naval Force of the Commonwealth, Naval School of Instruction, and Naval Establishment;
- "(11) Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to be asked to approve of the service on the flotilla of such officers of the Royal Navy as may be mutually agreed to for service as Instructors and Specialist officers, and to receive officers of the local flotilla for instruction at the torpedo gunnery and other schools in the United Kingdom;
- "(12) Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to be asked to give opportunities from time to time for officers and men specially selected by the Commonwealth being attached to battle fleets or torpedo flotillas in European waters for special instruction, the expense to be borne by Commonwealth; and
- "(13) For special facilities to be given, by arrangement with the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station, for the vessels of the flotilla being exercised in conjunction with the ships of the Royal Navy on the Australian Station, subject to the command of such combined exercises being held by the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy on the Australian Station."

It will be seen that this proposal of the Commonwealth Government carries out the wishes of the Admiralty by conceding the control of the Commonwealth naval forces in time of war to the Admiralty.

April 30, 1909.

APPENDIX to I.

Agreement between His Majesty's Governments of The United Kingdom, The Commonwealth of Australia, and The Colony of New Zealand, 1903.

THE Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c., and the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia and of New Zealand, having recognized the importance of sea power in the control which it gives over sea communications, the necessity of a single navy under one authority, by which alone concerted action can be assured, and the advantages which will be derived from developing the sea power of Australia and New Zealand, have resolved to conclude for this purpose an Agreement as follows:—

ARTICLE I.

The Naval Force on the Australian Station shall consist of not less than the under-mentioned sea-going ships of war, all of which shall be from time to time throughout the terms of this Agreement of modern type, except those used as drill ships:—

One armoured cruiser, 1st class,
Two second class cruisers;
Four third class cruisers;
Four sloops;
And of a Royal Naval Reserve consisting of 25 officers and 700 seamen and stokers,

ARTICLE II.

The base of this force shall be the ports of Australia and New Zealand, and their sphere of operations shall be the waters of the Australia, China, and East Indies Stations, as defined in the attached schedules, where the Admiralty believe they can most effectively act against hostile vessels which threaten the trade or interests of Australia and New Zealand. No change in this arrangement shall be made without the consent of the Governments of the Commonwealth and of New Zealand; and nothing in the Agreement shall be taken to mean that the Naval Force herein named shall be the only force used in Australasian waters should the necessity arise for a larger force.

ARTICLE III.

This force shall be under the control and orders of the Naval Commander-in-Chief for the time being appointed to command His Majesty's ships and vessels on the Australian Station.

ARTICLE IV.

Of the ships referred to in Article I, one shall be kept in reserve and three shall be only partly manned and shall be used as drill ships for training the Royal Naval Reserve, the remainder shall be kept in commission fully manned.

ARTICLE V.

The three vessels used as drill ships and one other vessel shall be manned by Australians and New Zealanders as far as procurable, paid at special rates, and enrolled in proportion to the relative population of the Commonwealth and New Zealand. If a sufficient proportion of men from either Colony should not on the aforesaid basis be forthcoming, a sufficient number of men to complete the complements of the ships may be enrolled from the other Colony.

They shall be officered by officers of the Royal Navy, supplemented by officers of the Royal Naval Reserve.

ARTICLE VI.

In order to ensure that the naval service shall include officers born in Australia and New Zealand, who will be able to rise to the highest posts in the Royal Navy, the under-mentioned nominations for Naval Cadetships will be given annually:—

Commonwealth of Australia	8
New Zealand	2

ARTICLE VII.

The branches of the Royal Naval Reserve established in Australia and New Zealand shall be called into actual service by His Majesty in Council, acting on the advice of his Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand respectively.

The men forming the Royal Naval Reserve shall be divided into two classes:—

- (a.) Those who have served for three years on board one of His Majesty's ships.
- (b.) Those who have not so served.

These men shall be trained on ships specially provided for the purpose.

The officers of this reserve force shall be included on the list of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve.

ARTICLE VIII.

In consideration of the service aforementioned the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand shall pay the Imperial Government five-twelfths and one-twelfth respectively of the total annual cost of maintaining the Naval Force on the Australian Station, provided that the total amount so paid shall in no case exceed 200,000*l.* and 40,000*l.* respectively in any one year. In reckoning the total annual cost a sum equal to 5 per cent. on the prime cost of the ships of which the Naval Force of the Station is composed shall be included.

ARTICLE IX.

The Imperial Government recognize the advantages to be derived from making Australasia a base for coal and supplies for the squadrons in Eastern waters.

ARTICLE X.

1. This Agreement shall be considered to become actually binding between the Imperial Government and the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand so soon as the Colonial Legislatures shall have passed special appropriations for the terms hereinafter mentioned, to which Acts this Agreement shall be attached as a First Schedule.

2. The Agreement shall be for a period of ten years, and only terminate if and provided notice has been given two years previously, viz., at the end of the eighth year, or at the end of any subsequent year, and then two years after such date.

ARTICLE XI.

1. The payments named in Article VIII shall be considered as payments in advance, and shall first become due and payable six months after the Colonial Legislature shall have passed the special appropriation referred to in Article X.

2. The period of ten years referred to in Article X is to be calculated from the date on which the Colonial Legislature passes the special appropriation referred to.

3. The payments under the existing Agreement and that Agreement itself shall terminate on the date on which the payments under the new Agreement commence.

4. The share of these payments due from each Colony shall be paid annually in London by the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth and Agent-General of New Zealand, and, pending the appointment of the first-named officer, by such person as the Government of the Commonwealth may nominate, to such account as the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may direct.

ARTICLE XII.

In time of peace one of the drill ships referred to in Article IV, and one other cruiser shall be stationed in the waters of New Zealand and its dependencies as their headquarters. Should, however, such emergency arise as may, in the opinion of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, render it necessary to remove either or both of such ships, he shall inform the Governor of the reasons for such temporary removal.

Schedule to Agreement.

Limits of Australia Station.

The Australia Station, as referred to in Article II of the foregoing Agreement, is bounded—

North.—On the north from the meridian of 95° east, by the parallel of the 10th degree of south latitude, to 130° east longitude, thence northward on that meridian to the parallel of 2° north latitude, and thence on that parallel to the meridian of 136° east longitude, thence north to 12° north latitude, and along that parallel to 160° west longitude, thence south to the Equator, thence east to the meridian of 149° 30' west longitude.

West.—On the west by the meridian of 95° east longitude.

South.—On the south by the Antarctic Circle.

East.—On the east by the meridian of 149° 30' west longitude.

Limits of China Station.

The China Station, as referred to in Article II of the foregoing Agreement, is bounded—

North.—On the north from the meridian of 95° of east longitude in 10° north latitude, along that parallel to the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, thence by the shores of Asia as far as the meridian of 180°.

West.—On the west from the latitude of 10° north by the meridian of 95° east longitude to 10° of south latitude.

South.—On the south from the meridian of 95° east longitude by the parallel of 10° south latitude to 130° east longitude, thence north to 2° north latitude, and along that parallel to 136° east longitude, thence north to 12° north latitude and along that parallel to the meridian of 180°.

East.—On the east by the meridian of 180° from 12° north latitude to the point where the meridian reaches the shores of Asia.

Limits of East Indies Station.

The East Indies Station, as referred to in Article II of the foregoing Agreement, is bounded—

North.—On the north by the southern shores of Asia, including the Persian Gulf, from an imaginary line drawn from Jebel Sejan on the African coast to Cape Babel Mandeb on the Arabian coast, to where the 10th parallel of north latitude touches the west coast of the Malay Peninsula.

East.—On the east by the meridian of 95° east longitude between the parallels of 10° north and 26° south latitude.

South.—On the south by the 10th parallel of north latitude between the coast of the Malay Peninsula and the 95th meridian of east longitude, and by the parallel of 26° south latitude between the 95th and 42nd meridians of east longitude.

West.—On the west by the 42nd meridian of east longitude between the parallels of 26° and 10° south latitude, by the 43rd meridian between the parallel of 10° south and the Equator, and by the east coast of Africa between the Equator and Jebel Sejan.

II.

TABLES SHOWING POPULATION, OVERSEA TRADE, AND
NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM, SELF-GOVERNING DOMINIONS,
INDIA, AND THE CROWN COLONIES.

Table I.—Population and Naval and Military Expenditure.

Table II.—Oversea Trade.

Table III.—Proportion between Oversea Trade and Naval and
Military Expenditure.

2, Whitehall Gardens,

July 17, 1909.

TABLE I.

STATEMENT showing Naval and Military Expenditure of the United Kingdom, Self-governing Dominions, India, and Crown Colonies.

Year.	—	Population.	Military Expenditure.	Military Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval Expenditure.	Naval Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval and Military Expenditure.	Naval and Military Expenditure per head of Population.	Remarks
1909-10 ..	United Kingdom	44,538,718	£ 27,459,000	£ s. d. 0 12 3½	£ 35,142,700	£ s. d. 0 15 9½	£ 62,601,700	£ s. d. 1 8 1	
1907-8 ..	<i>Self-governing Dominions—</i>								
1907-8 ..	Canada	6,153,789	1,359,217	0 4 5½	98,858*	0 0 3½	1,458,075	0 4 9	* Naval expenditure includes expenditure on fisheries' protection, hydrographical services, and wireless telegraphy coast services.
1907-8 ..	Newfoundland	234,163	3,000	0 0 3	3,000	0 0 3	
1907-8 ..	Australia	4,221,713	1,025,369	0 4 10½	271,643†	0 1 3½	1,297,012	0 6 1½	† Naval expenditure includes contribution of 200,000l. to the Imperial Navy.
1908 ..	New Zealand	1,021,000‡	193,252	0 3 9½	100,000	0 1 11½	293,252	0 5 8½	‡ Includes 49,000 Maoris and 12,000 Cook Islanders.
1908 ..	Cape of Good Hope—								§ Includes expenditure on reserve and district police.
	Europeans	579,741	
1908 ..	Europeans and natives	2,507,500	475,670	{ 0 16 5 } { 0 3 9½ }	50,000	{ 0 1 8½ } { 0 0 5 }	525,670	{ 0 18 1½ } { 0 4 2½ }	Includes expenditure on Transvaal Police
	Natal—								
	Europeans	92,485	
1908 ..	Europeans and natives	1,164,285	276,251§	{ 2 19 9 } { 0 4 9 }	35,000	{ 0 7 6½ } { 0 0 7½ }	311,251	{ 3 7 3½ } { 0 5 4½ }	
	Transvaal—								
	Europeans	316,675	
1908 ..	Europeans and natives	1,355,440	506,352	{ 1 11 11½ } { 0 7 5 }	506,352	{ 1 11 11½ } { 0 7 5 }	
	Orange River Colony—								
	Europeans	142,679	
1908 ..	Europeans and natives	447,090	¶ No returns of expenditure have been received from Orange River Colony.
	South Africa—								
	Europeans	1,131,580	
	Europeans and natives	5,474,315	1,258,273	{ 1 2 3 } { 0 4 7 }	85,000	{ 0 1 6 } { 0 0 4 }	1,343,273	{ 1 3 9 } { 0 4 11 }	
..	Total, Self-governing Dominions..	17,104,980	3,836,111	0 4 6	558,501	0* 0 8	4,394,612	0 5 2	

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..	Total, United Kingdom and Self-governing Dominions	61,643,698	31,295,111	0 10 1½	35,701,201	0 11 7	66,996,312	1 1 7½	
[098] 1908-9 ..	India	294,317,082	20,071,083	0 1 4½	482,134	0 0 0½	20,553,217	0 1 4½	Population of Feudatory States is included.
..	<i>Crown Colonies, &c.—</i>								
1907-8 ..	Gibraltar	18,644	Nil.	Nil.	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Contribution to cost of Imperial garrison.
1907-8 ..	Malta	209,974	5,000	0 5½	5,000	0 5½	
1907-8 ..	Cyprus	256,433	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	
1908 ..	Ceylon	3,988,064	131,933	0 7½	131,933	0 7½	Includes 112,500l. military contribution of Colony.
1908 ..	Straits Settlements	620,127	226,981	7 3½	226,981	7 3½	Includes 219,238l. military contribution of Colony.
1908 ..	Federated Malay States	678,595	48,097	1 5	48,097	1 5	Malay States Guides.
1907-8 ..	Labuan	8,286	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	
1907-8 ..	North Borneo	660,000	
1907 ..	Hong Kong	399,466	125,959	6 3½	125,959	6 3½	Includes 121,434l. military contribution of Colony.
1907-8 ..	Wei-Hai Wei	130,792	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Receives Imperial grant-in-aid, 10,000l.
1907-8 ..	Papua	350,000	
1908 ..	Fiji	128,000	968	0 1½	968	0 1½	
1908 ..	Bermuda	19,229	307	0 3½	307	0 3½	Cadet corps.
1906-7 ..	British Honduras	42,406	968	0 5½	968	0 5½	
..	Bahamas	59,200	Nil.	Nil.	Nil	Nil	
1907-8 ..	Jamaica	833,700	2,592	0 0½	2,592	0 0½	
1907-8 ..	Leeward Islands	136,100	1,466	0 2½	1,466	0 2½	
..	Windward Islands—								
1907-8 ..	St. Lucia	466	
1907-8 ..	St. Vincent	117	{ 0 0½ }	583	0 0½	
..	Grenada	
1908 ..	Barbados	194,518	909	0 1	Nil	Nil	909	0 1	
1907-8 ..	Trinidad and Tobago	334,540	5,269	0 3½	5,269	0 3½	
1907-8 ..	British Guiana	297,713	3,751	0 3	3,751	0 3	
1908 ..	Falkland Islands	2,300	224	1 11½	224	1 11½	
1908 ..	Gambia	154,330	5,921	0 9½	5,921	0 9½	
1907 ..	Sierra Leone	1,208,100	24,760	0 4½	24,760	0 4½	
1908 ..	Gold Coast	1,696,970	69,075	0 9½	69,075	0 9½	
1907 ..	Southern Nigeria	6,000,000	101,382	0 4	101,382	0 4	
1907-8 ..	Northern Nigeria	8,957,830	153,000	0 4	153,000	0 4	Receives Imperial grant-in-aid 295,000l.
1907-8 ..	St. Helena	3,490	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	
1907-8 ..	Rhodesia	1,398,000	34,944	0 5½	34,944	0 5½	Volunteers.
1907-8 ..	Basutoland	348,850	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	
1907-8 ..	Bechuanaland	133,100	
1907-8 ..	Nyasaland Protectorate	948,300	26,146	0 6½	26,146	0 6½	Receives Imperial grant-in-aid, 39,000l.
1907-8 ..	East Africa	4,000,000	51,516	0 3	51,516	0 3	Receives Imperial grant-in-aid 25,000l. Receives Imperial grant-in-aid 152,000l.

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TABLE I (continued).

STATEMENT showing Naval and Military Expenditure of the United Kingdom, Self-governing Dominions, India, and Crown Colonies.

Year		Population.	Military Expenditure.	Military Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval Expenditure.	Naval Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval and Military Expenditure.	Naval and Military Expenditure per head of Population.	Remarks.
<i>Crown Colonies, &c. (contd.)—</i>									
1907-8	Uganda	3,300,000	£ 56,606	s. d. 0 4	Nil	Nil	£ 56,606	s. d. 0 4	Receives Imperial grant-in-aid 85,000L.
1907-8	Zanzibar	230,000	Nil	Nil	"	"	Nil	Nil	
1907-8	Somaliland Protectorate ..	348,000	54,018	3 1½	"	"	54,018	3 1½	Receives Imperial grant-in-aid 37,000L., exclusive of cost of military operations.
1907-8	Mauritius	382,400	22,962	1 2	"	"	22,962	1 2	Contribution to cost of Imperial garrison.
1907-8	Seychelles	21,500	Nil	Nil	"	"	Nil	Nil	
	Total, Crown Colonies, &c...	38,871,357	1,155,337	0 7	Nil	Nil	1,155,337	0 7	

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TABLE II.

STATEMENT showing the Trade of the Self-governing Dominions, India, and the Crown Colonies with the United Kingdom and with other Countries in the Year 1907-8.

	Exports.			Imports.			Total Trade.			Remarks.
	To United Kingdom.	To Foreign Countries and other Colonies.	Total.	From United Kingdom.	From Foreign Countries and other Colonies.	Total.	With United Kingdom.	With Foreign Countries and other Colonies.	Total.	
<i>United Kingdom—</i>										
Trade with Self-governing Dominions	76,174,581†			120,913,717‡			197,088,298†‡			† Exports from the United Kingdom. ‡ Imports to the United Kingdom.
Trade with India ..	77,773,928†			33,724,414‡			111,498,342†‡			
Trade with Crown Colonies ..	22,851,152†			24,055,702‡			46,906,854†‡			
		343,338,474	520,138,135		470,919,093	649,612,926		814,267,567	1,169,751,061	
<i>Self-governing Dominions—</i>										
Canada	27,643,965	29,912,948§	57,556,913	19,700,000	56,505,887§	76,205,887	47,343,965	86,418,835§	133,762,800	§ The returns for Canada do not differentiate between overseas trade and overland trade with the United States.
Newfoundland ..	306,852	2,173,888	2,480,740	548,820	1,588,520	2,137,340	855,672	3,762,408	4,618,080	
Australia ..	33,975,579	38,848,668	72,824,247	31,906,447	19,902,586	51,809,033	65,882,026	58,751,256	124,633,282	
New Zealand ..	16,533,493	3,535,464	20,068,957	10,278,019	7,024,842	17,302,861	26,811,512	10,560,306	37,371,818	
Cape of Good Hope										
Natal										
Transvaal ..	42,453,828	2,756,172	45,210,000	13,741,295	11,521,705	25,263,000	56,195,123	14,277,877	70,473,000	
Orange River Colony										
<i>India</i>	32,724,414	93,232,681	125,957,095¶	77,773,928	46,394,367	124,168,295¶	110,498,342	139,627,048	250,125,390	¶ Includes exports by land—4,076,406L.
<i>Crown Colonies, &c.—</i>										
Gibraltar ..	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	¶ Includes imports by land—4,979,584L.
Malta	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
<i>Asia—</i>										* No figures available.
Cyprus	198,625	436,430	635,055	194,074	508,819	702,893	392,699	945,249	1,337,948	
Aden, Perim, and Socotra	174,047	1,906,194	2,080,241	312,511	2,838,622	3,151,133	486,588	4,744,816	5,231,404	

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TABLE II.—continued.

	Exports.			Imports.			Total Trade.			Remarks.
	To United Kingdom.	To Foreign Countries and other Colonies.	Total.	From United Kingdom.	From Foreign Countries and other Colonies.	Total.	With United Kingdom.	With Foreign Countries and other Colonies.	Total.	
<i>Crown Colonies, &c.—</i>										
<i>contd.—</i>										
<i>Asia—contd.</i>										
Ceylon ..	4,395,511	4,242,489	8,638,000	2,181,399	6,439,718	8,621,117	6,576,910	10,682,207	17,259,117	
Straits Settlements	8,823,000	26,795,556	35,618,556	5,767,415	35,132,442	40,899,857	14,590,415	61,927,998	76,518,413	
Federated Malay States	2,106	9,674,884	9,676,990	464,477	6,225,813	6,690,290	466,583	15,900,697	16,367,280	
Labuan	181,030	220,539	401,569	
North Borneo and Sarawak	1,300,000	952,130	2,252,130	
Hong Kong	
Wei-Hai-Wei	
Total, Asia ..	13,593,289	43,055,553	58,129,872	8,919,906	51,145,414	61,237,989	22,513,195	94,200,967	119,367,861	
<i>Pacific—</i>										
Fiji ..	1,220	882,444	883,664	57,600	636,907	694,507	58,820	1,519,351	1,578,171	
Tonga, Solomon, and Gilbert Islands	207,377	167,431	..	374,808	374,808	
Papua	63,756	87,776	..	151,532	151,532	
Total, Pacific ..	1,220	882,444	1,154,797	57,600	636,907	949,714	58,820	2,045,691	2,104,511	
<i>America—</i>										
Bermuda ..	1,831	138,767	140,598	121,831	298,765	420,596	123,662	437,532	561,194	
British Honduras ..	93,343	361,148	454,491	136,960	359,605	496,565	230,303	720,753	951,056	
Bahamas ..	27,908	112,690	140,598	93,631	279,306	372,937	121,539	391,996	513,535	
Jamaica ..	509,992	1,866,210	2,376,202	1,381,679	1,532,334	2,914,013	1,891,671	3,398,544	5,290,215	
Turks and Caicos Islands	126	23,691	23,817	5,378	22,282	27,660	5,504	45,973	51,477	
Leeward Islands	214,862	315,517	530,379	231,010	286,414	517,424	445,872	601,931	1,047,803	
Windward Islands										
St. Lucia	
St. Vincent	
Grenada	
Barbados	
Total, America ..	181,981	665,111	847,092	713,382	558,148	1,271,530	895,363	1,223,259	2,118,622	
Trinidad and Tobago	821,321	3,086,182	3,907,503	1,050,768	2,324,056	3,374,824	1,872,089	5,410,238	7,282,327	
British Guiana ..	615,317	1,028,787	1,644,104	925,459	772,460	1,697,919	1,540,776	1,801,247	3,342,023	
Falkland Islands ..	195,571	50,864	246,435	66,091	7,528	73,619	261,662	58,392	320,054	
Total, America ..	3,139,673	8,652,022	11,791,695	5,524,342	7,603,846	13,128,188	8,664,015	16,255,868	24,919,883	
<i>Africa—</i>										
Gambia ..	26,573	381,903	408,476	186,356	259,003	445,359	212,929	640,906	853,835	
Sierra Leone ..	228,399	602,860	831,259	708,765	279,257	988,022	937,164	882,117	1,819,281	
Gold Coast ..	1,954,626	687,048	2,641,674	1,758,315	607,880	2,366,195	3,712,941	1,294,928	5,007,869	
Southern Nigeria ..	2,039,821	2,162,883	4,202,704	3,330,786	1,108,121	4,438,907	5,370,607	3,271,004	8,641,611	
Northern Nigeria	
Total, West Africa	4,249,419	3,834,694	8,084,113	5,984,222	2,254,261	8,238,483	10,233,641	6,088,955	16,322,596	
St. Helena ..	4,598	106	4,704	31,733	3,881	35,614	36,331	3,987	40,318	
Rhodesia ..	2,289,901	279,835	2,569,736	967,030	598,131	1,565,161	3,256,931	877,966	4,134,897	
Basutoland	270,441	240,599	511,040	
Bechuanaland	66,660	105,515	172,175	
Nyasaland Protectorate	42,086	49,659	91,745	137,853	50,806	188,659	179,939	100,465	280,404	
East Africa Protectorate	105,182	389,528	494,710	329,769	469,948	799,717	434,951	859,476	1,294,427	
Uganda	137,119	137,119	147,411	186,676	334,087	147,411	323,795	471,206	
Zanzibar ..	142,474	927,593	1,070,067	193,242	1,039,715	1,232,957	335,716	1,967,308	2,303,024	
Somaliland Protectorate	215,708	233,239	448,947	
Mauritius ..	444,598	2,493,101	2,937,699	530,720	1,572,894	2,103,614	975,318	4,065,995	5,041,313	
Seychelles ..	43,262	107,526	150,788	27,324	63,662	90,986	70,586	171,188	241,774	
Total, Africa ..	7,321,520	8,219,161	16,093,490	8,349,304	6,339,974	15,168,631	15,670,824	14,459,135	31,262,121	

* No figures available.

TABLE III.

STATEMENT showing the Proportion between Foreign Trade and Naval Expenditure of the United Kingdom, Self-governing Dominions, India, and Crown Colonies.

	Year.	Exports.	Imports.	Total Foreign Trade.	Naval Expenditure.	Naval Expenditure for each 100 <i>l.</i> of Foreign Trade.	Remarks.
		£	£	£	£	Per cent. £ s. d.	
<i>United Kingdom—</i>	1907-8	520,138,135	649,612,926	1,169,751,061	35,142,700	3 0 1	
<i>Self-governing Colonies—</i>							
Canada	1907-8	57,556,913*	76,205,887*	133,762,800*	98,858	0 1 5½	* The returns for Canada do not differentiate between overseas trade and overland trade with the United States, and are therefore valueless for the purpose of this comparison
Newfoundland	1906-7	2,480,740	2,137,340	4,618,080	3,000	0 1 3½	
Australia	1907	72,824,247	51,809,033	124,633,280	271,643	0 4 4½	
New Zealand	1907	20,068,957	17,302,861	37,371,818	100,000	0 5 4½	
Cape of Good Hope	1908	45,210,000	25,263,000	70,473,000	85,000	0 2 4½	
Natal							
Transvaal							
Orange River Colony.. .. .							
<i>India</i>	1907-8	125,957,095	124,168,295	250,125,390	482,134	0 3 10½	
<i>Crown Colonies, &c.—</i>							
Gibraltar	†	†	†	Nil.	Nil	† No figures available.
Malta	†	†	†			
<i>Asia—</i>							
Cyprus	1907-8	635,055	702,893	1,337,948			
Aden, Perim, and Socotra	"	2,080,241	3,151,163	5,231,404			
Ceylon	"	8,638,000	8,621,117	17,259,117			
Straits Settlements	"	35,618,556	40,899,857	76,518,413			
Federated Malay States	"	9,676,990	6,690,290	16,367,280			
Labuan	"	181,030	220,539	401,569			

North Borneo and Sarawak	1907-8	1,300,000	952,130	2,252,130	Nil.	Nil.	† No figures available.
Hong Kong	†	†	†			
Wei-hai Wei	†	†	†			
Total, Asia	58,129,872	61,237,989	119,367,861			
<i>Pacific—</i>							
Fiji	883,664	694,507	1,578,171			
Tonga, Solomon, and Gilbert Islands	1907-8	207,377	167,431	374,808			
Papua	63,756	87,776	151,532			
Total, Pacific	1,154,797	949,714	2,104,511			
<i>America—</i>							
Bermuda	1907-8	140,598	420,596	561,194	Nil.	Nil.	
British Honduras	454,491	496,565	951,056			
Bahamas	140,598	372,937	513,535			
Jamaica	2,376,202	2,914,013	5,290,215			
Turks and Caicos Islands	23,817	27,660	51,477			
Leeward Islands	530,379	517,424	1,047,803			
Windward Islands—							
St. Lucia	}	1,480,476	1,961,101	3,441,577			
St. Vincent							
Grenada							
Barbados	847,092	1,271,530	2,118,622			
Trinidad	1907-8	3,907,503	3,374,824	7,282,327			
British Guiana	1,644,104	1,697,919	3,342,023			
Falkland Islands	246,435	73,619	320,054			
Total, America	11,791,695	13,128,188	24,919,883			
<i>Africa—</i>							
Gambia	1907-8	408,476	445,359	853,835			
Sierra Leone	831,259	988,022	1,819,281			
Gold Coast	2,641,674	2,366,195	5,007,869			
Southern Nigeria	4,202,704	4,438,907	8,641,611			
Northern Nigeria	†	†	†			
Total, West Africa	8,084,113	8,238,483	16,322,596			
St. Helena	1907-8	4,704	35,614	40,318			
Rhodesia	2,569,736	1,565,161	4,134,897			
Basutoland	270,441	240,599	511,040			
Bechuanaland	66,660	105,515	172,175			
Nyasaland	91,745	188,659	280,404			
East Africa Protectorate	494,710	799,717	1,294,427			

TABLE III—continued.

	Year.	Exports.	Imports.	Total Foreign Trade.	Naval Expenditure.	Naval Expenditure for each 100% of Foreign Trade.	Remarks.
<i>Crown Colonies, &c.—continued.</i>							
<i>Africa—continued.</i>							
Uganda ..	1907-8	137,119	334,087	471,206			
Zanzibar ..	"	1,070,067	1,232,957	2,303,024			
Somaland ..	"	215,708	233,239	448,947			
Mauritius ..	"	2,937,699	2,103,614	5,041,313			
Seychelles ..	"	150,788	90,986	241,774			
Total, Africa	16,093,490	15,168,631	31,262,121	Nil.		

III.

Admiralty Memorandum.

ON the 16th March of this year statements were made on the growing strength of foreign navies by the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty on the introduction of the Navy Estimates for 1909-10.

On the 22nd March the Government of New Zealand telegraphed an offer to bear the cost of the immediate construction of a battleship of the latest type and of a second of the same type if necessary. This offer was gratefully accepted by His Majesty's Government. On the 29th March the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution recognising the duty of Canada, as the country increased in numbers and wealth, to assume in a larger measure the responsibilities of national defence, and approving of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organisation of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy. On the 15th April Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister of the Australian Government, telegraphed that, whereas all the British Dominions ought to share in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the Empire, so far as Australia was concerned this object would be best attained by the encouragement of naval development in that country. (On Mr. Deakin succeeding Mr. Fisher as Prime Minister a further telegram was sent on the 4th June, offering the Empire an Australian "Dreadnought," or such addition to its naval strength as may be determined after consultation in London.)

In view of these circumstances, His Majesty's Government considered the time was appropriate for the holding of a Conference to discuss afresh the relations of the Dominions to the United Kingdom in regard to the question of Imperial defence, and on the 30th April sent an invitation to the Defence Ministers of the four Dominions and the Cape Colonies to attend a Conference under the terms of Resolution 1 of the Conference of 1907, to discuss the general question of the naval and military defence of the Empire, with special reference to the Canadian resolution and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia.

2. If the problem of Imperial naval defence were considered merely as a problem of naval strategy it would be found that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity of command. In furtherance, then, of the simple strategical ideal the maximum of power would be gained if all parts of the Empire contributed, according to their needs and resources, to the maintenance of the British Navy.

3. It has long been recognised that in defining the conditions under which the naval forces of the Empire should be developed, other considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account. The various circumstances of the oversea Dominions have to be borne in mind. Though all have in them the seeds of a great advance in population, wealth, and power, they have at the present time attained to different stages in their growth. Their geographical position has subjected them to internal and external strains, varying in kind and intensity. Their history and physical environment have given rise to individual national sentiment, for the expression of which room must be found. A simple contribution of money or matériel may be to one Dominion the most acceptable form in which to assist in Imperial defence. Another, while ready to provide local naval forces, and to place them

at the disposal of the Crown in the event of war, may wish to lay the foundations upon which a future navy of its own could be raised. A third may think that the best manner in which it can assist in promoting the interests of the Empire is in undertaking certain local services not directly of a naval character, but which may relieve the Imperial Government from expenses which would otherwise fall on the British Exchequer.

4. The main duty of the forthcoming Conference as regards naval defence will be, therefore, to determine the form in which the various Dominion Governments can best participate in the burthen of Imperial defence with due regard to varying political and geographical conditions. Looking to the difficulties involved, it is not to be expected that the discussions with the several Defence Ministers will result in a complete and final scheme of naval defence, but it is hoped that it will be found possible to formulate the broad principles upon which the growth of Colonial naval forces should be fostered. While laying the foundations of future Dominion navies to be maintained in different parts of the Empire, these forces would contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of Imperial defence.

5. In the opinion of the Admiralty, a Dominion Government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct fleet unit; and the smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component parts in time of war.

6. Under certain conditions the establishment of local defence flotillas, consisting of torpedo craft and submarines, might be of assistance in time of war to the operations of the fleet, but such flotillas cannot co-operate on the high seas in the wider duties of protection of trade and preventing attacks from hostile cruisers and squadrons. The operations of destroyers and torpedo boats are necessarily limited to the waters near the coast or to a radius of action not far distant from a base, while there are great difficulties in manning such a force and keeping it always thoroughly efficient.

A scheme limited to torpedo craft would not in itself, moreover, be a good means of gradually developing a self-contained fleet capable of both offence and defence. Unless a naval force—whatever its size—complies with this condition, it can never take its proper place in the organisation of an Imperial navy distributed strategically over the whole area of British interests.

7. The fleet unit to be aimed at should, in the opinion of the Admiralty, consist of the following:—

- 1 Armoured cruiser (new "Indomitable" class, which is of the "Dreadnought" type),
- 3 Unarmoured cruisers ("Bristol" class),
- 6 Destroyers,
- 3 Submarines,

with the necessary auxiliaries, such as depot and store ships, &c.

Such a fleet unit would be capable of action not only in the defence of coasts, but also of the trade routes, and would be sufficiently powerful to deal with small hostile squadrons should such ever attempt to act in those waters.

8. Simply to man such a squadron, omitting auxiliary requirements and any margin for reliefs, sickness, &c., the minimum numbers required would be about 2,000 officers and men, according to the Admiralty scheme of complements, including—

- 1 Rear-Admiral or Commodore and staff,
- 1 Captain,
- 4 Commanders,
- 43 Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants,
- 16 Engineer officers,

besides Medical and Accountant officers and warrant and petty officers of the various classes.

9. The estimated first cost of building and arming the class of ships indicated would be—

	£
"Indomitable" (new)	2,000,000
"Bristol"	350,000*
Destroyer (River class)	80,000*
Submarine (C class)	55,000*

It is difficult to estimate the annual cost of maintenance (i.e., upkeep of hull and machinery, sea stores, fuel, &c.) under the new conditions contemplated, but it may be taken that it would amount approximately to—

	£
"Indomitable"	52,000
"Bristol"	16,500
Destroyer (River class)	10,700
Submarine (C class)	2,300

It is also difficult to estimate the amount which should represent interest and depreciation on first cost. The life of the "Indomitable" and "Bristol" classes may be estimated at 20 years and that of the destroyers and submarines at 15 years, but the amount to be calculated on this basis would vary according to the rate of interest prevailing in each country. It has not, therefore, been included.

The total first cost, accordingly, of building and arming a fleet unit apart from auxiliaries would be:—

	£
1 "Indomitable" (new)	2,000,000
3 "Bristols"	1,050,000
6 Destroyers (River class)	480,000
3 Submarines (C class)	165,000
	<hr/>
	3,695,000

and the total annual cost of maintenance would be:—

	£
1 "Indomitable"	52,000
3 "Bristols"	49,500
6 Destroyers (River class)	64,200
3 Submarines (C class)	6,300
	<hr/>
	172,600

10. The above figures do not include the cost of personnel, which should be added to the annual charge for maintenance. The active-service pay of 2,000 officers and men, and their victualling and other like expenses, would amount approximately to 156,000*l.* a-year, calculated on the rates payable in the Royal Navy only.

It will be noticed that, as in the case of the matériel of the fleet unit, the estimated cost of the personnel required to man the ships does not comprise the whole cost. There would be other charges to be provided for, such as the pay of persons employed in subsidiary services, those undergoing training, sick, in reserve, &c.

11. As the armoured cruiser is the essential part of the fleet unit, it is important that an "Indomitable" of the "Dreadnought" type should be the first vessel to be built in commencing the formation of a fleet unit. She should be officered and manned as far as possible by Colonial officers and men, supplemented by the loan of Imperial officers and men who might volunteer for the service. While on the station the ship would be under the exclusive control of the Dominion Government as regards her movements and general administration, but officers and men would be governed by regulations similar to the King's Regulations, and be under naval discipline. The question of pay and allowances would have to be settled on lines the most suitable to each Dominion Government concerned.

12. It is recognised that to carry out completely such a scheme as that indicated would ultimately mean a greater charge for naval defence than that which the Dominions have hitherto borne; but, on the other hand, the building of a "Dreadnought" (or its equivalent), which certain Governments have offered to undertake, would form part of the scheme, and therefore, as regards the most expensive item of the shipbuilding programme suggested, no additional cost to those Governments would be involved.

* May have to be increased

13. *Pari passu* with the creation of the fleet unit, it would be necessary to consider the development of local resources in everything which relates to the maintenance of a fleet. A careful enquiry should be made into the shipbuilding and repairing establishments with a view to their general adaptation to the needs of the local squadron. Training schools for officers and men would have to be established; arrangements would have to be made for the manufacture, supply, and replenishment of the various naval, ordnance, and victualling stores required by the squadron.

14. All these requirements might be met according to the views of the Dominion Governments, in so far as the form and manner of the provision made are concerned. But as regards shipbuilding, armaments, and warlike stores, &c., on the one hand, and training and discipline in peace and war on the other, there should be one common standard. If the fleet unit maintained by a Dominion is to be treated as an integral part of the Imperial forces, with a wide range of interchangeability among its component parts with those forces, its general efficiency should be the same, and the facilities for refitting and replenishing His Majesty's ships, whether belonging to a Dominion Fleet or to the Fleet of the United Kingdom, should be the same. Further, as it is a *sine qua non* that successful action in time of war depends upon unity of command and direction, the general discipline must be the same throughout the whole Imperial service, and without this it would not be possible to arrange for that mutual co-operation and assistance which would be indispensable in the building up and establishing of a local naval force in close connection with the Royal Navy. It has been recognised by the Colonial Governments that in time of war the local naval forces should come under the general directions of the Admiralty.

15. The above is the scheme in its general outline, the details of which, if it meets with a favourable reception at the Conference, could be worked out by a sub-committee of representatives of the Admiralty and the Dominion Government concerned, who would consider *inter alia* :—

- (a.) The means of reconciling the local control of the Dominion Government over its naval forces with the principle of unity of command in time of war.
- (b.) The best means of arranging for the close connection, as regards ships and personnel, between the local and Imperial naval forces which is essential to enable these forces to attain the same standard of efficiency.
- (c.) The arrangements to be made during the transitional period pending the establishment of a complete fleet unit.

R. McK.

Admiralty, July 20, 1909.

IV.

Précis of Important Events connected with the Question of the Employment of Colonial Military Forces on Imperial Service.

SINCE the year 1862 the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the arrangements for the defence of self-governing Colonies has been based upon a resolution of the House of Commons which was unanimously agreed to on the 4th March of that year, to the effect :—

"That this House (while fully recognizing the claims of all portions of the British Empire to Imperial aid in their protection against perils arising from the consequences of Imperial policy) is of opinion that Colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defence."

1882.

2. In the Report of the Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce abroad the responsibility of the Colonies in regard to the military defence of the Empire was only touched upon in general terms in the following sentences :—

Report of
Lord
Carnarvon's
Commission.

"It is not yet possible to define with accuracy the conditions upon which to determine the relative apportionment of the burdens as between the mother-country and her Colonies, and, though the principle may be hereafter fixed, the relative proportions of payment will necessarily vary from time to time. The maintenance of the Royal Navy has hitherto fallen, and must, for the present, whatever we may look to in the future, fall upon Imperial funds, as also a large portion of the charge of fortifying and garrisoning those positions which it is essential to maintain, in order to enable your Majesty's ships to hold the seas. On the other hand, speaking generally, the Colonies, we think, ought to undertake the local defence of their commercial ports, and contribute towards the protection of the naval stations upon which the security of their territory and trade so largely depends. The Australian Colonies have already recognized this principle, and are taking effectual measures for the defence of their principal ports."

"The relations between Great Britain and her Colonies in regard to the general defence of the Empire must alter as time goes on. The growth of the Colonies in wealth and population will, in all human probability, be relatively more rapid than that of Great Britain; and their power to take a fair share of the defence of the Empire will be constantly on the increase. We are fully sensible of the immense and increasing value of the Colonies to the Empire, and we appreciate as much as we respect their loyalty and patriotism. There are no signs of unwillingness on their part to assume as large a portion of the Imperial burden as their strength will enable them to bear. The free and constant communications which are maintained with the responsible Colonial Governments on all matters of common interest will contribute powerfully to keep up a sense of partnership and mutual dependence, and to strengthen the bonds of affection between the mother-country and her Colonial Empire."

1885.

Australian
contingent
for service
in the
Soudan.

3. Early in 1885 the Government of New South Wales offered to provide a force composed of two batteries of artillery and a battalion of infantry for service with the regular troops in the operations then in progress in the Sudan. This offer was gratefully accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and on the 3rd March the Australian contingent, consisting of 800 men and 224 horses, sailed from Sydney for Suakin.

The force was equipped, transported, and paid at the cost of the Colony. The contingent did good service in the Sudan, and when the military operations in that region terminated the Government of New South Wales offered to maintain the force, if necessary, in India on the same terms as it served in Egypt.

Similar offers of troops were made by the Governments of other Colonies, but, while they were highly appreciated, it was not found necessary to take advantage of them.

1887.

Colonial
Conference.

4. At the Colonial Conference of 1887 the discussion in regard to the military defence of the Empire was almost entirely confined to questions of local defence and the relative responsibilities of the Imperial and Colonial Governments for the defence of Imperial coaling stations.

5. In a Memorandum laid before the Conference, the Secretary of State for the Colonies pointed out the importance of the terms of obligation of service of colonial forces being assimilated, in view of the possibility of the forces of two or more Colonies being brought together for active service.

The following conditions were proposed:—

- (1.) To serve at all times in the defence of their Colony.
- (2.) With the assent of their Colonial Government, and in the event of that Government providing the means, to aid Her Majesty in any wars in which she may be engaged.
- (3.) In such a case the command must be vested in the commanding officer of Her Majesty's troops.
- (4.) When serving within the Colony, to be subject to Colonial law. When serving with Her Majesty's troops beyond the Colony, to be subject to the Army Act and the Queen's Regulations.

1897.

Colonial
Conference.

6. In the opening discussion at the Conference of Colonial Premiers, 1897, the Secretary of State for the Colonies suggested that consideration should be given to the possibility of arranging an interchange of units between the Imperial and Colonial Forces. He proposed "that, for instance, a Canadian regiment should come to this country, take up its quarters for a period of time, at least twelve months, with the British army, and form, during the whole time that it is in this country, a part of the British army, and that in return a similar regiment of British troops, or a brigade of artillery or cavalry, should go to Canada, and should reside and exercise with the Canadian army, and form part of that army. The idea is that this should be chiefly for the purpose of drill and instruction, and I cannot doubt that it will be of enormous advantage to the Canadian troops and to the troops of the Colonies, to measure themselves against the regular army, and to learn the discipline and the manœuvres which are practised on a large scale in this country.

"But my imagination goes even further. It seems to me possible that, although in the first instance the idea is that such a regiment coming to this country would come solely for that purpose, and would not be engaged in military operations, yet if it were their wish to share in the dangers and the glories of the British army, and take their part in expeditions in which the British army may be engaged, I see no reason why these colonial troops should not, from time to time, fight side by side with their British colleagues. That, however, is a matter which, like everything else which I am putting before you, is not a recommendation which has any pressure behind it, it is merely a suggestion to be taken up by you voluntarily if it commends itself to your minds. What I have suggested might take place with regard to

Canada I believe might equally take place with regard to such fine forces as those of which we have seen representatives from some of the Colonies of Australia, and might take place also with regard to the South African Colonies."

7. The suggestion made for an occasional interchange of military units between the mother-country and the Colonies was generally recognised as one likely to prove useful in increasing the efficiency of the colonial forces, and the Premiers of those Colonies which possessed permanent forces of a purely military character expressed their intention of examining on their return what legislative or other measures might be necessary in order to give effect to it as opportunity offered.

1898.

8. With a view to facilitating the consideration of the subject of an interchange of military units between the mother-country and the Colonies, as proposed at the Colonial Conference, 1897, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, addressed a circular despatch, dated the 3rd August, 1898, to the self-governing Colonies, in which he explained generally the nature of the arrangements which suggested themselves to Her Majesty's Government.

Interchange
of Military
Units.

The suggestions were briefly that—

- (1.) The troops furnished by the Colonies should be complete administrative units, and should correspond in strength as nearly as possible to the normal establishment of similar units in England.
- (2.) With regard to financial arrangements involved, the most simple and satisfactory system would be for the lending authority to continue to pay for its own corps.

Thus the British unit in Canada would receive pay and allowance from the Imperial Government on the same scale as corps stationed at Halifax, at a rate to be determined, and it would be open to Colonial Governments to continue to pay their men serving in England at their present normal rates, or to make a deduction on account of lower prices in this country.

- (3.) Rations, barrack accommodation, travelling, and other allowances would necessarily be fixed by the scale obtaining in the country in which the men were serving, and the charges involved might, therefore, conveniently be borne in the estimates of that country.
- (4.) With regard to transport, the simplest arrangement would seem to be for each country to pay for the troops embarking at its ports.
- (5.) The period of service might, in the first instance, be taken as two years, inclusive of the time taken up in transporting the troops to and from the Colonies, and no soldier should be sent either from or to the Colonies with less than two years to serve.

Any agreement on the subject might, however, include a clause allowing the period to be extended if both parties agree to such extension.

- (6.) It seems most desirable that the mother-country should have the option of employing colonial units, other than garrison artillery, on field service abroad.

To enable this to be done it would be necessary to provide for a unit so employed being retained under the orders of the home authorities until the conclusion of the war in which it may be engaged, although the period agreed upon for the exchange may have expired.

- (7.) As regards discipline the colonial units while in England would come entirely under the Army Act and Rules of Procedure, and under the Queen's Regulations in so far as is consistent with the conditions of their engagement, while the British units serving in the Colonies will remain under the Army Act and under the Rules and Regulations of the Imperial service.

9. The replies of the Colonial Governments were generally favourable to the above proposals, but the organization of local forces, under which the small force of permanent service men were employed mainly in instructional duties, precluded the possibility of participation in the scheme.

1899.

Colonial
Forces in
South
Africa.

10. The South African war gave ample evidence of the enthusiasm with which the great self-governing Dominions are ready to take up arms in the common cause of the defence of the Empire. It is unnecessary here to set forth the details of the forces contributed. It may, however, be mentioned that Canada and the Australasian Colonies contributed 30,863 men, at a cost to their Governments of 1,858,218/.

1900.

New
Zealand
Imperial
Reserve.

11. The first measure of Colonial military legislation to provide for the establishment of an Imperial Reserve as part of the Colonial military forces, was the New Zealand Defence Act Amendment Act of 1900. Section 12 of this Act authorized the establishment of an Imperial Reserve, recruited from members of any other branch of the local forces, and provided that "the Reserve may, at the cost in all things of the Imperial Government, and in accordance with any arrangements made between the Governor and that Government, be employed on Imperial service outside New Zealand, within limits to be fixed by Act, or approved by Resolution of both Houses of Parliament."

Another section provided that if the Reserve were employed outside the Colony, in accordance with terms arranged between the Imperial Government and the Governments of the Australian Colonies, in such case, the cost of the service would be apportioned between the Imperial and Colonial Governments, in such a manner as might be agreed upon between them.

No Imperial Reserve has, however, yet been established under this Act.

1902.

Colonial
Conference.

12. Proposals for the formation of an Imperial Reserve in the Colonies available for service throughout the Empire in time of war were laid before the Colonial Conference of 1902, when the late Mr. Seddon, Prime Minister of New Zealand, gave notice of the following motion:—

"That it is desirable to have an Imperial Reserve Force formed in each of His Majesty's Dominions over the Seas for service in case of emergency outside the Dominion or Colony in which such reserve is formed. The limits within which such reserve force may be employed outside the Colony wherein it is raised, to be defined by the Imperial and Colonial Governments at the time such reserve is formed, and to be in accordance with any law in force for the time being respecting the same. The cost of maintaining and equipping such Imperial Reserve Force to defrayed in such proportion and manner as may be agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Governments."

The discussion of this motion revealed considerable difference of opinion amongst the members of the Conference. While the representatives of Cape Colony and Natal were disposed to fall in with the policy suggested by Mr. Seddon, the representatives of Canada and Australia were of opinion that the best course to pursue was to endeavour to raise the standard of training for the general body of their forces, to organize the departmental services and equipment required for the mobilization of a field force, leaving it to the Colony, when the need arose, to determine how and to what extent it should render assistance. It was considered that to establish a special force, set apart for general Imperial service, and practically under the absolute control of the Imperial Government, was objectionable in principle, as derogating from the powers of self-government enjoyed by the Colonies, and would be calculated to impede the general improvement in training and organization of their defence forces, and consequently their ability to render effective help, if it should be required.

1904.

Imperial
Reserve in
New
Zealand.

13. The question of the formation of an Imperial Reserve in New Zealand, as proposed by the late Mr. Seddon, was discussed at the 54th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 15th August, 1904. The proposal met with the warm approval of that Committee.

In a despatch, dated the 27th August, 1904, from the Colonial Office to the

Governor of New Zealand explaining how effect could best be given to Mr. Seddon's proposal, it was stated that—"His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the possibility of having a body of Colonial troops trained and organized and equipped available for Imperial service. The value of such forces, even though only partially trained and but hastily organized, for external service was sufficiently proved by the South African war, in which the various contingents furnished by New Zealand took so conspicuous a part."

"His Majesty's Government therefore welcomed the proposal put forward by your Prime Minister at the Conference, that an Imperial Reserve should be permanently maintained in each Colony for Imperial service within certain limits and on certain conditions."

"Two proposals for creating such a Reserve in New Zealand were discussed:—

"(a.) The organization of a force which would in time of war be at the disposal of His Majesty's Government for service out of New Zealand, and within the limits of China, South Africa, Canada, and the islands of the Western Pacific, the peace retaining fee of members of the force being paid, either wholly or partially, by His Majesty's Government, and the equipment provided by His Majesty's Government, the Colony paying interest on the value of the cost of the equipment: the term "time of war" being limited by the condition that the units would not be required to serve out of New Zealand, unless the Reserves of the regular army at home had been called out—that is to say, only in case of imminent national danger or great emergency."

"(b.) The organization of a force, the members of which would be liable by their term of engagement to serve outside New Zealand in time of war, but which would not be at the disposal of His Majesty's Government except by the specific consent of the New Zealand Government, to be given when the occasion for the employment of the force should arise. The retaining fees and all the expenses connected with the peace maintenance of the force would under these conditions fall on the Colonial Government."

"With regard to proposal (a) it appears to His Majesty's Government, after the most careful examination, to be open to very grave constitutional objection, so long as there is no central authority in the Empire upon which the Colonies are represented, and that so long as this state of things continues the working of the scheme would almost inevitably give rise to grave difficulties with the Colonial Government."

"It is their earnest wish that some means should be found for establishing such an authority, and they fear that to enter into such an arrangement as proposed with one Colony alone would retard the development in other parts of the Empire of the forces which are making for closer union, by giving rise to the suspicion that His Majesty's Government desired to limit the control of the Colonies over their forces, and encroach on the highly-valued privilege of complete local self-government."

"His Majesty's Government are convinced, therefore, that in the meantime they must rely upon the patriotic spirit and devotion of His Majesty's subjects beyond the seas for assistance, if need be, in time of emergency, and not upon any engagements which would appear to detract in the slightest degree from the purely voluntary character of such assistance."

"There is, moreover, apart from this consideration, the important fact that the burden of defence falling on the people of this country at the present time has enormously increased, and that to add to it a charge for a force maintained in the self-governing Colonies might probably be considered inopportune."

"For these reasons it appears to His Majesty's Government that proposal (b) is in every way preferable, and if your Government should see their way to adopt it, His Majesty's Government believe that such a step would be followed in time by other parts of the Empire, so that in time of emergency, such as during the late war, the Colonies would have trained and ready a force which would prove invaluable to the cause of the Empire."

On further consideration, however, the Government of New Zealand decided not to proceed further in the matter.

1907.

14. The subject of an Imperial Reserve was again touched upon at the Colonial Conference of 1907, but the general sentiment of the Conference was opposed to any action being taken in this direction.

15. Sir Joseph Ward, Prime Minister of New Zealand, dissented from the proposal. He explained that the view in New Zealand was that "we want to have our volunteer system carried out under a complete organized defence system in New Zealand, without distinction of any kind for oversea purposes. We are against anything in the nature of a standing army. We have now in existence our volunteers, many of whom are actively engaged in helping to develop the country. We have a very large reserve force of private individuals who are qualified to serve anywhere, and we want to be in the position, in New Zealand, of allowing it to be a voluntary offering from the Government and the individual to fight oversea when called upon for the Empire, and we know we could get thousands of them, and if we were to attempt to create a first line or company, whatever is suggested, to be always ready for oversea defence, I think you would create internal difficulties amongst the ordinary, or, rather, regular, forces who would willingly and spontaneously go out and fight when the time arises. I believe, with all due deference to my friend Dr. Smartt, that it is far better to let the country as a whole realize, in the event of trouble arising, that we can draw upon our volunteers for wherever we are going to fight, not ear-marking them beforehand. A good system of defence in our own country for use externally when the time arises is the better course to follow. It would entail legislation in our country if anything of the kind were proposed, and our people in time of peace do not want to have paraded a permanent organization to go outside the country to fight. That is the sort of thing that would deter them to some extent from general action when the time arises."

16. Sir Frederick Borden was also opposed to the suggestion. He stated: "I would like to add a word. This very question was brought up at the Conference five years ago, and discussed thoroughly and disposed of, for that time at least. I perhaps cannot put the matter better than I put it then. I will read what I said then: 'The suggestion which was made that there should be a special force, known as the Imperial Force, for service abroad is one I cannot subscribe to, because I believe, in the first place, it would have a derogatory effect on the militia itself. I am quite content, from what I know of the militia of Canada, that to have a special force receiving special favours, specially named, specially drilled and trained, would have an unfavourable effect on the militia at large. I would propose as an alternative, and so on, and I concluded: 'It seems to me that I do not think it is necessary that a set of men shall be labelled as being set apart for any particular service, but that our militia should be made absolutely effective, so that when the moment arrives we can take part and assist the Imperial Army by a voluntary enlistment.'"

17. The only resolution adopted by the Colonial Conference of 1907 in regard to Military Defence was:—

"That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognises and confirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organization of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire."

June 29, 1909.

V.

Sub-Conference on Military Defence.

Chairman.

General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, G.C.B., Chief of the General Staff.

Members.

Lord LUCAS, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for War.
Colonel J. E. B. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P., Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Major-General Sir DOUGLAS HAIG, K.C.V.O., C.B., Director of Staff Duties.
Major-General J. S. EWART, C.B., Director of Military Operations.
Brigadier-General A. J. MURRAY, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., Director of Military Training.
Brigadier-General G. F. ELLISON, C.B., Director of Organization.

Canada:

Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Australia:

Colonel W. T. BRIDGES, C.M.G.
Captain W. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

New Zealand:

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

South Africa:

Brigadier-General G. G. ASTON, C.B.
Colonel P. S. BEVES.

The representatives of the self-governing Dominions at the Imperial Defence Conference having signified their general concurrence in the proposition—"That each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire,"—the Sub-Conference on Military Defence, appointed to consider in detail the "Proposals for so Organizing the Military Forces of the Empire as to ensure their Effective Co-operation in the event of War" prepared and submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, submit the following recommendations:—

1. That the War Establishments of the Home Regular Army should be accepted as the basis on which the organization of units of the Dominion Forces should, as far as possible, be modelled.

It is highly desirable that the 1st Line Transport of units should follow, as closely as possible, the Imperial pattern.

The 2nd Line Transport, for Home defence purposes, may well be of the pattern most suitable to local conditions. But, in any case where Dominion forces share in an expedition over-seas, provision should be made on mobilization to modify the local pattern transport, when necessary, to meet the special conditions of the case.

2. That, in the event of a Dominion despatching a force for Imperial expeditionary purposes, it should be accompanied by a due proportion of administrative units, both with, and in rear of, the fighting troops.

3. That the Dominions should, as far as practicable, adopt the Field Service Regulations and Training Manuals issued to the Home Regular Army as the basis of the organization, administration, and training of their troops. In this connection it was agreed that in subsequent editions, or in revisions, the Dominions would be consulted in regard to any alterations or amendments which they might wish to propose.

4. That the Dominions should adopt, as far as possible, Imperial patterns of arms, equipment and stores.

5. That the officers performing General Staff duties throughout the Empire, whatever the force to which they belong, and while remaining responsible to, and under the control of, their own Governments, should be members of one body, the Imperial General Staff.

In Dominions where there are not enough qualified officers to fill General Staff appointments, the local Headquarters should be first completed, and the duties in districts be performed by Staff Officers as at present, who should be termed "attached to the General Staff" until qualified, or until gradually replaced by qualified General Staff Officers as they become available.

6. That, the proposal for the formation of sections of the Imperial General Staff in the several Dominions having been accepted, it will devolve on those sections to work out the details of the preliminary and higher education of officers of the Local Forces, in communication, so far as may be necessary, with the central body. In this connection the proposals set forth in Appendix D to the paper prepared by the Chief of the General Staff, regarding the further training of officers after leaving the Staff College, should be borne in mind.

7. That the Local Headquarters of the Imperial General Staff should study, in consultation with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the various strategical problems affecting their respective Dominions which may present themselves.

8. That when the services of any qualified General Staff Officers of the Home Regular Army are required by any of the Dominions, either on loan or interchange, or when the services of any qualified General Staff Officers of the Local Forces can be utilized for employment in General Staff appointments in the Home Regular Army on interchange, the procedure proposed in Appendix E to the paper prepared by the Chief of the General Staff should be followed. In regard to finance—

- (a.) In the case of *Loan*, the country employing the officer to defray all travelling expenses (including passage to and fro), pay and allowances;
- (b.) In the case of *Interchange*, passage to and fro should be defrayed by the country to which the officer belongs, all other pay and allowances (travelling or otherwise) being defrayed by the country employing the officer.
- (c.) Efforts should be made to assimilate the rates of pay attaching to equivalent grades of General Staff appointments.

In cases (a) and (b), if any special addition to the rates of pay attaching to the several grades of General Staff appointments is thought requisite to meet local conditions, it should be made by local rates and allowances payable by the country to which the officer belongs.

9. That the views advanced in Part III. of the paper prepared by the Chief of the General Staff on the subject of the interchange of General Staff Officers should be adopted, but it is recognised that, for some time to come, interchange to the extent ultimately contemplated must be limited, as regards each Dominion, by the number of properly qualified officers available.

10. That the system of intercommunication between the various sections of the Imperial General Staff proposed in Part III. of the paper prepared by the Chief of the General Staff should be adopted, and that the organization and duties of a Local Headquarters of the Imperial General Staff should follow, as closely as local conditions admit, those in force at Imperial Army Headquarters, as indicated in Appendix F, Table V., of the same paper.

11. As a means of providing a military education for persons who desire to become officers of the Local Forces, either those on a permanent or those on a militia basis, the establishment of local military colleges on the general lines of the Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada, which also provides a general and technical education useful in civil life, presents many advantages. Such colleges might also, as in the case of Kingston, provide for the higher military education of officers already in the forces.

The establishment of Officers' Training Corps, or other organizations having for their object the provision of additional officers required in the event of war, deserves serious attention.

12. In the opinion of the Sub-Conference the recommendations submitted above, while enabling the Dominions to take their share in the defence of the Empire, will also conduce to their territorial security and to the fighting efficiency of their forces for Home Defence.

W. G. NICHOLSON,
C.G.S.,
Chairman.

THE WAR OFFICE,
10th August, 1909.

PROPOSALS FOR SO ORGANIZING THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE EMPIRE AS TO ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVE CO-OPERATION IN THE EVENT OF WAR.

20
Gen. No.
2857

PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY THE CHIEF OF THE
GENERAL STAFF.

THE WAR OFFICE,
17th July, 1909.

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Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War on the Proposals of the Chief of the General Staff for so Organizing the Military Forces of the Empire as to Ensure their Effective Co-operation in the Event of War.

In laying these proposals before the Members of the Conference the War Office is well aware that the representatives of the Over-sea Dominions cannot at the Conference pledge their Governments, or undertake in any way to bind the officers and men composing Over-sea Dominion forces to engagements beyond the shores and boundaries of their own countries. It is hoped, however, in view of the great importance of organizing on identical principles and with a common purpose, that this fact will not prevent full consideration being given at the Conference to the objects proposed.

To organize local forces so that in a time of supreme emergency they may concentrate and act together as one army in any part of the Empire does not lessen but actually tends to increase the efficiency of these forces for the local defence of their homes.

No one can predict the time or place where concentration for the protection of some threatened part of the Empire may be required. It is only by considering in time of peace and, so far as local political conditions render this possible, working out practicable plans for general mobilization that the military forces of the Empire as a whole can be made really effective.

R. B. HALDANE.

17th July, 1909.

INTRODUCTION.

1. The British Empire extends over more than a fifth of the earth's surface, and the King's subjects number more than a fifth of the inhabitants of the globe.

The military forces of the British Empire, including the Indian Army, the troops of the Over-sea Dominions, and the garrisons of colonies and stations all over the world, amount to-day to a total of nearly 1,200,000 officers and men who can be called to arms in the event of war; but of these troops the Native Army of India is to a great extent localized by political and military considerations, while the Territorial Force at home and the forces of the Over-sea Dominions are only liable to serve within their own areas, though, if they volunteer to serve in time of war outside those areas, their offer may be accepted by His Majesty. Moreover, the British Regular Army has to provide a large garrison for India, and smaller garrisons for defended ports and naval bases abroad. Consequently, not only is the aggregate military force of the Empire small in proportion to the extent, population, and defensive requirements of the Empire, but the force available by its terms of service for expeditionary action in any part of the world, whether offensive or defensive in its nature, is almost insignificant when compared with the vast armies of the Continental Powers and Japan.

2. To produce an army which will be an effective instrument of war, so far as its numerical strength admits, its component parts should be organized and trained on a system which will render them capable of combined action in war. To produce an army which can promptly bring its full power to bear at the decisive point, its component parts should, as far as possible, be capable of employment in time of war in any theatre of operations where their services may be required. Only a fraction of the Military Forces of the Empire at present fulfils these conditions.

It is believed that the necessity for co-operation between the Over-sea Dominions and the Mother Country in case of a war threatening the integrity of the Empire is fully realized by all concerned, and definite proposals are submitted to the Conference in the following paper for the establishment of an Imperial military organization with that object in view.

3. The paper is divided into three parts—

Part I. contains general remarks on the military defence of the Empire.

Part II. suggests certain general principles on which the forces of the Over-sea Dominions might be organized, trained and administered, so as to be capable of forming a more effective part of an Imperial Army. Definite proposals are put forward for the consideration of the Governments of the Dominions as a first step in this direction.

Part III. deals with the development of the Imperial General Staff.

4. This paper is based on the clear understanding that, while the Mother Country confidently hopes to obtain the support and assistance of the Over-sea Dominions in the event of a war in defence of the Empire, she does not ask for any specific undertaking from any one of the Dominions in regard to the strength and composition of the military force which that Dominion may decide to place at the disposal of the Empire in time of need.

W. G. NICHOLSON, *General,*
Chief of the General Staff.

17th July, 1909.

PART I.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE MILITARY DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE.

1. At the Imperial Conference of 1907 the General Staff submitted a paper dealing with the "Strategical conditions of the Empire from a military point of view." In it they endeavoured to enunciate the principles upon which the military organization of the Empire should be based, and emphasized the importance of adopting some common ideal for which all could work. It was pointed out that this ideal involved acceptance of the following principles:—

- 1st.—That without superiority at sea our Empire cannot be maintained.
- 2nd.—That it is the duty of each self-governing portion of the Empire to provide, as far as possible, for its own territorial security.
- 3rd.—That schemes of mutual assistance in time of need should be prepared upon a definite system.

It appears to be generally recognized that these three principles of sea command, self defence, and mutual support must be the basis of any sound system of Imperial Defence.

2. The Mother Country has recognized these needs—

- (a.) By the maintenance of a Navy which is designed to keep command of the sea.
- (b.) By the provision of Territorial Forces for home defence.
- (c.) By the creation of an Expeditionary Force ready to proceed to any threatened part of the Empire.

The Dominions have shown their appreciation of two of the foregoing principles by their recently expressed desire to share in the burden imposed by naval armaments, and by their endeavour to organize efficient local forces.

3. The assembly of this Conference is a signal proof, if proof were needed, that the citizens of Greater Britain are now alive to the vital necessity of sea power, and that they realize that without it co-operation in war would be impossible, and the dissolution of our scattered Empire inevitable.

The risk of such a disaster must be avoided at all costs. It seems almost certain that, if the United Kingdom, with the aid of her daughter nations, can successfully maintain her maritime position, if the Empire continues to increase in military strength proportionately to its growth in wealth and population, and if we can organize some comprehensive system of Imperial strategy based upon the idea of mutual support by land and sea, the time cannot be far distant when we shall be practically unassailable.

4. In the case of a world-wide Power like the British Empire, our armies, without naval protection, would be chained to their own shores, unable to move to the point of danger or to co-operate in any way. Similarly, our fleets, without the support of sufficiently numerous and adequately trained defensive armies, would be fettered in their action by the want of naval bases and by the fears of a defenceless population, whilst, without strong and well-organized military forces available for expeditionary action, we should be powerless to protect our land frontiers, to co-operate with an allied Power, to carry a war into an enemy's country, or to bring it to a decisive issue.

The whole history of the British Empire is an illustration of the fact that the two services are inter-dependent, and that its safety hinges upon their combined action and cordial co-operation.

5. It is to the question of the most suitable military organization for such combined action that the General Staff desire upon this occasion to direct attention. Owing to conditions peculiar to the British Empire, the Regular Forces of the Crown, which are raised in the United Kingdom, differ in two essential respects from

those of nearly every foreign country, service in them being voluntary and of comparatively long duration. The system of enlistment and the terms of service in the Regular Army do not, therefore, admit of the accumulation of those vast reserves of trained men, which are at the disposal of Continental nations, and they compel us to look outside the Regular Army for that expansion which would become necessary directly we were engaged in a serious war. Outside the Regular Forces the troops are raised upon a non-permanent basis, and are only liable, as a rule, for service in defence of their own portion of the Empire. Consequently, we are likely to find ourselves face to face, in time of national emergency, with the necessity, subsequent to the outbreak of war, of supplementing the Regular Forces by means of improvised organizations and units for service over-sea. The adoption of this expedient may perhaps be unavoidable in certain cases under the peculiar conditions of the British Empire, but the General Staff can only look upon such a procedure as involving the acceptance of risks dangerously prejudicial to success. The evils which arise from it were made evident in the long drawn-out struggle in South Africa, a conflict wherein our need for a proper Imperial military organization was plainly revealed. "The true lesson of the war" (so runs the report of the Royal Commission) "is that no military system will be satisfactory which does not contain powers of expansion outside the limits of the Regular Forces of the Crown, whatever that limit may be."

The opinion then expressed is now generally accepted, and the efforts of those responsible for military organization have since been directed to the task of creating some system by which our comparatively small Regular Army can be supported and expanded to the extent which is necessary in time of war.

Provision
for service
over-sea.

6. The most important of the measures recently adopted in the United Kingdom has been the re-organization of the Militia as a Special Reserve capable of making good the wastage of war, either as drafts or as complete units. Beyond this it has been made possible both for units and for individuals of the Territorial Force to undertake liability on an emergency for foreign service.

Since the last Conference in 1907 progress has no doubt been made in all the self-governing Dominions in regard to the provision of military forces for local defence, increased attention is being paid to military training and education, and the importance of similarity of armament and organization has been recognized, whilst the foundations have been laid of an Imperial General Staff which, it is hoped, will direct the military policy of the Empire upon accepted principles.

In one direction, however, little or no progress has been made. In the Over-sea Dominions no organization has yet been devised for rendering assistance to other parts of the Empire in an emergency. The time seems to have arrived when this important question should be considered.

The undesirable
of
improvised
forces.

7. It is fully realized that in the hour of danger the ties of kinship and affection which bind the Self-governing Dominions to the Empire will prompt them to rally with enthusiasm to its aid. There seems, however, some reason to fear that an idea prevails that this help may be organized at leisure after hostilities have broken out. In certain circumstances no doubt this might be the case, but the conditions of modern warfare make it probable that great naval and military events will immediately follow, even if they do not precede, a declaration of war. If, therefore, organizations have to be improvised, staffs created, transport and equipment provided, and plans matured, after the outbreak of hostilities, the value of any assistance, however willingly and enthusiastically given, will be greatly lessened, even if such assistance be not altogether belated.

Modern warfare seldom admits of deliberation and improvisation after the outbreak of hostilities. It demands such a peace system that mobilization and concentration, directly they are ordered, can proceed smoothly and rapidly. Our ability to render prompt assistance to any threatened part of the Empire, and the value of our friendship to possible allies, depend upon the number of men available for over-sea service, and the rapidity with which they can be conveyed to the decisive point.

The present situation of the Empire demands a frank and free interchange of views upon this subject.

Definite
obligation
not to be
imposed.

8. It is not suggested that any one of the Dominions should be asked to undertake definite obligation. Whatever is done must be done spontaneously and with due regard to the circumstances in which each one of them is situated. It is also realized that there are many obstacles to be surmounted before any system of mutual support can be satisfactorily elaborated. War, however, can only be brought to a decisive and successful

conclusion by the offensive action of military force, combined in our case with naval superiority; and just as the British Government maintains such military force as its resources permit ready and able to proceed, in the furtherance of Imperial aims and interests, to any part of the world, so also might the forces of the Dominions be organized in such a way that their Governments would be ready, when the necessity should arise, to co-operate with the Mother Country and with each other to such extent as might seem good to them, without hasty improvisation, but with speed and certainty.

9. Under the existing Militia and Defence Acts of the various Dominions their governments have no power to employ military forces outside their territories in furtherance of Imperial interests.

Moreover, the forces raised over-seas are maintained on a militia basis. They have been so raised and organized in order to provide economically for the local defence of young nations whose development would be retarded by the much higher cost of maintaining regular forces. Citizen forces so constituted usually undertake responsibility for home defence only, but it is hoped that it may be within the power of the Self-governing Dominions so to organize their forces as not only to provide for local defence, but also to be in a position to share to the extent of their will and resources in the defence of the Empire as a whole.

10. It is confidently anticipated that co-operation will be forthcoming from all parts of the Empire in time of need. But, in order to utilize these resources from over-seas to the best advantage, it is urged that the arrangements for organizing, training, and mobilizing the troops of the Over-sea Dominions, while primarily directed to local defence, should also include the possibility of the employment of a portion of such troops in a wider sphere.

11. The General Staff are well aware that in discussing the question of co-operation they are treading upon difficult and even delicate ground. They feel sure, however, that nothing but good can result from a clear statement at this Conference of the position of the Mother Country which, being responsible for the defence of the Empire, is faced with a problem of great complexity. Within the limits of her financial capacity she has, whilst keeping command of the sea, to maintain a citizen force for home defence; she has to provide an expeditionary force ready to proceed over-sea at a moment's notice and capable of meeting a highly trained enemy; finally, she has to garrison India, the Naval Bases, and other Dependencies with professional troops both in peace and war. The Dominions are, at any rate, free from this third obligation, and such freedom simplifies for them the military task of rendering assistance to any part of the Empire which may require it. Free from the administrative difficulties which are inseparable from the work of providing reliefs and drafts of trained men for Indian and Colonial service, and from the financial burden which this implies, their task is reduced to one of so adjusting their organization for home defence as to admit of the despatch, without delay and without dislocation, of whatever forces they may be prepared to send to the aid of the Mother Country or of any other portion of the Empire.

12. The necessity for early consideration of this great question of Imperial military policy is increased by the fact that, in proportion as danger threatens the heart of the Empire and compels the Mother Country to concentrate her naval and military forces, the immediate responsibility for the safety of the outlying portions of the Empire must tend to be delegated to her daughter nations, whose possession of alternative lines of communication might enable them to send prompt and efficient aid to some threatened point or to reinforce or relieve the regular forces of the Mother Country.

For instance, Australia and New Zealand are so situated that they might be able to send troops to reinforce India, or the garrisons of defended ports in Asiatic waters, at a time when it would be unsafe to despatch them from the United Kingdom by way of the Mediterranean. Similarly, a United South Africa might be able to raise a force not merely sufficient for home defence, but capable of giving effective assistance in the solution of any military problems which might arise upon the African Continent. Canada is in the best position, perhaps, to render aid promptly should trouble arise nearer home, or to reinforce Australia.

As time goes on and the Empire gathers strength, it will no doubt be possible to define more clearly the military responsibilities and spheres of activity which should be undertaken by each of its component parts, but the foundations of a sound system of Imperial organization must be laid as a preliminary to the development of such an ideal.

to order
to order
to order
to order

Citizen
forces.

Organiza-
tion for
defence.

Relative
position
of the
Dominions.

How the
Dominions
can assist.

Military
value of
partly-
trained
troops.

13. The value of the assistance which can thus be afforded to the Empire by the troops of our Over-sea Dominions depends to a great extent upon the actual fighting efficiency of the troops at the moment when their services are required. Except in a purely defensive rôle, it would not be prudent, at the commencement of a great war, to employ a large proportion of troops raised upon a non-permanent basis against a highly trained and well disciplined enemy.

Foundation
of a
workable
system the
task of the
Conference.

14. We have in the British Empire a large number of armed men, but they have been raised under varying conditions of service, their standards of efficiency differ widely, and some of them are imperfectly organized for the work which they may be called upon to perform. The task which lies before this Conference is the foundation of a workable system which will enable us, should necessity arise, to employ the potential military strength of the Empire for a common Imperial purpose.

PART II.

PROPOSALS FOR THE ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE FORCES OF THE OVER-SEA DOMINIONS, SO THAT THEY MAY FORM PART OF AN IMPERIAL ARMY.

1. In this part, certain general principles are suggested on which the forces of the Over-sea Dominions might be organized, trained and administered, in order that they may be capable of assisting in the military defence of the Empire in accordance with the requirements indicated in Part I. Certain definite proposals are also formulated for giving practical effect to the acceptance of these principles.

Summary
of contents.

2. A common system of war organization implies that the general methods—

A common
system
of war
organiza-
tion.

- (1.) Of organization of units and formations,
- (2.) Of drill and training,
- (3.) Of staff and administrative duties,
- (4.) Of maintenance with personnel, supplies, and equipment,

are identical, so that, whenever officers and men are concentrated together into a unit, they will be capable of forming an effective part of the forces in the field.

3. As regards the organization of units and larger formations, attention is invited to Appendix A, showing the organizations which at present exist for Imperial defence in the United Kingdom, India, and the Dominions, and also the fields of action for which they are available.

The present
situation.

From a study of the Table given in Appendix A it appears that, while some progress has certainly been made, much remains to be done before it can be said that the forces of the Empire are organized on a common pattern.

At present, except in the case of Canada and Australia, which have a certain number of brigades, no higher organization than that of the regiment exists in the Dominions. Again, in none is it at present legally possible for a military unit to volunteer, as such, for service over-sea as part of an Imperial Army. As regards the existing units, we find mounted regiments with five to two squadrons, field artillery brigades with three or two batteries, infantry in regiments and battalions with a widely varying number of companies to each, and often single companies without a higher organization. The number of infantry units is, as a rule, out of all proportion to that of units of the other arms, and there is a great deficiency in the administrative services, such as supply, transport, and medical units.

4. If the Dominions wish to have the power of affording prompt and effective help in the defence of the Empire, their military forces should be organized and trained in peace on a standard system, so that, when the necessity arises, complete units and formations may be available for combined action over-seas, as part of a homogeneous Imperial Army. Legislation is, therefore, necessary to enable complete units, and not individuals, to volunteer for this service.

Necessity
for a homo-
geneous
Imperial
Army.

The first step towards rendering such an Imperial Army effective for combined action in war is the adoption of Imperial War Establishments, *i.e.*, tables showing in detail the numbers of personnel, animals, guns and vehicles, and the scales of ammunition, tools and explosives, and supplies, with which the various formations and units composing an army take the field on mobilization. These might be based on Home War Establishments, but should contain different scales for transport, supply, &c., to suit campaigns in different countries.

How this
can be
produced.

5. At home and in India, previous defects in war organization have recently been remedied, as far as the Regular troops are concerned. At home, the organization of

The United
Kingdom
and India.
(a.) Regular
troops.

the troops allotted to the Field Army in Brigades and Divisions has been carried out, so that from the Regular Army at home and in the Colonies and Egypt,

- 7 Cavalry or Mounted Brigades, and
7 Divisions,

exclusive of Lines of Communication troops, can be mobilized for over-sea service in the defence of the Empire.

From the British and native troops in India, a field army of

- 8 Mounted Brigades, and
9 Divisions,

is available by its terms of service for employment in war.

(b.)
Territorial
troops.

In addition to the above, the Territorial troops of the United Kingdom have received a Divisional and Brigade organization practically identical with that of the Field Army, and legislation has recently been passed by which complete units of the Territorial Force are enabled to volunteer, as such, for service abroad.

Proposal—
Same war
establish-
ments for
units.

6. The Dominions are, therefore, asked to consider and work out a policy by means of which the units of their existing forces may be so organized as to be capable of mobilizing at the war establishments of corresponding units in the United Kingdom, so that, should circumstances demand it, a proportion of these forces could be made available for Imperial purposes.

It is hoped that the development of the forces of the Dominions during the next few years will enable their respective Governments to consider the whole question of the numbers that might be made available for Imperial Service, always remembering that a passive defence is no defence.

Proposal—
Same
grouping of
units into
larger
organiza-
tions.

7. When a number of units can be furnished, they should be grouped in the same manner as shown in Home War Establishments. That is, mounted troops as Mounted Brigades, other units as Divisions if sufficient in number—if not, as Infantry Brigades—with a due proportion of Divisional Troops.

Proposal—
Same
proportion
of
administra-
tive units
and L. of C.
troops.

8. Whatever may be the size of the force despatched, it should be accompanied by the requisite number of administrative units and Lines of Communication troops, so that its requirements may be met with respect to ammunition, supplies, medical and veterinary services, &c. It must be noted that no organization exists in the United Kingdom for supplying these units to the contingents which the Over-sea Dominions may be willing to contribute for Imperial Service.

As regards Lines of Communication units, the following are requisite :—

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------|--|
| (1.) General Hospitals | | 2 per Division.
1 per 2 Mounted Brigades. |
| (2.) Stationary Hospitals | | 2 per Division.
1 per 2 Mounted Brigades. |
| (3.) Clearing Hospitals | | 1 per Division. |
| (4.) Hospital Ships | | 1 per Division. |
| (5.) Advanced Depôt of Medical Stores | | 1 per 2 Divisions. |
| (6.) Base Depôt of Medical Stores | | 1 per 2 Divisions. |
| (7.) Depôt Units of Supply | | 6 per Division.
2 per Mounted Brigade. |
| (8.) Bakery Sections | | 1 per Division.
1 per 3 Mounted Brigades. |
| (9.) Veterinary Sections | | 1 per Division.
1 per Mounted Brigade. |
| (10.) Base Accounts Unit | | 1 per Contingent. |
| (11.) Advanced Depôt Post Office | | 1 per Division.
1 per 3 Mounted Brigades. |
| (12.) Base Record Office | | 1 per Contingent. |
| (13.) Ordnance Depôt Units | | 3 per Division.
1 per Mounted Brigade |

(Vide "War Establishments, 1908-09.")

9. The same military terms should be adopted throughout the Empire, especially as regards names of similar bodies of troops, e.g., "Cavalry Regiment," "Field Company," "Infantry Battalion." Confusion in staff and administrative arrangements is the inevitable accompaniment of a varied nomenclature for units whose functions in war are identical. Proposal—
Same
nomen-
clature of
units.

10. In view of the above proposals, the need for a book of Imperial War Establishments is apparent, and the most simple course would be to adopt the War Establishments in force in the Home Regular Army with modifications to suit campaigns in different countries. Proposal—
Book of
Imperial
War Estab-
lishments.

11. As regards training, it is hoped that the principles of training laid down in the training manuals of the British Army may be adopted throughout the Empire. In some parts of the Empire, owing to climatic differences, some slight modifications may be necessary in the application of the principles to suit local conditions. Proposal—
Adoption of
training
manuals.

This year three important manuals have been issued to the Army, viz., "Field Service Regulations," Parts I. and II., and "Training and Manœuvre Regulations."

Field Service Regulations, Part I. (Operations), deals with the general principles which govern the leading of the Army in war, and upon it the training manuals of the various arms are based.

Field Service Regulations, Part II. (War Organization and Administration), gives the principles and rules which govern the duties of the Staff and Administrative Services respectively, as well as the system of maintenance in personnel, supplies and matériel, of an army in the field.

Training and Manœuvre Regulations give the principles and instructions for peace training, both individual and collective, as well as the rules governing the conduct of staff tours, regimental exercises, and manœuvres.

In addition to the above, there are the separate training manuals in use by the various arms of the Service, e.g., Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Infantry, &c.

12. For all staff and administrative work it is suggested that the Governments of the Dominions should accept and adopt the principles in the three manuals quoted above. Proposal—
Staff and
administra-
tive duties.

13. Reference has already been made to the matter of personnel. As regards supplies and equipment, it cannot be expected that the Dominions should at once adopt the patterns in use in the Home Regular Army in all particulars, though they can adopt its methods. At the same time it must be pointed out that serious inconvenience and difficulty in the administration of an army in the field is invariably caused by departures from uniformity in matériel. In the case of arms and ammunition such a lack of uniformity may have the gravest effects on the issue of an action. Proposal—
Personnel,
supplies
and equip-
ment.

It is hoped therefore that the Dominions may see their way to adopt, as soon as possible and as far as possible, the pattern of all stores, equipment, arms and ammunition in use by the British Army in the field.

14. In order that the various parts of the Empire may be in a position to place an efficient Imperial Army in the field, should circumstances require it, it is suggested that a constructive policy should at once be adopted, and that a plan, suited to its own special conditions, should be laid down as a starting point by each Dominion. Summary of
proposals.

The following questions are submitted for consideration in pursuance of such a policy :—

- 1st. Is each part of the Empire willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it to take its share in the general defence of the Empire?
- 2nd. Shall Imperial War Establishments be fixed, based on requirements for the most probable campaign of a serious character in which an Imperial Army is likely to be engaged?
- 3rd. Will the Dominions endeavour to organize their existing forces so as to be capable of mobilizing in accordance with the above establishments for a common Imperial object?

4th. Will the Dominions adopt the Field Service Regulations and Training Manuals issued to the Home Regular Army as the basis of the organization, administration, and training of their troops?

5th. Are the Dominions prepared to adopt, as far as possible, Imperial patterns of arms, equipment and stores?

If the foregoing questions are answered in the affirmative, the details could be worked out by the local General Staffs under the orders of the Governments of the Dominions, the War Office being referred to when necessary.

PART III.

PROPOSALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

1. His Majesty's Government, in December, 1908, submitted to the Governments of the Over-sea Dominions proposals in regard to the formation of an Imperial General Staff. These proposals have now been accepted in principle. Local conditions in each Dominion are so dissimilar, and differ so widely from those which obtain at home, that it is felt that, having accepted the principles, it now lies with the Governments over-sea to take the next step, and to put forward the proposals they advocate for giving practical effect to the scheme in their respective countries.

2. Attached as an appendix to this paper (marked B.) will be found summaries of the proposals recommended by the Canadian Government, and of a memorandum written by Major-General Hoad, Inspector-General, Commonwealth Military Forces, with General Sir William Nicholson's comments thereon. Major-General Hoad's memorandum has, however, not yet been considered by the Government of Australia.

It is hoped, however, that these summaries may serve as a basis for an examination of the problem, and that by discussing the proposals, and considering the essential details by which practical effect may be given to the principles already enunciated, both the home and the over-sea governments may be enabled to assist each other towards the common end, which is the formation and growth of an Imperial General Staff, and its establishment on a firm and business-like footing.

3. It will be noticed that education is the keynote of both the proposals—not only that higher education at a Staff College which is essential if the Imperial General Staff is to be composed of a body of officers trained to *think alike* on all matters of principle, but the preliminary education, by which officers can be so grounded and prepared as to be able to profit by the Staff College training when their time comes to be selected to go through the course at Camberley or Quetta, or, in the future, at the local Staff Colleges.

4. The necessity for both preparatory and higher education is so apparent that its importance need not be further insisted upon, but the manner in which it should be conducted is just one of those essential details which requires the closest attention of the Conference. It is suggested that the home authorities may be able to assist the Over-sea Dominions in this connection by the loan of qualified officers, should their Governments—as in the case of Canada—require help in the staffing of their educational establishments until they possess sufficient qualified instructors of their own.

5. Intimately connected with the subject of the loan of officers from the Home Regular Forces to the Over-sea Dominions is the question of the temporary interchange between officers for General Staff duties in different parts of the Empire.

It is a question which needs consideration from the following points of view:—

- (1.) The fitness of the officers proposed for exchange in respect of the duties they will be required to perform.
- (2.) The financial aspect.
- (3.) The most satisfactory way of commissioning officers in order to give them the necessary status and authority.
- (4.) The determining of the authority with whom shall rest the proposals for the interchanges.

(1.) In regard to the first point—

This is mainly a matter of education. Some years must necessarily elapse before the forces of the Over-sea Dominions can count on having in their ranks a number of officers whose General Staff training will enable them to interchange on terms of professional equality with those of the Home Regular Army.

This disparity in numbers will be less apparent among officers of the junior ranks in proportion to the number of officers who are selected to go through the Camberley and Quetta Staff Colleges—though the fact must be borne in mind that, at both of these Colleges, the accommodation is limited—but in the senior ranks it would appear that, with some exceptions, the system of *interchange* must, for some considerable time, give place to a system of *loan*.

It might even be possible to shorten this time, in fact, to bridge over this period, as regards senior officers, by sending to the Over-sea Dominions selected officers from home for a limited period to help officers in General Staff methods when the local sections of the Imperial General Staff are first formed.

Until, however, some progress has been made in applying the same system of General Staff organization throughout the Empire, so that it can be reasonably assured that General Staff duties will be performed on the same principles,—subject to such modifications in detail as local conditions may dictate—a regular interchange of officers of senior rank seems hardly practicable.

(2.) The second point is one of considerable difficulty.

If the "Comparative statement of rates of pay, Home, India and the Colonies" (see Appendix C) be studied, the bearing of the financial aspect on the subject will be at once apparent. In India, for example, the rates of pay and allowances are largely in excess of those allotted to similar appointments at home, the reason being that in order to induce officers to serve in that country there needed to be not only pecuniary advantages, but also compensation for the higher cost of living and for climatic disadvantages.

The rates of pay in the Over-sea Dominions have been framed, no doubt, in accordance with local conditions and requirements.

It may be difficult to assimilate the rates of pay for General Staff appointments throughout the Empire, but at an informal conference held by the Chief of the General Staff in London on 30th April, 1907, at which, however, the only representative from the Over-sea Dominions was Sir Frederick Borden, it was agreed that, "As regards the pay of officers exchanged, it was desirable that for the same grades of appointment there should be a universal scale of pay, any difference to meet local conditions being made up by local rates and allowances."

In Major-General Hoad's memorandum it is recommended that, in Australia, there should be three grades of General Staff Officers, paid as in England. The Chief of the General Staff made the following comment on this proposal: "Similarity of grading would facilitate matters, but a universal rate of pay would not work with local conditions"; and Sir W. Nicholson drew attention to the guiding principle that "Officers sent to serve far from their homes must be adequately paid."

Thus, while we must be prepared to assess the value of appointments and fix a rate based upon responsibility and local conditions, we must not neglect to appraise at their true value the additional allowances which should be apportioned to those appointments when it is desired to fill them by officers from abroad.

This question of allowances applies equally to an officer going out from home to an Over-sea Dominion, and to an officer from an Over-sea Dominion coming to England.

It cannot be expected that an officer whose qualifications lead him to hope that home appointments at 800*l.* per annum are open to him will willingly serve abroad at a smaller, or even equal, emolument, taking into consideration the necessary initial outlay and the unfamiliar conditions of living.

There must, in fact, be some inducement to offer, or the services of officers of the right type may not be found available when needed.

(3.) In regard to the third point, it is submitted for the consideration of the Conference that the issue of a temporary commission to the officers concerned will meet the case. For example, an officer of the Australian Military Forces on duty in England would receive a temporary commission in the Home Regular Forces; similarly an officer belonging to the latter would, while on duty in the Commonwealth, receive a temporary commission in the Australian Forces.

This arrangement, which appears to be simple and safe, has been found to work satisfactorily in the past, and is considered to be a sound arrangement to continue in the future.

(4.) The final point in connection with the question of interchange of officers is to decide with whom the initiative in the matter should rest.

It might perhaps be contended that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff would be the proper person to recommend and order the moves, but this procedure, if followed, would affect the principle of the full local control which, throughout the Imperial General Staff Memorandum, is so rightly insisted upon. It would seem best, therefore, to arrange that the initiative in regard to making proposals for the interchange of officers should

be vested in the Governments of the Over-sea Dominions, and provision made for notification to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff through the Governments concerned of each proposed exchange.

(NOTE.—In this connection it must be recollected that though the financial year ends on the same date in Canada as in England, viz., 31st March, the dates in Australia and New Zealand are, respectively, 30th June and 31st December.)

6. It is laid down in the Imperial General Staff Memorandum that "While the Chiefs of the local sections of the Imperial General Staff keep in close communication with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, they cannot receive orders from him." Thus, at the outset, is established the principle of the full control of the local Chief by his own Government. There are, however, certain matters of routine, and questions of a purely ephemeral nature, regarding which the several Ministers of Defence may be disposed to authorize direct communication being established between sections, and between the central body and sections, of the Imperial General Staff.

7. In order to assist in the development of the Imperial General Staff, the views of the Governments of the Over-sea Dominions are invited on the following points:—

- 1st. In what manner is it proposed to arrange for the preliminary and higher education of officers of the local forces?
- 2nd. Are the services of any qualified General Staff Officers of the Home Regular Army required by any of the Dominions? If so, what number of officers would be required, when, what would be their duties, and what emoluments would be offered? What should be their grading?
- 3rd. Do the views advanced on the subject of the interchange of General Staff Officers meet with general concurrence?
- 4th. Is the principle of direct communication to the limited extent indicated in paragraph 6 generally acceptable?

Table showing the Present State of the Organizations for Imperial Defence in the United Kingdom, India, and the Larger Self-governing Dominions, and showing the Fields of Action for which they are available.

APPENDIX A.

TABLE showing the Present State of the Organizations
for Imperial Defence in the United Kingdom,
India, and the Larger Self-governing Dominions,
and showing the Fields of Action for which they
are available.

Field of Action	Organization	Present State of Organization	Fields of Action for which they are available
Imperial Defence	Imperial Conference	Established in 1921, with representatives of the United Kingdom, India, and the larger self-governing dominions.	Imperial Defence
	Imperial War Conference	Established in 1921, with representatives of the United Kingdom, India, and the larger self-governing dominions.	Imperial Defence
United Kingdom	War Office	Responsible for the land forces of the United Kingdom.	United Kingdom
	Navy Office	Responsible for the naval forces of the United Kingdom.	United Kingdom
India	Indian War Office	Responsible for the land forces of India.	India
	Indian Navy Office	Responsible for the naval forces of India.	India
Larger Self-governing Dominions	Commonwealth War Office	Responsible for the land forces of the larger self-governing dominions.	Larger Self-governing Dominions
	Commonwealth Navy Office	Responsible for the naval forces of the larger self-governing dominions.	Larger Self-governing Dominions

**PRESENT STATE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS FOR IMPERIAL DEFENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, INDIA, AND THE LARGER SELF-GOVERNING DOMINIONS,
SHOWING THE FIELDS OF ACTION FOR WHICH THEY ARE AVAILABLE.**

A. Part of the Empire.	B. Organization of the military forces available for Local Defence (but with no obligation to cross the seas).	C. Organization of the military forces under statutory obligation to assist any threatened portion of the Empire.	D. Terms of service of troops under Column B.
UNITED KINGDOM	<p align="center"><i>Territorial Force.</i></p> <p>14 Divisions of all arms and with administrative services similar in composition to the Regular Divisions.</p> <p>14 mounted brigades of Yeomanry; Horse Artillery; and administrative services similar to the Regular mounted brigades.</p> <p>Army Troops consisting of— 23½ Infantry battalions. 2 Infantry battalions for Training Corps for Territorial officers. 10 Cyclist battalions. 1 Balloon company. 5 Wireless Telegraph companies. 5 Cable Telegraph companies. 5 Air Line Telegraph companies. 1 Railway battalion. 23 General hospitals. 2 Sanitary companies</p> <p>Special Troops for Defended Ports, consisting of— 95 Garrison Artillery companies. 1 Garrison Artillery detachment. 6 Heavy batteries. 24 R.E. Works companies. 21 Electric Lights companies</p>	<p align="center"><i>The Expeditionary Force.</i></p> <p>6 Divisions, each consisting of— 3 Infantry brigades (of 4 battalions). 3 Field Artillery brigades (of 3 batteries and Ammunition Column). 1 Field Artillery (Howitzer) brigade (of 3 batteries and Ammunition Column). 1 Heavy battery and Ammunition Column. 1 Divisional Ammunition Column. 2 Field companies. 1 Divisional Telegraph company. 2 Mounted Infantry companies. 1 Divisional Supply Column. 1 Divisional Supply Park. 3 Field ambulances.</p> <p>1 Cavalry Division consisting of— 4 Cavalry brigades (of 3 Cavalry regiments). 2 Horse Artillery brigades (of 2 batteries and Ammunition Column). 4 Field troops. 1 Wireless Telegraph company. 1 Cavalry Divisional Supply column. 4 Cavalry field ambulances.</p> <p>Army Troops, consisting of— 2 Mounted Brigades, each of— 3 Cavalry regiments and Mounted Infantry battalions. 1 Horse Artillery battery and Mounted Brigade Ammunition Column. 1 Mounted Brigade Supply Column. 1 Cavalry field ambulance 2 Yeomanry squadrons. 2 Cable Telegraph companies.</p>	<p>The Territorial Force is liable to serve in any part of the United Kingdom, but no part shall be ordered out of the United Kingdom: provided that His Majesty may accept a voluntary offer from any body of the Force to serve abroad.</p>

2 Air Line Telegraph companies.
3 Balloon companies.
2 Bridging trains.
1 Infantry battalion.
1 Army Troops Supply Column.
2 Field ambulances.

Troops for a Line of Communication, consisting of—
Head-quarters of base; Advanced base; Railhead; Posts; Rest camps and base depôts; and of—
5 Infantry battalions.
1 Base record office.
1 Works company.
2 Telegraph companies on Lines of Communication.
2 Railway control establishments.
2 Railway companies.
1 Central Railway establishment.
2 Railway districts.
12 General hospitals.
12 Stationary hospitals.
6 Clearing hospitals.
6 Ambulance trains.
6 Hospital ships.
3 Advanced depôts of medical stores.
3 Base depôts of medical stores.
2 Sanitary sections.
11 Sanitary squads.
40 Depôt units of supply.
8 Bakery Sections.
12 Auxiliary Transport companies (each of 50 wagons).
6 Auxiliary Transport companies (each of 100 wagons).
4 Transport Depôts.
2 Advanced remount depôts.
1 Base remount depôt.
6 Veterinary sections.
1 Base depôt of veterinary stores.
21 Ordnance depôt units.
3 Base accounts units.
1 Base post office.
4 Advanced base post offices.
7 Stationary post offices.
1 Printing and lithographic section with general head-quarters, and 1 with head-quarters of the Inspector-General of Communications.

A. Part of the Empire.	B. Organization of the military forces available for Local Defence (but with no obligation to cross the seas).*	C. Organization of the military forces under statutory obligation to assist any threatened portion of the Empire.†	D. Terms of service of troops under Column B
MEDITERRANEAN	A Division of all arms similar in general composition to those of the expeditionary force and a Cavalry Brigade of Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and administrative services. <i>The Field Army.‡</i> 9 Field Divisions of all arms and administrative services similar in general composition to the Home Divisions. 8 Cavalry Brigades, each comprising 3 Cavalry regiments, 1 Horse Artillery battery, and administrative services, similar to the Home mounted brigades.
INDIA	India is divided into 9 divisional and 3 independent brigade areas, each containing, in addition to the troops required to form the Division or brigade of the Field Army, the troops required for internal defence on the formation of the Field Army. Burma forms a separate divisional area, and Aden a separate brigade area. The following units are allotted to the internal defence of the above areas:— 1 British Cavalry regiment. 16 Native Cavalry Regiments. 2 Horse Artillery batteries. 9 Field Artillery batteries. 6 Native Mountain batteries. 13 Companies of Garrison Artillery. 19 British Infantry battalions. 53 Native Infantry battalions. 1 Company of Sappers and Miners. In addition to the above there are— 22 Battalions of Native Military Police. 21 Corps of Border Military Police, Militia and Levies, and the following Volunteer corps:— 2 Naval corps. 7 Light Horse corps. 7 Artillery corps. 7 Engineer corps. 16 Mounted Rifle corps. 50 Rifle corps.		

NOTE.—There are also the following Imperial Service Troops available for the Indian Field Army, but not under obligation to cross the seas:—

- 4 Cavalry brigades (42 squadrons in all),
- 1 Camel corps,
- 7 Infantry battalions,
- 3 Companies of Sappers and Miners,

and the following, furnished by Kashmir for the defence of that country:—

- 1 Squadron, Cavalry.
- 2 Mountain batteries.
- 3 Infantry battalions.

- CANADA (1.) *Active Militia* (peace 50,000, war 100,000) (permanent forces and corps on a Militia basis), from which the following brigades are organized:—
- 3 brigades of Cavalry§—
(2 brigades of 4 regiments and 1 brigade of 3 regiments.)
 - 10 brigades of Field Artillery||—
(2 brigades have 3 batteries and an ammunition column. Remainder 2 batteries and an ammunition column.)
 - 20 brigades of Infantry¶
(Of 3 to 5 regiments.)

No higher organization in peace than the Brigade, but in war these brigades would be grouped into Divisions and given their share of administrative service. A system of registration of transport is in existence.

Liable for active service anywhere in Canada or beyond Canada for the defence thereof.

* Except in the case of India.

† In the case of India, the whole of the Field Army would not be available to assist any other threatened part of the Empire.

‡ The following units are wanting to complete—3 British Infantry battalions, 14 Native Cavalry regiments, 4 Native mountain batteries.

§ There are in all 25 Cavalry regiments and 4 independent squadrons (in all 101 squadrons) of which—

15 regiments have 4 squadrons.	
5 " " 5 "	
2 " " 3 "	
3 " " 2 "	

|| In all 22 brigaded and 3 independent batteries.

¶ In all 91 regiments and 6 independent companies (710 companies).

A. Part of the Empire.	B. Organization of the military forces available for Local Defence, but with no obligation to cross the seas.	C. Organization of the military forces under statutory obligation to assist any threatened portion of the Empire.	D. Terms of service of troops under Column B.
Canada (continued).	(2.) <i>Reserve Militia</i> consisting of the whole male population of British subjects between 18 and 60 (about 1,000,000), but not existing at present in any organized form.		
SOUTH AFRICA	Regular garrison of Imperial troops, part of which are included in the Division and Cavalry Brigade for service in the Mediterranean (<i>vide</i> page 60).
CAPE COLONY	(1.) <i>Permanent Forces</i> — Cape Mounted Riflemen—1 Field battery, 5 squadrons. Establishment, 580. (2.) <i>Volunteers</i> — Royal Naval Volunteers, 3 companies. Field and Garrison Artillery, 1 battery and 6 companies. Light Horse, 1 regiment (4 squadrons). Mounted Infantry, 5 companies. Infantry, 12 corps (39 companies). Medical Corps, 2 companies. Establishment, 4,596. (3.) <i>Police</i> — Cape Mounted Police. Establishment, 708. <i>No higher organization than the regiment exists.</i>	Liable to serve wherever the interests of the Colony may require, within the Colony or beyond its borders.
NATAL	(1.) <i>Permanent Staff</i> . Establishment, 39. (2.) <i>Active Militia</i> — Naval Corps, 2 companies. Field Artillery, 3 batteries. Carbineers, 8 squadrons. Mounted Rifles, 5 regiments (17 squadrons). Guides and Scouts, 3 troops. Infantry, 2 regiments (12 companies). Corps and Departments. Establishment, 2,616.	The Militia are liable to serve within Natal, or adjacent thereto, for its defence—except the Militia Third Reserve, who are only liable to serve within their respective Militia districts.

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	(3.) <i>Militia First Reserve</i> , consisting of able-bodied unmarried white men between 18 and 30, not serving in the Active Militia. Strength about 5,700. (4.) and (5.) <i>Militia Second and Third Reserves</i> , consisting of all married white men between 18 and 30, and all white men between 30 and 50, respectively, who do not belong to the Active Militia. Strength about 10,600. (6.) <i>Police</i> — Armed Police.—Establishment, 1,020. <i>No higher organization than the regiment exists.</i>		
ORANGE RIVER COLONY ..	No local forces <i>Orange River Colony Police</i> — Establishment, 407	The Orange River Colony Police, in case of war or emergency, may be employed for assisting in the defence of the Colony, either within or without its borders.
TRANSVAAL	(1.) <i>Permanent Staff</i> — Establishment, 49. (2.) <i>Volunteers</i> — Horse Artillery, 2 batteries. Light Horse, 1 regiment (6 squadrons). Mounted Rifles, 2 regiments (15 squadrons). Engineers, 8 companies. Infantry, 2 regiments (13 companies). Cycle Corps, 1 corps (5 companies). Medical Corps, 3 companies. Establishment, 3,621. (3.) <i>Reserves</i> — Strength, 471. (4.) <i>Police</i> — Transvaal Police.—Establishment, 2,158. <i>No higher organization than the regiment exists.</i>	Volunteers are liable to serve in any part of South Africa where the interests of the Transvaal may require. The Transvaal Police, in case of war or emergency, may be employed for assisting in the defence of the Transvaal, either within or without its borders.

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A. Part of the Empire.	B. Organization of the military forces available for Local Defence, but with no obligation to cross the seas.	C. Organization of the military forces under statutory obligation to assist any threatened portion of the Empire.	D. Terms of service of troops under Column B
AUSTRALIA	<p>(1.) <i>Permanent Forces</i>— Establishment, 1,518. Staff, Artillery, Engineers, Army Service Corps and Army Medical Corps.</p> <p>(2.) <i>Citizen Forces</i>—</p> <p>(i.) Militia of all arms.—Peace establishment, 17,837; war establishment, 35,000.</p> <p>(ii.) Volunteers, Infantry and a small army nursing service.—Peace establishment, 5,821; war establishment, 11,700.</p> <p>(iii.) Reserve Forces (45,293)—</p> <p>(a.) Members of rifle clubs who undertake to serve.</p> <p>(b.) Persons who having served in the Military Forces enrol in the Reserve.*</p> <p>The Militia and Volunteers in each district are organized into—</p> <p>(1.) GARRISON TROOPS. (2.) A FIELD FORCE.</p> <p>The FIELD FORCE is organized in—</p> <p>(i.) 5 <i>Light Horse Brigades</i> (each approximating to a British Mounted Brigade) and consisting of—</p> <p>3 Light Horse Regiments. 1 Artillery Battery and Ammunition Column (Light Horse). 1 Field Troop Engineers. 1 Company Signallers. Light Horse Brigade Transport and Supply Column. Light Horse Field Ambulance</p>	Members of the military forces cannot be required to serve beyond the limits of the Commonwealth, or beyond those of any territory under the Commonwealth, unless they agree to do so

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	<p>(ii.) 2 <i>Infantry Brigades</i>, each comprising—</p> <p>Head-quarters. One squadron Light Horse. 2 Field Artillery Batteries. 1 Position Battery. 1 Infantry Brigade Ammunition Column. 4 Infantry Regiments. 1 Field Company Engineers. 1 Company Signallers. 1 Infantry Brigade Transport and Supply Column. 1 Field Ambulance.</p> <p>(iii.) 4 <i>Mixed Brigades</i>,† consisting of units of all arms, but which differ slightly in composition from normal Light Horse or Infantry brigades.</p> <p>No higher organizations exist. An Infantry brigade is approximately one-third of a British Division.</p>		
NEW ZEALAND ..	<p>(1.) <i>Permanent Force</i>.—Establishment, 325. Small permanent staff, Artillery, including Field Artillery Section and Electric Light Sections.</p> <p>(2.) <i>Militia Force</i>— This force consists of all males between 17 and 55, but the compulsory clause is not enforced, so the force does not exist.</p> <p>(3.) <i>Volunteer Force</i>.—Establishment, 17,123. All arms.</p> <p>(4.) <i>Reserve Corps</i>.—Establishment, 378. Six corps exist.</p>	The permanent force is liable for service throughout the Dominion, or beyond the limits thereof, for resisting the common enemy. Other branches are not liable for service outside the limits of the Dominion.

* There are now some 400 officers in the Reserve of Officers.

† Formed in districts where available numbers are insufficient for the normal Light Horse or Infantry brigade

A. Part of the Empire.	B. Organization of the military forces available for Local Defence (but with no obligation to cross the seas).	C. Organization of the military forces under statutory obligation to assist any threatened portion of the Empire.	D Terms of service of troops under Column B
New Zealand (<i>continued</i>)	<p>(5.) <i>Defence Rifle Clubs</i>—Establishment, 3,682.</p> <p>The units in each of the five military districts are allotted to—</p> <p>(1.) Garrison Troops, (2.) A mobile force, (3.) Reserves,</p> <p>but, owing to the scattered nature of the forces, combined training can rarely be carried out, and no higher organization than the regiment exists.</p>		

APPENDIX B.

SUMMARY OF THE REPLIES TO THE PROPOSALS FOR AN IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

A.—CANADA.

Accepts principles enunciated in Imperial General Staff paper, and considers that those principles can General best be applied "by an extension of the functions of Royal Military College, Kingston, and by including among its instructing staff specially selected officers from the educational branch of the Imperial General Staff." Their efforts are to be directed towards raising the standard of professional proficiency and promoting uniformity of thought among the officers of the Dominion forces who, in due course, will compose the local section of the Imperial General Staff.

(1.) To send Canadian candidates for Imperial Staff College to Royal Military College, Kingston, for Proposals. 6 months before the entrance examination. (Not to compete unless fully recommended by Commandant.)

(2.) New Commandant to be a General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, belonging to the Home regular army with previous instructional experience.

(3.) To obtain the services of two General Staff Officers, 2nd Grade, from the Home regular army. Their duties—to prepare Imperial Staff College candidates, assist education generally at Kingston, attend staff rides, regimental tours, and war games; lecture at Universities where military instruction is provided. serve on General Staff at annual camps, and take part in the training of the Permanent Force at the central camp, prepare schemes, set papers and act as examiners.

(4.) To organize Canadian General Staff in such a manner as to—

(a.) Provide Militia Council with materials with which to formulate a general policy in military matters.

(b.) To secure uniformity and continuity in the execution of that policy.

(c.) To advance the formation of an Imperial General Staff.

(5.) To organize Canadian General Staff in three Divisions—

(a.) General Staff at Militia Head-quarters to perform duties assigned by Order in Council dated 7th December, 1904.

(b.) General Staff in Commands and Districts to perform similar duties under the officers on whose staff they are serving.

(c.) General Staff Officers at Royal Military College (instructional duties).

No officer from the Canadian General Staff to be eligible for Imperial General Staff unless p.s.c. or qualified by service in the field.

(6.) Canadian Section of Imperial General Staff to consist for the present of—

Chief of Canadian General Staff.

2 Directors.

Commandant, Royal Military College.

The necessity of a Staff College is admitted, but the establishment of one is not within the range of Staff practical politics for some time to come. Meanwhile Canada is prepared to bear her proportion of any College increased expense at Camberley if officers may continue to go there.

B.—AUSTRALIA.

Accepts principles enunciated in Imperial General Staff paper. Major-General Hoad, in a memorandum, dated 3rd February, 1909, sets forth certain proposals with regard to the formation of a section of the Imperial General Staff in Australia. These proposals have not yet received the sanction of the Commonwealth Government. They are as follows:—

(1.) The Commonwealth Section of Imperial General Staff to comprise—

(a.) Headquarters Section.

(b.) The General Staff in Districts.

The Headquarters Section to consist of two Directorates—

(i.) Defence Organization Directorate.

(ii.) Military Training Directorate.

The proposed establishment is given in I.

Their duties are analogous to our Director of Military Operations, Director of Staff Duties, and Director of Military Training.

The duties of the General Staff in Districts correspond as far as possible to those of the two Directors at Head-quarters.

The proposed establishment is given in II.

(2.) Only specially qualified officers, including those of the Citizen Forces, to be appointed to the Commonwealth Section Imperial General Staff in Districts.

(3.) No appointments to Imperial General Staff to be made other than provisionally, except—

Chief of Commonwealth Section Imperial General Staff, 2 Directors.

(4.) When provisional appointments are confirmed, General Staff officers to be sent to England for further experience, either for attachment or in exchange for p.s.c. officers.

(5.) A specially qualified officer always to be employed on, or attached to, Central Staff in London.

(6.) Appointments to Commonwealth Section Imperial General Staff to be for 4 years.

Proposals.

(7.) To be three grades of General Staff officers, paid as at present in the War Office in England, viz. :—

	£
1st Grade	800 per annum.
2nd "	650 " "
3rd "	500 " "

(8.) A Conference to be held at the War Office after the Scheme has been under trial a reasonable time, and, subsequently, once in every 3 years under the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

(9.) To establish a Permanent School of Military Instruction, with a staff of highly qualified officers, under the supervision of the Chief of the Commonwealth Section of the Imperial General Staff, its object being to train officers for the Imperial General Staff, and to hold Courses of Instruction periodically for the education of officers of the Permanent and Citizen Forces in the accepted principles of modern training.

The detailed proposals for this school are contained in III.

SUGGESTED ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH SECTION IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

I.—Department of the Chief of Commonwealth Section Headquarters.

Branch.	1st Grade.	2nd Grade.*	3rd Grade.*
Director of Defence Organization	1		
Director of Military Training	1		
Total at Headquarters.. .. .	2		

* For subsequent consideration.

II.—In Military Districts.

District.	2nd Grade.	3rd Grade.	Remarks.
New South Wales			2 Imperial General Staff officers in each of these districts, of whom one should be a member of the Citizen Forces.
Victoria			
Queensland			
South Australia			
West Australia			2 Imperial General Staff officers, their grades to be determined later.
Tasmania			
Total in Military Districts	12		

III.

PROPOSALS FOR INSTITUTION OF A SCHOOL OF MILITARY INSTRUCTION.

Objects	1. Objects in view—
	(a.) To prepare candidates for the Staff College: to fill temporary General Staff appointments at Headquarters and in Districts, until Staff College graduates are available; to enable officers to qualify for higher appointments on the Administrative and Instructional Staff.
	(b.) To give officers, upon first appointment to all branches of the Permanent Forces, a uniform grounding in the rudiments of their profession.
	(c.) To provide courses of instruction at the School and in Districts for officers of the Permanent and Citizen Forces, in order to disseminate throughout the forces of the Commonwealth, approved principles as regards organization and training, and the best method of applying these principles to local conditions.
Instructional Staff.	2. School to be supervised by Chief of Commonwealth Imperial General Staff— Commandant, 1st Grade Imperial General Staff } 2 Instructors, 2nd Grade Imperial General Staff } p.s.c. officers obtained from home in the first case, assisted by temporary qualified officers.
Nature of Instruction.	3. A.—A senior class for more advanced students. B.—A junior class for officers on first appointment. C.—Courses to be held at, and away from, the school at various military centres.
Duration of Courses.	4. From 6 months to 1 year.
Numbers to be accommodated in first instance.	5. For A Course 10 officers (two to be selected for Staff College). For B Course 10 For C Course 10 at the School. Total 30 officers.

It would therefore appear, if a suitable building could be hired as a temporary measure, that the ultimate erection and location of the school might be left for future consideration.

COMMENTS BY THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF ON MAJOR-GENERAL HOAD'S PROPOSALS.

1. Principles in full accord with War Office Memorandum.
2. Suggests postponing for the present the appointment of General Staff Officers in Districts.
3. Draws attention to General and Administrative staffs working in unison.
4. Major-General Hoad's proposals as to the constitution and duties of Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff, in accord with War Office Memorandum.
5. Questions whether officers of Citizen Forces would be sufficiently qualified to perform duties of General Staff Officers in Districts. Points out necessity of highly-trained officers.
6. Interchange of officers and necessity of an Australian Officer being at Army Headquarters approved.
7. Similarity of grading throughout the Empire would facilitate matters, but universal rate of pay would not work in with local conditions. Draws attention to guiding principle "Officers sent to serve far from their homes must be adequately paid."
8. Notes that Major-General Hoad's proposals recognize that adequate military education essential, and offers to give any assistance or advice possible in the formation of a School of Military Instruction in Australia.

C.—NEW ZEALAND.

Accepts principles enunciated in Imperial General Staff paper. No proposals as yet received.

D.—SOUTH AFRICA.

Has not yet accepted principles enunciated in Imperial General Staff paper, owing to Transvaal, Cape Colony, Natal, and Orange River Colony all being in agreement that, owing to the possible unification of South Africa, the present would be an inopportune time for the several Colonies to commit themselves to any engagement.

APPENDIX C.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF RATES OF PAY. HOME, INDIA AND COLONIES.

Home.	India.	Canada.	Australia.	New Zealand.	Cape Colony.	Natal.
HEAD-QUARTERS.						
C.G.S. ..	Chief of Staff ..	C.G.S. ..	C.G.S. ..	Chief of Staff.. 400**
Director ..	Officer i/c M.O. ..	Director ..	Director (T. and O.)
G.S.O., 1st Grade ..	T. and S.D. ..	Assistant-Director
G.S.O., 2nd " ..	A.A.G.
G.S.O., 3rd " ..	D.A.A.G. { Lieut.-Colonel
	Staff { Major
	Captain
COMMANDS.						
Brigadier-General, G.S. 1,000	D.A.G. ..	Chief Staff Officer ..	Officer i/c T. and O. 400 to 600
G.S.O., 1st Grade
G.S.O., 2nd " ..	{ Lieut.-Colonel
Commndt., Staff College. 1,200*	Major ..	Commndt., R.M. College.. 720†	Prof. of Military Science, 800 Sydney University.
G.S.O., 1st Grade " ..	Professor ..	Professor
G.S.O., 2nd "
REGIMENTAL PAY.						
Lieutenant-Colonel ..	These officers generally ..	£ 380 } ††	£ 500 to 600	£ 325 to 400	£ 650	£ 550¶
Major ..	draw some staff or ..	304	425 to 500	300 to 350	700	456¶
Captain ..	command pay, in addi- ..	228	325 to 400	225 to 290	365	365¶
Lieutenant ..	tion. 180	171	200 to 300	175 to 215	273 to 319	255 to 273¶

* Plus 200L Table Allowance.

† Plus quarters, fuel and light, estimated at 160L a-year.

‡ The mean between the rates of regimental pay only which are drawn in the Cavalry and Infantry; command pay for Lieutenant-Colonels and allowances are not included.

§ Draws also : Travelling Allowance, 300L; Command Allowance, 50L. Total, 350L.

¶ Plus lodgings, command pay (for Lieutenant-Colonel and Major), fuel and light, and rations.

** According to latest returns.

|| Plus 50L if not in quarters.

ADDITIONAL APPENDICES

TO PART III.

OF

"PROPOSALS FOR SO ORGANIZING THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE
EMPIRE AS TO ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVE CO-OPERATION IN THE
EVENT OF WAR."

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APPENDIX D.

PROPOSALS REGARDING THE FURTHER TRAINING OF OFFICERS OF THE FORCES OF THE OVER-SEA DOMINIONS AFTER LEAVING THE STAFF COLLEGE.

1. On page 10* of the Imperial General Staff paper the following propositions are put forward, viz. :—

"After graduating at a staff college, an officer should return to regimental duty with troops for a time, in order to refresh his knowledge of their wants and feelings in the light of his wider experience. This period should, if possible, be for at least 1 year's duration."

"After this, officers selected as likely to be suitable for General Staff work should undergo, under the eye of the Chief of the local section of the General Staff, a probationary course of practical staff training with troops and at headquarters, during which they would be fully reported on, with regard to their fitness for the Imperial General Staff. Under present conditions this course of staff training should be carried on under the supervision of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, or in India under that of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in that country."

2. It is a question for consideration whether, in the case of officers belonging to the forces of the Over-sea Dominions, the probationary period alluded to above should not precede the return of the officer to regimental duty in his own Dominion.

It has been acknowledged that, for some time to come, the higher training necessary to fit an officer for work on the General Staff must, in the case of officers from the Over-sea Dominions, be carried out at the Camberley or Quetta Staff Colleges, i.e., until the Dominions establish Staff Colleges of their own.

3. It is suggested, therefore, that after the 2-years' course at the Staff College opportunity might well be taken for the attachment of these officers for 1 year to the different Directorates of the General Staff at Army Headquarters in England or India as the case may be, and also for a period to the staff in commands, where they could be initiated into the practical working of General Staff methods with troops.

This probationary period might be arranged as follows :—

AT HEADQUARTERS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

In the Military Operations Directorate—

Two months.

In the Staff Duties Directorate—

Two months.

In the Military Training Directorate—

Four months (to include attachment to the staff in a command, and attendance at manoeuvres and training, under arrangements to be made by the Director of Military Training and under the supervision of the Brigadier-General of the General Staff of the command).

4. As, moreover, it is very necessary that a prospective General Staff Officer should be given the opportunity of studying the administrative work of the Army, the officers, allowing 1 month for leave, should be attached for the remaining 3 months to the Adjutant-General's and Quarter-Master-General's branches of the Staff at Army Headquarters.

5. After this probationary period, which it is submitted will greatly enhance the value of the Staff College training, the officers should return to their respective Dominions and revert to regimental duty with troops, as indicated in the extract from the Imperial General Staff paper quoted in paragraph 1 of these proposals.

APPENDIX E.

PROPOSALS REGARDING THE PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN ARRANGING THE INTERCHANGE OF STAFF OFFICERS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

On page 11* of the Imperial General Staff paper a question of the temporary interchange between officers for duty in different parts of the Empire is discussed. In the "Proposals for so organizing the military forces of the Empire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event of war," Part 3, page 14†, the subject is further considered.

It remains to suggest a means by which these interchanges can be most conveniently arranged. It is suggested the following procedure will meet the case, viz. :—

In the first instance, the Chief of the Local Headquarters Section concerned, under the authority of his Government, should communicate with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the War Office informing him of the needs of the Dominion Forces in regard to the officer required for interchange, the rates of pay, duties of the appointment, and when and where required. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff will then send the names of suitable officers, who are available, to the Chief of the Local Headquarters Section. The latter must then arrange the matter with his Minister, and a formal application for the services of the officer selected by the Minister should then go forward from the Government of the Dominion to the Colonial Office.

In the same manner, when the Chief of the Imperial General Staff is desirous of obtaining the services of an officer of the local forces for employment in a General Staff appointment in the Home Regular Army, he should communicate with the Chief of the Local Headquarters Section concerned, who, with the concurrence of his Minister, would submit the names of suitable officers who are available to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The latter would then apply, through the Colonial Office, for the services of the selected officer to the Government of the Dominion concerned.

As pointed out, however, in paragraph 5 (1) of Part III. of the "Proposals for so organizing the military forces of the Empire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event of war," equality of interchange cannot be expected until the military education and higher staff training of the officers of the local forces have been assimilated to those of the officers of the Home Regular Army.

A procedure based on similar lines will be applicable when the Government of a Dominion desires to obtain the services of a general staff officer either of the Indian Army, or of another Dominion, in exchange for one of her own officers.

APPENDIX F.

Explanatory Memorandum, with Diagrams, showing
generally the proposed Organization and Distribu-
tion of the Duties of the Imperial General Staff,
and forming an additional Appendix to Part III.
of "Proposals for so Organizing the Military
Forces of the Empire as to ensure their Effective
Co-operation in the event of War."

20
Gen. No.
2857

MEMORANDUM.

1. Table I. shows the organization of the General Staff at Imperial Headquarters in Peace.

All questions, which affect the war organization, training, equipment and fighting efficiency of the army in general, are initiated by, or submitted to, the Department of the Chief of the General Staff.

If these questions involve principles, or are otherwise of importance, the views of the three Directors are obtained by means of personal interviews, conferences, and minutes, and these, whether unanimous or not, are referred to the Chief of the General Staff for his decision and approval. The decision thus reached represents the official view of the General Staff, and serves as a foundation on which the other Departments in the War Office base their administrative policy.

2. Table II. shows the distribution of Staff Duties in War at General Headquarters of the forces in the field. It should be noted that Field Service Regulations, Part II., lay down that the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the field is to be exercised through his Chief of the General Staff, who is his responsible adviser on everything that affects military operations. In the case of a smaller formation this adviser is the senior officer of the General Staff.

Although charged with the general co-ordination of staff work at General Headquarters, the Chief of the General Staff is not concerned with the detailed working of the Adjutant-General's and Quarter-Master-General's branches of the Staff.

3. Table III. shows the organization of the General Staff for the Headquarters of an Army or Group of Divisions.

4. Table IV. shows graphically how the system of command in the field is built up, and the manner in which responsibility is decentralized amongst subordinate commanders.

5. Table V. has been drawn up with a view to showing in tabular form what duties would fall to local headquarter sections of the Imperial General Staff under the scheme which was foreshadowed in the paper submitting the proposals for the formation of an Imperial General Staff to the self-governing Dominions.

It has been generally agreed that questions affecting the Empire as a whole should be decided by the Central Body at Imperial Headquarters. The functions which have therefore been allotted to the Local Sections are confined to the study of local needs and local possibilities, and to the supervision of the application of general principles under local conditions.

TABLE I

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS.

DEPARTMENT OF CHIEF OF IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

1. Principles and policy connected with—

- (a.) Organization of the military forces of the Empire for the purposes of Imperial Defence.
- (b.) The uses to which the above should be put in war.
- (c.) The training of the Imperial Army.
- (d.) Preparation and study of plans for the military defence of the Empire.

2. War organization and Imperial war establishments.

3. Education of officers, including the formation of military opinion on questions of policy.
4. Selection and administration of the Imperial General Staff.
5. Publication of all works dealing with war for the guidance of the Imperial Army.
6. Correspondence with local Headquarter Sections of the Imperial General Staff through local Ministers of Defence on matters connected with the above.

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

1. Collection of information about the Empire.
2. Strategic distribution of the Regular Army.
3. Preparation of schemes of offence for the Imperial Army under various conditions.
4. Study of schemes of Imperial defence other than in the United Kingdom in consultation with local Headquarter Sections.
5. Intelligence and secret service.
6. Mapping and Topographical Section.

DIRECTOR OF STAFF DUTIES.

1. Study and submission of proposals dealing with—
 - (a.) Strategic and tactical principles of employment of all arms in war.
 - (b.) Organization of an army for war as regards commands, staff, fighting units, services and departments.
 - (c.) The most suitable weapons and equipment to adopt.
2. Embodiment of decisions on above questions in Field Service Regulations.
3. Collection of opinions of the departments interested, and submission to Chief of Imperial General Staff for decision on questions of principle.
4. Organization and training of Imperial General Staff, appointments and attachments thereto. Staff College.
5. Intercommunication Services.


DIRECTOR OF MILITARY TRAINING.

1. Home defence plans and reconnaissance.
2. Instruction and training of forces in United Kingdom
3. Manœuvres.
4. Schools of training and education of officers.
5. Officers Training Corps.

TABLE II.

DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF DUTIES IN WAR.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.



NOTE.—For the efficient performance of staff duties all three branches must work in close co-operation. The power and responsibility of co-ordinating staff work at general headquarters is vested in the Commander-in-Chief; but, as it is not desirable that the Commander-in-Chief should himself be burdened with this duty, he will delegate it to such extent as he may think fit to the Chief of the General Staff, who is his responsible adviser on all matters affecting military operations, through whom he exercises his functions of command, and by whom all orders issued by him will be signed.—Field Service Regulations, Part II., Section 15, paragraph 3.

TABLE III.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF AN ARMY OR GROUP OF DIVISIONS.




TABLE IV.

ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AND CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN WAR.





TABLE V.

LOCAL HEADQUARTER SECTION OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF



NOTE.—In Commands and Districts, the staff to remain as at present constituted. Imperial General Staff Officers to be gradually appointed as they become available. There should be only one General Staff, i.e., the Imperial General Staff; it would be undesirable to create a second form of General Staff which could only be temporary.

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No. 17.

Secret.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE

**DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE,
1909.**

**NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCES
AT THE ADMIRALTY.**

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT,
October, 1909.

NOTES

OF THE

PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE

AT THE

ADMIRALTY

On Monday, 9th August 1909,

BETWEEN

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMIRALTY AND OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINION OF CANADA TO
WORK OUT A SCHEME FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A CANADIAN NAVY.

PRESENT :

The Right Hon. R. K. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty
(*in the Chair*).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir JOHN FISHER, First Lord of the Admiralty.
Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.
Mr. W. GRAHAM-GREENE, C.B., Assistant-Secretary of the Admiralty.
Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee
of Imperial Defence.

Canada :

The Hon. Sir F. W. BORDEN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia and Defence.
The Hon. L. P. BRODEUR, K.C., LL.D., Minister of Marine and Fisheries.
Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O.,
Assistant-Secretary to the Imperial Conference, *Secretary*.

Mr. McKENNA explained that before advice could be given for the establishment of a Canadian Navy, it was necessary for the Admiralty to know approximately what sum of money would be available annually for naval purposes, and what charges had to be met from that sum for essential local services not of a purely naval character.

Mr. BRODEUR stated that the amount had never been discussed by the Government, but the request was a very legitimate one, and he would suggest that two schemes should be prepared, one entailing an expenditure of 400,000*l.*, and the other 600,000*l.* The fisheries protection service now cost 50,000*l.* per annum, and, although it would probably be convenient for this service to be paid out of the same appropriation, the annual cost, 50,000*l.*, should not be regarded as a charge against the sum of 400,000*l.* or 600,000*l.* available for naval purposes, but as

additional to that sum; so that the annual sum available for naval estimates might be assumed to be 450,000*l.* to 650,000*l.*

The other charges against that sum were the cost of the maintenance of the naval dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt, which he estimated would amount to 40,000*l.* per annum (exclusive of the cost of maintaining that part of the dockyards which is allotted to the buoyage service) and the wireless telegraphy service, the cost of which was about 8,000*l.* per annum.

He accordingly requested that the Admiralty might prepare alternative schemes costing 400,000*l.* per annum and 600,000*l.* per annum for the establishment of a Canadian Navy.

He pointed out that there was still some uncertainty in Canada as to the position of the Dominion Government in regard to the dockyards of Halifax and Esquimalt. The Dominion Government had had temporary possession of Halifax dockyard for two years, but no formal transfer had been made and while this state of uncertainty as to their position continued the Canadian Government were unwilling to expend money on buildings or repairs.

Construction of docks will have also to be considered.

Mr. McKENNA explained that before the dockyards could be formally transferred to the Canadian Government the authority of the Imperial Parliament had to be obtained. A Bill had been drafted to enable this to be done, and he hoped that it would be passed by Parliament before the end of this session. In the meanwhile the Canadian Government had been informed that Esquimalt could be transferred to them provisionally in the same way as Halifax Dockyard.

Sir JOHN FISHER stated that from the purely naval and strategic point of view there was little to add to the Admiralty Memorandum which had been laid before the members of the Imperial Conference. The Admiralty, after careful consideration of the question, had arrived at the conclusion that the establishment of fleet units as recommended in that Memorandum was the most advantageous course. And this recommendation expressed not only the views of the present Board of Admiralty, but also the opinion of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, and of the Committee of Imperial Defence who had considered the question.

If funds would not permit of the Canadian Government at once undertaking the formation of a complete fleet unit, he urged that a beginning should be made with a vessel of the "Indomitable" class.

Without the "Indomitable" the smaller vessels of the fleet unit would strategically be of little value. They could not deal unaided with the more powerful foreign commerce destroyers, whereas the "Indomitable" with her great speed and radius of action could either catch up or avoid any vessel afloat, and her gun-power would enable her to deal with any hostile vessels that might be employed in operations against our oversea trade. If the Canadian Government proceeded with the construction of a vessel of the "Indomitable" type, the vessel, when completed, should be stationed on the Pacific coast.

He recommended the employment of the vessel on the Pacific coast, rather than on the Atlantic coast, because the full power of the British fleet could readily be brought to bear in the Western Atlantic in case of need, while the addition of an "Indomitable" to our naval forces in the Pacific would be of very great value.

A further reason for stationing the vessel on the Pacific coast was, that the United States would regard Canadian vessels in these waters as potential support to them against Japan, whereas, if stationed on the Atlantic, such vessels might have the effect of stimulating the United States Government to extend their building programme,—a development which was as little desired by the British Government as by the Canadian Government.

He put these suggestions forward as the advice of the Admiralty, based purely on naval strategical considerations. He was aware that there were other factors in the situation which the Canadian Government could not ignore; and if they were unable to adopt these suggestions, the Admiralty would be prepared to make alternative proposals.

Sir F. BORDEN concurred generally in the recommendations of the Admiralty for the establishment of fleet units, as an ideal to be aimed at, but he considered that for various reasons, it was not practicable for the Dominion Government at once to

proceed with the construction of a vessel of the "Indomitable" class, as the first step towards the creation of a Canadian Navy.

The bulk of the population of Canada was in the Eastern Provinces, and if an "Indomitable" was placed on the Pacific coast as proposed, there would at once be a demand for another "Indomitable" to be built and placed on the Atlantic coast, and if that demand was complied with, it would probably result in rivalry in shipbuilding with the United States, which Sir John Fisher rightly deprecated.

Further, it must be remembered that Canada was only beginning to establish a navy, and that it was desirable to proceed gradually, by gaining experience with vessels of a smaller type in the first instance.

Mr. BRODEUR pointed out that a large section of the population of Canada took no interest in naval developments, and if the Dominion Government tried to go too fast at the beginning, opposition would be aroused which might result in nothing of practical value being done.

The seafaring and fishing population on the Atlantic coast, however, afforded excellent material for a naval force, and, in order that they might be fully utilised, it would be necessary for them to maintain ships on the Atlantic coast.

He desired that a practicable scheme should be worked out that could be laid before the Canadian Parliament next session.

Mr. McKENNA suggested that if for political reasons the suggestion that an "Indomitable" should be laid down in the first instance does not commend itself to the Dominion Government, the Admiralty would be quite ready to modify their proposals, assuming that a permanent naval force were aimed at. If, for example, the construction of the "Indomitable" was for the present held over, the Canadian Government might begin with four small cruisers of the "Bristol" class, one "Boadicea" (as mother-vessel to the destroyer flotilla), six destroyers, and three submarine vessels. This force could, he thought, be provided for about 600,000*l.* per annum; but if not, the cost could be brought within that figure by omitting one of the four vessels of the "Bristol" class. A force of this nature would provide a naval career for all ranks, which was an essential condition in establishing a local navy. He suggested that some of these vessels might be stationed on the Atlantic coast and some on the Pacific coast; the Admiralty would be prepared to give the strategic justification for their distribution.

Mr. BRODEUR pointed out that it was important that the training of personnel should at once be proceeded with, and he inquired if the Admiralty could hand over to the Canadian Government one or two cruisers with instructors and officers for this purpose, the cost to be borne by the Canadian Government. He also inquired whether the Admiralty would be prepared to admit cadets destined for the Canadian Navy to Osborne and Dartmouth. He thought ten cadetships per annum would meet their requirements.

Mr. McKENNA stated the establishments at Osborne and Dartmouth were at present full, but he considered that it was of the highest importance that the officers of the Canadian Navy should have the same standard of training and discipline as the officers of the British Navy. He therefore readily undertook to meet the wishes of the Canadian Government in the matter, although the provision of additional accommodation at Osborne and Dartmouth, which might take a year, would probably be necessary.

As regards the provision of a cruiser and instructors for training purposes, the Admiralty would endeavour to comply with the request of the Canadian Government.

It was decided that the Director of Naval Intelligence and Admiral Kingsmill should work out the details of a scheme for the establishment of a naval force, on the lines suggested, with a permanent personnel of 1,500 to 2,000 men. The resolution of the Canadian House of Parliament of the 29th March 1909, being adopted as the basis on which to work. The Sub-Conference should reassemble in about a week, when the details of the scheme have been worked out.

NOTES
OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE
AT THE
ADMIRALTY
ON
Tuesday, 10th August 1909,
BETWEEN

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMIRALTY AND OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
TO CONSIDER A SCHEME FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF AN AUSTRALIAN NAVY.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. R. K. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty
(*in the Chair*).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir JOHN FISHER, First Lord of the Admiralty.
Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.
Mr. W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Assistant-Secretary of the Admiralty.
Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee
of Imperial Defence.

Australia:

Colonel the Hon. J. F. G. FOXTON, C.M.G., Minister without Portfolio.
Captain W. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O.,
Assistant-Secretary to the Imperial Conference, *Secretary*.

Mr. McKENNA reminded the Australian representatives that Mr. Deakin had put forward a proposal at the end of 1907 for the establishment of a flotilla of destroyers and submarines and depot ships as the nucleus of an Australian Navy. The Admiralty had estimated that the cost of establishing and maintaining such a flotilla would amount to about 346,000*l.* a year.

Since these proposals had been put forward the Government of the Commonwealth had offered to present the Imperial Government a vessel of the "Dreadnought" type and His Majesty's Government had gratefully accepted this generous offer. The cost of a vessel of the "Dreadnought" type was about 2,000,000*l.* The life of such a vessel might be assumed to be 20 years.

Taking interest on the capital cost of 2,000,000*l.* at 3½ per cent. and allowing for a sinking fund, it might be assumed that the annual cost of a "Dreadnought" amounted to 150,000*l.* per annum.

It would thus appear that the sum available for the establishment of an Australian Navy was about 500,000*l.* per annum, *i.e.*, 346,000*l.* the cost of Mr. Deakin's scheme for a destroyer flotilla and 150,000*l.* the annual cost of the "Dreadnought" which the Commonwealth Government had presented to the British Government.

The question for consideration now seemed to be how that sum could best be applied for the purposes of the naval defence of the Empire.

He suggested that the Commonwealth Government should adopt the Admiralty suggestion for the establishment of a fleet unit, as described in their Memorandum laid before the Conference, for service in Australian waters.

The total cost of such a fleet unit would be from 600,000*l.* to 700,000*l.* per annum, and if the Commonwealth Government would devote the funds available for naval purposes, say 500,000*l.*, towards the establishment of such a unit, the Admiralty would undertake to pay annually the difference between this amount and the total estimated amount required for maintaining the fleet unit as agreed upon. It was proposed in connection, on the establishment of the Australian Navy, to hand over to the Commonwealth Government the Dockyard and naval establishments at Sydney, on which the Admiralty had expended many millions of pounds.

The arrangement proposed by the Admiralty would come into force at the termination of the existing naval agreement. The existing agreement would terminate in 1913 and would not in all probability be renewed.

The fleet unit which it was proposed to establish would be more powerful than the squadron of cruisers now in Australian waters.

Sir JOHN FISHER stated that, from the purely naval strategic point of view, there was little to add to the Admiralty memorandum which had been laid before the members of the Imperial Conference. The Admiralty, after careful consideration of the question, had arrived at the conclusion that the establishment of fleet units, as recommended in that Memorandum, which could combine in time of war to form a powerful fleet, which he suggested might be called the Pacific Fleet, was the most advantageous course for the Dominion Governments to pursue. And this recommendation expressed the views not only of the present Board of Admiralty, but also the opinion of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, and of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He attached great importance to the vessel of the "Indomitable" type, as the citadel or base round which the smaller vessels of the unit could operate.

Without the large vessel of the "Indomitable" type, the smaller vessels of the fleet unit would be strategically of little value, for they would not be able to deal unaided with the more powerful hostile commerce-destroyers, whereas the "Indomitable," with her great speed and radius of action, could either catch up or avoid any vessel afloat, and her gun power would enable her to deal with any hostile vessels likely to be employed in operations against our oversea trade.

Colonel FOXTON suggested, if the Commonwealth Government began with the smaller types of vessels, they would have the harbours along the coast of Australia as bases, in which they could seek refuge in time of need.

Sir JOHN FISHER pointed out that ships which had to seek the protection of forts when hostile ships appeared on the scene were useless for war, and it would be waste of money to provide small vessels unless they were supported by an "Indomitable."

The essential requirement was the provision of ships capable of dealing with hostile vessels of the types that are likely to be sent to Australian waters. The "Indomitable" class fulfilled this condition in every particular.

The smaller vessels of the fleet unit, without the "Indomitable" to fall back upon, would be a source of weakness rather than an addition to our naval strength for Imperial defence purposes, for it would probably be necessary for the Admiralty to detach "Indomitables" to the Australian Station to save the small craft from destruction by the more powerful hostile cruisers.

No hostile cruisers of less strength would venture into Australian waters so long as there was a vessel of the "Indomitable" type on the Australian Station.

He therefore earnestly urged the Commonwealth Government, if they desired to make some real contribution to the naval defence of the Empire, not to expend money on vessels which would be valueless in war, alike for purposes of Imperial defence and for the protection of trade in Australian waters.

Colonel FOXTON stated that he was convinced by the reasoning which led the Admiralty to urge the construction of vessels of the "Indomitable" type as being most important for Imperial defence purposes. He remarked that the Commonwealth's gift of an "Indomitable" did not comprehend the maintenance of the vessel as well as its original cost. The offer was an expression of a desire on the part of the Commonwealth Government to make some contribution towards Imperial defence outside purely local defence requirements.

Captain CRESWELL stated he had no remarks to offer on Sir John Fisher's exposition of the strategic situation, but there were considerations other than immediate naval ones which the Commonwealth Government had to consider. The desire of the Australian Government was to develop a fresh centre of naval strength in Australia. They therefore wanted to be able to build their own ships, and produce locally all the essentials of a naval force. He suggested that if they were to expend their money on what he might call the foundations of naval strength—naval schools, dockyards, gun factories, and other establishments—their ultimate productive power would be much more fully developed than if they were to expend their money now on a vessel of the "Indomitable" type; such expenditure might be regarded as an investment which would bring back many "Dreadnoughts" in future years. He made this suggestion provided that there was no immediate danger and that there was no urgent need of more vessels of the "Indomitable" type.

Sir JOHN FISHER pointed out that, although there was, perhaps, no immediate danger, the crisis would come in four or five years' time, and vessels of the "Indomitable" type took two years or more to build. He understood that it was in view of this approaching crisis that the Australian offer of a "Dreadnought" had been made. If Captain Creswell's suggestion to spend the money now available on shore establishments were adopted, any "Indomitables" that might ultimately be built as the result of these measures would not be available until long after the critical time had passed.

Mr. McKENNA pointed out that under the existing naval agreement we now maintained in Australian waters a squadron the total cost of which was some 900,000*l.* per annum, towards which Australia and New Zealand contributed 240,000*l.*

These vessels were maintained in Australian waters purely in the interests of Australia; and, if the Admiralty were not compelled under the naval agreement to maintain them there, these vessels would be withdrawn, and a considerable saving on naval votes would thereby be effected.

He pointed out that the Japanese Alliance might terminate in 1915. By that time the Japanese and German fleets would be very formidable, and the position of Australia, in the event of war might be one of some danger.

The question was, therefore, whether the Commonwealth Government would organise their naval forces in such a way that they would be able to afford us some assistance in war, or whether they would leave the whole of the burden of Imperial defence to be borne by the British Admiralty.

The burden of armaments was falling with increasing weight upon the British Government, and the Admiralty might not be able to continue indefinitely to bear the burden of the heavy responsibilities now laid upon them for the naval defence of the Empire.

The situation of Australia was somewhat different from that of Canada. Australia was geographically isolated and remote from the centres of British naval strength, whereas the power of the British fleets could easily be brought to bear in the Western Atlantic for the defence of Canada. Moreover Canada gained a certain measure of security against aggression from the "Munro Doctrine" as laid down by the United States, which no Power will readily infringe.

Sir JOHN FISHER pointed out that an essential condition in the establishment of a local navy on a permanent basis was that the service should offer a career to the officers. If the conditions of service did not provide for this, efficiency could not be maintained. If the Australian Navy was composed entirely of small craft there was no possibility of providing suitable employment for the senior officers.

Captain CRESWELL suggested that the Navy did not exist to provide careers for the officers; moreover, there were outside appointments, such as harbour master-ships, which would be open to senior officers. If the Commonwealth Government first built the small vessels, appointments for senior officers in larger vessels would be available in a squadron like the one under the naval agreement, as at present.

Sir JOHN FISHER pointed out that the naval agreement terminated in 1913, so it offered no solution of the difficulty. The Australian squadron, as at present constituted, provided a naval force of little value for Imperial defence. In view of the heavy burdens thrown upon the Admiralty by the increase in the number of first class naval Powers, they cannot afford to maintain squadrons except for purposes of war. So long as we bore the cost we claimed the right of disposing of our forces in accordance with the needs of the strategic situation.

It was not generally realised how recent inventions had revolutionised naval warfare. The need for the smaller classes of cruisers was greatly diminished by the invention of wireless telegraphy.

Whereas formerly it was necessary to have a large number of these vessels as antennae and for the communication of information, their rôle is now to a great extent filled by wireless telegraphy, by means of which it is possible to send messages to vessels at a distance of 1,500 miles. He had laid emphasis on the large vessels of the "Indomitable" type, as these vessels were essential to meet the crisis that was anticipated in a few years' time.

Captain CRESWELL stated his proposals were made provided there was no urgency of the nature represented.

Colonel FOXTON stated that the proposals of the Admiralty appealed to him strongly, and he believed that they would be favourably received in Australia, as the people would realise that they were taking a share in their Imperial responsibilities. He was, however, doubtful if so large a sum as 500,000*l.* would be available annually. He said that before proceeding to work out the details of scheme for the establishment of a fleet unit, he would like to obtain Mr. Deakin's approval to the general lines of the scheme proposed by the Admiralty.

As regards the education of officers he considered that it would probably be necessary to establish schools of the Osborne and Dartmouth type in Australia, as, owing to the great distance, parents were generally reluctant to send their sons to England at the age of twelve.

He highly approved of the suggestion that the fleet to be formed by the assembly of the fleet units on the Australian, China, and East India stations should be called the Pacific Fleet, and he thought that the adoption of this title might tend to induce Canada to establish a fleet unit on the Pacific coast in the future.

It was decided that the Admiralty should draft a memorandum explaining briefly their proposals, for Colonel Foxton to communicate to Mr. Deakin by telegraph, with a view to obtaining his sanction to the Australian representatives proceeding to work out the details of a scheme for the establishment of an Australian Navy consisting of one fleet unit, the cost of which, up to 500,000*l.*, should be borne by the Commonwealth Government, and the balance between this amount and an estimate of total annual cost to be agreed upon should be defrayed by the Imperial Government. The unit to be under the control of the Commonwealth Government in peace and to join with the units on the China and India stations in time of war, to form the Pacific Fleet.

The Conference will reassemble in about a week when the details of the scheme have been worked out.

NOTES

OF THE

PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE

AT THE

ADMIRALTY

ON

Wednesday, 11th August 1909,

BETWEEN

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMIRALTY AND OF THE
DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND TO DISCUSS THE
ARRANGEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW ZEALAND
GOVERNMENT TO THE NAVAL DEFENCE
OF THE EMPIRE.

PRESENT :

The Right Hon. R. K. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty
(*in the Chair*).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir JOHN FISHER, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Assistant-Secretary of the Admiralty.

Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee
of Imperial Defence.

New Zealand :

The Right Hon. Sir J. G. WARD, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister of
Defence.

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O.,
Secretary.

Mr. McKENNA explained briefly the result of the discussions between the Admiralty and the representatives of Canada and Australia. It was hoped that Australia would proceed with the scheme for the establishment of a fleet unit in Australian waters as recommended by the Admiralty.

Canada was not able to proceed on so large a scale at present, but the Canadian representatives accepted the proposal for the establishment of a fleet unit as an ideal to be worked up to as their naval force developed. There would, therefore, for the present be only three fleet units available to form the Pacific Fleet, and not four as had been hoped when the scheme was put forward. There would be one unit on the China Station with headquarters at Hong Kong, one on the East Indies Station with headquarters at Colombo, maintained by the Admiralty, and the Australian unit,

towards which the Commonwealth Government would contribute some 500,000*l.* per annum, the balance required to complete the unit, probably about 200,000*l.*, being provided by the Admiralty either in money or some other form.

The Australian unit would be under the control of the Commonwealth Government in time of peace, but in time of war it would be joined to the two other units to form the Pacific Fleet, which would be placed under the command of the senior Admiral of the force.

The Admiralty had gratefully accepted the gift of a vessel of the "Dreadnought" type, so generously made to them by the New Zealand Government.

It was proposed that the vessel so provided should be a vessel of the "Indomitable" type, and that it should form part of the fleet unit on the China Station; and should visit New Zealand from time to time.

It would be observed that it was now proposed to call the units, when assembled together in war, the Pacific Fleet instead of the China Fleet, as it was understood that this title would be more acceptable to the Dominions.

In conclusion, the First Lord expressed the thanks of the Admiralty to the New Zealand Government for taking such an important part in the inception of the present Conference. They felt that every effort should be made to work out a scheme acceptable to the people of New Zealand, in view of the patriotic action taken by Sir Joseph Ward and his ministers in March last.

Sir JOSEPH WARD remarked that by the establishment of a fleet unit under the control of the Commonwealth Government, it would apparently be almost the only representative of the British Fleet in Australian and New Zealand waters, and consequently the position of New Zealand in relation to the British Navy would, when that alteration took effect, be somewhat altered. He thought in anticipation of that change that it was necessary for him to make suggestions in addition to the proposals put forward by the New Zealand Government.

The New Zealand Government had made their offer of a "Dreadnought," and their money contribution absolutely unconditional, because the people of New Zealand had confidence in the Admiralty, and readily accepted its control over the vessels towards which New Zealand contributed. He wished to emphasise the fact on behalf of New Zealand that they would build a "Dreadnought" and place it at the disposal of the Admiralty unconditionally.

The people of New Zealand felt a strong attachment to the ships of the British Navy, which he feared might not be extended to ships under the control of the Australian Government. He spoke quite impersonally. The New Zealanders had no objection in any sense to their Australian sister in the Southern Seas, but he held—and he spoke for New Zealand—strong views upon one great British Navy, and it would be seen by any impartial person that an alteration that placed New Zealand under a section of a navy controlled by another British country made a most material difference.

Although the population of New Zealand was at present much less than that of Australia, it was increasing rapidly, and he believed that ultimately New Zealand would carry a very large population. With its extraordinary productive capacity coupled with the fact that a large proportion of the whole country was well fitted for settlement, it was hard to forecast what the relative population of New Zealand and Australia would be in, say, 100 years hence. Both in any case would have greatly increased and he was quite confident that New Zealand would people many millions.

He was, therefore, very anxious to avoid the initiation of any arrangement which might create a feeling of separation from the British Navy proper, and he thought that such would almost certainly ensue if the ships which appeared in New Zealand waters were under the control of the Commonwealth Government, and the connection of New Zealand with the Imperial Navy was not, on its own coast, expressed in some concrete form.

It was, therefore, important from an Imperial as well as from a New Zealand point of view that there should be some arrangement under which their population should be able to identify themselves personally with the British Navy.

He desired to suggest, tentatively, that two of the small cruisers and some of the destroyers and submarines forming part of the China Station fleet unit might be detached for service in New Zealand waters in time of peace. These vessels might be manned either partially or wholly by New Zealand sailors enlisted on terms similar to those under the existing naval agreement. He was confident that many

New Zealanders would join the British Navy on those terms if the ships to which they referred were recognised as the New Zealand Section. He proposed that the Admiralty should pay these men at the ordinary Admiralty rates; New Zealand would pay the extra local pay in the form of deferred pay. As he understood that the providing of an Australian unit by the Commonwealth would bring to an end that country's contribution of 200,000*l.* a year, he thought it would be better that concurrently the agreement under which the New Zealand money contribution was given in its present form should cease and that the 100,000*l.* a year that New Zealand was now paying should be continued in the form of a payment for the difference between the ordinary rates of pay to the Navy and the extra amount imposed by local conditions in New Zealand. The contribution of 100,000*l.* would, of course, continue, but he thought it would be better to change it in the direction of making it a payment towards the difference in the wages paid for New Zealand men as against the ordinary Admiralty rate. If that amount was not all required to make up the difference in the rates of pay the balance should be at the disposal of the Admiralty. If the vessel of the "Indomitable" type provided for by New Zealand—which he was glad to hear from the First Lord of the Admiralty would visit New Zealand from time to time—could come to that country, if practicable, once a year and join with the other ships he was recommending should be on our coast, it would be very satisfactory indeed. It would also have the advantage of the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet upon the China Station—which in reality would be the Pacific Fleet—joining the New Zealand portion of the unit in New Zealand, which, apart from the advantages upon the naval side, would be of great value as it would keep the whole fleet in close touch with the people of New Zealand, who, it is certain, would be very gratified with such an arrangement.

He wished it to be understood that, quite apart from providing for a "Dreadnought," the contribution of New Zealand would, in no case, be less than 100,000*l.* per annum, and that his proposal was not intended to imply any restriction on the movements of these ships in time of war.

The New Zealand sailors should be liable to be interchanged with men of the British Navy, and the ships allotted to New Zealand waters should from time to time be exchanged with vessels of the same class on other stations.

Sir JOHN FISHER stated that the Admiralty fully recognised the extent to which recent progress in the question of Imperial defence was due to the initiative taken by the Government of New Zealand. The Admiralty would therefore gladly do everything in their power to meet the wishes of New Zealand in this matter.

He thought the scheme of allotting some of the smaller vessels of the China Fleet unit to New Zealand in time of peace was quite a practicable one, which the Admiralty would be able to carry out.

Sir JOSEPH WARD accordingly suggested that two "Bristols," three destroyers, and two submarines should be detached from the fleet unit on the China Station for service in New Zealand waters in time of peace.

Sir JOHN FISHER thought that the Admiralty would be able to meet his wishes and suggested that, with a view to showing their appreciation of the generous assistance given by the New Zealand Government, the China Station fleet unit, when complete, should proceed to the China Station *via* New Zealand, and should there detach the vessels which it was proposed to station in New Zealand waters. The ship of the "Indomitable" class belonging to the China Fleet unit might also be given a name to emphasise its connection with New Zealand.

Sir JOSEPH WARD said it was very gratifying to hear Sir John Fisher speak as he had done, and he would be exceedingly glad if both the suggestions made were carried out. Later on, he would submit a suitable name for the New Zealand battleship. He inquired when it was proposed to proceed with the construction of the "Indomitable" presented by New Zealand. He asked for this information as he wanted to make arrangements about the financing of the loan before he left London, and he wished to be able to make a statement to the New Zealand Parliament in obtaining authority to raise the 2,000,000*l.* required.

He also inquired how the new arrangements in view of the alterations in Australia would affect the existing naval agreement.

Mr. McKENNA explained that if the ship were laid down on the 1st of April 1910, about 800,000*l.* would be expended by instalments in the first year (*i.e.*, by 1st April 1911). Of the balance, 1,200,000*l.*, the larger part would be expended during the second year, ending on the 1st April 1912.

The ship would be ready for commissioning about July 1912. It would be ready to proceed to the China Station about the autumn of that year.

As regards the existing agreement a convenient arrangement would be for it to be determined when the fleet unit, with the "Bristols" for New Zealand waters, sails from England, say, the autumn of 1912. If the New Zealand Government preferred it, the time of construction of the "Indomitable" might be extended so as to coincide with the end of the agreement in 1913.

Sir JOSEPH WARD said that he understood the cost of shipbuilding was comparatively low at present, and for that reason he thought he would prefer the earlier date. He would send a memorandum to the First Lord of the Admiralty clearly setting forth what had been arranged at the discussion, in order that the arrangements could be carried out completely. The memorandum would be in such a form that he could lay it before Parliament on his return to New Zealand.

CANADA.

Summary of result of meetings:—

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable R. K. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty
(in the Chair).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir JOHN FISHER, G.C.B., O.M., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

T. J. MACNAMARA, Esq., LL.D., M.P., Parliamentary Secretary.

Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.

W. GRAHAM GREENE, Esq., C.B., Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.

Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Canada:

The Hon. Sir F. BORDEN, K.C.M.G., Minister of Militia and Defence.

The Hon. L. P. BRODEUR, K.C., LL.D., Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

Major-General Sir P. H. N. LAKE, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Rear-Admiral C. E. KINGSMILL.

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary to the Imperial Conference.

The Canadian representatives explained in what respect they desired the advice of the Admiralty, in regard to the measures of naval defence, which might be considered consistent with the resolution adopted by the Canadian Parliament on the 29th March 1909.

While, on naval strategical considerations, it was thought that a Fleet Unit on the Pacific, as outlined by the Admiralty, might in the future form an acceptable system of naval defence, it was recognised that Canada's double sea-board rendered the provision of such a Fleet Unit unsuitable for the present.

It was represented on the part of the Admiralty that it would be difficult to make any suggestions, or to formulate any plans, without knowing approximately the sum of money which Canada would spend. The Canadian representatives then suggested that two plans might be presented:—one incurring an annual expenditure of 400,000*l.*, and the other an expenditure of 600,000*l.*, omitting in both cases the cost of the present fishery service and hydrographic surveys but including the maintenance of Halifax and Esquimalt Dockyards, and the wireless telegraph service, estimated at some 50,000*l.* a year.

Taking, first, the plan for the expenditure of 600,000*l.*, after discussion the Admiralty suggested that the Canadian Government might provide a force of cruisers and destroyers comprising four cruisers of improved "Bristol" class, one cruiser of "Boadicea" class, and six destroyers of improved River class. As regards submarines, it would be advisable to defer their construction because they required a highly-trained and specialised complement.

The "Boadicea" and Destroyers might be placed on the Atlantic side, and the "Bristol" cruisers divided between the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean. The number of officers and men for this force of 11 ships would be 2,194, and the cost of the vessels suggested, including repairs and maintenance, interest and sinking fund on capital expenditure, and pay, &c., of personnel, at Canadian rates, would not, it was anticipated, exceed 600,000*l.* a year.

If it was decided to limit the plan to an expenditure of 400,000*l.* a year, the Admiralty suggested that one "Bristol," the "Boadicea," and two Destroyers should be omitted, in which case only 1,408 officers and men would be required. Two "Bristols" would then be placed on the Pacific, and one "Bristol" and four destroyers on the Atlantic coast.

Summaries are attached to this memorandum, giving the estimated details of the expenditure at British rates.

Pending the completion of the new cruisers, which should be commenced as early as possible, an arrangement might be made for the loan by the Admiralty of two cruisers of the "Apollo" class, so that the training of the new naval personnel might be proceeded with at once. The vessels would be fitted out and maintained at the expense of Canada, and the officers and men provided by volunteers from the Royal Navy, but paid by the Canadian Government. They would be lent until they could be replaced from time to time by qualified Canadian officers and men. The Admiralty would be willing also to lend certain officers for organising duties and for the instruction of seamen, stokers, &c.

Arrangements would be made to receive Canadian cadets at Osborne and Dartmouth.

In any consideration of the question of providing new docking facilities the Admiralty suggested that the docks should be designed of sufficient size to accommodate the largest ships whether for war or commerce, as apart from the mercantile advantage such docks might be used in case of an emergency by armoured cruisers and battleships. Docks of this kind might be placed on the Pacific, the Atlantic, and the River St. Lawrence.

The question of the Flag also was discussed, and it was arranged that the Admiralty would give the matter consideration and would communicate its views at a later date to the Canadian Government.

Any necessary Acts of Parliament which would have to be passed should be considered so as to place the discipline and general regulations of the naval forces as much on Admiralty lines as possible, having due consideration to local requirements. This legislation should also provide for the formation of a naval reserve and naval volunteer force.

In order to encourage a good class of men to make the naval service their profession for life, it has been found advisable in Great Britain to provide for pensions.

Other details, such as the training of officers and men, organisation, discipline, &c., were discussed, and a general agreement was arrived at that the wishes of the Canadian Government would be met as far as possible.

19th August 1909.

PLAN I.

SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURE AT BRITISH RATES ON PLAN OF £600,000.

Class.	Building and Arming.	Maintenance (Annual Upkeep of Hulls, Machinery, Sea Stores, Fuel, &c.).	Interest and Depreciation (3 Per Cent.).	Personnel.	Total (a), (b), (c).
	(a)	(b)	(c)		
Bristol - -	£ 377,000	£ 19,900	£ 25,300	£ 26,800	£ 72,000
Boadicea - -	350,000	16,500	23,500	19,900	59,900
Destroyer - -	80,000	10,700	6,700	5,500	22,900
4 Bristols - -	1,508,000	79,600	101,200	107,200	288,000
1 Boadicea - -	350,000	16,500	23,500	19,900	59,900
6 Destroyers - -	480,000	64,200	40,200	33,000	137,400
	2,338,000	160,300	164,900	160,100	485,300

PLAN II.

SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURE AT BRITISH RATES ON PLAN OF £400,000.

Class.	Building and Arming.	Maintenance (Annual Upkeep of Hulls, Machinery, Sea Stores, Fuel, &c.).	Interest and Depreciation (3 Per Cent.).	Personnel.	Total (a), (b), (c).
	(a)	(b)	(c)		
3 Bristols - -	£ 1,131,000	£ 59,700	£ 75,900	£ 80,400	£ 216,000
4 Destroyers - -	320,000	42,800	26,800	22,000	91,600
	1,451,000	102,500	102,700	102,400	307,600

PAY, &c. OF PERSONNEL.

PLAN I.

Class of Ship.	Numbers.	Pay, &c.	Victualling.	Medicines.	Total.
		£	£	£	£
4 Bristols - -	1,504	83,600	22,850	750	107,200
1 Bondee - -	270	15,650	4,110	140	19,900
6 Destroyers - -	420	26,500	6,300	200	33,000
	2,194	125,750	33,260	1,090	160,100

PLAN II.

Class of Ship.	Numbers.	Pay, &c.	Victualling.	Medicines.	Total.
		£	£	£	£
3 Bristols - -	1,128	62,700	17,140	560	80,400
4 Destroyers - -	280	17,670	4,200	130	22,000
	1,408	80,370	21,340	690	102,400

AUSTRALIA.

Summary of result of meetings :—

PRESENT :

The Right Honourable R. K. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty (in the Chair).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir JOHN FISHER, G.C.B., O.M., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

Rear-Admiral the Hon. E. A. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.

W. GRAHAM GREENE, Esq., C.B., Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.

Rear-Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Australia :

Colonel the Hon. J. F. G. FOXTON, C.M.G., Minister without portfolio.

Captain A. R. CRESWELL, C.M.G.

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary to Imperial Conference.

The suggestions made in the Admiralty Memorandum formed the basis of the discussion and the following arrangements were provisionally adopted, viz. :—

Australia should provide a Fleet Unit to consist of :—

1 Armoured Cruiser (new "Indomitable" class).

3 Unarmoured Cruisers ("Bristol" class).

6 Destroyers (River class).

3 Submarines (C. Class).

These vessels should be manned as far as possible by Australian officers and seamen, and the numbers required to make up the full complement for immediate purposes should be lent by the Royal Navy.

In peace time and while on the Australian Station this Fleet unit would be under the exclusive control of the Commonwealth Government as regards their movements and general administration, but officers and men should be governed by regulations similar to the King's Regulations, and be under naval discipline, and when with vessels of the Royal Navy, the senior officer should take command of the whole. Further, when placed by the Commonwealth Government at the disposal of the Admiralty in war time, the vessels should be under the control of the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

The Australian Fleet unit should form part of the Eastern Fleet of the Empire to be composed of similar units of the Royal Navy, to be known as the China and the East Indies units respectively and the Australia Unit.

The initial cost of such a Fleet unit was estimated to be approximately :—

	£
1 Armoured Cruiser (new "Indomitable" class) -	2,000,000
3 Unarmoured Cruisers ("Bristols") at 350,000l. -	1,050,000
6 Destroyers (River class) at 80,000l. -	480,000
3 Submarines (C. class) at 55,000l. -	165,000

Total - - - £3,695,000

The annual expenditure in connection with the maintenance of the Fleet Unit, pay of personnel, and interest on first cost and sinking fund, was estimated to be about 600,000l., to which amount a further additional sum would have to be added in view of the higher rates of pay in Australia and the cost of training and subsidiary establishments, making an estimated total of 750,000l. a year.

This annual cost should be disbursed by the Commonwealth, except that the Imperial Government, until such time as the Commonwealth could take over the whole cost, should assist the Commonwealth Government by an annual contribution of 250,000l. towards the maintenance of the complete Fleet unit.

The annual subsidy of 200,000L. under the existing agreement should be paid as heretofore by the Commonwealth to the Imperial Government up to the time when the existing Australian Squadron should be relieved by the new Australian Fleet unit.

When desired, officers and men of the Australian Service might be sent for training and service to vessels and training schools of the Royal Navy and their places taken by officers and men of the Royal Navy who, with the approval of the Admiralty, should volunteer for service in vessels of the Australian Navy.

The dockyard, &c., at Sydney, should on the completion of the Fleet unit be handed over to the Commonwealth Government free of charge, on condition that it is to be maintained in a state of full and complete efficiency, and that it shall not be diverted from its original purpose.

The construction of the Armoured Cruiser should be undertaken as soon as possible, and the remaining vessels should be constructed under conditions which would ensure their completion, as nearly as possible, simultaneously with the completion and readiness for service of the Armoured Cruiser, which it is understood would be in about 2½ years.

Training Schools for officers and men should be established locally and arrangements made for the manufacture, supply, and replenishment of the various naval, ordnance, and victualling stores required by the Squadron. Until stores and munitions of war are manufactured in Australia the vessels of the Australian unit should be supplied as far as possible with stores, ammunition, and ordnance stores in the same manner, and at the same cost, as other vessels of His Majesty's Service.

Great stress was laid upon the maintenance of the same general standard of training, discipline, and general efficiency both in ships and officers and men.

19th August 1909.

NEW ZEALAND.

Summary of result of meetings:—

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable R. K. McKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty
(in the Chair).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir JOHN FISHER, G.C.B., O.M., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.
W. GRAHAM GREENE, Esq., C.B., Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty.

Rear Admiral Sir C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

New Zealand:

The Right Honourable Sir J. G. WARD, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Colonel R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

Captain J. R. CHANCELLOR, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary to Imperial Conference.

The proceedings which took place at the various meetings are summed up in the form of a letter from Sir Joseph Ward to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and a reply from the latter, which are printed in full.

DEAR MR. McKENNA,

11th August 1909.

AT to-day's meeting you explained that the general idea underlying the Admiralty memorandum was that the present East Indies, China, and Australian Squadrons should be treated strategically as one Far Eastern, or, as you thought as a preferable term, Pacific Station, and that each of the principal portions of this station should have a complete Fleet unit, the Commonwealth Government maintaining one unit in Australian waters, in lieu of the present Australian Squadron, and the Imperial Government providing the remainder, the "Dreadnought" cruiser presented by New Zealand forming the flagship of the China unit. If Canada found herself able also to come into this agreement, her contribution to the Pacific Station would be a fourth unit.

I think it will conduce to clearness if I state my views in writing, hence this memorandum.

I expressed myself as generally satisfied with this arrangement as a strategic plan, but I would point out that if, as I understand, Australia is providing an independent unit, it means the superseding of the present British Australian Squadron, and the fact of that being done would, on its completion, determine the Naval Agreement with Australia and New Zealand, thus creating an entirely new position.

I favour one great Imperial Navy with all the Oversea Dominions contributing, either in ships or money, and with Naval Stations at the self-governing Dominions supplied with ships by and under the control of the Admiralty. I, however, realise the difficulties, and recognise that Australia and Canada in this important matter are doing that which their respective Governments consider to be best, but the fact remains that the alteration that will be brought about upon the establishment of an Australian unit will alter the present position with New Zealand.

New Zealand's maritime interests in her own waters and her dependent islands in the Pacific would, under the altered arrangements, be almost entirely represented by the Australian Fleet unit, and not, as at present, by the Imperial Fleet. This important fact I consider necessitates some suitable provision being made for New Zealand, which country has the most friendly feeling in every respect for Australia and its people, and I am anxious that in the initiation of new arrangements with the Imperial Government under the altered conditions the interests of New Zealand should not be overlooked. I consider it my duty to point this out and to have the direct connection between New Zealand and the Royal Navy maintained in some concrete form.

New Zealand will supply a "Dreadnought" for the British Navy as already offered; the ship to be under the control of and stationed wherever the Admiralty considers advisable.

I fully realise that the creation of specific units, one in the East, one in Australia, and, if possible, one in Canada, would be a great improvement upon the existing condition of affairs, and the fact that the New Zealand "Dreadnought" was to be the flagship of the China-Pacific unit is, in my opinion, satisfactory. I, however, consider it is desirable that a portion of the China-Pacific unit should remain in New Zealand waters, and I would suggest that two of the new "Bristol" cruisers, together with three destroyers and two submarines, should be detached from the China station in time of peace and stationed in New Zealand waters; that these vessels should come under the flag of the Admiral of the China unit; that the flagship should make periodical visits to New Zealand waters; and that there should be an interchange in the service of the cruisers between New Zealand and China, under conditions to be laid down.

The ships should be manned, as far as possible, by New Zealand officers and men, and in order that New Zealanders might be attracted to serve in the Fleet, local rates should be paid to those New Zealanders who enter, in the same manner as under the present Australian and New Zealand agreement, such local rates being treated as deferred pay.

The determination of the agreement with Australia has, of necessity, brought up the position of New Zealand under that joint agreement. I therefore suggest that on completion of the China unit, the present agreement with New Zealand should cease, that its contribution of 100,000*l.* per annum should continue and be used to pay the difference in the rates of pay to New Zealanders above what would be paid under the ordinary British rate. If the contribution for the advanced rate of pay did not amount to 100,000*l.* per annum, any balance to be at the disposal of the Admiralty.

The whole of this fleet unit to be taken in hand and completed before the end of 1912, and I should be glad if the squadron as a whole would then visit New Zealand on the way to China, leaving the New Zealand detachment there under its Senior Officer.

The Right Hon. R. McKenna, M.P.,
Admiralty, Whitehall, S.W.

I remain,
Yours sincerely,
J. G. WARD.

DEAR SIR JOSEPH,

18th August 1909.

The suggestions made by you at the meeting on the 11th and recited by you in your letter to me of the same date have been carefully considered and concurred in by the Admiralty.

The present Naval Agreement with Australia and New Zealand will not be renewed, and in view of this fact and the other special circumstances referred to by you the part of the China Fleet unit, as set out by you, will be maintained in New Zealand waters as their headquarters. Your wish that the ships of the Fleet as a whole, or at any rate the armoured ship and the cruisers, when completed, should pay a visit to New Zealand on the way to China shall also be carried out.

I take this opportunity on behalf of the Admiralty of repeating their sincere thanks to the New Zealand Government for taking so important a part in the inception of the present Conference. The Admiralty feel that every effort should be made to work out a scheme acceptable to the people of New Zealand, having regard to the patriotic action taken by yourself and your Ministers in March last.

I remain,
Yours sincerely,
REGINALD McKENNA.